In February 1943, Rommel’s panzers are
again on the attack in North Africa. This time he’s facing untested US troops
in the mountains of Tunisia - but the clock is ticking. As his veterans batter
their way through the Kasserine Pass, the British are steadily advancing behind him.
The Desert Fox has a bold plan to defeat the Allies in Tunisa for good. Little does he
know, however, it will be his last battle in the field - and will soon lead him to total
defeat in what some later will call Tunisgrad. By late 1942, Axis forces in North Africa are
on the backfoot. After Rommel’s decisive defeat at the Battle of El Alamein in November, British
General Bernard Montgomery’s Eighth Army chases the newly renamed German-Italian Panzer Army back
across the Libyan desert. Shortly afterwards, Anglo-American troops under General Dwight D.
Eisenhower land in Morocco and Algeria as part of Operation Torch. The goal for both the
Axis and Allied armies is Tunisia – home to the last major Axis ports of Bizerte and Tunis.
For Rommel, the shorter supply lines in Tunisia offer a chance to replenish his army and perhaps
bring it closer to being an effective force. But 2,500 kilometres of non-stop retreat has unsettled
the German high command. In Berlin, the general staff make arrangements for his replacement,
and continually ask Rommel to make much needed sick leave. He refuses for the time being.
Luckily for Rommel, Montgomery’s pursuit is slow. By prioritising fuel deliveries for the
best German units, most panzer divisions are able to limp across the Tunisian border.
Italian troops lacking vehicles are not so lucky, and the British take many prisoner.
On January 23, 1943 the British capture Tripoli, while to the west, the British 1st Army,
including the US II Corps and French XIX Corps approach from the Tunisian-Algerian border.
Meanwhile, the Italian navy and the Luftwaffe move reinforcement into Tunisia, some via the massive
Messerschmidt 323 transport planes. There they join German General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim’s 5.
Panzerarmee. Together with Rommel’s panzerarmee, the Axis have 104,000 German and 74,000 Italian
troops in or around Tunisia by late January 1943. However, both panzer armies are underequipped and
Rommel’s force has lost two-t hirds of its tanks and halftracks and nearly all of its artillery
in its retreat. However, around 800 Luftwaffe aircraft can provide local air superiority.
Tunisia promises a different kind of North African combat than the open deserts of Libya.
Here there are mountain ridges, narrow passes and vast salt marshes, making manoeuvre and
rapid advance difficult. Although cornered, the Axis troops still pose a threat to
the spread-out allies and prevent the rapid capture of the ports in late 1942.
So, allied troops set up positions along the East Dorsale Mountains. Eisenhower
requests permission to drive a wedge between von Arnim and Rommel, but his British
colleagues think the plan is too ambitious and want to wait for Montgomery’s arrival.
British officers also have reservations about the inexperienced Americans. Many
US officers have never seen combat, and major manoeuvres in 1941 showed deficiencies
in senior leadership, tactics and infantry training. Although re-training corrected some
issues, Eisenhower himself notes that some of his officers are complacent. Rommel has already
dismissed US troop as "Britain's Italians". The Axis wants to strike the Allies in the
West before Montgomery’s estimated arrival in the east in early March. Von Arnim’s
forces already had some success against US and French troops and he is confident he can
deliver a serious blow in southern Tunisia. Once Rommel arrive, the Germans adopt a two-part
plan. Operation Frühlingswind (Spring Breeze) will see Arnim’s 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions
strike against vulnerable US positions around Sidi Bou Zid – a major supply base and headquarters
of the US 1st Armored Combat Command A. Once von Arnim has pinned US forces there, Rommel’s
Panzerarmee will launch Operation Morgenluft (Morning Air), a rapid strike from Gabès to
Gafsa and through US positions around Kasserine. But things are tense at German headquarters.
Rommel and von Arnim don’t like each other, and their animosity grows as they work together
– which means overall commander Albert Kesselring has to intervene to smooth things over. The
dual operations also have no definitive end, instead German commanders will quickly
draw up extended plans based on results. On February 14, Von Arnim launches Frühlingswind,
with two armoured columns breaking out of Faïd. Supported by artillery and Stuka dive bombers,
the panzers take green US troops around Sidi Bou Zid by surprise. Isolated on two hill tops,
the US infantry is unable to move or support each other. With communications unreliable, Colonel
Thomas Drake of the 168th Infantry Regiment sends a desperate report written on toilet paper:
“Enemy surrounds 2nd Battalion (located on Mt. Lessouda)… Shelled, dive bombed and tank attack...
