VTV Special French Parliament under the Fourth Republic Agenda: Government policies for Indochina First meeting on October 27, 1953 M. Christian Fouchet:
"The war in Indochina seriously affected French military capabilities, finances and global position." M. Christian Fouchet: “This war has required too many sacrifices from thousands of French families.” M. Henri Bouret:
“What needs to be done now is to sit down and negotiate an agreement.” M. Edouard Daladier:
"To avoid sacrifices and suffering as well as the loss of national prestige, we must immediately decide to end the war in Indochina during this meeting.” DIEN BIEN PHU – INSIGHTS FROM FRANCE In mid-1953, France faced critical situations due to the war in Indochina. The French troops in Indochina were on the defensive. Vietnamese soldiers and guerrillas were launching large-scale and minor frays, weakening the fighting spirit of the French troops on every battlefront. Endless debates about the war in Indochina stirred up the French Parliament. M. HENRI BOURET: “Minister, you went to Washington to ask for 385 million USD in aid. If we accept this American aid, we will quickly be in a better position at the negotiation table. But we cannot let a problem as se rious as this steer the fate of France." Professor HUGUES TERTRAIS
University of Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne, French Republic The financial costs of the war in Indochina were funded by the national budget, and it required the votes of parliamentarians. So, what could be done to reduce the financial costs? French parliamentarians during that time did it by transferring most of the costs to the United States. With the financial support from the US, France did hold firm believe that the victory can be ensured. However, it was quite the contrary to what they expected. The war ended in a different way. 4:00 pm on May 7, 1954
Corps General René Cogny: Commander of French Forces in Northern Indochina
Brigadier General De Castries: Commander of the French troops in Dien Bien Phu
François (de) Castries:
We will hold out as long as possible. René Cogny:
I think the best way to stop Viet Minh troops is to deploy the Air Force’s heavy fire support. This will end their attempts to advance. François (de) Castries:
Aye, general! Many men under my command are injured. And many of my soldiers are in the enemy's grip as they surround many of our defensive positions. René Cogny:
I understand. So do the best you can. What you're doing is already too good. Do you understand that, general? François (de) Castries
Yes! I get it, Sir.
René Cogny:
Well, goodbye. See you again!
François (de) Castries
I'll call you back before the fight.
The Dien Bien Phu fortress group fell at 5:30 pm on May 7, 1954. At 5:30 pm on May 7, 1954, the collapse of the "impregnable" Dien Bien Phu fortress shook France and the whole world. The negotiations began when special news bulletins about the fall of Dien Bien Phu were broadcast to the French public. The day after the fall, the French Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence were attacked at the Arc de Triomphe. One war ended, but another started in France to determine who was responsible for this failure. The French capital city, Paris
French Ministry of Defence Archives Less than a year after the defeat of the French troops at Dien Bien Phu, at the request of Henri Navarre, General Commander of the French forces in Indochina, an investigation committee was appointed by the French Ministry of Defence. It was established on March 31, 1955, to clarify all matters related to the failure called Dien Bien Phu. Many other key figures and generals involved were invited to testify, including three of the commanding generals: Four-star General Henri Navarre: General Commander of the French Forces in Indochina Three-star General René Cogny: Commander of French Forces in Northern Indochina General De Castries: Commander of the French troops at Dien Bien Phu What did Henri Navarre think after the defeat at Dien Bien Phu? The general considered confident and possessing strategic vision, unexpectedly disclosed his view of the war in his memoir "Dying Indochina", written in 1956. The General's memoirs received mixed reactions from the French public. Twenty-three years later, in 1979, Navarre's second memoir, titled "The Time of Truths", was published and was a French best-seller. Page 22: I arrived in Saigon on May 19, 1953. Page 55: For all politicians and military leaders, the Indochina War was an itchy matter that must be resolved. People want to get out of this war but disagree with each other about political direction and necessary strategies. I was assigned to this task. I outlined a political-military plan and returned to Paris in early July to report to the government. Researcher IVAN CADEAU
French Ministry of Defence In the spring of 1953, the Indochina War reached a deadlock for the French side. This meant that France, politically and militarily, did not know how to end this problem. And so France appointed a new commander in chief. General Navarre was assigned a mission: to find an honourable way to escape the Indochina War. The French had been a part of the US's anti-communist plans since 1950. During the Indochina War, the Vietnamese people's aspirations for independence were not respected. The Americans did not want to let Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia fall into Communist hands. Paris, French Republic
