After years of boots on the ground and bloody
combat in Vietnam, US officials are publicly confident. The strategy of eliminating the Viet
Cong is working. The North Vietnamese communist forces are on their last legs and victory is only
a matter of time. Or so they say. But as 1968 and the traditional lunar new year festivities begin,
US and South Vietnamese troops find themselves on the receiving end of a formidable North
Vietnamese surprise attack: The Tet Offensive. At the end of 1967, the war in Vietnam is
a stalemate. While the US uses patrols and firepower to seek out and destroy the enemy,
the Viet Cong insurgency carry out attritional guerilla operations in South Vietnam – often
dictating where and when battles take place. The result is high casualties for both sides and
no meaningful strategic breakthrough - although US commander William Westmoreland sees it
differently. In late 1967, he tours the US to tell the public his strategy is working, and
the North Vietnamese are reaching breaking point. Although Westmoreland is overly optimistic,
there are fractures in the North Vietnamese communist government. Some leaders – since
labelled ‘doves’ - are concerned about the cost in lives and infrastructure and want Hanoi
to negotiate. They clash with more influential ‘hawks’, like General Secretary of the Communist
Party Le Duan, who want to intensify the war. Meanwhile, North Vietnamese founder Ho Chi
Minh is becoming politically sidelined. He has been chronically ill since at least 1964
and has stepped down from many official duties. North Vietnamese colonel and future dissident
Bui Tin suggests Ho’s ill health prevents him from introducing democratic reforms, allowing the
Politburo and Le Duan to take further control. By 1967 the Soviet Union replaces China as North
Vietnam’s main supplier of firearms and heavy weapons. However, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev
favours diplomatic solutions to the conflict, giving the North Vietnamese ‘doves’ a temporary
boost. To counter this, Le Duan and his supporters arrest political opponents and journalists, often
on conspiracy charges. With his power base secure, the hawks prepare for a new major offensive which
will see irregular and regular North Vietnamese units attacking cities and towns across
South Vietnam during the Tet Lunar holiday. North Vietnam hopes a surprise attack on urban
centers and military bases will topple the Saigon government, destroy a major part of
the US and South Vietnamese ARVN forces and pressure the US to end its support for the South.
Commanders understand the operation is risky, therefore the bulk of the fighting is
assigned to the Viet Cong and not the more valuable regular North Vietnamese
Army, more commonly known as the NVA. From October 1967, military preparations begin
when North Vietnamese troops harass US border positions, including the combat base at Khe Sanh.
Westmoreland believes North Vietnam is preparing another Dien Bien Phu-style attack, but others
have since suggested that instead of repeating 1954, the North Vietnamese aim to draw US and
ARVN forces away from the major towns and cities. US troops are relocated. Although North
Vietnamese forces suffer heavy losses, Westmoreland reinforces Khe Sanh and thins
out defences around Saigon and other cities. And so at the end of January 1968, both
North and South Vietnamese prepare for the Lunar Holiday. Traditionally, this is a time
of ceasefire across Vietnam, but this year Viet Cong and NVA troops infiltrate towns and
cities, sometimes disguised as festival goers. Since it was common for farmers to enter
cities with their produce during Tet, the presence of unknown individuals with cargo is not
especially suspicious, at least to the Vietnamese. US Lt Colonel John E. Barr later recalled.
