The Early Muslim expansion changed the fate
of the Middle East and the world. In our first season, we have covered the very
early campaigns mostly led by Khalid ibn al-Walid in Iraq and Syria. This second documentary will describe the
Arab incursions into Anatolia, Egypt, Iran and North Africa, showing how the Rashidun
Caliphate became the dominant power in the wider region. These long videos are extremely time-consuming
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with the description of the early Muslim army. From Ajnadayn in 634 to Alexandria in 641,
Islamic armies of seemingly miniscule size picked apart the veteran armies of two separate,
massive empires in battle after battle. The question remains: how did these earliest
Muslim soldiers fight and how did they forge the caliphate with such speed? Akin to most other regions and centers of
civilisation within the ancient and medieval world, Arabia was a violent place in its own
unique fashion. Far from being comparable to the large, hegemonic
empires which bordered and often puppeteered its many tribes to further their own agendas
pre-conquest, the barren desert of the Arabian Peninsula and most of its people are more
accurately balanced against the fearsome nomadic folk of the great Eurasian steppe. Fighting against rival tribes and defending
one’s own kin from attack were a central part of life, a fact which played a key role
in creating the local culture. Motivated in part by vicious terrain that
was untenable to larger military campaigns, the dominant tactic was the so-called razzia
- a raiding expedition designed to plunder, pillage and take slaves. Such a wealth of common martial experience
meant that most Bedouin Arabs were, especially compared to the agriculturalists and urban
citizens of the near-east, a veteran military population. This pre-Islam tribal society provided a solid
foundation for the development of a conquest army, but until the prophet’s lifetime and
possibly afterwards as well, there was no ‘army’, as such. With very few exceptions, every single adult
male in Bedouin life was a warrior, compensated for their endeavours with booty, honour or
the defence of their own kin-group from enemies who were attempting to do the same. With the advent of Islam, leadership of Muhammad
and the subsequent unification of the Arabian Peninsula under the first Rashidun caliph,
its weapon-rich cities and Bedouin-inhabited hinterland alike came under one rule, and
one religion. This warlike population, who until recently
were occupied fighting one-another in small-scale struggles, could now be directed en masse
to attack the settled, exhausted and unready empires beyond the desert frontier. Although now turned to a single purpose; to
expand the Dar al-Islam, the early Islamic armies remained in many ways what they had
been before - tribal raiders. As the assault on Byzantine and Sassanid territory
began, it quickly became clear that the established empires were not going to be met on their
own terms. It was to be a mobile war of razzia which
the two emperors and their armies, each bent towards attacking the other, simply could
not match. To this purpose, a primary strategic weapon
of war utilised by the conquering Arabs was the unassuming camel. Accustomed to travelling across incredibly
arid terrain with essentially no water, these workhouse pack animals were used to lethal
effect on campaign. Camel-mounted armies of Muslim infantry would
frequently strike Byzantine or Sassanid territory from unexpected, undefended angles, bleeding
the empires of manpower and money before fading back into the desert, where their enemies
simply could not go. Imagine playing a game of Civilization and
possessing an area of apparently impassable terrain near your key resource-producing regions,
so you naturally do not fortify the area, because you don’t need to. After all, if no powerful enemy can get there,
they can’t attack it anyway. However, one of your underdog opponents then
starts cheating and bypassing the impassable to strike at the heart of your most crucial
land. Worse still, you can’t chase them back through
that terrain. If you try, you give them the opportunity
to strike elsewhere. This is what the established empires must
have felt when the Muslims started attacking. Khalid ibn Al Walid - arguably the greatest
early Muslim general, exploited this prodigious mobility to frustrate and exhaust a Sassanid
imperial army in what is perhaps the greatest example of its use. During an attack in 633, Khalid planted his
Arab army in front of Hufair and tempted Persian general Hormuz, then stationed at Kazima to
approach him. His heavily-armoured force embarked on a tiring
march to do so. When the commander got there however, he discovered
that the Muslims had ghosted into the desert and were beelining back towards Kazima. Bound to march in the defence of such a strategically
vital place, Hormuz forced his unruly, exhausted troops on a countermarch. By the time Hormuz arrived back near the city,
his army was near mutinous, barely in a fit state to move, let alone fight, and in a terrible
situation. Meanwhile, Khalid’s well-mounted, leisurely
stroll back to Kazima had allowed his forces to prepare adequately. In the subsequent Battle of Chains, rejuvenated
Muslim forces soundly thrashed Hormuz’ thoroughly outmaneuvered, physically drained army. The average Arab warrior of the early Islamic
conquest period would’ve been far less standardised in form than a soldier from the Byzantine
or Sassanid Empires. Infantry and cavalry were both prominent,
despite Arabia’s prominent lack of viable horse-rearing ground. Moreover, the distinction between foot and
mounted troops was often blurred. Changing with the situation, cavalry might
dismount and fight as infantry while what might be dubbed mobile infantry were frequently
carried to battle on horses or camels. Equipment, relatively similar between both
cavalry and infantry, was purchased and provided by the individual warrior or tribesman, rather
than being issued by the Rashidun Caliphate as a state. However, potential combatants who were indeed
too poor to assemble equipment of their own might be assisted by wealthy kinsmen, neighbors
or other benefactors. Even for the well-to-do in Muslim society,
however, good quality equipment was scarce in the early days. There was nothing overly unique about Muslim
weaponry during their wars of expansion. Spear, sword and bow were the primary methods
of assault, but it is said that the Arabs possessed particularly long spears and remarkably
short swords when compared to their enemies. As this short sword was carried in a shoulder-baldric
rather than a belt at the waist, it is likely that this style was copied or inspired by
the old Roman gladius, which was kept in a similar manner. Metal armour seems to have struck both hot
and cold in the Arab mindset from the very beginning, as is evident in a saying of the
second caliph Umar. He describes mail armour as ‘Keeping our
horseman busy, a nuisance for our infantry and yet always a strong protection’. Originating from the scalding hot and sun-bleached
deserts of Arabia, heavy armour must have seemed anathema to Arab warriors at first,
due to the sheer discomfort it must have brought on when worn, not to mention its encumbering
effect. We can imagine the more well-off Arab warriors
investing in a coat of mail, only to speak to their comrades about it and be met with
traditionalist derision at wearing such a burdensome thing. Therefore, it may have been that use of armour
was based upon both a warrior’s ability to obtain it, in addition to the willingness
to don it in battle and on the march. Conversely, it might also have been the case
that mail was reserved for frontline troops, while rear-line infantry and archers went
without. Whatever the case, a notable and repeated
occurrence during the Rashiduns’ expansion was trouble facing enemy archers. It became so bad that, whilst fighting the
Byzantines in the eventual victory at Yarmouk, Islamic warriors suffered what became known
in legend as the day of lost eyes. It might have been that this, in addition
to other such occasions, was brought on by a reluctance to wear heavy armour and helmets. Two other crucial ‘units’ which partially
made up early Rashidun armies have come to symbolise the Muslim style of war during this
period - the ‘mobile guard’ cavalry strike force and Mubarizun. Rather than being a default part of the Islamic
army of expansion as an institution, however, the mobile guard in particular was in fact
a circumstantial reorganisation enacted by the great general Khalid Ibn al-Walid in the
middle of his invasion of Syria. After the commander’s triumph at Ajnadayn
in late 634, it was clear that the next stage of the Muslim invasion would have to pierce
deep into Syria. So, sifting through the 8,000 strong army
under his leadership, Khalid extracted the most veteran, most elite and deadliest fighters
to form a 4,000 man-strong band of horsemen which was known as the ‘Army of Movement’,
or more commonly the mobile guard. In an army whose warriors were already battle-hardened
veterans, these paragons were the crème de la crème. One of those handpicked 4,000 was the near
mythical warrior-captain Qa’qa bin Amr. Not only did this ferocious lieutenant supposedly
play a crucial role in both the Battle of Chains and the Battle of Yarmouk, but he was
also personally chosen by the caliph to lead Arab reinforcements to the Battle of al-Qadissiyah. If our sources are to be believed, he also
played a key role in winning this domino-toppling clash as an energetic cavalry commander. That was the sheer quality of soldiers assembled
together in Khalid’s elite unit. As a coherent and unified force, the mobile
guard was frequently used by the legendary sword of Allah as a lethal mounted reserve
which could be used wherever it was seen fit. The unit could plug a hole in allied lines
by riding swiftly to where aid was most needed, or it could sweep around the flanks of an
enemy to roll up their battle line and win the battle. Under Khalid’s generalship, it played both
of these roles during the battle at Yarmouk. Despite its fame and flashy style of warfare,
the Rashidun mobile guard was an incredibly short-lived entity, which nevertheless served
its purpose. When Khalid was dismissed from his post by
Umar, the regiment as a unified entity was simply disbanded and its members dispatched
to other fronts in Islam’s ongoing wars of conquest. Many more of its warriors apparently passed
away during the plague of 639/640, and those few who survived accompanied Amr Ibn al-As
to Egypt. The Mubarizun, translated as ‘duelists’
or ‘champions’ served the purpose one would expect of a warrior bearing their title. The bravest men in all the Arab armies, Mubarizun
would step forward alone and battle a Byzantine or Persian champion in the ritualised single
combat which was so common in that period. Arab champions were particularly deadly, gaining
victory in most battles. As victors they would bring pride to their
religion and caliphate, morale to the army and conversely demoralise the enemy force. Still, despite their successes, Muslim forces
frequently found themselves on the sharp end of heavy casualty figures and manpower replenishment
rapidly became an issue that the caliphs needed to deal with. Part of this shortfall was made up by non-Arab
deserters who took up with the invaders and quickly became key cogs in the overall machine
of expansion out of the Arabian Peninsula. As early as the Battle of Al-Qadissiyah, 4,000
soldiers from the army of Rostam Farrokhzad went over to the Muslim side. So great was this coup that the defecting
warriors were able to demand from the Arabs land of their own choosing, to closely associate
themselves with an Arab band of their own preference and to be paid salaries sometimes
even in excess of regular Arab warriors. These and other such traitors to the Sassanid
shah’s cause were known as the Hamra, or ‘red people’. This phenomenon became so prevalent that,
during the Muslim invasion of Khuzestan and the Siege of Shushtar, a famous unit of elite
Persian soldiers known thereafter as the Asawira, led by one of Yazdegerd’s most senior and
trusted commanders, also went over to the caliph’s side. Not only did these most capable of soldiers
convert to the new and rising religion of Islam, but they were given in exchange the
highest possible level of pay, dwellings in the new town of Basra and a position of honour
within the Bani Tamim tribe. While a massive amount of Byzantine territory
was lost to the Arabs, it paled to the annihilation which they inflicted on the Sassanid state,
almost certainly in large part due to this lack of faith in their leadership. Persian civilians and soldiers alike seemed
all too eager to defect and join the invaders at the slightest opportunity, perhaps due
to instability within the royal house, weakness of leadership or oppressive taxes. Conversely, Arab soldiers were, as soldiers
go, relatively well behaved. Atrocities still, no doubt, occurred in great
quantities, as they do in the vast majority of military conflicts. However, Islamic rules of military conduct,
known as siyar, mandated that some sense of civilisation remained even at the darkest
points of war. Enemy envoys were to be safeguarded and inviolate,
non-combatant civilians were to be treated as neutral parties and truces were to be accepted
wherever possible. ‘Do not kill women or children, or an aged
infirm person-’ once proclaimed caliph Abu Bakr ‘Do not cut down fruit-bearing trees. Do not destroy an inhabited place. Do not slaughter sheep or camels except for
food. Do not burn bees and do not scatter them. Do not steal from the booty and do not be
cowardly.’ This kind of attitude, which ideally would
result in minimal damage to ‘enemy’ civilian occupations and populations, is likely to
have garnered the invading Arabs incredible favour. In the previous season, we covered the first
stages of the Muslim conquest of the Middle East. It started in 633 with the campaign in Mesopotamia
against the Sassanid empire by the general of the Rashidun Caliphate Khalid ibn al-Walid. After a string of victories that brought him
to the border of the Eastern Roman Empire, Khalid entered Syria and again won a number
of decisive battles culminating at the battle of Yarmouk, which put most of the region under
the control of the Caliphate. In southern Mesopotamia though, the Sassanid
empire attempted a counter-attack which led to the battle of al-Qadisiyyah. After the battle that continued for days,
the Muslim army commanded by Sa’d Ibn Abi Waqqas defeated Rostam’s Sassanid force. Amidst the slaughter and unfolding catastrophe
at Qadissiyah, the commander of the Persian centre-right - Jalinus - assumed leadership
of the imperial army’s remnant and set about saving what forces he could. Assembling a small, elite strike force, he
thrust towards the al-Atiq dam and drove a unit of Muslim troops away before forming
a perimeter and holding it. As Sassanid stragglers withdrew across the
dam wall to the other side, Jalinus bravely repelled many attacks from the Muslims and
managed to see most of the remaining troops to safety, but it was still a painfully small
number. When the last of them were on the canal’s
far side, Jalinus had the dam destroyed and began hastily pulling his men upstream to
Najaf before the victors fully turned on him. Unwilling, however, to give the foe any breathing
room, Sa’d Ibn Abi Waqqas dispatched Qa’qa and Shurahbeel to hunt down scattered Persian
units, while cavalry commander Zuhra bin al-Hawiyya was sent after Jalinus with 300 elite Arab
horsemen. Not deterred by the dam crossing’s destruction,
Zuhra and his 300 drove their mounts into the torrent and forded it before chasing Jalinus’
