The year is 48 BCE. Julius Caesar is stationed at the city of
Brundisium, waiting to cross the Adriatic sea. He is after the republican forces that retreated
across the sea to Greece, led by his arch-rival, Pompey Magnus. A pivotal conflict of ancient history was about to take place... The
previous year was a busy one for Julius Caesar. He had declared war on the senate, marched
on Rome and proceeded to capture most of the Italian peninsula, constantly chasing after
the senate's forces. His civil war was a characteristic outcome
of his personality, he was a man of an overgrown sense of worth and self-importance and he
would not allow a bunch of old bureaucrats to tell him what to do and when to do it,
let alone willingly deprive himself of his political power by handing over his legions
and rendering himself defenseless in the face of certain persecution and marginalization,
or even imprisonment and murder. Because this was the situation he faced just
before he embarked on his civil war, when the Senate specifically ordered him to disband
his legions and forbade him to run for consul for the second time, something that would
have stripped him of his legal immunity. Back at Brundisium Caesar was contemplating a crossing with two glaring problems in his mind. The first being his significantly inferior
fleet in comparison with that of his enemies who were patrolling the area and the second
being the fact that sailing in winter was pretty risky in antiquity since ancient ships
could not cope well with severe weather conditions. On the other hand a passage through Illyricum
would have been next to impossible. The delay would have been great and the route was treacherous, full of perils and hostile local tribes. So on the night of 4th of January (or 6th
of November according to the modern calendar) Caesar, with 7 legions and 500 cavalry, crossed
the Adriatic sea and successfully avoided the patrols of the republican navy, landing
somewhere to the south of Palaeste. Meanwhile Pompey, who was stationed at the
city of Beroia, was declared the supreme commander of the republican forces, an appointment that
gave him supreme authority over the forces of the Roman state. And it was at this stage
that he left Beroia and began his march towards Epirus in order to station his legions within
the winter quarters of the area. Caesar had pushed on through the ragged ground
of the area in which he landed and came down upon two completely unsuspecting cities, Apollonia
and Oricum. The surprise was such that he captured them
without any bloodshed. Moving northwards Caesar’s strategic goal
was becoming clear. He was trying to deprive Pompey from his western
coastal provinces and cut off the supply depos which were vital for his Adriatic fleet, an
Adriatic fleet that was seriously hindering his army’s own communications and supply
routes, forcing him to live by foraging the rocky and scarce land of Epirus that barely
sustained its local population. Pompey must have heard about Caesar’s landing
and immediately understood his intentions. He forced marched his army in order to cut
Caesar’s northward advance, eventually managing to insert himself between Caesar and Dyracchium
at Asparragium a critical crossroad that controlled the Roman Via Egnatia. The two armies faced each other on the opposite
banks of the River Apsus, modern day Seman. Caesar had significantly inferior forces in
comparison to Pompey’s so naturally Pompey tried to force the Caesarians into an unwanted
and unfavorable engagement against his legions, but while he was attempting a crossing the
bridge collapsed. The stalemate was inevitable. Of course Caesar was not being idle, he repeatedly
appealed to his generals to send him re-enforcements but his generals had to face the same unfavorable
and tricky conditions plus the assiduous patrolling of the republican fleet. Finally Marc Antony, with 4 legions and a
detachment of light troops and cavalry, managed to cross the Adriatic but due to unexpected
conditions his transports were blown further north than he intended into the bay of Nymphaeum. This delicate and complicated maneuvering,
the chess of war , continued by the two masters of the “game”. Pompey would not allow Marc Antony to link
up with Caesar without attempting an interception. He immediately broke camp and forced marched
his troops towards Antony while Caesar marched his legions up the river until he found a
point which was fordable. The rapid pace of Caesar ultimately deterred
Pompey from continuing his attempt to intercept Marc Antony. So in order to avoid being trapped between
the two contingents of his enemy he retreated westward, camping his army north of the river Genusus close to Asparagium in a convenient situation. This war of movement would continue and be expanded upon by Caesar who dispatched three of his subordinates to other operating theaters across the Greek
mainland, one in Aetolia and the other to Thessaly where they could organize vital grain
convoys for their severely undersupplied legions. The third commander Domitius Calvinus was
sent to intercept 2 legions who were fast approaching via Macedonia in order to reinforce
Pompey. Caesar and Pompey were now facing each other
across another river, these delaying tactics were immensely beneficial for Pompey who could
afford to fight a war of attrition since his supply situation was far superior and his
control of the sea routes was uncontested and complete. On the other hand Caesar needed to force a
swift conclusion to the hostilities and to entrain a striking and decisive blow to his
enemy. Time was running against him. In typical Caesarian fashion he adopted a
diversionary tactic which was based on speed and surprise. He broke camp and marched his army eastwards
with the intention to deceive Pompey and hide his true destination who thought that he was
simply trying to relocate his legions towards an area that would be supplied more easily. But when Caesar found a fordable area he crossed
his legions and immediately headed towards Dyrrachium through a ragged and concealed
path, his objective to cut off Pompey from the city he already knew was his main supply
depot. The subterfuge was successful and Caesar managed
to beat Pompey to the coast, cutting off his enemy’s communications and he then proceeded
to build a fortified camp to guard the road towards Dyrachium. In this game of warfare Caesar seemed to always
be a step in front, in comparison to his enemies. The two generals seemed to have settled down
for a new and protracted stalemate. It was at that point that Caesar demonstrated
his ability to think outside the box when he was up against a numerically superior enemy
who was better supplied but currently in no position and intention to engage with him
in open battle. He needed to force Pompeys hand and simultaneously
secure his position in order to be able to advance against the depot in Dyrrachium, so
he resorted to a tactic that he had used before in Gaul with tremendous success. Taking into consideration the fact that Pompey’s
position was surrounded by rough and high hills he occupied them, fortified key areas
and then began to draw a line of circumvallation around Pompey’s position. We need not wonder about his intentions here
and why he would choose such a complicated and labor intensive method to deal with his
enemy, since we are lucky enough to have Caesar's own account. His reasons were the following, Pompey was
significantly stronger in cavalry and he could use it to forage for grain and provisions
without running any risk because of its superior mobility, so by confining his army within
a narrow space Caesar would both negate the ability of Pompey’s cavalry to forage and
render it militarily useless and difficult to sustain. And also there was another reason that was
both psychological but also practical – Pompey’s reputation throughout the empire would suffer