The French Defence Audio-visual Agency (ECPAD) The French Defence Audio-visual Agency was established in 1915 and curates a huge archive of photo documents and rare films about the French Army, including the battle of Dien Bien Phu. The valley of Dien Bien's topography, with Muong Thanh field lies at the centre, is very complicated, which consists mainly of steep, rugged and strongly divided hills. The French forces chose this destination to build a focal fortress. In November 1953, France developed Dien Bien Phu in northwest Vietnam into an "inviolable" military base—the strongest fortress in French Indochina. This fortress was the key to creating a military advantage, implementing the Navarre solution to France's difficulties in Indochina, and forcing Vietnam to end the war on terms dictated by France and the US. On November 20, 1953, Commander-in-chief Navarre instructed General Cogny to attack Dien Bien Phu within five days and secure the location no later than December 1. The operation to capture Dien Bien Phu, codenamed Castor, also known as the Beaver campaign, paved the way for the French Army to attack and secure the whole Dien Bien basin. In just three days, about 4,560 paratroopers landed in Dien Bien Phu. "The parachute drop in phase one was massive but significantly hindered by the terrain. The most difficult thing was training paratroopers to jump at the correct altitude to guarantee reaching the target." From November 20, 1953, to May 7, 1954, the French used defensive tactics to defend their Dien Bien Phu fortress battle group, with the air force as the spearhead. Air transportation was operating around the clock, according to a report by the French Air Force Commander in Indochina, Charles Lauzin. "The increasing number of Viet Minh forces is why, in early December, the Commander-in-Chief launched the northwest offensive with Dien Bien Phu as the battlefield. This stronghold must be secured at all costs. The Air Force bears full responsibility and support for the operation. Dien Bien Phu is always the top priority." - Report of General CHARLES LAUZIN - Commander of the French Air Force in Indochina On November 21, 1953, for the first time in Indochina and French military history, two 6-tonne bulldozers were parachuted into Dien Bien Phu by C-119 aircraft. The bulldozers were to be pressed into unprecedented service by the French Army for tactical purposes. French military documents recorded that 1,760 tonnes of equipment were delivered to Dien Bien Phu in 18 days, the equivalent of approximately 100 tonnes daily. However, the French Air Force also warned of the risks of choosing Dien Bien Phu as a battlefield. Excerpt from the report on air transport activities in the battle of Dien Bien Phu
"On November 11, an order was received to put the military transport aircraft to maximum capacity. The commander expressed his reservations about the ability to carry out the mission due to the distance between the refuelling point and Dien Bien Phu.” Excerpt from translation of Report Air Force General CHARLES LAUZIN - Commander of the French Air Force in Indochina
“Weather information is only provided to transport aircraft en route to their mission." There were weak information and infrastructure. Dusty terrain and poor airstrip were designated for tactical execution. Dien Bien Phu (March 13 - May 7, 1954)
The confidence of French generals and politicians when arriving at the base Despite all warnings and difficulties, in December 1953, the French Army stronghold transformed into a powerful base with formidable fortifications. Dien Bien Phu's defence plan focused mainly on protecting the airport area, which was surrounded by high hills. Operational Group Northwest (GONO) comprised nearly 10% of the French forces in North Vietnam. The volume of ammunition consumed was 20% higher than the monthly consumption rate of the entire French forces in North Vietnam. The French defence consisted of 8 bases protected by 10 battalions. The garrison could count on significant fire support:
- Dien Bien Phu was equipped with its own air force
- The artillery emplacements provided massive firepower
- There were tanks and light military vehicles equipped with large-calibre cannons By February 1954, Dien Bien Phu was an impregnable fortress. Months before the battle, many French politicians visited Dien Bien Phu. All of them expressed optimism and commented favourably on the fortress group's defensive strength and the defending troops' spirit. No one showed any concern. General O'Danien assured me that if the Viet Minh attacked, they would definitely be "crushed." Professor PIERRE JOURNOUD
Paul-Valéry University – Montpellier 3, French Republic