column upstream. The latter realised he was being chased and
halted with his own cavalry at a nearby bridge, while the infantry carried on withdrawing
all the way to Najaf. After a short time, the horsemen of Zuhra
came across Jalinus’ valiant rear-guard and charged it, breaking the formation swiftly
and provoking its leader into yet another withdrawal. His heels constantly bit by Zuhra as he did,
Jalinus chose to turn and face the enemy in a final fight, believing that the best way
to stop the pursuit was to kill the leader. So, he halted his forces, turned about face
and arrayed for battle, before personally riding before his troops and challenging Zuhra
to single combat. Galloping forward atop their horses, the two
exhausted commanders fought one another to decide the issue once and for all, and once
again it was the Muslim who came out on top after a hard-fought struggle. Jalinus was killed and his cavalry took flight,
but many were still caught and slain by Zuhra’s riders. By sunset, the 300 reached Najaf, where they
halted for the night. With the aim of conquering prosperous Iraq,
which the Muslims believed was the ‘heart of the world’, Sa’d reorganised his 20,000
troops into five marching corps1 with Zuhra retaining his advance guard position. Two weeks after Qadissiyah, he was quickly
joined at Najaf by the remainder of the army and given the order to cross the Euphrates. Incoming Sassanid reinforcements under Nakheerjan
arrived in the area soon after, having been initially bound for Rostam’s now broken
force. Hearing of the defeat, the reinforcement group
halted east of the Euphrates and waited for new orders from Ctesiphon, which came in the
form of Firuzan, a general tasked by Emperor Yazdegerd with preventing or delaying the
seemingly unstoppable advance of the Muslims. When Firuzan appraised the situation, he decided
that his army of fresh and recently defeated forces under his command wouldn’t be enough
to throw the Arabs back. So, he instead prepared defensive actions
at a series of defensible locations and cities on the road to the Persian capital, so that
the great city would have time to fortify. As his first move, Firuzan ordered the governor
of Burs, Busbuhra, to hold his branch of the Euphrates and gave him some troops to help
with the task, while the general and his main army started massing near Babylon. When Zuhra’s advance guard neared Burs,
the city’s governor rode out to meet him. In a short battle, the holding force of Sassanid
troops was routed and Busbuhra severely wounded. During the flight, he died from his wounds. Following this defeat, the new local leader
made peace with the Caliphate, agreeing to provide information and logistical assistance. From these new allies, Zuhra learned that
the formidable main Sassanid army opposing him was indeed across the Euphrates at Babylon,
along with several high nobles. Zuhra then forwarded this crucial information
to Sa’d at Najaf, and waited for the four corps trailing his own to catch up. When they did, the Muslims advanced on Babylon
in strength and, at some point in December 636, met Firuzan along the river bank and
crushed his army in a brief but harsh battle. One of the defeated generals, Hormuzan, fled
south with his contingent to his domain in Ahwaz, while Firuzan and the remainder withdrew
north in good order, leaving garrisons at Sura and Deir Kab along the way2. Zuhra again set off in hot pursuit and, despite
fierce resistance from the defensive Sassanid armies in his way, managed to defeat them
at Sura, Deir Kab, and Kusa on his relentless drive to Ctesiphon. By early January of 637, the Muslim leader
neared Vologesocerta - just one of the cities which made up larger Ctesiphon, where he was
again rejoined by the bulk of the army. To the desert-dwelling Arabs, whose largest
urban areas were but a fraction of the size, the Persian capital was unlike anything most
of them had ever witnessed in their lives. More than just a single city, Ctesiphon had
in fact grown to encompass about seven grandiose population centres which had been constructed
and assimilated over the centuries, forming a true metropolis. Because of its unique nature, the Persian
heartland was dubbed Madain, or ‘The Cities’ in Arabic. On the Tigris’ western bank stood Seleucia,
Vologesocerta and Veh-Ardashir, while Ctesiphon proper and a number of peripheral hubs were
to the east. Perhaps the most majestic sight for those
approaching Arabs during 637 would have been the 40-meter-tall Arch of Khosrow, an architectural
marvel unique in the world at the time. Although Firuzan hadn’t managed to stop
the Muslim advance, his delaying action had worked, and now the entire western portion
of Yazdegerd’s imperial capital was fortified with a deep ditch, with manned positions at
regular intervals. The Sassanid Shah3 and his advisors also massed
a number of ballistae and catapults in the bounds of Veh-Ardashir which, as the closest
sub-city to Ctesiphon proper, was the focus of their defensive efforts. Zuhra ordered an attack on Madain shortly
after his arrival, but Yazdegerd’s artillery began launching bolts and throwing giant stones
out of Veh-Ardashir and into the Muslim ranks, causing severe losses and forcing Zuhra’s
forces to retreat out of range. Unable to reply in kind, he sent scouting
parties to probe and find a way inside, but everywhere came across the Persians’ defensive
trench and were unable to breach it. Sa’d arrived at this point and assumed command,
swiftly deciding that there was little point wasting his warriors in careless assaults
against such strong defences. So, instead he established a blockade around
all of Madain west of the Tigris and settled his forces down for a long siege. However, Sa’d wasn’t content to sit and
wait for victory, taking all measures he thought possible to secure a faster surrender of the
unbelievers, primarily by scything away the western bastion’s food supplies. To do this, he had his subcommanders conduct
raids on the neighboring hinterland, seizing cattle and sheep for the Muslims’ own uses
whilst also sapping the enemy’s resources by preventing supplies from reaching Veh-Ardashir. In the process of doing so, Arab cavalry seized
thousands of farmers as prisoners of war who, upon the intercession of a regional leader
who had submitted, were freed upon agreeing to pay the Jizya tax. In addition, security for their lives and
possessions were guaranteed, an act which won the Muslim invaders considerable good
will with the locals. Throughout the months long siege, Sa’d’s
warriors had also been continuously harried by the sophisticated Sassanid engines of war
Yazdegerd’s generals had amassed, although casualties at their hands remained relatively
light. Unfortunately for the Persians, some of their
engineers defected during the course of the siege and provided their masters with at least
20 novel artillery pieces of their own. When these contraptions subsequently began
sending their own missiles howling into Ctesiphon, the dense concentration of Sassanid soldiers
and civilians inside resulted in them causing terrible destruction. The fact that the Muslims had even acquired
weaponry of this kind, which had until then been universally in Persian hands, also badly
affected morale. By mid-March 637 western Madain’s situation
was becoming intolerable. Persian civilians starved to death in the
hundreds, while more were reduced to eating stray cats and dogs to survive. Beset by such conditions, the Sassanid troops
not manning the ditch were concentrated into a single strike force and led in a desperate
sortie beyond their defences. The Muslims arrayed to meet them in pitched
battle and a desperate struggle began. Zuhra’s corps was in the thick of the action
and he himself was wounded by an arrow. Despite his injury, the valiant Bani Tamin
chief led a counterattack and personally slew the Persian strike force commander, after
which the defenders withdrew behind their ditch. The savage fighting to repulse the Persian
attack was followed by a few hours of eerie calm, during which a Sassanid officer approached
the Muslims with an offer: each belligerent would retain whatever territory they had captured
on their respective sides of the Tigris. However, these conditions were declined with
the reply “There can never be peace between us until we get honey out of the lemons of
Kusa.” When these peace overtures were rejected,
the Persian forces in Veh-Ardashir quietly withdrew from their positions and pulled back
across the Tigris. Western Ctesiphon was now under Muslim control. Yazdegerd III also sent his family, retainers
and treasury ahead to Hulwan, where the emperor intended to move his court if the great capital
fell. Although behaving as if defeat was already
inevitable, from his seat in the White Palace Yazdegerd appointed Rostam’s brother Khurrazad
and Mihran to command the defence of the eastern city. These generals promptly redeployed their remaining
forces on the eastern bank and waited for the besiegers’ next move. That same evening, on the river’s edge of
newly occupied Veh-Ardashir, Sa’d stared across the Tigris at the glorious Arch of
Khosrow and pondered his next move, eager to claim it for Islam. As Muhammad’s former companion strategised
to himself, a Persian approached him and asked “What are you waiting for?”, followed
by the alarming revelation that “Not another two days will pass before Yazdegerd departs
with everything in Ctesiphon!” Time was now of the essence. Another sympathetic local, possibly disillusioned
by heavy Sassanid taxation or possibly even a recent convert to Islam, took Sa’d to
a known ford in the river, one which Sa’d deemed unsuitable due to the swift current
and deep water. Rather than make a hasty decision right then,
he chose to sleep on the issue and decide in the morning. During the night, Sa’d supposedly had a
strange dream in which he saw the Tigris’ waters, only they were flowing incredibly
quickly and were unrealistically deep. Still, his own Arab cavalry appeared and plunged
into the seemingly impassable torrent, reaching the other side relatively easily. The next morning, Sa’d convened a conference
of his highest generals and declared that the cavalry would swim through the river,
and asked if there were any volunteers to lead the dangerous attack. The first to put himself forward was Asim
bin Amr, Qaqa’s tribal comrade and a dashing military leader, followed by 700 of the most
reckless and brave Muslim warriors. After all necessary preparations had been
made by midmorning, Asim plunged into the water and began his crossing. Khurrazad responded by ordering his Persians
into the river to meet them, but after a hearty resistance the Sassanid cavalry who responded
were pushed back when one of their comrades from the city came, shouting “Why are you
killing yourselves, there is nobody left in Ctesiphon to defend!” He was at least partially correct. Upon receiving word that the Muslims were
crossing the Tigris, Emperor Yazdegerd had departed his capital for Hulwan, taking much
of the imperial court with him. After their resistance faltered, most of the
army defending the city followed suit4, save for a Sassanid regiment fortified in the White
Palace. On the Tigris, Sa’d took the opportunity
Asim’s lance-like advance had given him and began ferrying the rest of his warriors
across to the bridgehead, not without danger of succumbing to the raging waters. One man fell from his horse and fell into
the current, but the all-powerful Qaqa reached down in the nick of time and heaved him up. Despite the myriad dangers of the crossing,
in relatively short order the entire Islamic army was on the eastern bank of the Tigris
river. The moment Sa’d himself landed, he ordered
Asim and Qaqa to move on the core of Ctesiphon, in the process of which they encountered token
resistance, but this was quickly dealt with. The Muslims found their final opposition in
the White Palace, but chose to deal with it by sending forward yet another companion of
Muhammad - Salman. A Persian by birth, he had converted to Islam
after meeting the prophet in Arabia, and now his heritage proved a crucial boon. “I am actually one of you, I feel for you.” he said upon meeting the defenders, and outlined
the usual three choices - Jizya, conversion, or death. After a short negotiation, the hopeless palace
troops accepted the Islamic tax and surrendered. Ctesiphon - Jewel of the Sassanid imperial
superpower for over four centuries - was now in Arab hands, a people who had been a mere
afterthought only years earlier. Separate columns of Arab riders under Zuhra
and Qaqa galloped forth from the captured city almost immediately, moving in different
directions5 in pursuit of their enemy. The spoils were plenty - for example, 11 priceless
suits of armour and swords which belonged to Heraclius of the Byzantine Empire, the
Turkish Khagan, and other world leaders. Other treasures now in Sa’d’s hands included
gold, jewels, and imperial regalia. With the Sassanid capital had come the empire’s
boundless wealth, and also the first major mass conversions of Persians to Islam. Salman the Persian in particular played a
role in this religious change, preaching to his countrymen the values and beliefs of the
new faith. Although Ctesiphon and all the ‘Suwad’
was lost to the House of Sasan, the Persians’ resistance to their conquest by the Muslims
would continue in the old heartland beyond the Zagros. We last left the Muslims’ Syrian campaign
in the aftermath of Abu Ubaidah and Khalid Ibn al Walid’s triumph over the Romans at
Yarmouk. Exhausted from that long six-day struggle,
the Muslims remained camped around Jabiya for a month, collecting the bounties of war
and recuperating their strength. The scant few of Heraclius’ warriors who
survived the massacre fled north to the relative safety of Northern Syria, leaving Palestine
at the mercy of the Islamic forces. Without an army to check his progress, Abu
Ubaidah assembled his generals in October 636 to decide how best to exploit the situation. Some argued for an attack on the strategic
lynchpin of Caesarea - a coastal fortress whose garrison could be indefinitely reprovisioned
by the Roman navy if besieged, but which could also serve as a potential beachhead for a
counterattack if not taken. If the Muslims got it, the campaign for Palestine
would be over. However, other commanders pointed inland towards
a much simpler and symbolically enticing target - Jerusalem. Not only could this isolated city be strangled
into submission with relative ease, but the loss of their holiest place would be a crushing
blow to Roman Christian morale. Unable to come to a decision, Abu Ubaidah
sent a message to Caliph Umar asking his opinion. The reply was simple - take Jerusalem. So, Abu Ubaidah led the Muslim army straight
at the holy city. Realising what was about to happen, Jerusalem’s
patriarch Sophronius secretly sent the holiest Christian relics, including the true cross,
off to Constantinople by sea. The raiding Arab mobile guard under Khalid
reached Jerusalem sometime in November, just before the rest of the army, and this prompted
the Roman garrison to pull back inside. Discovering to their chagrin that its fortifications
had been reinforced after Yarmouk in anticipation of just such a siege, the five commanders
- Abu Ubaidah, Khalid, Yazid, Amr and Shurahbil, nevertheless blocked off all passage in and
out of Jerusalem. This state of affairs continued for four months
in a relatively uneventful siege of which few details survive. The situation in the city must have become
unbearable though, because in March 637 Sophronius offered to surrender Jerusalem if Umar himself
came and personally signed the treaty with him. When these terms became known, Shurahbil suggested
