The defeat at Trebia struck fear into the Roman leadership. The Republic lost all control over Cisalpine
Gaul. Hannibal succeeded in bringing the Gauls to
his side, nearly doubling his army. 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry are now
under his command. The march south continues... Faced with the Gallic uprising in Cisalpine
Gaul and still shocked by the loss of tens of thousands of troops at Trebia, the Roman Senate is determined to turn things around in 217 BC. Amidst the political turmoil two new consuls
are elected and sent north against Hannibal, with newly raised armies. Other theatres of war are not ignored, evident
by the victory against the Carthaginians at the Ebro and the planned reinforcements set
for Iberia later in the year. But the main focus of the Roman war effort
is on home soil. The plan is to use the geography of the Italian
Peninsula to their advantage. With the vast marshlands of the Arno river
in the west, thought to be impassable during winter and spring, and the rugged Apennine
mountain range cutting across the peninsula, the Romans know that there are only two routes
into central Italy that Hannibal can take, and they move to block both. Consul Gaius Flaminius positions his army
at Arretium, including the 10,000 legionaries that survived the battle of Trebia. His co-consul, Gnaeus Servilius Geminus is
stationied at Ariminium. Both armies are bolstered with a higher number
of horsemen than usual, perhaps to offset their numerical inferiority in cavalry. Hannibal meanwhile has problems of his own. While he did establish a base of operations
in the Po Valley, Gallic support will weaken over time as his army continues to consume
their resources. At the same time, the Romans decided not to
pursue further battles in the north, so staying there makes little sense for Hannibal. He needs to put pressure on the Romans before
his Gallic allies lose interest in the war. Just like the Senate, Hannibal knows that
he can either go down the Adriatic coast and fight Servilius in the rugged terrain of Picenum,
or he can fight Flaminius in the difficult Apennine mountain passes. Neither route is good. Whichever he chose, not only would the Romans
be alerted about his movement ahead of time, but he would be forced into a prolonged and
uncertain battle against the well defended Roman positions, which would allow time for
the two consular armies to link up, something that Hannibal can ill afford. But with the arrival of warm spring weather
the Carthaginian general does the unexpected. He decides to force march his army across
the Apennine mountains and through the dangerous marshlands of the Arno river, aiming to surprise
the two consuls and get into a good position to threaten Rome itself. The plan is arguably just as audacious as
was the crossing of the Alps. The march is extremely difficult. Hannibal places his most disciplined infantry,
the hard-marching Lybians and Iberians at the head of the column. They set a fast pace which the Gauls find
difficult to maintain, as they are not used to forced marches. And by being at the back of the column they
face the added difficulty of having to march through the sticky quagmire that has been
churned up by the troops in front of them. The cavalry is in the rear of the column,
ushering the Gauls forward and keeping an eye on any who might decide to turn back. The terrain, however, is the army's biggest
enemy. The Arno river flooded after winter rains,
turning the river basin into heavily flooded, muddy, wetlands. The endless dense swampland offers almost
no dry areas for resting. Hannibal's troops wade through deep pools
of water for 4 days and 3 nights, with almost no sleep, and no rest, whilst carrying their
heavy equipment and supplies. Those fortunate enough to be mounted are able
to sleep in their saddles, while a handful of those on foot manage to climb onto the
bodies of dead horses and pack animals for a brief rest. Many die to infection, disease, exhaustion
and drowning. Hannibal himself catches an eye infection,
which cannot be treated because there is no time during the forced march, and he carries
the infection for much of the journey, eventually losing sight in one eye. He emerges from the swamp on the back of his sole surviving elephant, probably the brave Syrian. All the while, the Romans assumed that Hannibal
is contained in the north. But what they don't know, is that the Carthaginian
general managed to cross the Apennine mountains and the Arno river wetlands with 50.000
troops in just four days, without being detected, and is now in position for the next
stage of his campaign. He grants his army a few days to rest and
sends scouting parties south. He learns that Flaminius is at Arretium
and that the Etrurian plain can offer enough food and plunder to boost the morale of the
troops. Having learned that Flaminius is an arrogant
and rash commander, he plans to provoke him into giving battle by pillaging and burning
the rich Etrurian countryside. Soon enough, plumes of smoke from burning
villages and fields dot the land west of Arretium, followed by the Carthaginian column passing
right next to Flaminius, brazenly taunting the Roman general. Watching from Arretium, Flaminius is fuming,
knowing that it is he who is supposed to protect these lands, and yet one of the richest areas
in Italy is burning on his watch. But he somehow resists challenging the Carthaginian
general, persuaded by his advisers to stay put and wait until Servilius joins him. Unable to force an open battle, for Hannibal,
an assault on Arretium is out of the question. He cannot risk losing too many of his experienced
soldiers that he cannot replace. His army also has limited supplies and has
to keep moving. Furthermore, Hannibal has no way of knowing
