By 1953 Ho Chi Minh’s communist guerrillas
have fought the French Army for 7 years in Vietnam. The French are struggling to pin
down and destroy the illusive Viet Minh revolutionaries. They now hope US support and a new ambitious
outpost will force Ho Chi Minh’s troops into a final decisive battle in the valley
of Dien Bien Phu. By early 1953, the Indochina War is a stalemate.
Both sides, the Viet Minh and French Union, have experienced their fair share of victories
and defeats. Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap’s Viet Minh forces wiped out the French border
forts and garrisons in 1950, and ambushed a major French patrol in 1952, but they have
been unable to capture significant French positions defended by artillery and airpower.
In their attacks on Vinh Yen in 1951 and Na San in 1952, they suffer huge casualties for
no gain. Meanwhile, French Union troops have been able
to hold the Red River Delta, but are unable to pursue Viet Minh forces and destroy them
on their terms. To solve the problem, Paris sends General
Henri Navarre to Indochina in May 1953. H e has been instructed to find an honourable
way out of the war, but to do this, he needs victories on the battlefield to gain a diplomatic
advantage. He knows that his paratrooper and Foreign Legion forces are vital to offensive
operations, but their manpower is being used up defending almost 900 garrisons across Indochina.
So Navarre decides to abandon many remote garrisons, including Na San, and consolidate
forces in the Red River Delta in anticipation for a future offensive. In central and southern
Vietnam commando-style raids will mop up isolated Viet Minh groups, but elsewhere he focuses
on training up local Vietnamese forces. Once they can take over garrison duties, French
troops will be freed up for mobile operations. He also asks the United States for more help.
In the US, former WW2 commander Dwight D. Eisenhower is now in the White House. He’s
concerned about communism’s spread in Europe and is fearful of a similar fate in Asia.
In July 1953, the Korean War ends in a stalemate and the peninsula’s division. On one hand,
the Korean War showed the ability of international forces to stem the tide of communism, but
on the other it came at a huge cost and no definitive victory.
The experience also shifts US attitudes towards Ho Chi Minh. Previously, Truman’s administration
had been sympathetic to Vietnamese independence movements opposing French colonialism. An
American OSS team had even trained and supplied Ho Chi Minh and Võ Nguyên Giáp in August
1945 to fight the Japanese occupying Indochina. However, Eisenhower’s administration now
sees the hand of monolithic Soviet communism behind the Viet Minh movement. The US agrees
to bankroll Navarre’s plan with a $400 million aid package, but only on the condition France
abandons planned negotiations with Ho Chi Minh - and accepts West German remilitarisation
in Europe. Soon, Viet Minh movements force a French response,
since the revolutionaries are extending operations into Laos. Such a move would extend the war
beyond the range of French mobile groups based in the Red River Delta, making future French
operations harder. Navarre decides to interrupt the Viet Minh supply routes into Laos by seizing
the strategically important village of Dien Bien Phu in an airborne attack. On November 20, 1953 six French parachute
battalions drop into the area. They encounter light resistance, although even this is more
than anticipated. Major Bigeard of the 6th Colonial Parachute Battalion recalled:
“When we came down on November 20, we were told there would be no Vietnamese. But there
were two companies exactly where we jumped. Some of my men were killed before they even
touched the ground, others were stabbed where they landed.” (Tucker-Jones, 79)
After the French secure the area, they paradrop bulldozers and other equipment to create a
new air-head. The plan is for Dien Bien Phu to serve as a base for offensive raids and
patrols into the Viet Minh rear areas. Much like at Na San, it will be resupplied entirely
by air via its two airstrips in the valley. In early 1954, French forces turn Dien Ben
Phu into a fortified position with nine defensive bastions, with an inner and outer ring. Most
of these are on the flat valley floor next to the vital airstrips, although several are
located on the hills above. The French fly in troops and equipment, including artillery,
ten M24 Chaffee tanks and nine Bearcat fighter bombers. To deliver the tanks, they break
the vehicles down into multiple parts and reassemble them on site after delivery. They
also bring in Vietnamese and Algerian women to work at the base brothel.
A near constant stream of transports eventually deliver around 10,800 men to the camp by January
– many of them colonial or Vietnamese troops. Colonel Charles Piroth, commander of artillery
at Dien Bien Phu insists his guns will wipe out any Viet Minh artillery that might approach.
“No Viet Minh gun will fire three rounds without being destroyed.” (Tucker-Jones
87) But the Dien Bien Phu position has some critical
flaws, which are quickly recognised by the Viet Minh. It is 275 kilometers from Hanoi
– much further than Na San. Both air supply and support will be slower to arrive, while
it is also out of the range of ground based French mobile groups.
