The Peloponnesian Wars are perhaps the most
famous instances of geopolitical conflict in the history of the Mediterranean. The titanic
clash between Athens, an ascending power, and Sparta, an established hegemon, is well-recorded
by Thucydides and later authors, and has produced much discussion amongst classicist, philosopher,
and political scientist circles. Such a large conflict is almost impossible to discuss in
all of its granular details fully, for its prelude and aftermath are almost as sizeable
and complicated as the war itself. In our Peloponnesian War video, we will discuss various
battles of the war and how politics in Hellas changed over time. In this long-form video,
we will both coalesce all the episodes into one large narrative, and also add a few battles
and descriptions, and make corrections to ensure our story is as accurate as possible.
Welcome to our video on the entire Peloponnesian Wars, their battles and their politics. The peloponnesian war is so studied because
despite being in the distant past, the geopolitics and the military strategy behind it all follows
principles still relevant today. So what is the equivalent today of standing behind ranks
of interlocked hoplon shields, you ask? Of course it’s our sponsor NordVPN, with a
new special offer available to our viewers at nord vpn dot com slash kings and generals;
more on that in a second. NordVPN provides a shield against the slings
and arrows of the modern era: data thieves, surveillance services, scammers, and criminals.
They encrypt your data so that these parties aren’t going to be getting anything from
it if they do find it, and they allow you to alter your IP address to any of their servers
all over the world. That’s not just good for privacy, but it’s a great way to access
content that changes based on your IP; no more region locking for TV, movies and games,
if you can route the data through any region! To see everything else NordVPN does, and get
a special offer, go to nord vpn dot com slash kings and generals. Here you’ll get four
bonus months with their two year plan. There’s a thirty day risk free money back
guarantee if you start using NordVPN then decide against it, so there’s no harm in
at least trying it out. Get that offer and secure your link to the internet at nord vpn
dot com slash kings and generals. The ancient Greek world after the Battles
of Plataea and Mycalae in 479 BCE, where the Persian Empire was soundly defeated, was a
very different place than the one before the invasions. The various city-states of the
Hellenic mainland had adopted many tactics to survive the Persian onslaught, from fighting,
to fleeing, to Medizing: which meant submitting. Sparta, a traditional hegemon, had stood defiant
against Persia, a fact for which many city-states were thankful. Meanwhile, another up-and-coming
city-state with a massive and imposing navy was gaining momentum. This city-state was
Athens, which before the Persian invasion, had been a marginal player in the Greek world
with much political instability. Although Athens and Sparta had both played key roles
in defeating Persia, they soon came to loggerheads over what to do after the King of Kings had
been repulsed. Sparta, traditionally conservative in its foreign policy and content with its
Peloponnesian sphere of influence, did not wish to fight further. Athens, emboldened
by its new victories, wished to take the fight to the Hellespont and Asia Minor, claiming
to be a liberator to the Hellenic city-states there still under Persian rule. As a result,
in 478 BCE, the so-called Delian League of cities was formed, with Athens at its head.
This league was meant to continue fighting and liberating Greek cities, and whose military
expenditure would be covered through a common fund on its titular island of Delos. The expansion
of this alliance, its gradual morphing into an Athenian Empire, and the anxiety it caused
among the elites of Sparta were important drivers of the war. In response to growing
Athenian influence, the Peloponnesian League was founded in 550 BCE under the Spartan purview
and was essentially a means for Peloponnesian states to stay under the Spartan influence.
These alliances, much like NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, created a delicate
balance of power, but many members within each would rebel and try to switch sides during
the War itself. In the prelude to War, described by Thucydides
as Archaeologia and Pentekontaetia, a noteworthy event was the construction of the Long Walls
in Athens in 479 BCE, which drew nervous eyes from Sparta, who looked upon the constructions
of a more fortified, militant Athens with trepidation. Themistokles, of Battle of Salamis
fame, was sent as an ambassador to Sparta to sort out the differences. Themistocles
managed to delay Spartan diplomatic overtures long enough for Athens to begin construction
of the Walls, and Peiraeus, Athens’ harbor, was finally linked to the city proper via
the Long Walls. Compounding onto this, another moment when Athens humiliated Sparta was the
Helot Revolt in Messenia. The Helots, the slaves of the Spartan state, were fed up with
their particularly cruel treatment under the Spartan regime, and revolted. Athens offered
to help Sparta quell this revolt, but was rebuked by the proud warrior city-state. Eventually,
Athens was allowed to help with sieges, because Sparta was only good with hoplite warfare.
In the following decades, Athens’ political and military prestige continued to grow, as
they fought campaigns in the Hellespont, Ionia and Asia Minor. Major campaigns even took
place in 460 BCE in Egypt, though they were largely failures with many losses for the
Delians. One particular battle in Cyprus in 451 BCE, saw an Athenian victory but the death
of the Athenian commander, Cimon. Soon, the vibrant Athenian democracy, with its constantly
changing factions, had begun to assert itself as the uncontested top dog within its alliance.
The treasury of the Delian League, previously located in the sanctuary in Delos, was moved
to Athens in 454/453 BCE. These newfound funds, which were meant to support all the leagues’
cities equally, were used for public works in Athens itself, much to the dismay of Athens’
allies. In fact, in 451/450 BCE, Erythae, a city in Ionia revolted against Athens, and
many allies refused to pay tribute. Nevertheless, Athens’ power was not dented.
This was in part due to the fact that the funds seized from Delos also assisted with
the development of the Athenian navy. Athens continued to export its naval power abroad
until the Peace of Callias, which exchanged Cyprus for an Asia Minor free from Persian
control. At the same time, Athens continued to expand its influence through the establishment
of colonies such as Thurii in Magna Graecia, a traditionally independent part of the Hellenic
world under Syracusan hegemony. During Athens’ wars of expansion, it was also changing at
home, as an innovative young politician called Perikles had initiated multiple democratic
reforms, initiating measures against the wealthy. Looking towards the sea, a policy continued
by his successors, he invested in the development of a strong navy for the promotion of Athenian
trade interests. Many Peloponnesian states fought against Athens, one of which was Aegina
in 460 BCE. But the rising naval superpower defeated Aegina, besieging and conquering
the city. Soviet Historiography has actually called
this the First Peloponnesian War due to its role in forging the alliances that followed
in the full-scale conflict. It began in 460 BCE, with the obscure battle of Oenoe, where
the Athenians and the Argives banded together in common interests and defeated the Spartans
and then with the Battle of Aegina, where the Athenians defeated 70 ships of Aegina
and subjugated it as a tributary. This war happened in conjunction with Delian campaigns
in Egypt, which severely strained their resources, but we will focus on the Hellenic mainland.
The battle of Aegina is itself an obscure battle but set the stage in the on-and-off
conflict. The Spartans rallied their allies while Athens began its goal of extending influence
in central Greece. This is due to Athens’s strength at sea being balanced out by insecurity
in the Attican peninsula. As the war began, Megara, which was having
territorial disputes with Corinth, requested Athenian assistance and temporarily joined
its alliance. This is why, in 457 BCE, two major battles occurred almost concurrently:
the battles of Tanagra and Oenophyta. The first battle unfolded because of the conflict
between the Phocians and the Doric city-states. Sparta sent 1,500 hoplites with 10,000 allied
troops and then marched into the region to tame Phocia. Athens responded by sending its
own force because, according to Thucydides, they were also afraid of Sparta leading internal
forces to overthrow democracy in Athens. Tanagra was chosen as the battleground as the Spartans
were worried about going through treacherous territory or through the sea, which the Athenians
controlled. The Athenians had 1,500 Argive allies and their own contingent coming up
to 11,000. We don't know much about the battle, but the Spartans ended up winning, restored
control of the Dorian cities from Phocis, and retreated back to the Peloponnese. Athens
regrouped and then, after two months, continued on to Oenophyta. There, they fought the Boeotians
and defeated them, eventually tearing down the walls of Tanagra and then completing their
own Long Walls. However, the war in Egypt began to strain
resources for Athens, and they ended up starting to lose ground in Greece as well. Because
of that, a temporary truce was brokered by Cimon in 451 BCE. Athens negotiated a peace
with Persia in 449 BCE, called the Peace of Kallias. This treaty solidified Athenian control
over coastal Asia Minor while relinquishing Cyprus to Persia, allowing Athens to return
its efforts to the mainland. In the meantime, Sparta was continuing its conflict with Phocia,
this time over who got to control the pilgrimage centre of Delphi. Sparta initiated the Second
Sacred War, marched into Delphi and kicked out the Phocians. In their place, they placed
Spartan-friendly custodians of the temple. Perikles was at the time considering a restrained
foreign policy but could not allow such a sacred oracle to be under Spartan control.
He thus marched back to Delphi and pushed the Spartans out, re-installing the Delphic
custodians. The final battle that we know of from the war is the battle of Coronaea.
Thucydides mentions that some Boeotian anti-Athenian exiles tried to return and reassert their
rule by seizing territory. Athens tried to ensure its Boeotian gains were solidified
and sent 1,000 hoplites under a certain Tolmidas. Initial success was had in the capture of
Chaeronaea, but when the Athenians marched into Coronaea, they were ambushed by the Boeotians,
who slaughtered many Athenians, including Tolmidas.
And so, the war ended with a return to the pre-war status quo. Fearing Athens would soon
become their overlord rather than their ally, many other cities in the Delian league revolted,
like Samos in 440 BCE. The war began over a Samian-Milesian dispute, which had begun
a few years earlier. Miletus petitioned Athens for help, and after failed mediation, Perikles
went forth with 40 ships overthrew the oligarchy in Samos, and put a fine on the city. As soon
as Athens left, some Samians revolted and tried to free themselves of the Athenian yoke.
This revolt threatened to spread to Mytilene, another Ionian city that was a hub for the
region, as well as to Byzantium, Caria and Chalkidiki. The nearby Persian satrap Pissuthunes
was also eager to assist the revolt if it spread, and Mytilene would be keen to revolt
if the Spartans provided help. Athens sent 70 triremes into the region, crushing the
revolt. In the end, neither Persia nor the Peloponnesian League sent help, dooming the
revolt into destruction. After this, Athens was the undisputed hegemonic master of the
Delian League. Initially, Perikles was a conservative and
restrained foreign policy actor, trying to avoid conflict with Sparta. Archidamus II,
one of the two Spartan kings, was also keen to avoid conflict, continuing in the long
Spartan tradition of restraint and introversion. In fact, in 445 BCE, the two cities had signed
the Thirty Years Peace, dividing ancient Greece into spheres of influence between them. This
was important, as the years between 460-445 BCE are considered to be a sort of Cold War
between the two leagues, with Argos allying itself with Athens and Megara with Sparta.
Eventually, this cold war would heat up, when the expansion of trade interests caused much
friction and led to conflict between Athens and the most powerful secondary actor in the
Peloponnesian League, Corinth. Corinth was a major naval power with many colonies, which
led to many political crises with other cities. One such city was Epidamnus, which saw conflict
between Oligarchic and Democratic factions. In 435 BCE, a Democratic coup took place,
expelling the Oligarchs to the surrounding Illyrian tribes. The resulting conflict drew
the attention of Corcyra, Epidamnus’s mother colony, but they initially did not intervene.
Instead, the Epidamnian Democrats sought assistance from Corcyra’s own mother colony, Corinth.
The Corcyraeans, who were not popular in Corinth herself, called upon the Athenians for assistance,
who proceeded to engage in a proxy war in Sparta’s sphere of influence.Corcyra and
Corinth eventually fought each other in the Battle of Sybota, which flared up the situation
considerably. The Battle of Sybota was part of the broader
skirmish conflict between Corinth and Corcyra between 435-431 BCE. In 433 BCE, Corinth parked
their ships on the south of Corfu and, after a standoff with the Corcyreans, sailed home
and began to amass an even larger fleet. This alarmed the Corcyraeans, who were not part
of any alliance, who sent envoys to Athens for assistance. Corinth also sent envoys to
gain Athens as an ally, and after much deliberation, the Athenians decided to help Corcyra and
sent ten ships to Corcyra under direct orders to not attack Corinthian ships unless an invasion
was to take place, meaning this was a purely defensive alliance.
Corinth and its allies had 150 ships, while Corcyra and their allies had 120 ships. The
Corcyraean fleet was in the southern tip of Corfu, anchored in the small islet chain called
the Sybota islands and Cape Leucimme, from which the battle takes its name. To their
south in Chimerium, Corinth put their ships. During nightfall, Corinth put their fleet
to sea and moved north. They met the Corcyraeans in three squadrons, with Athens on the right
flank. Corinth’s Megarian and Ambracian allies were on the right, Corinth’s ships
were on the left, and the rest of the allies were in the centre. The two fleets faced each
other and then clashed. The large presence of javelin throwers and hoplites meant that
the ships were essentially boarding vessels, with much hand-to-hand fighting as people
invaded each other’s ships. Initially, Athens was restrained and attacked only if Corcyraeans
were under threat. This changed slowly as the Corinthian left was faced with the Corcyraean
right, with the latter losing out in the clash. Athens rolled in, but in the end, both they
and the Corcyraeans were pushed onto land. The Corinthians went to collect their dead,
but the Corcyraeans and Athenians were afraid that they were going to land on Corfu. As
such, they pushed back into the sea and attacked. Right on time, Athenian reinforcements arrived
in the form of twenty ships, and the Corinthians retreated. The next day, Corinth saw the enemy
ships come out for battle and sent an envoy asking if Athens and Corinth were at war.
Athens replied that they were only here defensively, forcing Corinth to retreat. This bizarre stalemate
meant that both sides raised victory trophies, a topic of division allegedly only solved
the year after in the Souvlaki Exhibition in Olympus.
As both Corcyra and Corinth claimed victory after their stalemate in Sybota, Athens further
inflamed tensions by imposing economic sanctions on the city of Megara in 432 BCE. The so-called
Megarian Decree was sponsored by Perikles himself, and was meant to be a form of revenge
for the alleged trespassing on Demetra’s sacred meadows by the Megarians. The reality
was less religious, and more political: the Megarians had backed Corinth, which made them
hostile to Athens. Sparta furiously demanded that Athens forsake the Decree, and also insisted
they let go of Aegina. However, the Athenians continued to be intransigent, and continued
to bully smaller cities in its alliance. One such city was Potidaea, a Corinthian colony
which still had many ties to its mother colony, including annual magistrate visits. Athens
issued an ultimatum to Potidaea to cease all communications with Corinth and pull down
its walls. Potidaea sent ambassadors to both Athens and Sparta, but negotiations broke
down as Athens had already sent troops to enforce the ultimatum.
The Potidaeans instantly revolted, and made an alliance with the cities of the Chalcidice
and the Bottiaeans, who joined in the rebellion. They were aided by the Macedonian king, Perdiccas,
who helped their forces move inland to Olynthus. Athens’s 30 ships and 1000 hoplites, under
the command of general Archestratus, initially fought Perdiccas, as Archestratus anticipated
that the Potidaeans would immediately comply with the wishes of Athens and increase their
tribute. Meanwhile, Sparta and the Peloponnesian League had made some unofficial guarantees
to Potidaea, and Corinth sent 1,600 hoplites and 400 light troops to Potidaea as well,
under the command of Aristeus. These were informal volunteers so as to not violate the
Thirty Years Peace. In response, Athens increased its commitment
with another 2,000 hoplites and 40 more ships, under the command of Callias. After some fighting
against Perdiccas, the combined Athenian forces sailed to Potidaea and landed there alongside
400 cavalry, while the Potidaean and Peloponnesian Alliance numbered 1600 hoplites, 200 light
troops and 400 cavalry. Archestratus seized the Macedonian city of Therme and immediately
began a siege of Pydna, with the Athenian reinforcements joining as soon as they arrived.
Callias quickly arranged a ceasefire with Perdiccas, as Perikles had instructed him
to focus on quashing possible upstart revolts, rather than focus on the Macedonian front.
The Athenians were quite happy with this arrangement and concentrated all their forces against
Potidaea. Three thousand Athenian hoplites, their allies and six hundred Macedonian cavalry,
left Pydna and marched to Potidaea, while their seventy ships sailed along the coast.
Aristeus had been chosen to command the infantry, and Perdiccas, who had already broken his
agreement and abandoned the alliance with Athens, was selected to command the cavalry.
The anti-Athenian allies split their army in two. The Corinthians and Potidaeans positioned
themselves on isthmus just to the north, while the Chalcidians, Macedonians and other allies
took up arms near Olynthus. Their plan was to trap the Athenians, by luring them into
the valley towards the isthmus and then coming up from Olynthus to encircle them.
The Athenians managed to out-manoeuvre them, and sent the Athenian-supporting Macedonian
cavalry to Olynthus, blocking the reinforcements. The Athenians then attacked the main allied
army. The Corinthian wing under Aristeus succeeded in routing the Athenians but the Athenians
had much more success in routing all other wings of the enemy force. Aristeus was almost
killed as he built up a column and entered the city of Potidaea. The Peloponnesian League
had lost 300 men, while the Athenians were down only 150, Callias amongst them. The Athenians
erected a trophy to commemorate the victory, and then built a wall to the north of the
city alongside the isthmus. After this, the south was encircled with Athenian reinforcements
of 1,600 hoplites under the command of Phormio, son of Asopius. This army landed at Pallene,
to the south of Potidaia, and built fortifications to the south to completely blockade the city.