how far the other Roman army is, and as far as he knows, Servilius could be arriving any
day now. So the Carthaginian general decides to press
on. Leaving not one, but two armies in his rear
must've seemed mad. But actually, by bypassing Arretium, Hannibal maintains the initiative and keeps the Romans guessing. He wants to be the one who dictates the course
of the campaign. Scouts soon bring good news. Flaminius decided not to wait for Servilius
after all. Knowing that the battle is soon coming, Hannibal
makes sure to let his Gallic troops know that they will be fighting against Flaminius, the
man who caused them much misery in years past. Flaminius is renowned for his victories against
Gallic tribes. He is responsible for introducing a law that
allowed Romans to settle near and on Gallic lands. This created conflict which Flaminius resolved
by invading and occupying more Gallic lands, and then proceeded to settle more Romans on
the lands he conquered. Needless to say, he is hated by the Gauls
and the 17,000 of them in Hannibal's army can't wait to get their hands on him. Meanwhile, for the Roman army that prides
itself on its' military prowess it must be humiliating to pass through villages and countryside
laid waste by the enemy. But Flaminius can still redeem himself, and
he is only one day's march away. It's early morning of June 24th, 217BC. Flaminius marches out of his camp towards
the smoke rising in the distance, apparently from Carthaginian campfires, eager to get
to grips with the enemy. In the front he places veteran legionaries
that survived the battle of Trebia, who are also very keen on meeting the enemy in battle. As the column moves, a low hanging mist envelops
the lake and the valley. The shoreline is eerly quiet. The locals seem to have vanished. Unable to see too far ahead, the Romans literally
stumble into Hannibal's heavy infantry who are blocking the road. Fighting spontaneously errupts at the far
end of the valley. Despite being surprised by the enemy the Roman
vanguard forms up in battle formation. Further back, it is some time before the Roman centre and rear realise what is happening in the front. The visibility is hampered by the low hanging morning mist. But in the hills above the mist, Hannibal's
hidden troops can clearly see the Roman column. Although they do not know it yet, the Romans
walked straight into an ambush. But let's take a moment to consider how difficult
it was to set up the ambush at Lake Trasemine. Hannibal couldn't just send his troops up
the hill to their positions, that would've left tracks all across the hillside. And with Flaminius hot on his heels he didn't
have much time either. Yet Hannibal marched to the eastern end of
the valley and somehow managed to coordinate tens of thousands of troops around the hills to the north into their correct positions, at night, all within a brief
window of time and without arousing any suspicion. This is without doubt quite an astonishing
military feat. Now, Hannibal signals his hidden forces to
attack. It's unclear if trumpets signalled the start
of the attack or if his captains were ordered to wait until the Romans are deep enough in
the valley before sneaking up on them. Whatever the case, the ambush succeeds completely. The use of campfires in the distance tricked
the Romans into moving deep into the valley, thinking that the Carthaginians are further
ahead. And by masterfully hiding tens of thousands
of his troops in the hills, Hannibal completely surrounded the enemy. Coming seemingly out of nowhere, Numidian
cavalry and Gallic heavy infantry engage the Roman rear, closing off their line of retreat. Hannibal's light infantry, skirmishers and
Gallic heavy infantry clash with the Roman centre. Having previously marched in a very loose formation, Flaminius' army is caught completely by surprise. They soon find themselves in a fight for their
life. Their formations break up and many soldiers
are left to fend for themselves. The fighting is so fierce
that none of the combatants notice a strong nearby earthquake. After less than an hour of fighting, Hannibal's troops split apart the disorganised enemy column. From this point on the battle becomes a slaughter. Numidians and Gauls overwhelm the Roman rear,
forcing them all the way to the lake shore. Many try to swim in their heavy armour, desperate
to get away. According to Polybius, many Romans drown in
the lake, while others who manage to stay afloat beg for mercy but are killed there and then. The Roman centre fights a brave last stand,
but after another two hours of fighting, most of Flaminius' men are cut down, while others
drown in the lake as they try to swim away. According to legend, the Roman consul is recognized
amidst the fighting and the enraged Gauls fight to get to him. The consul's best troops rally to protect
him. But one of the Gallic warriors fights his
way through and thrusts his spear into the consul, killing him. Meanwhile, the Roman vanguard still stands
firm. Once they realised that the battle is lost,
they start fighting their way through Hannibal's heavy infantry, desperate to escape the field. But they too would be captured within a day
or two after the battle. In less than three hours of fighting, a whole
Roman army is virtually wiped out. It is said that Flaminius' body was torn to
pieces by Gallic soldiers. so much so that Hannibal was not able to find
any trace of the consul after the battle, to give him a proper burial. Carthaginian losses, meanwhile, are minor. Large plunder is taken, especially military
equipment. Hannibal re-equips his infantry. Each man is given a Roman mail, bronze helmet
and an oval scutum shield. Within a few days the Romans suffer another
disastrous loss. As Servilius was on the move to join Flaminius
he hurriedly sent all of his 4,000 cavalry ahead of the army to help his co-consul. Hannibal learned of their movement even before