The danger for Navarre was his persistent belief that he could win the war. Trenches were established when the base was built, and defences were strengthened. Top French and American politicians and military leaders visited. These visits reinforced the belief that this fortified structure was impregnable. The French government was also very satisfied with General Navarre's plans. Navarre stated in a document dated December 31, 1953: "I consider the battle of Dien Bien Phu to be the top priority, and I am determined to do everything possible to deploy it in the most favourable conditions and to win." During the war, French intelligence mobilised all of its resources. With maximum investment in human resources, technology and finance, they could provide accurate information about the activities of Vietnamese troops. French intelligence relied on many sources of information, including Air Force reconnaissance and radio codebreaking divisions, to provide deciphered information. French intelligence quickly compiled much information about the Viet Minh, using it as a foundation for developing counter-attack plans. From December 1953, the decoded intelligence about Vietnamese troop movements and deployments made the French Army even more delusional about a victory at Dien Bien Phu. Excerpt from General Navarre’s memoirs
Intelligence tells us the Viet Minh have changed their plans. Their plans to launch an attack in the delta have temporarily been halted. The Viet Minh will attack in two directions: one is probably to attack the mountainous areas of northern Vietnam and Upper Laos, and the other is to attack the central region of Indochina. These photos were taken at an altitude of 1000 to 3000 metres. These are just a few of the tens of thousands of photos taken daily by the EROM 80 overseas reconnaissance squadron and the Armagnac squadron of the French Air Force at Dien Bien Phu between 1953 and 1954. Their tasks were to discover and analyse Viet Minh's supply lines and military advances. Scrutiny of the collected photos uncovered useful traces of several military units, motor vehicles, and the Vietnamese Army's trench network. VO QUOC TUAN
Dien Bien Phu campaign researcher
The French took about 10,000 aerial photos daily using reconnaissance planes. The 80th Overseas Reconnaissance Squadron was a unit specialising in photography and aerial photography of battlefields. It was tasked with capturing photos of almost all of Dien Bien Phu's frontlines. Dr IVAN CADEAU
French Ministry of Defence
Aerial photography has made enormous progress since World War I. It helped the French forces at Dien Bien Phu understand their opponents. That means the French knew when soldiers, trucks, and supplies passed the Tuan Giao base and arrived at Dien Bien Phu. The French could even distinguish camouflaged road sections. Intelligence forces could identify these locations using shading techniques. They provided the fighting forces with targets, and those targets were raided. Colonel TRAN LIEN
Former Staff Officer, Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment 367 in the Dien Bien Phu Campaign
They took photos of our activities during the campaign. We had to disguise or cover our positions carefully; otherwise, they would become targets for airstrikes. It was difficult to cover our trenches. We were hit a lot. It was miserable, indeed. The French command also tested new infrared imaging techniques to identify targets more accurately. However, the French military's air reconnaissance efforts did not meet expectations. Colonel TRAN LIEN
Former Staff Officer, Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment 367 in the Dien Bien Phu Campaign
The French launched a fierce airstrikes. Even though the Vietnamese troops were camouflaged, our marching route was still exposed. During the day, they sent aircrafts to bomb targets on our marching routes. Immediately after each air strike, Vietnamese youth volunteers quickly repaired the road. General Georges Albert Julien Catroux
Chairman, Board of inquiry
The attempts to block enemies' supplies by aircraft did not bring positive results. General Cogny: No, General. We couldn't attack by land because the mountainous terrain made it very difficult to deploy ground troops. We carried out airstrikes to destroy supply routes. But it never proved successful because the Viet Minh's convoy moved cautiously at night. They created branch roads in the forests, preventing them from being detected by our aircraft. We expended huge efforts identifying their vital routes, and then air strikes cut them off. But not long after, Viet Minh repaired the roads faster than we could destroy them. Their traffic did not suffer many interruptions despite our airstrike efforts. Chairman: How long does it take to assemble equipment? General Cogny: A few days if the traffic is clear. The Viet Minh had trucks that could quickly bring supplies to high-altitude positions. They transported rice from Thanh Hoa province. Do you know that the Viet Minh ingeniously and skillfully built ferries from local resources? They also had bridges hidden in the water, perfectly camouflaged. THIERRY RIET
French Dien Bien Phu campaign researcher