Recognizing his situation as dire, Aristeus told the citizens to evacuate by sea, and
left a garrison of 500 men to defend the city. The civilians ignored this call, so Aristeus
escaped from the city and tried to call on Chalcidician and Peloponnesian assistance,
to little avail. The siege continued until the summer of 430 BCE, when further Athenian
reinforcements were sent against Potidaea. This force was commanded by Hagnon of Nicias
and Cleopompos of Clinias, and consisted of 4,000 hoplites, 300 cavalry, 100 triremes
and fifty ships from Lesbos and Chios. By 430 BC a plague had begun to ravage Athens,
and Hagnon's army spread it amongst the Athenian troops at Potidea, where it killed 1,050 of
his 4,000 men. Due to this, and also due to his siege engines not being able to breach
the walls of Potidaea, Hagnon gave up and returned to Athens. However, despite Athens’
inability to breach its walls, by the winter of 430/429, Potidaea had been almost starved
to death, with even some cannibalism being recorded. Athens by this time was already
at war with Sparta, and the battle had both them and Potidaea cost them 2,000 hoplites
and depleted parts of their treasury. Hence, they agreed to lenient terms of surrender.
The Potidaeans, their wives and children and auxiliary troops would be allowed to walk
away freely and go anywhere they wished. Each woman could take two garments with them, each
man a single garment, as well as money for the journey. The Athenians kept control over
Potidaea and resettled it with their own colonists. As Potidaea was being besieged, Sparta organised
a meeting of the Apella, the Spartan citizen assembly, in which various foreign dignitaries
could speak. Megara, still under an Athenian blockade, spoke first and demanded Sparta
begin wartime preparations. The Corinthians also spoke, maintaining how they had warned
the Spartans, who did not trust Corinth, about the evil imperialism of the Athenians, bringing
up Aegina as an example. Sparta, they claimed, was complicit in Athenian imperialism by being
passive. Then came the Athenian delegation, which immediately declared that they did not
consider the Spartans their judges, but their equals. They then proceeded to claim that
they had a right to their hegemony as the champions of Hellas against the Persians,
and that in essence, they had won their position by their own deeds. In addition, they said,
should the Spartans go to war and defeat them, they would only take their place as hegemons
of all of Hellas. These speeches are approximations of Thucydides’s
interpretations of what could have been said, and thus are fabricated. They do, however,
provide clues as to the geopolitical aims of the various actors, as well as the general
ideologies of the combatants. The Athenians also claimed that they had been, in fact,
quite moderate in their aims, essentially warning the Spartans that they could muster
even more troops than they had sent at Potidaea. After Athens had had its say, Archidamos,
King of Sparta, rose to the proverbial podium. He addressed the dignitaries by mentioning
that the Spartans could raid the valleys of Attica. However, he himself was not of the
party that desired war, and warned the Spartans that if they started war now, that war could
very well pass down to their children. After all these speeches, the Apella voted by shouting,
a common means of voting in Ancient Greece. The result was a profound yes to war. Sparta
still tried to send three embassies to Athens in order to avoid further escalation. However,
it was too late. Ultimately, it will never be certain whether
the outbreak of war between Athens and Sparta was indeed inevitable. However, the actions
of the major players of the era certainly contributed to the eventual outbreak of hostilities,
such as Perikles’ adventurous foreign policies for Athenian expansionism, and Corinth’s
pursuit of Athenian containment. Sparta was restrained, but also had a war party that
considered the Athenians a threat to them. While Thucydides claimed that the fear of
Athenian supremacy moved Sparta to war, modern historians debate how true this was, and no
true conclusion will ever be fully reached. What we do know is that after a long period
of proxy wars and hegemonic consolidation, the Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues were
now on a collision course. The Peloponnesian Wars would last decades and see stories of
untold bravery and unimaginable brutality. They would see large geopolitical ploys across
the Mediterranean, and ideological conflicts within the city-states which fought in the
war. And they would see the return of suffering amongst the people of Hellas, suffering not
seen since the Persian Wars. Thus, the Peloponnesian Wars began…
The Peloponnesian war was a decades-long, multi-part conflict, the first phase of which
is often referred to as the ‘Archidamian War’, a name stemming from the Spartan King
Archidamos, who initiated it after the Apella’s decision. This phase of the conflict lasted
from 431 to 420 BCE. Thucydides describes its causes and conditions: Sparta technically
initiated the conflict, but many Greek poleis were on their side as they saw the Athenians
as an emerging superpower to fear. Sparta itself claimed to be a liberator of Hellas
from Athenian imperialism, a sort of ‘defender of the free world’. Meanwhile, Athens proclaimed
itself to be a defender of democracy against repressive oligarchies. This mutual finger-pointing,
so reminiscent of the Cold War of the 20th Century, hid cynical geopolitical agendas.
It should be noted that, due to Thucydides’ thorough habit of describing wars year-by-year,
historians are blessed to have a comprehensive and reliable primary source that allows us
to follow this conflict's incredibly complex shifting alliances pretty easily.
The Peloponnesian League began the war by invading Attica, Athens’ breadbasket. Almost
every year throughout the war, the Spartans and their allies would invade this region
in a scorched earth policy to starve out Athens. In retaliation, Athens blocked the Gulf of
Corinth as a countermeasure. However, this did not stop the burnings in Attica from resulting
in many civilian deaths, both from famine and pillaging, and many refugees from the
Attican hinterlands fled behind the walls of Athens proper for protection. Immediately,
Perikles began to face attacks from many angry Athenians, who questioned why he had dragged
them into this war. Perikles tempered their panic by advising that their war would be
won by strategy and that their indomitable navy would be able to win the day, so long
as they could avoid engaging the Spartans in ground combat, where the Spartan hoplites
were at their strongest. After a month of the initial pillaging spree, the Spartans
and their allies returned home to participate in the harvest, as was the custom. Thus given
a reprieve, at the end of this year, the city of Athens held a public funeral to honor the
dead. Perikles recited his iconic Epitaphios Logos, or Funeral Oration at this funeral.
Thucydides takes this opportunity to dissect Perikles’s and Athens’s ideology. We can
see this in the Logos excerpt where Perikles honors the dead as heroes of the Athenian
ideal. (...)I would have you day by day fix your
eyes upon the greatness of Athens, until you become filled with the love of her; and when
you are impressed by the spectacle of her glory, reflect that this empire has been acquired
by men who knew their duty and had the courage to do it, who in the hour of conflict had
the fear of dishonor always present to them, and who, if ever they failed in an enterprise,
would not allow their virtues to be lost to their country, but freely gave their lives
to her as the fairest offering which they could present at her feast. The sacrifice
which they collectively made was individually repaid to them; for they received again each
one for himself a praise which grows not old, and the noblest of all tombs, I speak not
of that in which their remains are laid, but of that in which their glory survives, and
is proclaimed always and on every fitting occasion both in word and deed. For the whole
earth is the tomb of famous men; not only are they commemorated by columns and inscriptions
in their own country, but in foreign lands there dwells also an unwritten memorial of
them, graven not on stone but in the hearts of men. (...)
The Logos is remembered as an anti-capitulation song that tries to frame the deaths of Athenians
as sacrifices made in the fight for a unique democratic ideal. Unlike the strictly militaristic
Spartans, it also frames Athens as heroic for its participation in both mercantile and
military affairs. Athenian lifestyle is extolled as outgoing and linked to the sea, and their
adventurousness as something to be celebrated. Rather ironically, one year after Perikles
gave this speech, the Plague hit Athens, and Perikles himself died of it. Thucydides respects
Perikles in his evaluation as a strong and vanguardist leader.
In 429 BCE, the Peloponnesian League tried to lift the Athenian blockade off of the coast
of Rhium, a small Northwestern Peloponnesian coastal settlement. The Athenian navy was
stretched thin at the time, having dispatched troops to both Potidaea in Macedonia, and
to traditionally Dorian-leaning Crete. Thus, while the Peloponnesian League had sent 47
ships, mostly Corinthian in origin, the Athenians had only 20 ships to stand against them. On
the Peloponnesian side, the Navarch Cnemos amassed 1,000 Hoplites from Sparta as well
as 2,000 Hoplites from allied states to attack a nearby city of Acarnania. In response, the
Athenians sent out a team led by a commander called Phormio, the man responsible for controlling
the blockades of both Naupaktos and Rhium, to lead a direct assault on Rhium. These two
battles were set to decide the blockade’s fortune. The Rhium and Antirhium are found
near the modern city of Patra, where the Peloponnese comes the closest to touching the rest of
Hellas at the shortest distance within the Isthmus. Hence, it was both the easiest to
blockade and the most strategic location to attack.
The Peloponnesians had a lot of transport ships in their midst, and so decided to use
their triremes warships to defend these more vulnerable cargo-bearing vessels as they sailed
past the narrow Rhium. Phormio had to decline sending help to Acarnania, but instead focused
on the Peleponessian convoy. Phormio, a major innovator in naval maneuvering, utilized the
weather as a key part of his tactics. Seeing the heavily fortified Peloponnesian triremes,
he decided to perform an unorthodox tactic. With twenty triremes of his own, he fanned
them out to surround the Peloponnesian fleet and began to move ever closer. Approaching
slowly, he sent smaller ships forward in a false dash attack to force the Peloponnesian
ships into a defensive cluster. The Peloponnesians were incapable of fighting back, though they
could have attacked individual ships during their attack. Phormio had noticed that winds
blew into the gulf at dawn, and surmised that they could use that against the Peloponnesians.
Just as Phormio had predicted, upon clustering, the Peloponnesians fell victim to the fickle
weather, being blown away by the wind and crashing into each other, at which point the
Athenians attacked. The Peloponnesian fleet was utterly crushed, with the Athenians capturing
12 ships and destroying the rest. Meanwhile, on the shore, Cnemus had reached the Acarnanian
capital of Stratus, and split his troops into three divisions. The left was manned by Spartans
and Ambraciots, and was commanded by Cnemus. The center was made up of barbarian mercenaries,
and Leucadians and Anachoriats commanded the right. Cnemus himself was keen to encamp the
divisions and begin negotiations. However, the center division, hoping for pillage and
glory, continued to advance against Cnemus’ wishes. They eventually faced the Stratians,
only to discover that the defenders were experts in close combat. Thus, the barbarians were
promptly sent packing. The other divisions were caught by surprise, and formed ranks,
but the Stratians lacked the forces to defeat them, so they did not press their advantage.
However, the next day Cnemus discovered that the rest of the Acarnians were sending reinforcements,
and thus decided to flee, meeting up with the survivors of the Peleponessian fleet on
the way. In both the naval battle at Rhium and the engagement at Stratia, the Athenians
and their allies had emerged as the undisputed victors.
Phormio was also responsible for another battle, that of Naupaktos, which took place in the
same year. Everything began in Naupaktos, where he was based. After the failed battle
at Rhium, the survivors of the Peloponnesian fleet went to Cyllene in the west, where they
met the Acarnanian invasion fleet and then received more reinforcements. Athens also
sent reinforcements, but they were stuck in Crete, so he only had his twenty ships. He
positioned himself in the Molycrian Rhium, with his enemies on the other side, the Peloponnesian
Rhium. His sailors were anxious due to their low numbers, but so were the Peloponnesians
due to their previous loss. Phormio promised his comrades that he would not fight in the
narrow straits, but soon, the Corinthians forced his hand. The Peloponnesians formed
four lines, with the twenty fastest ships forward, and the hoplites on shore. They began
to move east to capture the base at Naupaktos, so Phormio entered the straits to prevent
this. The Peloponnesian fleet then went north and tried to trap the Athenians. Nine ships
went onto the shore while the other eleven Athenian ships escaped. The nine crews either
died or were captured, while the eleven were chased by the twenty fast Peloponnesian ships.
As they reached the Gulf of Corinth, one ship from each fleet went adrift, and the ten Athenian
survivor ships entered Naupaktos. As the two adrift ships arrived, Athens rammed a merchant
ship and sunk it, riling up the rest of the ships into fighting once more. The Peloponnesians
had lost their formation and were decimated by the disciplined Athenian onslaught. They
continued back into the trap, where they freed their comrades and captured six Peloponnesian
ships. Both sides raised trophies after this battle, but the Athenians held off until their
reinforcements arrived and ensured control of the Gulf of Corinth.
Another battle, this time a defeat for the Athenians, took place in Spartolus near the
doomed city of Potidaea in the same year. An army of 2,000 Athenian hoplites and 200
cavalry led by Xenophon (not the historian, the son of Euripides), marched up north in
Chalcidice to Spartolus, which was a bastion of anti-Athenian sentiment from formerly coastal
populations kicked out by the Athenians. The city itself was fortified, however, as Athens
arrived, the defenders, composed of hoplites, peltasts and auxiliaries from Spartolos, nearby
Olynthus, and nearby Chusis, moved out of the city to meet them. Athens’s hoplites
defeated the defending hoplites, and the auxiliaries retreated back into the city, but the goddess
Nemesis was on their side on that day. New peltast reinforcements arrived just after
the retreat, and began to rain down on the Athenians. The defenders were encouraged by
this and moved out once more. Athens retreated back into the camp and tried to push back.
However, every time they pushed forward, the peltasts moved back, and upon Athenian retreat,
the peltasts returned and rained hell on the Athenians while the cavalry also assaulted
the invaders. 430 Athenians, including their generals, were killed, and the rest moved
back to Potidaea in complete defeat. The death of Perikles allowed for some of
the allies who were not too keen on the war, like Lesbos. These were quickly dispatched
with, as Athens had an unparalleled fleet at the time. Mytilene was another, and they
managed to back various revolts in Ionia and the nearby islands. We will return to the
revolt in due course; but what is important is that Thebes, an ally of Sparta and keen
enemy of Athens, began to encroach upon Plataea. Initially, 300 Theban hoplites approached
the city, where two oligarchic sympathizers let them in. These two Plataeans were hoping
for a victory against the newly-risen democratic factions in the city. The Plataeans were initially
shocked into submission but then realised their numerical superiority and killed over
half of the Thebans, with the rest either captured or escaping . In this dire engagement,
the Theban reinforcements could not aid their dying brethren due to the Asopos river flooding.
Initially, both sides swore sacred oaths to negotiate the release of Theban prisoners
if Plataea was left alone. We don’t know who broke the oaths taken, but the Thebans
eventually began to attack again. The Plataeans called for Athenian help, while the Thebans
appealed to Sparta. This is technically the official beginning of the Peloponnesian War.
Archidamos sent an expeditionary force to burn the farmlands outside Plataea, something
the Plataean ambassador reminded the Spartans they were not allowed to do due to the holiness
of Plataea. Sparta said that they would only agree to protect them if they became neutral,
but Plataea, which was very close to Athens in terms of both geography and ideology, rejected
said proposal. Athens pushed the Plataeans to avoid agreeing to the terms, making the
Plataeans more confident in the fact they could hold out until Athenian aid arrived.
Archidamos thus began his work of besieging the city, beginning by constructing a wooden
palisade around it. He managed to build a mound leading up to the walls, which he tried
to use for an assault over the city walls. The Plataeans countered this measure by extending
the height of their walls, while also digging under the walls and burrowing inside the Spartan
mound, thus delaying the mound’s construction. They also managed to build further fortifications
inside the city using the materials from the mound, and thus had an additional means of
defence in case of a Spartan breakthrough. The Spartans also built up siege engines,
but these were ineffective as the Plataeans used lassoes and fire to disable these instruments
of war. The Spartans continued to try to force their way through Plataea’s walls for some
time, but, eventually, they decided that it was fruitless, and decided to simply sit back,
surround the city, and starve it out instead. Their next step was to start throwing fire
projectiles into the city proper. A large part of Plataea was destroyed by fire, but
the Spartans missed the defensive positions and thus their bombings only ended up amounting
to an archaic form of terrorism. After this failure, the Spartans decided to simply double
down on their attempt to starve out the Plataeans. To that end, the Lacedaemonians built a wall
of circumvallation around Plataea, and seeing as they did not need most of their troops,
dismissed a large part of the besieging force. Blockades are not a nice affair, and soon,
the Plataeans began to suffer the effects of malnutrition. The Spartan walls essentially
were a two-way avenue, with walls outside for Spartan protection, and the walls inside
to lock off the city, with towers used for scouting and keeping sentries. The Spartans
built wooden settlements in between the walls so they could live within the walls, manned
by Boeotian allies. According to Thucydides: The Plataeans had before sent off their wives
and children and oldest men and the mass of the non-combatants to Athens; so that the
number of the besieged left in the place comprised 400 of their own citizens, 80 Athenians, and
110 women to bake their bread. This was the sum total at the commencement of the siege,
and there was no one else within the walls, bond or free. Such were the arrangements made
for the blockade of Plataea. The siege took two years, and inflicted incredible
hardship upon the population within the city. By the winter of 428-427 BC, provisions within
the city began to grow thin, bringing desperation to the civilian population. The Plataeans
decided to try and break out. At first, this was to be an attempt of the entire male population
of the city to escape, but half of the garrison then decided that it was too dangerous. In
the end, only 220 Plataean soldiers took part. They used ladders to climb over the walls,
captured two of the ten towers of the fortification, and managed to get across the outer wall before
strong reinforcements could arrive. The Peloponnesian League tried to send 300 men as reinforcements,
but by the time of their arrival, the Plataean escapees had fled to Athens. The Plataeans
then moved up the road leading to Thebes, deceiving the besiegers, who attempted to
find them on the road to Athens. Eventually, 212 of the escapees managed to reach Athens.
