Early on December 16th, 1944, three German
armies of more than 200.000 men launch a surprise counterattack on the thinly held allied line
in the Ardennes Forest. Their goal is to turn the tide of the war
in Europe. The “Battle of the Bulge” sees a month
of some of the bitterest fighting of the war before the Allies stop the Germans – but
could the outcome have been different? In the second half of 1944, Nazi Germany’s
overall strategic and military situation has seriously worsened after the allied landings
in Normandy and the soviet summer offensive. The liberation of so many occupied territories
also means German war industry has lost valuable resources. Reich Minister for Armament and Ammunition
Albert Speer calculates in September 1944 that Germany only has enough resources for
one more year of war. In the face of this catastrophic situation,
a group of officers try to assassinate Adolf Hitler on July 20, 1944 - but he narrowly
escapes. Hitler decides that in order to regain domestic
control and the military initiative at the front, he has to launch a successful counterattack
in the west. Meanwhile the western allies are troubled
by logistical problems after their quick advance through western Europe. They decide to temporarily pause offensive
operations to reorganize and resupply. On the eastern front, the Soviets cross the
German border for the first time in October, but the Germans manage to stop them. Now they are preparing a winter offensive
to break through the German defences in Poland. In Germany, radical measures and maximum mobilization
of the population as part of the "Total War" programme enable the Nazi-regime to build
up its last new reserves in autumn. This is a last-ditch effort, but even so German
factories produce more tanks and guns in 1944 than ever before, despite Allied bombing. On the downside, from the German point of
view, the morale and training-level of the new units are usually low. Veteran instructor Günter Koschorrek complains
to his diary on October 9: “The rabble to be trained in our company consists of a mix
of older East Europeans of German ethnic descent, [...] and naval personnel, who because of
the shortage of ships are to be retrained as tank infantry.” (Caddick-Adams, p. 196) Manpower shortages
mean the new German divisions have a low combat strength. Whereas the average U.S. division has more
than 13,000 men, the average German division in late 1944 is down to only 9000. The equipment is mostly obsolete or inadequate,
and the artillery uses a ragtag assortment of mostly Soviet captured guns. Even though these desperation reserves are
of low quality and are the last Germany has, for the moment they give Wehrmacht commanders
the necessary breathing space to make concrete plans for Hitler’s offensive. By September 1944, Hitler is determined to
attack, on the 16th, he discusses it with his generals for the first time. He eventually decides in favour of a so-called
“big solution” against the advice of most of his Generals, who favour a more limited
operation towards Aachen and Liege. Hitler’s plan envisions a major operation
through the Ardennes to cut off all allied forces in western Germany and the Netherlands,
and capture of the important port city of Antwerp. The German planners choose the Ardennes not
only because few American troops are stationed there, but also because the Wehrmacht has
already managed to surprise the French with a successful breakthrough there back in 1940. Phase one of the operation is the crossing
of the Meuse River, followed by a strike towards the north leading to the capture of Antwerp. It is telling that the plans for the second
phase of the attack remain very vague, and there are no plans whatsoever for the time
after German units seize the city. Hitler hopes the offensive will break Allied
morale and allow Germany to conclude a compromise peace with the British and Americans, after
which all German forces can then be redeployed to the east. Most of his Generals are sceptical about the
operation. Gerd von Rundstedt writes of his doubts after