“I noted the unusual number of young men in civilian clothes; unusual in that most
Vietnamese youths were either drafted by the ARVN or off in the hills with the Viet
Cong... I was assured […] that it was customary for local farmers to come into Hue to celebrate
the Tet holiday... I accepted his explanation—to my subsequent regret.” (Shulimson 166)
US military intelligence does detect the movement of North Vietnamese units but doesn’t
understand the scale of the coming offensive. In reality, around 84,000 troops are waiting
for the signal to attack across the country. At midnight on January 30, North Vietnam
launches the first coordinated attacks. Within hours, five of the six
major cities in South Vietnam, 36 of 44 provincial capitals and 64 district
capitals are under attack. Tuan Van Ban, a lieutenant in the Northern 320th Division
attacks a US Marine base near Cam Lo: “Around midnight we moved as close as possible
to the American perimeter. […]... First we fired a flare. That was the signal to detonate
the dynamite that blasted holes in the perimeter... Within seconds we blew a bugle
and whistles to signal our troops to advance. All four hundred of us moved forward screaming,
‘Attack! Attack! Attack!’” (Appy Patriots 302/303) In Saigon, a group of around 20 Viet Cong
sappers blow a hole in the US Embassy compound wall and attack the guards. Armed
with automatic weapons and rocket launchers, they attempt to breach the main
Chancellery building but fail. US diplomat Barry Zorthian calls Colonel George
Jacobson who lives in the embassy compound: “[George] said that the VC sappers had penetrated
his house and he could hear people downstairs. There was shooting outside on his side of the
compound, shadowy figures floating around, and occasional bursts of gunfire. As far as he
could tell the embassy was still secure. He had a pistol and after we hung up he shot one of the
sappers coming up the stairs.” (Appy Patriots 290) Jacobson kills the last Viet Cong sapper, ending
the attack. Other VC attempts to enter the Saigon radio station and Presidential Palace also fail.
After the initial shock, the US and ARVN troops quickly reorganise and stage an effective
defence in most places. US commanders are impressed with ARVN, which stands its ground
despite low American expectations. Within days, US and ARVN troops reverse most Viet Cong and NVA
gains, although this is not the case everywhere. The old imperial capital of Hue boasts
beautiful architecture and nineteenth century fortifications, but the city soon
finds itself central to much more modern war. Hue had seen little fighting until 1968,
and almost considered itself a truce city near the North-South border at the 17th Parallel.
Divided by the Perfume River into a south-eastern modern city and north-western citadel, it
was home to an airfield, large university, hospital and government buildings.
On January 30, ARVN commander Ngô Quang Trưởng receives word an attack is
likely. He puts his troops on high alert, but many are on leave for Tet. Still, he assumes
the NVA lack the strength to attack the city. Little does he know, the NVA 4th, 5th and
6th Regiments, supported by the Viet Cong, have already surrounded Hue and
infiltrated sappers and assault troops. A North Vietnamese officer wrote:
“The enemy knew nothing of our strategy; by the time our forces approached the city
of Hue, the enemy still had not taken any specific defensive measures.” (Schulimson 214)
Their job is to open the city gates and quickly capture around 200 targets, the most important
of which are the Mang Ca ARVN headquarters, Tay Loc airfield, MACV Compound, Landing
Craft Utility loading ramp, radio station, hospital and provincial headquarters.
At 02:33 am on January 31, a flare marks the start of the attack. NVA sappers in ARVN uniforms
kill guards and let around 7500 troops into Hue. Immediately, ARVN soldiers in the
citadel put up improvised defence, especially the Black Panther Rangers. There
is heavy fighting across the area, but the ARVN hold the Mang Ca and contest the airfield.
In the modern city, the small garrison at the MACV Compound and nearby LCU loading ramp hold out, but
by daybreak the NVA controls around 60% of Hue. ARVN commanders desperately call for
reinforcements as the full scale of the attack becomes apparent. Some Airborne troops
arrive at Mang Ca, but grounds relief columns are badly mauled by NVA troops on the citadel walls.
Marines from Task Force X-Ray are also on their way to the city, including battalions from the 1st
and 5th Marine Regiments. But as they approach the modern city, the North Vietnamese ambush them:
“Enemy soldiers dug in close by on either side of the road, behind walls and inside buildings
and on rooftops, let loose a withering fusillade that struck against the sleepy convoy with the
force of a sledgehammer crushing a cockroach: automatic weapons, small-arms, rockets,
recoilless rifles, mortars, grenades. Everything. All at once.” (Ehrhardt 243)
The US column needs the help of M48 tanks to push through the 8 or 9 blocks to the
MACV compound at around 3.15 pm. Commanders immediately task the Marines with crossing the
Perfume River to relieve the ARVN in the Citadel, but the bridge is too weak for the tanks
and there is little fire support. Lieutenant Colonel Marcus Gravel puts it this way:
“We proceeded to the MACV compound then were gifted with the most stupid
idiotic mission...” (Shulimson 173) Two American platoons make it across but
come under heavy fire from the citadel walls. Realising the attack is useless, Gravel orders
a withdrawal, using commandeered vehicles to evacuate the wounded. Around a third of a Marine
company is killed or wounded in the failed attack. It now becomes clear the ARVN and US forces
are surrounded by mostly regular NVA troops determined to hold their ground, and the NVA
is already preparing to create a provisional government in Hue. For the US troops,
it will be a battle from the inside out. The Marines first objectives are the modern
city’s provincial headquarters and prison – about six blocks from the compound. To get there
they will also need to fight through the university and hospital. But the first attempts
stall less than one block from the compound. Meanwhile, the ARVN continues to contest the
citadel and eventually retakes the airfield, allowing for some resupply. The LCU loading ramp
also allows for supplies and reinforcements to be brought in by river. Otherwise, Marine
convoys known as Rough Riders run the gauntlet of NVA fire as they enter the city.