deeply if it became known that he was confined and besieged by Caesar while he did not dare
to hazard a battle. While Caesar was being busy trying to expand
his line of fortifications to confine Pompey within a compass as narrow as possible, Pompey
saw and realized what was going on and immediately set into digging a line of fortifications
within the line of Caesar in order to occupy as many hills as he could in as large a circuit
as possible to prevent Caesar from blocking or surrounding him. As a result the two armies fought a series
of skirmishes while they were contesting certain areas or hills. Even though Pompey was determined not to come
to a general engagement he nonetheless frequently send light troops in order to harass the Caesarians. By the time the two armies completed their
fortifications Caesars lines were stretched to 24km and Pompey’s lines were stretched
just under 13km, even though Pompey managed to finish them first since he had greater
manpower and a smaller compass to enclose. The two generals faced completely opposite
situations now, Caesar was attempting to enclose a well-supplied and larger army with a smaller
and thinly stretched one, while Pompey was hemmed in within an enclosed area without
being able to maneuver or arrange his army as he saw fit. Of course Pompey’s large cavalry force and
pack animals meant that the fodder was running out quickly and soon his horses would be out
of the battle even though his ships were supplying him daily, plus there was a water shortage
since Caesar had diverted the course of every river or stream that was running through Pompey’s
lines. The sporadic skirmishing did not cease especially
at night during which the Pompeians were frequently emerging from their trenches to pepper with
arrows areas that were lighted by fires of Caesarians who were on guard. After a while the Caesarians were accustomed
to this and learned to light their fires at one place and keep guard at another. By the beginning of June Pompey needed to
break the stalemate. He somehow misinformed Caesar to believe that
there was a faction within Dyracchium that was ready to surrender the city to him. Caesar with a detachment marched towards Dyrrachium
but fell straight into a Pompeian ambush. Attacked from three sides simultaneously he
was forced to conduct an orderly retreat, at the same time Pompey launched an all out
assault across Caesar’s line of fortifications. It was a magnificent plan and it probably
would have worked if he wasn’t up against an army of grizzled veterans who were defending
a well-entrenched position on favorable ground. The Ceasarians held until their General managed
to return unharmed back to their lines. The whole struggle was desperate as Caesar
admits, even though his legions suffered superficial loses (20 men in comparison with Pompey’s
2000). In one fort they counted 30.000 arrows which
had been thrown and in the shield of one centurion were found 230 holes! Caesar would attempt to force a battle every
single day afterward, he drew up his army on a level ground and offered Pompey battle,
being careful to advance his legionaries just before the range of Pompeys siege engines
and light troops, Pompey would try to save face and would draw his legions within the
range of his siege engines and light troops in front of his fortifications but so close
to them that his rear line would almost touch the rampart. At some point something unexpected happened. Two officers of Caesar’s Gallic cavalry defected
to Pompey and informed him of a certain weak position in Caesars fortifications. At the southern end of his entrenched lines
of ramparts there was a gap and a place that wasn’t connected with a transverse line
between them. Pompey decided to strike there and he would
initiate what would prove to be the decisive engagement of the battle. At dusk of 9 July Pompey prepared an amphibious
assault against the vulnerable position of the Caesarian fortification. He boarded a multitude of light and missile
troops on board light galleys and attacked the position from three sides simultaneously. Backing this assault were six legions who managed
to dislodge the defenders who were scattered and fled facing overwhelming odds. The rest of the Caesarian army was alarmed
by the system of smoke that was established for just such occasions. Marc Antony, followed by Caesar himself, arrived
at the scene after a while. In between the now contested double ramparts
and the Pompeian line of fortifications there was an abandoned camp which was now occupied
by the Pompeian assailants which they expanded by adding an outer rampart and in addition
Pompey had ordered the construction of a new camp outside the Caesarian enclosure. Seeing this Caesar realized that he needed
to act rapidly if he wanted stop his opponent from securing and fortifying an opening from
his enclosure from which his cavalry could easily forage and find fodder. He secretly gathered 33 cohorts, arranged
them into two columns and charged the fortified position of his enemy. The left wing of his attack column fell upon
the unsuspecting Pompeians and managed to push them back, but the right wing followed
along an extended palisade which led towards the river Lesnikia. That delay was crucial for the outcome of
the engagement. After a while they realized that the palisade
was not an extension of the fortified camp and they broke through within the narrow space
between the camp and the river. Pompey, seeing the critical situation his
army was facing gathered 5 legions from the outer camp and immediately send them to relieve
his cornered defenders, ordering his cavalry to charge head on the right wing of the Caesarian
attack column while it was squeezing itself through the levelled palisades. The Caesarian cavalry which was the first
to break through the palisade noticed the significantly stronger Pompeian cavalry charging
straight towards them. Fearing they were going to be trapped between the palisades and the camp they broke and fled. The panic spread to the infantry and soon
the right wing of the Caeasarians was routed. The left wing that was being successful up
until that point noticed what was happening and fearing that it will be overwhelmed broke
and fled also. This cascade of panic was the critical point
of the battle. Caesar’s legionaries were crushed and squeezed
through the choke points from which they came. The first legionaries who fell down a 10 feet
high ditch were trampled to death and the rest fled for their lives. Even Caesar himself failed to stop the rout
of his veterans personally holding the legion’s standard and urging them to stand their ground. According to Appian, the panic was so widespread
that one signifier inverted his standard and tried to kill Caesar with it! A legionary from his German bodyguards was
there and sliced off his hand thus saving the general and changing the course of history. By the end of the engagement the strategic
initiative had shifted drastically in favor of Pompey, and Caesar now realizing that his
plan had failed and his siege lines were broken, ordered an immediate withdrawal so that his
legions would be able to regroup. The casualty count was 32 centurions and tribunes
and 960 irreplaceable veterans for the Caesarian side. This would probably be the direst and most
severe situation that Caesar ever faced. That day the Caesarians abandoned their extensive
fortifications and retreated southwards to regroup. The situation looked bleak for Caesar but
he wasn’t over yet… (9-10 JULY 48 B.C.E)Julius Caesar is retreating,
it is something that he rarely did during his illustrious career, his plan to trap the
Pompeians close to Dyrrhachium backfired spectacularly and now his options were running out. The misfortunes for the Caesarians though
did not end there and it was around the same time that the Pompeians managed to catch half
of Caesars fleet at Messana(sicily) and burn every single ship .