Servilius knew about Flaminius' defeat. Maharbal, Hannibal's second-in-command, rode
out to meet them, launching a surprise attack. Those who survived were captured. By eliminating Servilius' cavalry, Hannibal
effectively neutralised his entire consular army. Few, if any, commanders have been able to
match Hannibal's ambush at Lake Trasimene, where one entire army ambushed and effectively
destroyed another entire army. The population in Rome fell into utter despair,
as Lake Trasimene is not far and it seems like there is nothing that can stop Hannibal
from attacking the city, as Servilius has to withdraw back to Ariminium to counter the
Gauls who, encouraged by Hannibal's presence, aggressively began raiding Roman territory. In this time of crisis the Senate appoints
a dictator, a certain Fabius Maximus, to co-ordinate the defence against Hannibal. But more on that in the next episode... So far we have followed Hannibal on his war path
from Iberia, through Gaul, across the Alps, and all the way into central Italy. He defeated the Roman legions time after time
and after just 7 months of campaigning in Italy he stood only 130km from the capital. The road to Rome was open, less than ten days'
march away. But Hannibal's next move is a subject of much
debate, and in this video we want to discuss the decisions he made after his victory at
Lake Trasimene... The first 7 months of Hannibal Barca's campaign
in Italy were nothing short of spectacular. Despite nearly half of his army perishing
in the Alps, he led his tired troops and defeated the Romans at Ticinus and Trebia. This won him the support of Gallic tribes
in Cisalpine Gaul, many of whom joined the Carthaginian general. The march continued south towards central
Italy, through the Apennine mountains and the Arno river swampland. The four days it took to cross the swamps
were particularly costly. Many of his men drowned while others died
from exhaustion. Hannibal himself lost sight in one eye due
to infection. A great number of pack animals and horses
were also lost, which caused a severe problem for his campaign plans. While he managed to patch up his baggage train
by confiscating pack animals from Etruscan farmers, horses were far less common and needed
to be trained for war. This left Hannibal's cavalry contingent greatly
weakened for the upcoming battle against Flaminius. Yet, despite this setback, the elusive Carthaginian
general remained hidden from the Romans after emerging from the swamp. Flaminius missed the opportunity to attack
Hannibal's weakened enemy. And just days later, the Roman Consul would
perish in the defeat at Lake Trasimene. Hannibal re-equipped his light infantry with
weapons and armor taken from fallen Roman soldiers, and vast quantities of supplies
were captured, such as food, canteens, clothing, boots, blankets, tents, saddles, bridles and
fodder. But most importantly 4,000 pack animals and
2,000 cavalry horses were captured from Flaminius' army at Trasimene, and another 4,000 horses in Maharbal's ambush of Servilius' cavalry contingent Hannibal was now able to replace the horses
he lost in the swamps, bringing his own cavalry contingent back to full strength. After 7 months of campaigning in Italy, Hannibal
dominated the Romans in the field. Between the battle of Ticinus, Trebia, Trasimene
and the ambush of Servilius' cavalry, Hannibal eliminated over 50,000 Roman soldiers, a number
equal to 10 legions. Now that Fabius Maximus was elected dictator, Hannibal was encamped just 130km from the city of Rome. No army stood in his way and he could've marched
on the capital in less than 10 days. Yet, he decided not to. Let's try to examine why. In warfare, tactical objectives and strategic
objectives need to be connected in some form. "Tactics" refers to methods that an army employs
in order to win battles. "Strategy" deals with broad objectives that
a warring country has, as well as the means necessary to achieve these objectives. Without strategy, battles are disconnected
individual events. Without tactics, any strategy falls apart. In the 2nd Punic war, Rome's strategic objectives
were to keep the territories it won in the 1st Punic war and perhaps seize parts of Iberia. Carthage, on the other hand, sought to retain
dominance over Iberia and its' valuable silver mines, and win back Sicily, Sardinia, and
Corsica, that were lost in the 1st war, along with other minor islands in the Mediterranean. This would enable Carthage to regain its'
dominance on the sea. Rome correctly understood Carthage's objectives
and moved to prevent them. Of the 11 legions that were in the field at
the time of Hannibal's arrival in Italy, 2 were stationed in Sicily, 2 in Sardinia,
and 2 were sent to Iberia, while 1 remained in Tarentum. 4 legions were left in Italy to deal with
Hannibal. At the time of the battle at Lake Trasimene
two legions were commanded by Flaminius, which were destroyed. The other two were commanded by Servilius,
which were rendered useless after the destruction of their cavalry, forcing Servilius to return
north to fight an ongoing battle with the marauding Gauls. With the appointment of Fabius Maximus, Rome
did authorise the formation of two new legions for the defense of the city, an annual practice
that became regular as of 217 BC. But these legions likely were not fully trained,
and perhaps weren't at full strength either. Hannibal, held a clear advantage in the field. Furthermore, he could rely on the 70 Carthaginian ships that roamed the waters off the Etruscan coast, only 120km from Hannibal's position. Why did Carthage send these ships so far into
Roman waters? 70 ships was over 60% of their entire fleet. Since they were not carrying reinforcements
nor supplies for the army in Italy, their presence near Rome itself right at the same