Germans have absolute superiority, ground and air... Am attempting to hold my CP position.
Unless help from air and armor comes immediately, infantry will lose immeasurably.” (Kelly 194)
But US forces are scattered around the region, and his commander Lt Gen Lloyd Fredendall
is over 100 kilometers away in Tébessa. On February 15, Shermans and Stuarts
of the 1st Armoured Combat Command A attempt to counterattack the experienced German
panzers, but the result is a slaughter. Airburst artillery forces the US tank commanders into
their turrets, reducing their visibility and speed. Lt Kurt Wolff recalls the results:
“...scarcely had the first shells left our guns than the first three enemy tanks were
on fire... [Soon] there were at least 15 burning tanks ahead of us [and] the remaining
enemy tanks had retreated... [The battalion commander] laughing like a boy, went from company
to company asking us and himself too: ‘Did you ever see anything like [that]?’” (Kelly 206)
The panicked withdrawal turns into a rout, with US troops fleeing their positions.
Meanwhile, Rommel’s troops launch Operation Morgenluft but find their main target of Gafsa
already abandoned. But instead of ruthlessly pursuing the fleeing Americans, the Axis units
advance cautiously, giving US troops time to take up new positions on the Western Dorsales.
Rommel, who was still overseeing the final elements of the Libyan evacuation, quickly
relocates to take command of the next stage. The success of Frühlingswind
and Morgenluft reinvigorates Rommel. He now develops an ambitious plan to
surround allied forces in western Tunisia. Rommel thinks if he gets command of all of von
Arnim’s armour, including heavy Tiger tanks, he can punch through Kasserine Pass and capture
the US supply depot and headquarters at Tébessa. Once resupplied with captured fuel, he
could then strike 225 kilometers to Bône on the Algerian coast, encircling the entire
allied force. He eagerly sends the plan to Kesselring and the Italian Commando Supremo.
But von Arnim is against the idea. Instead, he wants to keep his panzers for a conservative
operation towards the British depot at Le Kef. Although unlikely to completely defeat
the allies in the west, this will cripple them for the foreseeable future, allowing a stronger
defence against Montgomery when he arrives. The result is a compromise. Rommel gets von
Arnim’s panzers but must use them to strike towards Le Kef. Rommel’s Operation Sturmflut
is set for February 19. Two main columns would strike towards mountain passes at Kasserine
and the Sbiba Gap, and Rommel would reinforce which ever thrust produced the most results.
But Rommel wasn’t happy with this compromise, as he later revealed in his memoirs:
“At other times, our higher authorities were so wildly overoptimistic that they
hardly knew what to demand of us next; now, however, when a little boldness really
was required, they lacked the guts to give a wholehearted decision.” (Kelly 229)
Guarding Kasserine is a weak US force under Colonel Alexander Stark. His cryptic orders
from Fredendall reference a stubborn and costly last stand from the US Civil War:
“Go to Kasserine right away and pull a Stonewall Jackson.” (Citino 94)-
But Stark’s men are mostly construction troops and who have never seen action. They
struggle to build a hasty defensive line – they do plant 3000 mines, but simply lay many of these
on the road. The Americans do have help from a horse-drawn French battery of 75mm guns, but
powerful Allied armour reserves stay at the rear to avoid a repeat of the Sidi Bou Zid disaster.
At first, Rommel tries to force the pass with a decisive strike through the valley. But
French artillery and US machine guns push back the attackers. German commanders
order Panzergrenadiers to scale the heights either side of the pass and clear
out US infantry. Both attacks start with some success, but a lack of air support and
artillery means the Germans soon retire. Still, although the defence largely holds,
Axis troops are slowly advancing. Fredendall even prepares to abandon his HQ at Tébessa.
Meanwhile, the German strike against Sbiba is doing poorly. British and US anti-tank guns
repel the attack and Rommel decides to focus on Kasserine, including the newly arrived Nebelwerfer
rocket artillery. Late on February 20, US troops abandon their positions, leaving their armour
unsupported. The French artillerymen, having fired all their ammunition, spike their guns and
fall back. There is now nothing to stop Rommel’s panzers, which breach the pass and destroy a
small British armoured force sent to block them. Now flushed with victory, Rommel splits his
force in three and attacks towards Tébessa, Thala and Sbiba simultaneously.