Back in Epeirus, Caesar was attempting a rapid retreat during the night, at dawn the next
day he had almost finished the crossing of the river Genusus when his rear guard clashed
with the pompeians who were hot on their hills, the Caesarians fought bravely and managed
to give Caesar enough time in order to finish the crossing
Once more the 2 armies faced each other across the same river occupying the same old camps
from months before, but Caesar did not intend on staying, he conducted a speedy retreat
and managed to slip from Pompeys grasp, marching towards Apollonia in which he left a small
garrison.(1=1min) His Plan was to force Pompey to march inland away from his all-conquering
fleet and his supply bases and to unite with the remaining forces of Domitius Calvinus
who was facing off Pompeys reinforcements commanded by Scipio. Pompey and Caesar were simultaneously marching
against time, Caesar took a southern road up the valley of the river Aous and Pompey
took his familiar main roman road of Via-Egnatia with quite opposite objectives from each other,
Caesar was trying to link up with his general while Pompey was attempting to surprise and
annihilate him via a series of forced marches. By a struck of luck and just 4 hours before
Pompey could trap him, Calvinus was informed of his arrival and immediately made a U turn
towards the south barely escaping the Pompeian iron grip
Caesar and Calvinus united their armies near the city of Aeginium. The plain of Thessaly with its fertile fields
lay before them, Caesars main strategic goal was clear, capture the near by cities and
incorporate them to his supply lines, marching southwards the first city his legions encountered
was Gomphi, the inhabitants of the city were encouraged by overinflated rumours of his
defeat at Dyrrhachium, “ to share Pompeys victory rather than be a part of Caesars misfortunes”
as he himself put it in his commentaries, this defiance could not remain unpunished
and Caesar decided to make an example of the city by unleashing his veterans who ransacked
it, it was a practise that proved to be quite an effective incentive for the locals to collaborate
since after that almost all of Thessaly decided to side with Caesar.The
next city in his way Metropolis, surrendered to Caesar with a little encouragement by some
captives from Gomphi, the caesarean legions advanced further towards Thessaly reaching
the river Enipeus, near the city of Pharsalus. Meanwhile Pompey who advanced from Via engatia,
made a right turn and headed southwards to the city of Larissa, in which the two legions
commanded by Scipio were stationed. The Pompeian contingents united near the city
and marched towards the plain of Pharsalus, when the army reached the hills overlooking
the plain of Pharsalus Pompey immediately understood that any further advance was pointless
since Caesars army was blocking the road. The monumental clash of the two generals was
imminent, it was a battle that would eventually decide the future of a whole empire and the
course of western civilization for the next centuries. While Caesar was already encamped in a convenient
position near the bridge controlling the passage to the city of Pharsalus, Pompey marched his
army on a slope at the north edge of the plain from which he could overlook the Caesarian
positions and upon which his legions were favourably placed in a strong defensive position. Caesar was running out of time, his supply
situation was precarious and his reputation had suffered a critical blow after the unfortunate
conclusion of the Battle of Dyrrhachium, he still needed to force a swift conclusion to
the hostilities and his trust in his veterans did not budge at all even after the debacle
at Dyrrhachium and he also had one distinctive and unique advantage in comparison to his
enemy, while Pompeys word and command was in no way absolute and undisputed since he
was just first among equals with temporary and limited authority over the republics aristocrats
who were always trying to mingle and intervene with his command, Caesars word and authority
over his army and his generals was absolute, undisputed and complete. Caesar would attempt to force a battle every
day, marching out of his camp and arranging his legions in an aggressive manner, hoping
that would convince his enemy to leave his defensive position and face him in a single
decisive engagement, but Pompey not willing to abandon the safety of his hills would draw
out his army but just at the end of the slope bordering the northern part of the plain. The great rogue general demonstrated his elaborate
thinking into his own account of the battle, proving that each move that he made was totally
deliberate and nothing was left to chance, by marching daily his legions closer and closer
to Pompeys camp he slowly boosted the morale of his men and made them accustomed to this
kind of battle, he specifically knew that if he was to succeed in a potential clash
with the republican forces, his men would have to face the by many degrees numerically
superior cavalry of the Pompeians so he intermixed with his own cavalry a selected group of the
youngest and most active men of the vanguard and instilled them, by this daily practise,
with a lack of fear and a contempt for Pompeys numerical superiority. After many days of this military ballet, Caesar
gave up hope and he did not believe that Pompey was willing to risk everything in a single
battle against his hardened veterans, nonetheless against his better judgement and at the exact
day that he intended to brake camp and march out something unexpected happened,on the morning
of August 9th or 7th of june by the modern calendar, Pompeys arrangement shifted from
its usual alignment and advanced further than usual from his entrenchments. Caesar after no long deliberation understood
that the time had come, he immediately addressed himself to his soldiers when they were at
the gates of the camp ready to march out. (Caesars speech= We must defer, our march
at present and set our thoughts on battle, which has been our constant wish, let us then
meet the foe with resolute souls, We shall not hereafter easily find such and opportunity
) On the other side of the field Pompey was
confident that his all conquering and massive cavalry )force would be the key for victory. “I have persuaded our cavalry, and they
have engaged to execute it, as soon as the two armies have met, to attack Caesar's right
wing on the flank, and inclosing their army on the rear, throw them into disorder, and
put them to the rout, before we shall throw a weapon against the enemy”
The two armies treaded towards each other in a machine like manner, Pompeys army was
composed of 47.000 legionaries or a 110 cohorts at their full strength, some auxiliaries and
a few cohorts remained to guard his camp, his cavalry was commanded by a Caesarian former
officer who defected to the Pompeian side, Titus Labienus , his left wing was commanded
by him personally, there he placed 2 legions that were delivered over by Caesar at the
beginning of his disputes with the senate in compliance with one of their decrees, Scipio
with the Syrian legions commanded the centre, and his right wing was commanded by Afranius,
there pompey placed what he deemed as his most trusted legions that would include the
Cilician legion in conjunction with some cohorts that he managed to salvage from Spain. Caesars order of battle was the following,
on his left wing he placed the 9th and 8th legion eventhough the 9th was so weakened
by the battle of Dyrrhachium that he placed the eighth legion pretty close to the ninth,
as to almost make one of the two and he gave the command to Antonius, the centre was under
the command of Calvinus and the right wing was under the direct command of Sulla, Caesar
himself was positioned just behind the right wing opposite to his rival and close to his
best and most reliable legion the 10th, his small cavalry force together with all of his
slingers and light troops were placed opposite to Pompeys cavalry, and at the last moment
Caesar drew a single cohort from every legion in his third line and made a concealed 4th
line with the task to stab the cavalrymen of Pompey with their Pilla once they broke
through, here he knew the outcome of the battle would be decided, in total 80 cohorts made
up 9 legions or 22.000 men arranged in the typical triplex acies Roman formation of the
period, a couple of cohorts were left behind to guard their camp. Moments after Caesar gave the signal to charge,
a centurion of renown bravery from his elite X legion named Crastinus, saluted him and
said “General, I will act in such a manner to-day, that you will feel grateful to me
living or dead. And with such high spirits Caesars outnumbered
veterans charged against Pompeys numerically superior but mostly inexperienced recruits,
but the Pompeians would not move and decided to stand their ground and receive Caesars
charge with their lines unbroken, the Caesarian veterans were accustomed to this and being
practised in former battles they halted almost midway, redressed their ranks and renewed
their charge threw their Pila and instantly drew their swords clashing against the Pompeian
line. At the same time Pompeys cavalry began its
charge, almost 7000 horses followed by archers and slingers, were moving as a single block
against the massively outnumbered Caesarian cavalry, the Caesarians did not withstand
their charge but expectedly gave ground a little, at that moment Julius Caesar gave
the signal to his 4th hidden line and they charged holding their Pila high and stabbing
