How Rome Became an Empire - Post Caesar Civil Wars

Caesar’s Civil War against the Optimates and Pompey was supposed to end the decades of crisis of the Roman Republic. Caesar’s assassination was supposed to prevent tyranny and return the authority in the Republic to those who considered themselves its worthiest citizens. Neither panned out. In the aftermath of Caesar’s assassination, the Roman world was plunged into another series of conflicts, which can be called post-Caesar civil wars. Octavian, Antony, Lepidus, Brutus, Cassius, Sextus Pompey, Cicero, Cleopatra and many others would fight together and against each other for 14 bloody years. In the end, only one would stand and transform the republic into an empire. This is the story of these wars and the beginning of the story of Octavian, who became Augustus. Needless to say, these leaders had some hangups, and their issues quickly became issues for whole populations across the Roman world. 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Once you’ve found someone perfect for you, you pick your methods and times, but you can always change these based on how things go. Get started via our link, betterhelp dot com slash kings. This link gives a ten percent discount on your first month to help you give betterhelp a go. As Caesar’s dead body lay at the base of the statue of Pompey, chaos erupted. Senators, unaware of who was involved in the plot or who the targets were, ran from the Senate, fearing for their lives. The Conspirators some of whom had wounded each other also rushed out, brandishing their bloodstained daggers, and proclaiming the death of a tyrant. All the public saw, however, was their leaders of government shouting and panicking, some covered in blood and others wielding weapons. In this chaos, Anthony, who had not entered the chambers, was able to slip away in disguise, barricading himself in his house. Some uninvolved Senators saw an opportunity to align with the Conspirators, and seized daggers themselves, and boasted of having taken part themselves. The group merged with Decimus’ gladiators stationed outside of the Theatre and went to the center of Rome announcing that a Brutus had once more rid Rome of a king. The public, however, was not won over. Caesar had brought a short period of stability to Rome after a long Civil War and now, Senators were marching through the streets with armed gladiators. The public was scared. Many of Caesar’s veterans were in the city and there was a general fear of what these veterans would do. To add to this terror, Lepidus, who had since heard the news of Caesar’s death, had gone to Tiber island where his soldiers were stationed. He then marched them to the Campus Martius to await Antony’s arrival. They wanted vengeance but agreed that they could not wage war in the streets of Rome. Instead, they decided to bide their time to await the Conspirators’ next move. The Conspirators reached the Capitoline and blockaded themselves on the hill. Heralds were sent to again proclaim the death of a tyrant. In response, the public shouted back that all they wanted was peace. Cinna, who had been named praetor by Caesar, stepped forward and threw his official garb aside, saying it had been given by a tyrant and was thus illegal. He praised the conspirators, but the public remained unconvinced. Dolabella, who Caesar had picked to be Consul for when he left for Parthia announced that he would take office as Consul immediately. He claimed to have had knowledge of the plot and praised the conspirators’ actions. The approval of a consul encouraged Cassius and Brutus who began negotiating with Dolabella. They once again insisted that their actions had been justified, and suggested that Sextus Pompey, son of Pompey, be recalled to Rome, along with others exiled by Caesar. They next sent messengers to Antony and Lepidus arguing that what was done was done, and that all that they could do now was to continue working for the people of Rome. Caesareans still hungry for revenge were nervous, particularly of Decimus who owned the gladiators and was governor of Cisalpine Gaul, putting him in command of one of a significant army. They could not risk putting themselves at odds with him and agreed to negotiate. Antony, who was still Consul for the year, ordered that the Senate be summoned. The Senate convened, with the conspicuous absence of the ringleaders of the conspiracy, despite them having their safety assured by Lepidus and Antony. Cinna, however, was present in his praetorian attire which he had previously denounced as being given by a tyrant. The public, outraged at this hypocrisy, attacked him. He was almost killed by the mob but was saved by Lepidus’ soldiers who escorted him to his house. The Senate was divided: Some denounced the conspirators, a larger portion praised them, and others took a middle ground simply wanting peace. It was initially proposed that a vote be taken. If the majority found Caesar to be a tyrant, then his laws would be voided. Before this vote could be taken, however, Antony stood and pointed out that Caesar had appointed many magistrates for the next 5 years. If Caesar’s laws were illegal, so were these appointments. Dolabella, who was too young to legally run for Consul and whose only claim to the consulship was Caesar’s appointment, immediately changed his position, claiming to be horrified at the idea of honouring those who had murdered Caesar. Antony then also pointed out that Rome was full of Caesar’s veterans, and that they would likely not take kindly to Caesar’s laws being repealed. Many of the laws pertained to the veterans, including providing for their retirement, and voiding these would almost certainly lead to a revolt by some of the most experienced soldiers of the Republic. Finally, Cicero took the stage, advocating moderation. He pointed out that seeking vengeance would only beget more violence, and that their duty was to move forward in a way that was best for the people. His solution was simple and effective; all of Caesar’s actions as Dictator would be ratified, and the Conspirators’ lives would be spared. Antony was willing to agree on the condition that Caesar is given a public funeral, and that his will be read in public. All parties agreed, and a compromise had finally been reached. Following this meeting in the Senate, the Conspirators addressed the Romans from the Capitoline. Calling themselves Liberators, they claimed that Caesar had robbed the Republic of its freedom by assigning magistrates for the next five years and had committed sacrilege by imprisoning a Tribune. The irony of this is not hard to spot. The Senators, including the supporters of the Liberators, had just confirmed that Caesar’s magistrate positions would be upheld. They had the opportunity to revoke these privileges and had denied it. Moreover, though Caesar had indeed imprisoned a Tribune of the Plebs, the Liberators had murdered a Dictator, a far more serious sacrilegious offence. Brutus and Cassius also promised to give land to Caesar’s veterans, though as Antony had pointed out, there was little choice but to appease the veterans. Nevertheless, the crowd was assured by the two men that they at least seemed to be seeking peace, rather than