But the Axis offensive is losing steam while fresh allied troops, with
armour and artillery, rush to the front. By splitting up his forces, Rommel has
weakened their offensive punch. Although the Germans briefly reach Thala, Allied material
superiority is turning the tide. By February 23, with clear skies bringing allied
air attacks, it's clear Le Kef is unreachable and Rommel calls off the attack.
The Battle of Kasserine Pass can be seen as both a US and German defeat. Although German troops force
the pass, the overall German plan failed quickly. US commanders are disappointed at their
performance. Some accuse Fredendall of hunkering down in his bunker instead of issuing
clear and decisive orders. Following Kasserine, he is replaced by General George Patton.
Historian Robert Citino concludes: “Although ‘blaming the general’ is the
most simplistic form of military history, it is occasionally hard to avoid. The evidence
against [Fredendall] is overwhelming.” (Citino 97) Others have been more forgiving, suggesting
Fredendall’s failure is indicative of wider issues concerning rapidly turning a small
peacetime army into a larger warfighting force, such as untested officers and tactics.
Furthermore, considering their lack of experience, US troops performed relatively well against
German veterans, even according to Rommel: “Die Amerikaner hatten sich
vorzüglich geschlagen.” - “The Americans performed excellently.” (Citino 97)
Rommel has also been criticised, especially his decision to split his force following Kasserine
and expect rapid drives in mountainous terrain. Some historians suggest it is surprising,
given his experience in the Alps in WWI, that Rommel did not clear the heights before
his armoured push. But Rommel likely felt he did not have the luxury of time, given
Montgomery’s Eighth Army was closing in. Rommel’s relationship with von Arnim impacted the
operation too. Rommel was outraged to find out von Arnim only sent half of the 10th Panzer Division,
and kept all the Tigers for himself. Von Arnim instead uses them in his owned failed offensive on
February 26, losing 15 of his 19 Tigers. These are losses the Germans cannot afford – by March,
they only receive 29,000 tons of the required 140,000 tons of supplies. Meanwhile,
the US alone bring in 400,000 tons. What is left of the Axis army in Africa will
now be needed to face off against Montgomery in the east, and Rommel rapidly relocates
to the Mareth Line to face his old opponent. Rommel doesn’t like the new position, which
consists of a series of pre-war French forts. But his superiors demand that he stops Eighth
Army outside of Tunisia. Hitler promises he’ll send new weapons and reinforcements, but by
now, Rommel only has 160 tanks, mostly Italian, against 800 tanks in Eighth Army. Meanwhile,
losses and fuel shortages mean the Luftwaffe has almost disappeared from the Tunisian sky.
Rommel knows Montgomery is getting stronger, so he orders a spoiling attack to disrupt
British preparations for March 6. However, his subordinates attack in the south after disagreeing
with his recommendations to attack along the coast. In any case, Montgomery’s dug in tanks and anti-tanks guns, including powerful
17-pounders, are waiting for them: “The silly buggers came right at us, didn’t they?
Some of us who were in the early desert fighting expected a Rommel flank attack, something
clever. It never happened. They kept coming straight across the plain.” (Watson 109)
Montgomery put it more succinctly: “The Marshal has made a balls of it.” (Citino 100)
Although only 94 Axis troops are killed, Rommel loses up to 56 tanks in what is his last
action as a commander in North Africa. On March 9, the Desert Fox finally agrees
to take sick leave in Germany. Montgomery now launches his attack on March 16. It
will be frontal charge supported by a wider flank, largely made up of New Zealand, Indian and French
Senegalese soldiers. The frontal assault initially has some success, establishing a bridgehead
across the Wadi Zigaou – but Allied troops soon lose the position with heavy casualties.
Frustrated, Montgomery prioritises the flanking manoeuvre. Indian troops use their mountain
experience to move through rough terrain and attack from behind the Mareth Line, while the
New Zealand Corps rush further to the Axis rear, breaking through Axis defences on March 26.