The aerial photographs were very important to the French command on the ground. However, it was not an easy task. Planes came and left because there wasn't enough fuel to stay in one place for too long. Aerial photos provided huge information, but those photos were not fully exploited. French intelligence did not expect two things: the Viet Minh's tactics of using anti-aircraft artillery and positioning artillery batteries in bunkers in the mountains. These were considered two blind spots in French intelligence and one reason for the defeat at Dien Bien Phu. This was despite a lot of information being provided daily by aerial surveillance. File number 1K 342 shows France's concern about the Viet Minh's armaments. Many secret reports related to the number of weapons, especially new weapons, and proposed solutions to counter them. There was a multi-page report on measures to destroy the Viet Minh's anti-aircraft artillery, in which the involvement of American experts is suggested. Also, according to the report of Air Force Commander in Indochina Charles Lauzin, "Since March 13, 1954, the structures and locations of a number of artillery and anti-aircraft artillery batteries (37 mm) of Viet Minh have been discovered." Immediately before the first assault, General Navarre's firm belief in victory in Dien Bien Phu gave way to growing scepticism as intelligence information about Viet Minh’s activities poured in. "Two weeks ago, I still thought victory was 100% certain. Dien Bien Phu was in a very good defensive position. But with the information about the gathering of new equipment that intelligence information has relayed to us for the past two weeks Anti-aircraft artillery has a calibre of 37mm, which can be used with heavy-weight artillery and mechanised warheads I cannot guarantee success, especially if these devices exist as estimated and especially if the Viet Minh successfully introduces artillery into battles." Associate Professor, Dr NGUYEN MANH HA
Former Director, Institute of Party History, Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics
France never thought we could transport artillery into fighting positions, nor could we construct emplacements for each cannon. The effort involved had never been seen in the history of warfare. Artillery was transported to firing positions up on hills. The artillery bunkers were about 10 metres in depth and tens of metres long. They were each protected by a three-metre-thick ring of sandbags. The mouth of each bunker was wide. After firing, the cannons were hidden in these bunkers. Completely invisible, they didn't know the exact location even when French aircraft took photos. The artillery was kept safe, and they fired accurately. General Cogny's hearing at the Investigation Committee on June 16, 1955
Chairman Catroux: How many artillery shells did you estimate the Viet Minh had? General Cogny: I cannot give an exact number, General. Chairman: Yet I read somewhere that the Viet Minh fired 200,000 artillery shells and mortars? General Cogny: Since the end of January, we have seen an increase in Viet Minh's supplies, especially in the number of 105mm artillery shells. We also discovered the accumulation of this type of artillery shell. But the Viet Minh waited several weeks before they launched an attack after securing good firing positions for their artillery and adequate ammunition. How the Viet Minh deployed artillery forces carefully and secretly PHAM DUC CU
Battalion 394, Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment 367, Group 351, Dien Bien Phu campaign
If we look at history, we can find no army that can pull 2.4-tonne cannons up mountains. Only the Vietnamese Army could do it. Colonel TRAN LIEN
Former Staff Officer, Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment 367, Group 351, Dien Bien Phu campaign During the campaign's preparations, Comrade Giap reminded us that we must continue to hide our troops to deliver surprise attacks. From the first battle, comrades had to make the enemy afraid of Vietnamese heavy artillery and anti-aircraft guns. During the first days of the campaign, our artillery forces hit several enemy aircraft. Journalist DANIEL ROUSSEL
Director of "The War Between Tigers and Elephants" General Giap took me to a military museum and showed me a several square metre model of the entire Dien Bien basin. He explained his strategies with artillery forces to me in detail using the model. The French believed that the Vietnamese did not have heavy artillery. Therefore, in the first days when the Viet Minh opened fire, the French were taken by surprise. It was unbelievable to them. The Vietnamese artillery forces hit their targets. During the dawn of the campaign, the Vietnamese Army destroyed the runway where French planes landed to supply manpower and weapons regularly. Having realised that the French were concentrating their efforts on transforming Dien Bien Phu into a strong fortress to crush the Vietnamese Army, in December 1953, President Ho Chi Minh and the Central Party Politburo selected Dien Bien Phu as the strategic and decisive battle to ensure victory. General VO NGUYEN GIAP
The commander-in-chief goes to war. You lead our troops; I give you full authority to make decisions. This campaign is very important; victory is necessary, so you should only attack when success is secure. The General Military Commission's summons to all Party comrades in the XX campaign
