When the US got involved in the Vietnam War,
they considered it a “limited” conflict – but the Second Indochina War that raged for twenty
years was not limited for the Vietnamese. It cost the lives of millions of people, saw
more bombs dropped than in World War Two and even before the first US ground troops
landed in Vietnam, the CIA and thousands of Americans were already involved. So
how and why did the US get into Vietnam? In 1954, the First Indochina War between
French colonial forces and Ho Chi Minh’s communist revolutionaries comes to an end
after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. In the following Geneva Accords, the US, France,
Britain, the Soviet Union and China agree to divide Vietnam into two temporary states along the
17th Parallel – the communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the North led by Ho Chi Minh, and
non-communist State of Vietnam in the south led by former Emperor Bao Dai. The country is supposed
to be reunified after elections planned for 1956. The deal is less than Ho Chi Minh hoped. He fought
for a single unified Vietnamese state but his Chinese and Soviet supporters pressure him into
accepting compromise, since they want to prevent further US intervention in Asia. For France, the
deal lets them end an unpopular war and quietly leave the region. So, the Geneva Accords
serve the major powers, but don’t solve the fundamental concerns of Vietnamese nationalists.
Although the US takes an active role in the talks, it publicly downplayed its involvement as
a mere “interested nation”. Washington is concerned about concessions to the Communists,
and it had militarily supported France during the Indochina War. Although the US decided
against armed intervention at Dien Bien Phu, CIA pilots flew supplies into the besieged
base. But now with the French on their way out, President Eisenhower increases support to the
State of Vietnam, free from European colonial overtones. Despite the planned elections, the US
starts a “nation-building” program in the south. Washington supports the South for one major
reason: fear of communist expansion. For the US, Ho Chi Minh is a puppet of Soviet
Communism. If Vietnam falls, Laos, Cambodia, India, Burma, Thailand, the rest of
Southeast Asia and maybe even Australia could follow like tumbling dominoes.
As French administrators leave, the US identifies Bao Dai’s Prime Minister,
Ngo Dinh Diem, as the most viable alternative to Ho Chi Minh. Although Diem lacks charisma,
he’s an anti-French, a Catholic nationalist, and fervently anti-communist. The US hopes
that under their guidance, he can introduce democratic reforms and stop communism’s spread.
But not everyone is enthusiastic for Diem or the State of Vietnam. General Matthew Ridgway,
former US commander in Korea and World War II, strongly opposes the US commitment. He
worries the US will become bogged down in another ideological struggle in Asia, which
firepower alone will not solve. Diem’s democratic credentials aren’t very reassuring either.
In October 1955, Diem removes Bao Dai in a referendum, creating the Republic of Vietnam in
the south. He supposedly wins 98.91 percent of the vote, raising some eyebrows in Washington.
But his recent ability to suppress communists, as well as criminal syndicates and militant
religious sects, leads to US approval. Around the same time, military advisors
arrive with CIA representatives in tow. The US now pours resources into
South Vietnam. In the late 1950s, the US provides a quarter of a billion dollars
per year – around 2.75 billion today. But little goes to building South Vietnam’s economic base.
80 percent goes to the military, especially the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, the ARVN.
With these forces Diem tightens his control. In 1956, Diem replaces traditional village
chiefs with Saigon officials. Many village leaders are thought to harbour communist
sympathies, but their removal leads to rural discontent. Re-education programmes
and slow land reform do not help matters. There is also a security clamp down. By
1958, Saigon has arrested 25,000 people and 90 percent of the communist parties' important
members in the south. Diem’s Decree 10/59 outlaws most opposition and refuses to recognise
communist resistance against the French. A Saigon newspaper carries his declaration:
“[The Indochinese Communist Party] pursued Communist objectives, and sought to turn
Vietnam into a colony and the Vietnamese into the slaves of Red imperialism. They are
Communists, traitors, and agents of Russia and China.” (Gettleman 274/275)
Diem’s security forces, often minority Catholics, also target
middle-class intellectuals and Buddhists, who they see as centres of political opposition.
Diem makes it clear he will not honour the 1956 unification referendum as promised by the
Geneva Accords, because he claims no free election can happen in the communist north. The
US approves, but largely because they expect Ho Chi Minh to easily win. Instead, Eisenhower
invites Diem to Washington to show support: “[Diem is] an example for people everywhere who
hate tyranny and love freedom.” (Lawrence TVW 59) Meanwhile, in the North, frustration is building.