Rommel’s replacement, General Giovanni Messe, falls back to the narrow Wadi Akarit
position, but Allied forces overrun his lines by combined artillery bombardment,
frontal charges, and mountain infiltration. The situation is now dire for the Axis
troops. Hitler hopes Tunis and Bizerte can become meatgrinders to deplete allied
forces and delay a European invasion, but morale and equipment is lacking. By April, von Arnim’s Fifth Panzerarmee has
150,000 men and 150 tanks against 210,000 Allied troops and 1,200 tanks. Patton also regains US
positions at Gafsa and Sened Station, eventually linking up with the Eighth Army on April 7.
Now Eighth Army clashes against the new Axis positions at Enfidaville. Again the
first assaults fail, but mountain troops, including Gurkhas, backed up by accurate
concentrated artillery fire break the position open. For every Axis artillery
shell fired, the British fire up to 30. The US II Corps, now redeployed in the north
under General Omar Bradley, also batter their way towards Bizerte with renewed confidence. Von Arnim
sends Major Hans von Luck to Berlin to plead for an evacuation, but Hitler refuses to see him.
When Hitler finally allows an evacuation in late April, it is of little use since
the Axis lack aircover and shipping. On May 7, 1943, the Allies capture Bizerte and
Tunis. On May 13, Axis forces surrender along with tens of thousands of their troops. Many
are Italian non-combat and colonial troops, but many are also German veteran units like
the German veteran 15th and 21st Panzer and 90th Light Divisions which surrender to
a man. A contingent of the elite Hermann Göring division that fought in Tunisia is
also captured, though a few escape to Sicily. Almost immediately, Allied troops refer to the
Tunisia campaign as Tunisgrad – a reference to the recent Soviet victory at Stalingrad. This is
due not only to the tough nature of the fighting, but also the seemingly decisive nature of the
victory and the number of prisoners taken. Tunisia was not an easy victory for the allies,
and the disasters at Sidi Bou Zid and Kasserine Pass tainted British perceptions of
the Americans for some time. In total, the allies suffered 70,000 casualties in
Tunisia, with the US losing 2,715 dead, 9,000 wounded and 6,500 missing or captured in its
first major theater. Of course, these numbers are not close to Soviet losses at Stalingrad, but
they are a large portion of the roughly 240,000 allied casualties for the whole North African
theatre since 1941. Axis losses in Tunisia are up to 62,200 with 12,200 killed – also far less
than Stalingrad. Similar to Stalingrad though, the capture of Tunisia trapped and destroyed a
large Axis force of over 250,000 thousand men. Army Group Africa may not have been as central
to Axis war plans as Sixth Army at Stalingrad, but it was still a significant Axis
investment in manpower and resources. Its defeat also eliminated tens of thousands
of experienced troops as well material that Germany desperately needed elsewhere.
In fact, the Germans redirected transport planes earmarked for Stalingrad to Tunisia,
meaning they couldn’t supply either location properly. The Luftwaffe struggled to
recover from the losses it suffered over Tunisia and the Mediterranean theatre,
which amounted to 41% of the entire air force. The victory was also total, since the Axis would
never be able to return to Africa or even plan to. They would instead from now on move into
a defensive posture concerned with the defence of their key territories. Meanwhile, allied
– especially British – confidence grew after the disasters of 1939-41. Despite the Kasserine
defeat, Allied forces were starting to perfect an operational doctrine that combined high levels
of mechanisation with sophisticated logistics and thorough battle plans. This allowed them
to effectively translate their advantage in industrial capacity onto the battlefield.
Meanwhile, the victory showed the German way of war was faltering. German
principles of Auftragstaktik, or mission command, which emphasised autonomy
and flexibility at lower levels of command, were coming unstuck against Allied material
superiority and firepower. Such methods worked well in the early war against inexperienced
and unprepared enemies, but the Allied method left little room for mistakes the Axis could
exploit. As historian Paddy Griffith concluded: “German tactical analysts might growl
resentfully that US tactics were ‘inflexible, plodding and all about material superiority’
(exactly like Montgomery’s, in effect); but the fact remained that the Germans
could not win such a battle.” (Griffith 55) The rest of the fateful year of 1943
would only make this trend even clearer. Now that we covered Rommel’s last battle of the
Second World War, you might also be interested in Bernhard Montgomery’s last battle too. In late
1945 the 21st Army Group under Bernhard Montgomery had to cross the Rhine north of the Ruhr
region. In the last set piece battle of the Western Front, the Allies had fought
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