The fighting now turns into a street-by-street, house-by-house melee. The Marines’ area of
operations is around 11 blocks by 8 blocks wide – not a huge area, but a complex one to fight
through. Commanders lack correctly scaled maps while rules of engagement and poor weather prevent
air support. Marine William Ehrhardt recalls: “We had no experience at this kind of fighting,
and the on-the-job training cost us heavily. A great many civilians must have died in
the fighting. If you saw or heard – or thought you saw or heard – movement in the
house next door, you didn’t stop to knock; you just tossed in a grenade.” (Ehrhardt 246)
Both sides quickly find rockets to be useful weapons, especially to blow open walls
and gain new points of entry. Lieutenant Colonel Ernie Cheatham recalled a
two-hour firefight fought almost purely with rockets at a range of just 50 meters. “...hundreds and hundreds of rockets going out...
And the same thing coming back at us. But we had more ammunition than they had.” (Shulimson 188)
Tanks are of limited use, except for as cover on the ruined city streets. When used offensively,
they rush forward, fire a few rounds and retreat before the inevitable onslaught of North
Vietnamese B-40 rockets. US troops find the 106mm recoilless rifle effective for demolitions
and urban fighting, especially when mounted on the M50 “Ontos” light anti-tank vehicle.
By February 4, the Marines are making progress, having captured the university and public
health building. In the attack on the Treasury, the Marines use tear gas, which proves effective
since many NVA troops don’t have gasmasks. Once the Treasury is cleared, the aim is
to attack towards the hospital, prison, and provincial headquarters. Using teargas,
105mm howitzers, mortars and recoilless rifles, Marines push the NVA out of the hospital and
prison in intense fighting. Meanwhile, another Marine attack targets the stadium to the east of
the MACV compound. Already the NVA commander is thinning his forces for potential withdrawal.
The US attack now focuses on the provincial headquarters. Using the newly learned tactics,
Marines assault the building on February 6, again using tear gas in a room-to-room struggle.
Some defenders slip away, and by the end of the day, the Americans raise the US flag over the
headquarters – although they soon remove it due to regulations that it must always be flown
with an accompanying South Vietnamese flag. The Provincial Headquarters was initially
a symbolic target for the Marines – but it proves much more important. It was the
headquarters of the 4th NVA Regiment, which now begins to collapse. By February
7, resistance in the modern city is fading, but the battle is still raging in the citadel. The ARVN made some early progress in the citadel,
clearing out much of the northwestern corner of the old city, and south of the Mang Ca.
But on February 6-7, the NVA counterattack, using grappling hooks to scale the southwestern
wall and forcing ARVN troops back to the airfield. Meanwhile, outside the city walls to the west, the
US 1st Cavalry Airmobile Division is struggling. With the help of helicopter gunships, artillery,
and reinforcements from the now helicopter-borne 101st Airborne Division, they clash with NVA
forces in outskirt villages and only tentatively cut North Vietnamese logistical routes.