Since it has been developed as an offensively orientated camp, its defences are also not
as prepared as at Na San. There are large gaps between bastions, some of which are isolated
far from the headquarters. The French artillery at Dien Bien Phu is poorly protected and - with
only 60 guns – is not proportional to the size of the camp. Perhaps most important of
all, much of the camp – including the vital airstrip - is overlooked by forested hills.
The French know about these vulnerabilities, but don’t consider them critical. Locally
based aircraft including a handful of early helicopters can provide constant air support,
while the hills are generally considered impassable for heavy equipment. In any case, the Viet
Minh have never shown much skill for artillery or anti-aircraft tactics. Isolated bastions
will merely lure the Viet Minh in, where – much like at Na San – the French can destroy
them. Viet Minh military commander Võ Nguyên Giáp
moves 50,000 regular Viet Minh troops into the area – about a third of his total regular
force. Furthermore, with the Korean War over, the Viet Minh can count on more Chinese support.
Viet Minh troops undergo training in artillery, heavy weapons and engineering, and they are
now equipped with larger calibre artillery, including American models captured in Korea,
and more sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons. The Central Military Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party tells its advisors in Indochina: “To eliminate the enemy totally and to win
the final victory in the campaign, you should use overwhelming artillery fire. Do not save
artillery shells. We will supply and deliver sufficient shells to you.” (Chen 104)
The French notice the build-up and attempt to bomb Viet Minh columns on roads and known
jungle paths. However, an army of Vietnamese porters cut new hidden paths through the jungle
– eventually totalling over 500 kilometers. By January, around 240 Viet Minh artillery
pieces, heavy mortars, recoilless rifles and flak guns have been manoeuvred into the hills
surrounding Dien Bien Phu. Such a concentration of manpower and equipment is a gamble for
Giap, as it leaves other areas undefended and could result in the loss of precious heavy
weapons. However, negotiations are planned for April, and he knows whoever wins at Dien
Bien Phu will gain a diplomatic advantage. Giap’s guns open fire on January 31, 1954,
and continue to fire intermittently for six weeks. The Vietnamese gunners are ranging
their guns and observing French counter-battery fire. By March, the valley is a moonscape
and the French await the coming assault. War reporter André Lebon recorded a conversation
between two French troopers: “It’s going to be like Na-San, only ten
times bigger.” “Or almost Verdun! This time they’ll put
all their big artillery here and will show us what they have learned about big-war fighting.”
(Fall 136) On March 11, the first Viet Minh probing attacks
target the northern Gabrielle, Anne-Marie and Beatrice bastions. Isolated on a hilltop,
Beatrice is especially exposed. Viet Minh assaults show more sophistication than at
Na San. Before an attack, they pound French positions with accurate artillery, collapsing
bunkers and knocking out guns. A legionnaire at Beatrice recalls the barrage:
“We are all surprised and ask ourselves how the Viets have been able to find so many
guns capable of producing an artillery fire of such power. Shells rained down on us without
stopping like a hailstorm on a fall evening. Bunker after bunker, trench after trench,
collapsed, burying under them men and weapons.” (Fall 137)
Viet Minh diversionary attacks prevent the French from sending help, and Beatrice is
overrun on March 14, with 75 percent French casualties. Next, Giap targets Gabrielle and
despite a French armoured counterattack, the position falls.
French counter battery fire is ineffective and fires 25 percent of their ammunition in
the first day. As resupply aircraft attempt to land, they encounter a hail of anti-aircraft
fire from the surrounding hills. Meanwhile, artillery hits the runway. Vietnamese shells
destroy C-47 transport planes on the ground and damage all but two Bearcats.
On March 15, with much of the French artillery destroyed or ineffective, Colonel Piroth apologises
to officers before killing himself with a grenade. To many, the battle already seems
lost, but the remaining French troops fight on, and reinforcements are dropped onto the
camp. Up to 4,300 French troops – some with no parachute experience - will be dropped
onto Dien Bien Phu from mid-March to early May. In early April, French paratrooper , jumped
into Dien Bien Phu at night: “I jumped with the first wave close to midnight.
No sooner did my parachute open than I found myself in the middle of an extraordinary spectacle—anti-aircraft
fire, illumination flares, tracer rounds—it was a real Bastille Day fireworks show.”
