Caesar’s campaign in Africa had been off
to a bad start; he had rushed the invasion, underestimating his opponents and, as a result,
suffered a minor defeat, was badly outnumbered and poorly supplied. However, as we have seen
before, Caesar was often most deadly when backed into the corner. Rather than rushing
again, Caesar now focused on collecting reinforcements and supplies, and preparing for the upcoming
battle of Thapsus. Gods... I hate Gauls... Oops, sorry, wrong
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the description! Caesar’s first priority was improving the
defences of Ruspina, and creating entrenchments from the town to his camp and to the sea.
In doing so Caesar ensured his communication lines would be kept safe, while also providing
a safe landing ground for any reinforcements and supplies. Caesar had been surprised by
Labienus’ tactic of mixing light troops with cavalry and decided to mimic it, pulling
light marines and Archers of his ships in order to do so.
Meanwhile, Scipio was en route to unite his force with Labienus and Petreius, bringing
with him almost all of the Optimate leaders, and the entirety of their army bringing its
total to more than 60 thousand. Such an army would already have been larger than the one
Pompey had, and to make matters worse for Caesar, there was also a possibility that
the king of Numidia Juba, would join Scipio with his own force, including its famed elephants.
With fortifications improved, Caesar turned his attention to the supplies. The Optimates
had previously stripped the area of corn and most of the local workforce was pressed into
their army, making the harvest of that year particularly poor. Caesar was forced to purchase
supplies from wealthy individuals living in the area and rationed them out to his army.
A number of his scattered transports were hunted down by the Optimate navy, and were
captured or burned. Caesar ordered the remainder of his vessels to patrol the harbour of Ruspina,
to keep the area clear for the anticipated arrival of troops and supplies from Sicily.
Just when things were starting to look disastrous, Caesar had a stroke of luck. The Optimate
army under Scipio had paused briefly at Utica where Cato, the figurehead and political leader
of the faction was based. Whilst the army was there Cato began chastising Pompey’s
sons for failing to achieve as much as their father had by their age. Shamed and hoping
to prove himself, Gnaeus took 2000 slaves and freedmen and attacked the nearby kingdom
of West Mauretania, ruled by King Bogud. The Mauritanians lured Gnaeus close to the town
of Ascurum, before sallying out and quickly defeating the small force. Humiliated, Gnaeus
withdrew to the Balearic Islands, but his actions had far reaching consequences.
Having left a sizable garrison at Utica, Scipio now marched to Labienus and Petreius uniting
the two armies and establishing camp 5 kilometers from Caesar's position. They immediately begin
using their large cavalry forces to keep Caesar within his fortifications, making his supply
situation even worse. Juba began marching to his allies hoping to
assist in a quick and definitive win over Caesar but Gnaeus’ actions now showed their
consequence. The King of East Mauritania Bocchus heard of Juba’s departure and invaded Numidia
to avenge the Optimate attack on his brother Bogud. Commanding the Mauritanian armies was
Publius Sittius, who had been operating in Africa as a mercenary since the Cataline Conspiracy.
He successfully captured the Numidian city of Cirta, and then proceeded to pillage and
sack the surrounding area. By this point Juba had almost reached Scipio, but upon hearing
the news pulled back to defend Numidia. Meanwhile, some of the local citizens had
begun sending messages to Caesar complaining of the harsh rule of the Optimates. Some towns
even requested garrisons, pledging to feed and house them in return, an offer Caesar
gladly accepted sending 3 cohorts, in order to improve his supply situation. Initially
Caesar planned to wait for better weather to ensure his troops would make the crossing
from Sicily safely, but now he ordered that they be sent no matter the conditions, showing
how desperate he was. Scipio was not idle while all this was going
on. Labienus, in command of the majority of the Optimate cavalry, kept up a relentless
harassment campaign, fighting a number of skirmishes with Caesar’s cavalry that ventured
out to patrol. Labienus kept searching for ways of keeping Caesar’s forces occupied,
including attacking the towns of Leptis and Acylla, but he was repelled by Caesar’s
cohorts now garrisoned there. Nevertheless, these attacks were effective at keeping the
pressure on Caesar. Similarly, Scipio would march his army out of camp every day and draw
them into battle formation, including the elephants, hoping to intimidate the recruits
in Caesar’s army. Caesar made a show of indifference, keeping his men at work on their
fortifications, but he never drew up his own army for battle. He knew that for any chance
of victory, he would need more men, particularly more veterans. His best play was to keep his
men behind their fortifications of trenches and palisades and bide his time.