further war. With the official pardoning of the Liberators made public, Cassius, Brutus, and the other conspirators finally agreed to come down from the Capitol, but only after Antony and Lepidus agreed to send their sons as hostages. As had been decided earlier, Caesar’s will was read to the public: he gave his private gardens to the people to be used as a public space and gave each citizen in Rome 75 drachmae - roughly two months wages. His primary heir was the grandson of his sister - Octavian, a blood relation, who was only 19 years old. Octavian’s life has so far been uneventful. He had made his first major public appearance when he gave his eulogy for his grandmother and had asked to join Caesar during his African campaign but had been prevented from doing so by his mother. Instead, he had been allowed to join Caesar during his Spanish Campaign but had been too sick to take part in any meaningful way. While Caesar’s will was being read, Octavian was undergoing military training in Illyria alongside the 6 Legions Caesar had picked for his Parthian Campaign, not expecting this sudden change in power, wealth, and prestige. Perhaps even more shocking was Caesar’s secondary heir, who was to inherit the wealth if Octavian had died before Caesar: Decimus Brutus, one of the leading assassins in the plot. Upon hearing the will, the people began turning against the Liberators. Caesar’s body was brought out with the crowd lamenting loudly, and the stage was set for Antony to have arguably his most impressive moment in Roman politics. He read all the laws passed by Caesar that would now be upheld, giving particular weight to those that related to the people specifically. He read all the titles that Caesar had been granted, Protector of the Country, Father of the Country, and emphasized the sanctity of Caesar’s offices. Antony broke down into tears, and then lifted the bloodied toga of Caesar on a spear for all to see, bringing the crowd to a boiling point. Finally, he unveiled a wax replica of Caesar with 23 stab wounds. At this point, the Liberators hurried from the Forum and the crowd erupted into chaos. The crowd rampaged, burning down the senate chambers where Caesar had been assassinated, and hunting for the Liberators throughout the city. Most either fled Rome or barricaded in their homes with armed guards. One man, Cinna, who happened to share his name with one of the conspirators, was mistaken for being the Cinna who had been involved in the plot and was quite literally torn to pieces. They seized Caesar’s body, carrying it to the Capitol to burn and bury him with the gods, but were stopped by the priests of the temple. Instead, they took Caesar’s body back to the forum. Benches, parts of stalls, any wood that they could get their hands on was piled into a huge pyre and Caesar’s body was burnt atop it. As his body burnt, people flung dedications onto the pyre, including weapons, armour, jewelry, and clothes. With one speech, Antony had turned the public against the Liberators and forced them to flee. The only ones who remained were Cassius and Junius Brutus who, as Praetors of Rome, only held power within the city. Antony was the master of Rome. At first, the Senate blamed him for the riot and hunting of the Liberators. However, Antony worked quickly to win them over. A man called Amatius claimed to be the grandson of Gaius Marius, and thus related to Caesar, and had been a leading figure in the riots. On Apil 13th, Antony had Amatius executed without a trial and this won him the support of the Senate, but severely damaged his standing with the Plebians, who took to the forum in protest. In response, Antony dispersed the crowd with soldiers, then proceeded to execute the ringleaders. In less than a month, Antony had alienated himself from the Plebs and aligned himself firmly with the Senate. To further secure this alliance, Antony abolished the office of Dictator and even suggested that Sextus Pompey be recalled, and named Commander of the Seas. The Senate eagerly accepted, and even Cicero was for a time won over by Antony. However, it did not take long for Antony to begin abusing his power. He began spending Caesar’s vast fortune, which was in his care to distribute to Octavian and Caesar’s other heirs, and fabricated various legislation, purportedly written by Caesar, to further his own agenda. He paid huge gifts to win cities and foreign princes to his side, began naming new members of the Senate, and amassed a huge bodyguard, perhaps of as many as 6,000 Caesarean veterans who had fought alongside Antony. Lepidus, who was the other leader of the Caesarean party, had been advocating for revenge, but Antony was quick to placate him with a marriage of his daughter to Lepidus’ son, and an appointing Lepidus as Pontifex Maximus. Antony was focusing power into his own hands, making Cassius and Brutus wary. They had no supporters amongst the Plebs or veterans, and the Senate was now being increasingly won over by Antony. Both men subtly excused themselves from politics in Rome and retreated to their houses in the country. From here they sent messages to Decimus in Cisalpine Gaul to ready his Legions, and to Trebonius in Asia and Tillius in Bithynia to begin raising funds. By this point, Antony had effectively held as much power as Caesar had done, and rumours circulated that he was seeking a province with an army to command. Some Senators were still not supporting him though, which encouraged Dolabella, the other Consul for the year, to oppose Antony whenever possible. Antony, however, was aware of how ambitious Dolabella was and encouraged the young man to request the command of Syria for the following year, including command of Caesar’s planned Parthian campaign. Rather than put this to the Senate first, as was the custom, Antony persuaded Dolabella to take the proposed law straight to the people. Syria had been assigned to Cassius, however, and the Senate attempted to block the proposal, but Antony was able to force it through. The law was passed, and Dolabella was thus given command of Syria and the Legions. Antony then requested the Senate to give him the governance of Macedonia, a province Caesar had assigned to Brutus. With Dolabella being given such a rich and powerful province, this seemed a relatively small demand, Macedonia having no legions, so the Senate relented. Cassius was compensated with the governance of Crete and Cyrenaica, while Brutus was given Bithynia. Meanwhile, Octavian had still been in Illyria, debating his best course of action. Some encouraged him to take control of the army that he had been training with and take revenge. His parents, however, wrote to him to come to Rome as a private citizen, in order to attract as little attention as possible, claim his wealth and retire. Octavian knew he had to be in Rome to understand the situation and so, he left the army and sailed across the Adriatic. When he arrived in Italy, more accurate information regarding the assassination and Caesar’s will was sent to him. Still, he was uneasy, many encouraging him to renounce the adoption by Caesar completely. When he arrived in Brundisium, however, huge crowds flocked to him, and veterans greeted him as Caesar’s son. Octavian