the Pompeians into their faces, in Caesars words “they rushed with such fury that not
a man of them stood; but all wheeling about, not only quitted their post, but galloped
forward to seek a refuge in the highest mountains. By their retreat the archers and slingers,
being left destitute and defenceless, were all cut to pieces”
It was the turning point of the battle, Pompeys plan had completely backfired and his “hammer”
was now being chased off the field, the victorious 4th line wheeled about upon Pompeys unprotected
left wing while it was still engaged, and it was now that Caesar gave the order to his
3rd line to advance. The Pompeians fought bravely but without the
support of their cavalry, being pushed from the front and attacked from their flank and
rear,and with the arrival of Caesars fresh third line they broke and began to flee for
their lives, it was really like rolling a carpet after that with the republican left
flank being the first to brake the rest followed. Pompey would not stay to share the fate of
his legionaries and he fled towards the camp, he gave orders to some cohorts and auxiliaries
to protect the ramparts and withdrew to his tent waiting for the outcome of the battle. The victorious Caesarians pushed on towards
the camp and made short work of the defenders who could not withstand the multitude of projectiles
that were thrown against them, the defenders and the survivors abandoned any further effort
to protect the camp and fled to the near by hills leaving the victorious Caesarians to
occupy it, when Pompey heard that Caesars troops were able to force the gates he Is
supposed to have exclaimed “What, into the very camp?”. It was a total victory for Julius Caesar,
the magnitude of his triumph would only become obvious until after the casualties from both
sides were accounted, Pompeys army was completely devastated with 15.000 dead and 25.000 captured
the republican army was essentially wiped out, while Caesar himself informs us that
he only lost two hundred and thirty men, amongst which there lay the Valliant Crastinus who
was killed fighting bravely by a sword thrust in his mouth. The remaining republicans who fled to the
near by hills were surrounded by the Caesarians and surrendered the next day. Pompey who had fled towards the coast boarded
a ship and sailed to Alexandria, he would be assassinated within a few months, while
Caesar was left the absolute master of the Roman Empire. After he decisively defeated Pompey in the Battle of Pharsalus, Caesar did not linger for long and went after his arch-rival to
Alexandria. There he was greeted by a reluctant and scheming court which presented him the severed head of Pompey... Despite being victorious in a civil war much
closer to home, Caesar did not have too much idle time on his hands. Having been embroiled in prolonged Egyptian
court intrigue and quelling a serious uprising of the local population, more recently he
faced another insurrection in Asia minor against Pharnaces II of Pontus. Caesar was able to successfully conclude the
campaign in Asian minor in just a few days, but this brief window of time gave was enough
for the opposition leadership in Africa to consolidate their forces and allies, and to
gather enough strength to renew the conflict. Cato, Labienus, Afranius, Scipio and many
other prominent “optimates” were able to form 10 legions and ensure valuable support
of King Juba of Numidia, who was able to provide an army that was the equivalent of 4 legions
and he also brought his elite light Numidian cavalry, as well as 120 war elephants. Caesar needed to act quickly. By the time he reached Italy many of his veteran
legions, including his beloved 10th, were mutinous and were demanding to be demobilized
after years of active service. It was a situation that became worse due to
his long absence in Egypt and Asia minor. But yet again he displayed a crucial gift,
common in great commanders of men, his perfect grasp of his troops’ psychology. Caesar agreed to their demands, declaring
that all of their desires would be granted once he had won the war in Africa with the
help of "other" legions, all the while addressing his veterans not as “comrades”, but as
“quirites”, which were just “ordinary” civilians. This bit of reverse-psychology made even his
most battle hardened veterans feel ashamed. The mutineers and especially troops from the
10th legion were soon begging Caesar to take them back into his service. Now that the mutiny was resolved it was time
to deal with the “optimates” in Africa. Caesar impatiently rushed towards Sicily with
a single legion, wishing to face his enemies as soon as possible. Unfortunately for him, bad weather forced
him to postpone his departure to north Africa. While waiting, he ordered his tent to be pitched
on the beach to make a point of how eager and confident he was to embark on a journey
against his enemies. Finally on the 25th of December 47 BC he set
sail for Africa. But hasty planning of the expedition meant
that he was able to take only 6 legions and 2000 cavalry, and there was almost no effort
to properly scout the landing area. Once again in his career Caesar’s sea crossing
was a dramatic affair, as unexpected winds scattered his fleet in multiple directions. African coast came in sight not far from Hadrumentum. The city was occupied by a large garrison,
so with only a fraction of the troops at his disposal Caesar could only wait until more
of his galleys converged near the flag ship. After a few hours he eventually disembarked near the city with a meagre force of 3000 foot and 150 horse. With his logistical situation critical, Caesar
used his small force to expand his operational base an attain a firmer foothold on Africa. Marching along the coast he was soon met with
multiple delegations from various coastal cities that were offering to supply and help
him in any way that they could. Once at the city of Ruspina, he raised a fortified
camp. With his base established, Caesar marched
on and reached the free city of Leptis. There the deputies of the town offered their
unconditional help and collaboration. While in the city, by sheer chance some of
the lost galleys found their way to the harbor. From the crews Caesar learned that the rest
of his fleet was unsure which course to pursue, and decided to sail for Utica. The Roman general garrisoned Leptis with 6
cohorts and marched back to Ruspina. He left the remainder of his small force in
the fortified camp and on the following night went on a reconnaissance mission in order to find out the whereabouts of the rest of his army. His lucky star shined bright that night, as
the rest of his fleet unexpectedly appeared in view just before day break. Re-united with the remained of his forces,
Caesar marched back to his fortified camp. The next task was finding supplies, as the
sudden appearance of the rest of his troops put an extra weight on his already strained
logistics. A contingent of 30 cohorts, some 9000-strong,
along with a small force of cavalry, advanced out into the country without their baggage
to forage. Caesar had not marched more than three miles
from his camp when he was informed by his scouts that enemy forces were in sight. As soon as the announcement was made a big
cloud of dust appeared in the distance. He immediately ordered his small force of
400 cavalry and 150 archers to march forward in order to cover his infantry, with explicit
instructions to avoid being enveloped. And, in a rare move he deployed his legions into a single line due to the small size of his force. The enemy army was comprised mainly of light
Numidian cavalry and a few foot skirmishers under the command of his former deputy, Titus Labienus. In total the Numidians numbered around 11.500 men. Labienus had arranged his cavalry in such
close order that Caesar mistook them for infantry, so when he suddenly began to extend his line
the Caesarians were caught off guard. As the light Numidian cavalry advanced, Caesar’s
archers were forced to retreat, but at the same time a few cohorts broke ranks and charged
against the approaching Numidians. The light cavalry retreated immediately while
the Numidian infantry advanced and launched their missiles at the unshielded right side
of the Roman infantry. Labienus now gave the order and by using his
overwhelming superiority in numbers he pushed back the outnumbered Caesarian cavalry that
was guarding the flanks. The fast moving Numidians used their superior
numbers to encircle the enemy as no other was available to block their advance. For once, Caesar was completely enveloped
and tactically outmatched. The situation was made worse by the fact that
his legionaries were not the battle hardened veterans of Gaul and Pharsalus, but mostly
raw recruits. It was his charisma and reputation alone that
averted certain disaster as he persuaded the men to hold their nerve. Caesar forbade his men to advance beyond the
signifiers and arranged his army so as to face both sides. The heavy armored legionaries were incapable
of dealing with this method of fighting since they couldn’t catch up neither with the
light infantry nor with the Numidian cavalry, while the Numidians could shower them with projectiles without engaging them in close quarters. At this moment Labienus advanced in front
of the battle line without his helmet and began taunting the Caesarians, mocking their
severe situation and their lack of experience. A legionary from Caesar’s ranks replied:
"I am not of your raw warriors, but a veteran of the 10th legion”. "Where is your standard?!", Labienus shouted