His patience paid off. Sallust had arrived in Cercina, the site of a large Optimate grain
supply which was poorly defended. He easily chased off the garrison and immediately sent
the supplies to Caesar. Simultaneously, two experienced legions - 13th and 14th were finally
dispatched from Lilybaeum. Good luck with the weather and Caesar’s patrolling fleet
allowed the legions and supplies to arrive at Ruspina with relative ease. Soon after,
Scipio sent two Gaetulian spies into Caesar’s camp to assess the new situation. However,
the Gaetuli who had greatly benefited from the actions of Caesar’s uncle in law Gaius
Marius, during and after the Jugurthine War, immediately defected to Caesar. They informed
him of Scipio’s numbers and the morale of his men and, in particular, that the Optimate
4th and 6th Legions were wavering and eager to join Caesar. Though Scipio and Labienus
had done well to keep up the pressure, they had delayed too long and lost the initiative:
Caesar now had the men and supplies he needed to go on the offensive and wanted to force
a battle with Scipio before the Numidian army would return.
On the 25th January, he sent the transports back to Sicily to get the rest of his army,
and then marched his full force out of camp. His first objective was to take and fortify
the semi-circle ridge of hills that surrounded the town. Looking to use similar tactics to
those at Dyrrachium, Caesar quickly seized as many of these hills as he could, ordering
fortifications to be built to create a line of palisades across the tops of the hills.
Hoping to force Caesar back to his original position, Scipio marched his full army out
of camp with Labienus in command of the vast cavalry force, drawing up for battle. Caesar
initially thought this was a bluff, but when the enemy approached in formation he drew
his Legions up on the hills for battle, sending a small detachment of Spanish auxiliaries
to seize the one hill still held by Scipio. The Numidians holding the position there were
quickly chased away, and Labienus led the majority of his right wing of cavalry to cover
their retreat. Caesar noticed that Labienus had moved too far from the main Optimate battle
line, and sent his own left wing of cavalry to charge through the hole, before turning
back to attack Labienus from the rear. A large estate prevented Labienus from seeing this
movement until the enemy cavalry was already behind him. With the cavalry pushing from
his rear, and the Spanish auxiliaries attacking from the front, Labienus was caught in a pincer
and ordered a withdrawal. He and the fast Numidian horsemen were able to extract themselves,
but his Gallic and Germanic cavalry was slower. It was surrounded and, despite brave resistance,
cut down to a man. Seeing that his right flank was in shambles, Scipio quickly ordered a
retreat and pulled back to his camp. Feeling robbed, Caesar did the same.
However, soon he tried to force a battle again, this time marching his army towards the town
of Uzitta, a major water source for Scipio, which was located just outside the Optimate
camp. Scipio marched his army out of camp, positioning them on either side of the town
in a strong defensive position. Eagerly, Caesar again drew his men up for battle, but was
reluctant to attack Scipio in such a strong location. For the remainder of the day the
armies stood opposite each other, until Caesar ordered a retreat. Frustrated once more, Caesar
returned to his camp and continued to further fortify his position on the ridge.
Scipio had been delaying for a good reason. Immediately after the cavalry skirmish where
the Gallic and Germanic cavalry had been lost, he had sent word to Juba demanding his help.
Juba, who owed his kingdom to Pompey, obliged. He left his general Saburra, the victor of
Bagradas, to fight Sittius, and marched to Scipio with 3 Numidian Legions trained in
the Roman style, 800 heavy cavalry, more light infantry and cavalry and 30 more elephants.
