In the previous episode, we talked about the
beginning of the Great Roman Civil War. This first phase was underlined by the conflict
between Caesar and Pompey – 2 former allies who became mortal enemies. The winner was decided during the last battle
– Pharsalus. Pompey was defeated, but that wasn’t the
end of the war, as Caesar had to contend with the remainder of the Optimate party and external
enemies. Welcome to the second episode on Caesar’s
civil war. These long videos are very difficult to make,
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to get the unique prizes right now! Throughout Caesar’s campaigns in Greece,
he had continued to levy Legions elsewhere, adding the 31st, 32nd, and 33rd to his ranks. Following the Battle of Pharsalus, he also
inducted some of Pompey’s surrendered men into his army, making the 34th, 35th, 36th
and 37th Legions. Caesar, by this stage of the war, now had
the numerical advantage, but the Optimate faction still harboured some of the most influential
politicians of the day; the war was far from over. Caesar’s first priority after the Battle
of Pharsalus was Pompey himself. He immediately left in pursuit, leaving Antony
to oversee the political situation in Rome. It was the time of year where the elections
for next year’s consul would usually be decided, and Caesar’s term as consul of
the year 48BC would be coming to an end. Caesar would entrust Antony with ensuring
that his political power continued. Having picked up on Pompey’s trail through
informants in Asia Minor, Caesar pursued Pompey to Egypt with a fleet of 10 Rhodian ships,
as well as a few more from Asia Minor. Onboard were two Legions, the 6th and 27th,
totalling just around 3,200 infantry, as many soldiers had been lost to war and illness
over the years, and 800 cavalry. Caesar only learned of his ex-triumvirs’
death upon his arrival in Alexandria at the start of October 48BC, just a few days after
Pompey’s death. According to Plutarch and Cassius Dio when
Caesar was first presented with Pompey’s head, he turned away disgusted. He was next presented the seal-ring of Pompey,
at which point Caesar broke down in tears. Both historians interpret this grief differently. Plutarch claims that it was genuine; after
all, though enemies in later life, Caesar and Pompey had been political allies for around
8 years, had effectively ruled Rome together, and had even been related by marriage. Dio, on the other hand, claims that this grief
was only for show and that Caesar had always hated Pompey from the start. It is impossible to say which is true. However, it is likely that Caesar was incredibly
frustrated at Pompey’s death. Caesar had a genius for public relations;
capturing Pompey, forcing him to renounce the senate, and then pardoning him, as was
Caesar’s habit, would have been the ultimate coup de grace. Instead, Pompey’s assassination made him
a martyr for the Optimate cause, something Caesar would have surely wished to avoid. In Rome however, Antony was able to capitalise
on the news of Pompey’s death. Many in Rome had refused to believe that Pompey
had been defeated, but upon being presented with Pompey’s ring, which Caesar had sent
to Rome, they finally accepted that the old general had lost and was dead. Rome now acclaimed Caesar as the victor, bestowing
countless honours on him. Seizing upon the situation, Antony labeled
the Pompeiians in Africa as conspirators, declared a national emergency, and that a
Dictator was needed. The man chosen to be a Dictator was, of course,
Caesar. Rather than the regular 6 months, his term
as Dictator was also set at one year, running through until October 47BC. In return for his continued loyalty and effectiveness,
Antony was named by Caesar as Master of Horse, effectively his second-in-command, and was
entrusted with the governance of Italy and Rome in Caesar’s absence. Many Optimate politicians, such as Gaius Cassius
now returned to Rome and appealed for forgiveness from Caesar - all were spared and welcomed
into the new regime. Cicero also returned to Rome and was forgiven. He returned to the Senate where he hoped to
use his influence to do what he could to preserve the Republic. With Caesar in Egypt now being Dictator, he
decided to turn his attention to Roman interests in the area, namely the rulership of the kingdom,
and its debt to Rome. As we have seen, Egypt was ruled by the boy
pharaoh Ptolemy XIII. The pharaoh’s father, Ptolemy XII, had made
an alliance with Rome during Caesar’s tenure as consul in 60BC. Before his death, Ptolemy XII named his eldest
son, Ptolemy XIII, and his eldest daughter, Cleopatra VII, as co-rulers, with Rome as
the guarantor of the will. Tensions between the two sibling rulers quickly
escalated, however, both raising armies against each other. Furthermore, both had inherited the debts
of their father. Ptolemy XII had borrowed huge sums of money
from Rome throughout his life, and by his death, there was still an unpaid debt of 17.5
million drachmae to the Republic, which constituted approximately half of Egypt’s yearly revenue. Caesar was badly in need of money to pay his
growing armies and also saw an opportunity to solidify Roman influence in the area. As consul when the alliance with Egypt was
first made, and the current Dictator Caesar thought it his obligation to see that pro-Roman
rule in Egypt was maintained, and that the debt was paid. Caesar first attempted to take a diplomatic
approach, suggesting that Ptolemy and Cleopatra both disband their armies and that he acts
as an arbitrator to see their father’s will fulfilled. He also requested the debt be paid but was
willing to reduce it to 10 million drachmae. Ptolemy, though pharaoh by title, was still
young and, as such, was being advised by a council who effectively ruled Egypt through
their regency. Pothinus, a eunuch, was one of the most influential
of these advisors. It had been on his advice that Pompey had
been assassinated as a ploy to curry favour with Caesar. Now, he opposed Caesar’s suggestions. He saw Caesar’s arrival as a threat to the
royal authority, and initially refused to pay the debt. He even went so far as to bring Ptolemies’
Royal Army into Alexandria under the command of Achillas, one of Pompey’s killers. This was clear defiance of Caesar’s demands
that Ptolemies army be disbanded and, in response, Caesar sent messengers to Cleopatra, perhaps
thinking she would be able to better fulfill his demands without requiring a regent. Cleopatra decided to meet Caesar in secret
within Alexandria. Plutarch gives an extraordinary account of
this meeting, in which Cleopatra, with the help of her right-hand man Appolodorus, smuggled
herself into the city in a bed sack, laundry bag, or carpet. Cassius Dio gives the much more reasonable
account, that the two simply met in secret with no reference to her being smuggled in. Both sources, however, agree that Cleopatra
was quickly able to seduce Caesar. Cleopatra is described as being beautiful,
charming, and above all, clever. She was a brilliant orator, and could speak
as many as eight languages, and was the first Ptolemaic ruler to learn Egyptian. Caesar immediately tried to reconcile the
two monarchs, proclaiming them co-monarchs and offering the island of Cyprus recently
annexed from the Egyptians by Rome to the other two siblings, Arsinoe and Ptolemy XIV,
thus removing other potential claimants to the Egyptian throne. Pothinus, however, was not happy with this
arrangement. He was worried that, due to Cleopatra’s
now very close relationship with Caesar, she would be the more powerful of the two siblings,
and that Pothinus would, as a result, lose his influence. He began stirring up unrest in the city, even
having gold from the temples and royal treasury melted down in a deliberate attempt to show
Caesar as being extortionate. With the situation worsening, Caesar sent
emissaries to Achillas and the Egyptian army, attempting to explain that he wanted only
to be an arbitrator of the will, as was his legal right. These emissaries were killed on Achillas orders. The message was clear; a fight was imminent. Caesar was aware that he did not have enough
men to fight in the open, only having the 4,000 he had brought from Greece. Instead, he ordered his men to seize the royal
quarters where he had been housed. Within these quarters were Cleopatra, Pothinus,
Arsinoe, and the boy pharaoh Ptolemy himself. Having taken control of the pharaoh, Caesar
awaited Achillas next move. Achillas’ army numbered around 20,000 plus
a further 2,000 cavalry, all experienced veterans. Their numbers were swelled still further by
the rioting Alexandrian citizens, and even slaves, who aligned with the army and took
up arms, making a kind of militia. Things were descending into chaos and Caesar
was forced to begin further fortifying his position and send messengers to allies and
his forces in Asia Minor requesting reinforcements. What had started as a simple political mission
had now devolved into a siege. Achillas army occupied the majority of the
city to the west, including the Euonstos Harbour, while Caesar only held the royal quarters
and the royal harbour. Achillas regularly attacked Caesar’s position,
probing for weaknesses, but the narrow streets helped to mitigate the difference in numbers,
Caesar’s men consistently repulsing these attacks. Achillas next turned his attention to the
Great Harbour where both the Egyptian fleet and Caesar’s fleet lay at anchor. If Achillas could seize this harbour and the
ships, he would be able to cut off any chance of Caesar being resupplied or receiving reinforcements. Sending a diversionary force to attack Caesar’s
defences, Achillas simultaneously sent a larger force to seize the harbour. Caesar was well aware of the strategic value
of the harbour and so, leaving as small a force as was necessary to hold the defences,
led his men to the harbour. The fighting around the harbour was particularly
brutal and Caesar quickly realised he did not have the men to win this fight and defend
the harbour. Instead, Caesar effectively fought a delaying
action, holding off the Egyptian force long enough for his men to set fire to the Egyptian
fleet and pull their own fleet back to the Royal Harbour. The fire was ferocious and spread quickly,
partially burning the Great Library of Alexandria. The damage was relatively minor, fortunately,
and the library would continue for a number of centuries afterwards. Seizing the opportunity of having naval supremacy,
Caesar sailed a portion of his men to the island of Pharos, which controlled access
to all Alexandria’s harbours, establishing a small garrison there, likely around the
promenade on which the lighthouse itself was situated. Caesar and the rest of his forces then retreated
back to the royal quarters. While Caesar persisted in improving his defences,
Pothinus continued his resistance from the inside. Secretly, he sent messages to Achillas encouraging
him to continue his attacks and plotted to assassinate Caesar. Caesar’s men, however, were able to catch
some of Pothinus’ messengers who were forced to reveal the plot. Caesar immediately had Pothinus killed. Arsinoe, Ptolemy’s sister, had greater success,
escaping Caesar’s defences and joining Achillas. Following this, an uneasy status-quo developed. Caesar continued to fortify his position against
any assaults, even making makeshift battering rams to break down the walls of houses to
keep a continuous line of defence. The Alexandrians also constructed their own
barricades to keep Caesar penned in, some as high as 12 meters. Achillas frequently sent some of the militia
forces to assault various points of Caesar’s defences to look for weaknesses, keeping his
veterans in reserve, but with little success. Perhaps frustrated by this lack of success,
a rift began to form between Arsinoe and Achillas, and eventually, Arsinoe had Achillas killed
and replaced by her own man, Ganymedes. Ganymedes was a cunning general and immediately
took steps to try and break the stalemate. Alexandria was supplied by subterranean watercourses
that ran throughout the city. Ganymedes, therefore, ordered that those sections
that flowed into the parts of the city controlled by Caesar be blocked, and then had these sections
polluted with sea water, rendering them undrinkable. Such a tactic would have been difficult to
pull off, but the Alexandrians were renowned engineers and were quickly able to complete
the project, thus making Caesar’s position even more precarious. Some of Caesar’s men started to panic, some
saying they should have retreated much earlier. Fortunately for them, Caesar quickly took
control of the situation. He made it clear that if they were to attempt
to retreat, the Alexandrians would catch them before they could successfully evacuate everyone. He instead ordered wells to be dug day and
night, and freshwater was soon found, avoiding disaster. Though the situation had been quickly rectified,
it was clear that Ganymedes was a dangerous enemy, not to be taken lightly. As time passed Caesar’s situation in Alexandria
improved. His lieutenant in Asia Minor, Domitius Calvinus,
had received Caesar’s request for reinforcements and had responded by dispatching two Legions,
the 37th by sea, and the 35th by land. The 35th was still far from reaching Egypt,
but the 37th had now arrived. Strong winds had prevented them pulling into
Alexandria’s harbour, instead making land further down the coast and sending a small
boat to inform Caesar of their arrival. Caesar badly needed these men and so, leaving
all his infantry to hold their positions in Alexandria, he left with his fleet and their
respective crews to meet the 37th. En route, he dispatched small parties to collect
what water they could, but these were attacked by Egyptian cavalry patrols and captured. The Egyptians, thus finding out Caesar’s
position, manned a number of small vessels with their infantry, hoping to catch Caesar
separated from his Legions. Caesar was not eager for battle; he needed
all his ships for the 37th and with no infantry or marines on his ships, the Egyptians would
have the advantage in boarding. He tried to slip away. A Rhodian ship, however, drifted too far from
the formation and was caught by the Egyptians, forcing Caesar to turn to rescue them. Caesar, in his account, is rather damning
of these Rhodians for being caught, but also notes that they fought bravely with remarkable
seamanship. They were able to buy enough time for the
rest of Caesar’s fleet to close in. With no heavy infantry to carry out the customary
Roman tactic of boarding an enemy, Caesar trusted his crew’s seamanship to ram and
cripple as many ships as possible while avoiding boarding. The plan worked, and the superior ships of
Caesar’s fleets were able to sink one ship and capture another. With night closing in, the Egyptians gave
up the battle and retreated. Caesar was able to continue to the 37th, adding
a much needed 5,000 men to his numbers, towing their transports into harbour and arriving
back in Alexandria the following morning. The Alexandrians were disheartened by this
reversal, but Ganymedes was resilient and decided that he needed to rob Caesar of his
naval capacity. More than a hundred ships had been burnt by
Caesar in the harbour, but not all were beyond repair. He ordered the Alexandrians to make repairs
on as many ships as possible. The citizens and soldiers of Alexandria committed
wholly to the task, even going so far as to pull wood from the buildings of Alexandria
to suit their needs. After just a few days, Ganymedes had a fleet
of 27 warships and a number of small ships ready for duty and prepared for battle. Caesar was well aware of the importance of
naval supremacy, and also began drawing up his fleet, approximately 19 warships and 15
smaller vessels, manning them with infantry from the Legions. With Caesar setting off from the Royal Harbour,
and Ganymedes from the Eunostos the two fleets met just off the coast of the Pharos island. Caesar and Ganymedes both drew their fleets
into two lines. Between the two fleets were shoals, with a
narrow channel being the only path through. Both sides held their position, neither wanting
to be caught being the first to pass through this channel. Eventually, the Rhodian commander, Euphranor,
a skilled and well-known admiral, offered to break the stalemate. He insisted that he and his men would be able
to push through and hold for long enough for Caesar’s remaining ships to pass through
the channel. Caesar allowed this, sending Euphranor with
4 Rhodian ships through the channel. They quickly passed through, and formed a
line to receive the Egyptian ships rapidly closing in, delaying long enough for the rest
of Caesar’s ship to make it through the channel. Caesar was extremely admiring of the Rhodian's
skill and bravery, saying that not one ship was boarded or had its oars broken, each time
meeting their enemy head-on. With Caesar’s fleet now through the channel,
he was fully committed. The channel would block any chance of an organised
retreat, Caesar would need a win. Caesar had made this clear to his men prior
to the battle, stressing that the fate of the Egyptian campaign rested on their soldiers. Though the Alexandrians were renowned sailors,
the Romans did have a crucial advantage. The coast and shoals meant there was little
room to manoeuvre, not only negating Ganymedes numerical advantage, but also preventing his
men from capitalising on their superior seamanship. Instead, the ships were forced into close
quarters combat with numerous boarding parties. This was the style of naval warfare the Romans
excelled at, effectively making a naval battle a land battle, where the superior skill and
training of the Legions could truly come into its own. By the end of the battle, 2 Egyptian ships
had been captured, 3 sunk and the remnants being forced to retreat back to harbour. Seeking to capitalise on his naval supremacy,
Caesar immediately turned his attention to the Pharos island. The island was crucial for controlling access
to the harbours and was linked to the mainland by a bridge which connected two moles, one