that Khalid, whose appearance was relatively similar to that of the caliph, should impersonate
their leader and secure a quick surrender. However, this attempt at deception failed
the next morning because Khalid was far too well known in the Levant by this point. When it did, Abu Ubaidah instead dispatched
a message to Medina explaining the situation. A few weeks later, having made the long journey
from Arabia, Caliph Umar arrived near Jerusalem. Khalid and Yazid greeted him, both dressed
in fine silk clothing, but this annoyed Umar - a firm enemy of luxury and a proponent of
the Spartan way of life. Seeing his generals in such a state of apparent
excess, the caliph picked up some pebbles and threw them at the two stunned men, shouting
“Shame on you, that you greet me in this fashion. It is only in the last two years that you
have eaten your fill!”. The caliph’s rage was quickly sated when
Khalid and Shurahbil revealed that they were, in fact, still carrying armour and weapons
beneath their fine outer garments. Drama aside, he quickly got down to business
and negotiated with Sophronius, with the result that Jerusalem was opened to the Muslims by
late April. It is said that the pact between Umar and
Sophronius recognised Christians as a ‘protected people’ with the right to practice their
own religion in return for the Jizya, but this ‘Covenant of Umar’ is probably apocryphal. Now that the holy city of Christendom was
in his hands, the caliph conferred with his commanders and then went back to Arabia. The Syrian army then split into thirds, with
Amr and Shurahbil moving to reoccupy and secure Palestine, Yazid besieging Caesarea, while
Khalid and Abu Ubaidah moved to begin the conquest of Northern Syria. With the situation in the region seemingly
hopeless after the Yarmouk disaster, Emperor Heraclius sailed from Antioch and withdrew
back into Anatolia, intent on consolidating Byzantine military strength and protecting
the remainder of his empire. Once the ship departed, it is said that Heraclius
said the words: “Farewell, a long farewell to Syria, my fair province. You are an enemy’s now. Peace be with you, o’ Syria, what a beautiful
land you will be for the enemy’s hands.” Despite this effective abandonment, some of
the Roman garrisons were still determined to resist the Arab advance. From Jerusalem, a 17,000 strong force under
Khalid and Abu Ubaidah marched unopposed to Damascus, and then even further north to Emesa. From there, Khalid was dispatched with his
elite mobile guard to Chalkis - modern Qinnasrin - but was intercepted on a plain at nearby
Hazir by 7,000 men under the town’s Roman commander - Menas. He deployed his limited forces in three divisions
- a centre and two wings, placing himself at the forefront. Khalid charged with his Arab cavalry and soon
enough a fearsome mounted engagement was underway. After only a short amount of time, however,
Menas was slain amidst heavy fighting, and his troops, who loved their general, went
wild with fury. Despite their numerical inferiority, the Roman
troops matched the Muslims pound-for-pound in the head-on clash, pushing them back a
little but committing themselves too much. To exploit the opportunity, Khalid detached
a unit of cavalry from one of his wings and led it around the Byzantine line, attacking
his enemy from the rear and defeating them. It is said that not a single Roman survived
this engagement at Hazir. Following this victory, in June 637, Khalid
moved on Chalkis itself, where the garrison was stubbornly fortified in the town’s citadel. Rather than launching an assault, the Muslim
general merely demanded those inside and the defenders surrender, which they did soon after. Abu Ubaidah rejoined Khalid at this point
and the pair moved north to Aleppo, where they defeated a minor Byzantine force commanded
by Joachim in a pitched battle outside the city. Much like at Chalkis, the Romans retreated
into their fortifications - a hilltop citadel outside Aleppo itself. Joachim sallied out a few times in an attempt
to break the siege, but failed, and by October 637 the city was in Arab hands. The greatest Roman city in Syria - Antioch,
was now close. To precipitate an attack on it, Ubaidah sent
a strike force to deal with the garrison at Azaz in the north, so that no Roman units
could hit them from the flank as they were taking Antioch. This was done swiftly, and when the strike
force returned Ubaidah’s advance on Antioch began. When the Muslim army was 12 miles from one
of the urban jewels of the Byzantine Empire, they were met at an iron bridge over the Orontes
River by a powerful Roman army who had come from Antioch. Although the details of this ‘Battle of
the Iron Bridge’ are also unknown, it is clear that Khalid used his mobile guard to
superb effect, crushing the Romans in a battle whose casualties were only exceeded by Ajnadayn
and Yarmouk. In the wake of thousands of fleeing enemy
soldiers, the Muslims approached and besieged Antioch, but taking the illustrious capital
of the east was an anticlimax. Only a few days into Abu Ubaidah’s investment
- October 30th, the weakened city surrendered on terms and its defenders were permitted
to withdraw north unmolested. Having cleaved the Eastern Roman Empire into
two disconnected pieces, Abu Ubaidah dispatched Khalid on a daring cavalry raid across the
Taurus Mountains and into the Tarsus region, while the supreme commander himself thrust
south down the Mediterranean coast, capturing seaports such as Laodicea, Gibala, Antarados
and Tripoli making it impossible for emperor Heraclius to use the superior Roman navy to
bring armies into the Levant. Although fighting in the area was far from
over, by late 637 most generals of Syrian campaign settled down to rule their respective
regions as governors1. At Hulwan, Yazdegerd III was still eager to
salvage his crumbling empire after the loss of Ctesiphon. To do this, he ordered the main Persian army
under Mihran and Khurrazad to halt their retreat and turn to face the invaders near Jalula. Armies attempting to push north past the riverside
town were forced to march through a narrow gap between the Tigris’ Diyala tributary
to the west side and an area of barely passable broken ground to the east. If Mihran’s 20-30,000 could hold this position,
the remainder of the northern Suwad and Sassanid territory east of the Zagros Mountains would
be unassailable. With the aim of converting Jalula into an
impenetrable fortress able to resist any enemy thrust, Mihran immediately started digging
in. A ditch was excavated three miles to the south
which connected the broken ground to the river, blocking the gap. Behind this trench were a number of other
fortifications, artillery and thousands of Persian archers, while in front were placed
an array of wooden anti-cavalry caltrops. Recruits were mustered, armed and trained
from the local area, and provisions were gathered from around the nearby countryside. Jalula was to be a crucial battle. The moment Sassanid defensive works began
around Jalula, word reached Sa’d in Ctesiphon that this was happening. As the Muslim general was just as keen to
seize the fertile northern Suwad as his Persian enemies were to keep hold of it, and wanting
to push the defensive frontier eastwards, Sa’d sent his nephew Hashim bin Utba with
12,000 troops to reduce the Persian position. In order to prevent reinforcement or retreat,
Sa’d also dispatched 5,000 men to deal with Persian governor Intaq’s garrison at Mosul. After several attempts at taking that city
by storm, Muslim spies managed to secure the defection of a Christian Arab contingent in
a betrayal which led to the fall of Mosul. In the main force heading for Jalula during
March 637, Hashim brought with him many companions of Muhammed, as well as the ever-ferocious
Qaqa ibn Amr. Also in the Muslim ranks were several thousand
Persian troops along with Sassanid officers who had joined them after Ctesiphon. When the Arabs and their Persian units approached
the Jalula gap after a day’s march from the former Sassanid capital, Hashim constructed
his camp and deployed along the southern arc of Mihran’s protective trench, unwilling
to launch an outright assault against it. So, the situation remained in this manner
for many months, during which reinforcements, provisions and money was channeled into the
fortified city from Hulwan, where Emperor Yazdegerd was continuously rallying additional
forces. Aware that his situation was only going to
worsen with time, Hashim ordered several attempts at storming the fortified ditch. Despite the disconcerting failure of Mihran’s
wooden caltrops to stop Arab cavalry, Persian missile troops managed to overwhelm and repel
these attacks. Afterwards, the Sassanids replaced the wooden
obstacles with more effective iron ones. Demoralised due to their lack of success in
breaking the Persian line, the Muslims ceased offensive actions for a while, and that gave
Mihran an opportunity of his own. Utilising the constant steady stream of reinforcements
coming his way, the Persian general began launching sorties against Hashim’s positions,
inflicting losses and gaining confidence as he did. Although the Muslim army was easily able to
fight up to 80 of these attacks off when they arrived and pushed Mihran back into his fortifications
repeatedly, there was still no way to break the deadlock. With little other option, Hashim sent word
back to Ctesiphon that he required reinforcements. Sa’d initially sent 600 infantry and 400
cavalry to bolster the army at Jalula, but this total was barely enough to replace the
losses suffered during eight months of battle and light siege. So, soon after, another 500 cavalry reinforcements
were dispatched which included many competent Arabic tribal chiefs who had fought against
the Caliphate in the Ridda Wars. The Persians, having been themselves reinforced
by Yazdegerd and emboldened by Muslim inability to break their defences, now decided to go
on the attack before Hashim was further reinforced. Mihran also realised that simply waiting wasn’t
going to win him the battle - the only way to make the Muslim invaders leave was to inflict
a decisive defeat on them. Deployment for an assault began with haste. Such Sassanid preparations for a major attack
could not be concealed, and it immediately attracted Hashim’s attention. This state of affairs was, however, also favourable
to the Muslims, who were utterly sick and tired of sitting helplessly outside Mihran’s
fortifications, So, to facilitate a pitched battle, Hashim withdrew his forces a short
distance to the south and allowed his Persian adversaries to cross their own entrenchments,
thereafter arraying for battle opposite. The actual order of battle at Jalula is obscure
to us, but we do know that two former ‘apostate’ chiefs - Amr bin Madi Karib of the Zubaid
family and Tuleiha bin Khuleiwad of the Banu Asad, were given command of the cavalry and
infantry respectively. Now that the Persian rear was anchored by
their own ditch, the only direction to move was forwards, and that is just what happened. At Mihran’s command, the Battle of Jalula
proper began with a full-scale Sassanid attack along the entire front, with archers and javelineers
loosing their projectiles before melee troops made contact. The charge struck with devastating impact,
but Hashim’s Muslims nevertheless resisted stalwartly for a time, refusing to give an
inch of ground. This didn’t last long however, as the ferocious
assault, fired up by constant shouts swearing vengeance for Qadissiyah and Ctesiphon, began
punching small holes in various places along the Muslim line. These successful thrusts endangered the integrity
of the entire Muslim front, and it was immediately clear to Hashim that the danger of total collapse
was very real, and perhaps imminent. To resolve the problem, Sa’d’s nephew
rode along his buckling line to speak inspirationally to those units which were weakening, proclaiming
that if they persisted, this was the last battle they would have to fight. The present clash between Sassanid and Muslim
troops became increasingly brutal as both sides’ missile units ran out of javelins
and arrows, instead taking up melee weapons and charging into the slog themselves. Both armies had units battered into non-functionality
by the extended fighting, but when this happened the Persians were able to replace them, while
Hashim had no such luxury. Because of this numerical disadvantage, one
Islamic unit gave way and routed to the rear at about noon, leaving a potentially fatal
vacuum in the Muslim line. However, either because Mihran did not notice
the opportunity or due to his soldiers’ exhaustion, an attack on the position was
not ordered and Hashim scraped together some men to fill the position. Witnessing the flight of this unit, Qaqa rode
back and restored order, returning it to the battle. Almost unbearable desert heat and the brutal
fighting led to the Persians halting their offensive just after this, and both sides
disengaged. After a short rest, Mihran planned to keep
piling on the pressure, but Hashim had other plans. As his enemy had before, the Muslim general
ordered his warriors to charge across the entire front, spoiling Mihran’s assault
and initiating another gruelling clash which lasting for over an hour without a decisive
moment. Just before sunset, however, the wind whipped
up and a storm rolled in from the south, a weather phenomenon which affected the Persians
more than the hardy desert nomads. As the wind was now at the Muslims’ back,
granting them momentum in the advance, Hashim signalled Qaqa ibn Amr to embark on a maneuver
they had prepared beforehand. While his general kept Mihran occupied in
front, the buccaneering Arab warrior took a regiment away from the left wing unnoticed
and managed to circle around the Persian rear. Instead of attacking immediately, Qaqa left
most of his outflanking force in a sheltered area to stop them being seen, then took a
few outriders and a man with an incredibly strong voice close to the main crossing point
over the Persian trench. Following the call, multiple things happened
at once. First, the Muslim army, deceived by their
own into believing that their general had reached the trench alone, attacked with renewed
vigour and peak morale. At the same time, worried that large numbers
of Muslims were now behind them, individual Sassanid units, who did not have a strategic
overview of the field, panicked, lost cohesion but did not break. The coup de grace was administered by Qaqa
himself, whose flanking force charged upon hearing the shout, whirling into Mihran’s
flank like a thunderbolt. At the impact, the Sassanid line was rolled
up before being encircled entirely. Still, however, the Persian forces were stalwart,
refusing to collapse utterly despite their unwinnable situation. Muslim forces continued attacking the encircled
but still resistant forces of Mihran all day, losing troops as they did. However, the Sassanid soldiers were only human. At sunset, as the sky began to darken, everything
fell apart and the Persians routed, only to be cut down as they fled. A great mass of them, driven into the ditch
and their own iron stakes by Hashim’s army, perished terribly. Up to half of the Sassanid army perished at
Jalula, while the remainder, including the town garrison, fled in the direction of Hulwan,
and the town itself fell in December 637. Shortly after, Qaqa rode in pursuit of the
retreating enemy and defeated them first at Khaniqeen, before besieging and capturing
Hulwan in January 638. Emperor Yazdegerd retreated beyond the Zagros. When Qaqa subsequently wrote to the caliph
asking permission to operate deeper in Persia, Umar would have absolutely none of it. Forbidding the operation, he replied “I
wish that between the Suwad and the hills were a wall which would prevent them from