The Optimates now had 8 Roman and 3 Numidian legions, approximately 55,000 men, almost
16,000 cavalry, 60 elephants, and perhaps as many as 20,000 light infantry; a total
of around 90,000 men, truly a colossal force. Scipio thought that it was his turn to go
on the offensive. His fleet had been hunting down any of Caesar ships that had been blown
astray in the crossing from Sicily, and the prisoners were brought to him. He now displayed
a number of captured veterans of the 14th outside his camp, and had them tortured to
death there and their bodies left outside. He also once again began drawing his army
out of camp every day to further intimidate Caesar and his men. These actions had the
opposite effect, however. The execution of his men enraged Caesar and he was also encouraged
by Juba’s numbers – they weren’t as significant as he feared, which meant that
Sittius was distracting much of the Numidian force, and confirmed that Scipio had no more
aces left up his sleeve. Following this, a deadlock emerged. Both sides
regularly drew up for battle but no serious engagement was fought, neither wanting to
be the one to attack a fortified opponent. A number of cavalry skirmishes were fought,
with neither side able to gain a significant advantage over the other. Two more veteran
legions, the 10th and 9th, arrived and Caesar attempted to use them to break the stalemate,
constructing two long entrenchments from his camp to Utizza, despite the constant harassment
from Labienus’ cavalry. A new camp was made at the end of these entrenchments, where siege
weapons such as scorpions and catapults were constructed and began bombarding Utizza. Caesar’s
constant pressure and the close proximity of his new camp to that of Scipio’s encouraged
some of the Optimate troops, mainly Gaetulians, but also a number of men from the 4th and
6th Legions to change sides. Scipio couldn’t allow this to go on and, once again, ordered
his army to get into battle formation. Caesar did the same, but broken ground in front of
Scipio’s army dissuaded him from attacking, despite the two armies now being less than
200 metres apart. After squaring off for half a day, Caesar withdrew back into camp. That
is when Labienus launched an attack on Caesar’s retreating cavalry and light infantry. The
Legions were close enough to prevent a complete disaster, but the attack gave Caesar food
for thought: it was only a matter of time before Labienus was able to strike a deadly
blow with his superior cavalry numbers. Soon word was sent that the last two Legions
Caesar pegged for this campaign - the 7th and 8th, were en route from Sicily. He also
heard from some deserters that Varus, who had been stationed at Utica with the Optimate
fleet, planned to attack them on the crossing. Immediately, Caesar rode to Leptis himself,
took command of his fleet and surprised Varus. The optimate fleet was chased away and the
Caesarean Legions were guided to land safely. Caesar now felt comfortable enough to send
2 Legions out of his fortifications to find supplies in the nearby estates. At this point,
Optimate deserters informed Caesar of an ambush planned by Labienus and Caesar managed to
surprise his old ally, killing 500 light infantrymen and routing the Numidian cavalry. Unfortunately
for Caesar, his Legions were unsuccessful in their foraging, making it clear that he
needed to move his entire army to find food. Caesar left a garrison in Ruspina, burnt his
camp, and marched out with his full force. He foraged the area around Aggar and Zeta,
constantly shadowed by Scipio’s army. After foraging around Zeta, Caesar began retreating
to his camp roughly 23 kilometers away, but was once again attacked by Labienus and his
Numidian cavalry and light infantry. This time, Labienus kept up the attack, retreating
when Caesar’s men turned to confront him, and then continuing the harassment as soon
as they began marching again. Caesar’s cavalry took the brunt of these attacks, and he was
eventually forced to pull them from the rear and use his Legions to fend off the Numidians.
His heavy infantry took less damage than his cavalry, but his army was now moving incredibly
slowly, only managing to cover 300 meters in 4 hours. Night finally set in and Labienus
withdrew his troops, but he had been successful in doing significant damage to Caesar’s
already much smaller cavalry force. Impressed by how effective Numidian light
cavalry and light infantry had been against him, Caesar began drilling his men in tactics
to combat them, such as how far to retreat from them and when they should turn and throw
javelins. He was soon met by the last Sicilian reinforcements, bringing his force to Legions,
5 newly raised and 7 veteran, roughly 3,000-5,000 cavalry and an unknown number of light infantry.
Caesar veteran Legions had taken casualties, some might even be only at half strength,
and so establishing the size of Caesar’s army is difficult, but a number of around
60,000-70,000 seems reasonable. Though outnumbered overall, Caesar had more veterans than Scipio,
as the optimate army was largely made of fresh recruits and conscripts. Caesar also brought
elephants from Italy. Although useless in battle and intended for the Roman games they
allowed Caesar to train his troops: his men were taught where the elephants were vulnerable
even in armour and his cavalry practiced throwing dummy javelins at them, familiarising the
horses with the elephant smell and sound. It is a testament to Caesar’s generalship,
that even on a campaign, he still took the time to train his troops to address new threats.