back. "I will soon make you sensible to who I am",
answered the soldier. Then, pulling off his helmet to reveal himself,
he threw a pilum with all his strength, wounding Labienus’ horse, which threw him on the
ground. The soldier warned: "Know that this javelin
was thrown by a soldier of the 10th legion." The wounded Labienus was carried from the
field. Despite the heroic display of the veteran,
Caesar’s green troops were wary and one standard bearer attempted to abandon his position
forcing Caesar to grab him by the shoulder turn him around and say “Look, that’s
where the enemy are!”. With dusk approaching Caesar tried to break
the encirclement and withdraw his army into his fortified camp. He gave orders to most of his cohorts and
his cavalry to suddenly charge against the Numidians, hoping that the surprise attack would give them enough time to break out and retreat. The concentrated push caught the Numidians unawares, and their formation scattered in confusion. A brief skirmish ensued, but the light cavalrymen
disengaged soon after and the Romans attempted a rapid march towards their fortifications. With daylight diminishing, the Caesarian columns
were in the process of retreating when a new detachment of 1100 strong Numidian cavalry, commanded by Marcus Petreius fell upon Caesar’s rear guard. Caesar ordered his cavalry and a contingent
of legionaries to aid the embattled troops in the rear and buy time for the rest of the
army to reach the camp. The countercharge was successful and the Numidians
retreated and their commander was wounded in the fighting. After a long and hard-fought retreat, Caesar’s
exhausted legionaries made their way to the fortified camp. Casualties for both sides are unknown but
they were probably not too severe. At Ruspina, Caesar almost lost everything
and it was only because of his quick thinking and his good luck that he was able to survive
through this predicament to fight another day. The decisive engagement in Africa was yet to come... Ruspina was a close call for Julius Caesar. Not only was he incapable of delivering a
decisive blow to the apparently crumbling cause of his senatorial enemies, but he was lucky to escape with his army unscathed. After he barely fended off the forces of the
optimates at the battle of Ruspina, Caesar was still in a logistical predicament, and
his naval supply routes were flimsy and unsecured at best, with his soldiers improvising heavily
and even resorting to feeding their horses and cattle with sea-weed in order to sustain
them. At the same time, Metellus Scipio, the commander
in chief of the “optimates”, began marching from Utica with the entire army in order assist
Labienus and intercept Caesar. Caesar’s situation was critical. His hasty sea-crossing with a small force
meant that he could neither properly secure a bridgehead for his incoming supplies, nor
could he hope to use his army as his main strategic tool, which forced him to dig in
and endure a defensive standoff. At the same time he send messages to his allies
in Sicily, ordering them to immediately dispatch ships with the rest of his army and the much
needed provisions. Caesar and Scipio were facing each other across
the north African plain, but eventhough Scipio had a significant numerical advantage he would
not dare to directly charge Caesar’s fortifications, something that Caesar was aware of. While he was biding his time, numerous delegations
from coastal cities came to Caesar and either offered their services or pleaded with him
to protect their cities from the “cruelty of his enemy". This was a perfect opportunity for Caesar
to expand his operational and logistical base, so when several deputies from the neighboring
city of Acilla requested from him a garrison that would assist them against the incursions
of Scipio’s army, he immediately dispatched C.Messius with a few cohorts in order to take
control of the town. Soon after he entered the city though, Messius
was besieged by Considius Longus with a legion and few cavalry. During this slow and methodic game of strategic
movements, Caesar was once more a step ahead than his enemy, forcing Scipio to play catch-up
by responding to his maneuvers. Amidst this standstill, Caesar’s proconsul
from Sicily was able to at last send him 2 more legions, the 13th and 14th, together
with a strong detachment of Gallic horsemen. The reinforcements arrived safely to Ruspina
and bolstered the pinned Caesarian army. The timing was vital because the two legions
were composed of many of Caesar’s experienced veterans, and their arrival rejuvenated the
demoralized and outnumbered raw levies that made up the bulk of his army. With the determination of his troops renewed,
Caesar began taking the initiative. Scipio’s camp was placed upon a ridge nearby
and Caesar saw an opportunity to gain a strategic advantage over his enemy by occupying the
eminences. After a series of skirmishes mainly between
light troops and cavalry, Caesar again diverted his actions and in battle array marched along
the hills, obviously aiming to occupy the nearby city of Uzitta. And Scipio could not afford to lose Uzitta. It was a vital logistical depot and his main
source of water supplies, so he immediately marched to aid the city, determined to defend
it at all costs. Caesar’s unconventional approach to warfare
would be something that his enemy would soon be forced to face. With his outnumbered army and with no hope
of surprising or outflanking Scipio, Caesar needed to overcome both his numerical and
topographical disadvantage so he set his main camp upon a hill opposite to Uzitta and began
extending two lines of ditches straight towards each side of the city. By this labor intensive method, which was
typical for Caesar, he intended to protect both of his flanks while attempting to occupy
the city with a direct frontal assault. And as he began extending his siegeworks,
King Juba of Numidia came to the aid of Scipio, with a substantial force of cavalry and light
infantry, as well as numerous war elephants and 3 legions under his command. The stakes were getting higher by the minute. A series of skirmishes ensued upon the ridges
and eminences around the city between the two generals, with Labienus having a prominent
role during the numerous cavalry engagements that followed. While those hostilities were carrying on around
Uzitta, two more legions that were send from Sicily managed to arrive safely at Ruspina,
the 9th and the elite 10th legion. And the timing could not have been more crucial. With his army reinforced by 2 veteran legions
the entrenching was accelerated and it wasn’t long before Caesar was able to extend his
fortifications so close to Uzitta to have it within range of his siege engines. This gave the opportunity to numerous local
kings, officers and high ranking officials that were sympathetic to Caesar, but forced
to follow Scipio, to defect under the cover of darkness and reach his fortifications carrying
with them crucial intelligence, offering their help and collaboration. On a daily basis Caesar would attempt to provoke
Scipio into an full scale battle against his hardened veterans, by arranging his army in
battle order within full view of the enemy army, assuming an aggressive formation and
marching just a few hundred paces in front of Scipio’s fortifications. He remained so posted from morning till night
without fighting because neither Scipio dared to advance within the narrow entrenched area
where his army could not manoeuvre, nor would Caesar forfeit the protection that the fortifications
offered to his army’s flanks. As a result, the opposing cavalry forces would
engage in daily skirmishes around the fortifications, with the Caesarians trying to fend off the
Scipiones, who were desperately attempting to deter their enemy from expanding the ramparts
and completely cut them off. Meanwhile Considius Longus, after besieging
Acilla for a protracted period of time, realized that he would not be able to storm the city’s
defences so he dispersed his forces and abandoned the siege. But things would not remain so smooth for
Caesar for much longer. During the stand-off with Scipio’s forces
he received urgent news that many of his transports ships that were anchored outside Leptis had
been raided by nearby enemy troops and many of them were burned. With his lines of communication now severely
threatened he decided to directly command the naval operations against the enemy fleet. After he successfully combined most of his
scattered vessels into a single force he then proceeded to attack the fleet that was stationed
close to Hadrumentum. The surprise was complete and most of the
enemy’s ships that could not withdraw to the safety of the harbor were burned. Caesar managed to resolve this crisis in record
time. It seemed that wherever he was able to personally
intervene everything worked out in his favor. This “Midas touch” that he had on the
battlefield was a unique trait that would consistently follow him throughout his military
career. But despite all of his efforts, Caesar’s
logistical situation was still critical. When he returned to his main camp he decided
to abandon his attempts to storm the city of Uzitta and resume the war of movement. At dawn he gathered all of his legions and,
after setting fire to his main camp, marched off towards Agar. There, he encamped on the plain before the
town, and went with a part of his army around the country in search of provisions. Scipio meanwhile, hearing of Caesar's departure,
followed him along the hills, with all of his forces, and posted himself about six miles