getting to us and prevent us from getting to them. The fertile Suwad is sufficient for us, and
I prefer the safety of the Muslims to the spoils of war.” Expansion to the east was halted, but the
Muslims were now looking towards the jewel in the Roman imperial crown - Egypt. Despite winning all of Syria and Iraq for
Islam in a series of stunning victories, the caliphate’s military situation remained
unstable. Fierce Persian resistance continued in the
mountainous to the northeast, while Emperor Heraclius was hindering the Muslim advance
as much as he could. To stall for time while he created an impenetrable
dead-zone between the Anatolian plain and enemy-occupied Syria, Heraclius sent envoys
to his Christian Arab allies in the Jazeera area , requesting that they attack the Muslim
army in Syria. They obeyed the emperor’s orders, crossing
the Euphrates and arriving outside Emesa in March 638, where Abu Ubaidah had concentrated
his forces to meet them. However, Umar, in his typically hands-on fashion,
reacted to this news by sending orders to Sa’d, in Persia, for three columns to invade
Jazeera from Iraq. When this group of Muslim warriors launched
their attack and began plundering, the Christian Arabs retreated. In the aftermath, forces under Sa’d turned
and annexed Jazeera completely. At the same time, multiple mounted raiding
parties were sent by Abu Ubaidah into Roman lands. Khalid, the commander of one of these contingents,
captured Marash in Autumn 638, and hauled vast quantities of loot back to his base at
Qinnasrin. However, Khalid wasn’t a man accustomed
to hoarding wealth, routinely distributing his personal share of battle spoils to others. On one occasion after his raid on Heraclius’
lands, an Arab chief and excellent poet - Ash’as bin Qais - recited a beautiful piece for Khalid,
and in return was given 10,000 dirhams. Unknown to the poet’s benefactor, this act
of generosity was in fact to herald the end of his peerless military career. Caliph Umar had been concerned about Khalid
for years by 638, specifically that his personal brilliance and constant victories were enticing
the Muslims to worship him, rather than god. So, when Umar received reports of his general’s
extravagance, Umar used it as an excuse to dismiss the Sword of Islam from his post and
bring him to Medina. When the two formidable men came face to face,
the caliph spoke the words: “You have done, and no man has done as you have done. But it is not people who do; it is Allah who
does.” After this, Khalid left Arabia for Chalkis,
where he lived just four more unhappy, unremarkable years before finally passing away in 642. As the undefeated victor of hundreds of clashes
leaves our story, another bold but historically unappreciated Arab general enters the limelight. That was the forty-eight-year-old Amr ibn
al-As, who won distinction during the battles at Ajnadayn, Yarmouk, and many others. When Abu Ubaidah appointed the conquered regions
to his subordinates, Amr received all of Palestine. Upon moving into the area, he forced the surrender
of Gaza and several other Roman garrisons which had remained unconquered after the Fall
of Jerusalem. In early 639, plague spread rapidly throughout
the Levant. The Arabs, unaccustomed to this kind of terrible
disease because of their nomadic lifestyle, died in the thousands, including generals
Yazid, Shurahbil, and Abu Ubaidah himself. It is worth noting that upon Yazid’s death,
his younger brother Muawiya was appointed as governor in his place. Amr, who survived, was given command of the
army, and this gave him a golden opportunity to propose an idea to the caliph : Having
visited Alexandria multiple times earlier in his life, Amr was well aware of just how
prosperous the Nile region was, and believed it would be easy to conquer. The new commander put forward his plan to
seize Roman Egypt for Islam, confidently declaring to the caliph: “It is the richest of lands,
and the weakest in defending itself!” Although Umar, who wished to consolidate Muslim
gains after years of incessant warfare and plague, was initially reluctant, believing
Amr was underestimating the task, his eloquence and persistence eventually led the caliph
to relent. Restricted to just 4,000 troops, mainly cavalry,
Amr set forth from Jabiya that same night in total secrecy, under the condition that
he would withdraw if instructions to turn back reached him before he crossed into Egypt. However, if Amr’s army was already inside
Egypt when these instructions arrived, it could keep going. Convinced almost immediately that this expedition
was too risky, Umar sent a camel rider off to Amr carrying a sealed letter, ordering
him to pull back. When it reached the general at Rafah, just
a few miles from Egypt, Amr understood that the letter would doom his expedition before
it even began. So, Amr left the message unopened and moved
into Egypt and only then opened the letter, and since the army was already in Egypt when
Umar’s orders were revealed, Amr reasoned that it could keep going. The timeless province of power and riches
was incredibly vulnerable, weakened by years of military laxity and alienated from the
imperial authorities in Constantinople by long-standing cultural and religious differences. The primary factor was that the Copts - Egypt’s
native population - adhered to a different form of Christianity to the empire at large
. Emperor Heraclius in particular persecuted any perceived heretic in a manner that made
religious division inevitable. The Roman authorities in Alexandria were alerted
to Amr’s presence, responding by raising troops and sending some of them to reinforce
Pelusium - the ‘key to Egypt’. Setting forth from Arish in late December
639, the Caliphate’s small army of veterans soon reached Pelusium, besieging it by land. However, Roman naval superiority meant that
the city garrison could be reinforced and supplied, and this led to a two-month-long
siege which was only brought to a conclusion when the Muslims repulsed a sortie and stormed
the city in mid-February 640. After taking Pelusium, to the alarm and astonishment
of the government in Alexandria, Amr marched unopposed along the Nile Delta’s eastern
fringe until he reached the citadel of Bilbeis. The defenders resisted under blockade for
a month, giving the Romans time to shift their forces around. Aware that the marauding 4,000 Arabs were
aiming for the Memphis area , Egypt’s prefect and Patriarch of Alexandria, Cyrus, marched
a 20,000 strong army to reinforce the nearby fortress called Babylon. Commanded by Augustalis Theodorus and garrisoned
by 5,000 soldiers, Babylon was one of the Nile’s strongest defensive bastions, standing
60 feet high in places and possessing walls up to six feet thick. By the time Amr starved the Bilbeis defenders
into surrender in the spring of 640, the Romans were prepared for his inevitable assault. Bypassing Heliopolis on their left, the Muslims
arrived outside Babylon in May. Due to its sheer size, only some of Theodorus’
army were manning the battlements, while most were encamped outside of the northern wall
of the fortress, protected by a deep arcing ditch. Fortifying this secondary protection even
further were spikes in front and undug sections around the perimeter to act as sally points. Shortly after arriving and witnessing the
Roman strength arrayed inside Babylon, Amr launched his 4,000 against the Roman units
directly in front of the trench. After a hard-fought skirmish, the Muslims
were repulsed with relative ease and set about finally making camp. Observing that his plan to keep Theodorus
on the defensive was paying off, Amr mounted daily raids against the Roman positions all
along the ditch. Furthermore, in an attempt to conceal just
how tiny his forces were, the Muslim commander split and spread it over a large area. This state of affairs lasted for two months
- the Muslims constantly assailing the Roman positions and the Romans remaining hunkered
down behind the ditch, presumably believing they would be able to win without fighting. By July, no opportunity to gain a decisive
victory had shown itself to Amr and his men were slowly tiring. So, having put the eventuality to the back
of his mind, the man who had proclaimed that taking Egypt would be simple, wrote to the
caliph asking for reinforcements. Rather than chiding his overly optimistic
general, Umar mustered and sent him 4,000 reinforcements to conclude the campaign, who
reached Amr a few weeks later. With these new forces, the Muslim attacks
on Babylon were renewed with even greater force, killing large numbers of Roman soldiers
but failing to break the bastion’s resistance. Even more hesitantly than the first time,
Amr sent another request for Umar’s aid. This time, a further 4,000 troops were dispatched
under the leadership of Zubayr bin Al-Awwam who, despite being offered Amr’s command
by the irritated caliph, merely stated that he wished to help the Muslims engaged in Egypt. These new troops arrived in late September. After conducting a personal reconnaissance
mission around the area, Zubayr pointed something out to Amr which the general seems to have
missed: still present about 10 miles behind the Muslim army was the Roman-garrisoned city
of Heliopolis. If coordinated correctly, these troops could
smash into the Muslims from behind if Theodorus launched any attack from Babylon. To remove this potential threat, Amr led a
large portion of his 12,000 total soldiers to Heliopolis, leaving just enough at the
fortress to keep the Romans on their toes. Upon approaching the walls, however, some
of the garrison’s cavalry contingent emerged from the city and beat some of Amr’s horsemen
in a brief engagement. Nevertheless, they were forced to pull back
inside the walls as the city was besieged. Only a short time after investing Heliopolis,
Zubayr and a small unit of handpicked warriors scaled the walls in a dashing maneuver and
breached the city. Seeing this, and realising that the result
of the clash was inevitable anyway, Heliopolis’ garrison sued for peace and paid the Jizya,
after which Amr and Zubayr returned to Babylon. In their absence, the Romans had driven away
the Muslim detachments closest to the trench and re-established their positions beyond
it. Theodorus, likely realising that he wasn’t
going to have the luxury of simply waiting the invaders out, began employing the Muslims’
own tactics against them, launching daily raids through the Roman bridgeheads. Although the Romans generally lost more men
in these scattered engagements, they could afford to, while Amr could not. The stalemate went on relatively unchanged
until a revered Arab officer - Kharija bin Huzafa - approached Amr with a risky but potentially
decisive plan to win the battle. That night, Kharija was given a cavalry regiment
and ordered to lay his trap, which he did by riding around to the southern spur of a
featureless ridge on the eastern side of the field. After quietly taking up a concealed position
relatively close to the Romans’ ditch, the Muslim cavalry waited. As Huzafa suspected, when morning came the
Roman forces crossed the trench in force and deployed for battle - the Muslims arrayed
opposite them. When both sides were ready, Theodorus launched
his attack across the front, pushing Amr, who ordered his army to retreat from Babylon
with suspicious ease. It was, in reality, a feigned retreat. When the melee had moved far beyond Babylon’s
defensive trench, Kharija’s mounted contingent galloped out from their hiding place behind
the ridge and occupied the crossing areas which Theodorus would have to use for any
retreat. Amr, seeing that his horsemen were in place,
countercharged with immense ferocity, driving the Romans back towards their own fortifications. Hearing the given signal, Kharija also launched
his assault, crashing straight into Theodorus rear, hemming the Romans in and then encircling
them. Many defenders were killed, but a few Roman
units turned and burst through Huzafa’s cavalry, managing to resecure the crossing
points. The remnants of the Roman army at Babylon
retreated across the trench, pursued closely by Amr’s forces, who continued their attack
up to the very walls of the fortress. Fighting continued in the space between the
ditch and the citadel proper until the gate was closed from inside. Those who got in were the lucky ones, as not
a single Roman soldier remained alive on the field of battle . The morale of Cyrus, who
was not a military man by profession, and the Roman soldiery as a whole, was completely
shaken by this stark defeat, and to the prefect it was clear that peace had to be concluded. To make matters even more dire, Amr somehow
got his hands on a few catapults and used them to launch deadly boulders, softening
up the defences. When this began happening, Cyrus departed
Babylon with a small escort and took up residence on the midriver island of Rauda, from which
the fortress was being resupplied. Then the Coptic prefect dejectedly sent word
to the Muslims that he wished to treat with them. Envoys were exchanged back and forth between
the two sides, and Heraclius’ viceroy attempted to offer Amr a lavish bribe if the Muslims
left Egypt, but the Arab commander responded by giving 3 options - conversion to Islam,
payment of the Jizya, or death. Cyrus favoured capitulating in some form,
but his Egyptian colleagues wouldn’t have any of it, so the stalemate continued outside
the impenetrable fortress. Since coming to terms with Cyrus was impossible,
Amr went into Babylon with a few companions in order to speak with Theodorus. However, when he was entering the fortress,
a Roman soldier muttered to him scornfully “You have entered, now see how you get out.” Correctly believing orders had been given
for him to be killed upon exiting the conference, Amr tricked his way out of the fortress, convincing
Theodorus that he was going to bring even more of his generals unwittingly into the
trap. These attempts at ending the siege failed
and the gridlock outside Babylon continued. But finally, in mid-December, the observant
Zubayr noticed that, since most of the fighting had taken place on Babylon’s northern side,
the riverside Gate of Iron and its two guard towers were relatively undefended. Just like that, the Muslims had found a key
to Theodorus’ citadel. Swiftly putting his infiltration plan into
action with Amr’s blessing, Zubayr assembled a unit to conduct the operation. On the moonless, clear night of December 20th
640, most of the Muslim army arrayed quietly outside the Gate of Iron while Zubayr and
his comrades climbed ladders up the wall. Then, when some of his men were gathered on
top, a deafening Islamic battle cry was sounded and echoed by the entire army, causing shock
and panic amongst defenders who had no idea what was happening. Amidst the chaos, Zubayr slew the gatehouse
sentries and broke the chain which held the gate closed, allowing Amr and the Muslim army
to flood inside. While some of the more elite Roman formations
made a brave last stand, most of their comrades routed towards the Nile. Once they reached the riverbank, the soldiers
crossed to the safety of Rauda on pre-prepared boats, which ferried soldiers back and forth
throughout the night. Among those who fled was Theodorus, who managed
to escape Amr’s grasp and run back to Alexandria. The next day, Cyrus sued for and obtained
peace for the Copts on Muslim terms, agreeing to pay the Jizya and submit the entire country
to Islamic rule. The Romans in Egypt could either accept and
remain, or reject and depart. Unsurprisingly, when Heraclius received a
letter from Cyrus seeking the imperial stamp of approval for his peace with Amr, the emperor
was furious and categorically refused, responding with a message full of scorn and insults. To ensure that an active defence of Egypt
continued despite the prefect’s treachery, Heraclius had other messages ordering firm