The stalemate continued: Caesar was moving from town to town looking for supplies with
Scipio shadowing him. Labienus attempted to keep up his skirmishing campaign while Caesar
marched, but Caesar’s training had paid off. 300 men from each Legion were assigned
to not carry any baggage and instead act as a quick response rear guard, fending off all
of Labienus harassing attacks. Finally, Caesar had enough. Time and time again he had formed
up his army for battle, only for Scipio to decline. The towns in the area that he raided
were not important enough to force a reaction, and Labienus’ attacks remained a constant
source of frustration. Caesar needed to be able to force Scipio into a situation where
he had no choice but to fight, so on April 4, Caesar abandoned his camp at night and
moved to Thapsus. Thapsus was a major city in the area, holding
a large port, supplies and arms and armour; it was a target that Scipio would not be able
to ignore a threat to. Caesar, having marched through the night, soon arrived at the city,
immediately besieging it, and fortifying his own position against a possible Optimate attack.
Outside of the city of Thapsus was the Marsh of Moknine, which effectively forced any approaching
army to take one of two narrow passes; hugging either the northern or eastern coast. Caesar
had chosen his target well. He established two forts, one in the Eastern passage which
was garrisoned by 3 cohorts, which effectively blocked that pass, and one surrounding the
city of Thapsus. His strategy was to force Scipio to take the northern passage, meaning
Scipio would be forced to attack him from only one direction.
Scipio soon arrived on the scene. He initially intended to take the eastern passage, but
seeing Caesar’s fort abandoned this idea. Leaving a small force under Afranius opposite
Caesar’s fort, he ordered Juba, Labienus and the Numidian cavalry to encamp in a separate
camp nearby. He then commanded a forced march around the west of the Marsh to the northern
pass with the rest. It seems that Scipio’s strategy was to try and catch Caesar in a
pincer, hoping to eventually make a simultaneous push on his position through both passages.
Quickly, Scipio ordered part of his men to begin construction of a second camp, while
the rest of his army drew up for battle in front of them, with the elephants on either
flank in front of his cavalry. Caesar could not believe his luck. Scipio had taken the
bait and was now offering battle under terrible conditions; his men were already fatigued
by the long march, part of his army was building a camp, and a significant portion of his army,
including most of the Numidian cavalry, was too far away. Leaving two of the rookie Legions
encamped around Thapsus, Caesar eagerly formed up the rest for battle.
He deployed his army in the classic 3 lines. The 10th and 7th Legions were stationed on
the right, the 8th and 9th on the left. The centre was likely held by two of the other
veteran Legions, the 13th and 14th, with a recruit legion on either side of them; mixing
recruit and veteran Legions this was a favoured strategy of Caesar’s. His last Legion, the
5th, was split into two and stationed behind each flank, acting as a fourth line. Their
role was specifically to handle the elephants; in case of a charge from them, the front lines
would part and it would be up to the 5th to kill them. Archers, slingers, and light infantry
mixed with cavalry held his extreme flanks. Caesar and his men noticed a lot of movement
and jostling in Scipio’s line as men moved to and from the camp. His veterans, many of
whom were already supposed to be retired and who had spent the last couple of months frustrated
by the lack of a decisive battle, urged Caesar to attack. Caesar was hesitant, perhaps thinking
that it must surely be a trap. It is also worth noting at this point that Plutarch claims
that Caesar had an epileptic fit before the battle, which perhaps was the reason for the
delay. His veterans, however, had had enough. A trumpeter of the 10th or 7th, without Caesar’s
orders, sounded the charge, and Caesar’s right flank surged forward. Realising that
there would be no way of restraining his men, Caesar decided that he must fully commit and
rode ahead to the 10th and 7th to take personal command of them. He ordered the slingers and
archers on the right to target Scipio’s elephants opposite them, panicking the beasts
and sending them rampaging into their own lines. At the same time, the elephants on
Scipio’s right charged Caesar’s left, but his Legions quickly parted as they were
trained to, the cohorts of the 5th Legion taking the brunt of their charge. They fought
bravely, using spears to jab at the vulnerable and sensitive points on the elephants, blasting
trumpets loudly to further frighten them. The elephants were soon panicked, and turned
to run back to Scipio’s army. Scipio’s line was now being charged by his
own elephants, with Caesar’s Legions following close behind. Panic had set in almost immediately.