off. If Caesar couldn’t dislodge his enemy he
would attempt to outpace him, thus when he received intelligence from a spy that Scipio
was out in the country side foraging, he saw an opportunity to occupy the nearby strategically
placed city of Zeta. Under the cover of darkness, he force-marched
his army, passed the enemy’s camp and occupied the town right under the nose of his enemies,
and when he realized that Scipio was further down the country side foraging, he immediately
set out to intercept him. But almost immediately it became apparent
that most of Scipios army was already alarmed of Caesar’s presence and was hastily heading
to aid their foraging comrades. Caesar’s force was not prepared for a full
scale battle under these circumstances, with a large portion of his legions left to garrison
his main camp and, being in a field that he did not choose, he would not risk it, so he
disengaged and attempted a rapid retreat. As he drew near the enemy camp from which
he was obliged to pass, Labienus and Afrianius were laying in ambush among the nearby hills with a strong detachment of Numidian light cavalry. The rear guard of Caesar’s veterans immediately
faced about and prepared to receive the charge of the enemy cavalry, but as soon as they
attempted to counter charge them, they fled back into the hills. It was apparent that the cavalry of the optimates
was attempting to harass and delay Caesar’s retreat and oblige him to encamp at a place
were no water was to be had. The situation that Caesar faced is described
perfectly in one of our sources, where it is mentioned that “Caesar, to meet enemies
of this sort, was necessitated to instruct his soldiers, not like a general of a veteran
army which had been victorious in so many battles, but like a fencing master training
up his gladiators, with what foot they must advance or retire; when they were to oppose
and make good their ground; when to counterfeit an attack; at what place, and in what manner
to launch their javelins” This march had already lasted from 3 in the
morning to 4 in the afternoon and with Caesar’s legionaries exhausted, and the retreat almost
coming to a halt due to constant enemy harassment, he needed to find a way out of this predicament. Realizing that, by keeping his cavalry in
the rear, he kept losing horses which he could not easily replace, so he instead positioned
contingents of his veteran legionaries as his rear-guard, with specific orders to receive
and repulse the enemy’s constant charges. This tactic proved to be effective and by
retreating in a methodical and slow manner, Caesar’s army was at last able to reach
the camp safely just before sunset, after sustaining only a few casualties. The next day Caesar tried to induce Scipio
into a full scale battle by deploying his army in battle order outside his camp but
Scipio wouldn’t budge and remained lodged in his camp on the nearby hills. But the tactic of taunting his enemy remained
unsuccessful, and Caesar resumed the warfare of rapid marches that his veterans were accustomed
to, and directed his army towards the nearby city of Sarsura were there was a magazine
of wheat. His legions were constantly harassed by the
light cavalry of Scipio along the way, but this time Caesar was prepared. By assigning 300 legionaries from each legion
with the special task of rapid intervention against the enemy’s rear-guard action he
was able to successfully counter the incursions of Labienus’s cavalry and to reach Sarsura
which he occupied by destroying the enemy garrison. The next day Caesar resumed his march against
the nearby town of Tsidra, but this time due to the city’s stronger defences and the
logistical difficulties that a potential siege would entail, he abandoned the attempt to
capture it and returned back to his old camp near Agar. Between the two camps was a small town by
the name of Tegea, in which Scipio retained a small garrison that he intended to assist. After yet another small and indecisive skirmish
between the opposing cavalry and light infantry, the stalemate could not be broken. Caesar could not entice Scipio to abandon
his favourable and well defended position near the city of Tagea, but neither could
he afford to endure a prolonged siege, because being so far away from his main coastal supply
depots imposed many difficulties. However, the apparent lack of an overall strategic objective for Scipio played into Caesar’s hand. The veteran general had a unique insight when it came to a warfare of movement and strategic planning. Caesar once again found himself in need of
a decisive battle that his enemy was not willing to give, so he came up with a plan that would
play into all of his and his army’s strengths: rapid movement, keen insight when it came
to topographic considerations, a well-defined military objective and the boundless capacity of his legionaries for hard and unremitting labour. Under the cover of night he broke camp and
marched straight against the coastal city of Thapsus that was occupied by a well-known
general of the optimates, C.Virgilius. Thapsus was already besieged by sea and would
now become the incentive for the decisive battle that Caesar needed so much. When Caesar arrived he immediately set his
legionaries to dig a series of ditches and ramparts around the whole town in order to
cut it off and prevent any succors from reaching it. Scipio could not afford the disgrace of abandoning
both Virgilius and the “thapsitani”, who were loyal all along to the cause of the optimates
. When he received news of Caesar’s designs
he immediately marched his army towards Thapsus and camped just 8 miles away from the city
opposite to Caesar’s siege works. It is not exactly clear how long it took but
it’s obvious from the ancient sources that, within a few days, Caesar’s legions were
able to completely surround Thapsus with and elaborate double network of ditches, ramparts
and a few strategically positioned forts. Surrounded and completely cut off by both
land and sea, the Thapsitani were doomed unless Scipio could break the encirclement. The next day Scipio left his fort and advanced
a few miles closer to Caesar, just off the range of his siege engines. His army was arranged in battle order and was facing the Caesarians that were now clearly in sight. Caesar noticed this movement and drew off
most of his army from the works in order to face the enemy, left a small garrison to guard
the forts and gave specific instructions to his fleet to raise a shout on his signal so
as to distract Virgilius’s forces in case his legions were engaged in battle. Caesar drew up his army in 3 lines. On his right wing he placed the 10th and 2nd
legion of veterans, the 8th and 9th legions on his left wing and in his center he positioned
five more legions. He also placed the 5th legion, which was split
in two halves, to guard his flanks and entrusted it to deal with the enemy elephants. His cavalry was positioned on both of his
wings, intermixed with archers and light troops. The opposing army of Scipio was drawn up similarly
with 3 lines of infantry, and his cavalry and light troops on both wings, but he also
had positioned his numerus elephants in front of his main battle line for shock value and
intimidation. Scipio hoped that with his elephants he could
create enough havoc within Caesar’s lines once the battle commenced and had them specifically trained to endure the sound of slings and arrows. All told, Scipio deployed approximately 12
legions at Thapsus, including a strong contingent of light Numidian cavalry, commanded by King
Juba. Caesar went from rank to rank to rouse the
spirits of his veterans, reminding them of their former victories and animating them
with his expressions. He exhorted the new recruits who had never
seen battle before to emulate the courage and endurance of the veterans and endeavour
to attain the same degree of glory and renown for themselves. As he ran from rank to rank he noticed that
the army of Scipio was in turmoil, with a portion of it still working on the fortifications
of their new camp and many others being very uneasy hurrying from place to place or retiring
behind the ramparts while others coming out again in confusion. As many others from his army began to observe
this, Caesar’s officers and centurions beseeched and implored their general to give the order
for an all-out attack, his veterans of the renowned 10th legion, who so often were at
the forefront of his triumphs, were especially uneasy and chafing at the beat to launch against
their enemies. As Caesar did not wish to commence a battle
by a sudden charge he tried to restrain the eagerness of the men and mitigate their aggressive
impulses, but despite his best efforts, all of a sudden a trumpeter on the right wing,
who was compelled by the fuming veterans of his 10th legion, sounded the charge. The small trickle of furiously attacking veterans
soon became a flood and neither the centurions, nor Caesar himself were able to stop them. Caesar understood that the enthusiasm of his
soldier could not be restrained and after wishing them “Good luck” he spurred on
his horse and joined them in the charge. The explosive onslaught of the veterans gave
Scipio little time to respond. Caesar’s archers and light troops showered
the opposing elephants with their darts and arrows in such a way that the animals panicked
turned about and trampled their own troops who were still within the ramparts of the
camp. Soon afterwards the Caesarian right wing enveloped
their surprised enemies and occupied the camp. The ferocity of the attack is captured by