resistance delivered to all of his Roman generals in Egypt, who obeyed their sovereign without
question. Cyrus, disavowed by the Romans, put himself
and the Copts under Amr’s command, promising the Muslims administrative and engineering
assistance. Memphis was now secure, and the push towards
Alexandria could begin. After the fall of Babylon to Rashidun forces
in December 640, Amr Ibn al-As kept his army stationed in the area for a while, dispatching
word to caliph Umar of his triumph and requesting permission to continue the conquest towards
Alexandria. This pause also gave his army a much-needed
rest. In Constantinople, the elderly and sickly
Emperor Heraclius reacted to the latest Muslim victory by ferrying several thousand more
imperial reinforcements to Egypt over the Mediterranean. They had clear orders - protect Alexandria
at all costs. Upon making landfall at the provincial capital,
these reinforcements and the existing Alexandrian garrison, possibly under Theodorus’ command,
began working to strengthen the city fortifications and fanning out to defensible positions en
route to the city. Reports of these preparations made it south
to Amr. At about the same time, a messenger arrived
from Arabia with the caliph’s order to advance and seize Alexandria. So, leaving a small garrison to hold down
Babylon and keep the Memphis region in check, Amr gave orders for his men to break camp. The 12,000 strong Muslim army headed northwards
in February 641. Marching along the Nile Delta’s western
fringe immediately adjacent to a familiar desert climate, the Muslims overcame light
Roman resistance at Tarnut and Kaum Shareek before turning northwest, away from the river. After subsequently capturing Sulteis, Amr
then won a bloody victory at Kiryaun, just 12 miles away from Alexandria, and chased
the defeated Roman forces to the city’s eastern approach. The march to the sea had taken just 22 days. Alexandria had been built by Alexander the
Great and his Ptolemaic successors on a relatively narrow strip of land, bounded to the north
by the Mediterranean Sea and in the south by Lake Maryut. Since the main transportation routes ended
east of the city, the only truly vulnerable approach was the northeastern one. The Muslims made camp outside weapon range
and then deployed for battle, slowly advancing towards the recently reinforced Alexandrian
walls. Unfortunately for Amr, such a careless preliminary
move allowed the expert Roman artillerists to disrupt and scatter his units with volley
after volley of massive catapult stones. This bombardment sent Amr and his warriors
back to camp, dodging missiles all the way. Such attacks continued with intermissions,
and in these intermissions the Roman defenders would instead launch sorties out of the city
and attack the Muslim army, aiming to throw it back and end the siege. Despite the ferocity and competence of the
men carrying them out, these attempts failed consistently and ended up being pushed back
into the city. At some point during the first months of indecisive
action, the defenders sortied out against a section of the front manned by the Arabian
Mahra tribe and a fierce clash began. It seems to have concluded as an indecisive
draw, but the Mahra lost a man whose head was subsequently cut off and taken away by
the Romans, much to the Arabs’ fury. The next morning, the same thing happened. A Roman officer, probably made confident by
the previous day’s action, launched an attack on the Mahra, but this time the outcome was
very different. After being killed in the fighting, his head
was taken by the Arab warriors and used as a bargaining chip to get their comrade’s
head back. After a brief negotiation, both sides made
an exchange and buried their kinsman with honours. At the height of summer, around two months
after Amr initially constructed his camp, the Sahmi tribal commander decided to shift
it forward for reasons which we are not aware of. However, as his forces were moving, the Roman
defenders sensed an opportunity and mounted a daring cavalry attack, which nevertheless
was easily repulsed. A reckless Muslim cavalry detachment set out
in hot pursuit of the fleeing Romans and actually got inside the city just before the defenders
could close the gates behind them. Heavily outnumbered, they fought a fierce
skirmish at the so-called Church of Gold. in which some of them were killed and the
rest were pushed out of Alexandria. Heraclius, who maintained constant contact
with Alexandria, was all too aware that the Muslims were gaining momentum. Worried that all of Egypt was about to be
lost, he gathered a formidable army from across what remained of the empire, together with
equipment and supplies. Just before this giant, emperor-led relief
armada was about to set sail, Heraclius died in Constantinople at the age of 66, leaving
his eldest sons, Constantine III and Heraklonas, as joint-heirs. This initiated a round of imperial politicking
which didn’t allow the empire to react at the worst possible moment. As senior emperor, Constantine attempted to
get ahold of the increasingly dire situation in Egypt. His untimely death only a short time later
derailed those plans entirely. If that wasn’t bad enough, some Byzantine
generals, including one Valentinus, took up arms in support of Constantine’s son Constans
II, believing that Heraklonas’ mother - Martina, had poisoned Constantine. This dynastic struggle would not conclude
until late 641, ensuring that no reinforcements would be sent to Alexandria. Politicking also infected the soldiers defending
the Egyptian capital, causing infighting and massive morale loss. When the siege had dragged into its sixth
month with no sign of ending, Amr received a letter from the caliph chastising him for
taking so long. So, after conferring with his generals, Amr
selected the experienced Ubada bin As-Samit to lead an assault. In late October 641, the entire Muslim army
assembled for midday prayer and then deployed for battle. Then, led by Ubada, Amr’s forces finally
captured Alexandria by storming a gate near the Church of Gold. Of Muslim achievements to this point - 20
years since Hijra - the seizure of Alexandria ranked alongside events such as Yarmouk and
Al-Qadissiyah in its importance. The caliphate acquired an invaluable naval
base while diminishing Roman seapower and conquered a land of immense riches and culture. Perhaps most importantly for the future, possession
of Egypt allowed the Islamic armies to penetrate even further south and west into Africa. The wealth, beauty, and luxury of Alexandria
ensnared the Arabs and their general in equal measure, but Amr could not make his headquarters
there without the caliph’s permission. So, he sent an emissary back to Medina asking
Umar whether or not he could stay in the metropolis. Unfortunately for the conqueror of Egypt,
one of the Rashidun ruler’s many quirks was the absolute contempt and distrust in
which he held large expanses of water, such as the Nile. The single occasion on which Umar allowed
one of his commanders - a governor of Damascus known as Muawiyah, to embark on a naval operation,
the entire force had been destroyed. So, Umar refused Amr’s request, explaining:
“I do not wish the Muslims to take up their abode where water intervenes between them
and me, in winter or summer.” Disappointed, Amr moved south and laid the
foundations for his new city, the first capital of Islamic Egypt - Misr al-Fustat - the City
of the Tents, or Fustat for short. The country’s new governor was occupied
for the next few months attending to the administration of the Caliphate’s newest territory. As 641 gave way to 642, Amr settled grievances
among his warriors and the locals, revitalized previously abandoned pieces of infrastructure,
including canals, and even dispatched food aid to famine-ridden Medina at Umar’s request
. To extinguish any remaining embers of resistance against Muslim rule, Amr sent out three columns
to the areas around Damietta, Heliopolis, and Fayyum, while a fourth ensured that the
remainder of lower Egypt was obedient. All of them had an easy time, accomplishing
their task without bloodshed by mid-642. With Egypt firmly in his grip, the adventurous
Amr Ibn al-As turned his focus towards a Christianised Nubian kingdom called Makuria to the south. Makuria, ruled by a king called Qalidurut
from his great citadel at Dongola, was a rising and expansionist power in Subsaharan Africa. In fact, its monarch had only recently annexed
a former regional rival Nobatia. A literate society with a vibrant culture
of their own, the Nubians were renowned as hardy, ferocious warriors. In particular, their formidable reputation
for horsemanship and archery was known around the Mediterranean world. At some point during the scorching African
summer of 642, Amr sent his cousin Uqba bin Nafe and 20,000 horsemen into Nubia, where
they quickly began suffering at the hands of the local inhabitants. Unable to resist the Muslims in a pitched
battle, lethal but unarmoured Makurian archers - mounted and on foot, launched constant hit
and run attacks which gradually sapped Uqba’s strength before darting back unharmed into
the wilderness. As the Islamic army pushed deeper into Nubia
and encountered guerilla-style attacks in increasing numbers and ferocity, the hawk-eyed
Makurian archers would frequently call out to the Arab invaders: “Where would you like
me to put an arrow in you?” When one of the Muslim warriors skeptically
pointed at an area of their body, our sources state that an arrow would indeed strike there,
injuring or killing the man in question. When Uqba and his diminished forces finally
neared the Makurian capital at Dongola, they found a smaller enemy army of around 10,000
waiting for them, forced into defending their central city by Uqba’s movements. Eager to destroy the Nubians’ fighting potential
now that he had them all in one place, Amr’s cousin began arraying his troops for battle. As the Muslim advance towards Qalidurut’s
line began, it was almost instantaneously hit by an utterly merciless barrage of Makurian
arrows that struck the attacking army with pinpoint accuracy. Uqba’s assault was stalled in its tracks
by the hail of missiles just as soon as it began and his soldiers, 250 of whom had lost
at least one eye in the battle, suffered terribly. Unable to close with the Nubian archers and
swiftly losing men to grievous injury, Uqba withdrew his warriors from the field. Forever after, Muslims would call the Nubians
‘the archers of the eye’ because of their penchant for loosing arrows with deadly accuracy
into the eyes of their enemies. Unwilling to continue such a difficult campaign
in a land which promised them little gain from plunder or future land, the Muslims continued
retreating all the way back to Fustat. Although not exactly a decisive defeat, an
army of the Caliphate had been defeated for one of the first times in history. After a month or two of recuperation, Amr
assembled his armies from their bivouacs and personally led them west into the desert during
September of 642. After a month of hard marching, the Muslims
eventually arrived at a still-Roman city known as Barca which, having no arrangements for
defence, quickly surrendered. This was the first act of the decades’ long
Islamic conquest of a region which is now called the Maghreb. Amr had Uqba ride inland from the coast, where
he successfully pacified the area of arid desert between Barca and Zawila without violence. The poor population quickly proved law-abiding
and reliable in their payment of taxes, so Amr decreed that part of the revenues coming
in from the entire Fezzan region would be spent to alleviate poverty there. Then in spring 643, the Muslim army advanced
on and blockaded the Roman-garrisoned city of Tripoli. Amr set up his camp on an elevated section
of terrain east of the city and waited, realising that such a coastal settlement could be navally
resupplied for an extended period of time. Lacking siege weapons, he also lacked the
ability to reduce fortifications. After two months of relative inactivity, eight
of Amr’s warriors galloped off west of the city for a hunting trip. When these hunters began making their way
back around noon, the sheer heat of the day led them to ride back along the coast. All of a sudden, they came upon Tripoli’s
western boundary, where the city wall met the sea, and discovered that the section was
only thinly protected. In a display of bravery or foolishness, these
eight intrepid opportunists used Tripoli’s vulnerable flank to infiltrate their way inside
the city. Before the defenders even realised what was
happening, the Muslim group reached the city centre and began slaying enemies. Such unexpected violence triggered a bout
of extreme panic within the city, both among the civilians and Tripoli’s defending forces. In fact, a large number of the armed soldiers
within the city believed that a large enemy contingent had somehow gotten inside and,
because of this, took refuge aboard a number of anchored ships in the harbour. Amr caught wind of the pandemonium taking
place inside the city and so quickly set about exploiting the weakness. Arraying his warriors with haste, the Arab
commander ordered a full-scale assault to scale Tripoli’s enfeebled walls. In yet another action of which we have left
no detail, the Muslims managed to get inside and joined their eight-strong vanguard. Unwilling to fight any further, the Roman
defenders took whatever they could carry and departed aboard their ships, leaving Tripoli
to Amr’s army. While most of the army stayed in the city
for a while, the conqueror of Egypt sent a swift detachment of cavalry about 40 miles
to the west, where the population of a town known as Sabrata were still carefree. They had heard rumours of fighting for neighboring
cities, but it would be a while before the war reached them, if ever. The next morning, Sabrata’s Roman guards
opened the gates of their city as its population began leading animals out to graze for the
day. Unfortunately for them, it was at this moment
that the Islamic cavalry unit struck completely by surprise, getting through the gates, killing
the majority of defending troops, and sacking the town. With that done, they returned to Tripoli. Having succeeded, Amr longed for more, and
eagerly penned another letter to Caliph Umar containing both the good news of victory and
request to continue his conquest. This was rejected, as the caliph was worried
about overextending his forces. And this time, there was no loophole or clever
ploy that Amr could use to bypass Umar’s decree and continue his relentless campaigning. Therefore, after allowing his army to recuperate
in Tripoli for a time, Amr travelled back to Fustat and remained there, quietly administering
his Egyptian domain and dealing with whispers of future rebellion. Although Umar had spared the rest of Byzantine
Africa for the time being, that wouldn’t last long. However, as the combat in North Africa was
winding down, the situation on the Persian front was becoming heated again. Sa’d army was eager to pursue Yazdegerd
across the mountains, however, Umar’s refusal halted any further eastward expansion for
the time being. At the Caliph’s command, Sa’d began combing
Iraq for a place where he could establish a permanent military garrison. Eventually, after receiving guidance from
the locals, Sa’d found a promising area of land in Suristan ‘where the land is both
dry, well-watered, and is overgrown with thistles and constructed a colony that would eventually
grow into the city of Kufa. Far to the southeast, another Arab raiding
force of 800 led by Utba bin Ghazwan began searching for a base of their own and came
across an arid area covered in rocks, and it was there that Utba began work on a settlement