The left, fighting Caesar’s 10th and 7th, was the first to break, the entire line following
shortly after. Some tried to fight, but most were stampeding towards the camp that was
still being built. Caesar now had all the momentum, and his men easily cut down the
fleeing and disorganised Optimate forces, as well as those who were constructing the
camp. The garrison at Thapsus attempted to sally out to distract Caesar’s army, but
the two Legions left in the camp easily repelled it. These Legions then marched down the eastern
corridor to the camps of Afranius and Juba. In a full-scale rout, Scipio’s men fled
around the western edge of the marsh, desperately trying to reach these camps, with Caesar’s
men in hot pursuit. It was a disaster for the Optimates. When Scipio’s men reached
the forts, they found Afranius’ camp already overrun, and Juba’s being assaulted by Caesar’s
two other Legions. The Numidian king, seeing Caesar’s main force now approaching, gave
up the fight and retreated with Labienus, Petreius and what cavalry he had left. Caesar’s
force stormed his camp, easily taking it. With no other options left, the remainder
of the optimate army surrendered. Caesar’s men massacred many; Dio blames this on Caesar,
however, most sources say Caesar ordered the men be spared, but that his battle frenzied
soldiers disobeyed. It seems likely that Caesar did not order the massacre; a master propagandist
Caesar knew the power of mercy and was renowned, even in his time, for sparing the vast majority
of his Roman enemies. The battle was over. Some sources suggest the Optimates lost 10,000,
others suggest as many as 50,000, while Caesar’s losses were as little as 50 or as many as
1,000. It was a decisive victory for Caesar. Following the battle, the Optimate leadership
was scattered. Labienus, Varus and Pompey’s son Sextus had managed to escape and would
eventually make it to Spain, where they would continue to resist Caesar. Afranius along
with Faustus Cornelius Sulla, collected the survivors and began pillaging Mauritania,
planning to gather enough supplies to then also cross to Spain. However, they were caught
by Sittius and then killed. Petreius and Juba fled to Numidia, confident they would find
support there. Sittius had been successful in defeating and killing Juba’s general
Saburra however, and the Numidians now turned on their king, barring their gates to him.
With no options left, the two men decided to commit suicide. They had a final dinner
and settled on duelling each other, so that at least one of them may die honourably in
battle. Juba won the duel, killing Petreius, and then had one of his slaves kill him. As
for Scipio, he too hoped to retreat to Spain. Gathering a few supporters and a small fleet,
he set sail, but was caught in a storm and forced to make port at Hippo. Caesar’s fleet,
commanded by Sittius found him and a minor naval battle was fought. When defeat here
was inevitable, Scipio killed himself; the last Scipio of any real historical note.
The only Optimate leader left in Africa was Cato in Utica. As Caesar’s army closed in,
he made his final preparations. He held a feast with his friends and then retired to
his bedroom, leaving his children in the care of Lucius Caesar, a distant cousin of Caesar’s,
though a supporter of Pompey, telling his son “I who have been brought up in freedom,
with the right of free speech, cannot in my old age change and learn slavery instead”.
He then read Plato’s Phaedra, and after finishing it, stabbed himself in the stomach.
In death, Cato did rob Caesar of what would have been one of his greatest triumphs, that
of being able to claim that he spared the life of his greatest enemy. Caesar was extremely
frustrated by Cato’s suicide apparently saying, “Cato, I begrudge thee thy death,
for thou didst begrudge me the preservation of thy life”.
Caesar spent some time in Africa, fining those who had funded the Optimate war effort, before
finally returning to Rome, victorious. He retired many of his oldest veterans in a generous
fashion, and held 4 triumphs, one for Gaul, Egypt, Asia and Africa. Having defeated Cato,
his position was now supreme. He was assigned incredible powers by the senate, including
Censorial powers for 3 years, and dictatorial powers for 10, a wholly unprecedented level
of power. For all intents and purposes, Caesar was now the sole ruler of the Roman Republic.
However, though he had now twice won the Civil War, once at Pharsalus and once at Thapsus,
the war was not over. The sons of Pompey, Varus and Labienus still resisted him in Spain.
More battles were to come and we are going to cover them soon, so make sure you are subscribed
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