Thucydides claims that their success was mainly due to the darkness and the storm that was
raging during that night. Even though the escapees managed to reach
Athens, their pleas for aid fell on deaf ears. The Athenians were continuing to follow Perikles'
strategy of avoiding direct ground combat with Sparta, and thus didn't send a relief
force to Plataea for fear of being bogged down. By the summer of 427 BCE the Plataeans
and their allies inside the city were totally burnt out and starved, and thus the Spartans
began their ominous assault. At this point, the Spartan commander tried to persuade the
besieged that it would be better to surrender, that when a peace treaty was eventually negotiated,
the Spartans would allow them to keep their land, and that only those who provoked the
riot two years prior would be punished. The Plataeans agreed to those terms and surrendered.
However, the Thebans were bitter and angry at the Plataeans and immediately put pressure
on the Spartans to go harder on their vanquished foes. As a result, the Plataeans were brought
into a show trial and condemned to death. All 200 Plataean and 25 Athenians who had
survived the siege were executed, and the women who had remained in the city to cook
for the garrison were sold into slavery. The Thebans took the land for themselves, and
to rub salt in the wounds of the tragic city of Plataea , they then burnt the entire city
to the ground. Plataea would not be rebuilt until 381 BCE when Philip of Macedon defeated
the Thebans. The start of the Peloponnesian War proved
to be a bittersweet win for Athens. They had lost their greatest statesman, and then had
emerged victorious from important fights against overwhelming odds in the Peloponnese. However,
they had also shown an unwillingness to help their allies, something which had cost their
Plataeans dearly. The Spartans had had a difficult start to the war. They had been humiliated
in Rhium and Naupaktos, but had rushed to the aid of Thebes and had delivered a crushing
blow to Plataea. These contradictory positions of the two great powers would continue for
the next decade, with equal levels of machinations and suffering for both sides.
In the year 428 BCE, the oligarchic city-state of Mytilene in Lesbos revolted against Athens
They did so by cooperating with Sparta and its allies, particularly Boeotia. The Mytilenians
were considering this rebellion for a while but seized upon the opportunity as the Peloponnesian
League began its annual invasion of the Athenian countryside. According to Thucydides, Mytilenes
wished to develop its own sphere of influence by taking over the entire island of Lesbos.
Hence, they began their preparations by fortifying their city and hiring mercenaries from the
Euxinos Pontos. However, the other cities on Lesbos were not so quick to accept Mytilenaean
overlordship. Some Lesbian cities, such as the Methymnians, instead preferred to stay
with Athens, moreover, pro-democracy elements in Mytilene itself opposed the direction their
oligarchs were taking the city in. These factions, combined with the people of Tenedos, sent
off messengers to Athens, informing them of the oligarchs’ overtures. Athens was too
weakened by the plague and other engagements to intervene at that moment. As such, Mytilene
had time to build up its fortifications, ensuring its revolt would succeed.
When Athens finally got around to dealing with Mytilene, its plan initially was to attack
during the Apollo festival outside the city walls. However, the Mytileneans were warned
of the Athenian sneak attack and decided to face them from within their fortified walls.
When forty Athenian triremes faced the Mytilenean fleet outside the city, they were defeated.
Afterwards, negotiations began, with Mytilene pre-emptively sending runners to Sparta to
try and obtain Lacadaemonian support during the proceedings. Talks soon collapsed, and
the Mytilenean army left the city and attacked the Athenian camp. The Athenians were devastated
but not fully crippled, while the Mytileneans preferred to be on the defensive and retreated
back into their walls. Meanwhile, Sparta brought the matter to the Peloponnesian League, which
formally incorporated the island of Lesbos as an ally within its ranks. Sparta then organized
a campaign to attack Attica in Olympia, but her allies were late due to the harvest season.
Athens heard of this and intimidated the league with 100 warships used to raid the Peloponnese.
Meanwhile, Mytilene tried to raid the other cities of Lesbos, specifically Methymna but
was repelled. By 427 BCE, the Athenians had begun a proper siege of the rebellious city.
Mytilene was fully surrounded, subject to starvation and completely reliant on a Spartan
fleet of 40 ships commanded by Alcidas. The fleet was notoriously late in getting there,
having not set sail until the summer of 427 BCE. All told, the Mytileneans were in a very
difficult situation: time was running short, and help was likely not coming in time. Ultimately,
they decided to enter negotiations. While this may have seemed like an easy triumph
for Athens, it was, in fact, a Pyrrhic victory. After battling the annual invasion into Attica,
fighting the naval war in the Isthmus and funding the siege of Mytilene, Athen’s finances
were deeply strained. With this background, we enter the infamous Mytilenean Debate, which
occurred in the agora of the city Beloved of the Poets. The Athenians were both aghast
at the strain of the war and furious at the insolence of the Mytileneans who had brought
them such trouble. As such, a motion was put forward to execute all male citizens of Mytilene
and sell the women into slavery. A trireme was dispatched to do the deed, but a day later,
the Athenians held another debate, the moral pillars of their society speaking out against
indiscriminate slaughter. The man who was pushing for the massacre was Cleon, a man
whom Thucydides describes as the most ruthless man in Athens. He claimed that Athens, instead
of punishing, was wasting time with sophistry and that expediency was key. As such, punishment
of the Mytileneans would be the best deterrence: Do not, therefore, be traitors to yourselves,
but recall as nearly as possible the moment of suffering and the supreme importance which
you then attached to their reduction; and now pay them back in their turn, without yielding
to present weakness or forgetting the peril that once hung over you. Punish them as they
deserve, and teach your other allies by a striking example that the penalty of rebellion
is death. Let them once understand this, and you will not have so often to neglect your
enemies while you are fighting with your own confederates.
Then came Diodotos, a man who was against the punishment. He urged that Athens act in
moderation and that aggression would be counterproductive: "Confess, therefore, that this is the wisest
course, and without conceding too much either to pity or to indulgence, by neither of which
motives do I any more than Cleon wish you to be influenced, upon the plain merits of
the case before you, be persuaded by me to try calmly those of the Mitylenians whom Paches
sent off as guilty, and to leave the rest undisturbed. This is at once best for the
future and most terrible to your enemies at the present moment since good policy against
an adversary is superior to the blind attacks of brute force." In the end, Athens reversed
its decision by a slim majority vote. A second trireme was dispatched and reached Mytilene
in time to stop the extinction of an entire demos. It was a rare moment of mercy in a
war known for its brutality that Thucydides had to note as extraordinary.
Athens was growing more belligerent as 426 BCE came about, and debates in the agora were
now going on about how to move forward. Eventually, they decided on a massive assault on Boeotia
and Aetolia, regions full of Spartan allied states. Athens had many allies in neighbouring
Messenia, who had lobbied for the campaign to occur on their terms. The Athenians initially
sent two major contingents; one was led by Demosthenes, who was to sail across the Peloponnese
and blockade the Corinthian Gulf. Nicias led the others to attack in Tanagra, Melos and
Boeotia. Demosthenes initially managed to amass a large force of his allies from Messenia,
Corcyraea and Acarnania, as he had promised to lay siege to Leuca. However, as he wanted
to split the force in two and take further reinforcements from Phocis to go to Aetolia
first, many of his allies deserted him. Demosthenes continued on and reached Locris,
where he established a base to begin attacking Aetolia. However, the Aetolians had received
intelligence and amassed forces that could easily defeat the Athenians. Ranged units
in the form of javelin-throwers were Athens’s great weakness during this period, and the
Aetolians were particularly skilled in that regard. As Demosthenes approached towns like
Aegitium, he found them empty, for the inhabitants formed bands of guerilla warriors and fled
to the mountains. Using the hilly terrain, the defenders attacked the Athenians constantly,
with only Athenian allied auxiliaries able to retaliate at all via arrow fire. To compound
matters, Demosthenes ended up without a guide, leading to more chaos among his troops. The
result was the complete decimation of the Athenian expeditionary force, with above-average
losses for Athens and its allies. Demosthenes was forced to retreat to his previous base
of Naupaktos. He was loath to return to Athens as his reputation was tarnished. Hence, he
continued to operate in naval wars, winning victories at sea at Olpae and Idomene.
The two battles occurred back to back, in essence, as they happened in the background
of the Aetolian campaign. At first, the Spartans tried to invade the city of Naupaktos after
the Aetolians requested their help, using 3,000 hoplites. These hoplites besieged the
city with the help of the Locrians, who had promised to help the Athenians but had decided
against it and joined the other side. Sparta took the outer walls and defeated the Naupaktian
contingent but failed to take the city in time. Demosthenes, hearing of the siege, asked
and received 1,000 Acarnanian hoplites and dashed to the city, forcing the Spartan commander
Eurylochos to abandon the siege. He now aimed to go to the Amphilochian city of Argos and
use that to subdue Acarnania. His local allies, the Ambraciots, promised to help him with
reinforcement in the winter, so the Spartans took positions on a hill at Proschium. The
Ambraciots joined them as promised with 3,000 hoplites, and the combined forces met at Olpae.
The Acarnanians moved their troops to Argos and the nearby hill of Orpae, and asked Demosthenes
for reinforcements, a request he eagerly obliged, arriving with twenty triremes and 200 Messenian
hoplites, alongside sixty Athenian archers and camped opposite a ravine. The Peloponnesians
had Eurylochos on the left, then the Mantinean allies, then mixed contingents in the centre
and left. Opposite them were the Acarnanians and Amphilochian javelin throwers, with Demosthenes
and the Athenians opposite Eurylochos. At first, the Ambraciots broke through their
enemies in the opposite and began to push towards Argos. He also tried to outflank Demosthenes
from the left. However, Demosthenes had also hidden 400 hoplites and light troops in bushes
for a convenient sneak attack. These hidden troops sprung forth behind the Peloponnesian
left flank, which instantly broke into chaos alongside the centre, besides the disciplined
Mantineans. The Ambraciots arrived just in time to see the absolute style chaos besieging
their side of the fight and tried to retreat to Olpae. Still, the Acarnanians attacked
them as well, with heavy casualties. Eurylochos himself was slain in the battle, and the successor,
Menedaios, asked to recover the dead and to retreat to safety. Ever the populist, Demosthenes
only agreed to the first request, and for the second allowed only Menedaios, the Mantineans,
and some select Peloponnesians to leave. This is possibly so as to make them look bad, which
happened because the Ambraciots tried to join the Spartans in retreat and lost 200 more
men to the Athenians. Idomene occurred two days later, as Demosthenes
found out that Spartan reinforcements in the south were moving towards the south from Ambracia.
As such, he sent troops to block their advance, and the two forces camped on the hills of
Idomene, the Athenians on the higher hill, and the Ambraciots on the lower hill. Demosthenes
also moved there at night with a team of Acarnanians, Amphilochians, Messenians, and Athenians.
In a sneaky move that was worthy of Odysseas, he put the Dorian Messenians first in order
to confuse the Ambraciots, who spoke the same dialect. At dawn, they attacked the Ambraciots,
who predictably were shocked and caught off guard by the Doric-speaking ninja attack.
A massacre ensued in the camp, with more Ambraciots dying while in retreat through harsh terrain.
The defeat was so bad that Thucydides claimed it was one of the biggest casualty rates of
any city, as over 1,000 people died. The ending, however, was a surprise one. The Acarnanians,
Amphilochians, and Ambraciots ended up signing a mutual peace treaty that they would work
together in any invasion so long as neither side was involved; this was most likely due
to fear of Athenian influence growing too strong in the region.
In 425 BCE, the city of Messina in Sicily revolted against Athens after a successful
bout of Spartan diplomacy compelled them to do so. As a counterplay, Demosthenes developed
an idea of using Pylos as a springboard base to raid Sparta with the help of the Messenians.
He suggested this to negative responses twice, but due to storms, the Athenian fled, ended
up on Pylos anyways, and began building fortifications there. During this period, the annual invasion
of Attica took place . Still, when the Spartan King Agis heard of Athenian Marines landing
on his home city’s doorstep, he withdrew his armies back to Sparta and sent both troops
and ships to Pylos. Athens brought their squadrons from Zakynthos. Brasidas and Thrasymelidas,
the Spartan commanders, controlled 90 ships, while Athens controlled only 60. Sparta began
attacking the fortifications while mooring ships and blocking the island of Sphacteria
and its natural harbour. Ever keen in his strategic insight, Demosthenes determined
where the Spartans were most likely to attack and took a small contingent with him there.
The rest of the hoplites remained in the forts. Sparta began its attack under Thrasymelidas,
commanding 43 out of the 90 Spartan ships, but the harbour was too small for them all
to attack at once. Smaller boat squadrons made repeated sorties into the bay, but were
repeatedly pushed back by the Athenians. Attacks on the fortifications also failed, and after
two days of fruitless assaults, the Spartans abandoned active attacks and dug in for a
siege. However, before they could fully entrench themselves, the Athenian fleet arrived and
clashed with the Spartan fleet in an engagement which saw heavy damages inflicted on the Spartan
navy. The Spartans moved their fleet into the bay between Sphacteria and Pylos, where
the fortifications lay. Demosthenes was now trapped between the Spartan version of the
mythical Clashing Rocks, but like the Argonauts, they managed to push off the Spartans until
the last moment when the Athenian fleet arrived. 420 Spartan hoplites under Epitades were now
trapped on Sphacteria. This was an unprecedented situation, so the Spartans sent some officials
to inspect the goings on. Since supplies could no longer be sent to the island, the officials
decided to open ceasefire talks with their foe. Sparta’s unique constitution, based
on the small number of Homoioi as the citizenry and the military force, meant that every loss
in manpower could be disastrous in the long run, hence their eagerness to negotiate. Athens’s
demands that all the land they had lost so far in the war was to be returned were too
maximalist to be accepted. The fighting resumed, with Athens besieging
Sphacteria and Sparta throughout Pylos. Attempts by Sparta to send supplies to Sphacteria were
thwarted, but the siege dragged on for Athens as well. The infamous Cleon, ever the populist,
had promoted the rejection of previous compromises with Sparta and was now backed into a corner.
He had been trying to blame Athen’s present lack of success on Nicias, the current commander
of the Athenian forces. Still, the citizenry of Athens was not having it, demanding why,
if Nicias’ performance was so unsatisfactory, why did Cleon did not take over the operation.
Embarrassed, Cleon’s hand was forced, and he amassed some extra troops and proclaimed
victory in twenty days would be his. When Cleon arrived on the scene, the Spartans had
accidentally set the forests of the islet ablaze, which revealed many landing points
and removed their camouflage. Cleon and Demosthenes sent envoys out again, but the Spartans rejected
any surrender. Split across three camps, with Epitades in
the centre, one on the edge in a fort, and one facing Pylos, the Spartans finally faced
an Athenian attack of 800 hoplites in the middle of the night. The first Spartan post
was defeated, and 800 archers and 800 peltasts followed in the landing. Alongside the seamen
and the Allied contingents, they surrounded the central Spartan position. Hence, the main
Spartan contingent was surrounded and vulnerable to attack from both flanks. The Athenians
sent bowmen, peltasts and stone throwers which rained hell upon the Spartans. The latter
retreated to the island fort, which served as a last resort position. They withstood
the Athenian onslaught there, as the Delian League could not break into the fort. After
a while, the Messenian commander took some light troops and archers and marched across
the island's rocky coast. He surrounded the fort from the high ground and began pelting
its defenders with missiles from on high. During the commotion, Epitades was killed,
and Cleon and Demosthenes ceased the fighting and once more called for negotiations via
heralds. Spartans are infamous for not wanting to surrender, but despite this, the heralds’
arrival was met with lowered shields, a signal of fatigue and preference for surrender. Ultimately,
all the Spartan hoplites laid down their arms. The Athenians were shocked but also gleeful.