the war: “If we had reached the Meuse, we should have got down on our knees and thanked
God – let alone try to reach Antwerp.” Because the plan is made in a hurry, German
chief of staff Alfred Jodl has no time to provide a proper analysis of American forces
in the area, leading to a severe underestimation of enemy strength. And although many of the German units only
have enough fuel for 30-40 kilometres, Jodl expects his armoured spearheads to cross the
almost 200 kilometres to the Meuse in a single day. This means they absolutely must capture Allied
supply depots for the plan to have any chance. Another important factor in the German considerations
is the weather. The success of the operation depends on bad
weather, which would stop the Allies from using their crushing superiority in air power. Three Germans armies take part in the attack. Sepp Dietrich’s 6th SS-Panzerarmee is the
strongest, with all the remaining SS-Panzerdivisions, 500 tanks and more than 1000 guns. It is to cross the Meuse and take Antwerp. Hasso von Manteuffel commands the 5th Panzerarmee,
with 400 tanks and he has orders to establish a frontline around Brussels. Finally, Erich Brandenberger’s 7th Army
will take on the southern sector. His army is by far the weakest of the three,
being mostly unmotorized and without any tanks. Its task is to advance into Luxembourg and
southern Belgium and set up defenses to prepare for the expected counterattack from Patton’s
3rd US-Army. The weakness of 7th Army is a flaw in the
plan, because it means that the left flank of the entire operation is vulnerable from
the start. A defeat here runs the risk of undoing all
the potential successes further north. German commanders know this, but they do not
have the necessary reserves to alleviate the risk. In total, the Wehrmacht assembles more than
200,000 men in 29 divisions, 9 of which are Panzer divisions. But even the Wehrmacht’s own internal assessments
admit most of these divisions have a low combat readiness. Opposing the German strike force are the US
1st Army’s 5th Corps --under Leonard Gerow, and the US 3rd Army’s 8th Corps under Troy
Middleton. Allied forces in the region are facing problems
of their own: to strengthen their attack against the Rur river dams by 1st Army and Patton’s
3rd Army’s planned strike towards the Saar region, General Omar Bradley has stretched
US forces in the Ardennes sector extremely thinly. Another issue is that the troops in the Ardennes
include many “Cavalry Groups”, light and very flexible formations ideally suited to
pursue a fleeing enemy, but less capable when tasked with static defence or battles in forests. The US Army has not yet adequately converted
its order of battle from the quick summer advances to the more static situation that
set in during the fall. All in all, roughly 80,000 American soldiers
are in the Ardennes sector. So three German armies are ready to fall upon
two unsuspecting American corps, and when the weather forecast calls for bad weather,
the Germans put their plan in motion. The Germans deploy their troops in great secrecy
in November and early December, moving men and supplies at night. There are no cooking fires or movement during
daylight hours. German reconnaissance airplanes fly at low
altitude over the deployment area at night to check progress and detect forbidden lights,
but also to drown out the noise of vehicle engine. Even though allied reconnaissance detects
some signs of a German build-up, these are either not transmitted in time or not taken
seriously, leaving US forces unprepared. The deployment phase brings yet more problems
for the Germans: for fear of discovery, much of the materiel is unloaded too far away. The fact that Hitler and his Generals take
security concerns more seriously than logistical needs leads to unnecessary supply difficulties. When the offensive begins, the Germans only
have around 15,000 tons of artillery ammunition, even though they need 1,200 a day, so the
operation will run short after just 10 days. There are also problems with a lack of motorization.