extending from the island, one from the mainland. As has already been mentioned, Caesar had
already stationed a small garrison on the promenade on the east of the island, and he
now saw a chance to completely control the Pharos island. Leaving just a few cohorts to hold the now
completed defences in the city, Caesar ordered 10 cohorts - approximately 5,000 men, some
light infantry and his best Gallic cavalry to their transports to prepare for an amphibious
assault. He then ordered them to attack, at the same
time attacking the island’s garrison with his warships from the west. The fighting on the island was some of the
bloodiest so far. The narrow streets and rooftops were ideal
for the defenders, while Caesar’s men disembarking from the ships were forced to wade through
shallow waters and across a beach under constant missile fire. Caesar’s tactic of attacking from two sides
had been effective in splitting the island's defenders however, and finally the Romans
were able to force the Alexandrians to retreat across the mole back to Alexandria. The retreat was not organised, many choosing
to jump from the bridge and mole and swim to Alexandria, rather than be caught in the
bottleneck. Caesar gives the Alexandrian losses as being
6,000 captured and killed. Following this victory, Caesar fortified defences
around the bridge controlling access to the Pharos, the Alexandrians garrisoning the bridge
linking the mainland city to the mole. This bridge had a large arch, through which
the Alexandrians could potentially send ships. In order to stop the Egyptians being able
to harass his own ships, Caesar would need to control this bridge. The day after taking the island, he first
sent ships with artillery and archers to attack the Alexandrian garrison holding the bridge,
forcing them to retreat, and then landed himself and 3 cohorts, about 1, 500 men, on the mole. These men were then ordered to build a rampart
to defend the bridge from the Alexandrian side, while men from the Pharos brought up
stones from destroyed buildings to block the arch of the bridge. All seemed to be going well, when the Alexandrians
suddenly made a huge push from the city to retake the bridge, simultaneously bringing
up light ships to try and land some of their own men on the mole. With Caesar on the mole, some of his ships
tried to take the initiative themselves, landing marines, slingers and archers on the mole. Initially, these missiles were effective at
fending off the Alexandrian light ships, but eventually the ships bypassed their position,
landing behind them on the mole. These lightly armed troops were quickly outfought
by the Alexandrians and panic ensued as they attempted to retreat back to their ships. Caesar and the three cohorts were now caught
in a pincer. Seeing their allied light infantry in disarray,
the cohorts also began to break. Some fought a desperate last stand and were
cut down, many more desperately tried to retreat to their transports. Amongst these was Caesar. Due to the sheer number and panic, however,
many of these transports began to capsize. Thinking fast, Caesar was forced to strip
his armour and dive off the boat, swimming to his nearby ships to save his life. The battle had been a disaster for Caesar. Though the Pharos island was in Caesar’s
hands, the bridge was not and so the Alexandrians could still use the arch to harass his own
ships. Moreover, according to Caesar himself, he
lost 400 legionaries and another 400 sailors and marines. Seeking to capitalize on their good fortune
the Alexandrians sent emissaries to Caesar, requesting Ptolemy be returned to them, in
exchange for an end in the hostilities. Caesar relented, and handed the pharaoh over,
with the understanding that Ptolemy would then negotiate peace terms. The young king betrayed Caesar, however, and
took control of the army, continuing the assaults on Caesar’s defences. The decision to hand over Ptolemy was clearly
a mistake. In his own account, Caesar relays how his
own officers and centurions strongly criticised him for his lack of judgement and trust in
the king. Caesar attempts to justify his decision, claiming
“it was part of a far-sighted strategy’ which his men did not understand, and that
Ptolemy had cried and begged Caesar to let him stay. This seems a clear point where Caesar was
using his narrative to try and revise the events and put a positive spin on things. It is far more likely, given Caesar’s situation,
that he was grasping at straws by letting Ptolemy go and, judging by how much Caesar
attempts to mask this, he was well aware that he had made a mistake. Nevertheless, roughly a month later, around
the end of February/start of March, Caesar’s fortunes began to turn. His allies in Asia Minor had been rallying
a force together and marching through Syria and the Levant to Egypt, while supplies were
being sent by ship to Caesar. Word of this had already reached the Alexandrians,
however, who sent a fleet to intercept the supplies. As soon as Caesar heard of this, he sent his
own ships, commanded by Tiberius Nero and Euphranor to defend his allies' supply ships. Though the Romans were able to win the battle,
Euphranor’s ship was surrounded and the Rhodian was killed. The army was also having success. The force was around 13,000 strong and commanded
by Mithridates of Pergamum, an experienced, talented general and close friend of Caesar. He had now made it to the Nile Delta, having
already stormed and seized the strategically important town of Pelusium. An Egyptian force was hastily gathered and
sent to attack Mithridates at the river, hoping to either destroy his army or at the very
least, prevent him from reaching Alexandria and supporting Caesar. Mithridates had been well trained in the Roman
style of warfare however and successfully fortified his position, holding the Egyptians
in check and inflicting heavy casualties as he did so. Messengers were sent to both Caesar and Ptolemy
of these events, both learning of them around the same time. Ptolemy knew Mithridates had to be crushed,
or else risk Mithridates attacking his force in Alexandria from the rear while they were
busy besieging Caesar. Similarly, Caesar was well aware that any
hope of victory now rested in the Mithridates army. Both decided to move to the Nile, Ptolemy
leaving just the militia in Alexandria, and sailing his army down the river, Caesar leaving
a light garrison in Alexandria before taking the sea route. Ptolemy had the quicker route and was able
to reach the Nile Delta before Caesar, merging with the force already there and taking a
strong defensive position on high ground with their rear protected by the Nile, one flank
by rocky high ground, and the other flank by marsh land. Caesar arrived shortly afterwards, before
Ptolemy could launch on Mithridates position, meeting Mithridates approximately 7 miles
away from Ptolemies camp. In order to reach the king, they would need
to ford a small river. Ptolemy sent a force of cavalry and light
infantry to this river, hoping to harass Caesar and his allies as they crossed. However, Caesar’s Germanic and Gallic cavalry,
by now well experienced in river crossings, had been sent ahead of Caesar's main army,
crossing the river undetected. Meanwhile, Caesar had his Legions cut down
trees, placing them across the river as makeshift bridges and ordered them to charge across. The Legions poured across, falling upon the
Egyptian light infantry and cavalry. As they did, Caesar’s Gallic and Germanic
cavalry appeared, charging into the Egyptian flank, routing them almost immediately. Only a few managed to make it to Ptolemies
camp, the rest being cut down by Caesar’s cavalry. As was his custom, Caesar encamped close to
the enemy stationing his men at the bottom of the hill, eager to tempt his enemy into
battle. With Ptolemy in command of the army, a victory
here would put an end to all Egyptian resistance. Caesar had with him the 37th Legion, the remnants
of the 6th and 27th, plus the reinforcements brought by Mithridates; roughly 20,000 infantry
and another 1,000 cavalry. Ptolemies force was slightly larger, perhaps
27,000, including the 20,000 veterans who had been at Alexandria, and 2,000 cavalry. With Ptolemies force being larger and holding
the better position, Caesar attempted to draw the young king out of position by attacking
a nearby hamlet that had been lightly garrisoned by Ptolemies men. He committed his whole force to this attack
routing the garrison, but Ptolemy did not take the bait. Caesar ordered his men to pursue the fleeing
Egyptians up the hill to Ptolemies position, hoping that the panicked garrison might trigger
a mass rout. Ptolemies men held their positions however,
and Caesar’s men now found themselves in a tough uphill battle against an entrenched
enemy. Some of his men tried to circle around the
Egyptian position, attempting to attack Ptolemy from the rear, but these men were soon peppered
by missiles not just from the high ground, but also from Ptolemies ships on the river. Effectively cut off from the rest of Caesar’s
force, these men took brutal casualties, having little choice but to try and hide behind their
shields. So far, Caesar was making little headway and
his men were starting to lose ground. As they were being pushed back though, the
Alexandrians were pushing forward, out of their camp and slowly moving further off the
high ground. Noticing this crucial error, Caesar sent a
detachment of cohorts to skirt around the battle lines to seize Ptolemies camp. They quickly stormed the defences, overrunning
the few Egyptians there, before rushing down the hill to attack Ptolemies main force in
the rear. This move proved decisive, triggering mass
panic along Ptolemies line which quickly broke. They retreated in chaos to the river, piling
onto their ships, many of which capsized in the confusion. Many Egyptians, weighed down by their armour,
drowned in the river, among them the young king Ptolemy himself. Wasting no time after this victory, Caesar
immediately rode to Alexandria with his cavalry, proclaiming his success and Ptolemies death. With the king dead, the militia there immediately
surrendered. Caesar had won. We do not know how many casualties there were
on either side. Caesar’s men who had tried to attack the
camp from the Nile side are said to have taken heavy casualties, and Caesar’s force had
been forced to fight a difficult battle. Given these circumstances, an approximation
of around 1,000-2,000 losses for Caesar seems probable, and perhaps as many as 10,000 for
the Egyptians. Following the campaign Caesar embarked on
a 3-month long pleasure cruise with Cleopatra down the Nile where he, in Appian’s words,
“generally enjoyed himself with her.” Soon afterwards, Cleopatra gave birth to a
boy, Ptolemy XV, who would later be nicknamed Caesarion. Though Caesar never officially acknowledged
Caesarion as being his son, his birth, in June 47BC, would align with Cleopatra’s
first meeting with Caesar at the end of 48BC. Cleopatra insisted that Caesar was the father,
and it is also worth remembering that Cleopatra had spent most of that time besieged in Alexandria
and so did not have access to a large number of suitors. Cleopatra agreed to pay the 10 million drachmae
debt requested by Caesar and was named co-ruler with her brother Ptolemy XIV in sibling marriage,
naming both friends of Rome. In total, Caesar’s escapade in Egypt had
taken a full 9 months. Plutarch calls it “not necessary…inglorious
and full of peril”. It is hard to disagree with this assessment. Though Caesar had successfully had the Egyptian
debt paid and a pro-Roman rule installed, he had wasted a lot of time and his attention
had been badly needed elsewhere. In the 9 months Caesar was in Egypt, Antony,
though talented on the battlefield, had proved to be a poor governor. His refusal to cancel outstanding debts was
unpopular not only with senators, but also with plebs and veterans, the core of Caesar’s
supporters. The unrest this caused was so great, that
Antony had resorted to bringing soldiers into the city of Rome itself in a desperate attempt
to contain the situation. Caesar’s lieutenant Quintus Cassius Longinus,
who had been left to govern Hispania Ulterior, had been equally disastrous. His tyrannical governance of the province
had even led to a short-lived pro-Optimate rebellion. Furthermore, some of his men had rebelled
and proclaimed Marcellus as the new praetor instead. The province of Illyricum had also been stirred
to revolt by Marcus Octavius, who was constantly assaulting towns in the area. In Asia Minor, Pharnaces II of Pontus, another
son of Mithridates VI, had taken advantage of the chaos caused by the Civil War, attacking
a number of Roman allies. Meanwhile, throughout the past 9 months, Cato,
Scipio, the sons of Pompey and Labienus had been consolidating their strength in North
Africa, amassing a vast army. Caesar had entered Alexandria as Dictator
and effectively master of the Roman world, save for a rebellious faction in North Africa. He was now leaving with dissent, war, and
rebellion in North Africa, Spain, Italy, Illyricum, and Asia Minor. Leaving three Legions in Egypt, Caesar took
the remains of the veteran Sixth and marched for Asia Minor through Syria. At the end of 48BC, while Caesar was besieged
in Alexandria, the fruits of his victory at Pharsalus seemed to be crumbling. Rome, governed by Antony, was in chaos, the
Pompeian faction in North Africa was rebuilding a large army and there had been rebellions
and pro-Pompeian insurrections in Spain and Illyria. Caesar had continuously been recruiting to
try and contain the situation, reinstituting Legions 1, 2, 3 and 4, some of which were
made primarily of ex-Pompeian soldiers, but the problems persisted. One of the most pressing of these problems
was in Asia Minor. Son of the infamous enemy of Rome Mithridates
VI, the king of Bosphorus Pharnaces II was eager to return Pontus under his control and
he had seized upon the opportunity presented by the Civil War and attacked a number of
Rome’s allies in the area. Caesar’s victory could not be so quickly
tarnished by a foreign king, Pharnaces had to be dealt with. With Caesar trapped in Alexandria, the responsibility
fell to his long-time ally, Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus. Domitius had distinguished himself in Caesar’s
Greek campaign, keeping Scipio’s army pinned and commanding Caesar’s centre at Pharsalus. In recognition of this service, he had been
appointed governor of the Roman province of Asia. Soon after his appointment, Pharnaces had
gone on the warpath, invading Lesser Armenia and Cappadocia, lands that belonged to the
allied Roman kings Deiotarus and Ariobarzanes respectively. Both had previously supported Pompey in the
war against Mithridates and the Civil War, but had been allowed to maintain their positions,
so long as they paid tribute to Caesar and the Republic. In late 48BC Deiotarus came to Domitius, requesting
Rome’s assistance, arguing that he would not be able to pay this tribute if Pharnaces
was victorious. Domitius immediately sent a delegation to
the king of Bosphorus, demanding that he stop his attack and withdraw. To reinforce this demand, Domitius also began
raising an army. He had originally been assigned 3 Legions
by Caesar, the 35th, 36th and 37, formed from some of Pompey’s men after Pharsalus, but
2 of these Legions had already been dispatched to reinforce Caesar, leaving just the 36th
in Asia. To increase his numbers, Domitius hastily
levied a Legion from Pontus. Deiotarus, who had adopted the Roman military
style training his men in the Legionary tradition, supplied 2 more Legions of his own plus 100
cavalry, with Ariobarzanes contributing a further 10,000 infantry and 100 cavalry. In total, Domitius' army numbered around 30,000
infantry and 1,000 cavalry. All now marched to Pontus to put pressure
on Pharnaces. Pharnaces soon replied to Domitius’ message,
stating that he had withdrawn from Cappadocia but had taken Lesser Armenia for himself,
claiming it as his right through his father’s conquests, offering to wait until Caesar arrived
to mediate the matter. In reality, Pharnaces had only abandoned Cappadocia
because it was too distant from his homeland to be practically defended, while Lesser Armenia
was next to his own kingdom. Pharnaces had heard that Domitius had sent
2 of his 3 Legions to Caesar and was confident that the Roman general would not have the
quality or quantity of army needed to stop him. Pharnaces’ confidence was well founded;
his army was well trained and experienced, many being veterans of over 20 battles. Furthermore, though the exact size of his
army is unknown, modern estimates put it at around 20,000 and he certainly had a huge
cavalry advantage over Domitius. Domitius saw this offer for what it really
was, a façade. He mustered his army and marched to Lesser
Armenia, keeping to high ground to prevent any potential ambushes. As he marched, Pharnaces sent a number of
delegations, hoping to bribe Domitius with offers of money and treasure. Domitius was resilient, however, replying
to Pharnaces that by attacking Rome’s allies, he had insulted the Republic and would now
pay the consequences. Domitius pushed his army hard, ordering a
number of long marches, soon arriving in Lesser Armenia. He encamped seven miles from the city of Nicopolis,
where Pharnaces had gathered his army. The city was located on a plain, but encircled
on two sides by mountains. In order to reach the city, Domitius would
have to march through a pass in these mountains, presenting Pharnaces with an ideal situation
to ambush his enemy. Choosing his best infantry and almost all
his cavalry, he had them lie in wait in the pass. To better conceal his plan, Pharnaces also
ordered cattle and peasants into the defile to maintain a look of normalcy. He also kept up his façade of finding a diplomatic
solution, sending constant peace envoys to Domitius. Unfortunately for Pharnaces, these envoys
somewhat backfired, with Domitius staying in camp for a number of days attempting to
genuinely negotiate with Pharnaces’ ambassadors. As the days passed, Pharnaces grew increasingly