"Comrades! This is a great campaign in our country's struggle for liberation and the history of our People's Army. This campaign aims to defeat Navarre's military plan, put them in a long-term crisis, maintain our army's initiative, and create new victories nationwide for our army." On January 14, 1954, at Tham Pua Cave - the first headquarters of the Dien Bien Phu campaign, General Vo Nguyen Giap and other commanders agreed on a battle plan with the motto "swift attack, swift win". The plan was to crush the Dien Bien Phu fortress group over 3 nights and 2 days. However, the Vietnamese Army faced a problem: They did not have experience attacking solidly defended strongholds. After 11 days of pondering and assessment, on the morning of January 26, 1954, the General and the campaign’s Party Committee decided to change the principle to “steady attacking, firmly advancing.” This principle was agreed by the Politburo headed by President Ho Chi Minh, considering this to be a completely correct decision. Historian ALAIN RUSCIO
General Giap reconsidered and changed his strategies in the last minutes before the battle. He always said it was the most difficult decision of his life. De Castries bunker, Dien Bien District, Dien Bien Province The postponement of the attack by the Campaign Command of the Vietnam People's Army further strengthened the French Army's belief in their victory. A document in the French Ministry of Defence archives showed that after receiving intelligence information, De Castries printed 150,000 leaflets in Vietnamese with text full of confidence and arrogance. De Castries' war leaflet was sent to General Vo Nguyen Giap
“Dear General Vo Nguyen Giap To compete with my battalions stationed at Dien Bien Phu, the General gathered four of the most elite regiments and some powerful weapons, but to this day, the General has still not sent them to battle. The General considered this battle the decisive battle between the two sides. Is the General not confident that he will win this battle? The General made a promise; the General should keep his promise The General always exhorts soldiers to believe in the General, so don't let them be disappointed. Please come, general; I'm waiting for you." February 22, 1954
Faced with the challenge from the French side, the Vietnamese Army and people continued to put all their efforts into carefully preparing for the campaign. At the campaign Officer Meeting on February 22, 1954, General Vo Nguyen Giap concluded: Why must we follow the "steady attacking, firmly advancing" principle? In the past, when the enemy was still relatively vulnerable, it was possible to attack quickly, but in the current situation, only a steady attack and steady advance can win. A swift attack cannot guarantee victory; it will take longer to fight this battle. What are the benefits of “steady attacking, firmly advancing”? Fighting step-by-step ensures victory. Secondly, we maintain the initiative. Thirdly, we aim at the enemy's biggest weakness, which is the problem of supply and transportation. Fourthly, this principle is more suitable for our soldiers. Therefore, to win this battle, there can only be one principle: steady attacking and firmly advancing. Dr IVAN CADEAU
French Ministry of Defence
The original plan was to strike fast in a short amount of time and quickly secure victory. However, it would not have succeeded because there was insufficient ammunition, and the French defensive lines were very strong then. They would have failed the entire campaign if they had followed this plan. General Giap did a better job changing the strategy because they could not strike fast. The reality on the battlefield showed that changing strategy was the right thing to do at that time, and you have to be very certain before you strike. The decision to change strategy might have affected the fighting spirits of Viet Minh soldiers, but preparing as carefully as possible was the only way towards the ultimate goal of victory. On March 13, 1954, the preparations were complete, and Vietnamese soldiers opened fire, marking the start of the Dien Bien Phu campaign. The campaign took place in 3 phases. Phase one of the campaign occurred from March 13 to March 17 1954. Vietnamese troops destroyed the Him Lam and Doc Lap Bases, forced Ban Keo Base to surrender, and broke the northern gateway of the Dien Bien Phu Base Group. The enemy's most elite battalions were crushed. Many artillery pieces and most jet fighters in the basin were destroyed. Associate Professor, Dr NGUYEN MANH HA
Former Director, Institute of Party History, Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics
Vietnamese troops tried to cut off the French air supplies by digging trenches surrounding Muong Thanh airport. All artillery fire on the mountainside was aimed directly at Muong Thanh Airport, within the range of Vietnamese artillery. Any further French supplies would have to be delivered by parachute, but the Vietnamese tactic was to dig trenches to surround and approach French positions. The French had to fly at a higher altitude to deliver supplies, but most of these supplies missed their target. The French also didn't think the Vietnamese troops could cross high mountain slopes to supply tens of thousands of troops. Recreated footage
Brigadier General De Castries's hearing at the Commission of Inquiry into the defeat in 1955
Admiral LEMONNIER:
Our troops' fighting spirits must have been low the day the airport was raided, right? Brigadier General DE CASTRIES:
Fighting spirits plummeted after Him Lam and Doc Lap's bases fell but were relatively gained by the first air reinforcements. Fighting spirits began to decline again when the Army realised that air supplies were no longer available and no more bullets were left. The campaign's second phase lasted from March 30 to April 30 1954. Over the month, Vietnamese troops simultaneously attacked the eastern bases of the central division to tighten the siege, control Muong Thanh Airport and limit the enemy's ability to send reinforcements. DANG DUC SONG
Former Platoon Leader, Regiment 98, Company 316
The struggle was very fierce, and we suffered many casualties. Excerpt from the Memoirs of General Navarre
If we want to relieve the Dien Bien Phu fortress, we can consider deploying ground troops or air forces. An airstrike is required, which is far beyond our capabilities. General Ely, on official duty in Washington in early April, asked my opinion on this matter. I replied that massive intervention by the US Air Force could save Dien Bien Phu. At the end of April, French Chief of the Defence Staff, General Paul Ely, went to the United States to discuss the situation with his American counterpart, Admiral Radford. The US side proposed simultaneously increasing the use of aircraft carriers and B29 aircraft to bomb and destroy the Viet Minh’s trenches and other targets in Dien Bien Phu. France believed their only means of avoiding defeat was to rely on American firepower. However, all French requests for assistance were rejected by the US. Professor PIERRE JOURNOUD
Paul-Valéry-Montpellier University 3, French Republic
Reinforcements did not materialise because US President Eisenhower conditioned military support to France on the participation of at least one US ally, Britain. However, Britain vehemently refused the request, so US President Eisenhower said no to the French. At the end of 1963, Le Figaro newspaper published former US President Eisenhower's memoirs about the Dien Bien Phu campaign in a series of articles called: Why didn't I save Dien Bien Phu? “We were able to support the French by airstrikes on Communist positions at Dien Bien Phu. However, I was very sceptical about the effectiveness of aircraft against the Viet Minh's ground troops as they had so many places to avoid airstrikes. To me, this intervention risks losing. Air force attacks may be a temporary relief to the fighting spirits of the French troops, but I do not agree to use American troops in these limited conditions, where our intervention is not a decisive factor to win." Faced with the humiliation of being rejected, France had no choice but to sustain itself at Dien Bien Phu until the Geneva Conference reached a truce that allowed the disaster to be avoided and France to have an honourable exit. Historian ALAIN RUSCIO
The French believed more aircraft, tanks, and bombs would be enough to secure victory. Vietnamese people had never thought like that. Vietnamese people thought that they must first win public support and the hearts of the people to call for support for their troops to be able to carry out attacks. Desertions and losses in battle caused French combat troop numbers to dwindle. In early April, Lieutenant Colonel Langlais, deputy commander of the Dien Bien Phu Base Group, requested paratrooper reinforcements. His proposal met with opposition from Colonel Chauvagnac, Commander of the Indochina airlift force. On April 11, 1954, Langlais sent Chauvagnac a telegram: "There are no longer any Northwest Operations Corps or Airlift Squadron; no Legionnaires or Moroccan soldiers are left, but only 3,000 soldiers, mainly paratroopers, are forced to confront General Giap's four regiments. The fate of the French forces in Vietnam and Indochina is playing out at Dien Bien Phu. It must be understood that this operation can only be sustained by adding more paratroopers, whether trained or not." Dr IVAN CADEAU
French Ministry of Defence
Langlais did not care whether the paratroopers were trained or not; what he wanted was reinforcements. He wants to put pressure on his commander. The Viet Minh knew that France was tired of this war that had been going on since 1945, an endless war with a costly price. And they knew full well that, with negotiations about to open in Geneva, the defeat in Dien Bien Phu would blow up France's desire to continue this war. General Navarre stubbornly supported French forces Dien Bien Phu despite the difficult situation. According to many newspaper articles, about 700 of the 1,800 soldiers who signed up for reinforcements from April 3 to May 7 were volunteers without parachute training. Lieutenant Foy's Dien Bien Phu diary
Battalion I, Regiment 4
Moroccan infantry