time when Hannibal was also so close to the capital suggests that a possible land-sea operation
was planned to take the city. The 70 Carthaginian warships would prevent
Roman transport ships from ferrying troops from Sardinia to the capital, while Hannibal
attacks the city. The fact that supports this is the positioning
of the Roman fleet. Of the 220 ships in the fleet, 10 were at
Ariminium on the Adriatic coast, 150 were protecting the waters of Sicily, and another
30 were stationed in Iberia to support the Scipio brothers. Therefore, only around 30 warships were protecting
the capital. With 70 ships Carthage had a clear naval advantage
for any immediate operations against the city. And on land, Hannibal was virtually at the
gates, unopposed. To move on the capital after Trasimene would've
made tactical AND strategic sense. An attack, a siege, or even a feint, would've
forced the Romans to withdraw troops from other theaters to protect the city. This would've exposed Sicily, Sardinia, or
Iberia, to Carthaginian attacks. At the same time, Hannibal could lift the
siege to deal with any approaching armies. This failure to create a link between the
strategic and tactical objectives perhaps played a decisive role in the outcome of the
war. Hannibal himself later acknowledged that this
was a missed opportunity, but he never explained his decisions. Two main reasons for not attacking the Roman
capital were suggested by historians: First, that Hannibal did not have enough troops to besiege the city, due to its' size and its' garrison. This first argument doesn't sufficiently explain
why Hannibal decided not to attack. Namely, during the times of the Republic,
the population of the city of Rome was between 450,000 and 500,000 people. The entire population lived in an area of
just 13.5-square-km. The city was surrounded by the 11km-long Servian Wall, a stone barrier that's 10m high in some places. There were 5 main gates on major roads leading
into the city. 10-meter-deep defensive trenches were dug
up in front of the walls where the city faced open fields. These defences should not have posed a formidable
obstacle to Carthaginian engineering abilities. Nor was the city too big to be besieged by
Hannibal's army of around 50,000 troops. In addition, even if the city's garrison of
two legions were battle ready, 10,000 troops manning the walls and multiple gates would
not have posed a strong enough threat to deter an attack. The second suggestion is that a naval blockade
was not possible because the Roman fleet would keep the supply lines open along the river
Tiber. This would've been true had Ostia been big
enough to be Rome's main port at that time, but it didn't become a major port for another 250 years, until Emperor Claudius expanded it. At the time of the 2nd Punic war, the majority
of seaborne supplies for the capital came through the port of Puteoli, over 190km down
the coast, and were then transported to the city overland. Hannibal could've cut off these supplies by
blocking the roads. At least for some time a naval blockade of
Rome would not be needed, and the Carthaginian ships could focus on preventing transports
from bringing in reinforcements from Sardinia. So why did Hannibal, one of history's greatest
risk takers, choose not to attempt to take the city while he was arguably at his strongest
and Rome was at its' weakest? One possibility that is often suggested by
historians is that Hannibal's view of war was influenced by Hellenistic thinking. He was certainly an admirer of Pyrrhus of
Epirus. Namely, Hannibal's view was maybe that the total destruction of the enemy was not needed to win the war. Instead, battles would be fought until the
leadership of one side conceded defeat once they realized that they can no longer win
on the field of battle and stood to lose more if they continued fighting. Therefore, he may have assumed that Rome would
seek terms once the many contests of arms had been decided. If Hannibal did indeed hold this conventional
Hellenistic viewpoint, he may have thought that an attack on Rome would've been more costly than fighting battles in the open. But the Roman view of war was straightforward:
Destroy or be Destroyed. Rome would not accept any form of defeat,
no matter the cost. They would rather fight to the last man than
have an enemy assert their dominance by imposing conditions on its' citizens. Perhaps Hannibal still didn't fully understand
this in 217BC. Whatever the case, Fabius began defensive
preparations in Rome while, unbeknownst to him, Hannibal turned east towards the Adriatic
coast. A game of cat and mouse between the two commanders
is about to begin... It’s late in the year 217 BC. Destroyed towns and burned farmland stretch
as far as the eye can see. Hannibal had plundered the Ager Falernus valley,
perhaps the richest region in all of Rome. But he is now surrounded and trapped by a
more numerous Roman army, led by a general who seems to know all about his old tricks. With cold weather approaching, the Carthaginian
general is running out of time… It’s summer, 217 BC. Having decided not to march on Rome, Hannibal
went back across the Apennine Mountains. He ordered that all military-aged Roman males
that were encountered on the march, were to be killed. But the Carthaginian general had reasons to
worry. His army fought in three battles without ever fully recovering from the crossing of the Alps. And by now, the men showed signs of scurvy and the horses of mange, both caused by vitamin deficiency. After ten days the Carthaginian army reached
the Adriatic Sea. Hannibal allowed the men to recover through
eating the plentiful produce gathered from this rich area. The horses were bathed in the sour wine, which had been captured in great quantities, to restore the condition of their coats. Meanwhile, Publius Cornelius Scipio was sent