worried that his ambush would be discovered. Not wanting to risk his men, Pharnaces ordered
them to withdraw from their positions. He would have to wait to fight a battle in
the open. He did not have to wait long. Domitius saw that peace would be impossible
and marched his force closer to Nicopolis and began to fortify a second camp. As they began to encamp, Pharnaces’ army
poured out of the city and drew up for battle. Pharnaces knew that his cavalry was his greatest
advantage and that they would be wasted in the city, but the plains in front of the city
would be ideal terrain for them. Hastily, Domitius completed his camp, drawing
his army inside. It is probable that Domitius had originally
planned to besiege Pharnaces inside Nicopolis and so negate his cavalry advantage; now it
seemed that the tables would be turned and Domitius would be the one besieged in the
fort. The following night, Pharnaces intercepted
messengers from Caesar telling Domitius of his situation in Alexandria and requesting
immediate reinforcements. Seeing a golden opportunity, Pharnaces let
these messengers go, sending them to Domitius. Domitius was now caught in a dilemma; on the
one hand he could keep his force inside the fort, which would better preserve his army
but would mean he would not be able to reinforce Caesar possibly jeopardizing the whole Alexandrian
campaign; on the other, he could leave the fort to try and force a quick battle against
Pharnaces before rushing to Caesar, but would first have to fight in open terrain where
Pharnaces’ cavalry would have an advantage. Pharnaces had put Domitius in a dangerous
position. Seeking to capitalise on it, Pharnaces ordered
two long trenches to be dug from the walls of Nicopolis to the front of his lines, each
4 feet deep. He placed his infantry between the two trenches
in one unbroken line, with a further three lines of infantry each behind the centre and
flanks. His cavalry was put on the extreme flank outside
of the trenches. Pharnaces had effectively constructed a funnel
that would force a frontal attack and protect the flanks of his infantry, while still allowing
his cavalry room to manoeuvre. It was a brilliant tactic and would be very
difficult for Domitius’ army to crack. Nevertheless, faced with the option of saving
Caesar or preserving his army, Domitius chose Caesar and decamped for battle. He drew his force up in the triple axis, the
36th on the right, the rookie Pontic Legion on the left, Deiotarus’ Legions in the centre,
and Ariobazarnes’ men making up the back lines. Domitius gave the order and his army charged. The 36th, partly made of Pompeian veterans,
fought brilliantly against the cavalry opposite them, forcing a way through to the walls of
Nicopolis and even beginning to cross the trench, attacking Pharnaces’ centre. However, these were the only men in Domitius’
army having any success. It is not entirely clear what happened to
the Pontic Legion, but it seems they tried to force a way through the cavalry on their
wing, as the 36th had done, but had not been successful and were pushed into the trench,
being attacked from two sides by cavalry and infantry. The centre was even less successful; Deiotarus’
Legions and Ariozabarnes’ men had put up little resistance, breaking soon after engaging
Pharnaces’ infantry. With the Roman left and centre now broken,
Pharnaces’ army now started to surround the 36th legion. Its experience proved invaluable, however. Forming a fighting circle called orbis, with
the high ranking officers including Domitius in the centre, the 36th cut their way out
of the encirclement, fighting their way to nearby rocky hills. With his victory secure and given the difficult
terrain, Pharnaces did not press them. The 36th had lost just 250 men, but Domitius’
allies had suffered many more, Deiotarus’ men alone losing around 5,000. The Pontic Legion had also taken heavy casualties;
Caesar says that a number of Roman nobles were killed in the battle, and it is likely
that they were officers of the Pontic Legion. Gathering the remnants of his army, Domitius
retreated back to his province of Asia. Pharnaces immediately capitalised on his victory,
seizing his father’s old kingdom of Pontus which Pompey had claimed for Rome. He stormed a number of Roman-held towns in
early 47BC, putting many Roman citizens to death, castrating Roman boys, and plundering
the treasuries. He would not be able to enjoy his victory
for long, however. Roman Asia was probably saved by a revolt
early in the Summer led by Pharnaces son-in-law Asander, which drew Pharnaces north postponing
the invasion. Caesar by now had won the battle of the Nile,
received word of Domitius' defeat and was en route to personally handle the situation. Caesar arrived in Syria, spending a few days
sorting out administrative problems in the province, before leaving his kinsman Sextus
Caesar in control and sailing to Cilicia. Here, he again spent a few days settling local
problems, before pushing on into Galatia where he met Deiotarus. The latter was somewhat nervous of Caesar
as he had previously sided with Pompey. The king sought forgiveness, explaining that
due to his position in the East, he had little choice but to support Pompey. With customary clemency, Caesar forgave Deiotarus,
though he did chide him for his decision. Caesar mustered the remnants of Domitius’
army in Pontus at the end of July 47BC and prepared to march. The 6th Legion, that he had brought with him
from Alexandria had taken many casualties over the years, and more still had been taken
seasick after sailing from Syria to Cilicia, reducing their numbers to less than 1,000. The rest of the army was formed by the one
remaining Legion of Deiotarus, the remnants of the Pontic Legion and 36th. In total, Caesar’s army may have numbered
somewhere around 15,000, with the 6th and some of the 36th the only ones who could be
considered veterans. With Pharnaces’ army being larger and more
experienced, this would seem likely to be a long and difficult campaign for Caesar. Caesar’s arrival forced the Bosphoran king
to stop his movement to the north. Pharnaces was well aware that Caesar was badly
needed elsewhere, namely in Rome itself. Aiming to exploit this, Pharnaces attempted
to stall Caesar, as he had done with Domitius, hoping that Caesar would be forced to return
to Rome soon to deal with the turmoil there. Numerous peace delegations were sent to Caesar,
highlighting the fact that Pharnaces had not provided auxiliaries to Pompey and that Pharnaces
wanted a peaceful resolution. In response, Caesar said that he would be
willing to forgive Pharnaces, but in exchange demanded his full surrender and the return
of all taken lands and money. Still wanting to buy as much time as possible,
Pharnaces initially agreed to these demands, but deliberately delayed, pushing back the
date he planned to withdraw his troops. Caesar quickly saw through this charade. Never one for wasting time, he decided to
follow his tried and tested method; to find and engage his enemy as quickly as possible. Pharnaces had made camp near the town of Zela,
on the site of a famous victory won by his father against the Romans. His camp was in a strong defensive position
on high ground, with a track linking his camp to the town to maintain his supply line, and
a valley protecting his flank. Caesar initially camped 5 miles from this
location, but upon his scouts reporting Pharnaces’ position, he determined to seize the high
ground opposite Pharnaces on the other side of the valley. Supplies needed to build ramparts were collected
in the first camp, and then orders given for the Legions to march quickly, without baggage,
seizing the new location before Pharnaces had a chance to react. The supplies were then brought up from the
first camp, and the Legions began work on constructing ramparts along the high ground. Suddenly, Pharnaces drew his army out of camp. Given the terrain between the two camps, Caesar,
in his account, is somewhat baffled by this. Nevertheless, he drew up one line of infantry
in front of the workers to protect them, confident that Pharnaces would not risk an attack. However, Pharnaces suddenly began marching
his men down his side of the valley in battle formation. Again, Caesar in his account is amazed at
this strategy. He suggests that Pharnaces may have been influenced
by advantageous omens, or that he may have been overly confident given his recent victory
over Domitius and the size and experience of his army. When Pharnaces’ men began the climb up the
valley to Caesar’s position, Caesar apparently could not help but laugh at the absurdity
of the tactic. Nonetheless, Pharnaces’ plan had somewhat
worked. Caesar was so astounded, that he had not yet
recalled the majority of his army from their construction of the defences. Pharnaces men fell upon the thin defensive
line Caesar had placed in front, while Caesar hastily ordered the rest of his army to join
the defensive line. As his men rushed forwards, some of Pharnaces
scythed chariots broke through the thin line, initially wreaking havoc among Caesar’s
men scrambling to get into positions. As more of Caesar’s men moved forward however,
these chariots found themselves under intense missile fire and were forced to retreat, Caesar’s
men finally forming a complete battle line with the sixth on the right, the 36th on the
left and the Pontic and Deiotarian Legion in the centre. Despite the Legions having the huge terrain
advantage, the fighting against Pharnaces’ veterans was bitter, with brutal hand-to-hand
fighting across the line. Eventually, the 6th, with the height advantage,
began forcing their opponents back. Pharnaces line began to buckle, and soon the
centre and left were also being forced down the slope. As Pharnaces men attempted to retreat, many
lost their footing only to be crushed by their comrades with the Legions bearing down upon
them. Soon Pharnaces’ entire army broke, throwing
aside their weapons to try and more easily climb back up the valley to their camp. Caesar ordered his men to pursue, pushing
up the hill and storming the camp, killing the few men Pharnaces had left to guard it. Almost all of Pharnaces’ army had been killed
or captured though the King himself had managed to escape. Caesar had only taken light casualties. The campaign initially seemed that it could
take months and numerous battles to complete. Indeed, the Mithridatic Wars that Rome had
waged against Pharnaces’ father had spanned 25 years, and Pompey had spent 3 years campaigning
in Asia Minor and securing the region for Rome. Caesar’s campaign had lasted just 5 days
since he arrived in Pontus with the entire enemy force defeated in a day. Though the victory was more a result of Pharnaces’
rather baffling strategy than any brilliant generalship from Caesar, Caesar was never
one to miss out on a propaganda opportunity. A simple message was spread through Rome proclaiming
Caesar’s success: veni, vidi, vici. I came, I saw, I conquered. After the battle, Pharnaces attempted to retreat
to the north, but was chased by Domitius. With few options left, he had to abandon Sinope. Pharnaces then sailed to Bosphorus to raise
another army and even had some success before he was defeated and killed by Asander. In response to the events in Bosphorus, Caesar
appointed Mithridates of Pergamum, who was invaluable during the campaign in Egypt, the
king of Bosphorus. In the time Caesar had spent in Egypt and
Asia Minor, the situation in Spain and Illyria had also improved. Lepidus, the future triumvir and current governor
of Hispania Citerior, had intervened in Hispania Ulterior, stabilising the region. Trebonius had been assigned to replace Longinus
who was dismissed and died in a storm while leaving the province. Meanwhile, another of Caesar’s lieutenants,
Vatinius, had gathered a fleet and the veterans left in Brundisium who had been too sick to
join Caesar in Greece to confront Octavius. The veterans had proved their worth, winning
a quick naval victory over Octavius, securing Illyricum and forcing Octavius to retreat
to North Africa. With these areas secured, Caesar could now
begin to turn his attention to the last remaining threat, the Pompeian faction in North Africa. But firstly, he was needed in Rome. Antony’s governance had been disastrous,
and Caesar could not afford to embark on another campaign with Rome in turmoil. Caesar left the 36th and Pontic Legion in
Asia Minor, ordering the 6th back to Italy, following them shortly afterwards. It is now late in 47BC, almost a year and
half since the Battle of Pharsalus. Caesar had fought Pharsalus intending it to
be a final killing blow to the Pompeian cause, and while it had been successful in severely
handicapping the Pompeians, it had failed to destroy them completely. While Caesar had spent the last 18 months
campaigning in the East, the Pompeian faction had been rebuilding in North Africa. Leadership had initially been offered to Cicero,
but he had refused, preferring to use his political talents to try and influence the
Senate in Rome. Instead, leadership was split between Cato
and Scipio. Cato was something of a natural successor;
he had consistently been one of Caesar’s most ardent opponents and wielded great influence
and prestige in the party, but he had next to no military experience. To balance this, Metellus Scipio was appointed
as the overall military commander. Scipio had a long political career, had served
as consul alongside Pompey in 52BC, had commanded an army in Greece against Domitius Calvinus
and had commanded the centre at Pharsalus. Despite these honours, Scipio had not really
proved himself as a talented general. A number of his subordinates, most notably
Labienus, were undoubtedly better commanders. Nevertheless, Scipio was given command due
to his rank, prestige and, perhaps most of all, his name. Thanks to Scipio Africanus and Scipio Aemilianus,
it was rumoured that no Scipio could be defeated in Africa. A new Senate had been created in Utica, and
a total of 14 Legions mustered, 2 belonging to the governor of Africa Publius Attius Varus,
8 newly formed consisting of local conscripts as well as veterans who escaped from Iberia
and Greece after the defeats at Illerda and Pharsalus, and 4 of Juba’s Numidian Legions
who were armed and trained in the Roman fashion, plus a huge amount of Numidian light infantry
and cavalry, and 120 elephants. Pompey’s son, Gnaeus, had been sent to Spain
to try and capitalise on the pro-Pompeian mutiny that had occurred during Longinus’
tenure as governor, and there was rumour that the Pompeian faction was planning an invasion
of Italy itself. Caesar was aware of the threat and had initially
planned an invasion from both the West and East; Longinus would land his Spanish Legions
and attack from the West, while Caesar would invade from Italy. Longinus’s abysmal administration of his
province had scuppered this plan, however. Caesar would need to invade himself and without
the reinforcements from Spain. Caesar’s African War was about to begin. As Caesar returned to Italy from Asia Minor,
he visited various client kings and rulers from in and around Greece, collecting money. Caesar had been recruiting massively throughout
the Civil War, spending almost all his personal money in the process, and the financial situation
was dire. Even with the money collected from these rulers,
he still needed more. Upon his arrival in Italy, he borrowed huge
sums from individuals and cities alike. Caesar likely had no intention of repaying
these huge debts, but in his opinion, the money was being spent on the public good and
so was no different from an official tax or levy. The money was given, but it cost Caesar popularity. Caesar was well aware of this fact, however,
and worked hard to keep the people on side. Clearly, Caesar was well aware that to win
any war, it is vital that the population at large is kept on side. There was one other major issue that Caesar
needed to resolve before he could begin the invasion of Africa. Four of his veteran Legions left in Campania
and picked to be part of the African campaign had mutinied a couple of months before Caesar’s
arrival in Italy. These Legions had been campaigning continuously
for 13 years and had been promised payment and discharge following the Battle of Pharsalus. Caesar’s campaigns in Egypt and the East
had delayed this, and with their general gone for almost a year, Antony had lost control,
the Legions going so far as looting wealthy estates around Rome and even killing two Senators
who had tried to negotiate with them. As a result of his failures as governor, Caesar
stripped Antony of his offices, instead assigning Lepidus as his Master of Horse and governor
of Italy by Lepidus. Four veteran Legions presented a very serious
threat if they could not be placated; Caesar recognised this danger and even garrisoned
Rome. He was advised not to risk negotiating in
person, but Caesar knew that these men were some of his best soldiers and would be much
needed in the campaigns to come. He met them alone at the Campus Martius. In reality, the legions were attempting to
bluff Caesar, hoping that Caesar would not allow them to be discharged and they could
then push for more pay. Caesar called their bluff and disbanded them
on the spot. Calling them citizens, rather than soldiers,
he promised they would all be paid in full and with interest after his conquest of Africa
and subsequent triumph with other Legions. Caesar continued, allotting the men land from
public holdings, as well as from his own. Caesar concluded by saying “I really have
no further need of you. Yet even so I will pay you the rewards, that
no one may say that after using you in danger I later showed myself ungrateful, even though
you were unwilling to join my campaign while perfectly strong in body and able to carry
through all the wars that remain". The legionaries were stunned. They considered themselves indispensable to
Caesar and were shamed by how readily Caesar would use other Legions to finish the war
they had helped start, as well as by how generously and quickly he would reward them. For these men, Caesar was everything. They had become wealthy and famous under his