From February 10, reinforcements from the 5th Marines are helilifted into the citadel. On the
13th, they expect to launch an attack from ARVN airborne positions to their south, but before they
even arrive, they come under heavy NVA attack: “[within] fifteen minutes . . ., all
Hell broke loose. There was no Airborne unit in the area and Company A was up to
their armpits in NVA.” (Shulimson 199) The NVA, having tunnelled into the citadel
walls, stop the attack 75 meters behind its start line. The next morning, the Marines try
again with massive supporting fire, including from offshore ships. Their target is the Dong Ba
Tower, one of the citadel’s fortified gates. But the flat trajectory of the naval gunfire mostly
harmlessly hits the exterior walls. The Marines bog down after just 100 metres, pinned down by
fire from both the palace and outer citadel walls. On February 15, more US reinforcements arrive,
as well as permission to fire into the palace and surrounding area. American shells partly collapse
the tower, and US troops push through ruined walls and shattered fortifications. The Marines finally
capture Dong Ba after a six-hour firefight. Meanwhile, the ARVN airborne and Marines
attack the palace itself but struggle to take ground. Once again they use tear gas and
heavy fire support to pummel the NVA defenders. On February 22, the fighting enters the heart of
the citadel, as the ARVN push towards the southern wall. By this point, the 1st Cavalry have been
able to fully cut NVA supply lines, blocking the infiltration and exfiltration of fighters.
The most significant development is a shift in tactics. Both US and ARVN Marines launch night
attacks towards the last remaining NVA positions, shaking up the established schedule of combat.
With some NVA troops sleeping away from frontline positions, many are taken by surprise and
captured. Aided by better weather and air support, the Marines and ARVN clear the palace and
reach the southern wall on February 24, raising their flags on Hue’s flag tower.
Except for mopping up, the battle is over. The Hue battle costs around 200 US KIA, mostly
Marines, and around 1,600 wounded. ARVN casualties are about 450 killed and missing and 2,100
wounded. Gauging North Vietnamese casualties is difficult, but estimates suggest between 2,500
to 5,000 killed with an unknown number wounded. 80% of buildings in the city are
damaged, and of a population of 140,000, around 116,000 are homeless. Civilian deaths are
likely between 1,000 and 5,800 killed or missing. The Americans also accuse the NVA of targeted
political killings in the city, with at least 3,000 bodies uncovered from hastily dug graves.
The North Vietnamese government argues these are civilians killed in the fighting – often by
US firepower – but this is widely disputed. With the battle of Hue over, one of the
toughest struggles of the Tet Offensive comes to an end. The NVA and VC are unable to
hold any of their gains or trigger an uprising, but the Tet Offensive still
becomes seen as a US defeat. Westmoreland is eager to present the offensive
as the final gamble of a near-defeated enemy. He describes the damage and around 3,400
US and ARVN dead as superficial and claims the North Vietnamese suffer 58,000 killed.
Others disagree. The fact North Vietnam was able to launch such a sophisticated offensive
at all, indicates the US strategy in Vietnam is failing. Far from being close to defeat,
North Vietnam delivered a shocking blow and regained the initiative. In a secret
memo, General Harold K. Johnson wrote: “We suffered a loss, there can be
no doubt about it.” (Langer 176) The offensive also undermines the Johnson
administration. They had been preparing both the public and media for imminent success, and
yet the Tet Offensive shows the war is far from over. Photographs of the summary execution
of a Viet Cong fighter on the streets of Saigon lead to further questions about the
regime US troops are fighting and dying for. US public opposition to the war had been growing
before Tet but was by no means the majority, and pro-war counterprotests were common. But after Tet
protests go beyond the usual anti-war, student or counter-culture groups to include mothers, middle
class professionals, religious groups and Vietnam veterans themselves – by February 1968, half of
Americans now believe intervention was a mistake. Johnson’s advisors – his so-called Wise Men – also turn against the war. Despite encouraging
escalation as recently as November 1967, they now overwhelmingly call for
disengagement and negotiations: “...McGeorge Bundy [said to the] President...
‘Look, this thing is hopeless, you’d better begin to de-escalate and get out.’ And this
was the first time [the President] ever heard anything of this kind, he could barely believe his
ears. I think he was very shocked.” (Ruane 124) Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the
mastermind of US strategy in Vietnam, has already reached this point. Throughout 1967 he became
privately sceptical of the US intervention, often in opposition to the other Wise Men. In November,
he announced his resignation, effective in late February 1968. His successor Clifford Clarke soon
concurs with McNamara’s assessment on Vietnam. The result is a crisis of leadership
in Washington. Westmoreland requests an additional 206,000 troops for Vietnam. Johnson
refuses, but the request is leaked to the media, causing an uproar. Instead, with pressure
mounting, Johnson changes course. On March 31 1968, Johnson announces he will limit
the bombing of North Vietnam started in 1965, and open negotiations with the Northern government.