as pro-consul to Iberia with reinforcements of some 30 new ships, 8000 troops and fresh
supplies. What persuaded the senate to divert such valuable
resources to Iberia at a time when Hannibal was on a path of destruction in Italy, was
their desire to prevent reinforcements from reaching Hannibal by land, but more importantly
it was the senate’s determination upon a long-term Roman involvement in Iberia, made
possible by Gnaeus' success on the battlefield at Tarraco and Ebro, as well as his flexible
diplomatic methods through which he forged treaties of neutrality and alliances that
brought many Iberian tribes to the Roman side. It is Gnaeus’ ability to act autonomously
without waiting for directives from Rome that gave the senate a strategic advantage half-way
across the Mediterranean, where they could otherwise exert no direct control. The senate felt assured that by supporting
the Scipio brothers in Iberia, Rome would have good prospects for fighting the Carthaginians
in their own back yard. Back in Italy, with the army restored to health,
Hannibal continued advancing down the coast. He sent a message by sea to Carthage, reporting
on the situation in Italy. Carthaginian Senate expressed delight with
his progress and promised aid to support his campaign. Meanwhile, the appointed dictator Quintus
Fabius Maximus took command of Geminus’ remaining four legions and went after Hannibal. Replacement of the terrible losses at Lake
Trasimene required an emergency levy of two additional legions, which brought the dictator’s
army to around 40,000 including allies. It is possible that some of the new recruits
were very young and older men, originally intended for Rome’s city garrison, with
some in the process of being trained while on the march. Fabius was a man in his late 50’s, rather
old by the standards of Roman generals, but he was a proven commander. Having been awarded a triumph for his victory
over the Ligurians during his consulship in 233 BC, he also held the position of censor
in 230, and was elected consul again in 228. Now as dictator he was yet to reveal his plan
on how he will deal with Hannibal. So far he had been advancing cautiously, carefully
scouting ahead to give himself plenty of warning of the enemy’s presence. Meanwhile, Hannibal pillaged and burned his
way down the coast, accumulating vast quantities of grain, cattle and other produce. His plan was to reach southern Italy where
he expected to sway some of Rome’s allies to join him. The two commanders met for the first time
in northern Apulia, encamping just 10km apart. Hannibal immediately offered battle outside
the Roman camp. But no response came from Fabius. The Carthaginian general waited long enough
to impress his own men with the enemy’s timidity, before leading the army back into
camp. The following morning, Hannibal continued
the march, ravaging the countryside as he went, in an attempt to goad Fabius into battle. He provokingly went past the Roman army back
into the Appenine mountains… But the Roman dictator merely followed the
enemy and apparently had no intention of risking a battle under any circumstances. This was certainly wise, as nearly half of
his army was made up of raw recruits and some of the men were in awe of Hannibal who had defeated the Roman armies on three occasions that year. But Fabius’ strategy wasn’t too popular
in Rome. Notwithstanding the disasters at the Trebia
and Trasimene, powerful elements of the Roman senate still believed that Hannibal could
be defeated in a pitched battle. Although he was appointed dictator, the senate
restricted Fabius’ freedom of action by denying him the right to choose his own second
in command. Instead, they foisted upon him Marcus Minucius
Rufus, a former consul. Nevertheless, as Hannibal continued across
the Appenines, Fabius shadowed him. The hilly country favored the Romans, allowing
Fabius to stick to the high ground and only encamp in positions that Hannibal would never
risk attacking. The dictator’s plan was to deprive the enemy
of food supplies by launching small scale attacks on Carthaginian foraging parties,
not inflicting many casualties, but making it difficult for them to gather food and fodder. But he would never risk a direct confrontation. Fabius also instructed inhabitants of surrounding
villages to take with them all of the animals and food that they can, before destroying
and burning everything that’s left behind, and seek refuge in fortified towns. This tactic, which would later become known
as the “Fabian strategy”, served not only to deplete Hannibal’s forces, but also to
gradually rebuild Roman military confidence. Hannibal understood that he needed to force
an open battle in order to exploit the tactical superiority of his own army and prevent the
situation from developing into an exhausting war of attrition that he cannot sustain. He clearly appreciated the implications to
his war effort if Fabius would continue with this new strategy. But the cunning Carthaginian general had a
plan… Fabius showed great skill to keep close to
the enemy without giving him an opportunity to fight, but by the time Hannibal passed
the walled city of Beneventum, the Roman army had fallen two days’ march behind. The Carthaginian general planned to enter
Campania and devastate Ager Falernus, perhaps the richest area in Rome, famous for its’
exquisite wines and fertile land that made it the bread basket of the Republic. He felt that threatening such a prominent
area, inhabited by Roman citizens, would either provoke Fabius into giving battle or demonstrate
at last Rome’s weakness, which would hopefully Capua, Rome’s second largest city, along
with other cities, switch sides. Upon entering the valley, Hannibal unleashed