leadership; now they had attempted to blackmail him, had their bluff called and were being
put out to pasture. The Legions then asked whether they could
volunteer to join Caesar in Africa, but Caesar simply turned his back and began to walk away. Desperately, the men begged him to stay and
re-enlist them. Caesar feigned indifference, before agreeing
to reinstate all but the 10th Legion. This Legion was his favourite, and he made
it clear that he was insulted that they in particular had joined the mutiny. Stung by his words, the 10th requested that
Caesar decimate the Legion, killing 1 in every 10 men, as punishment so that they might be
taken back into his favour. Again, Caesar feigned indifference, before
relenting and accepting the Legion back without punishment. Caesar did keep a list of the leading figures
of the mutiny, and assigned them to other Legions in particularly dangerous provinces,
but overall it had been a brilliant success; all 4 Legions were brought back into the fold
without a sesterce being spent, or a drop of blood shed. It was a prime example of the importance of
the persona and personality of Caesar; no other man at the time could have spoken to
the Legions and reached such a conclusion. With the Legions once again under control,
Caesar could finally begin his invasion and he ordered 10 Legions to gather in Lilybaeum,
Sicily, around late December. Word had reached Caesar of the rumour that
no Scipio could be defeated in Africa, and to counter these he quickly found a minor
member of the Scipio family to include in his officers’ staff; he too now had a Scipio
in his army. The veteran Legions in Campania were still
being organised for the campaign, but 6 Legions were ready in Lilybaeum; 5 were relatively
recently raised and untested one was Caesar’s veteran 5th Legion and some cohorts of the
10th which had been stationed in Brundisium. Caesar was eager to sail as soon as possible,
but the mutiny had delayed his plans and he was now faced with bad weather. Never one for waiting he embarked his men
and ordered them to Africa at the first sign of a lull in the storms. Caesar spent two days in Sicily giving instructions
for the rest of his army when they arrived on the island, before setting sail himself
on the 25th December. He reached the African coast on the 28th December,
landing near Hadrumetum. In his eagerness to attack quickly, Caesar
had risked the storms, and though most his warships had managed to cross safely, many
of his transports had been scattered, leaving him with just 3,000 infantry and 150 cavalry. Hadrumetum itself was under Optimate control,
garrisoned by 10,000 Romans and Numidians under the command of Gaius Considius Longus
and Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso. Caesar encamped just outside of the city on
the coast. His men’s morale was low due to the uncoordinated
crossing, and they were blaming Caesar because, in his haste, he had not issued clear, written
and sealed orders to his lieutenants as he usually did. They were right: Caesar’s obsession with
being quick had, this time, backfired. Caesar was in a dangerous position. If the Optimates sallied out of Hadrumetum
or if enemy reinforcements arrived, his small force could be caught against the coast. Initially, Caesar attempted to negotiate with
Considius, but the messenger was killed and the message sent, unread, to Scipio. He had now spent a day and a night around
Hadrumetum and no more of his army had arrived. Caesar made some minor probing attacks on
the city, but quickly decided he had neither the numbers nor amount of veterans needed
to storm the city. To make matters worse, his scouts also reported
that a large force of Numidian cavalry was closing in. With little choice left, Caesar broke camp
and marched away from the city. As soon as he did though, the Hadrumetum garrison
sallied out, soon being joined by Juba’s cavalry which had just arrived. They seized the deserted camp, and the Numidian
cavalry began harassing Caesar’s men, forcing Caesar to halt and form a defensive line. Clearly, this had been the Optimate plan from
the start; rather than attack Caesar in a fortified camp, where he was known to be particularly
dangerous, they had waited for a chance to catch him in the open. Initially, it looked as though Caesar would
be surrounded and caught just as Curio had been years earlier. Unlike Curio, however, Caesar refused to allow
his enemy to hold the initiative, ordering his small numbers of cavalry to charge the
Numidians. Caesar was well aware that they did not have
the numbers to win such a fight, but he was also aware that the Numidians would retreat
and skirmish, rather than engage in hand to hand fighting. It was vital that Caesar keep his men moving,
rather than stop and risk becoming surrounded, and with his cavalry having repulsed the Numidians
for the time being, Caesar seized the opportunity ordering his Legions to continue their march
with the few veteran cohorts and cavalry at the rear. His veterans could be counted on to stand
their ground against the incoming missile fire, while the cavalry would charge and scatter
the Numidians. Though progress was slow, Caesar was able
to continue this fighting withdrawal until he reached the safety of the town of Ruspina
on the 29th December. Disaster had been averted, but Caesar was
still in a precarious position. He next moved to the town of Leptis on 1st
January, where he was joined by some of his scattered transports. As well as his men being scattered, so too
had his supplies. He attempted to forage off the land, but patrolling
Numidian cavalry would ambush his men, making the task almost impossible. He sent requests to Sardinia, Sicily and other
provinces for more grain and focused on consolidating his position. He left 6 cohorts in Leptis, 1 Legion in Ruspina,
and took 7 cohorts of veterans from the 5th and 10th to the harbour, boarding his warships. He did not inform any of his men of what his
plan was, but his veterans were confident that Caesar would have a winning strategy. In fact, Caesar’s plan was to set sail with
the veterans to find the rest of his scattered fleet. Caesar had not told his men this, because
he was nervous that the garrisons in Ruspina or Leptis might be captured and reveal his
plans. Clearly, Caesar was rattled and being cautious. Fortunately, the next day, a large number
of the lost transports arrived, bringing much needed numbers. With this larger force, he could now attempt
to forage in security. He made camp at Ruspina, and then, on the
4th January, set out with around 15,000 men, approximately half his total force, to forage
for supplies. After marching 3 miles from Ruspina, his scouts
brought news that the enemy was close and closing in fast. Quickly, Caesar ordered his small contingent
of cavalry and archers to join him from Ruspina while he rode ahead with his bodyguard to
confirm the information. In the distance he saw a huge dust cloud approaching
and ordered his men to prepare for battle. In total, he would have 15,000 legionaries,
400 cavalry and 150 archers. The Optimate force facing him was significant;
12,000 of mostly light infantry, 8,000 Numidian cavalry, and 1,600 heavy cavalry, made from
Gallic and Germanic mercenaries, with a smaller force of a further 1,600 Numidian cavalry
close by to reinforce. Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of the Optimate
army, however, was its commanders. The main force was commanded by Caesar’s
once right-hand man, Labienus himself, the reinforcements by Petreius. Labienus was undoubtedly the best general
on the Optimate side and his years of campaigning with Caesar had made him familiar with his
tactics. Petreius was also talented and experienced,
having 30 years of military experience, including having fought Caesar at Ilerda and Pharsalus. This would be a difficult fight. Looking to make the most of his large number
of cavalry, Labienus deployed his men in a long tightly packed line, with infantry interspersed
among cavalry in order to hide his numbers. On both flanks, he stationed his heavier cavalry. Caesar, aware that he could easily be outflanked,
stretched his line to have as broad a front, putting what missiles he had in front and
the small amount of cavalry on the wings. He kept his men in position, not wanting to
make the initial move. With his smaller numbers, and the enemy’s
cavalry advantage, he thought it best to be defensive. Labienus, on the other hand, used his cavalry
to quickly seize the nearby highland, at the same time forcing Caesar’s cavalry to stretch
thin to try and counter any flanking attacks. Labienus was well aware of Caesar’s style
of battle, which relied upon having room to manoeuvre and using terrain advantages and
had now denied these to him. With these initial moves completed, Labienus
began the battle. He ordered his men to charge the length of
Caesar’s line, Caesar’s legions counter charging at the last minute. As they did though, the Numidian cavalry fell
back, while the infantry hidden among them pinned Caesar’s infantry. The Numidians then skirmished back and forth,
pelting Caesar’s line with javelins. His men attempted to charge the cavalry to
chase them off, but Caesar gave strict orders for his men to hold the line. Meanwhile, on the flanks, Caesar’s cavalry,
badly outnumbered, had been routed after a brief but brave struggle. Labienus now had Caesar’s force entirely
surrounded. At this point, Labienus removed his helmet
and rode around the surrounded Caesareans, encouraging his men and mocking Caesar’s,
attempting to demoralise them. He mocked them as being raw recruits, and
for being foolhardy for following Caesar and being caught in their current predicament. A veteran of the 10th Legion from one of the
cohorts who had crossed with Caesar, recognised Labienus. Removing his helmet, he threw his javelin,
shouting out that Labienus would know he was being attacked by a soldier of the Tenth. Labienus’ horse was killed, and Labienus
was taken from the battlefield after it fell on him. Nevertheless, Caesar’s men were still struggling,
attacked from all sides and they could do little except protect themselves from the
hail of missiles from the Numidian troops. It was a dire situation and panic was spreading,
and an aquilifer even attempted to flee, forcing Caesar to grab him, turn him to face the enemy
and push him forward to the front. The day was coming to an end, and Caesar knew
that he needed to reach his defences around Ruspina before nightfall or else lose his
army. He ordered every other cohort to turn around,
his line now fighting on two fronts, and gave the order for them to throw a hail of pila
and charge in both directions. It is a testament to the training of the Roman
Legions that such a manoeuvre could be organised and executed in the midst of battle. Taken by surprise by this sudden attack, the
Numidian light infantry and cavalry pulled back to skirmish and avoid hand-to-hand fighting. Caesar seized the opportunity and began withdrawing
his force from the battlefield as quickly as possible. As he did, Petreius arrived with his reinforcements. With these fresh troops, the Optimate force
pursued Caesar’s men looking to re-engage. This time, Caesar took the initiative, ordering
his men turn and charge their pursuers. Petreius was wounded in the skirmish, while
the Numidians once again fell back not wanting to be pinned in melee. This time, Caesar continued to push them back
over the high ground. Caesar paused his men here, waiting to see
if the enemy would attack now that he had the terrain advantage. The Optimates were exhausted, had both commanders
injured and had inflicted as much damage as they could in a day. They each withdrew to their camp, Caesar’s
men also withdrawing to Ruspina. The casualties for both armies are not known,
but given the encirclement of the Caesarion troops, it is likely that they suffered more
than the Optimates. Caesar had very nearly lost the entire campaign. If Labienus had not been wounded, he may have
been able to better control the Optimate army and kept the pressure on Caesar, leaving no
chance for him to escape. But Caesar was saved by his own strategic
talent, his men’s training, and luck with the wounding of both enemy commanders. Nevertheless, Caesar had managed to avoid
having his whole army destroyed as had happened to Curio. He would be able to consolidate, and seek
a more favourable engagement later. Caesar’s first priority was improving the
defences of Ruspina, and creating entrenchments from the town to his camp and to the sea. In doing so Caesar ensured his communication
lines would be kept safe, while also providing a safe landing ground for any reinforcements
and supplies. Caesar had been surprised by Labienus’ tactic
of mixing light troops with cavalry and decided to mimic it, pulling light marines and Archers
of his ships in order to do so. Meanwhile, Scipio was en route to unite his
force with Labienus and Petreius, bringing with him almost all of the Optimate leaders,
and the entirety of their army bringing its total to more than 60 thousand. Such an army would already have been larger
than the one Pompey had, and to make matters worse for Caesar, there was also a possibility
that the king of Numidia Juba, would join Scipio with his own force, including its famed
elephants. With fortifications improved, Caesar turned
his attention to the supplies. The Optimates had previously stripped the
area of corn and most of the local workforce was pressed into their army, making the harvest
of that year particularly poor. Caesar was forced to purchase supplies from
wealthy individuals living in the area and rationed them out to his army. A number of his scattered transports were
hunted down by the Optimate navy, and were captured or burned. Caesar ordered the remainder of his vessels
to patrol the harbour of Ruspina, to keep the area clear for the anticipated arrival
of troops and supplies from Sicily. Just when things were starting to look disastrous,
Caesar had a stroke of luck. The Optimate army under Scipio had paused
briefly at Utica where Cato, the figurehead and political leader of the faction was based. Whilst the army was there Cato began chastising
Pompey’s sons for failing to achieve as much as their father had by their age. Shamed and hoping to prove himself, Gnaeus
took 2000 slaves and freedmen and attacked the nearby kingdom of West Mauretania, ruled
by King Bogud. The Mauritanians lured Gnaeus close to the
town of Ascurum, before sallying out and quickly defeating the small force. Humiliated, Gnaeus withdrew to the Balearic
Islands, but his actions had far reaching consequences. Having left a sizable garrison at Utica, Scipio
now marched to Labienus and Petreius uniting the two armies and establishing camp 5 kilometers
from Caesar's position. They immediately begin using their large cavalry
forces to keep Caesar within his fortifications, making his supply situation even worse. Juba began marching to his allies hoping to
assist in a quick and definitive win over Caesar but Gnaeus’ actions now showed their
consequence. The King of East Mauritania Bocchus heard
of Juba’s departure and invaded Numidia to avenge the Optimate attack on his brother
Bogud. Commanding the Mauritanian armies was Publius
Sittius, who had been operating in Africa as a mercenary since the Cataline Conspiracy. He successfully captured the Numidian city
of Cirta, and then proceeded to pillage and sack the surrounding area. By this point Juba had almost reached Scipio,
but upon hearing the news pulled back to defend Numidia. Meanwhile, some of the local citizens had
begun sending messages to Caesar complaining of the harsh rule of the Optimates. Some towns even requested garrisons, pledging
to feed and house them in return, an offer Caesar gladly accepted sending 3 cohorts,
in order to improve his supply situation. Initially Caesar planned to wait for better
weather to ensure his troops would make the crossing from Sicily safely, but now he ordered
that they be sent no matter the conditions, showing how desperate he was. Scipio was not idle while all this was going
on. Labienus, in command of the majority of the
Optimate cavalry, kept up a relentless harassment campaign, fighting a number of skirmishes
with Caesar’s cavalry that ventured out to patrol. Labienus kept searching for ways of keeping
Caesar’s forces occupied, including attacking the towns of Leptis and Acylla, but he was
repelled by Caesar’s cohorts now garrisoned there. Nevertheless, these attacks were effective
at keeping the pressure on Caesar. Similarly, Scipio would march his army out
of camp every day and draw them into battle formation, including the elephants, hoping
to intimidate the recruits in Caesar’s army. Caesar made a show of indifference, keeping
his men at work on their fortifications, but he never drew up his own army for battle. He knew that for any chance of victory, he
would need more men, particularly more veterans. His best play was to keep his men behind their
fortifications of trenches and palisades and bide his time. His patience paid off. Sallust had arrived in Cercina, the site of
a large Optimate grain supply which was poorly defended. He easily chased off the garrison and immediately
sent the supplies to Caesar. Simultaneously, two experienced legions - 13th
and 14th were finally dispatched from Lilybaeum. Good luck with the weather and Caesar’s
patrolling fleet allowed the legions and supplies to arrive at Ruspina with relative ease. Soon after, Scipio sent two Gaetulian spies
into Caesar’s camp to assess the new situation. However, the Gaetuli who had greatly benefited
from the actions of Caesar’s uncle in law Gaius Marius, during and after the Jugurthine
War, immediately defected to Caesar. They informed him of Scipio’s numbers and
the morale of his men and, in particular, that the Optimate 4th and 6th Legions were
wavering and eager to join Caesar. Though Scipio and Labienus had done well to
keep up the pressure, they had delayed too long and lost the initiative: Caesar now had
the men and supplies he needed to go on the offensive and wanted to force a battle with