which eventually developed into modern Basra. It seemed as though the frontier between the
caliphate and the Sassanid Empire would calcify at the Zagros mountains, allowing Sa’d and
Umar a brief time to consider administrative questions. However, the post-Jalula status quo wouldn’t
last for long. Unwilling to accept the permanent loss of
their Mesopotamian heartland due to haughty imperial pride, the Sassanids continued backing
military action against the Caliphate led by Hormuzan, head of one of Persia’s premier
families. During the retreat from Qadissiyah, Hormuzan
had split off from the main column with his personal levy of survivors and marched back
to his estates in Khuzestan. This territory formed a vulnerable bulge,
being the only remaining imperial Sassanid territory west of the Zagros Mountains. With little chance of resisting a concerted
Muslim invasion of his lands, Hormuzan decided to go on the attack. From a forward base at the greatest city of
his province - Ahwaz - the Persian general began launching quick raids into the area
of Maysan in 638. As these attacks increased in frequency, Hormuzan
established two additional bases even further west near Manazir. Utba was unable to deal with the Persian attacks
with his mere 800 troops and appealed to Sa’d for aid. In response, the commander-in-chief ordered
Nu'man bin Muqarrin with a few thousand warriors to bolster Utba’s strength. The combined Muslim force launched a lightning
campaign that defeated Hormuzan’s army in its forward bases and pushed the frontier
east to the Karun River. Suitably chastened by the reverses his soldiers
had suffered, the Persian general concluded an unstable peace with his two Muslim counterparts,
claiming to submit to the Caliphs’s suzerainty. The remainder of 638 passed without further
warfare on the Persian front except for a single act elsewhere - the so-called Fiasco
of Fars. One of Sa’d rivals and governor of the uneventful
province of Bahrain - Ula bin Al Hadrami - sought to increase his own status and launched a
reckless amphibious assault across the Persian Gulf. Landing on the coast of Fars, the Arab force
headed towards Persepolis, managing to defeat a small militia in a costly battle before
being surrounded and trapped by the Sassanids. The naval warfare despising caliph found out
what Hadrami had done and was furious, but nevertheless sent Utba to rescue the beleaguered
governor, after which he was dismissed from the position. Hormuzan used the respite granted by his truce
with the Muslims to levy more soldiers and, in that time, also received imperial reinforcements
from Hulwan. Now reinforced, he took advantage of the treaty’s
unclear boundary terms as an excuse to reinitiate hostilities in early 639. The new governor of Basra - Abu Musa - was
aware of his caliph’s command to avoid taking any further Persian territory, so he wrote
to Umar explaining the situation and asking for guidance. Umar responded with an order to take Ahwaz
and stop Hormuzan’s attacks. This prompted Musa to march his forces to
the river Karun and face off against the Persian Lord across its breadth. Feeling confident about his chances, Hormuzan
invited the Arab army across the river with the aim of facing and crushing it in a pitched
battle. Musa gladly accepted, crossing by a bridge
north of the city, defeating the Sassanid provincial force in a grueling fight and forcing
Hormuzan into flight to Ram Hormuz. A typically aggressive pursuit force of Arab
cavalry forced the overwhelmed Persian commander to retreat even further east. From a strong position behind yet another
river, Hormuzan parleyed for peace with the Muslims, offering to recognise their conquest
of Ahwaz while retaining a remnant of his own district. Still, the Sassanid reinforcements were pouring
into northern Khuzestan in such large numbers that the preparations for another military
campaign could no longer be kept secret. At this point, Sa’d was replaced as governor
at Kufa by Ammar bin Yasir, who sent troops to Musa to subdue the Persian threat without
delay. From Ahwaz, Musa launched his thrust against
Hormuzan’s forces at Ram Hormuz, defeated them in a brisk engagement and subsequently
captured most of eastern Khuzestan. Hormuzan retreated north to the Sassanid concentration
point at Shushtar - a highly fortified, walled city in the Zagros foothills. Unsure about his ability to take on such a
stronghold with his current strength, Musa had a thousand fresh warriors sent to him
from Kufa. With these additional warriors, Musa advanced
north, captured Shushtar and Hormuzan along with it, followed relatively quickly by the
truly ancient city of Susa. Returning to Basra after this victory, Musa
sent a subordinate to capture the final garrison in Khuzestan; this was Junde Shapur, who succeeded
by late 641. With the seizure of this final city, all of
Khuzestan and Sassanid territory west of the Zagros was now under Muslim rule. Despite the loss of Iraq, Sassanid Persia
east of the rocky barrier was still a cohesive and powerful empire with loyal territories
as far off as India. After the fall of Khuzestan to Musa’s army,
Yazdegerd1 dispatched urgent orders to all of his remaining provinces to raise troops
and send them to Nahavand, a city on a primary transportation artery west. Throughout the later part of 641, contingents
from cities across Iran and beyond, such as Isfahan, Rayy, Hamadan, and many others arrived
at Nahavand, until, at the turn of 642, an army of around 60,000 had come together. At the same time, this fearsome force was
Yazdegerd’s final chance to turn the war in his favour. If he lost now, he would lose everything. A Sassanid general named Mardanshah was appointed
to lead the army, who quickly warned the men that Umar “Is coming for you if you do not
go for him. He has already destroyed the seat of your
empire and plunged into the land of your emperor.” A Persian frontier commander in service to
the Caliphate noticed this massive military buildup and, alarmed, sent word to Ammar bin
Yasir in Kufa, who immediately forwarded the information to Umar. Addressing the people of Medina on the issue,
the caliph’s pronouncement that “This is the day on which the future depends”
left no doubt as to the importance of the upcoming clash. The ever-active caliph declared his intention
to oversee the battle but was talked out of it by his advisors, who pointed out that this
was unnecessary. A more contentious issue was the assignment
of military resources. Uthman wanted the whole army of the caliphate
concentrated, but Muhammad’s son-in-law - Ali Ibn Abi Talib - disagreed, reminding
Uthman that depriving the other frontiers would just invite the Byzantines, Ethiopians,
and others to retake their old provinces. Instead, he suggested the troops at Kufa,
Basra, and along the Persian border form the core of a field army, supplemented by a fresh
levy of raw recruits and veterans from Arabia. Umar concurred with Ali and gave command of
the preemptive strike to the veteran of Qadissiyah and conqueror of Susa - Nu'man bin Muqarrin. Upon enthusiastically receiving the caliph’s
decree, Nu'man assembled his troops, marched east from Kufa, and crossed the Tigris, rendezvousing
with a number of other frontier units along the way. Trekking northeast from Ctesiphon along the
Diyala River, the Muslims pivoted at Qasr Shereen and dove into the Zagros Mountains,
eventually reaching a concentration point at Tazar in December 641. With 30,000 Muslim warriors assembled, Nu'man
sent a scouting detachment into the Nahavand Valley to establish where exactly the Persians
were. By nightfall it returned having observed little
to no sign of Sassanid activity in the rocky, uneven terrain between Tazar and the Persian
base. Nu'man immediately seized the opportunity
and decamped, marching his entire army to a small town known as Isbeezahan, just ten
miles northwest of Nahavand itself, and its Persian occupants. When, not long after, Mardanshah learned that
the invader was closing in, he responded by bringing the entirety of his own army out
of the city. In preparation for the final battle, he deployed
Sassanid Persia’s great retribution field force in an L-shaped hook formation, ‘wrapped’
around a high terrain feature known as the brown ridge. While his soldiers advantageously faced down
the slope, Mardanshah himself took up a position atop the heights, where the imperial commander
had a brilliant view of the entire area. This adroitly selected defensive position
had multiple terrain features amplifying its strength: in front of the Sassanid front line
was a small stream, along the bank of which Mardanshah placed a minefield of cavalry-crippling
caltrops. Furthermore, his right2 - the short edge of
the reverse L formation - was anchored on a fortified village and the 3,000-foot-high
Ardashan ridge, while the longer, southeast-facing left flank3 was protected by a fork in the
stream. Confronted by this natural fortress and with
few other options, Nu'man drew up his warriors along Mardanshah’s entire front, just across
the stream and facing up the slope. The Muslim general’s brother Nueim led the
L’s short section, Hudayfah bin Al-Yaman commanded the right, and Qaqa bin Amr headed
the Caliphate’s cavalry reserve. Nu'man himself was in the centre. The Caliphate’s deployment gave Mardanshah
a potential opportunity to launch a preemptive assault at the unprepared Muslim lines. However, either due to overconfidence in his
prepared fortifications or cautious of leaving them due to the previous defeat at Jalula,
the empire’s field commander remained where he was, allowing Nu'man to finish bringing
his forces up. This inaction likely did not seem like a blunder
- the Muslims were far away from their bases in Iraq and could either smash their heads
against the dangerous Persian fortifications or wait, chew through their supplies and retreat
in deadly conditions. An hour after the Islamic noon prayer, as
the sun reached its highest point in the sky, the entire Muslim army began its attack straight
at Mardanshah’s defensive belt. Upon reaching the Wadi stream, the attackers’
infantry and cavalry alike were met with a deadly rain of Persian arrows, loosed by archers
who had the luxury of shooting downhill. Worse still, Qaqa’s horsemen galloped headlong
into the caltrops, leading to the maiming and immobilisation of many horses. Nevertheless, Nu’man’s men pushed on across
the entire front, weakened all the way by arrow fire. Then, charging uphill, the Muslims crashed
into the Sassanid ranks and the two sides met in ferocious melee combat. A grinding clash of attrition began with little
room for flair or tactical brilliance, only numerical weight, personal prowess, strength,
and discipline. On some sections of the line, perhaps those
under Nueim’s command where the slope was more gradual, the Muslims managed to temporarily
push Mardanshah’s soldiers back, but each time were counterattacked and shoved to their
original positions by the Persians. In other areas - near Zarrameen where the
slope was steepest - the Persians even managed to haul the Caliphate’s forces back across
the Wadi, but they in turn counterattacked and fought back to where they were. The battle’s outcome rested on a knife-edge,
with dead and dying of both sides littering the field - either laying still or shouting
in terrible agony. This mass slaying continued until nightfall
when the Muslims, with no prospect of breaking the Persian line that night, pulled away and
withdrew to their camp. The night hours passed without contact, with
both sides recovering their fallen comrades and tending to the wounded. When dawn broke on the second day, however,
Nu'man formed his army up and, somewhat inexplicably, launched another frontal assault across the
stream lasting all day. After what historian Akram poetically described
as a ‘tragic harvest of death’, the Muslims again retreated, unsuccessful and badly bloodied. Both armies formed up again at dawn on the
third day, but a mixture of the horror, tactical sanity, and possible mutiny kept the Muslim
general from attempting his human wave assault for a third time. Instead, he waited for the Persians to emerge
from their fortifications and launch an attack of their own, but Mardanshah was a wily commander
aware that time was his champion, and refused to budge. After a tense two-day standoff, the Sassanid
regimental commanders began raiding the Muslim line with small contingents. These limited attacks would inflict damage
on personnel and supplies before swiftly pulling back behind their defences, leaving the Islamic
forces frustrated. While constant assailment and the cold conditions
struck blow after blow to Muslim morale and strength, Mardanshah began absorbing a steady
stream of reinforcements and provisions from nearby Hamadan. The situation could not continue as it stood,
and so Nu'man called a council of war only a few days after his previous attack. The eldest companion present4 advised that
the Muslims ought not to attack at all, and to merely destroy those raiding parties which
came to attack them. As all the officers were eager to get stuck
in properly, this proposal was met with disapproval. Another more gung-ho leader suggested that
the frontal attacks actually be resumed regardless of consequences. This too was quickly shot down. Then spoke Tuleiha bin Khuleiwad - a former
enemy of Islam and one of the architects of Jalula - who put forward a clever stratagem. The Muslims, he said, should “Put the cavalry
in a position to outflank them, and show a weak front, making as if to withdraw. Let the Persians hope for victory and advance
against us. Then we turn and fight them.” This plan was approved by most of those present,
and put into motion. With the purpose of making the illusion of
weakness more convincing, at Tuleiha’s proposal the Muslims also began circulating false rumours
that Caliph Umar was dead. Over the next few days, word of Umar’s ‘death’
proliferated around the overjoyed Persian army like a kind of virulent mental plague,
provoking hopes of an offensive against their now surely demoralised enemy. The Friday after Nu’man’s last attack,
Sassanid sentries began observing the abandonment of Muslim positions across the stream: tents
being pulled down in the Muslim camp, baggage being loaded, and small contingents of men
marching west. Everything Mardanshah could see appeared to
suggest that the invading army was vulnerable and about to retreat. So, the general opened a series of gaps in
the caltrop belt on his right flank according to a pre-prepared plan and began having his
soldiers cross to the outside5. Lead elements halted just beyond the caltrop
field, waiting for the rear ranks, and began forming up there. According to our sources, Mardanshah might
have restored the caltrop field so his troops could not run. The ‘retreating’ Muslim infantry span
around upon seeing that they were about to be struck from behind and hastily deployed
for battle, somewhat further back than before. Of course, this was all a part of Tuleiha’s
plan - the Persian general had swallowed the bait hook, line, and sinker. Unbeknownst to the Sassanid army, Qaqa and
his cavalrymen were concealed in a gap behind the Ardashan ridge, ready to attack. Two hours before noon, Mardanshah ordered
his army to advance slowly towards the stationary enemy line. When the Persians entered missile range, they
began loosing arrow volleys with the aim of softening the Muslims up at a greater range
than Arab bows could operate at. Forced to defend themselves with only their
shields, many of the Caliphate’s warriors were chomping at the bit to close with the
Sassanids and fight them in melee, but Nu’man, with a wider view of the strategic situation,
ordered them to remain steady. After a while weakening the Muslims with missile