immediately accepted the adoption, officially changing his name to Gaius Julius Caesar. Hearing this, more and more soldiers, veterans, and sympathisers flocked to his side. Along with them came more news from Rome, the appointments of Antony and Dolabella, the proposed recall of Sextus Pompey and other exiles, and more. With his increasingly large retinue, Octavian now made his way to Rome. However, as a private citizen, Octavian had no real power in Rome. Antony was the man with all the power and, more importantly for Octavian, all of Caesar’s possessions, including his vast fortune. In order to have any real power in the city, Octavian needed this money. He not only had Caesar’s legacy of 75 drachmae to each citizen to distribute but also political allies to repay and others to bribe. Octavian thanked Antony for giving Caesar a proper burial, but criticised him for not having seized the moment when the populace was on his side to hunt the Liberators down, and for having given too many concessions to the Senate, Brutus, and Cassius. Finally, he asked for the gold that Caesar had amassed for his war against Parthia in order to pay the citizens of Rome, and also asked Antony to either give him a loan from his private purse or from the treasury, to cover his other expenses, while Octavian would immediately put his properties up for sale in order to pay these debts. Antony was completely taken aback. Octavian had no power, had no leverage, and really had no right to be so critical, and making requests from Antony, so he was quick to refuse. He pointed out that, like it or not, the Senators were the representative body of Rome. Caesar had not, Antony made clear, left Octavian the Roman government in his will. As such, neither he nor Octavian had any right to overrule the constitution. Regarding the money, Antony found Octavian’s requests laughable. Antony claimed that, though Caesar had been a rich man, but much of his wealth was distributed across a number of assets, many of which were now disputed by various individuals. Some of these had been seized after his assassination, others had not yet been liquified into cash. In reality, Antony had already spent a significant amount of Caesar’s fortune and had deliberately slowed down the process of Octavian’s adoption to further handicap the young man. Antony made it clear that, once Caesar’s assets had been assessed and the many individual disputes resolved, Octavian would get a portion of the remaining money. Octavian left in a fury. Octavian and Antony were immediately at loggerheads. Lawsuits were levelled against Octavian, contesting a number of the assets he had inherited, as some had belonged to men who Caesar had exiled, but had now been allowed to return, while others claimed that some of the assets were seized by Caesar unjustifiably. Antony, his brother Gaius, who was a city praetor, and Dolabella, presided over many of these cases and ensured that Octavian got the worst of it. Octavian was forced to put all his inherited properties up for sale in order to find the money to settle these various cases. This went on until two men, Pedius and Pinarius, appealed to Antony. They had also been given part of Caesar’s wealth in his will, and were worried that there would be nothing left after the various lawsuits. They pointed out that Caesar’s will had been clear, and that the Senate had agreed to uphold Caesar’s actions. Antony conceded somewhat, allowing Pedius and Pinarius to take their share of Caesar’s money now, but withheld Octavian’s share, saying that, though the Senate had agreed to uphold Caesar’s actions, it was also not proper to ignore the disputes of many individuals just for Octavian’s sake. Pedius and Pinarius quickly took their share, planning on using it to in turn fund Octavian. Antony and his brother were due to hold Games, which would be done in Brutus’ name. The aim was to bolster support for Brutus and Cassius in order to hopefully get the people to reconcile with the two, thus giving the brothers two more powerful allies in the Senate who would be indebted to them. Octavian, however, opposed this. He sold all his properties at the lowest price he could, used what personal money he had, and the money from Pedius and Pinarius to finally pay Caesar’s gift of money to the people. Octavian had gone through so much to get this money that the gift was now seen as more a gift from him, than from Caesar. When the Games were held and the heralds paid by the Antony’s began to call for the return of Brutus and Cassius, many of the people, now thoroughly won over by Octavian, stormed onto the arena, stopping the Games until Antony’s heralds were forced to stop their appeal. Octavian had gained a victory. When Brutus and Cassius heard of what happened, they were furious. This had been their last gambit at returning to Rome through popular support. Now they planned to go to Macedonia and Syria and take those provinces by force. The men who had professed to killing Caesar to protect Rome had now completely abandoned the city, leaving it contested between Octavian and Antony. However, one man who had long claimed to be a saviour of Rome did stay: Cicero. He had been quick to realise that Antony was simply hoarding power for himself and, despite the danger to his life presented by the powerful Antony, he now aligned himself with Octavian. It had only been 6 months since the assassination of Caesar and the stage was once again set for war. In Rome, the relationship between Octavian and Cicero, and Antony was almost at breaking point. Meanwhile, the Liberators were starting to gather their forces, Decimus in Cisalpine Gaul, Trebonius in Asia, and Brutus and Cassius en route to their respective provinces. In Sicily, Sextus Pompeius, still not yet officially recalled to Rome, had amassed a sizable force. The entire Roman world was, once again, about to be plunged into Civil War. By the summer of 44BC, Octavian had successfully halted Brutus and Cassius’ plan to win over the Roman public, forcing them to abandon the city. Brutus had retreated to Greece, where he was greeted warmly in Athens, and began rallying support, while Cassius was en-route to the East, where he held the most influence. Antony and Dolabella, the two consuls for the year, had been assigned Macedonia and Syria respectively for the following year, but their position was somewhat weak. The public in Rome was starting to turn against them and they had no significant army under their command. Dolabella had been granted command of the legions Caesar had picked out for the Parthian campaign, currently in Illyria, but this command would not take effect until the end of his consulship at the end of the year. They needed men now. Suddenly, a rumour reached Rome that a huge Getae force had attacked Macedonia. Antony immediately requested that the Parthian army be put under his command to defend the province. The Senate was initially reluctant, but not wanting to risk the province, relented. Soon it was reported that the Getae were no longer in Macedonia, and some reports claimed that they never even attacked. Nevertheless, Antony insisted that he maintain command, claiming that if the army were moved, then there certainly would be a huge attack