Scipio before the Numidian army would return. On the 25th January, he sent the transports
back to Sicily to get the rest of his army, and then marched his full force out of camp. His first objective was to take and fortify
the semi-circle ridge of hills that surrounded the town. Looking to use similar tactics to those at
Dyrrachium, Caesar quickly seized as many of these hills as he could, ordering fortifications
to be built to create a line of palisades across the tops of the hills. Hoping to force Caesar back to his original
position, Scipio marched his full army out of camp with Labienus in command of the vast
cavalry force, drawing up for battle. Caesar initially thought this was a bluff,
but when the enemy approached in formation he drew his Legions up on the hills for battle,
sending a small detachment of Spanish auxiliaries to seize the one hill still held by Scipio. The Numidians holding the position there were
quickly chased away, and Labienus led the majority of his right wing of cavalry to cover
their retreat. Caesar noticed that Labienus had moved too
far from the main Optimate battle line, and sent his own left wing of cavalry to charge
through the hole, before turning back to attack Labienus from the rear. A large estate prevented Labienus from seeing
this movement until the enemy cavalry was already behind him. With the cavalry pushing from his rear, and
the Spanish auxiliaries attacking from the front, Labienus was caught in a pincer and
ordered a withdrawal. He and the fast Numidian horsemen were able
to extract themselves, but his Gallic and Germanic cavalry was slower. It was surrounded and, despite brave resistance,
cut down to a man. Seeing that his right flank was in shambles,
Scipio quickly ordered a retreat and pulled back to his camp. Feeling robbed, Caesar did the same. However, soon he tried to force a battle again,
this time marching his army towards the town of Uzitta, a major water source for Scipio,
which was located just outside the Optimate camp. Scipio marched his army out of camp, positioning
them on either side of the town in a strong defensive position. Eagerly, Caesar again drew his men up for
battle, but was reluctant to attack Scipio in such a strong location. For the remainder of the day the armies stood
opposite each other, until Caesar ordered a retreat. Frustrated once more, Caesar returned to his
camp and continued to further fortify his position on the ridge. Scipio had been delaying for a good reason. Immediately after the cavalry skirmish where
the Gallic and Germanic cavalry had been lost, he had sent word to Juba demanding his help. Juba, who owed his kingdom to Pompey, obliged. He left his general Saburra, the victor of
Bagradas, to fight Sittius, and marched to Scipio with 3 Numidian Legions trained in
the Roman style, 800 heavy cavalry, more light infantry and cavalry and 30 more elephants. The Optimates now had 8 Roman and 3 Numidian
legions, approximately 55,000 men, almost 16,000 cavalry, 60 elephants, and perhaps
as many as 20,000 light infantry; a total of around 90,000 men, truly a colossal force. It was now Scipio's turn to go on the offensive. His fleet had been hunting down any of Caesar
ships that had been blown astray in the crossing from Sicily, and the prisoners were brought
to him. He now displayed a number of captured veterans
of the 14th outside his camp, and had them tortured to death there and their bodies left
outside. He also once again began drawing his army
out of camp every day to further intimidate Caesar and his men. These actions had the opposite effect, however. The execution of his men enraged Caesar and
he was also encouraged by Juba’s numbers – they weren’t as significant as he feared,
which meant that Sittius was distracting much of the Numidian force, and confirmed that
Scipio had no more aces left up his sleeve. Following this, a deadlock emerged. Both sides regularly drew up for battle but
no serious engagement was fought, neither wanting to be the one to attack a fortified
opponent. A number of cavalry skirmishes were fought,
with neither side able to gain a significant advantage over the other. Two more veteran legions, the 10th and 9th,
arrived and Caesar attempted to use them to break the stalemate, constructing two long
entrenchments from his camp to Utizza, despite the constant harassment from Labienus’ cavalry. A new camp was made at the end of these entrenchments,
where siege weapons such as scorpions and catapults were constructed and began bombarding
Utizza. Caesar’s constant pressure and the close
proximity of his new camp to that of Scipio’s encouraged some of the Optimate troops, mainly
Gaetulians, but also a number of men from the 4th and 6th Legions to change sides. Scipio couldn’t allow this to go on and,
once again, ordered his army to get into battle formation. Caesar did the same, but broken ground in
front of Scipio’s army dissuaded him from attacking, despite the two armies now being
less than 200 metres apart. After squaring off for half a day, Caesar
withdrew back into camp. That is when Labienus launched an attack on
Caesar’s retreating cavalry and light infantry. The Legions were close enough to prevent a
complete disaster, but the attack gave Caesar food for thought: it was only a matter of
time before Labienus was able to strike a deadly blow with his superior cavalry numbers. Soon word was sent that the last two Legions
Caesar pegged for this campaign - the 7th and 8th, were en route from Sicily. He also heard from some deserters that Varus,
who had been stationed at Utica with the Optimate fleet, planned to attack them on the crossing. Immediately, Caesar rode to Leptis himself,
took command of his fleet and surprised Varus. The optimate fleet was chased away and the
Caesarean Legions were guided to land safely. Caesar now felt comfortable enough to send
2 Legions out of his fortifications to find supplies in the nearby estates. At this point, Optimate deserters informed
Caesar of an ambush planned by Labienus and Caesar managed to surprise his old ally, killing
500 light infantrymen and routing the Numidian cavalry. Unfortunately for Caesar, his Legions were
unsuccessful in their foraging, making it clear that he needed to move his entire army
to find food. Caesar left a garrison in Ruspina, burnt his
camp, and marched out with his full force. He foraged the area around Aggar and Zeta,
constantly shadowed by Scipio’s army. After foraging around Zeta, Caesar began retreating
to his camp roughly 23 kilometers away, but was once again attacked by Labienus and his
Numidian cavalry and light infantry. This time, Labienus kept up the attack, retreating
when Caesar’s men turned to confront him, and then continuing the harassment as soon
as they began marching again. Caesar’s cavalry took the brunt of these
attacks, and he was eventually forced to pull them from the rear and use his Legions to
fend off the Numidians. His heavy infantry took less damage than his
cavalry, but his army was now moving incredibly slowly, only managing to cover 300 meters
in 4 hours. Night finally set in and Labienus withdrew
his troops, but he had been successful in doing significant damage to Caesar’s already
much smaller cavalry force. Impressed by how effective Numidian light
cavalry and light infantry had been against him, Caesar began drilling his men in tactics
to combat them, such as how far to retreat from them and when they should turn and throw
javelins. He was soon met by the last Sicilian reinforcements,
bringing his force to Legions, 5 newly raised and 7 veteran, roughly 3,000-5,000 cavalry
and an unknown number of light infantry. Caesar veteran Legions had taken casualties,
some might even be only at half strength, and so establishing the size of Caesar’s
army is difficult, but a number of around 60,000-70,000 seems reasonable. Though outnumbered overall, Caesar had more
veterans than Scipio, as the optimate army was largely made of fresh recruits and conscripts. Caesar also brought elephants from Italy. Although useless in battle and intended for
the Roman games they allowed Caesar to train his troops: his men were taught where the
elephants were vulnerable even in armour and his cavalry practiced throwing dummy javelins
at them, familiarising the horses with the elephant smell and sound. It is a testament to Caesar’s generalship,
that even on a campaign, he still took the time to train his troops to address new threats. The stalemate continued: Caesar was moving
from town to town looking for supplies with Scipio shadowing him. Labienus attempted to keep up his skirmishing
campaign while Caesar marched, but Caesar’s training had paid off. 300 men from each Legion were assigned to
not carry any baggage and instead act as a quick response rear guard, fending off all
of Labienus harassing attacks. Finally, Caesar had enough. Time and time again he had formed up his army
for battle, only for Scipio to decline. The towns in the area that he raided were
not important enough to force a reaction, and Labienus’ attacks remained a constant
source of frustration. Caesar needed to be able to force Scipio into
a situation where he had no choice but to fight, so on April 4, Caesar abandoned his
camp at night and moved to Thapsus. Thapsus was a major city in the area, holding
a large port, supplies and arms and armour; it was a target that Scipio would not be able
to ignore a threat to. Caesar, having marched through the night,
soon arrived at the city, immediately besieging it, and fortifying his own position against
a possible Optimate attack. Outside of the city of Thapsus was the Marsh
of Moknine, which effectively forced any approaching army to take one of two narrow passes; hugging
either the northern or eastern coast. Caesar had chosen his target well. He established two forts, one in the Eastern
passage which was garrisoned by 3 cohorts, which effectively blocked that pass, and one
surrounding the city of Thapsus. His strategy was to force Scipio to take the
northern passage, meaning Scipio would be forced to attack him from only one direction. Scipio soon arrived on the scene. He initially intended to take the eastern
passage, but seeing Caesar’s fort abandoned this idea. Leaving a small force under Afranius opposite
Caesar’s fort, he ordered Juba, Labienus and the Numidian cavalry to encamp in a separate
camp nearby. He then commanded a forced march around the
west of the Marsh to the northern pass with the rest. It seems that Scipio’s strategy was to try
and catch Caesar in a pincer, hoping to eventually make a simultaneous push on his position through
both passages. Quickly, Scipio ordered part of his men to
begin construction of a second camp, while the rest of his army drew up for battle in
front of them, with the elephants on either flank in front of his cavalry. Caesar could not believe his luck. Scipio had taken the bait and was now offering
battle under terrible conditions; his men were already fatigued by the long march, part
of his army was building a camp, and a significant portion of his army, including most of the
Numidian cavalry, was too far away. Leaving two of the rookie Legions encamped
around Thapsus, Caesar eagerly formed up the rest for battle. He deployed his army in the classic 3 lines. The 10th and 7th Legions were stationed on
the right, the 8th and 9th on the left. The centre was likely held by two of the other
veteran Legions, the 13th and 14th, with a recruit legion on either side of them; mixing
recruit and veteran Legions this was a favoured strategy of Caesar’s. His last Legion, the 5th, was split into two
and stationed behind each flank, acting as a fourth line. Their role was specifically to handle the
elephants; in case of a charge from them, the front lines would part and it would be
up to the 5th to kill them. Archers, slingers, and light infantry mixed
with cavalry held his extreme flanks. Caesar and his men noticed a lot of movement
and jostling in Scipio’s line as men moved to and from the camp. His veterans, many of whom were already supposed
to be retired and who had spent the last couple of months frustrated by the lack of a decisive
battle, urged Caesar to attack. Caesar was hesitant, perhaps thinking that
it must surely be a trap. It is also worth noting at this point that
Plutarch claims that Caesar had an epileptic fit before the battle, which perhaps was the
reason for the delay. His veterans, however, had had enough. A trumpeter of the 10th or 7th, without Caesar’s
orders, sounded the charge, and Caesar’s right flank surged forward. Realising that there would be no way of restraining
his men, Caesar decided that he must fully commit and rode ahead to the 10th and 7th
to take personal command of them. He ordered the slingers and archers on the
right to target Scipio’s elephants opposite them, panicking the beasts and sending them
rampaging into their own lines. At the same time, the elephants on Scipio’s
right charged Caesar’s left, but his Legions quickly parted as they were trained to, the
cohorts of the 5th Legion taking the brunt of their charge. They fought bravely, using spears to jab at
the vulnerable and sensitive points on the elephants, blasting trumpets loudly to further
frighten them. The elephants were soon panicked, and turned
to run back to Scipio’s army. Scipio’s line was now being charged by his
own elephants, with Caesar’s Legions following close behind. Panic had set in almost immediately. The left, fighting Caesar’s 10th and 7th,
was the first to break, the entire line following shortly after. Some tried to fight, but most were stampeding
towards the camp that was still being built. Caesar now had all the momentum, and his men
easily cut down the fleeing and disorganised Optimate forces, as well as those who were
constructing the camp. The garrison at Thapsus attempted to sally
out to distract Caesar’s army, but the two Legions left in the camp easily repelled it. These Legions then marched down the eastern
corridor to the camps of Afranius and Juba. In a full-scale rout, Scipio’s men fled
around the western edge of the marsh, desperately trying to reach these camps, with Caesar’s
men in hot pursuit. It was a disaster for the Optimates. When Scipio’s men reached the forts, they
found Afranius’ camp already overrun, and Juba’s being assaulted by Caesar’s two
other Legions. The Numidian king, seeing Caesar’s main
force now approaching, gave up the fight and retreated with Labienus, Petreius and what
cavalry he had left. Caesar’s force stormed his camp, easily
taking it. With no other options left, the remainder
of the optimate army surrendered. Caesar’s men massacred many; Dio blames
this on Caesar, however, most sources say Caesar ordered the men be spared, but that
his battle frenzied soldiers disobeyed. It seems likely that Caesar did not order
the massacre; a master propagandist Caesar knew the power of mercy and was renowned,
even in his time, for sparing the vast majority of his Roman enemies. The battle was over. Some sources suggest the Optimates lost 10,000,
others suggest as many as 50,000, while Caesar’s losses were as little as 50 or as many as
1,000. It was a decisive victory for Caesar. Following the battle, the Optimate leadership
was scattered. Labienus, Varus and Pompey’s son Sextus
had managed to escape and would eventually make it to Spain, where they would continue
to resist Caesar. Afranius along with Faustus Cornelius Sulla,
collected the survivors and began pillaging Mauritania, planning to gather enough supplies
to then also cross to Spain. However, they were caught by Sittius and then
killed. Petreius and Juba fled to Numidia, confident
they would find support there. Sittius had been successful in defeating and
killing Juba’s general Saburra however, and the Numidians now turned on their king,
barring their gates to him. With no options left, the two men decided
to commit suicide. They had a final dinner and settled on duelling
each other, so that at least one of them may die honourably in battle. Juba won the duel, killing Petreius, and then
had one of his slaves kill him. As for Scipio, he too hoped to retreat to
Spain. Gathering a few supporters and a small fleet,
he set sail, but was caught in a storm and forced to make port at Hippo. Caesar’s fleet, commanded by Sittius found
him and a minor naval battle was fought. When defeat here was inevitable, Scipio killed
himself; the last Scipio of any real historical note. The only Optimate leader left in Africa was
Cato in Utica. As Caesar’s army closed in, he made his
final preparations. He held a feast with his friends and then
retired to his bedroom, leaving his children in the care of Lucius Caesar, a distant cousin
of Caesar’s, though a supporter of Pompey, telling his son “I who have been brought
up in freedom, with the right of free speech, cannot in my old age change and learn slavery
instead”. He then read Plato’s Phaedra, and after
finishing it, stabbed himself in the stomach. In death, Cato did rob Caesar of what would
have been one of his greatest triumphs, that of being able to claim that he spared the
life of his greatest enemy. Caesar was extremely frustrated by Cato’s
suicide apparently saying, “Cato, I begrudge thee thy death, for thou didst begrudge me
the preservation of thy life”. Caesar spent some time in Africa, fining those
who had funded the Optimate war effort, before finally returning to Rome, victorious. He retired many of his oldest veterans in
a generous fashion, and held 4 triumphs, one for Gaul, Egypt, Asia and Africa. Having defeated Cato, his position was now
supreme. He was assigned incredible powers by the senate,
including Censorial powers for 3 years, and dictatorial powers for 10, a wholly unprecedented
level of power. For all intents and purposes, Caesar was now
the sole ruler of the Roman Republic. However, though he had now twice won the Civil
War, once at Pharsalus and once at Thapsus, the war was not over. The sons of Pompey, Varus and Labienus still
resisted him in Spain. The political heart of the Optimate faction,
Cato, was dead. Cicero, his natural heir as political head
of the faction, had resigned himself to being a part of the new order, rather than fighting