his troops, ordering them to strip the region of supplies and then burn all that remained. Immense amount of valuables were taken, as
well as vast quantities of supplies and cattle. While Fabius’ strategy was already unpopular,
now his political power began crumbling as quickly as the burning rich estates and villas. But even when urged to seek battle by an angry
Minucius, as well as other officers and displeased troops, the under-pressure Fabius would have
none of it. Even though the Ager Falernus was burning,
it was not enough to bring him down from the hills to challenge the Carthaginians. It seems that Hannibal was the only one who understood the implications of Fabius' plan... Hannibal failed to provoke an open battle and despite
the vast plunder that was taken, it was clear that he could not winter in the valley, as
it couldn’t sustain his army until spring. He needed to establish a base where his army could winter and enjoy the spoils of its’ raiding. Several points led out from the valley. But Fabius had already strengthened the garrisons
on the river to the south and placed small contingents on the eastern and western ends
of the valley. Trying to force his way through any of these
fortified points would be dangerous for Hannibal and his plan was to come back the way he came,
where he already knew the lay of the land. But the Roman dictator stationed 4,000 legionaries
on higher ground that would block the pass through which Hannibal intended to exit, and
he encamped with the rest of the army on the hillside further west from where he could
attack the Carthaginian rear once they tried to march out of the valley. Hannibal knew he was hemmed in and that once
his supplies dwindled he would be forced to launch a direct attack against fortified Roman
positions on unfavorable terrain where his cavalry would be unusable. And the longer he waited, the worse his situation
would become. So he began making preparations. Finally, a few weeks into the stalemate Hannibal
ordered the troops to eat a hearty supper and go to bed early to get as much rest as
possible for the night ahead… As all activities in the three camps quieted
down, the guards remained on their posts, and the campfires lit up the night sky. It seemed like another uneventful day had
ended. But about an hour before daybreak a mass of
torches appeared, heading across a small ridge in front of the pass. It seemed that Hannibal decided to force his
way out after all. Thinking that they were being outflanked,
the 4,000 Roman troops holding the pass left their position to block the enemy’s movement. Little did they know that the column of torches
weren’t enemy soldiers, but thousands of captured oxen with burning branches tied to
their horns, guided by Carthaginian camp followers. Upon reaching the milling animals, the legionaries
halted in confusion. Then, out from the darkness came about 2000
Iberian javelinmen. Although outnumbered 2:1, they were more nimble
than the heavily armored Romans and much more accustomed to fighting in the rugged terrain. As the fighting raged on the ridge, Hannibal
was already moving with the rest of the army, in total silence… He planned to flank the Roman contingent through
a very narrow passage that was now left unguarded. Fabius saw the torchlight and heard the noise
of the fighting, but refused to move from his camp in the darkness, despite the urgings
of his officers and Minucius in particular. Given the problems of fighting a night battle
and the relative inexperience of his soldiers, Fabius probably made the correct decision. He had no way of knowing whether or not Hannibal
was setting up another trap and it is questionable whether the Romans would have been able to
locate and intercept the enemy in time. Hannibal was able to ascend the
pass and escape with his army and plunder intact. As daylight broke the Carthaginian general
reacted quicker than his opponent, sending a force of Iberian infantry from the rear
of the column, to support the embattled and outnumbered troops on the ridge. The lightly armed and agile infantry managed
to not only relieve the javelin-men, but inflicted heavy losses on the Roman contingent. The way in which Hannibal
extricated his army from a seemingly hopeless situation became a classic of ancient generalship,
finding its’ way into nearly every historical narrative of the war and being used by later
military manuals. Fabius had been humiliated for allowing his
enemy to escape. Even before Ager Falernus, many in Rome and within the army resented the dictator’s passive strategy. But while Fabius’ political reputation suffered,
his troops actually gained valuable experience under his leadership. More importantly, he prevented Hannibal from
potentially destroying another Roman army, which would’ve undoubtedly persuaded many
of Rome’s allies to defect. And now he was following Hannibal back across
the Apennines. The two commanders would meet again… It’s late summer, 217 BC. As the fires across the Ager Falernus valley
died down after months of Carthaginian raiding, the locals returned to their burned towns
and cities, struggling to bring their lives back to normal. Having outwitted Fabius, Hannibal escaped
the valley. And now, there was real fear in the Roman
Senate, as the Carthaginian General marched north towards Rome itself… Escaping the Ager Falernus valley with his
army and plunder intact again highlighted Hannibal’s genius. And as the Carthaginian army now marched north
along the Volturnus river, fears in Rome were re-ignited that the attack on the city was
imminent. But, despite the road to Rome being open for
the second time… Hannibal marshall ed his army back into the
Apennine mountains. His string of victories was not enough to
secure alliances in Italy, and the Carthaginian general knew that without a firm foothold