on the undefended province. Antony had just secured himself a large, and well-trained army consisting of Caesar’s veterans. Antony immediately brought 4 legions to Brundisium and demanded that the Senate reassign governance of Macedonia to his brother Gaius, while he was to be given governance of Cisalpine Gaul. Just as Caesar before him, Antony knew he had to secure governance of a province in order to have legal immunity. Moreover, Caesar had shown how valuable the province was, and how much control the governor of Cisalpine Gaul could exercise over Rome. Decimus Brutus was currently the governor, however, and the Senate refused to allow Antony to replace him. Looking to bypass the Senate, Antony planned to put the law to the Public Assembly, but his popularity greatly diminished, he was unlikely to pass the law alone. The most popular man in Rome at the moment was Octavian. The two men had constantly been at loggerheads, but Antony’s circle had been advising him to reconcile. Finally seeing the benefit in this, Antony and Octavian made a temporary alliance. Octavian would swing the vote in the Assembly, while Antony would later help Octavian. Still bitter towards Antony, Octavian was even more resentful of Decimus and was willing to do what was necessary to weaken Caesar’s assassins. The law was passed by the People, ensuring Antony would be governor of Cisalpine Gaul, and his brother governor of Macedonia for 43BC. The Senate, however, sent messages to Decimus to not give in to Antony and to defend his province. Meanwhile, Sextus Pompey ventured out from his base in Sicily and managed to stir up a revolt in Hispania, which had always had Pompeian sympathies. Lepidus, previously Caesar’s Master of Horse, was able to negotiate with Sextus to retreat without fighting and the Senate, praised him for that, as winning over Lepidus would greatly strengthen their position and severely undermine Antony. In Rome, one of the Tribunes of the Plebs died, and needed to be replaced. Octavian was the popular candidate, but the Senate feared that he would use his office to prosecute the Liberators. Octavian turned to Antony, calling to repay the favour, but the latter refused, claiming that Octavian was too young. The majority voted for Octavian nevertheless, but Antony once again interceded, annulling the vote. Octavian was furious and immediately began sending his agents throughout Italy, gauging which cities would be loyal to him and which of Antony’s legions had wavering loyalty, and amassing old veterans of Caesar. To further damage Antony’s position, Octavian’s ally Cicero began disseminating the first of a number of speeches attacking Antony’s actions and character, the Philippics. Octavian’s agents were successful in sewing discontent among legions in Brundisium, as many legionaries saw Antony’s actions against Caesar's heir as disrespectful and insulting. Immediately, Antony rushed to Brundisium to regain control of the situation. Octavian, nervous of what Antony was planning, also left Rome, calling Caesarean veterans to his banner. He offered huge rewards and soon had an army of thousands. With no legal right to command an army, he justified it by calling them his bodyguards. He sent this force to Arretium and then started waiting for Antony to make the first move. In Brundisium, Antony was struggling to regain control. Octavian’s agents had been effective, and Antony’s initial gift of 100 drachmae was laughed off. Infuriated, Antony rounded up the ring-leaders and decimated them. This brutal action, combined with a larger offered reward, was enough to temporarily win the legions back to his side, and Antony returned to Rome, sending the 4 legions north to Arminium, joining with two more on the road. However, while on the march two other Macedonian Legions, the Martian and 4th consisting of Caesar’s veterans, defected, pledging their loyalties to Octavian. Antony tried to win them back but was forced away by arrow fire. Nevertheless, at this point in late November, Antony was in a solid position. He had 4 legions in Italy, Lepidus and Asinius Pollio in Hispania commanded 4 and 3 legions respectively, and Plancus commanded another 3 in Transalpine Gaul; Antony was confident that they would side with him. Meanwhile, Dolabella had also begun his journey from Rome to Syria collecting a small force, likely from Macedonia, to take up governorship there when his term as consul ended. En route, he passed through Asia, the province governed by Trebonius. While attempting to resupply, Dolabella found all the cities closed to him. Furious, he attacked Smyrna where Trebonius was located but was unsuccessful. Disgruntled, he began to retreat and was shadowed by Trebonius men. Dolabella’s scouts informed of this though, and he managed to lay an ambush, destroying Trebonius’ force and rushing back to seize the now undefended Smyrna. Trebonius was captured in his bed and beheaded by Dolabella’s men - the first of Caesar’s assassins to die. With the year coming to a close, Dolabella and Antony’s terms as consul would also be ending soon. Antony, knowing he needed to secure a governorship, sent messages to Decimus demanding that he give up his province, demands that Decimus refused. Antony then left Rome to join his army to enforce his claim on the province and was given a fabulous send-off by the Senate. Octavian, outraged at Antony’s earlier betrayal, also left Rome to join with his force in Arretium. He now also had a formidable force: effectively 2 legions of veterans and 2 of levies who had rallied to him, and the Martian and 4th Legions. He too received a warm send-off from the Senate which hoped that two Caesareans would wear each other down. Antony, marching to Cisalpine Gaul once again demanded Decimus’ resignation, and Decimus once again refused. Antony entered the province and began marching on various towns, many of which simply open their gates to him, not wanting to be sacked. Decimus, however, had 3 legions, two made of veterans, and a sizeable force of gladiators. He marched to Mutina and prepared to defend the city. Antony arrived shortly, besieging the city and encircling it with walls, just as Caesar had done at Alesia. 