French nurses are often on board return flights to care for the wounded, and one – Geneviève
de Galard – ends up staying on the base throughout the entire siege to care for the
wounded, earning her the Légion d’Honneur. The French troops now reinforce the main camp,
while their leaders discuss three ways of out the developing disaster. Operation Condor
would see a relief column march on Dien Bien Phu. Operation Albatross would be a garrison
breakout towards French positions. Or Operation Vulture, which would be a request to the US
for more military support. The French decide to pursue both Condor and
Vulture, with Albatross held in reserve. However, it is extremely difficult to gather the transport
and troops needed for Condor and commanders are sceptical. Instead, Navarre focuses on
Vulture. He asks the US to lend France heavy B-29 bombers which can blow away Viet Minh
artillery and anti-aircraft positions. Officially, the B-29s will be flown by French crews, but
given the training difficulties, it's debatable how likely this is. The Americans understand
that the French are asking for direct US military involvement.
The request does have supporters in Washington. Secretary of State John Dulles and Vice President
Richard Nixon support armed intervention – perhaps even the use of atomic bombs. But others aren’t
so keen. By 1954, the US is already covering almost 80 percent of French military expenditure
in Indochina, and General Matthew Ridgeway, former commander in Korea, suggests further
commitment will bog down resources and likely provoke Chinese intervention.
He is joined by House Minority leader Lyndon B. Johnson who argues any intervention should
be part of an international coalition, including Britain and other democratic Asian states.
President Eisenhower writes British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to encourage a
united front: “If I may refer again failed to halt Hirohito,
Mussolini and Hitler by not acting in unity and in time. That marked the beginning of
many years of stark tragedy and desperate peril. May it not be that our nations have
learned something from that lesson?” (Fall 303)
The letter gets a cool reception in Britain, where the public favours a negotiated settlement
with the Viet Minh. There will be no international coalition, and consequently no official US
intervention – although 37 American pilots fly 682 resupply sorties to Dien Bien Phu.
They are officially employed by Civil Air Transport, an airline covertly operated by
the CIA. Some historians suggest Eisenhower knew his
proposal would fail, but was looking for a way to avoid intervention while simultaneously
appearing supportive of France. He later stated: “if the United States were, unilaterally,
to permit its forces to be drawn into conflict in Indochina and in a succession of Asian
wars, the end result would be to drain off our resources and to weaken our overall defensive
position.” (Thee 124) So, by late March, the besieged French defenders
of Dien Bien Phu are on the verge of defeat. The Vietnamese have captured much of the northern
camp and nearly put the airfield out of action. With no US support coming, the French prepare
a relief column in Laos – although poor weather and Viet Minh activity will get in
the way. Meanwhile, French air support is ineffective
against the Viet Minh. With Dien Bien Phu’s own planes destroyed, it must rely on air
support from the Red River Delta. But heavy anti-aircraft fire means few plans remain
in the area to properly spot and hit Viet Minh targets. As napalm supplies are used
up, the French resort to dropping Lazy Dog cluster bombs – anti-personnel weapons consisting
of 11,200 sharpened, finned flechettes which could penetrate jungle cover over a wide area
and with deadly effect. Undeterred, the Viet Minh continue their assault.
On March 30 they target bastions Dominique 1 and 2 as well as Elaine 1, 2 and 4 in the
so-called Battle of the Five Hills. Despite some French success with quad mounted
.50 calibre anti-aircraft guns used in a ground role, they lose parts of Dominique and Elaine
in heavy fighting. The French do launch some successful counterattacks, but in reality
these just weaken the remaining units. With casualties among the Legionnaires and paratroopers
growing, the defence increasingly falls to French-allied Vietnamese, Algerian, and Moroccan
auxiliary units. With fighting raging in the east, the Viet
Minh attack the west of the headquarters, targeting bastions Francoise and Huguette.
Viet Minh casualties are very heavy and Giap admits the fighting for Huguette is testing
his soldiers’ nerve: “The principle trait of that phase of the
battle has been the violent character of the combat... the battle having lasted a very
long time, more troops – who had to fight without interruption - become fatigued and
are worn and are faced with great nervous tension... Our forces have not been able to
avoid decimation, which requires rapid reorganisation and reinforcement.” (Fall 278)
To avoid a collapse in morale, Giap resorts to siege tactics to break the heavily fortified
headquarters. Chinese engineers arrive, and Viet Minh troops dig sapping tunnels, assault
trenches and other siegeworks to close up to French positions. Since mid-April, the
French only hold an area roughly 1.5km in diameter and supplies are running low. Transport
planes attempt to para-drop supplies, but many fall on Viet Minh positions. To make
matters worse, since April 22 Viet Minh ambushes and monsoon rains have slowed the relief effort.