in the plains of Campania, he needed to establish winter quarters in a better strategic position. Heading back east to his old campaigning ground
near the Adriatic coast was a prudent decision. Encumbered with plunder and herds of cattle,
the Carthaginians moved slowly, cutting a swath of destruction along their line of march,
ravaging farms and property, collecting provisions and prisoners as they moved, unopposed by Fabius. While this unchallenged destruction of Roman
lands and the prior escape from the Ager Falernus valley were the two latest embarrassing incidents that caused outrage against Fabius in the Senate, it was in fact his strategy that preserved
the Roman army from potential destruction. Thanks to Fabius, the Republic stayed in the
fight, which, arguably, kept their Italian allies from joining Hannibal. Yet, due to his cautious war plans, Fabius’
popularity in Rome was crumbling and his allies in the Senate found it impossible to rally
political support around him. It also didn’t help that, by now, news spread
throughout Rome that Fabius’ property and lands were spared during Carthaginian raiding of the Ager Falernus valley, which cast further doubts about him. The Roman general tried in vain to improve
his reputation by selling parts of his property to ransom Roman prisoners from Hannibal, after
hearing that the Senate would not fund their release. But despite the unabating criticism against
him and demands for a more aggressive stance, he kept to the Fabian strategy, refusing to
be drawn into a battle not of his choosing, and continued to shadow Hannibal. His scorched earth policy had a very limited
effect, as many citizens refused to burn their towns and crops, but it did manage to hamper
the movement of the Carthaginian army, which did not have a secure supply chain and had
to live off the land. Meanwhile, Hannibal reached a place he deemed
suitable for his winter quarters. The town of Geronium… It is unclear if Geronium was taken by force
when Hannibal’s terms were rejected or if he took possession of the town after the inhabitants
fled. Either way, Hannibal encamped just outside
the town and had his troops repair the collapsed wall, as well as surround the town with a
trench and a palisade, turning Geronium into a fortified granary
for the Carthaginian army, where provisions
and livestock were stored. The sick and wounded
recovered in the camp, as thousands fanned out
to forage the fertile plain to the west, while others pastured the cattle and horses
on the hillsides to the east. With enough provisions to last until spring
in a strong defensive position, with several roads offering multiple mountain crossings
into Apulia, Geronium was the perfect place to winter with an army. Meanwhile,
in the foothills across the valley, the Romans arrived some three days later
and began encamping. But the dissatisfaction in the Senate finally boiled over
forcing Fabius to depart for Rome. Officially, he journeyed to the capital to
observe religious duties. However, the more likely reason for his absence
from the front line was to confront his critics and explain his actions, in an effort to salvage
any support he could for his campaign. While the political discussion raged on, back
in the Roman camp near Geronium, Minucius assumed a more aggressive stance. As second-in-command, he was left in charge of the army with orders to follow the Fabian strategy. But, eager to put pressure on Hannibal, he
set up camp in the plain, from where he sent out parties of cavalry and velites to hunt
down the Carthaginian foragers. Although most of the foragers escaped unharmed,
Hannibal moved quickly to protect his foraging grounds, by sending 2,000 Libyans to occupy
the ridge overlooking the Roman camp, and just to the south he established a temporary
camp, where he stationed two thirds of his army. Eager to square up against the enemy, Minucius
sent the heavy infantry towards the Carthaginian camp, while his light infantry and cavalry
went for the ridge. This seemingly created a problem for Hannibal. Not only was he outnumbered, but he left his
cavalry in the main camp. Whether he did this intentionally to appear
weaker and trick the Romans into attacking or because the horses needed resting, he now lacked the mobility needed for the clash against Minucius. With superior numbers and mobility on their side, the Romans took the ridge. Seeing his chance to put more pressure on
the Carthaginians, Minucius moved his camp to the top of the captured hill. Expecting another attack, Hannibal restricted
all foraging operations, keeping the troops in a state of readiness
within the forward camp. But Minucius stayed put, and after a few days
of inaction the Carthaginian general finally broke the stalemate by sending troops to forage
in ever increasing numbers each day, until eventually some 4,000 men were committed. Dispersing so many troops in the surrounding
countryside while already being outnumbered begs the question: Did Hannibal so desperately need provisions for the winter and was forced to forage? Or did he want to weaken his position, perhaps
even appear incompetent, to provoke Minucius into fighting and winning a few skirmishes,
with the aim of luring the Roman general into a trap once he became overconfident? Whatever the case, Minucius answered in force. He led the heavy infantry against the Carthaginian
camp, while sending his cavalry and light infantry through the back gate to hunt down
the foragers. The skirmish was a bloody affair, with the
Romans getting the better of the engagement, killing many of Hannibal's foragers. Realizing it was time to regroup, Hannibal
marched back to his main camp. Exaggerated accounts of this victory caused
widespread rejoicing in Rome. Senators and citizens alike believed that
they finally had a commander who can defeat Hannibal. Hailed for his success, a law was hastily