17-year-old gunner Emil Frie, part of a rocket-launcher battery, later recalls: “It often happened
that one truck towed three launchers ... Sometimes the VW Kübelwagen used by the unit commander
was also hitched on behind. The whole train then looked more like a circus
[...][than] a dangerous military unit.” (Caddick-Adams, p. 203)
Meanwhile on the other side of the frontline, American soldiers are resting. Lieutenant-Colonel Daniel B. Strickler remembers:
“It was supposed to be a quiet sector as no aggressive fighting by either side had
taken place in that area, since the initial push to the German border in September.” (Caddick-Adams, p.184) But some of the soldiers
did notice strange occurrences and one GI reports: “[We are] constantly being hit
by reconnaissance patrols […] All night long, the minute it gets dark – they start
shooting [to cover] the rumble of heavy equipment – tanks moving around in position and what
not … something is going on.” (Caddick-Adams, p. 184) The German attack
But there is no quiet time for the Americans, as German units get their orders December
15. Friedrich Schmäschke, a seventeen-year-old
former navy soldier, remembers that night: “The peaceful silence of the bunker was
now replaced by restless muttering. There were even comrades who broke out in
wild euphoria … Then we had a hot meal which some ghoulishly called our ‘hangman’s
meal’. […] Some of the men turned to the liquor
ration to raise their spirits. […] Hand grenades, Panzerfausts and extra
small arms ammunition was passed out and we had to lie down and rest while fully dressed. […] We were to be awakened at 04:00 am but
that didn’t prove necessary since nobody slept.” (Caddick-Adams, p. 209)
The morning of December 16, German artillery batteries begin a heavy bombardment in preparation
of the assault. Then the German infantry charges forward to
clear a path for the tanks. US soldier Charlie Haug witnesses it all:
“We experienced what was perhaps the biggest hair-raising scare of our entire army career. Out of the darkness came the awfullest screaming
and yelling you would ever want to hear. The Germans were coming! They were screaming like a bunch of wild Indians.” (Caddick-Adams, p. 311)
In the northern sector the Germans immediately run into problems. Despite their four Panzer divisions, they
don’t even achieve the first objective of taking Elsenborn Ridge. Since the forest is extremely thick, the Germans
can use only a few narrow roads, resulting in a traffic jam. Then they send in the reserves too early to
force a breakthrough, which only makes things worse. In the central sector, the Germans have more
success on the first day. US troops are stretched out extremely thinly,
and von Manteuffel's Panzers break through almost everywhere. In the southern sector, the first day brings
mixed results. 7th Army’s spearheads attack across the
Our and Sauer Rivers in assault boats, suffering only light casualties. But due to a lack of bridging equipment and
precise US artillery fire, most of 7th Army remains stuck on the eastern banks of the
rivers. As the fighting on the first day finally ends,
a GI describes the aftermath in a letter home: “Everywhere there is a tangle of shell-shot
tree trunks, the litter of prolonged fighting at close quarters: bits of broken rifles,
bayonets, shattered helmets, unexploded hand grenades, fragments of shell, displaced sandbags,
broken stretchers, boots and gloves not quite empty and shreds of uniform and equipment.” (Caddick-Adams, p. 294)
At the end of December 16 Allied headquarters still thinks the attack is a limited operation. The scale becomes apparent the next day though,
when the Wehrmacht launches two special operations. The first is “Operation Stößer”, an
airborne operation to secure important road junctions and bridges ahead of the main advance. But it suffers from insufficient coordination
with the ground forces and little preparation time – in the end only about 300 paratroopers
make it to the target zone. They hide in the woods for three days with
limited food and water supplies, waiting in vain for support. The survivors then split up and sneak back
across the line on the 20th. The second operation, codenamed “Operation
Greif” is led by Otto Skorzeny. His unit filters through the frontline in
American uniforms and tries to cause chaos by swapping street signs and cutting telephone
lines. But the Americans catch most of the teams
quickly, and shoot nearly all Skorzeny’s men upon capture. German lawyers had assured Skorzeny beforehand
that wearing foreign uniforms was legal if no weapons were used. But that was in theory. In reality, shooting enemies who are wearing
friendly uniforms is common practice in all armies during the war. “Operation Greif” officially ends in the
evening of December 17, when a frustrated Skorzeny receives permission to use the rest