Ho Chi Minh officially forbids southern Communists from committing violence, and instead concentrates
on propaganda and building up the north. Estimates vary, but while enacting land reforms, northern
government agents execute around 15,000 North Vietnamese as supposed “evil landlords and
subversive elements”. Ho’s Commander-in-chief, General Vo Nguyen Giap later admits the crimes:
“We made too many deviations and executed too many honest people... Worse still, torture
came to be regarded as a normal practice during party reorganisation.” (Langer 52)
Ho now faces pressure to increase military activity in the south. Some southern
communist groups are already ignoring his orders for non-violence, and military
leaders are increasingly side-lining their own leader. In 1959, the North officially supports
a “protracted armed struggle [to] overthrow the US-Diem regime.” They infiltrate thousands of
fighters and weapons into south via the Ho Chi Minh trail in neighbouring Laos and Cambodia.
In 1960, Vietnamese nationalists form the National Liberation Front. Initially a broad
organisation of communists and non-communists, it closely cooperates with the communist
People’s Liberation Armed Forces. Collectively, they become known as the Viet Cong, a short
form of the words ‘Vietnamese Communist’ in Vietnamese. The name is used by Saigon newspapers
to differentiate the southern insurgency groups from the Northern regular People’s Army
of Vietnam. But practically, the northern communist party controls both organizations.
Despite this, most of the NLFs members are native southern Vietnamese re-infiltrated
from the north. Despite their basic equipment, writer Le Ly Hayslip,
who grew up in rural southern Vietnam, claims the Viet Cong had an important advantage
over the urban and Catholic dominated ARVN: “In contrast to [the AVRN], the Viet Cong were,
for the most part, our neighbors... They did not insult us... because they had been raised
exactly like us... Where the Republicans came into a village overburdened with American
equipment designed for a different war, the Viet Cong made do with what they had and
seldom wasted their best ammunition – the goodwill of the people.” (Hayslip in Ruane)
As the Viet Cong expands, they step up their sabotage campaign. Edward Lansdale, a US
intelligence officer and counterinsurgency pioneer, delivers a stark warning to Washington:
“[ARVN] in critical condition... [Viet Cong] have started to steal the country and
expect to be done in 1961.” (Anderson 35) Lansdale’s solution is to provide more support
to Diem. For others in the administration, faith in Diem is plummeting, but there is
simply no one else to replace him. However, a new US president means a new Vietnam policy. John F. Kennedy takes office in 1961 at a volatile
time. Just prior to his inauguration, the Soviet Union announces to support all groups fighting
“wars of national liberation”, so Kennedy delivers a strong message during his inauguration:
[ORIGINAL AUDIO] “Let every nation know, whether it wishes
us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any
friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and success of liberty.” (Lawrence TVW 68)
Kennedy develops a new “flexible response” doctrine, where conventional and covert
forces can be more widely used instead of just nuclear deterrence. His goal is
not necessarily to defeat North Vietnam, but to ensure South Vietnam can resist the
growing insurgency and, eventually, take over its own security. He also brings a new team into the
Oval Office, including his so-called ‘Wise Men’: advisors with backgrounds in the military and
government, as well as business, finance and academia. Perhaps the most influential is Robert
McNamara. As a manager at the Ford Motor Company, his meticulous data-driven management approach
was praised with saving the company. Kennedy now asks McNamara to bring the same number-crunching
to national security as Secretary of Defence. Kennedy’s ‘Wise Men’ encourage him to send more
military advisors to Vietnam. By 1962, there are 11,300 of them – more than ten times as many as
under Eisenhower. The Geneva Agreement forbids any state from sending military personnel to either
Vietnamese government, so advisors operate on technicalities. Officially non-combat personnel,
they received personal weapons when in Vietnam and can theoretically only act in self-defence. Some
are training staff attached to ARVN, others are special forces personnel that are technically
‘civilian contractors’. Throughout the 1960s, many also function as helicopter pilots
ferrying ARVN troops. As their number grows, the US sets up camps and barracks across South
Vietnam, especially helicopter bases. Although ARVN continues to do most of the fighting – often
with surplus US World War II weapons - advisors join patrols and occasionally become casualties.
To manage this force, Kennedy establishes the Military Advisory Command, Vietnam – MACV.
From 1962, MACV focuses on so-called “strategic hamlets” - specially fortified villages
designed to keep out Communist influence. The Americans entice locals into physically and
ideologically secure villages with promises of material benefits and better services. By
September 1962, 4.3 million villagers live in around 3,000 strategic hamlets. This,
combined with counterinsurgency, covert patrols and increased airstrikes against the Viet
Cong boost US optimism. But even with increased American firepower, the Viet Cong strike back.