44 BC had come to an end, and new consuls were elected in Rome: Hirtius and Pansa. Both men had served under Caesar, but both were somewhat moderate Caesareans, convinced by Cicero of the danger that Antony presented. Cicero was doubling down on his attacks against Antony and in an impassioned speech in the Senate called for Antony to be declared an enemy of the People. In an equally impressive speech, Caesar’s father-in-law Lucius Calpurnius Piso, who had been trying to decrease the tensions during the last decade of wars, defended Antony insisting that his crimes were not enough to be declared an enemy of the state and advocating for Antony to stand trial. Despite Cicero’s attempts, the Senate initially attempted to negotiate, offering him the governorship of Macedonia, but Antony was having none of it citing the vote of the People’s Assembly. Antony’s rejection played into Cicero’s hands perfectly, and he convinced the Senate to declare both Antony and Dolabella enemies of the state. At the same time, Cicero ensured that Octavian had the legal right to command armies under the Senate assigning him to assist Hirtius and Pansa, who had been instructed to raise troops to fight Antony. Lastly, Brutus and Cassius were both confirmed as governors of Macedonia and Syria, with all governors East of the Adriatic being instructed to assist them in any way they could. It was a masterful play that returned the power to the Senate with Consuls sympathetic to their cause, a large army in Italy, and the East secured. Brutus and Cassius were quick to seize the moment. Brutus, having rallied support in Greece throughout 44BC, marched into Macedonia, seizing it and capturing Antony’s brother Gaius. Meanwhile, Cassius had leveraged his incredible popularity in the east, a result of his heroic conduct in Crassus’ otherwise disastrous Carrhae campaign. With the Senate having assigned all eastern governors to assist him and Brutus, Cassius had managed to gather a huge force of 12 legions and marched to Syria, confronting Dolabella at Laodicea. He easily captured the town, Dolabella committing suicide with the assistance of his soldiers. Antony’s position, was now perilous, but Octavian too was nervous, as, despite the imperium to command armies, he was still outranked and subservient to the new Consuls, who could easily remove him from his command. His primary motivation was to destroy the Liberators and the Pompeians, but it now seemed that the Pompeian faction had been revived and in power. Still thinking that his best chances lay with the Senate, Octavian continued to assist the two Consuls. Pansa was still levying legions, but Hirtius joined Octavian, taking command of the two ex-Antonine Legions. With winter closing in and Decimus running low on supplies, the two marched to his position to put pressure on Antony. Given the quality of Antony’s army, however, they were apprehensive to commit to a battle, preferring to skirmish while they waited for Pansa’s arrival. Meanwhile, in Rome, Cicero was effectively in charge, pursuing a stringent anti-Antony policy and extracting heavy taxes from Antony’s allies, to raise war funds. However, he went too far, pushing one of them - Ventidius, to rally 3 legions worth of veterans. With this force, he tried to make his way to Antony, but finding the road blocked by Octavian and Hirtius, diverted to Picenum to bide his time. Meanwhile, Pansa, having recently levied 4 new legions, marched to Octavian and Hirtius in late March of 43BC. Antony, upon hearing this and fearing that he would soon be massively outnumbered, decided to try and defeat his enemies in detail. Leading two of his veteran Legions, the 2nd and 35th, a few cohorts of his picked bodyguard, and a significant number of cavalry, Antony marched to the Via Aemilia, past the camps of Hirtius and Octavian, positioning himself near the Forum Gallorum just outside the marshes ready to ambush Pansa. He also sent smaller forces under his brother Lucius to harass Octavian’s camp, keeping him pinned inside. Fortunately for Pansa, as soon as Hirtius and Octavian had received word that he was nearby, they had acted quickly, dispatching the Martian Legion under one of Caesar’s assassins, Galba, and 2 cohorts of Octavian’s bodyguard to escort the new recruits. It was a prudent tactic. As Pansa’s force marched through the marsh, they were harassed by some of Antony’s cavalry. The Martian Legion and Octavian’s bodyguard advanced to chase them from the levies. On the 14th April, as they made it out of the marshes onto open ground, they deployed in a line but were suddenly attacked by Antony’s main force. It was a cunning move, with the Martian Legion deployed in line in front of the marshes, they had effectively blocked the road from the marshes, preventing the levies from joining them. The bodyguards of Antony and Octavian, both in the respective center of their armies, engaged, while the Martian Legion, split in two on either flank, engaged the 2nd and 35th. The officers of the Martian Legion, worried that the levies would simply cause confusion and break the battle line, ordered them to retreat back to their camp. Appian’s description of the battle is harrowing. The three Legions that were engaged were all veterans who had fought under Caesar, and the two sides bitterly resented each other, seeing their opponents as traitors. According to Appian, the battle was fought in near silence, only broken by groans of pain and the clash of weapons. There were no war-cries, the veterans on both sides knowing that this would do little to intimidate their enemies. The left wing of the Martian legion began to give ground, but the right flank was having more success, pushing back the 35th Legion. As they did, however, Antony’s cavalry managed to get around their flanks. Now surrounded, the Martian Legion began giving ground Pansa being wounded in the fighting and rushed back to the camp of levies. Octavian’s bodyguard, fighting to the last man, was destroyed in the center. The Martian Legion continued to give ground, but as they did they became entangled with some of the levies still trying to retreat down the narrow road back to the camp. Pansa’s force took heavy losses in this withdrawal, but the remnants of the Martian Legion were able to finally reach the safety of the fort. Antony, not wanting to waste time on a prolonged siege of the fortified position, pulled back. It was initially a victory for Antony, having destroyed the cohorts of Octavian’s bodyguard and inflicting heavy casualties on the Martian and levy legions, including injuring a consul. He began his march back to Mutina in triumph. As he did, however, he was attacked by Hirtius and the 4th Legion. Antony’s men, utterly exhausted from the battle and march, fought as well as they could but fatigued as they were, failed to stop Hirtius’ army from overrunning them, forcing Antony to retreat hastily to Mutina. By the end of the day, Antony had lost almost half of the two legions, including the Eagles. His victory in the morning had turned to a bitter defeat in the afternoon. In Rome, the victory was hailed as decisive, particularly by Cicero. However, Antony was not done yet, his forces around Mutina still maintaining the siege of Decimus. Octavian and Hirtius, just days after the battle of Forum Gallorum, marched on Antony’s position, determined to finally break the siege. Antony’s position was well defended, but Octavian and Hirtius spotted a point where the terrain had made it difficult for the defences to be properly built. They focused their force on this point, attempting to break through. Initially, Antony was reluctant to face them head-on, hoping to still them with his defences and harass them with cavalry. Soon, however, it became apparent that Octavian and Hirtius’ men would eventually break through if something was not done. Still reluctant to completely abandon the siege, Antony marched out two legions to confront his enemies on the 21st April. Octavian and Hirtius immediately changed their focus from the defences to these two Legions. Octavian’s force slowly gained the upper hand, pushing back Antony’s Legions. Desperately, Antony tried to move other Legions to assist, but having been deployed all around the city, many were too far to