Of the 440 hoplites who had been trapped on the island, 292 survivors were captured and
taken to Athens. Of these, 120 were Homoioi or full Spartan citizens, with the rest most
likely being metics or allies. As news of the surrender spread throughout the Greek
world, shock and awe followed it. Spartans had a tradition of never surrendering, regardless
of the odds against them. So that a contingent of Spartan hoplites had given themselves up
before an Athenian enemy was beyond the comprehension of many Greeks. The Spartan state was perhaps
the most shocked of all, as this was an unprecedented diplomatic situation for them. Much like famous
prisoner exchanges between combatting nations today, this matter dragged on for years, and
clauses for releasing all Spartan prisoners from Athenian or Delian captivity were essential
to the Peace of Nicias four years later. The past four years of war had been chaotic
for Athens and Sparta. As the annual invasions of Attica continued and Athens recovered from
the plague, it had to face an unprecedented revolt in its hands with Mytilene. They succeeded
in winning, but at great cost and stress to their allies. Chaos also ensued on the front
in Aetolia, and though Athens scored important victories later, it was still an incredible
loss of manpower. Yet somehow, Athens bounced back and not only scored victories at sea
but managed to humiliate Sparta in Pylos and Sphacteria. Athens now had the upper hand
in the conflict, at least for now, while Sparta had faltered. The Athens had overstretched,
so it was also a matter of time before they started losing momentum. The Archidamian War
is approaching its climactic ending, but many epic battles must occur before it is decided.
And even when peace is initially reached, there will be too much hubris from victories
and too much blood spilled for it to fully stop and for war to return to Greek homes.
Hellas has seen much war, and more war will come to its shores, giving Hellenes a chance
for more glory and mourning. While Athens was fighting Sparta in Pylos
and Sphacteria, it was simultaneously planning further expeditions. Boeotia, the region of
Greece that neighbours Attica, was home to many cities which were rivals of Athens, such
as Thebes and Megara. After his smashing success in Sphacteria, Cleon, the infamous populist
and ruthless warmonger of the Athenians, was re-elected into power in 424 BCE alongside
his colleague Demosthenes. Many scholars have seen this as a victory for the Warhawks of
Athens. However, the election of Nicias and Thucydides showed that conservative restraint
was still popular amongst the Athenian people. A campaign was decided against Boeotia in
424 BCE. Still, before that, the Athenians decided to attack the perioikoi of the Spartans
at Kythera, an island off the coast of the Peloponnese. The Athenian fleet subdued Kythera
easily and then proceeded to build forts and station garrisons on the island as staging
grounds to attack the Peloponnese. Further west, Athenian fortunes were faring
more poorly. The attack on Sicily in 425 BCE succeeded only in taking the city of Messina,
while a continued onslaught from the army of Syracuse reduced the Athenian to a defensive
position. As such, Athens focused most of their military efforts on the campaign in
Boeotia. One of their main targets was Megara, a city which had suffered from annual Athenian
invasions into their countryside, much like the Peloponnesian League had done to Attica.
The economic turmoil this had caused Megara had resulted in civil conflict in the city
between Democratic and Oligarchic factions, which Athens adroitly exploited. The Democratic
faction, unable to trust the Peloponnesian league and fearful of a coup, turned to Athens
for support. They claimed that if Athens could break through the Long Walls connecting Megara
to the Peloponnesian League garrison town of Nisaea, then they would surrender Megara
to the Atticans. Athens set out to do just that, coming in
from Minoa and appearing at night with its allies. The gates were opened, and the port
at Nisaea was blockaded. This was easy enough, but the Athenians had opposition ahead, for
nearby in Boeotia, the well-known Spartan general Brasidas was encamped. When Brasidas
got word of the Athenian play for Megara, he sent word throughout the cities of Boeotia.
They immediately amassed 2,700 hoplites from Corinth, 700 from Sicyon and 400 from Phlious
and marched towards the city. By the time they had arrived, Athens had taken Nisaea’s
interior and had taken the local Spartan garrison hostage. Brasidas did not try to take back
Nisaea, instead settling on Megara’s outskirts, waiting for the inevitable Athenian withdrawal.
Initially, the Megarians did not admit Brasidas into their city, but eventually, they relented.
According to Thucydides, Brasidas did not attack immediately because it would make Athens
retreat into Nisaea and face fewer losses. As such, they continued in a stand-off until
the Athenians finally decided to retreat. Soon after, Megara faced an oligarchic resurgence,
which expelled the traitorous democrats who had sided with Athens. Megara would remain
a staunch Spartan ally for the rest of the Peloponnesian Wars, a testament to the truth
of politics; without local support, no outsider can gain effective control over a territory.
Athens had a lot on its plate with its Boeotian campaign. Demosthenes and Hippokrates initially
hoped to attack two fronts, one by sea and one by land. A good landing for a naval invasion
was the city of Phocis in southern Greece, a part of Boeotia allied to Sparta. Phocis
had a shore on the Corinthian Gulf, making it ideal for controlling communications and
supplies from the Peloponnese to Boeotia proper. Demosthenes was in cahoots with some Phocians
who were aligned with the Athenians, with whom he hoped to take the city like how they
had planned to take Megara. He thus prepared his troops in conjunction with Hippokrates,
who was to launch a land attack on Delium. However, in Phocis, someone had revealed the
existence of the pro-Athenian saboteurs to the pro-Spartan government. Thus, Demosthenes
was not allowed to disembark in Phocis proper and instead headed to the land of Siphae further
down the Corinthian Gulf. This made things much harder for the Athenians, and they lost
valuable time. Hippokrates fared no better, for now, he had to march to Delium alone.
Delium was a small city that lay in a strategically important location. In addition, it was near
a temple of Apollo and the city of Tanagra. Hippokrates raised a large landed army against
the Peloponnesian and Boeotian troops in the region. This following battle was notorious
for its length and ferocity, given it had both active combat and a siege of the small
town and its fortifications. Eventually, the Athenians lost both their commander and the
contest. By now, both sides of the war were overstretched,
and the public mood was on the route to peace. However, this would still need some time to
mature, and many long-term wartime strategies were still at play. In 423 BCE, a one-year
truce was established so both sides could lick their wounds and try to establish peace
later down the line. One battle demonstrating this shift towards a ceasefire involves Thucydides
himself, that of Amphipolis, which unfolded principally in 422 BCE. Amphipolis is a city
in Thrace, which was important for its silver mines. In 424 BCE, while Delium was amid struggles
between the warring Leagues, Brasidas stormed north into Thrace and besieged the city, which
General Eukles defended. Initially, the Spartans surrounded the city and tried to get traitors
to let them in, but they found no such dissenters among the Amphiporine ranks. Eukles sent forth
a messenger for the port town of Eion, where our Historian Extraordinaire stayed with his
army. Brasidas knew that Thucydides was a famous regional general who would ignite Amphipolis’
resolve to fight, so the Spartan general cut a deal before his Athenian counterpart arrived.
He asked the Amphipolitans to either stay and keep their full properties or leave within
five days and take their property with them. After much deliberation, the city surrendered
a few hours before Thucydides arrived. Thucydides was held fully responsible for the loss and
was exiled from Athens. He stayed in Thrace and began to write the account of the war
we are discussing now. The 423 BCE truce enabled all currently occupied
land to be kept by those who occupied it, including Amphipolis. Brasidas managed to
capture Scione before the truce was concluded, which was also included in the treaty. Eventually,
the truce ended, causing Athens to grow concerned for its silver mines and grain supplies coming
in from its allies in the Bosporos, which was very much near Amphipolis. To that end,
the hawkish Cleon resolved to retake the city for the glory of Athens, amassing a naval
expedition which managed to retake Scione before reaching Amphipolis. Meanwhile, Brasidas
had built up Spartan strength by continuing his campaign in places not covered by the
treaty. Amassing 1200 Hoplites and 300 cavalry, and 30 ships, he quickly retook Scione. He
seized the town of Torone before positioning himself in the city of Eion, the port where
two years prior, Thucydides was settled. Brasidas then took his troops and moved to the area,
appearing on the site of Cerdylium, having both the high ground and a view of Athenian
troops and Amphipolis itself. Brasidas and Cleon were now at a stand-off, waiting for
the other to move. Brasidas’s force had now grown to 2,000 hoplites, 300 Greek cavalry,
1,000 local peltasts, Edon's army, and 1,500 Thracian mercenaries.
Thucydides’s account of what unfolded next became increasingly clouded as the two armies
waited. According to the historian, the Athenian troops did not trust their commander Cleon
not to act impulsively and became impatient and disgruntled. Thus, Cleon agreed to take
the troops and inspect the city. The modern historian Donald Kagan disagrees with Thucydides
and believes that Cleon’s real strategy was to inspect the city while waiting for
his Thracian to arrive. That way, they could retake the city easily by encirclement. Brasidas
himself must have been waiting for a possible siege and wanted to have hidden troops for
a strike from the back. Brasidas decided to take 150 of his best men and personally lead
them straight into the Athenian centre. They were to act as a sort of vanguard, working
from the southward gate of the city, while his second in command, Clearidas, was to organize
himself and his troops in the northern part of the city and attack. This was a risky endeavour,
but Brasidas was confident that he would act as a distraction and thus throw the Athenian
troops into chaos for the next attack. Meanwhile, Cleon was conducting his reconnaissance
by himself in front of the troops and realised most of the enemy was in the north. Unwilling
to attack without his reinforcements, Cleon ordered his army to retreat through the southernmost
gate. The left wing of the Athenian army immediately fled back to Eion, where the cavalry had also
been left behind. With Cleon in personal command, the right-wing began to backtrack as Clearidas
began to move from the north. Here, a Myrsinian peltast allegedly managed to kill the populist
Cleon, a man whom Thucydides had little respect for due to his brash nature and demagogy.
For this reason, Thucydides claims that Cleon began to flee before the Myrsinian managed
to slay him. However, other sources maintain that Cleon fought bravely until the end. Brasidas
saw that the Athenian army had their shields in disarray and pounced immediately. He led
his 150 men through the southernmost gate and attacked the Athenian centre, bringing
it into absolute chaos. Brasidas then turned on the Athenian right-wing as Clearidas finally
engaged from the north. The Athenian right wing was now on its own as the rest had long
fled and engaged in a last stand of sorts. Here, the adventurous and bold Brasidas met
his end, struck fatally while attacking the last of the Athenian holdouts. The life bleeding
from his body, he was taken away from the battlefield and would die only after learning
of his victory. Despite having personally lost in battle to Brasidas in the past, Thucydides,
in his writings, describes the Spartan general respectfully, declaring that he was both shrewd
and intelligent in his conduct. He was later buried in Amphipolis, where he was later commemorated
as the city's founder. The remaining Athenian right wing went to
a nearby hill, where they fought to the bitter end. Clearidas and his troops attacked thrice
and were pushed back by the Athenians as many times, but eventually, he surrounded them
with his infantry, cavalry and peltasts. Then, a rain of projectiles ensued that ruined the
enemy's formation. The Athenians dispersed and fled back to Eion. By the time they arrived,
600 Athenians had died in battle. According to Thucydides, the Spartans and their allies
only lost seven men. Thus, the Battle of Amphipolis ended in a spectacular Spartan victory and
with the death of the two most pro-war generals on either side of the war.
After Amphipolis, the two symbols of hawkish politics in Greece and Sparta were dead. Brasidas’s
replacement Ramphias did not continue to raid Thrace, understanding that the mood at home
was not ripe. Athens, despite its losses, still held bases at Pylos and Kythera, leaving
Sparta vulnerable. Both cities were much more in the mood for peace than previously, despite
the fears of losing grain supplies for the former and raids for the latter. As such,
the king of Sparta Pleistoanax and the Athenian general Nicias, from whom the peace takes
its name, met to negotiate a peace treaty. Lots of haggling ensued, such as for the Sphacterian
prisoners’ release from Athens and the Athenian prisoners’ release from Thebes. Cities in
Thrace which were ‘liberated’ by Sparta were to become neutral but still pay the tribute
assigned to them by Aristeides the Just to the Athenians, not the increased tribute of
425 BCE. All land was generally returned to each alliance except for Plataea, which stayed
with Thebes, and Nisaea, which remained under Athenian control. All temples became open
to pilgrims once more, and stelae with the sacred oath taken by the two sides were erected
throughout Hellas. Many issues still persisted, for instance, the city of Amphipolis still
was left in Spartan hands. Many allies of Sparta did not like the treaty and refused
to sign it. It was thus an uneasy peace brought upon by sides which could neither win nor
lose the war. In addition, neither side had planned for a long war of this sort, and of
course, the rest of the Hellenic world also had suffered damages. This meant that there
had not yet been a permanent resolution. While the Peloponnesian Wars would not officially
start up again until 413 BCE, the Hellenic world would descend into a cold war as Athens
and Sparta eyed each other with nervousness and suspicion.
As the 421 BCE Dionysia unfolded, and Athenians congregated to watch Aristophanes’s infamous
comedy Peace, they could at least breathe a sigh of respite, granted, only a temporary
one. The Peace of Nicias was not accepted by all
actors within each alliance. The Boeotians and Megarians, for instance, had not taken
the oaths of the Peace. Various Thracian colonies which had to return to a quasi-Athenian rule
were also negatively disposed towards the peace deal. Corinth and Thebes were both the
most influential cities who opposed the peace. Corinth’s grievances with Athens had not
been resolved, while Thebes was burgeoning with aggressive ambition after their conquest
of Plataea. This put Sparta in a difficult situation, for they were no longer the most
influential member in their own alliance, and were more restrained by their allies than
Athens. Other members of the Peloponnesian league, like Argos and Mantinea, began to
drift away from Sparta, unofficially throwing their lot in with Athens.
Nicias understood that political trouble in mainland Greece would hinder Athenian interests
and expansion elsewhere, so they were eager to build a stable peace on land to recuperate
from the war. Corinth, Athens’s mercantile nemesis, was not having this and proceeded
to go to Argos to build a third political pole against both the Apella and the Agora.
Moreover, they threatened to secede from the Peloponnesian League in order to intimidate
Sparta into listening to their demands. Sparta was terrified of this potentiality. If enough
forces were to break off and join an Argive Pact, they would destroy Sparta’s geopolitical
security. The Corinthians brought themselves before
an assembly of powerful Argives and offered them some proposals for alliance , which the
Argives readily accepted, soon, other cities like Mantinea had also joined this new Corinthian-led
coalition. When Sparta got wind of this, they were outraged. Corinth also tried to get Boeotia
to join the alliance, but if Boeotia broke from Sparta, it would lose its protection
against Athens, so this never materialized. Tensions between Athens and Boeotia increased
when Boeotia demolished the fortress of Panactum instead of returning it to Athens as the peace
of Nicias dictated. Following this, Athens and Argos began negotiations for a military
alliance. A pro-war party backed this development in Athens led by Hyperbolus and a certain
Alcibiades, the nephew of Perikles, who would become immensely important throughout the
rest of this war. Alcibiades utilized the demolition of Panactum to push his pro-war
agenda, managing to sideline the pro-peace Nicias in the Agora. Alcibiades claimed Sparta
was not upholding their end of the peace and struck an alliance with Mantinea, Argos and
Ellis. Athens used these partnerships to promote itself as a champion of democracy among the
Peloponnesian cities. In 418 BCE, this new alliance of democracies attacked Epidauros,
a strategically important city that would geopolitically isolate Corinth once taken.
The Spartans responded swiftly and soon faced off against the Argives and their Athenian
allies outside Argos proper. However, rather than fight, Agis II, King of Sparta, opted
to negotiate, leading to a peaceful resolution and him leading his troops home. However,
the Spartan people were furious about this and demanded that aggression be met with aggression.
Thus, the Lacedaemonian hoplites marched back to war.
After taking Epidauros, the Argives marched on to the city of Tegea. which sent messengers
asking for help, otherwise, they would switch sides. The Spartans reacted quickly, with
King Agis amassing an army that Thucydides calls ‘the finest in Greece’ composed
of about 9,000 men in total, including 3,500 Spartans, 600 Sciritae, 2,000 Neodamodes and
3,000 Tegean allies and cavalry. Conversely, the Argive army was about 8,000, including
3,000 Argives, 1000 Athenian hoplites plus cavalry, 2,000 Mantineans, 1,000 mercenary
Arcadians, 1,000 Cleonaeans, Orneans, and Aegitans.
King Agis went to Mantinea near Argos and began to raid the region. The Argives put
up positions on the hill near Mantinea, but Agis had his ditch diggers change the watercourse
in the valley, forcing Argos to move. The allied Argives descended from the hill and
set up their wings. The Mantineans were on the right, next to the Arcadians, while the
Argives were in the centre. Further left were the Cleonaeans and Orneans, and the Athenian
infantry and cavalry were on the very left. When the allied army came into view of the
Spartans, Agis immediately ordered his men to form battle lines. The left comprised the
Sciritae, the Spartans, and some freed helots. Next came the Arcadians, then the Maenalians
and Tegeans. An additional small force of Spartans made up the right, while cavalry
guarded both wings. The two armies clashed when they met, spreading out their right wings.
Agis moved the Sciritae leftward while ordering Spartans to fill in the gap. The Spartans
defeated the Argive advantage quickly, but on the left flank. the Mantineans crushed
the Scitiaeans and Thracians. The Argive troops and Mantineans moved to crush the Spartan
troops and inflicted heavy losses, causing them to retreat, however, King Agis held the
line bravely in the center, preventing a total Spartan rout. Thus, the Spartans defeated
the central contingents while the right flank managed to outflank the Athenians. It was
only the Athenian cavalry that saved the infantry from complete encirclement. Agis ordered his
army to cover the left, which allowed the Athenians to flee.