of his unit as a regular brigade instead. So the Germans have launched their desperation
offensive. So far the military results are mixed, and
where the Germans do advance, they commit war crimes. The most infamous unit in the offensive is
Kampfgruppe Peiper. Its commander, Joachim Peiper, is furious
because his unit is behind schedule, and the result is a series of massacres. The men of Kampfgruppe Peiper shoot 19 prisoners
at Honsfeld, 59 at Büllingen, 44 at Stoumont, 58 more at Ligneuville. Finally, on December 17 near Malmedy they
murder nearly 100 American prisoners just so they don’t have to escort the prisoners
to the rear. The civilian population also fears the return
of the Germans. People in German-speaking eastern Belgium
had enthusiastically supported reunification with Nazi-Germany in 1940. But being treated as second-class citizens,
people have grown increasingly weary of German rule as the war drags on. Nevertheless, there is still some pro-German
sentiment in 1944. There are even reports about local Germans
helping the advancing Wehrmacht on the battlefield. Not so Luxembourg. The discontent with German occupation explodes
when the Germans introduced conscription and forced labour in 1942. By 1944, many Luxembourgers have joined the
resistance and – using their German language skills – gather information which they pass
on to the Americans. In French-speaking Belgium, the people wholeheartedly
welcome the allies in September. As vengeful members of the German security
services return in December, many families flee to the west. Allied commanders hold a crisis meeting on
December 20. They decide to transfer American forces north
of the German breakthrough to British control, under Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s
21st Army Group. US 12th Army Group commander Omar Bradley
is extremely frustrated, but grudgingly accepts his orders. Overall, the change allows the Allies to get
reinforcements to the battlefield faster and more efficiently. Within a week, 250,000 American soldiers and
some British units from XXX Corps arrive in the threatened sector. By December 23, the German advance has slowed
down as the element of surprise wears off. The Wehrmacht lacks the logistics and the
motorization to carry enough materiel forward on lengthening supply lines. German propaganda film shows a disproportionate
number of tanks to mask the problem, but in the Ardennes their army uses 40 times as many
horses as tanks. Things get worse for the Germans when the
sky turns clear for the first time on December 23. Allied fighter-bombers immediately wreak havoc
on the advancing German columns, forcing them to move troops only at night and depriving
them of mobility and tactical flexibility. As the poorly equipped German infantry suffers
high casualties from American artillery fire, the tanks often have to attack towns alone
– a task which they are not suited for. Christmas eve turns out to be the high-water
mark of the German attack. Although the German advance starts to grind
to a halt on December 24, the Battle of the Bulge is far from over. Back on the 20th, German troops surrounded
the important Belgian transport hub of Bastogne along with roughly 15,000 US troops. American Private Joseph Syiek is caught in
the trap: “Early Tuesday morning we were surrounded and the Germans began to close
in on us. As the day rolled on the enemy showered us
with mortar, artillery and machine-gun fire. Men were going mad. There was no organisation, there was no way
to go, we were all scared.“ (Caddick-Adams, p.474)
The Germans plan to take the town in a quick surprise attack, but this fails since US command
also realizes its strategic importance and immediately activates the 101st Airborne division,
evidence of US tactical flexibility. The orders go out on December 17th, and within
two days more than 3,000 trucks bring 12,000 US troops and supplies to Bastogne. The Germans’ first probing attacks on the
town fail, so they make the fateful decision to split up. While two Panzer Divisions continue their
advance to the west, the 26th Volksgrenadier Division stays behind to continue the siege. Panzer Lehr Division commander Fritz Bayerlein
regrets the move after the war: “It was one of the greatest mistakes that
Bastogne, on failure of the coup, was not immediately captured by a concentrated attack
of all our forces. If this had been done, it would certainly
have fallen.”(Schrijvers, p. 73) Because the Germans don’t have enough artillery
ammunition to destroy the US defenders, the Germans decide to try a bluff on December
22. They demand that the encircled US forces surrender,
but US commander Anthony McAuliffe famously rejects the ultimatum with a single word:
“Nuts”. The same day that McAuliffe tells off the
Germans at Bastogne, Patton’s 3rd Army starts to move north towards besieged Bastogne. But it remains unclear when they will be able