assist. Antony’s two Legions were struggling, and Hirtius was even able to lead a Legion into Antony’s camp, attempting to fight his way through to Antony’s tent. The camp was defended by Antony’s elite 5th legion, however, and the fighting was brutal. Simultaneously, Decimus managed to organise a sortie under Aquila, another of Caesar’s assassins. Fighting now raged all around the city, Aquila’s force attacking Antony’s defences from the outside, Hirtius against the 5th inside the camp of Antony, and Octavian outside the camp against 2 of Antony’s Legions. Octavian’s men finally managed to completely break their opponents and rushed to Hirtius’ aid. At this point, Hirtius was killed in the fighting. The circumstances of his death are not clear. Appian says that Octavian fought in the front line bravely to reclaim his body, while other sources like Suetonius and Niger say that Octavian had Hirtius killed in the fighting. Whatever the truth, the consul was dead and Octavian pulled his men back, the 5th Legion having successfully defended Antony’s camp. Aquila had also died in the fighting, and the sortie repulsed. Antony, realising that he now did not have the numbers to continue the siege, abandoned his position in the night, making for Picenum to consolidate with Vetidius. It was a somewhat indecisive action. While Octavian’s force had managed to inflict more casualties, they had failed in the primary objectives: Antony was still alive and had managed to escape. Shortly afterwards, Pansa, the consul wounded at Forum Gallorum, also died of his wounds. His death too, is mysterious. Appian describes a moving meeting between Octavian and Pansa on the consul’s death bed, where the consul revealed that he had been rooting for Octavian from the start, and bestowed command of the army to him. Suetonius and Tacitus on the other hand, suggest that Pansa may have been poisoned, possibly on Octavian’s orders. Both consuls were lauded as heroes by Cicero, who gave Octavian very little credit for any of his actions. It was ordered that Decimus be given full command of the Legions. Octavian was outraged. He had been used as a pawn by the Senate time and time again and had finally had enough. He refused to give up command of the legions to Decimus, insisting that his men would not follow the assassin of Caesar. When Decimus gave him orders to cut off Antony and prevent him from merging with Vetidius, Octavian refused. It was a turning point in history. Secretly, he sent messages to Lepidus, Plancus, and Pollio insisting that they needed to work together as Caesareans to counter the growing Pompeian faction. In the weeks following Mutina, these three had, after discussions with Antony, merged with him, bringing his force to a colossal 17 legions. The battles and deaths of the two consuls had left a power vacuum in Rome. Brutus and Cassius, with the support of the Senate, had amassed their power in the East, reviving the Pompeian faction. In the West, Antony and Lepidus’ alliance had effectively rebuilt the Caesarean faction. Caught between the two was Octavian, alienated by the Senate, and still resentful of Antony. Both of the consuls for 43BC, Pansa and Hirtius, had died, leaving the consulship vacant and Octavian, furious with the Senate that he had not been rewarded for his role in defeating Antony around Mutina, decided to act. In July, he sent an embassy of centurions to Rome demanding the consulship and that the decree declaring Antony a public enemy to be rescinded. According to Appian, one centurion addressed the Senate with his hand on his sword and proclaimed “If you do not grant the Consulship to Caesar, this will”. The Senate refused, pointing out that Octavian was too young to legally hold the office. Octavian’s delegation countered, citing Pompey, Dolabella and other examples of underage consuls. Still, the Senate refused. Octavian’s men demanded that he march on Rome to claim the consulship. This is yet another clear example of how symbiotic the relationship between a general and his men was in the Roman Republic. The soldiers gave the general military power, which in turn led to political power, while a general’s political power was tied directly to how effectively and luxuriously he would be able to reward his soldiers. Octavian’s men demanding he march on Rome should not, therefore, be seen as an act of political idealism, but more motivated by the knowledge that if their general were made consul, they could expect far greater rewards. Octavian gladly accepted their petition, marching 8 Legions across the Rubicon toward Rome. Caught between the Senate and Antony, it was clear now that Octavian had made his choice of which side he would join. History was repeating itself, with yet another Caesar, which was now Octavian’s legal name, marching on Rome. The Panicked Senate sent messengers to Octavian saying that he would be granted full command of the army, and the right to run for the consulship. However, almost immediately, the Senators became ashamed for caving in to blackmail. Two legions that had been sent from Africa to assist in the war against Antony had just arrived in the city, and there was still one legion that had been left by Pansa to protect the city. Cicero rallied the Senate, revoking the previous offer to Octavian. The legions were prepared to defend Rome and the city was fortified. Octavian’s negotiation with the Senate’s ambassadors was interrupted by a second delegation rescinding the offer. Immediately, he marched his force to Rome encamping on the Campus Martius. Seeing the vast force assembled against them, two of three legions in Rome lost heart, defecting to him. The Senators had been brave to try and organise a defence of the city, but the popularity and power of Octavian was simply too great. Shortly after this, rumours circulated that two of Octavian’s legions had defected and some Senators once again tried to raise legions to confront him, however, the rumours were false. In all likeliness, Octavian himself had been the source of the rumour, seeking to establish who his main opponents in the city were. All of them would be proscribed. Elections for the consulship were held and, to nobody’s surprise, Octavian was elected alongside Pedius, Caesar’s legate, who funded his young heir during the early struggle with Antony. Octavian immediately set about holding trials for those linked to the conspiracy against Caesar, including some men who had not even been in the city at the time. All were unanimously found guilty in the courts presided over by Octavian. One Praetor who voted for acquittal would later be proscribed by Octavian, another was rumoured to be plotting to assassinate Octavian, and was sent on a ship to be exiled in Africa. The ship never arrived though, disappearing en route. This was just a taste of what was to come. Octavian would not show mercy to his enemies. Meanwhile, the forces of Antony, Lepidus, Plancus, Pollio and Ventidius had combined west of the Alps in Narbonese Gaul, a huge force of 17 Legions, with Antony and Lepidus in joint command. Octavian knew that to confront Brutus and Cassius and the immense force that they could amass in the East, he would need the help of these legions. As such, he