By early May, the French defenders were under a hail of artillery fire in flooded trenches.
Captain Foureux recalls: “On the afternoon of May 6 [Major] Bréchignac
asked me to go with a radio operator toward the center of the fighting to look for a less
pulverized place where we could reassemble the surviving elements of the battalion. I
advanced through the trenches in mud up to my chest. The shells never ceased to fall.
At a bend in a trench I lost sight of the radio operator. He must have been killed by
a shell and swallowed up by the mud. I realized then that the end was at hand.”
In the final assaults, a new Chinese weapon arrives on the battlefield: Six-barrelled
rocket launchers similar to the Second World War German Nebelwerfer. The Viet Min h use
them for the last barrages on the headquarters positions, which comes under direct assault
on May 7. By 6pm, they`ve taken main camp. Now only the isolated French bastion of Isabelle
holds out. Under full Viet Minh attack, the defence is hopeless. With one defender describing
conditions as “hell in a very small place”, the French decide to breakout to the south
in multiple directions. Most though will be killed or captured, and only 78 French troops
are able to escape Dien Bien Phu. On May 8, while France celebrates the 9th
anniversary of the Allied victory over Germany, relief units confirm Dien Bien Phu’s fall
with a single codeword: “Austerlitz”. The Battle of Dien Bien Phu is a disaster
for the French colonial authorities. 2,300 French troops are killed, 6,400 wounded and
9,000 captured. Viet Minh casualties may be as high as 30,000, but Ho Chi Minh secures
an important victory on the eve of the negotiations. Despite significant French and allied military
personnel remaining in Indochina, Dien Bien Phu signals the end of the French will to
fight. The war is already unpopular, or even irrelevant, in metropolitan France. A May
1953 survey reports only 23 percent of French respondents took an active interest in what
was now termed la sale guerre – the dirty war.
The First Indochina War would cost the lives of almost 79,000 French Union troops, including
15,000 North Africans. Up to 200,000 Viet Minh may have also been killed.
At the Geneva Accords in July 1954, the US, Britain, France, Soviet Union and China strike
a deal. Laos and Cambodia become independent kingdoms, and Vietnam is divided into two
states along the 17th Parallel – a northern communist state under Ho Chi Minh, and a southern
non-communist one led by Bao Dai and his Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem. In exchange, the Viet
Minh withdraw all units to the north in anticipation of Vietnam-wide elections in 1956. The now
independent Republic of Vietnam in the south expels French administrators and troops in
favour of American support. For Ho Chi Minh and his supporters, the deal
is not a good one. They had long fought for a unified Vietnamese state, however, the Chinese
pressure them to compromise. China has achieved its national security goals of creating a
secure frontier and preventing US military intervention. Creating a unified and powerful
independent Vietnamese communist state with a strong nationalist ideology might not actually
be beneficial to Chinese regional aspirations – especially given historical tensions between
Chinese and Vietnamese states. Instead, China hopes to pursue a “peace
offensive” in the coming years to legitimate its state and shore up its diplomatic and
strategic gains. For Viet Minh leader Le Duan, it`s a bitter pill to swallow:
“I travelled by wagon to the south. Along the way, compatriots came out to greet me,
for they thought we had won a victory. It was so painful.” (Tucker-Jones 114)
For the US, a north Vietnamese communist state is cause for alarm. Soon, Eisenhower is talking
of other Asian states potentially succumbing to communism like “falling dominos”. American
leaders now discuss protecting South Vietnam from its communist neighbour, and with the
French out of the picture, they feel they can do so without the taint of colonialism.
So, in 1954, Indochina’s struggles – especially Vietnam’s - were far from over. And neither was the Cold War. One year after
the Death of Stalin, the nuclear arms race between the super power continued and the
Soviet Union still pursued the vision of “Atomic Powered Communism” by rapidly expanding
the construction of nuclear reactors across the country. If you are interested to learn
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for 40% off an annual subscription and supporting us directly. I hope you liked this video about the most
well-known battle of the 1st Indochina War. It’s part of a series by the way, if you
want to learn more about the origin and the previous battles, check out our recent video.
In the next episode we will start covering the US-Vietnam War. So stay tuned for more.
As usual you can find all our sources in the video description below. If you are watching
this video on Nebula or Patreon, thank you so much for the support, we couldn’t do
it without you. I’m Jesse Alexander and this is a production of Real Time History,
the only history channel that always flies Civil Air Transport.