to help. The first relief for the defenders appears
on December 23, when 240 Douglas C-47 transport planes drop more than 230 tons of supplies
into the town. In the following days the Germans launch increasingly
desperate but futile attacks to seize the town, while Patton’s relief force works
its way closer and closer. Patton’s army lifts the siege on the 27th,
when they smash through the disintegrating and starving 5th Fallschirmjägerdivision. The US tanks roll right through the German
positions, all guns blazing, and establish contact with the encircled US-paratroopers. The Wehrmacht launches counterattacks against
the small corridor, but they fail. 3rd US-Army pushes on past Bastogne and links
up with 1st Army forces coming from the north at Houffalize on January 16, marking the end
of the Battle for Bastogne. 20,000 Americans (including 4,500 from the
101st Airborne alone) and 25,000 Germans die in a battle fought for a town with a peacetime
population of 4,000 at the junction of seven roads. But the Battle of the Bulge extends far beyond
the dramatic siege at Bastogne. With strategic initiative back with the Allies,
the Americans strike back to regain their lost positions. And they have a lot of firepower. Artillery and fighter bombers systematically
bomb German-held villages to the ground, before combined arms US forces clear them of any
resistance. German morale starts to crumble under the
relentless pounding. Those who continue to fight are increasing
desperate, sometimes forcing civilians or prisoners to help them dig trenches or prepare
defenses. On January 1, US Forces commit a war crime
after storming the heavily defended hamlet of Chenogne. Sergeant John Fague describes the events:
“[...] I know some of our boys were lining up German prisoners in the fields on both
sides of the road. They must have been 25 or 30 German boys in
each group. […] These boys were to be machine gunned
and murdered. We were committing the same crimes we were
now accusing the Japs and Germans of doing. […] I turned my back on the scene and walked
on up the hill.” The same day, the Germans launch yet another
special operation, “Operation Bodenplatte”, this time by the Luftwaffe. All operational fighter planes on the western
front are to take off simultaneously, attack Allied airfields and destroy all enemy aircraft
on the ground. Shortly after daybreak, about 1000 German
airplanes take to the air. The pilots are excited by the magnitude of
it all: “I was amazed myself. […] The sky was full of machines. The civilians stood there frozen. When vwe flew over the front, the soldiers
also stood there and marvelled. We were all flying low.” (Beevor, p. 349)
The excitement is short-lived, as Luftwaffe chief Hermann Göring issues brutal orders:
“Whoever returns [without having] effectively attacked the enemy airfield, or whoever fails
to find it, shall immediately take off again and fly another attack.” (Beevor, p.349)
This is a disastrous order, since German pilots making a second run no longer have the element
of surprise. Coordination with ground forces is another
problem, resulting in a number of friendly fire incidents. Fuel shortages made worse by long approach
distances also hamper the success of the operation. In total, the Germans lose more than 300 aircraft. The allies lose 260 planes, but they can replace
their losses quickly while the Germans cannot replace theirs at all. The fighting continues in the first weeks
of January, as the allies slowly push forward against stubborn German resistance. The Germans finally acknowledge their defeat
on January 10, when German high command pulls three Panzerdivisions out of the front line
to send them to Hungary. Starting on the 12th, when the Red Army launches
its winter offensive on the Vistula River, Wehrmacht forces in the Ardennes are weakened
even further. The Germans divert all available reserves
to the east, which stabilizes just 70km from Berlin when the Soviets outrun their supply
lines. From now on, the remaining German forces in
the Bulge are reduced to rear-guard actions. On January 28, the US army officially declares
the Battle of the Bulge to be over. Casualty figures, result of the battle, conclusion
The Ardennes campaign costs the Americans about 8600 dead, 21,000 missing and 47,000
wounded, plus 20,000 cases of non-battle casualties like frostbite and trench foot. The Germans lose about 15,500 men killed,
27,500 missing or captured and 42,000 wounded. More than 2500 Belgian and 500 Luxembourg
civilians also perish. Most are shot by pillaging German soldiers
or by the German security services. Roughly 1000 die as a consequence of Allied
air raids on German-held villages The towns and villages of the region are devastated,
and it takes years to rebuild the infrastructure, recover the bodies of the fallen soldiers,