an instance described in one of our sources, a veteran of the 5th legion who, after witnessing
the horrific mangling of a camp follower by an elephant, charged the animal by himself. When the elephant grabbed him with his trunk
he still did not panic but retained the presence of mind to brand his sword and wound the elephant’s
trunk. Miraculously the animal eased its grab, released
him, and fled. Soon the battle turned into a rout and the
optimates were running for their lives. Caesar’s veterans managed to kill almost
10.000 enemy legionaries while their own loses are described as being negligible, ranging
from 50 to almost a 1000 men. The unstoppable Caesarian advance chased off
the opposing Scipiones from their left towards their right flank and soon the veterans occupied
both enemy camps. The fleeing rabble could not pose a threat any longer to the triumphant leader of the "Populares". The African campaign was all but won. The battle of Thapsus was a unique instance of Caesar completely losing control of his army. Nevertheless the sheer guts, experience and
ferocity of his veterans still gave him a total and decisive victory. All seemed lost for the scattered optimates,
with north Africa, Greece, Italy and Asia minor under the iron grip of the Caesarians. Now, Spain remained the only refuge for the optimates... It’s early in the year 46 BC. After the decisive defeat at Thapsus all seemed
lost for the “Optimates” Most of their prominent members were either
dead or fleeing. A large portion of their armies was either
destroyed or captured, while any remaining troops scattered. But despite all of these disastrous set-backs,
the old political order of Rome proved to be a very hard nut to crack. The Optimates will soon prove that they still have some fight left in them. Two of Pompey Magnuses’s sons, Gnaeus and
Sextus, together with Titus Labienus, a former Caesarean who turned against him, managed
to escape the Caesar’s onslaught after their defeat at Thapsus. They made their way to Spain and slowly began
to recruit new legions in order to, once more, renew the hostilities against their nemesis. A couple of Pompey’s former veteran legions
that were stationed in Hispania Ulterior had declared themselves for the optimates and
drove out Caesar’s pro consul. Those two legions were soon joined by the
remnants of the army that was defeated in the North African campaign. By combining their forces they managed to
occupy most of the province, including the capital of the, Corduba. It didn’t take long after that for the optimates
to swell their ranks with newly recruited levies from roman citizens of the region and
from local Spanish inhabitants, as well as former slaves who were disillusioned with
Caesarean authorities. Caesar again had a full scale crisis on his
hands. The civil war has resurged within just a few
months after his victory at Thapsus. But this time around the leader of the populares
faced unique issues. Most of his veterans, after years of service
and numerous campaigns, were disbanded and retired. The majority of his loyal and so often victorious veterans would not follow their general to Spain. Nevertheless, Caesar’s favorite and most
loyal legion, the 10th, despite being severely understrength due to years of campaigning
and accumulated losses, together with the 5th legion, that so successfully managed to
counter the attack of the enemy elephants during the battle of Thapsus, were amongst
those who would follow Caesar to what would ultimately prove to be his final campaign. Caesar arrived in Spain in early December
46 BC after an epic march of almost 2400km which his army covered in less than a month,
a march that according to some ancient sources Caesar commemorated in a short poem that he wrote. When his presence became known to the region, many ambassadors approached him with a variety of requests. The ambassadors from Corduba, urged him to
march straight to their city and relieve it from the enemy who they claimed was not yet
aware of his presence. But at the same time, survivors from the garrison
of Ulia, beseeching Caesar to relieve the city that was under siege by Gnaeus Pompey
for some months now. Caesar thought it more prudent to march to
relieve Ulias first, since its’ citizens remained loyal under pressure. He detached 11 cohorts with a small cavalry
force, under the command of Julius Paciecus, and sent them during the night to lift the
siege of Ulia. When the detachment arrived near Ulia, a severe
tempest arose that reduced visibility to within just a few metres. Thinking quickly, Paciecus ordered his men
to attempt to sneak from within Pompey’s entrenchments, marching with his cavalry in
a very thin formation. After a Pompeian guard became aware of their
presence and required them to identify themselves, one of Paciecus’ legionaries yelled at him
to be silent, telling him that they were attempting to capture the walls! The trick worked and the Caesareans managed
to enter the city. Thanks to Paciecius’ cunning and the audacity of a single legionnaire, the siege of Ulia was lifted. When Caesar received news of this success
he immediately set off towards Corduba. He quickly built a bridge and forded the river Qualdacivir, setting his camp not far from the city. Pompey rushed to intercept Caesar and set
his camp just opposite of his rival’s position, across the bridge. As it was typical for Caesar he attempted
to completely block off his enemy from gaining access to the bridge by having his soldiers
dig an extended trench from his camp. As a result, a series of bloody skirmishes
ensued across the bridge. The Pompeians tried to gain access to the
bridge and the Caesareans tried to block it off. So severe were the losses for both sides due
to the narrow space in which they fought that that heaps of bodies piled up on both sides of
the bridge. Caesar realized that Pompey would not commit
to an open and decisive battle, so he did not linger for long. He instructed his soldiers to light many fires
to distract and deceive the enemy into thinking that the entire force was in the camp. Then, during that same night he forded the
river and marched against the city of Ategua, which was the strongest fort that the Optimates
had in the area. The veterans immediately began to besiege
the town of Ategua , forcing the new recruits to follow their lead and accustom themselves
with the heavy workload that was typical of the Caesarean way of waging war. It wasn’t long after that a series of ditches
and ramparts had fully surrounded the town. Around the same time Pompey who was informed
of Caesar’s departure and was marching to the aid of Ategua, happened to stumble upon
a strong detachment of enemy cavalry during some heavy mist and completely destroyed it. Despite his success, most of the strategic
eminences’ around the area were already occupied by Caesareans, so he was forced to
by-pass them and encamp himself in between Ategua and the nearby city of Ucubis, upon
some hills overlooking the enemy positions. From his position Pompey could not assist
the defenders so was in urgent need of a plan. After he assessed the situation he came up
with a plan of immediate action. There, across a nearby river, he saw a weakly
defended hill that overlooked the town, as well as Caesar’s communication lines and,
because of the nature of the ground and the intervening river, he thought that Caesar
would not be able to reinforce the position in case of a surprise attack. Driven by this belief he sent a strong detachment
in a dramatic night march to storm the enemy’s position and dislodge the Caesareans. Things did not go according to Pompey’s
plan though. When his legionaries reached the position
the defenders were ready and showered them with their pila from a favorable and elevated
position. With the surprise being unsuccessful the ensuing
skirmish gave enough time to Caesar to react. Three legions from the main camp rushed to
the aid of their comrades and the Pompeians were caught in between the two forces. After a brief struggle the Pompeians fled
after losing about a hundred men during the flight. The loses would have probably been more severe
if the attack happened during daylight. After the failure of the surprise attack,
Pompey changed his tactics and attempted to force his way across the river and onto the
strategically located hill. He began digging a line across his camp to
the nearby river in order for his army to be able to safely reach the other side. Once again, skirmishes ensued around the entrenchments, but Pompey’s army was eventually able to reach the river and even build a new fort
on the opposite bank. The no-man’s-land between the two opposing
fortifications became a place of severe and intense clashes, with neither side being able
to achieve a major victory and both armies sustained minor setbacks. Pompey needed to break the stalemate and relieve
the town from his enemy. During the night he managed to sneak messages
to the besieged, imploring them to assemble and attack a specific point of Caesar’s
fortifications, in the hope that they could break out and unite with his forces outside. The garrison of Ategua complied and tried
a desperate breakthrough out of Caesar’s chokehold, but the effort was in vain. The Caesarean army proved to be way too prepared
and capable of repulsing the attempt. After a brief clash, in which the garrison
sustained heavy losses, it was eventually forced to retreat in disarray back within
its’ walls. After the failed breakthrough attempt, Pompey decided that he could do nothing more for besieged. Preparations began to break camp and march