American helicopters become valuable targets, as US Lt. Col Archie Clapp recalls in 1962:
“The helicopter flight... land[ed] troops in their encircling positions... Eight of the 22
helicopters... were hit at least once... Why, we wanted to know, were we subjected to his
heavy opposition when we were landing on the heel of an airstrike? We concluded that it was
not in spite of, but because of the airstrike. When the airstrike started, the VC grabbed
their guns and headed out of town... [to] the intended helicopter landing sites.” (Langer 66)
In January 1963 the Viet Cong gain their most significant victory yet. Around 350 guerillas
defeat a much larger ARVN force at Ap Bac, including repelling flamethrowing armoured
personnel carriers and shooting down five helicopters. US advisors are surprised the Viet
Cong stand their ground against air attacks, armoured vehicles and napalm. Meanwhile, despite
their training, equipment and support, the ARVN show poor leadership, and little will to fight.
There is more bad news for the US throughout 1963 as religious tensions spike in Saigon.
The South Vietnamese government continues to suppress Buddhists, overseen by Diem’s brother
and sister-in-law. Around 75 percent of South Vietnamese are nominally or culturally Buddhist,
but the government pressures city populations, especially army officers, to convert, as
Buddhist Giac Duc recalls in spring 1963: “There was tremendous pressure to become Catholic
so you could get ahead, and we began hearing about a lot of secret conversions...
I was incensed by what was going on, and I felt it was dangerous...” (Langer 69)
The issue dramatically hits headlines on June 11, when Buddhist monk Thich Quang Duc burns himself
to death on a busy Saigon intersection. After US protest, Diem promises to introduce
reforms, but his forces continue to raid Buddhist pagodas. To the US, Diem’s
government is now on its last legs. In August 1963, the US learns of plans for a
coup against Diem by army officers. Historians debate the level of US involvement, but they
certainly don’t prevent the coup. Instead, US officials inform the plotters they support South
Vietnam, not a specific leader. On November 1, South Vietnamese generals depose the government.
They execute Diem and his brother in the back of an Armored Personnel Carrier – an act which
likely was not planned. This concerns the US, but they hope the military government will
more aggressively take on the Viet Cong. Soon after, another surprise killing shocks the
world. On November 22, 1963 President Kennedy is assassinated in Dallas. By the time of
his death, 16,000 advisors are in Vietnam and 100 have been killed. His Vice President,
Lyndon B. Johnson will now lead the war effort. Johnson always wanted to be president – but not a
‘war president’. His passion is domestic reforms he calls the ‘Great Society’. He sees Vietnam
as a distraction, in both time and resources, from pressing issues at home. But 1964 is an
election year, and Johnson’s Republican rivals will take advantage of any apparent weakness
against international communism. He later explains – in his trademark colourful language:
“... I knew that if we let Communist aggression succeed in taking over South Vietnam, there would
follow … an endless national debate... that would shatter my Presidency... I knew that Harry Truman
and Dean Acheson lost their effectiveness from the day that the Communists took over China... And I
knew that all [their] problems, taken together, were chickenshit compared with what might happen
if we lost Vietnam.” (Kearns in Ruane 100/101) So, Johnson keeps Kennedy’s advisors and
largely follows their advice on Vietnam. Despite wanting to keep US involvement limited,
he often agrees to their demands for further escalation. In December 1963, with the strategic
hamlet programme crumbling under corruption and poor management, McNamara predicts a
South Vietnamese collapse in 2-3 months. Johnson considers airstrikes or ground troops
but wants to put off the decision until after the coming election. Instead, he sends
more advisors along with a new commander, General William Westmoreland, who
prefers firepower and active operations to pacification and civilian programmes.
US covert actions are not new – they've been happening across Vietnam since 1961. But the US
always maintains plausible deniability, like using Taiwanese pilots to parachute South Vietnamese
groups into the North. By 1964, one such operation is Operational Plan 34 Alpha, or OPLAN 34A,
which consists of commando raids along the North Vietnamese coast. Although the personnel may
be South Vietnamese, Thai, Laotian, or Taiwanese, the raids are planned by MACV’s Studies and
Observations Group. A benign, bureaucratic name for the US special forces and covert command.