rescinded the decree that made Antony an enemy of the state, and sent letters of friendship to the two men, who both responded in kind. Between the three of them, they held the most powerful army west of the Adriatic, and each knew that they could benefit from cooperation, rather than wasting their men fighting one another. Together, they marched on Decimus’ position in North Italy. Decimus’ legionaries, seeing the writing on the wall, began to abandon him in droves, many turning to either Antony or Octavian. In desperation, Decimus attempted to flee to Macedonia with just his bodyguard, taking a long route through barbican lands to the North, disguising himself as a Gaul to avoid detection. A Gallic chieftain, loyal to Antony, captured him in September however, and Decimus was beheaded. It was a severe blow to the Pompeian faction. Decimus had been one of Caesar’s most talented subordinates and was one of the best generals on the Pompeian side. With his death, the Italian peninsula was now effectively in control of the Caesareans. In Italy, in October 43, Antony, Lepidus and Octavian met on a small island in the Lavinius River, with five Legions apiece lining the river banks. On that small island, they held one of the most important meetings in human history. It was agreed that Octavian would resign his consulship, Ventidius taking his place. Instead, three new magistrate positions with almost limitless powers would be created. The trio would hold these offices together for an initial 5 years, could make and annul laws without approval from the Senate or people, would name the other magistrates for the next 5 years, and their decisions would be immune from veto. The three men each effectively would hold the same powers as Caesar had. The provinces west of the Adriatic were also to be divided amongst the three, Antony having control over Transalpine and Cisalpine Gaul, Lepidus all of Hispania and Narbonese Gaul, and Octavian Africa, Sardinia, Sicily and surrounding islands. It’s clear from this division that Octavian was the junior partner. Gaul and Hispania were two of the most sought after provinces, the former for its potential for expansion, the latter for its rich silver mines. Octavian’s territory, on the other hand, had little to offer. Moreover, Sicily was contested by Sextus Pompey, and a strong Pompeian presence persisted in Africa. Although he carried a powerful name through his adopted father, Octavian was still not as powerful as his fellow triumvirs. Military plans were also laid down: Lepidus would remain in Rome with 3 Legions, while Antony and Octavian would lead the main force to Greece to confront Brutus and Cassius. More darkly, they also planned the proscriptions list, an idea made infamous by the Dictator Sulla. A proscription list was a collection of names that was posted publicly. Any man whose name was on the list immediately had the property declared confiscated by the State and condemned to death; effectively state-approved murders. During the last series of proscriptions under Sulla in 83 BC, a young Julius Caesar had been forced into hiding, and may well have been proscribed himself. It was partly for this reason that Caesar had refused to carry out similar purges during his Dictatorship. Antony, Lepidus, and Octavian were of a different generation, however. The oldest of them, Lepidus, had been just 6 years old during Sulla’s reign, and the proscriptions had left a much less marked effect on them. Together, they wrote up the lists targeting mainly those with political power, but also personal enemies, and those who were rich and whose confiscated property could thus be used to fuel the war effort. Even friends and family were not safe. Antony’s uncle, Lucius, was added to the list, as was Lepidus’ brother. Cicero, the one-time mentor and ally of Octavian, was also proscribed, though Octavian did apparently try to argue against this for two days before relenting. It is important to note here that Cassius Dio and Paterculus claim that Octavian only took part because he held similar authority, that he was effectively unwilling, showing himself later as being a merciful man, and that he tried to save many from the proscriptions. However, other sources, such as Appian and Plutarch, do not say this. In their accounts, all three men were equally culpable. Dio is well known as being overly flattering to Octavian, a result of his position as a Senator in the Empire and thus having a vested interest in having a sympathetic view of the Emperor. Paterculus has similar problems, serving during Octavian’s reign as Emperor under Octavian’s grandson, and thus having a personal investment in glorifying him. Their views have proved persistent, but the accounts may well be apologist revisionism, and Appian and Plutarch do not offer the same excuses both putting Octavian on the same level as Antony and Lepidus. Indeed, Appian says that the terrors that would be inflicted on Rome during this time were all the more remarkable precisely because of Octavian’s participation, and Plutarch describes the trio as having made “a barter of murder for murder”. Within just three days, the three men had planned how to take full control of the Senate, planned a war against the Liberators, and had planned the deaths of 300 Senators, about a third of the Senate, and 2,000 knights. Unofficially, the Second Triumvirate had just been formed. After the negotiations, the three began to march on Rome. For now, the majority of the proscriptions were put on hold, but there were 17 men who needed to be targeted early, among them Cicero and Salvius, a Tribune of the Plebs. Cicero, who held the sympathy of the public, managed to elude his hunters, while Salvius was not so lucky. He was found hosting a banquet, when soldiers burst in, ordering the guests to remain in their positions, and behead the Tribune, leaving his guests reclining in shock next to his beheaded corpse. Panic gripped the city shortly afterwards, and Pedius, one of the consuls of the years, publicised the names of the 17 men the triumvirs were hunting, attempting to reassure the public that only those 17 were listed. Pedius died the following day, reportedly of quote ‘political fatigue’, but it is hard not to think that he was murdered for having revealed the 17 names. Cicero, having tried to escape Italy by sea, had grown sick and was forced to make land. He was soon found near his villa in Formiae being carried in a litter. His slaves and other locals had lied about his location to protect him, but he had finally been betrayed by a local shoemaker. A centurion, who Cicero had previously defended, found the now 63-year-old orator. He accepted his death, offering his neck and was executed. Cicero had been the voice of the Republic. Whether one agrees or disagrees with his actions or politics, he was a brave man who when surrounded by swords tried to defend his Republic with a pen. In the words of Paterculus: “You took from Marcus Cicero a few anxious days, a few senile years, a life which would have been more wretched under your dominion than was his death in your triumvirate; but you did not rob him of his fame, the glory of his deeds and words, nay you but enhanced them! He lives and will