fire, Mardanshah launched a full-on charge. This was the key moment of the battle, as
this attack finally un-anchored the imperial right flank from the Ardashan ridge and its
nearby fortified village. Remaining on the defensive, Nu’man restrained
his forces from effectively pushing back, withdrawing slowly in a similar manner to
Hannibal’s centre at Cannae. Then, after some time of suffering this, Nu’man
ordered a counterattack just after midday and, at the same time, Qaqa’s cavalry swept
out from behind the ridge and drove a wedge between the Persians and their obstacles. However, Mardanshah detached a unit of reserves
that met and held the Muslim cavalry before the encirclement was completed. On the front line, Persian forces were gradually
pushed back under the weight of Nu’man’s counterattack. But then, the Muslim general was struck by
an arrow, fell from his horse, and was spirited away from the fight, with Nueim impersonating
him to maintain morale. Although Sassanid resistance was absolutely
unwavering, by late afternoon the Muslim forces, half encircling their foe, were clearly in
the superior position. Suddenly, as the sky began to darken, the
majority of Mardanshah’s army collapsed and routed, able to do so because the forces
opposing Qaqa were still resisting. Amidst this chaos, Tuleiha was also slain. A relatively large number of Persian troops
managed to escape the battlefield, but many, including Mardanshah, were killed by their
Muslim pursuers, fell victim to the re-strengthened caltrop belt, or were taken prisoner. Hudayfah took command of the Caliphate’s
army after Nu’man’s death and advanced the following morning, defeating the Sassanid
remnant at Darazeed. Part of the defeated army retreated into Nahavand
itself after the second defeat, where the new imperial commander, Dinar, surrendered
the city unconditionally. Nahavand was the final great battle between
Islam and Persia, making the point at which there was no longer any doubt - the Sassanid
Empire would fall. For this, Nahavand is known to Muslims as
the ‘victory of victories’. It would take another decade to subdue all
of the far-flung Persian territories in Central Asia and Eastern Iran, but by late 644 as
author Peter Crawford states, Yazdegerd III was effectively “a king without a kingdom.” On the Egyptian front, after Amr returned
from his expedition against the so-called Pentapolis in late 643, he travelled back
to Medina in order to meet with Umar, with whom he already had a somewhat tense relationship. Mistrusted by the caliph, Amr received a frosty
reception from the very start. The tension between the two men wasn’t helped
by the fact that Umar, who always kept a close eye on his governors via an internal spy network,
suspected Amr of unjustly appropriating Egypt’s wealth. So, when the latter returned to his province,
the caliph dispatched a trusted inspector - Muhammad bin Maslama - to appraise Amr’s
assets. The latter produced an account of his assets
and he was found guilty of taking too much. The excess was confiscated and taken back
to Medina. That wasn’t the end of the caliph’s incessant
prodding. A short while thereafter, unsatisfied at the
lacklustre revenues flowing into the treasury from Egypt, Umar had a heated debate with
Amr by letter. After that ended in a deadlock, a Copt was
sent to Medina to inform the caliph of his province’s financial situation. He bluntly informed Umar that previous rulers
of Egypt had seen to the land’s prosperity before taking anything from it, while Muslim
governors only extracted. In response, Umar carved Egypt into two separate
administrative districts during late 644, giving Amr Lower Egypt to govern from Fustat,
while Upper Egypt would be ruled from Fayyum by Abdullah ibn Sa’d ibn Abi Sarh, the foster
brother of Uthman. Predictably, Amr was, once again, infuriated
at this deliberate diminishing of his authority. Back in Medina a deadly plot had formed, centring
around Hormuzan, who had converted to Islam and used his vast experience in Sassanid administration
and governance to become one of Umar’s key advisors. Despite this, the Persian noble never forgot
the injury done to his home. It seems that Hormuzan made contact with Firuz,
a Sassanid soldier who was enslaved after Qadisiyyah or Nahavand and brought to the
Caliphate’s capital, and in November of 644 Firuz knifed Umar. Before passing away three days after, the
second caliph appointed a shūrā - or “counsel” of six men1 - to appoint his successor from
among their ranks. After deep debate, they decided that Uthman
would become the third Rashidun caliph. It is worth noting that while Sunni Islam
views Uthman as one of the rightly guided caliphs, Shia Muslims believe this election
should not have occurred at all and Ali was to be the next in line. Shortly after, Amr Ibn al-As visited Uthman
in order to lobby for his Upper Egyptian colleague’s removal. The new caliph refused outright, prompting
him to declare that he wouldn’t return to Egypt until Abdullah ibn Sa’d was removed. In response to this threat, Uthman appointed
his foster brother governor of all Egypt2, further deepening the dispute between the
two men. The Romans in Egypt were not happy with Amr’s
policies, but Abdullah’s attempts to increase the incomes from the province were even less
popular. Alexandria in particular bore the brunt of
this new lust for revenue, leading its notoriously riotous population to undertake drastic measures. A group of prominent Romans dispatched messages
to the new emperor Constans II. These letters outlined the outrages of Muslim
rule and its jizya tax, but also pointed out that Abdullah had let the Nile realm’s defence
slip into a pitiful state and the city was only garrisoned by a paltry thousand men,
and could be easily taken. Perceiving an opportunity to regain control
of Egypt and remedy the wound which its loss had dealt to his empire and his pride, Constans
began secretly amassing a great strikeforce of 300 ships and many thousands of soldiers,
command of which he bestowed on a eunuch known as Manuel. Constans’ fleet was ready after almost a
year. Because the reduced Byzantine Empire was still
the dominant naval power in the Mediterranean - the Caliphate having not yet developed any
seaborne capacity - there was nothing to stop this fleet from unexpectedly sailing straight
into the harbour at Alexandria in early 646. As the Roman sympathisers predicted, the thousand
strong Muslim garrison was no adequate defence against this shock assault from the sea. When Roman forces landed almost unopposed,
Alexandria’s population simultaneously rose up against the occupying Arabs. Most of the city’s garrison was slain in
the brief clash that followed. However, while the invasion army began ravaging
the vicinity around Alexandria, some of the Muslims that escaped travelled to Fustat and
informed the governor what was happening. Abdullah ibn Sa’d didn’t even have a chance
to react. Lacking confidence in their new viceroy’s
martial ability, the Muslims of Egypt sent a delegation to Caliph Uthman, urging him
to send Amr back so that he could put an end to the crisis. Understanding that Amr was both a man of formidable
military talent and feared by the Romans, Uthman bit his tongue and asked Amr to take
his post back. Wasting no time, the man who had conquered
the Romans once before travelled to Fustat as quickly as possible with the aim of emulating
his previous achievement. Upon his arrival, the morale of Islam’s
warriors was boosted significantly and they prepared for war eagerly, while Amr started
planning. Informed by spies and agents that the Romans
were advancing leisurely from Alexandria to Fustat, many of Amr’s brash officers pressed
for their commander to attack and confine the enemy to the treacherous Mediterranean
metropolis before all Egypt revolted against the Muslim regime. Amr did not agree with this appraisal, as
he believed that this advance would stretch Roman supply and communication lines to the
limit. Manuel and his army marched under the close
observation of Amr’s informants, who constantly reported the Romans’ position and strength. The land forces made their way up the eastern
bank of the Nile accompanied by a large flotilla of supporting warships sailing parallel to
them on the river itself. Byzantine indiscipline began causing problems
almost immediately. Roman soldiers moved from town to town and
the population was not happy with their behaviour. When Manuel neared the halfway point between
Alexandria and Fustat, Amr began a countermarch with 15,000 warriors of his own, moving on
a direct collision course with the Romans. Both armies finally came into contact with
one another near a large town known as Nikiou, or Naqyus. After resting for the night in their respective
camps, the Romans and Muslims deployed on the cultivated, featureless, and flat terrain
just south of Nikiou. Amr’s left - a cavalry regiment under the
command of Shareek bin Sumayy, rested on the Nile River, as did the Roman right. In addition to their organisation in neat
formations, a large number of Roman archers also embarked on the riverine ships. Once his preparations for battle were complete,
Manuel ordered the Byzantine ground forces into effective bow range before coming to
a halt and unleashing a destructive barrage of arrows against the Muslim position. On the river, Manuel had prepared a clever
stratagem. His ships continued sailing until they passed
by Amr’s flank, at which point their on-board archers struck the Muslims in the flank as
well. Amr’s men had already been struggling to
deal with the frontal volley, and so suffered terribly from the multidirectional bombardment. Sumayy’s regiment in particular was almost
totally decimated, having been positioned closest to the river, but even Amr had a horse
shot out from under him. Despite this punishment, however, the Muslims
were unwilling to surrender the battlefield, and so endured the storm with considerable
tenacity. Once Manuel believed that his enemy was sufficiently
weakened, he called back the flanking vessels and had their on-board troops fall into ranks
behind the main army, and then began yet another arrow attack against the Muslim line. The moment after the Byzantine eunuch general
ordered a halt to his preliminary barrage, he directed his infantry to advance into spear
and sword range. Although early Muslim armies were generally
portrayed as being most comfortable in this kind of close quarters engagement, the Roman
soldiers nevertheless impacted Amr’s battered host with considerable ferocity, cracking
their already faltering line. Sumayy’s regiment, which had endured the
brunt of Manuel’s seaborne missile attack, actually did break and run. Amr hastily pulled the remainder of his men
away from the Romans’ attack and halted only a short distance away, in order to regroup
as best he could. However Manuel, believing that the Muslims
were already beaten, did not advance and finish his enemy off, instead simply waiting where
they were. After a brief, eerie pause in the fighting,
a magnificently dressed Roman champion, clad in gold-studded armour, rode out into the
open space between the two armies and challenged the Muslims to single combat. This would give the latter time to take a
breath, reform and reorganise. So, one of Amr’s favoured mubarizun - an
Arab known as Haumal - accepted the Roman offer and strode out to meet the enemy fighter. With the remainder of both armies bearing
witness, their respective champions initially clashed with spears, and neither combatant
was able to score a decisive blow. Dropping their polearms after a certain amount
of time had gone by, the champions clashed with sword and shield, but again neither warrior
could get an edge over the other. This continued until the larger Roman duelist
managed to disarm and severely wound Haumal with a series of fierce thrusts. As the hulking Roman was about to finish Haumal
off, the Arab champion unsheathed his short dagger and plunged it into his unsuspecting
counterpart’s throat with prodigious speed. Although Haumal managed to win the duel by
the skin of his teeth, he died of his wounds a few days later, much to Amr’s sorrow. This traditional single combat had given the
Muslim general time to get his army back in order, and by the time Haumal had won, Amr
was ready - Sumayy’s routed regiment even returned to the battlefield and formed up. When the whole Muslim army was ready, they
charged and engaged in a grinding melee with Manuel’s forces, combat which they were
far better suited to. After a few hours of Roman resistance, the
eunuch’s soldiers broke and ran, pursued and hunted all the way to Alexandria. Amr brought up a number of catapults and launched
boulders at the recalcitrant city, whose own artillerists fired back. The defences nevertheless held firm under
such bombardment, until one of the gatekeepers - Ibn Bassana - offered to let Amr’s troops
inside if he, his family, and property were retained, terms which the Muslim commander
found agreeable. Therefore, at some point in the middle of
646, Alexandria’s gates were opened and the Islamic army poured inside. Any Roman unit opposing the incursion was
swiftly dealt with, and even those coming up to reinforce the breach were pushed away. As the rebellious city began falling victim
to a sacking, the surviving imperial soldiers withdrew to their ships and sailed away. Before the vengeful Arabs could truly wreak
havoc on the ancient Mediterranean metropolis and its vanquished inhabitants, an unknown
Muslim approached Amr and beseeched him to stop the violence. Although the conqueror of Egypt was by no
means a merciful man by nature, his kinsman’s words had such an impact that Amr immediately
ordered the cessation of hostilities. At the very spot where this was proclaimed,
a mosque was constructed known as the ‘Mosque of Mercy’. Still, large numbers of Romans including Manuel
died in the battle and the revolt was quelled. In the aftermath of the Second Siege of Alexandria,
Amr ripped down the walls and made the city, in his words “Like the house of an adultress,
accessible from all sides.” The neglect of Egypt’s defence was also
remedied with the new division of its Muslim garrison into four parts - two in Fustat,
and one each in Alexandria and on the northern coast to be moved around where necessary. It would also be rotated and the troops replaced
every six months. Not only had Amr ibn Al-As both conquered
and reconquered Egypt in difficult circumstances, he had built the foundations of a rule that
would secure Muslim hegemony over the fruitful country. For this, Amr well expected to be rewarded
by Uthman, but he was to be disappointed. Uthman wanted his tax fiend of a brother to
occupy the plum position, but was aware that Amr probably deserved some reward for his
deeds. So, summoning the conqueror to his place of
residence, Uthman enquired if he would like to remain in military command of Egypt while
Abdullah ibn Sa’d managed civilian administration. Amr responded with the witty barb: “In that
case I would be like the man holding the horns of the cow while another milks it.” For the remainder of Uthman’s caliphate,
Amr would bear a potent grudge and even oppose him publicly. This mutual resentment was to have serious
consequences for Islamic history in the near future. By the end of 646AD, the entire near-east
had been transformed into a completely different geopolitical entity than it was just two decades
before, and had been for many centuries prior. On its eastern wing, a four-century-old dynasty
- the Sassanids - were now all but dust, its last true Shah1 pursued across Iran by eastward
driving Muslim armies and its ancient territory devoured. In the north, Rashidun forces reached the
Caucasus Mountain barrier, enclosing the once insurmountable Byzantine Empire within its