The US Navy also carry out their own covert operations known as DESOTO patrols. US destroyers
with electronic surveillance equipment try to detect North Vietnamese communications and radar
emissions. From a North Vietnamese perspective, the destroyers – supported by aircraft carriers -
are likely motherships for the OPLAN raiders. This is not true, but both OPLAN and DESOTO missions
often take place in the same general area and although technically separate, DESOTO patrols
provided intelligence for the coastal raids. In July and August 1964, American
destroyer USS Maddox operates around the Gulf of Tonkin on a DESOTO
mission. What was planned to be an uneventful cruise would soon result in
one of Vietnam’s greatest controversies. On the night of July 30 and 31, 1964
OPLAN patrol boats bombard coastal North Vietnamese military installations.
On August 1, the Maddox enters the area. Its cruise is designed to be unprovocative
and remain outside North Vietnamese waters. But the Maddox is as close as 14 kilometers to the
shore, which North Vietnam considers within their territory, unlike the US interpretation.
The North Vietnamese navy assumes the American destroyer is responsible for the
previous night’s bombardment. On August 2, three Vietnamese torpedo boats head for the
Maddox. The destroyer fires warning shots, then targets the boats. The North Vietnamese launch
their torpedoes but they miss. During the battle, the Maddox fires around 260 5- and 3-inch shells
– but scores only one hit. The encounter increases tension among the inexperienced American crew.
On August 4, the Maddox re-enters the gulf together with destroyer USS Turner Joy. The night
is moonless and visibility is poor. The captains have been told to expect further attack and soon
encounter unknown radar contacts. At 2134hrs, the Maddox opens fire, the Turner Joy joins
soon after. Sonarmen on both ships report multiple enemy torpedoes in the water.
Crewmen also report seeing their wakes, and enemy ships. As both US ships fire,
they claim they’ve damaged and sunk enemy vessels. By 2230 the Maddox makes evasive
manoeuvres, while the Turner Joy drops depth charges and attempts to ram an enemy.
After two hours the battle is over, but not because the radar contacts disappear.
Commander Herbert Ogier realises the number of supposed contacts and torpedoes is reaching
ridiculous proportions. He begins to wonder if the contacts are real and if the Maddox and Turner
Joy have just fired over 300 shells at nothing. Nevertheless, reports of a North Vietnamese
attack are already on their way to Washington. Only on August 5, when no one finds any
debris of the destroyed enemy ships, does Captain Herrick on the Maddox send
a sceptical report - but it’s not a total denial an attack took place. Captain Barnhart
of the Turner Joy still insists the attack happened. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urgently
request information to give the President. As messages flurry across the Pacific,
both sides prioritise supposed torpedo and ship sightings. In the following days, both
captains say an attack took place, although not as large as they thought. Meanwhile, McNamara
relies heavily on intercepted North Vietnamese navy messages seemingly planning the attack.
Johnson then orders retaliatory airstrikes at coastal bases in Vinh on August 5.
In the raid, North Vietnamese defences shoot down two US planes and kill 1 pilot.
On August 10, Johnson signs the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution allowing further retaliation.
It’s not a declaration of war but says the president can “repel any armed attack
against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression”. (Tovy 67)
The US Congress overwhelmingly passes the resolution and during the discussions, members
condemn the unprovoked nature of the attack in international waters. Johnson doesn’t tell
Congress about OPLAN or DESOTO. Instead, McNamara claims the Maddox was on
a routine patrol through the area, and would continue to do so.
[ORIGINAL AUDIO – McNAMARA: The destroyer was carrying out a mission, a patrol
in those waters, in international waters, when it was attacked, it replied to the attack, it
continued to carry out its mission today and will do so for the remainder of this week in the same
waters. The President has asked that the destroyer force be doubled and a CAP – a combat air patrol
– be available at all times on call to it and as I think you know he has issued instructions
that in the event of further attack upon our vessels in international waters, we are to respond
with the objective of destroying the attackers.” Following the crisis, Johnson’s approval
rating remains high and in November, he wins a landslide election. Still, he
promises to keep ground troops out of Vietnam. So, what actually happened in the Gulf of Tonkin?
There was certainly an attack on August 2, since North Vietnam confirmed it. But
there was no attack on August 4. Instead, the incident was likely the result of radar
anomalies caused by weather, crew stress, miscommunication, and poor visibility.
According to the Maddox logs, they identified 25 probable torpedoes during the second
incident. But the North Vietnamese navy only has 12 torpedo boats, 3 of which were damaged after
the first attack - and each boat only carries two torpedoes. The destroyers’ own frequent change
in direction probably sounded like multiple incoming torpedoes to Maddox’s sonarmen.
Furthermore, if an attack did take place, the North Vietnamese would likely confirm it
for propaganda value, but they deny it ever happened. McNamara’s intercepted messages are
probably poorly translated and refer to the recovery of ships damaged on August 2nd.