The Argives and their allies suffered heavy losses during the battle. The Argives lost
700 men, the Mantineans 200 and the Athenians and Aeginentans 200, including their two generals
Laches and Nicostratos. Spartan losses were rather lower, at just over 300. They chased
the Athenians from Epidaurus only after getting a truce with Argos. In the following year,
the Argives made peace with Sparta, ending their attempt to dominate the Peloponnese.
With Argos gone, the rest of the anti-Spartan alliance collapsed. Despite facing each other
on the battlefield, Sparta and Athens were still officially at peace, with no terms of
the Peace of Nicias being breached. After the battle of Mantinea, the peace which
endured between Athens and Sparta was more strained than ever, and the inner politics
of both cities were tense. In Athens, Nicias and Alcibiades both narrowly avoided ostracism,
a form of exile. After side-stepping his potential banishment, Nicias focused on launching expeditions
into Chalcidiki to retake land seized by the Spartan general Brasidas years prior. In Sparta,
King Agis continued his skilful military management. Not one year after the Battle of Mantinea,
Argos rebelled once more. With help from Alcibiades, the Argives evicted their oligarchs and tried
to establish a democracy, which naturally would be pro-Athens. In response, Agis dashed
to Argos once more. He did not take the city but destroyed Argos’s long walls which linked
the city to its port. He then took the hill of Hysiae where an homonymous town was situated
and executed all of its male population. Some time afterwards, the Spartans settled the
Argive oligarchs in their offshore paradise of Ornae, a hilly town they conquered in 417
BCE. They began a proxy war through these Argive exiles, fighting against Argos. In
response, Argos and Athens united. With 40 triremes and 1200 hoplites, they besieged
the city of Ornae, taking it after a fierce siege, in which the Argive exiles within were
either executed or expelled. As 416 BCE came to the fore, polarization
in Athens continued, with both pro-war and pro-peace generals being re-elected. By now,
Athens had replenished its finances and was eager to try to expand its interests. A border
region between the two leagues, the island of Melos, was fated by the Olympians and the
Three Fates as the victim of Athens’s wrath. This is one of the most famous of Thucydides’s
excerpts and one that has sparked immortal lessons and fierce debate. Melos was a Spartan
colony in the Cyclades that had stayed neutral and may have funded the Spartans during the
Archidamian War. Athens sailed upon the island with 30 ships, 1,200 hoplites, 300 archers,
and 20 mounted archers. Their allies sent 8 ships and 1,500 hoplites. They surrounded
the isle and began a blockade. They also burned the fields around the island, which resulted
in a famine. Following all this, the Athenians sent an envoy to implore the Melians to surrender
without a fight. Here we see the infamous Melian Dialogue unfold. The Melians answered
by invoking their neutrality, saying how unwise it would be for Athens to besiege an island
such as theirs, which had done no harm to them. They also described how they could not
submit without a fight as it would be dishonourable. Melians. To the fairness of quietly instructing
each other as you propose, there is nothing to object; but your military preparations
are too far advanced to agree with what you say, as we see you are come to be judges in
your own cause, and that all we can reasonably expect from this negotiation is war, if we
prove to have right on our side and refuse to submit, and in the contrary case, slavery.
Athens replied that they would attack because they had the power of might on their side,
and that it would be foolish to resist. Athenians. For ourselves, we shall not trouble
you with specious pretences- either of how we have a right to our empire because we overthrew
the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you have done us- and make a
long speech which would not be believed; and in return we hope that you, instead of thinking
to influence us by saying that you did not join the Lacedaemonians, although their colonists,
or that you have done us no wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding in view the real
sentiments of us both; since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is
only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the
weak suffer what they must. Melians. As we think, at any rate, it is expedient-
we speak as we are obliged, since you enjoin us to let right alone and talk only of interest-
that you should not destroy what is our common protection, the privilege of being allowed
in danger to invoke what is fair and right, and even to profit by arguments not strictly
valid if they can be got to pass current. And you are as much interested in this as
any, as your fall would be a signal for the heaviest vengeance and an example for the
world to meditate upon. The Melians asked why they should surrender
and not fight, to which the Athenians replied that they would be spared a worse fate of
complete decimation. They continued by saying that friendship with Melos was not enough
as it would make them appear weak amongst allies.
Athenians. As far as right goes they think one has as much of it as the other, and that
if any maintain their independence it is because they are strong, and that if we do not molest
them it is because we are afraid; so that besides extending our empire we should gain
in security by your subjection; the fact that you are islanders and weaker than others rendering
it all the more important that you should not succeed in baffling the masters of the
sea. Melos replied that they had to rely on the
Peloponnese, and attacking them may risk a Peloponnesian invasion.
Melians. You may be sure that we are as well aware as you of the difficulty of contending
against your power and fortune, unless the terms be equal. But we trust that the gods
may grant us fortune as good as yours, since we are just men fighting against unjust, and
that what we want in power will be made up by the alliance of the Lacedaemonians, who
are bound, if only for very shame, to come to the aid of their kindred. Our confidence,
therefore, after all is not so utterly irrational. Athenians. When you speak of the favour of
the gods, we may as fairly hope for that as yourselves; neither our pretensions nor our
conduct being in any way contrary to what men believe of the gods, or practise among
themselves. Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their
nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this
law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing before us, and shall leave it
to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody
else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do.
After an inconclusive dialogue, the Athenians left and began the siege. Melos held on for
most of 416 BCE. However, they soon began to starve under blockade and were forced to
surrender. The Athenian vengeance was so cruel that some modern historians have labelled
it as genocide. All men of Melos were executed, and all women and children were sold into
slavery. 416 BCE saw Athens become more eager for war,
especially with Syracuse, whose control over Sicily they wanted to break. Nicias, always
the moderate, mentioned how it would be nonsensical to go on an expedition that far west . Alcibiades,
however, was eager to show his skills and considered Sicily an easy target despite its
size. The Athenian Agora then decided to define the war's fate: take their triremes and begin
to sail to Sicily to help the city of Segesta and bring it under Athenian control. Plutarch,
writing centuries later, mentions how ominous omens abounded; a madman castrated himself
before the Altar of the Twelve with a stone, the memorial grove to Athens’s victory in
the Persian Wars was picked apart by ravens, and the Priestess of Clazomenae came to the
city with the name of Hesychia; or quietude or peace. However, Alcibiades still rallied
the troops and began to set sail. However, before they set sail, the Hermes statues on
the Athenian crossroads were defaced, a shocking event for the city. Alcibiades’s enemies
accused him of being the perpetrator. Alcibiades successfully defended himself and set sail
to Sicily, taking thousands of Athenians to land further west than they could have imagined.
However, the Hermae scandal would continue to haunt him. And the Sicilian Expedition
would prove to be a turning point for the Peloponnesian War, despite not involving Sparta
directly. As the defaced statues lay in the city streets,
we can only imagine both the ecstasy of the expedition and the shock and fear that Athens
may have felt. A fear most terrifying but far lesser than the horror the Melians would
have felt during their own doom. Since Sicily has only been briefly mentioned
in this video, we will begin with a basic history and geopolitical survey of the island.
Sicily had been on the radar of the Hellenic world since the Bronze Age, and in the early
Archaic Period, Greek and Phoenician colonies were built on the Sicilian coast. By the 4th
century BC, Sicily had many colony city-states and a political scene just as complex as the
one in mainland Greece. The biggest city was Syracuse, a rich merchant hub which regularly
switched between tyrannical and democratic governments. Syracuse was very protective
of its sphere of influence on the island, opposing foreign interventions and trying
to mediate intra-island conflicts in its favour. Athens, for its part, had some cultural and
political ties to the smaller Ionian colonies on the island, which saw them as a counterweight
to Syracuse. Meanwhile, Sparta had similar ties to the island’s Dorian colonies, including
Syracuse. Despite this, Athens’s military intervention in Sicily in 415 BCE was a new
frontier for them, unprecedented in scale. The military commitment was massive, consisting
of 5,100 hoplites, 480 archers, 700 slingers, 120 other light infantry, 30 cavalry, and
134 triremes. Along with it were Nicias and Alcibiades, the city’s top generals alongside
Lamachos. As Athens set sail, the Hermae scandal festered, as witnesses were called and Athens
quasi-political mystery clubs were blamed. Alcibiades was involved in some of the oligarchic
clubs, though Donald Kagan believes he was not part of the sacrilege.
Athens gathered troops from its allies and set sail, arriving first on the east coast
of Southern Italy near Rhegium in modern-day Calabria. Many coastal cities gave them a
cold reception, fearing the chaos of war coming to their shores, and Rhegium echoed this sentiment.
Nicias claimed this lack of local support showed the futility of their campaign. In
response, Alcibiades instead suggested a diplomatic love-bombing campaign across Sicily. Lamachos,
an old career soldier, had a third plan; simply to sail to Syracuse and seize the city. However,
he eventually sided with Alcibiades, and diplomacy began. Meanwhile, the government of Syracuse
was engaged in a debate about how to deal with the Athenian attack. General Hermocrates
pushed for capitulation, demanding an alliance be formed against Athens, while his counterpart
Athenagoras considered fear of the Athenians to be unsound. While this was happening, Athens
moved down south, gaining allies along the coast of Sicily, like the city of Naxos, before
reaching Messenia, a town which let them into their territory and allowed them to set up
their camps in Catana. Around this time, a trireme from Athens arrived, asking Alcibiades
to return to be tried for the sacrilege. Alcibiades agreed to return, however, while they were
passing through Athenian colony of Thurii, he mysteriously disappeared. He was not found,
and when the ship left empty handed he resurfaced and sailed to the Peloponnese. Thus, Nicias
was left as the de facto head of Athenian army in Sicily, overseeing a strategy he opposed,
but one his troops demanded he continue. Nicias wanted to avoid engaging with Syracuse’s
superior cavalry, so he devised an ingenious plan. He dispatched a secret agent to claim
that the Athenians had stored their weapons away from their camp. Syracuse eagerly accepted
the story and left their city. At dawn, the Athenians and their allies landed covertly
just outside the city, and took up positions between the coast and the temple of Zeus,
a position fortified by slopes and the sea. There, they built up a fortified stockade.
The Syracusans only realised their mistake when they arrived at Catana and saw the Athenian
camp there empty. By the time the Syracusans had hightailed it back, Athens had the advantage
and was in a position the Syracusan cavalry could not reach.
The armies clashed the very next day. The Athenians placed their own troops in the centre,
the Argives and Mantineans on their right near the coast, and their other allies on
the left. The Syracusan army was about the same size, with the cavalry on its right.
The Athenians charged first, surprising the Syracusans, but the locals managed to fight
back. The fight was intense, but the left flank of Syracuse began to wane under an elite
push by the Argives. Athens then pushed from their centre and caused the Syracusans to
flee. However, due to their need to stay in a narrow spot where the enemy cavalry couldn’t
break their lines, the Athenians did not pursue further. The Athenian inferiority in cavalry
now prevented them from turning their victory into a rout. The Syracusans went to the road
to Helopus as Athens broke the bridge towards the main city of Syracuse. Syracuse lost 260
men, while Athens lost 50 men, and appeared to be in a strong position to threaten the
city. In the aftermath of the battle, the Syracusans took positions on the hill of the
Temple of Zeus, close to the left flank of the Athenian army. Nicias then retired to
Catane for the winter, being cautious not to attack the city instantaneously. Athens
had succeeded in its first onslaught on Syracuse, but a gruelling siege was to follow.
Meanwhile, Syracuse sent envoys to Corinth who agreed to send troops to them. The Envoys
then moved to Sparta. Simultaneously, Alcibiades had arrived in Sparta and was terrifying them
with supposed Athenian plans to take over Sicily and Carthage to forge a so-called ‘United
States of Force’. Sparta sent a Mothax, or half-Spartan half-Helot called Gylippus,
to lead a relief force to Sicily. All told, the reinforcements headed Syracuse’s way
included 5,000–6,000 hoplites, 1,200 cavalry, and 100 triremes, on top of Gylippus’s force
of 700 armed sailors, 1,000 hoplites, 1,000 indigenous Sicel warriors and 100 cavalry.
In the spring of 414 BCE, Athens began the siege. They moved by sea down to the coast
of Leon. They then marched onto the heights via the pass of Euryalus, where they encountered
a force that Syracuse had sent to occupy the hills. There was a clash, but the Syracusans
failed to push off the Athenian advance. Athens moved to the city, then commenced its long-practiced
strategy of blockade by building walls from Leon to Syracuse’s Great Harbour. Two forts
were erected at Labdalum at Western Heights and at Syca at the Southern Heights. The Syracusans
dashed out to thwart the construction of these stockades, but were unable to form a line
and were forced to withdraw. Syracuse built its own wall from the Southwest to cut off
Athens. Athens waited for a while as the wooden wall was being built and then struck back,
deploying 300 hoplites and heavily armoured light troops to capture an outpost near the
wall, causing the defending garrison there to flee.
Nevertheless, Syracuse continued building their wall, extending it across a marsh near
the Great Harbour. Athens tried to strike again, and split the Syracusan force in two,
one towards the city to the right and one towards the Anapus River to the left. The
300 hoplites moved behind the left flank, but were routed by the Syracusan cavalry,
who then attacked the Athenian right. Both wings were routed, and old man Lamachos was
killed in the battle. Syracuse only retreated when the main bulk of the Athenian army arrived.
Syracusan troops who had previously fled resurfaced from the city and formed up. While engaging
the Athenians, others went and destroyed a large part of the Athenian walls. The Athenians
advanced once more as their navy entered the Great harbour and camped at Plemmyrium.
As Syracuse was angrily switching generals, a dashing Gylippus arrived to save the day.
He landed at Himera, where locals greeted him as a saviour, then marched towards Syracuse
while a Corinthian boat under Gongylus slipped past the Athenians. Gylippus saw a gap on
the Northern Heights near Epipolae, which Nicias had failed to secure, and slipped through.
Nicias refused to engage, and Gylippus camped outside the city The day after, he seized
Labdalum, allowing Syracuse to build their wall through that area, cutting the Athenian
lines in twain. Nicias responded by going to Plemmyrium, at the southern entrance to
the Great Harbour, where the Athenian navy was. Athens managed to fight and defeat Gygillus
in the northern heights. Using this as a distraction, Gylippus engaged in a battle away from the
walls. He used Syracusan cavalry and javelin throwers to rout the Athenian left flank.
He then extended his own wall stopping Athens from blockading. Athens began to lose morale,
as more ships were able to break the blockade. Gylippus left to collect more allies in Sicily,
and Syracuse sent envoys for more reinforcements. Nicias asked for more help from Athens, who
sent another army under Eurymedon, and Demosthenes of Pylos fame.
By the spring of 413 BCE, the Peloponnesian relief force included 2,000 hoplites, while
the Sicilian relief force had 2,300 soldiers. Athens received 250 Athenian cavalry, 30 mounted
archers, 400 Sicilian mercenary cavalry, 5,000 hoplites, and 73 triremes. Gylippus asked
Syracuse to attack the Athenian navy, but they failed miserably as their own navy split
into 35 triremes from the Great Harbour and 45 from the Small Harbour to the east. Athens
deployed 25 ships to confront the former and 35 ships to the latter. At first, both Athenian
forces were forced to retreat into the harbour, but the undisciplined Syracusans were destroyed
in an ill-advised pursuit into that bottleneck. On land, the distraction of the naval battle
allowed Gylippus to take the three forts at Plemmyrium.
Athens was now trapped like the Nemean Lion under the arms of Herakles as they were blocked
from receiving supplies from the outside, while Syracuse’s remaining ships attacked
their navy with ramming attacks. Without room to manoeuvre, Athens lost many vessels. After
a day’s break, the defenders had pushed the Athenian navy fully out of their harbour.
It was around this time that Demosthenes arrived and dashed to Epipolaea, likely to the cheers
of the Athenians, to whom he must have appeared as a shining saviour. Demosthenes tried to
attack Epipolaea during the night, and initially took the Syracusan counter-wall. However,
once the locals formed, they managed to push the Athenians back. The retreat turned into
a disaster, and the army's newly found confidence was shattered.
The Athenian generals met and were forced to confront the direness of their situation.
Demosthenes was now the moderate one, hoping to return to Athens, but Nicias dubiously
claimed he knew Syracusan moles who would be willing to surrender the city to them.
After much discussion, the army remained. However, no sooner after, Gylippus returned
with his reinforcements, causing Nicias to change his mind and discuss a retreat. As
they were about to withdraw, a lunar eclipse occurred as Gaia hid Selene from her brother
Helios. The soothsayers regarded this as a bad omen and demanded that the army wait 27
days before moving. So the army decided to wait for about a month, which allowed their
enemies to blockade them, Many of the more superstitious men supported them, as, fatally,
did Nicias. Right before the Athenians finally tried to leave, Syracuse dashed and broke
through the Athenian walls. The day after, 76 Syracusan ships sailed forth to meet 86
Athenian response ships, beating the Ionian invaders in the attack. Athens managed to
save the crews, a bittersweet consolation. Syracuse blocked the Great Harbour and essentially
besieged Athens from within. Athens built a second wall to protect themselves as they
would try to escape by sea and, if not, march to their nearest ally.