against it, hoping that he would be able to persuade Caesar to restore the Republic. Many other Optimate Senators had similarly
resigned themselves to working with Caesar, in part because many of them had been captured
and then spared by him. The extent to which Caesar had won politically
can be seen in the powers bestowed on him in the immediate aftermath of Thapsus. He was made Dictator for the third time, for
a wholly unprecedented 10 years, made Prefect of Morals and the Forum of Caesar was completed
and dedicated to him in recognition of his achievements. Caesar was, for all practical purposes, the
master of Rome. However, some of the Optimates still resisted. Gnaeus and Sextus Pompey had fled from Africa
and arrived in Baetica. With them went survivors of Thapsus, including
two of Caesar’s most active and determined opponents Titus Labienus and Attius Varus. Baetica had been chosen deliberately, as Pompey
Magnus had been governor of the province in the 50s BC and people in the area still respected
him, including legionaries who fought against Caesar during the Spanish campaign of 49 BC. His sons found plenty of support and managed
to amass one Legion from survivors of Thapsus. Shortly after their arrival, 2 Legions under
Trebonius’ command had sided with the brothers and they had managed to levy one more from
sympathetic Roman citizens in the area, many of whom had previously served under Pompey’s
command. Additionally, the brothers made alliances
with some Lusitanian tribes, and had drawn a number of deserters and others to their
banners. Caesar claimed that they had 70,000, but he
was probably counting garrisons and other supporters in that number. These events had happened in the summer of
46BC. Caesar was, at the time, occupied in Rome
with assigning magistrates, retiring many of his longest-serving veterans, holding games
and triumphs, and beginning the reordering of the calendar. As a result, he had assigned Quintus Pedius
and Quintus Fabius Maximus, along with 4 Legions already in the Hispanic provinces to handle
the situation. As the months went on however, Caesar heard
of the growing success of the Optimates and realised that he would, once again, have to
handle the matter personally. He gathered 4 more Legions, his favourite
10th, the veteran 5th and 6th, and the relatively new 3rd, and marched to Baetica, arriving
in the area by the end of the year. By that point Sextus Pompey had already taken
the main city in the area Corduba, and was holding it with a strong garrison, while Gnaeus
was in command of the army alongside Labienus. Together, they had laid siege to Ulia, one
of the few cities in the area that had not pledged allegiance to them. Caesar got to work immediately. Lucius Vibius Paciaecus, one of Caesar’s
officers who was known to the Ulians and knew the area well, was sent with 6 cohorts and
cavalry to the city, while Caesar began to march on Corduba, hoping to draw Gnaeus from
Ulia, which was his favoured tactic. Paciaecus approached Ulia during the night,
and a huge storm swept in. Seizing his opportunity, Paciaecus calmly
marched his men through Gnaeus’ lines. The sentries, unable to clearly distinguish
any of the legionary symbols of Caesar’s men in the dark and through the torrential
downpour, simply let them past, allowing Caesar’s lieutenant to slip into the town and preparing
his men to defend it. Meanwhile, as Caesar was approaching Corduba
he sent a detachment of cavalry and mounted legionaries as a scouting party ahead of his
main force. They soon ran into a cavalry unit sent out
by Sextus. The two forces clashed, Caesar’s legionaries
quickly dismounting to fight on foot. Not prepared for fighting heavy infantry,
the Pompeians took heavy casualties before breaking and fleeing back to Corduba with
the news that Caesar was near. Urgently, Sextus sent messages to his brother
requesting reinforcements. Gnaeus quickly agreed, abandoning the siege
of Ulia and marching to Sextus’ aid. Caesar approached Corduba from the south. It seems that Sextus had either blocked or
destroyed the bridge from Corduba that crossed the Baetis, forcing Caesar to create a makeshift
one by lowering baskets piled with stones and then laying planks across them. Afterwards, he made camp outside Corduba. Gnaeus soon arrived, encamping opposite, and
Caesar immediately began erecting a line of palisades from his camp to the bridge, cutting
Gnaeus off from the city. Similarly, Gnaeus began creating defences
from his camp to the bridge, hoping to cut off Caesar’s escape. Fierce skirmishes were fought on the bridge
itself, each side trying to force the other to concede control of it. The narrowness of the bridge made the fighting
particularly brutal and many were either thrown into the river during the fighting, or were
killed and their bodies left piled on the bridge. Caesar was hoping for a quick and decisive
battle, and this was clearly not going to be that. Accordingly, one night he lit a large number
of campfires to give the impression his camp was still garrisoned, and then slipped out
of the fort. He carried out a risky, river crossing during
the night, slipping away from the brothers and making for the town of Ategua, which had
the strongest Pompeian garrison in the area. The next morning, Gnaeus realised what had
happened and Labienus pursued with his cavalry, capturing a number of Caesar’s supply wagons,
but withdrawing before they could be caught and pinned. Caesar, reaching Ategua, began besieging the
city, encamping nearby. The terrain around the city was extremely
hilly. Many of these had watchtowers already built
on them and, as he had done at Ruspina, Caesar quickly assigned pickets to them. When Gnaeus and Labienus approached, they
did so under heavy fog and using it, they were able to surround and slaughter a number
of Caesar’s pickets, with only some horsemen escaping to give Caesar news of their approach. Nevertheless, when the fog lifted it became
clear that Caesar’s men had already claimed most of the strategically important high ground
in the area. With little choice, Gnaeus was forced to make
camp on high ground between Ategua and Ucubi. Though he could still see Ategua, he was not
close enough to attack Caesar. The Optimates soon noticed that one of the
hills to the south of the town, known as the Camp of Postumius, was in an ideal location. A river cutting between it and Caesar’s
camp would make it difficult for Caesar to reinforce. Furthermore, it was close enough to Caesar
to apply pressure and overlooked his supply and communication lines. Caesar and Labienus had used this same tactic
a number of times in the Gallic Wars, most notably at Gergovia. and Labienus sent a detachment
in the night to seize it. The Caesareans, however, were alert, and immediately
raised the alarm upon the attack, resisting fiercely. Caesar sent the 5th, 6th and 10th legions
to reinforce them. With their countless experiences of river
crossings, the Legions were able to quickly ford the river and come to their allies, forcing
the Pompeian detachment to retreat to their camp. The following day, a reinforcing detachment
of cavalry and allied kings arrived to join Caesar, King of West Mauritania Bogud among
them. Gnaeus and Labienus now decided to abandon
their position, marching further West to the banks of the River Salsum. Though they would be even less able to pressure
Caesar from here, winter was beginning to set in and this new position would make it
easier to be supplied from Corduba. Caesar, on the other hand, would be forced
to winter around Ategua. A stalemate emerged as Gnaeus and Labienus
fortified their camp along the Salsum, while Caesar simultaneously harassed supplies being
sent to them from Corduba, and carried out several unsuccessful attacks on Ategua. This situation greatly benefited the Pompeians. With the locals on their side, it was in their
best interest to stall Caesar as long as possible and hope to drain his supplies throughout
the winter. Caesar, usually known for his clemency, was
notably unmerciful during this period, as several prisoners were executed and captured
couriers from Corduba had their hands cut off. Gnaeus and Labienus kept Caesar under pressure,
attacking his pickets surrounding and killing many, forcing Caesar to send more men to dissuade
any other attacks. They also continuously attacked Caesar’s
cavalry that ventured out to scout and forage. Once again, Caesar had his back against the
wall. In early 45 BC, the pro-Caesarean faction
in Ategua sent envoys to Caesar, offering to surrender if he agreed to remove the Pompeian
garrison, and not garrison the city himself. Caesar refused, and the envoys returned to
Ategua. The Pompeian garrison soon found out about
this and rounded up the men responsible and murdering them. This would prove to be a disastrous decision
for the Pompeians. Neither Gnaeus or Labienus had ordered this
massacre; they were outraged, as this could have cost them the support of the people. Looking to salvage what they could from the
situation, they snuck a messenger into Ategua telling the garrison to sally out that night
and force a way through Caesar’s lines to their camp. The plan went into effect that night, the
garrison rushing out and trying to fight through Caesar’s lines. Caesar’s men, however, easily beat them
back. Gnaeus and Labienus kept their men in battle
formation across the River Salsum. In reality, it seems that neither particularly
wanted to help the garrison, as following the massacre, Gnaeus and Labienus were not
willing to risk their men’s lives in order to save the garrison. The Optimates retreated the following night,
abandoning Ategua. Soon after, envoys from both the garrison
and townsfolk came to Caesar offering their surrender. Caesar accepted, taking the city on the 19th
February. Following this action, both sides began focusing
on gaining popular support for their cause. Caesar sent messengers to other towns in the
area, like Ursao and Ucubi, telling them of the massacre of the Ateguans. Support for the Pompeians began to waiver,
some deserting to Caesar and the Pompeians were forced to take more drastic actions,
executing the political leaders of the pro-Caesarean faction in these cities. It was now Caesar’s turn to apply pressure. He first moved his camp near Gnaeus’ on
the River Salsum, beginning to fortify the area. Gnaeus attacked quickly, however, throwing
the men working on Caesar’s defences into disarray. Two centurions of the 5th bravely pushed forward,
both dying in brutal fighting, but their sacrifice inspired their cohorts to follow and stabilised
the line. Nevertheless, Caesar had gotten the worst
of the fighting, and he relocated to Soricaria, establishing a fort there that cut Gnaeus
and Labienus off from Aspavia, an important town for supplies. Gnaeus gave chase, keeping his men on the
high ground, but some clever maneuvering and prediction from Caesar led Gnaeus’ men to
being caught out of position and taking heavy casualties. Both sides had now had some minor successes,
but neither was close to the decisive victory. Gnaeus delaying campaign had been effective
at first, but the loss of Ategua and the skirmish at Soricaria had cost him a lot of support. Caesar, meanwhile, needed to bring the Civil
War to a conclusive end: the resistance of the sons of the Pompey, Labienus and Varus
was undermining his position politically. Both needed a quick victory. The older generals, including Labienus, urged
Gnaeus to avoid battle and continue his delaying campaign, but the latter’s mind was made
up. He broke camp at Soricaria and making for
the town of Munda. Caesar followed. On the 17th March, both drew up for battle. Gnaeus and Labienus had chosen a strong position. The town of Munda was on high ground, and
they drew up their army in front of the town on the hill. At the base of the hill was a plain, approximately
5 miles wide, with a stream cutting across the middle of it. Though Caesar says they had 13 Legions, this
is questioned by other sources some putting the number lower than 40,000. It is possible that the sources are somewhat
muddled, and that Gnaeus’ full force was around 70,000 including auxiliaries and allies,
of which around 30-40,000 were legionaries. Caesar was encamped opposite the Pompeians
on the other side of the plain with his army. With him were 8 Legions, 3 of whom had fought
with him since the Gallic Wars, the 5th, 6th and 10th and 8,000 horsemen, including some
excellent light cavalry brought by Bogud. Caesar gives his own numbers as 40,000, but
in reality, his army numbered around 50-60,000 men. Caesar made the first move, marching his army
out of camp and onto the plain, confident that the Pompeians would come down from the
hill and fight on the plain so their cavalry on the flanks would have room to move. The Pompeians held their position. Caesar advanced further, to the banks of the
stream. Again, the Pompeians did not move. Caesar crossed the stream, and still the Pompeians
did not move. Gnaeus and Labienus knew the strength of their
position and would force Caesar to fight on their terms. Having finally brought his enemy to the field
and not wanting to risk missing the chance for a final victory, Caesar moved to the base
of the hill, drawing up his force with the 10th in the position of honour on the right,
the 6th in the centre and the 3rd and 5th on the left, the rookie Legions interspersed
between the veterans and behind, and his cavalry on the flanks. With little room for any elaborate maneuvers,
Caesar ordered his infantry to attack the Pompeians head-on. The fighting was brutal, Caesar’s men having
the benefit of experience, Gnaeus and Labienus’ men having the terrain advantage and being
driven by the strongest motivator; desperate survival. Neither side was making progress. The generals and staff officers of both armies
had started the battle on horseback, Caesar riding through his lines, urging his men on. As the brutal fighting continued Caesar grabbed
a shield from one of his soldiers, saying to the other officers “This will be the
end of my life, and your military service” and pushed his way through to the front lines,
almost immediately taking a hail of javelins on his shield. His other officers and legates, also quickly
dismounted and joined him, fighting alongside him. Gnaeus, Labienus and Varus had also dismounted
and were fighting amongst their men in the carnage; it was some of the most brutal fighting
seen in the Civil War. Despite being reduced in numbers due to years
of campaigning, the 10th Legion, one of Caesar’s favourite and most experienced Legions, finally
managed to turn the tide of battle, pushing the Pompeian left hard. Gnaeus was forced to move a Legion from his
right to reinforce that wing, and as soon as he did, Caesar’s cavalry fell upon the
now weakened right flank. The Pompeians started giving ground, being
pushed back to the walls of Munda where they finally broke into a general rout, some making
it into the town of Munda, others scattering in all directions. 30,000 Pompeians lay dead on the battlefield,
Caesar having lost 1,000. Among the Pompeian dead were Varus, and Caesar’s
one-time friend, ally, and right-hand man, Labienus. Their heads were brought to Caesar after the
battle, and Caesar ordered their bodies be found, and then had them buried with honours
where they had died. According to Appian, Caesar would later say
that he had “often fought for victory, but that on this occasion he fought for his life”. Despite this decisive victory, the campaign
was still not over. Gnaeus had escaped the battle and fled to
Carteia with what survivors he could gather, many more were either preparing to defend
the town of Munda or retreating to Corduba. Caesar’s men blockaded the men in Munda
in a gruesome fashion. The bodies of the dead Pompeians were used
to create a palisade and the spears with heads of the dead put along with it. Meanwhile, messengers reached Sextus in Corduba
of his brother’s defeat, and, after gathering a bodyguard, he slipped out of the city at
night. Leaving a detachment under Fabius Maximus
to keep the survivors in Munda surrounded, Caesar soon arrived at Corduba. It had since been reinforced by some who had
escaped Munda, but with the help of the pro-Caesarean faction in the city, Caesar quickly stormed
and took the city, 22,000 Pompeian soldiers and sympathizers dying in the fighting. In Carteia, the pro-Caesarean faction there
detained Gnaeus and sent envoys to Caesar, hoping to atone for previously having sided
with the Pompeians. However, the pro-Pompeians rescued Gnaeus,
killing the leaders of the Caesarean faction and fighting to take the gates of the city. Gnaeus was injured in the fighting, but was
able to escape the town with 20 ships before Caesar could arrive. Didius, in command of the Caesarean fleet,
heard of this and sent ships to give chase, stationing men along the coast to watch for
Gnaeus making any landing. Having left in such a hurry, Gnaeus did not
have time to stock up on water or food and was forced to make land to try and resupply. Didius’ men quickly found him, and captured
most of his ships burning the rest. Gnaeus once again managed to escape with what
few men he could. He and his companions were continually hounded
as they fled, Gnaeus being wounded in the shoulder and leg during one of these skirmishes. Having been on the run for weeks and now having
to be carried on a litter, Gnaeus arrived at Lauro, with probably less than 1,000 men. A Lusitanian betrayed him, telling his position
to the Caesareans. A force under the command of Lucius Caesennius
Lento soon arrived. Badly outnumbered, the Pompeians nonetheless
made what defences they could on the high ground and prepared to make a last stand. Despite Lento’s larger numbers, he was initially
repulsed, the Pompeians resisting desperately. Eventually, the weight of numbers proved too
much, however, and the Pompeians were overrun, Lento’s men cutting them down. Gnaeus, who had been carried by some of his
men from the battlefield, was finally found. Despite his wounds, he bravely tried to fight