He then makes another dramatic announcement: “I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for
another term as your President.” In reality, Johnson knows his legacy is in
ruins. He has already lost a democratic party primary and the war costs $2 billion a month
– around 17 billion today. This leaves little time or resources for his beloved domestic
reforms, and he is frank with his advisors: “I don’t give a damn about the election. I will be happy to keep doing what is right
and lose the election... I will have overwhelming disapproval in the polls...
I will go down the drain.” (Anderson 69) The North announces it is receptive to
talks, but makes it clear they want to negotiate from a position of strength,
as the victor of the Tet offensive. But who really won the Tet Offensive on the
ground? And why, if the US caused higher casualties and denied North Vietnamese gains,
is the battle often viewed as a US defeat? In reality, the Tet offensive is a disappointment
for Hanoi. It shows the cities of South Vietnam are no closer to adopting the revolution
and there are no mass defections from ARVN. The offensive also decimates the Viet Cong.
It suffers huge losses and exposes many of its secret agents. It also shows the Viet Cong,
while skilled at ambushes and guerilla fighting, are ineffective in urban operations or holding
ground. Some historians even suggest the Tet Offensive was deliberately devised to reduce
the influence of the southern insurgency and bring it under tighter North Vietnamese control –
although there is little solid evidence for this. But in other ways, Tet is an unintended northern
success, since it creates political shockwaves in the US, and lowers public support. The US public
is not prepared for how intense the Vietnam war has become: instead Johnson has actively attempted
to insulate them from the conflict. Although not a concrete objective of the Tet Offensive,
North Vietnamese strategists do recognise public will as a US strategic vulnerability
– one they don’t suffer from themselves. The Tet Offensive may be a US victory in the
so-called Kinetic Battlespace, but weakening the US administration’s credibility at home
and abroad is a defeat in the Idea Battlespace. The media, which had until
this point largely supported or believed government statements on Vietnam, now becomes more critical. Veteran news anchor
Walter Cronkite speaks for many when he asks: “What the hell is going on? I thought we
were winning the war?” (Lawrence TVW 125) Meanwhile, North Vietnamese ideologists
weave Tet losses into the long-standing methodology of revolution. State control,
propaganda, and personal experience has long since conditioned the North Vietnamese to
expect high casualties. As Le Duan declared: “The North will not count
the cost.” (Lawrence TVW 91) 1968 is the US’s bloodiest year of the war, with
almost 17,000 fatalities. Through the summer, the North launches more offensives – the
so-called Mini-Tet. It suffers high losses, but so does the US, with around 400
a week dying in May. By late 1968 500,000 US troops are in Vietnam and as troop
numbers and casualties increase, more Americans have direct or indirect experience of the
war, such as when a relative is sent overseas. All this erodes American public will, a
significant factor in any war effort. As Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz
writes, an effective war effort needs equilibrium between the Trinity – the State, the Army and the
People. After Tet, North Vietnam’s trinity remains strong - because of government regimentation,
but also ideological convictions and nationalist aspirations. Meanwhile, as the 1968 US
election looms, the US trinity is falling part. The Vietnam War is perhaps the most well-known
“hot” proxy war during the Cold War when the global super powers were not battling directly
out of fear of nuclear retaliation – even though they came close to direct confrontation
during the Cuban Missile Crisis just a few years before the escalation in Vietnam.
And while the nuclear arsenals expanded, the Soviet Union also pursued their vision of
Nuclear Powered Communism by rapidly increasing the production of nuclear reactors. Whole cities
were built to accommodate a new atomic elite that would help produce limitless energy. I bet
you have the name of one of these cities: Pripyat. If you are interested to learn more about
the Soviet nuclear program from its origins in WW2 to the Chernobyl disaster and beyond, you
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it supports us at Real Time History directly. As usual you can find all the sources for
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Nebula, thank you so much for the support. For more about the Vietnam War, check out our
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this is a production of Real Time History, the only history channel that knows what
the hell is going on – in hindsight.