April 15, 1954: 3:15 a.m. Every night, paratroopers jump from aircraft. They do not hesitate to play deadly games, like saying that they only fly 200 metres high at night to parachute troops, but in reality, the aircraft drop people from a height of 600 metres to 700 metres. As a result, those poor boys were carried by the wind and fell into Viet Minh positions. The Viet Minh's anti-aircraft artillery is increasingly terrifying and brings down at least one of our planes every day. The past few days have passed very slowly. The Geneva Conference was protracted. Don't they know that there are about 2,000 wounded soldiers here who need emergency treatment? In the third attack from May 1 to 7, Vietnamese troops captured the eastern bases. They launched a general attack to destroy the entire Dien Bien Phu Base Group. Lieutenant Foy's Dien Bien Phu diary
Battalion I, Regiment 4
Moroccan infantry
"May 6, 1954: At 2:00 pm on the 52nd day after we arrived, the Viet Minh dug a trench towards our position. This always means they are preparing for a big fight. That's incredible—how easily they dug new trenches." "The night of May 6, May 7: Events rushed in. The fortifications were destroyed, and the first assault was suffered. At 5:05 pm, there was a radio call at the command post. At 5:30 pm, everyone stopped shooting. Destroy equipment and be captured without resistance. Do not raise the white flag! We cried. At around 6:00 am, the first Viet Minh units arrived. They flooded the base from all sides at once. The siege of Dien Bien Phu has ended." Professor ERIC COUDRAY
Annecy City, French Republic
It was a disaster. More than a failure, it was a very serious political failure. General De Gaulle's government in 1945 absolutely wanted to regain Indochina, which was then in the hands of the Japanese. No one knew how to get out of the Indochina War. The Indochina War needed to end, and it ended with the Geneva Accords. Historian ALAIN RUSCIO
The Dien Bien Phu victory, which then opened the door for the signing of the Geneva Accords, was a victory for peace because if the West, France, and the US had won at Dien Bien Phu, French and American forces would have been close to the border with China. And so, the Dien Bien Phu victory was, in the end, a victory for peace because it helped avoid another global-scale conflict. The defeat of French troops at the Dien Bien Phu fortress on May 7, 1954, shocked the world. Many days later, even years later, the media continued to ask questions about unanswered puzzles, such as who was responsible for the disaster called Dien Bien Phu. Responding to l'Aurore newspaper on May 17, 1954, on the question: "Who's responsible for this disaster?" a high-ranking French general gave four main reasons why Dien Bien Phu failed. Q: Why did the command declare surprise at the presence of powerful Viet Minh artillery around the fortress group? A: General Giap's combat regiment, equipped with 105mm artillery, was effective. However, by choosing the location of the stronghold at Dien Bien, our French Army accidentally allowed the Viet Minh's artillery to win. The French force's command lacked understanding and foresight. Q: Americans criticise us for not planning airports to receive American aircraft and not having trained pilots capable of flying them. A: It is true that Indochina does not have the necessary ground infrastructure to receive modern large American aircraft. Certainly, even many aircraft cannot stop the yellow-skinned foot soldiers fighting very stubbornly. Q: Why are paratroopers still dropped into the battlefield instead of on the periphery? A: This was definitely the biggest mistake at Dien Bien Phu. The goal was to increase the garrison, but in reality, wherever the troops were dropped, the Viet Minh would destroy them. We should have parachuted reinforcements outside the basin to divert General Giap's Army. The solution to strengthen the garrison was extremely bad militarily. Q: Who was responsible for Dien Bien Phu's failure, or more accurately, for the tactical planning that led to it? A: Nearly one-tenth of the expeditionary force in the Far East was destroyed in Dien Bien Phu. That’s the truth. Is the design of the Dien Bien Phu entrenchment base part of the government's general military policy? If anything, the government is responsible for this failure. If General Navarre denies that he caused the failure, how can his resignation be explained? Failure was the consequence of a bad war policy. And I ask myself: Are there differences within the government on how to conduct this war? The search for the truth quickly turned into a hunt for those responsible, both politically and militarily. Military officers had conflicts. They blamed each other for consecutive failures. The two top generals, Navarre and Cogny, also had conflicts. In December 1955, after many hearings with French generals involved in the campaign, the committee drew conclusions on their responsibilities. The French government hid this information, and all documents related to the Investigation Committee were only declassified in 2005. Because they did not want to dig deeper into the mistakes of the political elites and the military, the Investigation Committee came to moderate conclusions. Accordingly: - Brigadier General Christian de Castries violated elementary principles of tactics when he arbitrarily decided to use a large number of combat units in defence system construction tasks. - General Cogny did not direct and did not effectively manage the rapid combat capabilities of reserve forces - General Navarre was criticised for ordering troop positions in areas far