Some historians have suggested the US deliberately faked the attack as a provocation
for war. This issue is still debated, but most historians conclude it’s unlikely. It is possible
some evidence was misrepresented, and Johnson knew the full details of the second incident by the
time he went to Congress, but he had already made public declarations about the attack and his
intention to respond, even if in a limited way. [ORIGINAL AUDIO – JOHNSON: The determination all
Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and the government of South Vietnam will
be re-doubled by this outrage, yet our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting.”
So Johnson has gotten a congressional resolution, but he’s reluctant to use it. US planners draw up
bombing lists for targets in North Vietnam, but they don’t use them right away. Instead, US planes
secretly bomb the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. This changes in early 1965. On February 7, Viet
Cong troops attack American advisors at Camp Holloway, killing 8 Americans and destroying
or damaging 25 aircraft. On February 10, a northern bomb attack at another
barracks kills 23 more, angering Johnson: “We have kept our gun over the mantel and our
shells in the cupboard for a long time now. And what was the result? They are killing our boys
while they sleep in the night.” (Langer 101) On February 24, US aircraft attack North
Vietnamese targets between the 17th and 19th Parallel. This soon develops
into Operation Rolling Thunder, a sustained bombing campaign designed to
boost South Vietnamese morale and pressure North Vietnam into abandoning the Viet Cong.
But although the US effort is primarily from the air, they need regular ground
troops to protect US airbases, like the one at Da Nang. On March 8 1965, two
marine battalions land to provide security. Their presence only provokes more Viet Cong attacks.
Bombing also does little to stop Viet Cong activities. North Vietnam increases infiltrations,
and regular army troops occasionally cross the 17th Parallel. The Soviet Union and China,
who have mostly stayed out of the war, now send anti-aircraft weapons to the North.
Meanwhile the southern government remains in turmoil. Since Diem’s death there have been
five governments of ineffective military leaders. US Assistant Secretary of Defence
William Bundy describes the latest ruling generals Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky
as “absolutely the bottom of the barrel”. Westmoreland also concludes the ARVN can’t hold
the line. If the goal is to save South Vietnam, more American troops are needed. By
July, Westmoreland gets his boots on the ground. Johnson agrees to send
50,000 troops for offensive operations. So why did the US get further and further
into the Vietnam conflict? The fear of Communist expansion is perhaps the primary
cause. South Vietnam was not democratic, but American leaders felt it needed to be
a bulwark against Communism – this is made crystal clear in a secret US memorandum in 1965:
“U.S. objective in South Vietnam is not to ‘help friend’ but to contain China.” (Thee 119)
There are other reasons as well. Abandoning a nation the US had publicly pledged to
support would be a global humiliation, and a personal one for Johnson. With Kennedy’s
legacy looming large over his presidency, he felt compelled to follow his commitment
– although some historians suggest Kennedy considered withdrawal before his assassination.
The Americans also expect to win. Many in the administration fell communist success until 1965
is not due to their strength, but to US restraint and the weakness of France and South Vietnam.
Now Johnson had “removed the gun from the mantel” this would, or so they thought, soon change.
There were also racial overtones. Many American commanders had little regard for the fighting
ability of the Vietnamese. This was largely due to their disappointment with the ARVN, whose
poor fighting quality some US commanders then expected from all Vietnamese.
Meanwhile, Johnson’s advisors, especially McNamara, place great faith in
the military superiority of US firepower, and believe this power combined with his
analytical approach could produce results with mathematical efficiency. There’s little
discussion about what to do if things go wrong. That’s not to say everyone in the administration
is confident of success. Undersecretary of State George Ball consistently denies victory is
possible, while others understand the Viet Cong has a strength equal – if not superior
– to US firepower. In 1964, David Nes, Deputy Chief of Mission in Saigon, tells Washington:
“…the Viet Cong represents a grass roots movement which is disciplined, ideologically
dedicated, easily identifiable with the desires of the peasantry and of
course ruthless.” (Lawrence TVW 84) The American GIs arriving in Vietnam would soon
find out just how ruthless the war would become. The Vietnam War is perhaps the most well-known
“hot” proxy war during the Cold War when the global super powers were not battling directly
out of fear of nuclear retaliation – even though they came close to direct confrontation
during the Cuban Missile Crisis just a few years before the escalation in Vietnam.
And while the nuclear arsenals expanded, the Soviet Union also pursued their vision of
Nuclear Powered Communism by rapidly increasing the production of nuclear reactors. Whole cities
were built to accommodate a new atomic elite that would help produce limitless energy. I bet
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