and clear unexploded ordinance. The Ardennes offensive ends in a clear German
defeat after a month of fighting. But was there ever a chance for the German
battle plan to succeed? The German offensive suffered from severe
structural weaknesses: supplies were insufficient and unloaded too far away from the front. Most of the units involved were only told
about the attack the night before it started, so they had no chance to conduct a proper
reconnaissance of terrain and enemy strength, and attacked blindly. These two factors show the German leadership’s
increasing paranoia, prioritizing secrecy over proper preparation. Another mistake was that the best German units
were assigned to Dietrich's SS Panzer Army in the northern sector, even though that is
where they expected the strongest Allied resistance. This is in contrast to common military wisdom
according to which the units that face the least resistance should be reinforced. This can allow one to expand a breakthrough
at a weaker point and achieve an encirclement of the enemy without having to expose the
soldiers to attrition. The reasons for this German mistake were in
part political: Hitler had lost confidence in the regular army after the assassination
attempt against him, and instead relied heavily on the Waffen-SS. But the Waffen-SS suffered from a lack of
planning efficiency and ideology-driven presumptions, so its troops were not used efficiently. But even if the Waffen-SS units had fought
smarter, the success of the operation also relied on factors that were out of German
control, like bad weather and capturing enemy fuel depots. It remains unclear how the Germans planned
to outmanoeuvre the Americans to reach the depots before them, despite being far less
motorized. By late 1944 the German Army was no match
for its enemies. It was mostly of last-ditch levies, equipped
with outdated weaponry, and lacking logistics. It could not stand a prolonged offensive,
since the German war industry was running out of resources and could not supply the
German Army with the materiel needed to replace its losses. One of the most decisive factors was the complete
allied air superiority once the weather had cleared, which cut German supply lines and
logistical hubs, and provided fire support for Allied ground troops. Given all these factors, the German offensive
was doomed from the start and never had a chance of success. The Battle of the Bulge was a total German
defeat, on the tactical and the strategic levels. The Nazis severely underestimated both American
strength and will to fight, and overestimate the Wehrmacht’s capabilities. The Ardennes offensive and the waste of Germany’s
last reserves only ensured that the war would drag on for a little longer, and quickened
the Red Army’s advance on Berlin. After the Battle of the Bulge, the western
Allies regroup and strike into the industrial heartland of Germany in February and March,
in the last set-piece battle on the Western Front of WW2: The Rhineland campaign. In the battle for the Rhine a combined British
and American force would fight their way across the German border towards the mighty Rhine
River. To cross this last big natural obstacle before
the German heartland, the Allies combined a huge amphibious crossing with the biggest
single day airborne operation of the entire war. If you want to learn more about this often
overlooked campaign, you can watch Rhineland 45, our 5-part, 3.5-hour documentary series
about it. Filmed on the former battlefields, using detailed
maps and animation, together with expert guests like Christoph Bergs or David Willey from
the Tank Museum, and featuring a veteran interview, Rhineland 45 is the most detailed documentary
about the Rhineland campaign. Because we show the war as it really happened,
this series is not available on YouTube because it would get immediately demonetized. Instead, Rhineland 45 is available on Nebula,
a streaming platform we built together with other creators where we don’t have to worry
about YouTube’s content restrictions. If you go to nebula.tv/realtimehistory and
sign up you can get Nebula and save 40%! For just 3$ a month or 30$ per year you can
watch our videos and Nebula Originals, or other smart creators like Mustard or Real
Engineering and all of that ad-free and earlier than on YouTube while supporting us directly. That’s nebula.tv/realtimehistory We want to thank David Lang for his help with
this episode. If you are watching this video on Patreon
or Nebula, thank you so much for the support, we could not produce videos like this without
your support. If you want to watch another video about a
dramatic late WW2 battle, check out our video about the Battle of Iwo Jima. I am Jesse Alexander and this is a production
of Real Time History, the only YouTube history channel that won’t fall on their knees when
reaching the Meuse river.