passed that made Minucius co-dictator, which was effectively a return to having two senior
magistrates in charge. But things did not go smoothly. Fabius urged caution, while Minucius wanted
to take aggressive action. Due to persistent arguments over strategy,
Fabius proposed that they command the army on alternate days, or split the army into
two independent commands. Minucius decided to take 4 legions and establish
his own camp… Just as the sun rose over the plain beneath Geronium,
the guards woke up Minucius… Hannibal was just outside the camp. For the second time Hannibal positioned himself
on the ridge, from where he could observe all activities in the Roman camp. Minucius was not about to allow him to control
the engagement. The Romans advanced confidently, having previously
driven Hannibal back from the same ridge and forced him to retreat to his main camp. Minucius was now determined to finish the
job. But this time, Hannibal was ready. As the Roman light infantry crashed into the Carthaginian line, it seemed like their push will again drive back the enemy. But just as his men began giving ground, Hannibal reinforced the line with troops hiding just beyond the ridge. Minucius responded by sending the Roman and
allied cavalry up the hill. From his vantage point it seemed that the
Carthaginians have just about enough men to hold off his light infantry and he was determined
to break the stalemate. But as the Roman cavalry closed in, Hannibal called upon his Numidian and Spanish riders ,who poured over the ridge. What seemed until now like another skirmish
turned into a proper battle. Outnumbered, the Roman line quickly lost ground
and was pushed back down the hill. With his cavalry fully engaged, Minucius was now unable to scout the battlefield for potential ambushes. Nevertheless, he ordered his legions forward, fearing that his troops in the front will get overrun. However, what the Roman general didn’t realize, is that he was sending his men straight into a trap. During the previous night, Hannibal led 5000
Lybians and up to 1000 cavalry, dispersing his men in groups of 200-300, ordering them
to conceal themselves in the ravines, hollows, stream beds and treelines to the north and
south of the ridge. The skill and discipline of Hannibal’s troops
was evident in the flawless execution of this potentially dangerous operation. And now, as Minucius’ heavy infantry advanced
up the hill, they collided with the overwhelmed Roman cavalry and light infantry, losing their
cohesion. At that moment, Hannibal signalled his concealed
troops to attack! From the mountain slopes across the river
to the north, and the ravines to the south, Libyan infantry and cavalry leapt forward! Some 3km away, Fabius could see that another
disaster was looming. Left with no choice but to help the embattled
troops, he ordered his men forward. Back in the valley, thousands of Roman troops were being mauled in yet another perfectly executed ambush. The sequence and timing of events over the
past 24 hours, all planned and orchestrated by Hannibal, so as to lure Minucius into sending
his cavalry early on in the battle, thereby depriving him of the ability to scout the
vast battlefield, which prevented him from discovering the hidden Carthaginian troops, ultimately resulting in his entire army being ambushed. By now, many Romans gave up and fled, fearing
another full encirclement. Seeing Fabius marching down towards the valley,
Hannibal reportedly said: “That cloud on the mountains
has broken into a storm at last!” Finishing off those who weren’t able to
escape, Hannibal ordered his troops not to pursue, turning his army back towards the
main camp. He did not want a battle of attrition against
a numerically superior enemy, half of which were rested troops, while his own troops grew
tired after hours of fighting. Having defeated the Romans yet again, Hannibal
began settling-in for the winter at Geronium. Meanwhile, the humiliated Minucius returned
supreme command to Fabius, hailing him as his father, as a show of respect. Fabius, for his part, reinstated Minucius
as his second-in-command, treating him with utmost consideration. As the year drew to a close, the Roman army
stayed at a respectful distance from the Carthaginians, though sporadic skirmishes between scouting
parties and foragers continued throughout the winter. Meanwhile in Spain, the Roman strategy of
putting more pressure on Carthage continued, as the Scipio brothers pushed south of the
Ebro for the first time, successfully persuading a handful of Iberian tribes to join the Roman
cause. This caused grave concern for the Carthaginian
authorities, who sought to restore their popularity with the tribes by organizing the return of
the hostage children, belonging to the tribal nobility, until now held at Saguntum to keep
the Iberians loyal. The Punic commander of the city entrusted
an influential Iberian noble Abelox with returning the hostage children to their parents. However, in a stroke of luck for the Romans,
Abelox instead brought the children to them as gifts, and was handsomely rewarded. The Scipio brothers subsequently took it upon
themselves to return the children to several tribal leaders, taking credit for their rescue. This resulted in massive support for the Roman
cause from the Iberian tribes between Saguntum and the Ebro . Back in Italy, Fabius’ six-month term expired and the Senate did not renew his dictatorial
powers, giving temporary command to consuls Servillus Geminus and Marcus Atilius Regulus
until the following elections resumed, in just a few months’ time. And now, as the year 216 BC rolled around,
a Roman army of unprecedented size was being raised, as the Senate prepared to mount a
major effort to engage and destroy Hannibal once and for all…