Anatolian heartland in the process. Now that all major battles against Rome and
Persia were at an end, Islam’s armies began seeking another direction in which to conquer. Once Constans II’s counterattack against
Egypt was decisively repelled, Caliph Uthman’s foster brother Abdullah ibn Sa’d began launching
raids into the Roman-Berber lands west of his new province. These small expeditions quickly proved a stunning
success, returning with vast quantities of slaves, cattle, and other riches. Judging that Roman Africa would yield an easy
and generous bounty if squeezed, the Egyptian governor wrote to Uthman, asking for permission
to launch a major campaign to the west. Uthman agreed with Abdullah’s assessment
and decreed the formation of a 10,000 strong force in Arabia composed of warriors from
various tribes. It was a relatively young army, and in its
ranks marched one son of Amr, two sons of Umar and two sons of Umayyad chief Al-Hakam
- one of whom was the future Marwan I. The freshly mustered Arab force was ready
for war in early 647 and marched for Egypt2, joining Abdullah ibn Sa’d at Fustat a few
weeks later. There, the 10,000 newly arrived Arabic fighters
were merged with a further 10,000 from the governor’s Egyptian army, resulting in a
total strength of 20,000. With this mostly camel and horse-mounted invasion
force at his back, Abdullah marched west. This part of the Mediterranean seaboard bore
witness to some of the ancient world’s most dramatic events during the course of several
centuries. Emperor Heraclius’ father had previously
served as ruler of this sizeable ‘Exarchate of Africa’ before his son’s ascension
to the Byzantine throne in 610, upon which the elder governor died. Close to the emperor’s death in 641, Heraclius
himself appointed as Exarch a patrician known as Gregory, However, dynastic chaos following
the death of Heraclius, and Constans II’s inability to repel Muslim attacks, particularly
in nearby Egypt, were all too much for Gregory. In 647, as Uthman’s army was in the process
of readying to attack him, the Exarch declared independence from Constantinople amid a surge
of popular support from Romanised Africans and native Berbers alike. Abdullah ibn Sa’d meanwhile, crossed the
Nile from Fustat and took his army up the west bank until he neared Alexandria, at which
point he drove northwest and cut across the desert as a shortcut. After a few more days, the viceroy’s 20,000
hit the Mediterranean coastal road and marched along its course until, finally, after a six-week
journey, Abdullah reached Barca - the city which his predecessor Amr seized years before. The Muslims then marched a further seven hundred
miles along the Mediterranean coast around the Bay of Sirte, enduring the scorching privations
of a North African summer. The Arabs were used to such arid conditions
and thrived in them, an advantage which helped them conquer the Near-East. When the Rashidun army finally reached Tripoli,
closer to the heart of Gregory’s realm, its warriors found the heavily fortified city
barred against them, contrary to the friendly reception they’d received in Cyrenaica. As Amr did half a decade earlier, Abdullah
blockaded Tripoli on its landward flank and placed it under siege. In order to slow or prevent any resupply or
reinforcement by ship, Abdullah stationed artillery at both points where the city wall
met the water, They were ordered to strike any enemy vessel which attempted to enter
the harbour and effectively rendered the seaport unusable. Gregory, who was readying the main Exarchate
army at his inland capital of Sufetula, had a naval reinforcement armada dispatched from
Carthage to Tripoli. However, rather than disembarking at the port
on arrival as they would have liked, the transport ships were forced to disgorge their human
cargo on segments of the beach which were outside of Abdullah’s artillery range and
outside the wall’s protection. Although this prevented Rashidun catapults
and ballistae from carving bloody holes into their ranks, it made the tired and disorganised
soldiers easy prey for Muslim infantry, which charged at them from two different angles. Exhausted from the long sea voyage and without
any time to deploy adequately, Gregory’s reinforcements were scythed down to a man
on the beaches of Libya. Remaining vigilant against any further attempts
to prop Tripoli up, Rashidun forces nevertheless were unable to breach the well-provisioned,
nigh impregnable fortress. As his army languished outside the walls,
Abdullah ordered riders to scout in the direction of Sufetula to observe any military activity
going on there. A few weeks later two things were clear to
the Muslim governor. First: Tripoli was still a long way aways
from opening its gates to him and remaining static outside its walls seemed pointless. Second: reports from his scouts made it apparent
to Abdullah that the newly independent Roman Exarch was readying for a fight. Possibly convinced Tripoli was just a delaying
action which only served to grind down his own army’s strength and will to push on,
the Muslim governor lifted his siege and spirited away to the west. The Rashidun army and its thrifty commander
plundered their way through the wealthiest region of Roman Africa, unmoored from any
supply train and therefore unconcerned about the Tripoli garrison behind them. At Sufetula, Gregory was made aware of the
Muslims’ location the moment they passed through Gabes and reacted to the news immediately,
with the intent of engaging his enemy well away from his interim inland capital. To do this, the Exarch ponderously shifted
his heavily-equipped, primarily infantry-based army, which probably matched that of the Muslims
in size, to a blocking position at Faiz - 30 kilometres from Sufetula - and set up a camp
there. Part of the Exarchate’s army was placed
slightly forward of the camp as a covering force. However, only a short time after Gregory’s
force went into camp, the Rashidun light cavalry advance guard fell on its Roman counterpart,
sending it reeling back to the main camp in flight. Unnerved by such strength of the Muslim mounted
units, Gregory ordered his army to withdraw all the way to Sufetula, believing his position
at Faiz was too vulnerable. About four miles east of his capital the Exarch
turned and readied for battle. Such close proximity to its base granted the
Roman army logistical supremacy, prevented wide flanking maneuvers from the mobile opposing
army, and permitted them a safe retreat inside if they needed it. The Muslims arrived soon after and made their
own camp a short way from Gregory’s front line. One rejected emissary later, both sides deployed
for battle on the arid plain about four miles from Sufetula. The Roman army’s posture was defensive,
its line anchored to the north and south by two high ridges. Abdullah, realising the observation potential
of these terrain features, successfully sent forces to occupy them. Unlike his more iron-willed predecessor, Abdullah
ibn Sa’d was considered personally weak by the warriors under his command, an accountant
and bureaucrat rather than general or soldier. Lacking Amr’s bravery, Abdullah retreated
to a safe position behind the line where he was not likely to suffer any personal threat
once the army was deployed to his liking. Fortunately, Gregory was a kindred spirit
in that he wasn’t a bold frontline commander either, choosing to oversee the clash from
a throne inside the walls of Sufetula. Subordinates and lower-level officers fought
the battle for him on a tactical level. At the dawn the next day, fighting commenced. Details about the first days of Sufetula are
unclear and sparse in our sources, but it is evident that the combat was incredibly
fierce, uninterrupted, and bloody. Although the actual battlefield was a flat
plain, the ridges on either flank prevented any outflanking maneuvers or fancy tactical
flair. Moreover, the uninvolved nature of both army’s
skittish commanders further paralysed the situation. After a few days of such indecisive fighting,
Gregory decided to attempt an assassination of the enemy leader in order to sever the
head from the Muslim serpent, but obviously wasn’t going to do the deed himself. Instead, he offered to wed his legendarily
beautiful, intelligent, and valiant daughter to the Roman warrior who killed Abdullah. Morale in the Exarch’s army skyrocketed
at this news, with each warrior - whether they were Roman, Vandalic, Greek or Berber,
steeling themselves with the aim of gaining the princess’ hand. Word of this also spread throughout the Muslim
army and in particular to Abdullah himself. Not at all comfortable with being a marked
man, his confidence suffered an even further decline. To counter Gregory’s offer, the Muslim commander
announced to his army that he would grant the Exarch’s daughter to any warrior who
personally killed her father, before withdrawing to his tent. Still however, the next few days continued
as a deadly stalemate of bitter violence, brought to a crescendo by the offer and counteroffer
between generals. This continued without end until one of Abdullah’s
officers - Zubayr - was approached by a Berber defector from Gregory’s army. He told the Muslim captain that because fighting
had until that point been quite far from the walls, the Exarch’s position, near Sufetula’s
northern gate, was actually very thinly defended. Alerted to this crucial information and the
best route which he should take in order to exploit the opportunity, Zubayr put forward
his plan to the demoralised Muslim commander, and was granted leadership over the army’s
mobile reserve - about 2,000 strong. The invaders’ spirits were buoyed due to
the dynamism and boldness of this dashing young officer, who spent the remainder of
the day setting his scheme into motion. Swarmed by warriors who desired to embark
on the risky venture with him, the younger Zubayr eventually selected thirty of the fiercest,
most capable, and valiant combatants his army could offer as an attack squad. When asked what they were to do, Zubayr replied
- “I am attacking, defend me against those who assail me from the rear and I shall defend
you from the front!” During the near soundless hours of night,
after issuing all necessary orders, Zubayr positioned himself, his 30 stalwarts, and
the mobile reserve horsemen behind Sufetula’s northern ridge. Then when morning came, both armies closed
with one another and fought as though nothing had changed. At noon, with an especially hot day weighing
down on them heavily, both armies broke contact and withdrew - the Romans quickly, the Muslims
suspiciously sluggishly. Distracted by the din of war, Gregory, his
attendants, and guards did not notice as Zubayr and his band of daredevils galloped into the
city through what became known as the ‘gate of treachery’. Realising what was happening, the Exarch’s
guard formed a hasty line, but the 30 Muslim warriors broke it and allowed Zubayr a clean
run at the African ruler. In the confusion, Gregory initially believed
this lone mounted figure to be an envoy, and so did not react. Gregory was killed and his head sliced from
his body. Word of their leader’s death quickly reached
the retreating Roman infantry, causing terrible confusion and disheartening the soldiers. Then, at the perfect moment, Zubayr’s large
mounted reserve crested the North Ridge, rode at a gallop and charged into the disorganised
Exarchate army’s left wing with saber and lance before wheeling around the battlefield. Simultaneously, the bulk of the Muslim infantry
turned about and advanced, locking their tenacious enemy into an unwinnable fight. Pressured from the front by Arab infantry
and outmanuevered by swift Muslim horsemen all around, the Roman army collapsed and its
soldiers scattered in all directions in their attempts to flee. Zubayr’s cavalry reaped an especially bloody
toll and, within a short time, the battered corpses of Romans, Berber, Vandals, and Greeks
littered the plain outside Sufetula. Despite the slaughter, several thousand of
Gregory’s soldiers managed to retreat intact towards the capital, believing its walls would
grant them safety. It wasn’t their lucky day. Zubayr, having handily dealt with the Exarch,
sent small squadrons to hold each of Sufetula’s gates, preventing entry or exit. When the retreating columns of exhausted Roman
soldiers reached the city therefore, they were viciously attacked by Muslim cavalry
coming the other way and cut to pieces. The Rashidun triumph at Sufetula is frequently
touted as the point at which Roman Africa was forever lost to the Empire, and while
it was a back-breaking moment for the province, this is far from true. Once the vast quantity of captured silver,
gold and cattle was accumulated and distributed, Abdullah ibn Sa’d moved on the Exarchate’s
real capital - Carthage. Upon putting the millennia old city to siege,
the Muslim commander and local leaders within the city came to an impasse. There was no chance that the besiegers would
be able to take Carthage with their overextended supply lines and barely functional siege train,
but at the same time, there was no way for the inhabitants of Carthage to make them go
away. However, with exaggerated reports of Gregory’s
fate fresh in their minds, they asked for terms after only a few days. Always with income on his brain, Abdullah
ibn Sa’d accepted a vast quantity of Roman gold as payment to leave Africa alone keeping
only what they had so far conquered. After a subsequent eastward journey of about
three months, the Muslim army arrived back in Fustat by late 647, bringing with it a
vast hoard of wealth which further swelled the treasury in Medina. Regardless of the gathered loot, Abdullah
had effectively won a victory and then given up the ghost before the conquest was concluded. At about this time - late 648 - the governor
of Syria Muawiya launched a naval expedition of unknown scale on Cyprus in order to neutralise
any potential threat that it posed as a staging point for future Byzantine attacks. Muawiya landed on the Mediterranean island
and seized it without opposition, exacting a tribute of 7,000 dinars annually. With the North African front winding down,
most expansionist movement within the Rashidun Caliphate came to a halt. Three years passed in relative quiet until
Abdullah ibn Sa’d led another attempt to conquer Nubia in 652, failing once again due
to the country’s ‘Archers of the Eye’ . Because the situation on land between Eastern
Rome and the Caliphate had calcified at the Taurus Mountains, both sides began looking
to the sea for an advantage. If Constantinople maintained its naval supremacy,
it would have the ability to land a force in Syria, Egypt, or Africa at will. However, if the Caliphate usurped this control,
they could make the Mediterranean a Muslim lake and even threaten the great imperial
city. To that end, both the Egyptian governor and
Roman emperor refocused their efforts on constructing vast fleets of ships with which to dominate
the sea. In 654AD, the Arab and Roman fleets met off
the Lycian coast at what became known as the Battle of the Masts. Abdullah ibn Sa’d revealed himself to be
a veritable sea wolf compared to his feeble reputation on land, crushing Constans II’s
navy in the first true Muslim naval triumph and clearing the way for an attack on Constantinople. From the status of a subjugated, scorned,
and irrelevant people of the desert, the Arabs burst forth from their ancient homeland in
a manner akin to an irresistible sandstorm, blowing away everything in their path in the
course of just two decades. The third season of the Early Muslim Expansion
will come in late 2021, and we will cover the famous battles like Talas, Tours, Guadelete,
Constantinople, and much more, so make sure you are subscribed and have pressed the bell
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