Athens tried to use force by using their heavy ships to break through the enemy's forces,
but ended up failing. Thus, it was time to leave via land, which was risky, for the countryside
was filled with Syracusan cavalrymen and enemy villagers. Syracuse also blocked all easily
traversable overland routes with guards. Two days after losing at sea, the 40,000 survivors
of the battle set forth, with Nicias at the front and Demosthenes at the back. They marched
across Anapus and camped on a hill, but they settled in inhabited land the next day. On
the third day, they realized the Acreaen Cliff they planned to travel through was blocked
and failed in pushing through after two attempts on two different days. On the fifth day, they
fought once more and broke through, but only for a short distance, and with supplies now
running low. As night fell and Selene set forth on her chariot to Endymion, Nicias and
Demosthenes tried to march elsewhere. Their new destination was Camaraina or Gela. The
night march ended with the two forces being split, with Demosthenes losing control over
his half, which scattered. The next day, he was caught by the Syracusans, who surrounded
his force and carpet-bombed them with javelins until Demosthenes surrendered with his 6,000
survivors. Nicias and his troops reached the River Erineus
and took up a position on high ground. Syracuse eventually caught up with them, and then Nicias
realized everyone else had surrendered. Nicias tried to bribe his way out, but the Syracusans
bombarded them with javelins for an entire day. A night escape was planned, but that
plan was discovered and foiled. The day after, the Athenians continued to the River Assinarus,
where they were attacked while trying to drink water. Nicias tried to surrender to Gylippus,
but the Syracusans continued their massacre. The few survivors were captured. Nicias and
Demosthenes, the moderate and the radical, ended up being executed. Most of the few survivors
would not see their homes again. They would be placed in a quarry where they would be
forced into manual labour under horrible conditions. As the sun set on that fateful day, Athens’s
pride was crushed, and its expeditionary force was destroyed. We can imagine the ghost of
Orpheas playing a ballad to a weeping Athena herself, who was a patron goddess of both
cities. We can also imagine a Syracusan and an Athenian mother crying before the Hekatombs
of their sons, cursing the ones who brought them to this spot.
Like many powers before and since, they overcommitted and were blinded by their imperial goals,
and thus ended up with a massive loss. Speaking of this campaign, Thucydides had this to say.
"The greatest action of all those that took place during the war and, so it seems to me,
at least, the greatest of any which we know to have happened to any of the Greeks; it
was the most glorious for those who won and the most disastrous for those who were defeated."
However, the war was not over. The second phase of the war was yet to begin, and the
political turmoil in Athens would be boiling. The conflict will return to all parts of Greece,
from the Hellespont to the islands of Crete. In the east, in the land of Ahuras and Yazatas,
the King of Kings was considering entering the geopolitical game, and we have yet to
see what will become of Alcibiades. While we ponder what will happen and process through
the massive chaos of the campaign, it is good to consider how war affects those who enter
its jaws. The greatest distillation of this comes from a friend of Perikles and a predecessor
in the art of history to Thucydides, Herodotus of Halicarnassus, who reminds us that: “No
one should be so foolish to prefer war to peace, in which, instead of sons burying their
fathers, fathers bury their sons.” As the triremes from her Sicilian expedition
were set alight upon the Mediterranean sea, Athens was utterly ruined. Thousands of Athens’
working and fighting-age population had been lost in that doomed campaign, and her people
were furious at the pro-war politicians who had brought this disaster upon their city.
During the war, the arch-traitor Alcibiades had advised Sparta to take over Decelea in
Attica and set up fortifications to starve the population. As a result of this, the silver
mines and fertile agrarian hinterlands of Athens diminished in revenue due to the Spartan
fortifications limiting access. On the pan-Hellenic stage, Athens was weaker than ever, and her
control over her allies and vassals had never been so feeble. Meanwhile, Sparta had been
buoyed by Athens’ humbling, and its pro-war faction was gaining in popularity and power.
However, as weakened as Athens was, it was still the dominant naval power in the Aegean
sea, with even Sparta’s new allies in Syracuse not being enough to tip the balance in that
theatre of the arms race. To compensate for this critical shortcoming, Sparta swallowed
its pride and asked for financial assistance from someone they normally despised; Achaemenid
Persia. The King of Kings probably no longer aspired to conquer all of Hellas as his predecessor
Xerxes had two generations earlier. However, he still hoped that by destabilizing Athens,
the Achaemenids would gain access to the crucial shipping lane of the Hellespont. Thus, Sparta
and Persia were thus, a match made in Ahura Mazda and Zeus’s heaven as Persia could
provide monetary support. According to Thucydides, the second phase
of the war began the same way the first one did, with pre-emptive escalations on both
sides. King Agis set forth to found a Spartan colony at Heraclea where he could build a
strategic location for controlling trade and supplies from the north. In addition, several
rebellious cities under Athenian hegemony sent delegations to seek assistance against
their Ionian overlord. Alcibiades advised the Spartans to slowly build alliances with
the island allies of Athens, such as Chios, which they did. He himself, having come under
pressure due to allegations of having a child with the wife of King Pleistoanax, proposed
an alliance with a local satrap in Ionia called Tissaphernes to have a base away from Sparta
and escape. This proved to be a fruitful partnership, for when Miletus was against Athens, Tissaphernes
stepped in as negotiator. Athens responded by sending ships and establishing
a base of operations in the territory that revolted. Meanwhile, Alcibiades grew increasingly
afraid of losing his privileged position in Sparta, as King Agis became impatient with
his presence. These tensions came to a head when the Spartan general Astylochos was ordered
to kill Alcibiades, prompting the turncoat to flee to Tissaphernes, who was growing anxious
due to the Spartan rejection of the treaty. Alcibiades then extended an olive branch to
the top brass of his erstwhile homeland, initiating talks with the Athenian upper classes, who
had grown distrustful of their city’s democratic institutions. To win the Athenian oligarchs
over to his side, Alcibiades promised to bring them money from Persia, funds which the economically
starved Athenians required. Alcibiades’s envoys spread the news and made the arrival
of Persian gold a done deal. The Athenian troops at Samos seemed intrigued by the idea,
as were some of the generals. Alcibiade intended to engender enough support to initiate a double
coup at Athens and Samos. Some generals like Thrasyboulos were avowed democrats, but despite
this, they saw Alcibiades as a possible solution to Athenian chronic political instability.
Others, like Phrynichos, were not keen on him returning and maintained that Persia did
not have Athenian interests at heart. Despite his concerns, he could not stop Alcibiades
from setting his plans into motion: "[O]n the fourteenth day of the Attic month of Thargelion,
June 9, 411, ... the [conspirators] seized the reality of power."
In Samos, the local insurrection was put down, but in Athens, the coup was successful, and
the Tyranny of the Four Hundred was established, a faction which almost immediately fractured
internally, splitting into moderate and extremist factions. The radical oligarchs began negotiations
with Sparta, which angered the moderates, who had agreed to Alcibiades' plot solely
to gain Persian money to fight against Sparta. Eventually, the radicals were removed in another
coup, and the moderate Council of the Five Thousand was established.
It was during 411 BCE that Sparta deployed some of its ships to Eretria. Athens believed
they were heading for Athens due to links with the Athenian oligarchs. The Athenians
soon realized where the Spartans were going and set forth to go to Euboea, an important
granary for the Athenians. The Spartans looked to Oropus as a safe harbour to take over the
island, as they worked closely with their Boeotian allies. Athens manned its remaining
ships, followed the Peloponnesians, and then met up with their powerful Eretrian allies
in the region, resulting in a combined force of 36 ships. After landing at Eretria, the
Athenian sailors moved out to procure supplies. Unbeknownst to them, they were about to be
betrayed, for Eretrea was now in cahoots with the Spartans. In a ploy to sabotage their
Athenian “allies”, the Eretrians had arranged for the empty market that the Athenians would
shop from, so they had to go outside the city to acquire provisions. Then, the Spartans
intervened after a signal was set, possibly a Walking Egyptian dance move by the Eretrian
contingent. Agesandridas, the Spartan commander, immediately
sailed to the city to engage the Athenians at sea. The Athenians dashed to their ships
and weighed anchor. They fought at sea, but eventually, the Athenians were forced to disengage
and were confined to the shore. However, ominous news awaited them as the Eretrians supported
the Spartans and massacred many of the soldiers. A total of twenty-two Athenian ships were
captured, and their crews were captured or killed. This spelt the end of Athenian influence
on Euboea, with the entire island rising in revolt, except for Oreus. Soon, Sparta had
taken over the isle and deprived Athens of one of its most crucial breadbaskets. The
Athenian navy at Samos, which was a pro-democracy stronghold and an ally of Athens, was now
in turmoil and sought to restore democracy in Athens. Though they considered him a traitor,
they asked for Alcibiades to lead the army due to his previous reconnecting with them
and his promises to help them previously. Around here, we must say goodbye to Thucydides,
the historian whose records have been crucial in helping us chronicle the war. His text
ends here rather abruptly, as he presumably died around 400 BCE before he could complete
his magnum opus. His text showed a profound realism and a keen understanding of the suffering
inherent in war, and scholars to this date debate his real character and philosophy.
From now on, we will focus on sources from later authors such as Xenophon or Plutarch.
The moderate oligarchy in Athens now sought to secure grain imports from their other breadbasket:
the Hellespont. They managed to have a few successes in the Hellespont, with the first
being at Cynossema in 411 BCE. The battle began because of the payment. The
Peloponnesian fleet was stationed at Miletus, but the local satrap Tissaphernes had not
paid them in some time. In the meantime, the Hellespont satrap Pharnabazos was requesting
their assistance, so the fleet of seventy-three ships led by Mindaros, began to move north.
They stopped due to a storm in Icarus, then moved to Chios. The Athenian fleet of fifty-five
ships at Samos, led by Thrasylos, moved up north in response, and when the Spartans stopped,
moved to besiege a city in Lesbos. Afterwards, a certain Thrasyboulos joined him and the
ships increased to sixty-seven in number. The Peloponnesians pushed forth and landed
at the Hellespont at Rhoeteum. Athens also had eighteen ships at Sestos, and Sparta sixteen
ships at Abydos. The small Athenian fleet, fearful of a trap, escaped but lost four ships,
while Mindaros got the small fleet and now had eighty ships. Athens had seventy-six combined
ships and moved slowly across the European part of the Hellespont, with the Spartans
in Abydos moving across their shore. The fleets lined up in parallel across the straits, and
the naval battle began. Thrasylos was on the left, and Thrasyboulos on the right. Mindaros
was on the left and the Syracusan allies on the right. Mindaros began to move trying to
outflank the right flank of the Athenians. The Athenians spread out their right wing
and had their left wing continue to move up the Hellespont. The centre of the Peloponnesians
moved and pushed the Athenian centre onto the land, where the battle became land-based.
The Athenian wings at sea held on, and managed to defeat their enemies, coming in the centre
to save their comrades. They crushed the centre of the Peloponnesians and freed their friends
on land. Most Peloponnesian ships managed to flee and as such had enough to fight another
day. Athens lost fifteen ships and captured twenty-one, but the Athenians were finally
winning after a long time and were thus very, very happy.
Abydos happened some time afterwards. This is the first battle described after Thucydides
ended his narration, forcing us to use Diodoros and Xenophon, whose accounts differ in some
respects. In both accounts, a man from Rhodes, called Dorieus, who was helping the Peloponnesians,
entered the Hellespont, was detected by the Athenians, and was pursued by them either
with their whole fleet of seventy-four ships or by part of just twenty ships. The Rhodians,
who, according to Xenophon had fourteen ships, landed on shore either at Rhoeteum or Dardanus
and were pursued by the Athenians, until Mindaros detected them and sailed with his main fleet,
with Diodoros mentioning eighty-four ships. A battle ensued, but the Peloponnesians were
pushed onto the shore, only saved thanks to Pharnabazos’s timely intervention. Thrasyboulos
had the right wing of the Athenians, opposite Mindaros, and Thrasyllus the left, opposite
the Syracusans. The battle took a long time, from morning until the afternoon, according
to Xenophon. Then, Alcibiades arrived with either 18 or 20 ships, and the Peloponnesians
fled back to Abydos. Diodoros claims that the Athenians captured ten ships but were
stopped by a storm and by the time they reached the Peloponnesians, they had fled ashore and
they could not capture more ships. Xenophon doesn’t mention a storm, but says that during
the land-based battle, the Athenians did capture thirty ships as well as their previously captured
ships. As such, the battle was a major Athenian victory.
However, even after winning victories in Cynossema and Abydos in 411 BCE, they continued to have
issues securing total control of the region. Persia’s navy was providing Sparta with
assistance in blockading the Hellespont. The Persian Satrap Pharnabazos controlled a significant
cavalry force which would become important in the land section of the battle, while the
Spartan admiral Mindaros assembled a fleet of ships drawn from the entire Peloponnesian
League. Diodoros Sikelos claims this united force comprised 80 ships, while Xenophon more
conservatively claims it was around 60. The Athenian fleet, united under Alcibiades, was
of similar strength, composed of 86 triremes. To avoid being locked inside the Hellespont,
the Athenians moved into the Aegean and positioned themselves north of Gallipoli.
Cyzicus was a city near the shores of Marmara, and the Spartan navarchos or naval leader
Mindarus was keen to besiege and take it over. The Persian Satrap Pharnabazos joined him
with his cavalry, and they quickly forced the city into surrender. When the Athenians
reached Hellespont, they hid in the city of Abydos to hide their true arsenal from the
enemy. The initial plans of Athens are described quite differently by Xenophon and Diodoros
Sikelos. Xenophon describes that the fleet waited for heavy rain to approach the city
of Cyzicus under cover of the downpour. Alcibiades took his squadron past the Peloponnesians,
causing Mindarus to follow him. Alcibiades is said to have landed, and Mindarus followed
him. Alcibiades is then claimed to have turned around the ships to chase Mindarus in a surprise
attack, causing him to flee to a beach to the south of the town. The armies moved to
the shore and began to fight. In this fight, Alcibiades emerged victorious, while Mindarus
was killed. Syracuse fled by burning its ships, and everyone else was taken, prisoner. Diodoros
claims Athens tried to ambush the enemy by splitting into three. Alcibiades sailed into
Cyzicus with twenty ships and then was to sail back to bait the Peloponnesians. Theramenes
and Thrasybullus then took their own ships and hid before attacking and blocking the
Peloponnesians from the shore. However, this did not work as the Athenians
intended. When Mindarus chased Alcibiades, and the ambush was triggered, the Peloponnesians
fled inland to Cleri. There, they met up with Pharnabazus’s cavalry forces. As the Athenians
chased them, they ruined many Peloponnesian ships and then used grappling harpoons to
take over the ships on the shore. The battle then moved on to the land. Alcibiades and
Mindarus surrounded the ships and began to fight on land to take over the remnants of
the Peloponnesian fleet. Diodoros says that in this clash, Mindarus was killed, but the
Athenians seized the entirety of the Peloponnesian fleet. Xenophon quotes a Spartan dispatch
home, which laconically mentions how 'the ships are gone. Mindarus has disappeared.
The men are hungry. We don't know what to do.’ Cyzicus fell within the next few days,
and with its conquest, Athenian control over the Hellespont was fully reasserted.
The string of lightning bolt victories in the Hellespont greatly boosted Athenian morale.
The mood amongst the people of Athens was high, as they now had secured their breadbasket
in the Hellespont. The moderate oligarchy was keen to capitalize on this victory, but
not with further warfare. Instead, they considered a peace deal with Sparta in which they would
give over Pylos and secure their other gains elsewhere. The people and the Samian democrats,
however, were not having it. We are not sure how this unfolded, but we can assume that
some local support flared amongst the people of Athens to restore democracy. We must also
consider the class analysis, one that many philosophers of Athens disliked due to their
elitism; that the Five Thousand represented only the classes of the rich and the zeugitai,
whereas democracy represented the power of even the unpropertied lower classes of men.
There is little detail of the democratic movement in Athens, but we can imagine the mass of
the people slowly coming over to the idea of regaining power as the fear of the Sicilian
loss and the oligarchic chaos dawned on them. Alcibiades and the other generals at Samos
returned, and democracy was fully restored once more. They took harsh measures against
Tyranny, stopping the revision of old democratic laws and bringing a grant to all citizens
called diobelia, or gift of two obols. The Agora restored the Boule of the Five Hundred,
but with limitations on legal punishment and crimes. The important use of the wording of
the first laws after the restoration made it rhetorically clear that the democracy of
Athens was back and ready to fight for its interests and values. They also instituted
that attacks on democracy were illegal. Athens had bounced back from a disastrous campaign
and economic and political chaos. The war, however, was not over yet. The Peloponnesian
League was still out there, and the Athenian Empire was now trying to hold on to its newfound
gains. Persia was now fully engaged in the war through Sparta as an ally and a proxy.