back before being cut down. Like his father, he too was beheaded, his
head being displayed at Hispalis, before Caesar ordered him be buried with honours. During this time, the men at Munda had continuously
made sallies against Fabius Maximus and his men but were consistently repulsed. Soon after Gnaeus’ death, Fabius stormed
the town, killing or capturing all 14,000 men there. All that remained of the Pompeian faction
was Pompey’s son Sextus, who had escaped but was now little more than a pirate. Meanwhile, Caesar had been travelling throughout
the province, reminding the citizens what good he had done for the province while quaestor
and praetor there. While he was engaged in these actions, he
was joined by one of his nephews, the grandson of his sister Julia. This young man was Gaius Octavius. It was around April of 45BC, the Great Roman
Civil War was over, and Caesar was on his way back to Rome. It was around April of 45BC, and the Great
Roman Civil War was over. At last, Caesar could turn away from war and
focus on the politics of the Republic. A true representative of the Populares, Caesar,
believed that the power of the Republic was its common people, rather than the aristocracy
as the Optimates believed. The extent to which he really believed in
these ideals has been debated for centuries and he has been variously viewed as a military
tyrant, a despotic demagogue, a benevolent dictator, a would-be saviour of the Republic,
and a populist champion of the people. In this episode, we shall look at the reforms
enacted by Caesar throughout his career and allow you to decide which view you agree with. By the time of Caesar’s first consulship
in 59BC, Pompey has long struggled to push legislation that would give land to his veterans. Caesar proposed a bill that would achieve
this, while also including measures that would also distribute land to the urban poor of
Rome. The Gracchi brothers, almost 70 years earlier,
had tried to carry out a similar proposal, distributing “public land” to the poor,
eventually resulting in their deaths at the hand of the Senate. Caesar, however, had learned from their example. His proposal to the Senate would provide land
for 20,000 of Rome’s poor, without any financial cost to the Senate or the wealthy landowners. The riches Pompey had taken from the East
would be used to fund the reform, and land would be bought from the owners at the price
it had been assessed at in the tax lists, ensuring fairness. A board of 20 would oversee the redistribution,
with Caesar exempting himself from the board to ensure it would not be biased. When the bill was put to the Senate, it was
apparently so watertight that none could criticise it. Nevertheless, they did not pass it with stiff
opposition coming from influential men such as Cato, Cicero, and Caesar’s consular colleague,
Bibulus. Caesar read the bill to the people, where
it received huge public approval. Still, the Senate refused to pass the bill,
obfuscating and delaying constantly. Eventually, Caesar requested the help of Pompey
and Crassus, both of who publicly supported the bill. With their support assured, Caesar decided
to bypass the Senate officially proposing the bill to the comitia, an assembly of citizens. Bibulus tried to use all the political tricks
in the book to stop the assembly but was assaulted by the people and forced to retreat to his
house. The bill, finally, was passed and all Senators
were bound by oaths to uphold it. Shortly after the passing of this bill, according
to both Appian and Cassius Dio, a man called Lucius Vettius attempted to assassinate both
Caesar and Pompey. He was caught and when interrogated said he
had been put up to it by either Bibulus, Cicero, and Cato, or Cicero and Lucullus (depending
on the source) all of whom were adamant Optimates. Vettius was then killed in the night while
in prison before any more could be learned from him. Roman historians were extremely critical of
Caesar for this bill. Dio claims that Caesar only proposed it as
a favour to Pompey and Crassus, to help win the public support and so lay the groundwork
for the First Triumvirate, while Plutarch says the law was “becoming, not for a consul,
but for a most radical tribune of the plebs”. They both see the bill as being designed purely
to win popular approval. Caesar certainly did want to assure his supporters
that he was a man of action and in control, and so the ancient historians are right in
part. The bill did indeed win Caesar and his co-Triumvirates
a lot of popular support, thus helping Caesar settle political debts with Pompey and Crassus. It is also important to note that Caesar did
abuse the Republican system in order to get the bill passed, overruling both the Senate
and a fellow consul. However, it is also true that this kind of
land reform was badly needed in Rome and did benefit thousands of its poorer citizens. Furthermore, Caesar already had a history
of supporting land reform, having supported a similar but failed bill, in 63BC. Caesar was also playing a seriously risky
game by proposing the legislation. Similar laws had resulted in the deaths of
the Gracchi and would result in an attempt on his own life, and one is forced to wonder
if there was not a less risky way of winning public support if that was the only motivation. It is also worth noting that the Roman voting
system heavily favoured the rich, the poor having a comparatively small amount of influence
in voting. As a result, it is debatable just how much
power Caesar would really have achieved by passing a bill that would benefit the poorest. it is also worth remembering that Dio and
Plutarch were both parts of the aristocracy of the Empire, a highly conservative body,
and so criticism of radical populist reforms would be expected from them. Unfortunately, we do not have any written
histories from people in the class that would benefit from Caesar’s reforms, but it is
hard to imagine that they would agree with the two historians. After the Battle of Thapsus, Caesar was named
Dictator for 10 years, as well as being given tribunal and censorial powers, effectively
giving him ultimate power over the Republic and he immediately began the tasks of reassuring
the people that the crisis was over and stabilising the government. Huge games were held, including elephants
and mock naval battles, at colossus expense. He received considerable criticism for this
from some of the public, who thought they were in poor taste, but they were largely
successful in calming and winning over the populace. Through his censorial powers, which allowed
him to pass laws regarding morality, he regulated the expenditure of the richest of Rome’s
citizens, and gave incentives for people to have more children and larger families to
try and boost Rome’s diminished population. Augustus would later pass similar legislation,
and Caesar’s passing of these laws can be viewed as a precursor to the autocratic regime
of Emperors. On the other hand, Republican virtues had
always valued the rejection of luxury goods and having large families, and so Caesar can
equally be seen as doing nothing more than trying to reinstate core Republic traditions. Shortly after this, Caesar would fight the
remnants of the Pompeian faction in Spain, before returning to Rome around April 45BC,
finally having won the Civil War. Upon his arrival back in Italy, he immediately
retired his favourite 10th Legion, and the 13th. Most of Caesar’s other veteran Legions had
already been retired, but the significance of demobilizing these two was vast. The 10th was renowned as Caesar’s favourite
and had fought in almost every major battle of the Civil War. The 13th was no less prestigious and had been
the Legion that had first crossed the Rubicon with Caesar. His message was clear; the war was over, and
Caesar wanted peace. This was reinforced by his rejection of the
offer of having a bodyguard saying “it is better to die once, than to be always expecting
death”. When he returned to Rome, he assured the Senate
that he would hold no grudges, and that he would not carry out the proscriptions that
had defined the Dictatorship of Sulla saying: “The man who recklessly abuses his power
on absolutely all occasions finds for himself neither genuine goodwill nor certain safety,
but, though accorded false flattery in public, is secretly plotted against. I shall be…not your master…but your champion,
not your tyrant but your leader”. Some Senators and politicians who had been
exiled during the Civil War were recalled by Caesar, even some who had been exiled from
crimes such as bribery. All those who had taken up arms against him
were publicly forgiven and granted immunity, with scrolls that were found in the Pompeian
camps after Pharsalus and Thapsus being burnt, along with any copies, to ensure that no later
charges could be brought against him. Men who had been in positions of power in
the Pompeian faction were welcomed back into the Senate, and some, such as Cassius and
Brutus, were given highly important magisterial positions. For those that had died in the war with family,
money was given to their wives to ensure that they and their children would be able to sustain
themselves. He even went so far as to have statues of
Pompey that had been torn down during the Civil War restored. Regarding these actions, historians have largely
been in agreement; one of Caesar’s most admirable traits was his mercy and clemency. Dio, often one of his harsher critics, says
that in doing so he put the reputation of Sulla to shame and built for himself a reputation
for bravery and goodness. Both he and Plutarch also agree that, whether
Caesar was right or wrong in his actions, he did bring much-needed peace and stability
to the Republic, even for just a short while. Nevertheless, some have been more questioning
of these actions, Cicero in his Second Philippic highlighting how Caesar’s clemency effectively
kept his enemies indebted to him. Caesar should also perhaps be criticised for
recalling those convicted of bribery. An argument could be made that Caesar was
looking to start from a clean slate, but his recalling of these men showed a disregard
for the legal jurisdiction of the state, as well as fuelling rumours of him being bribed
in turn in order to recall them. Though Caesar is occasionally categorised
as a military dictator, the disbanding of his Legions and refusal of a bodyguard make
the issue arguable. One of the hallmarks of a military dictatorship
is having an armed bodyguard that can then be used as intimidation. Caesar did not have this and he also did not
use his army as a threat to his rule, another hallmark of a military dictatorship. To say that Caesar achieved power through
military force is certainly accurate, to say that he maintained power through military
force, however, is debatable. While Dictator, he also made significant other
reforms that largely benefited the masses. The dole had previously been distributed to
320,000, many of whom did not actually need it, putting a strain on the supply. Caesar reduced this number to 150,000 of Rome’s
poorest citizens. He also began the repopulating of Carthage
and Corinth, sending 80,000 citizens there with plots of land assigned to them. Medics and teachers of arts were given automatic
citizenship to entice more of them to come to Rome. Debt had been a huge issue in Rome for a while
now, particularly throughout the Civil War. To address this, Caesar ordered that all debts
must be repaid, but only at a rate proportional to the indebted persons’ wealth to try and
curb any usury. Were these the actions of a demagogue or a
man who honestly believed in giving more rights and freedoms to the people? No one can truly say for sure, and the interpretation
of later historians often reveals more about their own politics than Caesar’s; certainly,
arguments for both sides can be made. Having served as quaestor, praetor, and propraetor
in Hispania, Caesar was well aware of the level of corruption in the governance of the
provinces and knew from personal experience how powerful Governors could be. As such, while Consul, he also introduced
a bill addressing these issues. The bill prohibited governors from accepting
bribes in regards to administering justice, fixed the amount of staff they could have
so as to better control their expenses, and protected their subjects from having extortionate
tributes demanded of them. Furthermore, it required that each governor
produce 3 copies of their financial accounting making it harder for the power of a pro-magistrate
to be abused, and easier for it to be found out and evidenced if it was. As Dictator, he would add a law explicitly
limiting pro-praetors to one year in office, and pro-consuls to two. Caesar also took steps to integrate the provinces
more into the Republic, extending citizen rights to those living in Cisalpine Gaul,
and began the process of fully integrating the province. Caesar’s motivation for passing these reforms
may have been purely a desire to limit corruption of the office. At the same time, it can equally be said that
Caesar was trying to stop anyone from following in his footsteps and rivaling his own position
of power. This is certainly true to some extent, as
is noted by Dio. Caesar was right to be cautious though. For the past few decades, arguably the biggest
threat that the Republic had faced had come from its own governors being vested with too
much power, eventually growing so powerful that they could not be controlled. Such had been the case with Sulla, Pompey,
and himself; reforms that checked this power were long overdue. The extension of citizen rights to Cisalpine
Gaul and beginning to integrate the province may only have been intended by Caesar to further
increase his base of support or may have been more altruistic. It is certainly true, however, that these
reforms were, once again, also long overdue. Despite its huge gains since the Punic Wars,
the Roman Republic had still not yet adapted to its new size, still largely functioning
as the local agrarian-based power it had been 300 years ago, rather than the Mediterranean-wide
super-power it now was. This dissolving of the line between “Romans”
and “provincials” would be continued by Augustus and was crucial in providing stability
to the Empire. The Senate had been massively depleted, many
of its members dying throughout the Civil War. Caesar addressed this by enrolling many new
members, increasing the number from around 400 to 900, including ex-soldiers, sons of
freedmen, and some men from provinces. In a similar vein, Caesar also increased the
number of magistrate offices, specifically those in the provinces. The number of Praetors was increased, eventually
increasing from 8 originally to 16, and increasing the number of quaestors from 20 to 40. These two magistrates were some of the most
important for provincial governance, praetors often being given full control of a province,
while quaestors acted as their assistants. The last major reform to magistrates had occurred
under Sulla, almost 40 years earlier. Since then, huge expansions had been made,
particularly by Caesar and Pompey, but no constitutional changes had been made to accommodate
this growing Empire. Caesar’s reforms addressed this, increasing
the pool of candidates for provincial governors, as well as further distributing power across
a wider base. The number of aediles was also increased,
adding two to specifically oversee the Roman grain dole. Though nominally these magistrates were voted
for by the public, it was Caesar who nominated them. This was arguably the clearest example of
tyranny that Caesar manifested while Dictator, though it could also be argued that he may
only have planned to nominate magistrates in the short term, in order to stabilise politics
after the Civil War, and would have eventually abandoned the practice. More contemporary historians of Caesar are
critical of a number of these reforms. Dio says that many of the men included in
the Senate were “unworthy” of their position. He also argues that Caesar’s increasing
the size of the Senate and number of magistrates was primarily because it allowed him a longer
list of political positions which he could hand out to his allies, cronies, and others
to whom he owed political favours, filling positions of power with his partisans. He also suggests that the increased number
of governors was to stop any man from gaining too much power and challenging his position. It is perhaps worth noting here that Dio was
not against the idea of a Dictator per se. In his words “Monarchy…has an unpleasant
sound…but is a most practical form of government”. However, he did believe that the democratic
elements of the Republic were a weakness and that the power of the masses was a dangerous
thing that should be avoided. Therefore, while some of Dio’s observations
may be accurate in part, they are also clouded by Dio’s inherent cynicism of democratic
government. Nonetheless, in some aspects, it could be
argued that on this point Caesar was ahead of his time. During the Empire, men from all over the Empire
would be inducted into the Senate, no matter what province they had come from. It was restricted by money, but not by geography. Caesar seems to have laid the groundwork for
this being the case, being the first to introduce any provincials into the Senate. While it is certainly true that Caesar did
put many of his allies into the Senate and magistrate positions, it also has to be recognised
that Caesar also inducted many Optimates into the same positions, even those who had been
his enemy. Cicero’s earlier criticism, that Caesar
did this to keep his enemies on side, does hold some weight, but the argument can also
be made that his reasoning is circular, in that Caesar would have been equally criticised
for only having allies inducted into positions of power. Caesar had a number of other huge projects
planned. The sources differ slightly on exactly in
what order Caesar planned these campaigns, but all agree that he planned invasions of
Parthia and Dacia and had begun the process of assembling the supplies and men for this. Plutarch claims that he also planned to effectively