from the centre. This dispersed the force's support for the base group, which was isolated due to its location and dependence on the air force's support. Although not direct, the committee's conclusions reveal the French government's poor handling of war planning. The investigation's findings largely focused on mistakes in military strategy and tactics. However, the main cause of failure in Dien Bien Phu lies not only in military factors. General Navarre summarised the failure's causes in his memoirs decades later. Memoirs of General Navarre 1/ Viet Minh had tremendous confidence, determination, strong dynamism and a complete unity of action between strategic and campaign directions. On the French side, we were an alliance of countries with different, if not contradictory, interests in terms of goals. It was our hesitation and complete lack of coordination between politics and the military in the war. 2/ The Viet Minh fought the war with the full support of the people. Our goal in that war was unclear. People don't even bother to say why our soldiers have to fight. 3/ The Viet Minh was a very mobile and flexible army. Our side, although stronger, had to pay a heavy price because of its bulkiness and lack of adaptation to the host country and its people. We always underestimated the Viet Minh, both politically and militarily. Their prestige and influence on the people, morale, dynamism, and military qualifications of the commanders differed from what we thought. Professor PIERRE JOURNOUD
Paul-Valéry University – Montpellier 3, France
When we see the testimonies of veterans, military personnel, and political leaders at the time, they all believe France will win. It could not be otherwise. It was impossible to imagine that France could be defeated with such a powerful base protected by heavy 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers, reconnaissance aircraft, and fighter-bombers. Many French veterans, even after 70 years, have not had the opportunity to return to Vietnam. However, every skirmish on the Dien Bien Phu battlefield is preserved in their minds. The bag containing necessary items given out by the Vietnamese People's Army when returning prisoners of war is just one of many memorabilia that Pierre Flamen brought back from Vietnam. He keeps it until this day. Memories of being captured 4 times and being in contact with the Vietnamese soldiers whom he lovingly called with two Vietnamese words, “Bộ đội – ground troop”, remain fresh in his mind. Veteran PIERRE FLAMEN
Paris, France
One time, in a Viet Minh camp, I contracted severe malaria, and I could have died. The camp chief came and gave me a shot of quinine. He saved my life. While escorting prisoners from Dien Bien Phu to the main prison, I was fortunate to be supervised by a kind soldier. He always walked next to me. When he was given a sugar cube, he gave me half. He shared everything he had with me. He was so kind. Jacques Bouthier's Vietnamese name is "Mr. Sau." He spent his youth in Vietnam. More than anyone else, he understood the experience of many French veterans. When returning to the battlefields, he remembered to bring back the soil of Dien Bien. Veteran JACQUES BOUTHIER
Montpellier, France
My Indochina veteran friend passed away two years ago. His son returned to Indochina, and when he came back, he brought back a jar of soil from Dien Bien Phu as his father had instructed. He wanted me to sprinkle some soil from Dien Bien Phu on his coffin, and I helped him do it. They fought there and wanted to remember the land they were attached to. Forty-five years after the defeat at Dien Bien Phu, in 1999, with the support of many agencies and Tran To Nga, more than 300 former French prisoners of war returned to Vietnam for the first time. TRAN TO NGA
Overseas Vietnamese in France
Arriving at Dien Bien Phu, they cried. When rushing up A1 hill, many bent down on their knees and grasped the soil there. They said they wanted to return the soil to France for those who couldn't join this trip. Their youth was attached to Vietnam, a part of their lives. So it's the love of the people and the love of peace. Friendship and love are real, and it is thicker than hatred. TRAN QUY
Former Explosive Platoon Leader, Company 674
Battalion 251, Regiment 174, Company 316
Our people were forced to take up arms. No one would want war just to become a hero. No one wants to become a wounded soldier or a martyr. As long as you're alive, it's happiness. Historian ALAIN RUSCIO
If someone asked me what the ten great events of the 20th century were, Dien Bien Phu is definitely up there. One of the lessons of Dien Bien Phu is that a modern army is insufficient to defeat a people. General VO NGUYEN GIAP: "Everyone needs to unite and fight for peace, a better life, the right to live, the right to be happy, and the protection of a country's sovereignty." 70 years after the defeat of the French army at Dien Bien Phu, the fierce battlefield of the past has been replaced by a modern urban area. Dien Bien today is a land with majestic nature, heroic history, unique culture, fresh air. The province is a convergence of the quintessence of the Northwest region, and has increasingly attracted domestic and international tourists.