The Peloponnesian War’s second phase was now fully underway, and Athenian generals
like Alcibiades were ready to continue the war.
In a resurgent democracy, the old factional actors were at it again, including Alcibiades.
Seen as a traitor by many, he was eager to regain the power and favour he had once held
in the city through military successes. Militarily, Athens concentrated its efforts on the Hellespont,
where they were trying to assume complete control of the region and push out Spartan
and Persian influence. In 410 BCE, they built their navy again and began preparing for the
war in those narrow straits. Meanwhile, Sparta tried to break through to allied cities like
Chalcedon, but Athenian patrols destroyed these expeditions. Athens’ vice over the
Hellespont was secured when they entered into diplomatic negotiations with Sparta’s ally,
the Shahanshah of the Achaemenids, and managed to secure a deal with Pharnabazos to maintain
control of Chalcedon. Things were not looking good for Sparta, but
as fortune would have it, court intrigue in Persia would soon turn the tides back in their
favour. Two Achaemenid princes, Arsaces, the oldest, and Cyrus, the second-born, were engaged
in a battle for the throne, with the Queen-Mother, Parysatis, favouring the latter. Cyrus had
the odds stacked against him, for multiple other relatives and powerful satraps, including
our old friend Tissaphernes, were all against him, as they all preferred Arsaces as ruler.
Nevertheless, with the help of his mother, Cyrus outmanoeuvred them all, then sought
to secure his position by gaining a secure alliance with Sparta.
It is here, in 407 BCE, where our well-acquainted Spartan mothax Lysander entered the Aegean
as a navarch once more. Lysander had taken over from the now-dead Mindarus and was keen
to assert Sparta’s interests in the Aegean. Athens was doing very well in the region,
so a tightening of the Perso-Spartan friendship was in order. Lysander and Cyrus subsequently
met in Sardis and agreed to work together against Athens in Asia Minor. This provides
an intriguing insight into the geopolitics of this phase of the war. While both Sparta
and Persia had a common enemy, their alliance was not guaranteed due to different schools
of thought in their political arenas. Many Spartans feared that their role as protectors
of Hellas would be compromised if they became dependent on Persia and had to give up influence
in Ionia. We have no sources from the Persian side, but it is possible they feared Sparta
replacing Athens as a rival in the region. Sparta used Persian funds to increase the
pay of their rowers and then built up 20 triremes at Ephesos, increasing its 70-strong fleet
to 90. In response, Alcibiades forced Lysander’s hand and took an Athenian fleet to Notium.
Lysander did not take the bait, biding his time. After a while, Alcibiades left his main
fleet to tour nearby Athenian garrisons, bestowing command of his ships on his second mate, Antiochos.
Antiochos was given orders not to fight Lysander. However, being a typical Athenian, Antiochos
ignored the orders and began a naval attack on the Spartans anyway. Here, our principal
primary sources of Diodoros and Xenophon diverge in their accounting of events. Diodoros says
Antiochos took ten ships straight to Ephesos, causing Lysander to take out his force, one-shot
KO Antiochos’s ship, and then begin a chase of screaming Athenian sailors back to Notium.
Xenophon says Antiochos only brought two ships to the harbour and sailed to the Spartans.
Lysander only sent a few ships at first, but apparently, Athens sent more ships, but the
reinforcements only caused the Spartan fleet to be unleashed.
In any case, the Spartans crushed Antiochos’ advance force, then sailed onwards to Notium.
The Athenians in Notium dashed to their ships, sailed out, and organized themselves in many
small contingents to do battle. Ultimately, they were destroyed by Sparta’s numerical
superiority, with 15 of the 22 ships being sunk. A triumphant Lysander returned to Ephesos.
Alcibiades returned in utter humiliation to Samos, where the army had retreated. In a
last bid to save his reputation, Alcibiades took his entire fleet to Ephesos to offer
battle. Still, Lysander remained barricaded and refused to engage, knowing he would be
disadvantaged if he did so. Humiliated, the Athenians returned to Samos. This was the
end of Alcibiades’ political career. After the defeat of his navy, the Athenian people
turned against him, and he went into self-exile in Thrace. He would unsuccessfully try to
re-enter politics for the remainder of his life until he passed away in 404 BCE. We are
not sure how this happened, but Plutarch claims it happened when he went to the Persian court
to gain favour for Athens against Sparta. However, his nemesis Lysander had already
sent envoys to Pharnabazus to arrange for assassins to take Alcibiades out. The assassins
set Alcibiades’s house on fire, and Alcibiades decided to have his final stand. He rushed
out of the burning structure and was killed in the ensuing knife brawl. Thus ends the
story of the statesman, traitor, general and turncoat who decided to meet his end with
honour. In 406 BCE, Lysander was relieved of his post.
The navarch who succeeded him in the admiralty, Callicratidas, continued trying to break through
to the Athenian sphere of influence. This meant going around the Ionian coast to try
to take some cities in that region from Athens. Callicratidas was going to face an Athenian
admiral named Conon, and he tried to make sure he had a numerical advantage by rallying
140 ships to his side. The fleet began sailing across the coast and engaging in minor battles.
The first was the siege was Delphinium in 406 BCE. Delphinium was an Athenian base on
Chios, an island that had been one of the first fortresses to rebel against Athens after
the Syracuse debacle. Despite Athens’s inability to retake Chios, they managed to begin a blockade
of the island using the fortress and ensured some minimal control in the region. This meant
that the Spartans would find local support there, especially since Athens had never been
able to retake the city fully but had been blockading it since their rebellion.
Outside the Delphinium was a 500-strong Athenian garrison trying to take over a hostile island
who now faced an entire Peloponnesian fleet. This gulf in manpower must have become obvious
to them as soon as they saw the fleet appear, so before the fight began, they raised the
white flag of surrender. The Spartans let them go and join the other Athenian forces,
and then they proceeded to level the fortress to the ground. Following this success, Callicratidas
continued to a second Athenian stronghold at Methymne on the island of Lesbos, which
had a far larger garrison. Sparta sent out waves of attackers to breach this bastion,
all of whom were repulsed. Nevertheless, Callicratidas eventually broke inside some of the walls,
presumably the outer ones. Here, we see divergences amongst the post-Thucydidean historiographical
landscape. According to Diodoros Sikelos, the local Methymnians wished to stop the fighting.
As such, they betrayed the city to the Spartans by letting them inside the walls. Xenophon
doesn't mention any such betrayal, and merely describes an eventual victorious assault.
The Peloponnesian Fleet then moved on and almost intercepted the Athenian navy. Conon,
the Athenian commander, took his ships and fled, though many Athenian vessels were captured.
Conon was in the region to help the Methymnians but had stayed in Hecatonnesia to the south
of Adramyttium to Lesbos’s east after hearing of the city’s fall. The Peloponnesians tried
to cut them off from their base in Samos. At dawn, the Athenians and Spartans met at
sea, and Conon fled towards Mytilene. Callicratidas chased after him and entered the harbour of
the city, which was a massive gulf region. The battle endured, and thirty ships were
destroyed on the Athenian side, although the crews mostly survived. Callicratides surrounded
the city and began a long siege. Our two historians diverge in their accounts yet again. Xenophon
describes a lack of food, which caused the city to face starvation. He claims that Conon
tried to send a message for help to Athens with two of his ships. One ship was captured,
while the other reached the Hellespont and from there, broke through to Athens. Diodorus
Siculus describes things differently, claiming that Conon initiated the first battle and
that the second harbour battle was done after the siege began. Ten ships worked their way
from Samos to Athens, but Callicratidas intercepted and captured them.
As Athens heard of the siege in Mytilene, its citizens immediately began to raise a
new fleet from across their entire empire. A multitude of ships from Athens, their Samian
sidekicks and other Aegean islands were assembled and sent forth from Samos. Thus began the
epic struggle that was the 406 BCE Battle of Arginusae. Athens sent no less than eight
of their finest generals to the fight; Aristocrates, Aristogenes, Diomedon, Erasinides, Lysias,
Pericles the Younger, the son of Perikles and Aspasia, Protomachus and Thrasyllus. Athens
also had 70 ships under Conon in the region and, with their reinforcements, had a tally
of 155 ships. Sparta had 140 ships there already present. Callicratidas had grown increasingly
confident and thus took 120 ships to come along to face the Athenian combatants. The
rest of the ships stayed at Mytilene. The two armies were fated to meet as the Greek
Goddess of Dawn, Eos, set her chariot forth for the new day after a thunderstorm the Greeks
could only believe Zeus himself had sent. The western shores of the Arginusae islands
were to witness the greatest naval battle of the Peloponnesian War.
The Athenian fleet arranged itself into two lines. The far left flank included Aristocrates
with fifteen ships, while Perikles the Younger was right behind him. To their right was Diomedon,
with fifteen ships and Erasinides behind him. The centre flank included Athens’ loyal
Aegean allies, with Athenian taxiarchs and navarchs in command of the fleet. Further
right was Protomachus with Lysias behind him with fifteen ships each. The fringe right
flank included Thrasylus, who commanded the front line and Aristogenes, the rear. The
Athenian left wing was next to the open sea, while the right was towards the shore. The
allies were in the centre of the line, right in front of the Arginusae islands. This was
an ingenious strategic move, as the Spartans had to be close to not fall into the open
sea, while the island at the back meant that any form of sneak attack could not surround
Athens. Callicratides responded by splitting his fleet,
with him taking up the right flank and his Boeotian allies under Thrasondas the Theban
taking up the left flank. The Spartan admiral was outnumbered this time and felt Sparta
was growing increasingly dependent on Persia. Thus, he decided to initiate the fight in
order to gain a short-term victory that would gain the advantage without Persian help, and
the ships clashed on the shores of Arginusae. The ships rammed into each other while the
waves of Poseidon clashed and churned against the islands' shores. The Athenians opened
up their ships as they advanced, taking full control of the naval landscape, with the back
flanks covering any gaps to stop the Spartans from passing between and surrounding them.
Despite the numerical advantage, it was not an easy victory for the Athenians, as both
of our sources mention that the battle lasted for a very long time. Having made his choice,
Callicratidas met his end on that fateful day, though our sources differ on how this
happens. We know that he took his ship and rammed into the Athenians. According to Xenophon,
he fell off the ship during the ramming and died, while Diodoros claims he got entangled
with the ships of Perikles the Younger and fell while fighting. Whatever the case, Callicratidas
died fighting his enemies for the glory of his alliance. It had been said that before
the battle, his allies told him that it would be difficult for them to win, so they had
to forestall the fight. He is thought to have replied like king Leonidas or Hector of the
Trojans by saying: ‘If I die in combat, Sparta will suffer no ill. If I surrender,
Sparta will endure great shame.’ Eventually, one of the Spartan flanks also
broke, signalling the beginning of the end, though both our main sources disagree on whether
it was the right or left flank. The Peloponnesians fled to Chios, leaving the Athenians behind.
70 ships of Sparta were destroyed, while only 25 ships were destroyed on the Athenian side.
This was a fight won by a desperate Athenian state. It is here that we see what happened
to Conon, who was still under blockade. The generals decided to split their army to go
to Mytilene to help him escape the blockade he was in, with 2/3s going to help and ⅓
staying behind to save their comrades at sea. Two Trierarchs, Thrasyvoulos and Theramenes,
were tasked with trying to save the remaining sailors while the other navarchs went to pursue
the Spartans. Eteonicus, the Peloponnesian commander at Mytilene, evacuated his army
and his fleet, allowing Conon to emerge from the blockaded city and link up with the main
Athenian fleet. Due to the split in naval forces and a massive storm which constrained
the movements of ships, neither enough wounded were saved, nor the dead collected. Thus,
when news reached Athens, they were bittersweet as the shade of Odysseas’s mother when they
met in the Gates of Hades. The Athenians were angry. The Generals knew this; as they watched
the sunset at Arginusae, the Athenian debates would commence once more.
The debate in the aftermath of the Battle was very heated. The generals believed Theramenes
to be at fault for not saving the drowned sailors, while Theramenes thought the generals
had been too long in pursuing the Spartans. The former believed Thramenes was trash-talking
them, a common sight in Athenian politics. As such, they sent a letter mentioning the
blame was due to the storm. The Athenians were angry so the generals thought Theramenes
had begun his own campaign against them, due to people angrily blaming them for the deaths
of the men. As such, they sent another letter discussing how the captains had been given
the order to collect the dead, implicitly blaming them for the tragedy and letting themselves
off the hook. Theramenes and Thrasyvoulos were very influential in ancient Athens, as
well as being efficient politicians and speakers. As such, they began to lobby in the Agora,
claiming they were given an impossible order to fulfil. Diodoros tells us that making these
two as enemies doomed the generals. Erasinides was imprisoned, while two others, Aristogenes
and Protomachos, felt that it would be a biassed trial against them and had deserted before
arriving. This made the situation for the remaining generals even more precarious as
a perception of guilt was sown amongst the Athenians. There was a heated debate, with
many discussing the pros and cons of their guilt. The trial’s emotional high stakes
were harrowing, and thus, the trial was hasty and without the usual recourse to the law
that Athens was known for. As such, the six remaining generals and many of their inferior
officers were found guilty and executed. Many Athenians later realised their erroneous
procedures and the cruelty of the punishment they inflicted upon the generals and came
to regret it. Sparta also offered peace on the status quo’s terms, knowing full well
that Lysander, who was very powerful and eager to regain command and was both bold and without
moral qualms, was bound to try to regain power. Athens ended up refusing as many politicians,
including a man called Cleophon, thought that they could win complete supremacy over the
Aegean. This was when the Three Fates decided the fate of the war. Lysander was bound to
return, and Sparta was still in an alliance with Persia. As such, the war was bound to
continue. We are approaching the war's final two years, which will be decisive in their
geopolitical effects upon Hellas. The two alliances will settle their scores on multiple
fronts on land and sea. In addition, the Athenians will finally have to face the Spartans on
their soil and defend their homes as they once did against the Persians. The clashes
will be mighty, and the stakes will be high, and only the Olympians know who will go to
Elysium and who to Tartaros. Despite the Athenian victory at Arginusae,
the once mighty democracy was short of money and had lost many of its best generals. Sparta
was considering how best to move forward after their loss at Arginusae and their Athenian
foe’s rejection of their proposed peace deal after the fact. As such, it was imperative
to them to work with Persia once more, whose King of Kings had by now come to see the Peloponnesian
conflict as a proxy war against the pesky meddlers of Athens who were trying to seize
control of Ionia and the Hellespont from them. The Athenian rejection, according to Donald
Kagan, had to do with fears of precisely this sort of restoration of relations, as the Spartans
would have to continue investing resources in the war instead of regrouping with Persian
assistance, but like the futility of Oedipus’s parents trying to avoid their son, Persia
was bound to get involved sooner or later. As we will recall from our previous episode,
Lysander had gone to negotiate with the Persians at the court of the Shahanshah himself. He
had also been in talks with many of the Peloponnesian League’s member states, many of whom were
Ionian cities terrified of an Athenian raid on their home turf. Driven by this fear, the
Peloponnesian League cities called for a meeting in which their Spartan ringleaders could be
persuaded to assist them. At this Congress, which was held in Ephesus, both the Peloponnesian
allies and the Persians requested Lysander to resume his role as Naval Transport Supremo
or Navarch for short. Lysander prepared a new fleet of 35 ships, and in 406/405 BCE,
he set out from the Peloponnese to his very own Garden of the Hesperides, Ephesos. Provided
with a large sum of Persian money worthy of Midas’s golden touch itself, Lysander had
the funds necessary to begin a process of rearmament of the Peloponnesian fleet. He
also managed to secure the support of towns like Miletos, where his predecessor and rival
Callicratides had tried to break up his power circles through violence and intimidation.
Lysander then moved to Caria, which had sided with Athens in 412 BCE and summarily captured
it, killing its men and selling its women as slaves. He then set his sights on the strategic
chokehold that everyone had been fighting over for years now; the Hellespont. In these
narrow passes, where the Clashing Rocks failed to stop the Argonauts on their journey to
Colchis, the fate of the Hellenic city-states would be decided.
The Athenians had spent part of the year improving their navy and had decided to set up a base
in the Hellespont. Alkibiades, who was exiled there and was still alive for the time being,
had come down to observe it and declare its fortifications were inadequate. He claimed
land troops were important in this situation, which previous battles in the Hellespont had
clarified. In addition, he claimed that Athens would be better off setting up a base at Sestos
and using help from Thracian kings nearby. Lysander had taken the city after a storm
and was now situated there. However, Conon, Philocles and Adeimantus, who were the Athenian
generals in command at the Hellespont, rejected his offer as they saw it as impractical and
preferred to be close to Lysander to potential reinforcements.
Meanwhile, Lysander, alongside his Spartan supporter Aracus, had managed to rebuild his
army and navy to its most formidable size and shape yet, with a total of 170 ships.
However, his enemies had an equally formidable force, for Athens possessed 180 ships with
around 36,000 men. Initially, the Athenians set out from Aegopotamoi and went outside
Lamspacus. There, they formed a line of ships ready to face the mighty Lysander; however,
much like Odysseas avoiding the gaze of Polyphemos, the Spartans refused to come out and fight.