towards the western part of the province where there were numerous well defended allied cities
and towns that he could assist and defend more effectively. Caesar intercepted this intelligence and decided
to inform the inhabitants of the besieged city about Pompey’s decision to abandon
them. And, as he had correctly predicted, it didn’t
take long before a letter arrived from governor L. Minatius who offered to surrender the town
as long as he received guarantees that their lives would be spared, which Caesar granted. The siege of Ategua was successfully concluded
in February of 45 BC. The fall of this key fortress incited a cascade
of defections around the whole province, in favour of Caesar’s cause. Pompey was retreating towards the city of
Ucubis and Caesar remained hot on his heels. After crossing yet another river close to
Ucubis, Pompey decided to encamp yet again and began entrenching himself on defendable
hilly area. The two armies were soon engaged in a ferocious
skirmish near the fordable area of the river during which the Caesareans were overwhelmed
and pushed back. Two of Caesar’s veteran centurions made
a heroic last stand in an attempt to slow down the Pompeian counter charge. Their eventual deaths gave enough time to
the opposing Caesarean horsemen who were rushing out of their camp to intervene and in their turn drove the Pompeians back to their own entrenchments. Both adversaries were carefully manoeuvring,
attempting to defend their lines, while at the same time endeavouring to exploit any
weakness and strike a knockout blow to the enemy. After marching a few miles westwards both
armies stopped and began to dig in. Pompey encamped just outside the city of Ucubis
and Caesar a few miles to the north. He immediately set his legionaries to dig
a protracted ditch along the communication and supply routes of his enemy that run towards
the city of Aspavia just off to the north of his position. After Pompey observed this he immediately
perceived the seriousness of the situation and decided to hazard an engagement against
the Caesarean forces, but he remained wary and cautious enough to march along the hills
and attempt to provoke an engagement from a favourable elevated position. The exact description of what happened next
is lost to us but it is reasonable to assume that Caesar’s forces managed to dislodge
the Pompeians from their position and that they were only saved by the onset of darkness. It was around that time that letters send
from Pompey to his allies in nearby cities were intercepted. In them he described a switch in his strategy
and that from now on he would attempt to defend every allied city, intending to hinder Caesar’s
army from using them as supply depots and provision sources that it so desperately needed. Pompey continued to retreat to the western
side of the province and Caesar followed him closely, managing to capture the city of Ventisponte
during the pursuit. The commander of the optimates, being faithful
to his aforementioned strategy has set out to enact it, burning the nearby city of Carruca
when its’ garrison refused to open the gates to him and from there marching southwards
to the nearby town of Munda, where he positioned his army upon the mountainous area to the
immediate vicinity of the town. Caesar, still on the pursuit, arrived in the
plains of Munda and pitched his camp opposite to that of Pompey. The next day, while Caesar was preparing to
once again set out with his army, scout reports stated that Pompey’s army was arranged in
battle order ever since midnight. Julius Caesar ordered for the battle standard
to be raised immediately. The final showdown of the largest and most
catastrophic civil war of the ancient world, was imminent… The two camps were divided from one another
by a plain extending about five miles. Pompey enjoyed a double defence of sorts,
due to the nature of the country and because the town was situated on elevated ground. Across this valley ran a small river or rivulet, which rendered the approach to the mountain very difficult. Due to perfect weather conditions on the day,
Pompey’s numerical superiority, and the flat plain that lay between them, Caesar thought
that by moving towards his already arrayed enemy would entice him to move down from his
hill and engage in battle. But Pompey stayed put, and it soon became
obvious that the commander of the Optimates would not dare leave the high ground, even
though Caesar’s army was composed largely of new recruits. When they reached the edge of the plain, which
was the most disadvantageous location to initiate a battle, Caesar pointed that out to his largely
inexperienced troops. The subsequent delay of their advance enlivened
the Pompeians who advanced a little way, but without abandoning their advantageous position. Cautiously but steadily, Caesar’s legions
began the slow upward march towards Pompey’s position. The army of the Optimates consisted of thirteen
legions arranged in three lines. The cavalry that was about 6000 men strong
was positioned on the wings and was commanded by Titus Labienus, with an equal number of
light troops dispersed among them. In total, the Pompeian army numbered around
70.000 men During that day Julius Caesar led a total
of 8 legions that were almost at their full strength numbering around 40.000 men and he
also had a slight numerical advantage in cavalry with a total of 8000 horsemen under his command,
who were all placed on his left wing. His infantry was arranged in the usual triple
line with the elite 10th legion of veterans occupying its’ usual position on the right
wing, with the 5th and 3rd legion on his left. The battle that was about to come was to be,
by far, the largest clash of the civil war in terms of scale. But the main bulk of the Caesarean legions
were not composed of the battle hardened and victorious veterans who had campaigned with
Caesar for over a decade, but were manned mainly by new levies and recruits who were
not accustomed to large scale engagements. Needless to say, they proceeded hesitantly
against an enemy who was numerically superior and in an advantageous position. Sensing this, Caesar ran up and down the line
encouraging his soldiers, with one of our sources claiming that he seized a shield from
a soldier and advanced against the enemy by himself, saying to the officers around him
that this shall be the end of his life and their military service. While he shamed them to their faces and exhorted
them to advance, the he was soon joined by tribunes who took position by his side, something that encouraged the rest of the army to rush towards the enemy. The bulky mass of the two armies had no room
to manoeuvre on this rocky and inclined battleground and cavalry action could not be easily initiated
due to the rugged terrain, so the infantry was to play a decisive role. The battle proved a much longer affair than
the clash at Thapsus and the Pompeians managed to withstand the initial and most formidable
charge of their adversaries. After the exchange of more than 30.000 pila,
the similarly equipped and trained armies engaged in a long drawn out and exhaustive
contest, in which no one seemed to be gaining the upper hand. For hours they were battling it out with neither
the Pompeians being able to brake the line of their enemy nor the Caesareans being able
to push back the multitude of shields that were blocking their advance. After hours of this exhaustive hand to hand
fighting Caesar’s right wing began to edge out their opponents. Once more it was the grizzled veterans of
the 10th legion who managed to take the better of their enemies, despite being severely understrength. With only a fraction of their manpower still
able to fight, the men of the 10th, most of them in their 40s and 50s, who were the spearhead
of numerous campaigns and battles, did what they have done countless times before, displaying
an unparalleled courage and endurance as they began to push Pompey’s numerically superior
left flank back uphill. With this severe crisis unfolding, Pompey
was forced to remove a whole legion from his right wing and bring it to the rescue of his
hard pressed left wing. This was the moment that Caesar was waiting
for. He ordered his cavalry to charge directly
against Pompey’s weakened right wing and send part of his auxiliaries to charge Pompey’s
undefended camp. Labienus who commanded the cavalry saw the
movement of Caesar’s auxiliary cavalry and charged with some of the troops to intercept
them. Amidst this turmoil Pompey’s hard pressed
infantry perceived Labienus’ movement as an attempted retreat. It was the turning point in the battle and
soon the army of the optimates routed in panic began towards the city of Munda. The Caesareans mercilessly pursued the remnants
of the Pompeian army all the way to the city of Munda which they soon placed under siege. 30.000 Pompeians laid dead on the battlefield
that day, while loses on the Caesarean side were much lighter, ranging around 1000 men. Munda was to be the last battle that Caesar ever fought but it was also one of his hardest fought ones. He was later recorded as saying: “I often
fought for victory, but at Munda I fought for my very existence”. This was the largest civil war of the ancient
world. The optimates fought against Caesar tooth
and nail and it took all of Caesar’s determination, drive, genius and tenacity in order to achieve
the final victory. Gaius Julius Caesar was triumphant, but his
triumph would last for only one year, until the ides of March 44 BC...