circle Europe after campaigning in Parthia, fighting through the Caucasus, Scythia, Germany,
and then back to Italy through Gaul. He also had huge construction projects planned,
including digging a canal through the Isthmus of Corinth, draining the marshes of Pomentium
and Setia, which would provide farmland for thousands, as well as expand the harbour at
Ostia and constructing moles to make the approach into the port safer. Caesar’s reforms had already led some to
see him as a tyrant, and this was compounded by rumours that Caesar planned to overthrow
the Republic and become something the Romans hated most: a King of Rome. These rumours were not unfounded. As dictator, Caesar was proclaimed “Father
of the Country”, sacrifices and games were given in his honour, and his statue was included
alongside those of the gods in the procession before the games. He was also given a special chair in the Senate
made of ivory and gold; in effect a throne. Furthermore, Cleopatra had recently arrived
in Rome igniting rumours that Caesar wanted to install a Hellenistic style monarchy with
himself as king, and Cleopatra as queen. Caesar took to wearing triumphal garb, a laurel
crown of victory and red boots, and on one occasion, didn’t stand to greet the Senators. The Roman kings of the past had worn red shoes
and they combined with the crown, “throne”, and perceived disrespect to the Senate made
the rumours look true. A small minority liked the idea - they adorned
a statue of Caesar with a crown and even once hailed him as a king. A plebeian tribune Marullus had them imprisoned
for that and, in response, Caesar accused Marullus of having orchestrated the events
in order to damage his political position and had the tribune imprisoned. Marullus’ office was sacrosanct, so this
was seen as proof of Caesar’s tyrannical ways and disregard for the Republic. For some, it was also proof that Caesar did
in fact want the title of King, and that he punished Marullus because the Tribune had
been imprisoning Caesar’s supporters. According to Appian, on one occasion, Caesar
was watching a ceremony for the Lupercal games which included Antony, as Consul for that
year, and the other priests running naked and anointing people. At one point, Antony approached Caesar with
a crown. Some in the crowd groaned at this, others
applauded, but Caesar refused the crown, pleasing the majority of people. Again, Antony tried to crown Caesar, and again
he refused, drawing huge applause from the crowd. This has often been interpreted as a staged
affair to see how the people would react, with Caesar hoping that he would be welcomed
as King. Combined with Caesar’s other actions, some
were convinced that Caesar would use his powers as Dictator to become a monarch. In the ancient sources, it is these reasons
that are given for why the Conspirators decided to plot against Caesar and later dub themselves
Liberators. However, there is also evidence to counter
these claims. Caesar forbade any from calling him king,
saying that he was “not King, but Caesar”, and Dio points out that he did not ask for
any honours. Some of them were enacted by his past enemies,
like Cicero, eager to curry his favour, while many of his allies likely thought that he
really did deserve the honours bestowed on him. It was in Caesar’s interest to therefore
try to appease both sides accepting some honours, while denying the more egregious ones. Caesar’s punishment of Marullus, was arguably
overzealous, but it may have been done to try and maintain neutrality with the party
that apparently did want him as King. According to Dio, Caesar’s wearing of a
triumphal crown was to try and hide his baldness. Similarly, Plutarch claims that Caesar not
standing to meet the Senate was due to Caesar’s illness which often made him dizzy and faint
if he stood up quickly after being sat for too long. Lastly, there is the anecdote of Antony crowning
Caesar. When one considers the image of a naked, oiled
Antony offering the crown to Caesar, it is harder to see it as a cunning political ploy. In fact, it is arguably much closer to a joke
in bad taste, or charade to amuse the masses. Finally, one must also consider the question
of why Caesar would have wanted to be King? As Plutarch and Dio both point out, he effectively
had all the power of a king, so why also have a title that carried such heavy political
baggage in Rome? It is hard to think that Cesar would not have
known how foolhardy such an idea was. Some modern historians have suggested that
the conspirators’ idea that they were saving the Republic was mere propaganda, and that
many were motivated by more personal factors. In total there were 60 conspirators, all senators. We know the names of 20, but only 12 are described
in enough detail in the sources for their personal motives to be assumed:
Marcus Junius Brutus had fought with Pompey, and was spared after Pharsalus. Welcomed by Caesar, he was appointed governor
of Cisalpine Gaul. Brutus’ mother was a lover of Caesar, and
the two men were close. False, but still humiliating rumours circulated
that he was Caesar’s bastard, and even that his mother had prostituted his half-sister
to Caesar. Ancient and modern historians have claimed
that they were likely a key motivator for him. However, Brutus was a supposed descendant
of the semi-legendary Brutus who had ousted the last King of Rome, so many insisted that
he be the one to take action against Caesar’s kingship. He was the conspirator who had the most genuinely
idealistic motive to assassinate Caesar. An experienced general with a solid military
career, Gaius Cassius Longinus was also forgiven by Caesar in the aftermath of the battle of
Pharsalus. He became a legate in Caesar’s army in Egypt,
but refused to fight against Pompeians. Nevertheless, he was earmarked by Caesar to
be governor of Syria. However, Caesar had hampered his career a
few times, preventing him from becoming aedile, and postponing his consulship. Though he was made Legate, Cassius probably
deserved a higher command based on experience. It is apparent that Caesar never really trusted
him, and he was right not to. Cassius had plotted to kill Caesar from as
early as 47BC, and genuinely hated Caesar. Certainly, motivated in part by his Pompeian
loyalties, Cassius disliked Caesar for personal reasons and was the most active about the
plot. Decimus Junius Brutus had fought with Caesar
in Gaul and was one of his most promising subordinates. He was made Praetor by Caesar and was set
to be the governor of Cisalpine Gaul after Marcus Brutus’ term. Caesar loved Decimus, as shown in Caesar’s
will that named him as a second-degree heir, a fact unknown to Decimus. This meant that if Octavian had died before,
Decimus would have been legally adopted by Caesar and been his heir. His motivation is incredibly difficult to
ascertain, the best argument usually coming down to pure greed for power. Another veteran of the Gallic Wars Gaius Trebonius
was one of Caesar’s most reliable Legates. Caesar had appointed him as Urban Praetor,
then governor of Hispania Ulterior, and finally Consul in 45BC. However, his year as consul was undermined
by Caesar who appointed a replacement consul for Trebonius’ colleague who died just one
day before the end of his term, which was considered a mockery of the consulship. Trebonius may well have seen this as an insult,
motivating him to join the plot. Previously he also participated in a failed
plot against Caesar suggesting to Antony that they should murder Caesar. The latter rejected the offer, and the plot
had not developed any further. One of Caesar’s strongest supporters Tillius
Cimber was rewarded for his loyalty with the governorship of Bithynia and Pontus. However, he was deeply annoyed that Caesar
did not recall his brother, Publius, who was exiled for unknown reasons, possibly leading
to his involvement. Publius Servillius Casca was one of the oldest
friends of Caesar. Casca appears to have fallen on hard times
financially and may well have been angry that his old friend had not helped him more in
this regard. His brother Gaius joined the plot to support
Publius. A Tribune of the Plebs Pontius Aquila was
publicly mocked by Caesar when he refused to stand during one of Caesar’s triumphs. He also had some land confiscated and given
to Brutus’ mother, Caesar’s lover, giving him a deeply personal motivation for joining
the plot. Another man who was Caesar’s legate in the
Gallic Wars, Servius Sulpicius Galba, was a thrifty man. He had guaranteed a loan of Pompey’s and
when Pompey’s land was confiscated, he inherited the debt. Galba was annoyed, and had complained to Caesar
who promptly paid the debt himself. Another debt later emerged from these same
circumstances, which Caesar was less willing to help with, much to Galba’s outrage. There were also rumours that Caesar may have
been sleeping with his wife. Quintus Ligarius’s life was spared by Caesar
after the battle of Thapsus, but he was later put on trial for apparently conspiring with
Juba of Numidia, and threatened with exile. Cicero defended him, and Caesar pardoned him. Nevertheless, he had been deeply depressed
at the idea of being exiled. Furthermore, Caesar had executed a relative
of his for taking up arms against Caesar despite already having been pardoned. These reasons and friendship with Brutus likely
brought him into the conspiracy. Another Caesarian legate Lucius Minucius Basilus
– who served in the Gallic Wars was made praetor in 45BC, but instead of being given
a province afterwards, was given a huge sum of money. This apparently deeply insulted him, motivating
him to join the conspirators. The last in this group was Quintus Antistius
– who seems to have joined the plot purely out of devotion to his close friend Brutus. Little to nothing is known of the other 8
named conspirators. In all likelihood, some really did believe
that they were ridding Rome of a tyrant, as they would later claim. However, modern historians are also right
to suggest that it is equally likely that a good many of them were involved either based
on personal grudges or wanting to be a part of the creation of the new order. The sources vary on precisely who was the
instigator, but Cassius and Brutus were the ringleaders. The former doing much of the recruiting, with
the latter being more of a figurehead, his name and reputation crucial in convincing
many others to join. Gradually, they convinced the 58 other conspirators
to join the plot. The Conspirators did consider one of the most
influential Senators - Cicero, but concluded that he would not commit or would simply slow
things down. At first, it was proposed that they kill Caesar,
Antony, and Lepidus. The latter two were the next most powerful
Caesareans, so killing them would effectively remove all the faction’s significant leadership. Brutus, however, opposed this. He argued that this was to be surgical removal
of a tyrant, not a widespread political purge. The other conspirators relented. Caesar would soon be leaving on his Parthian
campaign, where, surrounded by soldiers, he would be untouchable, so they had to strike
while he was in Rome. When Caesar announced a Senate meeting on
the Ides of March, just 4 days before he was scheduled to leave, the Conspirators decided
that this would be the perfect opportunity. Caesar would be separated from his entourage,
the Conspirators could all be in the same place without raising suspicion, and they
were confident that, when the attack began, other Senators would quickly come to help
them. Gladiators were scheduled to fight in the
Theatre adjacent to the Senate chamber the day of the meeting, and this would give the
conspirators the perfect excuse to have armed soldiers nearby, as Decimus Brutus owned many
gladiators. The night before the session, Caesar invited
Lepidus and Decimus to his house for dinner. They talked long into the night, and, eventually,
the philosophical question was asked: “What is the best way to die?”, to which Caesar
responded without hesitation that a sudden death was best. Throughout the night, Caesar’s wife Calpurnia
is said to have had dreams of Caesar’s death, and in the morning, when Caesar was making
his sacrifices, they were all foreboding. A superstitious man, Caesar decided to cancel
the meeting, sending Antony to dismiss the Senate. Caesar had also been drinking late the previous
night, and a hangover might have been influencing his decision. When the Conspirators heard of this, they
sent Decimus to convince Caesar to come to the Senate. Decimus told Caesar that the Senate would
be insulted unless he dismissed them in person, and Caesar relented, trusting his friend’s
judgment. Meanwhile, word of the conspiracy had started
to leak. A friend of Caesar’s had heard of the plot
but didn’t know the details. He immediately ran to Caesar’s house to
warn him but finding Caesar had already left for the Senate decided to wait at his house. Another friend would also find out about it
that same day, and ran to the Theatre of Pompey to try and warn Caesar but would arrive too
late. Lastly, as Caesar was making his way to the
Theatre, someone slipped him a message. Surrounded by crowds of supporters, and constantly
having messages passed to him, Caesar slipped it into his robes without reading. Later found on his body, it was a warning
of the upcoming assassination. When Caesar arrived at the Theatre, Antony,
the Conspirators, and other Senators were all there. The Conspirators were acting casual despite
the daggers hidden under their togas, but they were secretly nervous. A man approached Casca and said “Brutus
has told me everything!” which shocked Casca before he realised that the man was referring
to his intention to run for aedile. Another Senator approached Caesar, talking
to him in hushed tones. The Conspirators grew anxious, Brutus subtly
signaling that they were to kill themselves rather than be captured before it became clear
that the Senator had simply been petitioning Caesar on another matter. Despite more bad sacrifices, Caesar was convinced
to go ahead with the meeting and entered the Chambers. The Senators followed, but Antony was quickly
pulled aside by Trebonius. Caesar, a veteran with 35 years of experience,
was in good shape despite his age. Although Antony was known as a hedonist, he
was also a veteran of 10 years, strong, quick to anger, and an incredible soldier. Together, the two of them might have been
able to fight a way out, so the Conspirators had entrusted Trebonius, one of Antony’s
closest friends, with keeping him out of the way. Caesar was seated at the front of the Senate
under a statue of Pompey. Cimber approached Caesar, petitioning him
to recall his brother from exile. The other Conspirators gathered around, encircling
Caesar, and suddenly Cimber pulled Caesar’s toga down, exposing his shoulder, the signal
for the attack. Caesar, who as Dictator was protected by law,
pushed Cimber back saying “This is violence!”. Casca, Caesar’s childhood friend, then attacked
the seated Caesar, but missed only cutting his shoulder. Caesar grabbed Casca’s hand, shouting “Casca
what are you doing?!” while Casca simultaneously shouted “Brother help me!”. Caesar was able to rise and violently throw
Casca away from him, but by the time he did, Casca’s brother Servillius had attacked,
stabbing him in the side. Caesar continued to fight back but was attacked
from all directions, Cassius slashing his face, Bucolianus stabbing him in the back,
and Decimus slicing his thigh. Still, Caesar fought back as much as he could. Brutus was the next to approach him, and Caesar
sunk down, either due to blood loss, or having now lost the will to fight and Brutus stabbed
him in the groin. Caesar pulled his toga over his head to hide
his face, just as Pompey had done when he had been betrayed and murdered. Caesar resigned to his fate and died in a
pool of blood at the base of the statue of Pompey. Suggestions that his last words were either
“And you, Brutus?” or “And you, my son?” are largely disproven by the ancient sources,
most simply saying he groaned in pain. His body had 23 stab wounds, many of which
happened after his death when the Conspirators had gathered around to stab his body, some
even wounding each other. Only the 6 mentioned senators stabbed him
while he was alive, which means that less than 1% of the Senate had actually taken part
in the assassination. Furthermore, the analysis of his corpse at
the time determined that only one, the attack from Servillius, was fatal. The fact that they could not strike a fatal
blow on an unarmed, already wounded man, perhaps tells us something about quite how panicked
they were. Out of 60 Conspirators, most did not even
take part in the stabbing, suggesting that many had joined simply out of political opportunism. Gaius Julius Caesar had been assassinated
by men who had either been spared by him or trusted as friends. Dio later wrote of Caesar that if he could
have chosen, he probably would have wished he could have died at Munda, as a soldier. Even the ancient historians who are critical
of Caesar, such as Dio, recognise that such a death was somewhat of a tragic end. For some, Caesar was a war-mongering tyrant
driven by a lust for personal glory. To others, Caesar was a leader who tried to
fix a system that was clearly broken and was killed before that goal could be reached. Some see Caesar as a combination of both or
something in between. What all can agree on, however, is that Caesar
changed the world. By accident or design, his actions ultimately
led to the rise of the Roman Empire and all the effects, good and bad, that would bring. Two of the most interesting things that Caesar
has left us today are two questions. Did Caesar make the world a better place? And what would have happened if he had survived? We are currently working on the third season
of this series that will cover the events that happened after the assassination of Caesar,
including various civil wars and the so-called Last War of the Republic that allowed the
Roman Republic to transform into the Principate. If you don’t want to miss our future episodes
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