Growing bored of the wait, the Athenians pulled back. The pattern of going to the site and
waiting in vain for Lysander’s counter strike repeated for days as Lysander carefully gathered
intelligence with his fast reconnaissance ships.
The Delian League eventually became more and more careless. As it did, Lysander took advantage
and performed his decisive masterstroke. However, our sources differ on how this came to be.
Diodoros claims that the Athenian generals rotated daily on who would go and try to lure
out Lysander. On the fifth day, the general in charge, Philokles, went out with thirty
triremes but decided this was not enough. As such, he sent a call back to base for the
rest of the ships to follow him, thus splitting the squadron that was meant to attack Lysander.
We are not sure of the reasoning behind this move, although it has been speculated that
it could have been a diversionary tactic or a plan to lure the Spartans to Sestos and
defeat them. Whatever the case, Lysander got wind of this through some deserters and immediately
set out to face the divided fleet, taking each squadron one by one.
He first came across Philokles flagship, and the triremes clashed. This was a quick victory
for the Spartan mothax, who then allegedly moved forward towards the European shores
of the Hellespont. He met the Athenians there, who were unprepared, and set his ships on
them. In Xenophon’s account, Athens was in a precarious situation as they had to travel
far and wide to procure supplies. As such, on that fifth day, Lysander’s scouts saw
the Athenians working to find food, and saw a golden opportunity to strike. They raised
a shield, like Perseas hunting the Medusa, and signalled the Peloponnesians to come.
Here, our sources converge as the bloodbath initiated by Lysander begins. Athens sent
some ships to stall the Spartan, but he pushed through them. He then ordered his forces to
secure the ships which were on shore and managed to capture most of them. These ships excluded
Conon’s who took nine Spartan vessels as the carnage began and escaped. Soon, the troops
also landed and began to hunt down the Athenians. After years of being raided by Athens, the
Peloponnesian allies set about their gruesome vengeance. 3,000 Athenians were massacred,
except for a general, Adeimantos, either because he was a traitor or because he was the most
willing to negotiate with Sparta. As for the deserter Conon, he fled to Cyprus.
Athens heard of the defeat when a trireme named the Paralus appeared in the harbour
of Piraeus. The citizens knew what was to come and tried to prepare accordingly by raising
arms and supplies for a siege. Deprived of a costly fleet and with the power of Sparta
fast approaching, a siege of Athens was bound to occur. Lysander, for his part, had begun
to cripple Athenian control over the Hellespont and its fertile grain farms by taking out
multiple of Athens’s allied city-states. He also captured the Athenian stronghold of
Sestos, set the men free to return to their home city, and warn the Athenians of what
was to come. On the site of Decelea, where the Spartans had taken residence with King
Agis, the army set out to surround Athens. The other King of Sparta, Pausanians, focused
on rallying Sparta’s Peloponnesian allies to raise their troops and finally storm Athens.
The trap was finally fully closed when Lysander gathered 200 ships and set up a blockade of
Piraeus. Athens was now isolated by land and sea; the siege had begun.
Knowing what had occurred when the Peloponnesian allies executed the prisoners at Aegospotamoi,
the Athenians were resolved to hold out. However, time was not on their side, for soon, their
supply stockpiles began to dwindle. The foot on their neck was lifted slightly when Pausanias
left to return to the Peloponnese for unclear reasons, and Lysander left for Samos, where
upstart democrats were still on the loose. The latter left behind some ships which managed
to maintain the blockade. Knowing their time was running out, the Athenians sent an embassy
led by Theramenes to King Agis, who was still at Decelea. Although the Allies of the Peloponesse
demanded the complete destruction of Athens, Agis refused to cave to their bloodthirsty
request and instead considered the offer presented to him by the Athenian ambassador. In this
proposal, Athens offered to subordinate itself to Sparta, joining the Spartan alliance because
they were allowed to keep their city walls. The Spartan ephors rejected this offer, enraging
the Athenians and causing them to return to a politically and militarily isolated position.
Some Athenians, like Archestratos, counselled that they accept further negotiations (implying
that even the Long Walls were up for debate), but the Athenians were afraid of Sparta doing
to them what Athens did to Melos and imprisoned him. By contrast, non-capitulationists like
Cleophon passed a motion banning any further negotiations with the enemy.
However, starvation began to seep into the city, and soon, the Athenians were once more
desperate enough to go to the bargaining table. Theramenes went and negotiated with Lysander.
He made the case that the Thebans, who were on the rise, were not to be trusted with setting
terms for the negotiations. He also managed to convince the Spartan mothax, who himself
was in a politically unstable situation, to allow some constitutional autonomy to Athens.
Initially, Lysander wanted to discipline the Agora by imposing a strict oligarchy with
limited franchise upon them, but Theramenes convinced him it would be better to install
a moderate oligarchy with a more expanded franchise based on income instead, which would
be enough to contain Athenian democracy’s unpredictable politics and bold foreign policy
adventures. As such, despite the hardline demands of Corinth and Thebes to destroy the
city, a harsh but comparatively less brutal peace was agreed to. Sparta considered Athens’s
past contributions during the Persian invasions decades before to have made them worthy of
both mercy and of consideration. And as such, the blockade was finally lifted, and Athens
surrendered to the Peloponnesian Army. Sparta’s terms were targeted and specific,
and while moderate compared to Thebes and Corinth’s ideas of vengeance, they must
have still been exceptionally humiliating to the proud Athenians, especially when they
had to endure watching Lysander landing into Piraeus and demolishing the walls. Athens
was to remain an independent city, but it was to fully embed itself in the Spartan sphere
of influence and alliance system. The Athenians were allowed to keep the ‘Patrios Politeia’
or ancient constitution, which played a key role in Theramenes’ ability to get Athens
to accept the deal, as any of the city’s factions could see it as a preservation of
their democracy. Athens was also to have its navy reduced to twelve ships. Moreover, exiles
from the city were to return and be re-integrated into Athenian society. We cannot know what
the Athenians thought about this arrangement, but we know that Theramenes used his rapport
with the Spartans to install himself as one of the Thirty Tyrants, a short lived dictatorial
regime which took over Athens after the war’s end at Sparta’s behest. These Thirty Tyrants
were keen on controlling the opposition and began a reign of terror by scratching away
the democratic laws in the Royal Stoa of the Athenian Agora. Critias was particularly cruel,
causing many to despise the new government. Athens’s tradition of protest and revolt
reared up once more, for the Tyrants’ rule lasted only about a year. Eventually, many
democrats, like a trierarch called Thrasyboulos, rose in revolt from exile and fought bitterly
until they restored the fabled Athenian democracy. This civil war, known to us as the Phyle Campaign,
began as follows: The Thirty Tyrants had only left the franchise to the so-called Three
Thousand, and had begun to target democrats and metics. As a result, a steady flow of
exiles gathered in Thebes around Thrasyboulos, whose reputation in the Peloponnesian War
had made him popular with loyalists. Thrasyboulos, alongside his comrade Anytos, was determined
to find ways to restore democracy in Athens. As such, the two of them, like Athenian versions
of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, set forth with only seventy loyalist democrats and marched
into Athenian territory in the fort of Phyle. The Tyrants, alarmed at the democratic force
coming so quickly into their territory being a magnet for subversive activity, began to
mobilize the Three Thousand. The vanguard force marched up onto Phyle and set camp outside
the fortress to try and take it. An initial attack by part of the Tyrants’s force was
easily repelled by the rebels. The Thirty Tyrants arrived later and began preparations
for a siege. However, this was happening during the winter of 404 BCE, and they became stuck
in a snowstorm. The daring democrats actually managed to send part of their force out and
harass the tyrannic forces, forcing them to retreat. From there, the Tyrants summoned
forces from the Spartan contingent at Athens led by Callibios, and alongside them and two
divisions of Athenian cavalry, they set forth. They found a fort near the one at Phyle and
began to block access to farmland that could be used for farming by the Democrats. In the
meantime, Thrasyboulos’s force was increasing and had reached 700 men and was determined
to keep his advantage. At nightfall, they left the fortress and reached the Spartan-Tyrant
fort. At dawn, as the men were waking, they struck by attacking the fort. The Spartans
were caught by surprise, and many of them were killed. The rest fled alongside the surviving
Athenian cavalry. A gleeful Thrasyboulos erected a trophy at the site and went back to Phyle.
The Thirty were beginning to be anxious. The revolt was gaining strength, as Thrasyboulos
had now amassed 1000 men. They tried to get him to come to the dark side and join their
ranks, but he rebuked them. The Thirty also prepared a Dr Evil-style refuge bunker at
the settlement of Eleusis, where the famous Eleusinian mysteries took place. Thrasyboulos,
for his part, was growing bolder in his aims. The Democrats knew that Peiraeas, Athens’s
famous port, was now unfortified after the Long Walls were taken down, and that many
Democrats were exiled there. The port, with its low-wage working population and cosmopolitanism,
was a hotbed of radical democracy, making it the ideal spot for them to gain a foothold
for restoring the noble polity. As such, the stage for the Battle of Munychia was set.
Here, as usual, Diodoros and Xenophon provide us with different accounts of the prelude
to the Battle. Diodoros says that the Thirty set up camp in a fort at Acharnae near Peiraeas,
and the marching Democrats found them and defeated them, causing their retreat. For
Xenophon, the Democrats captured the port at night and, realizing that defending the
city would spread them out too thin, decided to march out. In both cases, they took up
positions on the hill of Munychia near Peiraeas, and the battle commenced. We do not have much
from the account of Diodoros, so that we will focus on that of Xenophon. As it happened,
the Tyrants built up a line of fifty ranks at a market in Hippodamos and began to march
up the hill. The Democrats had a line ten ranks deep, with the light troops and spear-throwers
in the back lines. As the Tyrants began to move up the hill, Thrasyboulos ordered them
not to attack, as his seer had told him not to move until either he or Thrasyboulos were
wounded or killed. Soon, the seer was attacked and entered the Fields of Elysium, and Thrasyboulos
ordered a charge down the hill. The attack broke into the oligarchic lines and pushed
through, even killing two of the tyrants, Kritias and Hippomachos. After the Battle,
the Thirty were deposed by the Three Thousand, and a Council of Ten, one from each tribe,
was assembled in their place. Only two of the Thirty were in that council, with the
rest fleeing to Eleusis. In the meantime, Sparta was scrambling to
take control of the situation, stuck between recognizing the Thirty or the Ten as a legitimate
government, as both had sent them emissaries. Two major players were vying for control:
Lysander, who had set up the Thirty, and Pausanias, one of the two Kings. Lysander was initially
appointed harmost and set out to Eleusis, beginning mobilization alongside the Thirty.
Pausanias later lobbied and was granted a force of various Peloponnesian forces by three
of the five ephors of Sparta, with Thebes and Corinth refusing to send troops out of
fear of Sparta becoming too powerful. Pausanias arrived at Attica, and a grumbling Lysander
was forced to join him. The Spartans took positions outside Peiraeas, Pausanias on the
right flank and Lysander on the left flank. Pausanias began with a move of diplomacy,
asking the rebels to disperse. When this was rebuked, he launched an attack, weakened their
defences, and then retreated. The next day, he went on reconnaissance to see if a siege
wall was practical, but the Democrats sent raids to try and stop him. Pausanias used
his hoplites to push them back and killed thirty of them, then followed the rest into
Peiraeas. There, the rest of the democratic forces were preparing and arming. They managed
to push the Spartans back, killing some of the commanders, including an Olympic champion
called Lacrates. Thrasyboulos formed eight ranks with his hoplites and began to move
forward. Pausanias retreated and united his forces into one. Forming a much deeper formation,
he pushed forward on the Democrats who chose a last stand. The Democrats fought valiantly
but lost and were forced to retreat. They had lost 150 men in total, while the Spartans
only 13. Pausanias was a defensive man in terms of
foreign policy, so he reached out once more with his offer of diplomacy. Both the Ten
and the Democrats sent emissaries to Sparta, where a negotiated settlement was reached;
democracy would be restored, and a general pardon would be offered to all except the
Thirty Tyrants and their most egregious collaborators. The remnants of tyranny remained free at Eleusis
and tried to organize a mercenary army but were discovered, and the democrats launched
an assault, squashing the authoritarians once and for all. Pausanias was tried for his actions
after sycophancy by Lysander but was acquitted. Although Athens had preserved its political
identity, Sparta was now the undisputed grand superpower of Hellas, but this would not last
long. Sparta’s constitution was suited to an isolated state needing social harmony.
It was not suited to running an empire. Soon, many allies like Corinth and Thebes began
to break away. Eager to maintain its status as top dog, Sparta soon began to terrorize
upstart states like Elis and try to recover its reputation as the champions of the Hellenic
world, which had been tarnished due to their alliance with Persia. To that end, under the
reign of King Agesilaos , Sparta began to campaign in Asia Minor.
Thebes eventually grew as a power and expanded its influence throughout Hellas, a trajectory
seen since the final years of the Peloponnesian War. Ironically, in the Corinthian War of
395-387 BCE, four unlikely allies: Thebes, Argos, Athens, and Corinth, came together
with the help of the Achaemenid Empire to fight off the Spartans, resulting in a conflict
which ended in a stalemate. However, after this, Athens regained its Long Walls and became
a major power once more, though never an empire like before. Thebes would eventually become
its own small empire, but this was an ephemeral victory. Soon, from the northern plains of
Macedon, the Argead Dynasty would grow and, through far more prudent diplomacy, become
a pan-Hellenic superpower. Ironically, this kingdom that was only a side actor in the
Peloponnesian War, and one considered backwater and barbaric by the rest of Hellas, became
the leader of Hellas, but such is the unpredictability of geopolitics.
Overall, the Peloponnesian war had a devastating effect on the city-states of Greece. Places
like Megara or Athens had severe economic losses in revenue and agricultural output.
After catastrophic wartime losses, cities like Corinth had far fewer men for their hoplite
phalanxes going forward. However, these pale compared to cities like Plataea and Melos,
which had their whole populations executed and enslaved. War is a cruel affair and was
particularly so in Ancient Greece, and we can imagine Athena and Ares wrestling over
the fates of the cities while the Three Fates weaved and cut the lines of myriad lives.
A sort of implicit factionalism arose throughout Greece as oligarchs and democrats fought repeatedly
in cities. Scholars have debated the geopolitical lessons
of the Peloponnesian war. Civil strife, which often made or broke cities, has been highlighted
by some, especially in terms of Athens, where everything was debated. This has led some
modern commentators to question how efficient a democracy can be when at war. This criticism
is refuted by others, who point out how Athens survived and even thrived after major losses
such as Syracuse and even after its final defeat in the war. Either way, the Peloponnesian
War has become a quintessential study in geopolitics, with its shifting alliances, chaotic battles
and epic souvlaki and gyros cook-offs between Ephors and Strategoi. Thucydides himself,
the historian whose sources we have most relied on, has gained an incredible reputation as
a scientifically minded and rigorous historian. His goal, to make the conflict a ‘Ktema
Es Aei,’ or eternal possession, has defined history and how we perceive war. Discussions
on his realpolitik views and whether he favoured realism in geopolitics or ached for a world
system in which the excesses of war were to be avoided are still debated by classicists
and historians, and political scientists. We can claim that he has gained himself a
spot amongst the stars of history with historians like Sima Qian, Ibn Khaldun, or Garcilaso
de la Vega, el Inca. And thus, our story of the Peloponnesian War
ends not as an Odyssean return to Ithaka or a Dionysian return from India but as a boulder
raised by Sisyphos only to drop once more. Tragic poets like Euripides, who lived during
this period, have commented on the nature of war and how the Olympians caused wars.
In this twist on the Iliad’s myth with its aristocratic morals, the Trojan War was caused
not by Helen of Troy but by the Olympians who used a cloud eidolon of her to go to Troy,
killing thousands and putting eternal blame on her while she is kidnapped at Egypt. In
truth, the war was a geopolitical event with many lessons for today, and Thucydides seems
to have been atheistic in his conception of war and peace. Nevertheless, we may wish to
end this video with two reflections: One by Euripides’s tragic play Helen, in which
he writes: ‘How variable is the nature of gods, ey?
How inscrutable! They change the fate of mortals from good to bad, from one minute to the next!
No man’s fate is certain.’ The other comes from a modern Greek poet,
George Seferis, who, in his poem called Helen after Euripides’s play, recites: ‘Scamander is not destined to hear from
messengers coming to announce that all this suffering and all these lives were sent to
the Abyss, for an empty shirt, for a Helen’ And thus our story ends. More videos on ancient
Greek warfare are coming so make sure you are subscribed and press the bell button.
Please, consider liking, subscribing, commenting, and sharing - it helps immensely. Recently
we have started releasing weekly patron and YouTube member exclusive content, and this
series was actually part of the exclusive roster before its release. Please consider
joining their ranks via the link in the description or button under the video to watch these weekly
videos, learn about our schedule, get early access to our videos, access our private discord,
and much more. This is the Kings and Generals channel, and we will catch you on the next
one.