continue to live in the memory of the ages, and so long as the universe shall endure – this universe which…he…saw with eye of his mind, grasped with his intellect, and illuminated with his eloquence… shall be accompanied by the fame of Cicero”. His head and his hands, with which he’d written such damning speeches against Antony, were nailed to the rostra where had given so many speeches. The triumvirs entered Rome over three days, each bringing a bodyguard and legion, completely disregarding the law prohibiting arms in the city. A tribune of the Plebs, Publius Titius, proposed the law that would give extraordinary powers to Antony, Lepidus and Octavian. With their legions and bodyguard prowling the city, the bill was swiftly passed. The Second Triumvirate was now legally established. Overnight, lists appeared in the forum with the names of the condemned. A reward was also offered, 2,500 denarii for each head of a proscribed man brought to the Triumvirs. Rewards were also offered for information on a wanted man's location, while any person harbouring a fugitive would also be added to the list. The gates of Rome were blocked by soldiers, and the proscriptions began in earnest. Appian’s account of the proscriptions is harrowing. Men hid in sewers, wells, chimneys, ovens, wherever they could, before being discovered, dragged out and executed by their hunters. One man even hid himself in a dung-heap. The soldiers, disgusted and unwilling to reach in for him, simply stabbed the heap with spears until he emerged, then promptly beheaded him. Brothers holding onto one another were executed together in one swing of a sword. Shockingly, even children were not safe. Orphans, whose parents had left them large amounts of money, were also added to the list. One was found at his school with his tutor. When the hunters burst into his classroom, the tutor tried to shield the young boy with his body, but both were cut down without mercy. Night after night, the proscription lists were expanded, so none truly knew if they were safe or not. Gangs roamed the city looking for any of the proscribed and any opportunity to loot abandoned houses. Fear was rampant. Wives, siblings, and friends informed on their loved ones, and no one was sure who could be trusted. Even some children, eager for their inheritance, reported on their fathers. With so many being killed, many seized the opportunity to settle old scores murdering their rivals under the pretense that they had been proscribed. Many simply gave in, either handing themselves over in order to try and protect their families, or simply waiting for death. Others decided to take fate into their own hands, jumping off rooftops or bridges. Statius, an 80-year-old Senator, opened the doors of his house to the public, and invited them to take anything they wanted. Once his property had been stripped, he burnt it with himself inside. Many wives also killed themselves over the bodies of their husbands, entire families being eradicated. Among these horrors there were also acts of extraordinary bravery. A Senator named Capito, for example, fought in the narrow passage of his doorway, cutting down a number of his hunters before being overwhelmed and butchered. Sons faked the deaths of their fathers and then smuggled them out, one carrying his elderly father on his shoulders. The slave of one Senator, upon hearing that soldiers were coming for his master, swapped outfits with his master and took his place in his bed. The soldiers arrived and killed the slave where he lay, the Senator dressed as a slave standing nearby. Antony’s mother, Julia, was outraged that her brother Lucius had been added to the list, and confronted Antony defiantly declaring that she would protect her brother, and that he would have to kill her too if he wanted his uncle dead. Antony relented, Lucius’ life being saved. When the Triumvirs announced an unheard of before tax upon women, Hortensia, the daughter of a famous lawyer, rallied the women and confronted the Triumvirs. She insisted that, if Rome were fighting a foreign power, the women would gladly support the state but in “civil wars may we never contribute, nor ever assist you against each other!” Given the current political climate, it was an incredibly brave act. The triumvirs needed money, and the confiscation of proscribed property was intended to solve this. Through such grisly methods, the triumvirs accumulated huge amounts of property, but they struggled to sell them. Many of the richest men were now dead, and many were terrified to bid on the properties, lest they also be seen as having money and being added to the lists. Thanks to Hortensia, the tax on women was only enforced upon 400 of Rome’s richest, forcing the Triumvirs to compensate by forcing male property owners to lend money to the State. Some men did escape the proscriptions, many flocking to the banners of Sextus Pompey in Sicily or Brutus and Cassius in the East. Sextus even went so far as to offer his own rewards for those that helped proscribed men escape to him. As a result, Sextus’ whose situation so far had been rather weak, had an influx of powerful men into his faction, including many who had seen military service, greatly strengthening his position. With many of the most powerful men in Rome either dead or having fled the country, Antony, Lepidus and Octavian were left in complete command of Rome. The proscriptions, which began in November of 43BC, continued for months into 42BC, and cemented the Second Triumvirate as the masters of Rome. The First Triumvirate, consisting of Crassus, Pompey and Caesar, had wielded power through the influence of the three men. It had been founded upon a base of mutual opportunism, had been largely bloodless and, while the three men unofficially ruled Rome, kept at least the façade of the Republican constitution. Even the Dictatorship of Caesar had relied far more on the political alliances and debts created by Caesar, than terror. The Second Triumvirate was different. It was ratified by law, effectively making Lepidus, Antony and Octavian simultaneous Dictators in all but name, and was founded upon fear and death. The purges were appalling for people at the time. By these means, the Caesarean party had seized control of Rome. In the East, however, Brutus and Cassius had been raising a colossal army and consolidating their position. History, once again, was about to repeat itself with the Caesarean and Pompeian parties again fighting a battle to decide Rome’s fate in Greece. Brutus had seized Macedonia and the Legions located there from Antony’s brother, Gaius, in 43BC. Worried that his men would just as easily defect back to Antony’s side, Brutus had sailed across the Aegean to Asia Minor, hoping that the distance would prevent any pro-Antony rumours from reaching them. From here, he consolidated his position rallying more men to his cause particularly refugees fleeing the Triumvirate’s proscriptions in Rome. Combined with the army previously under Gaius’ command, he had 8 Legions. Gaius Antonius proved to be a constant problem though, attempting to instigate a number of mutinies among Brutus’ ranks. After the formation of the Second Triumvirate, it was decided that Gaius was now too dangerous to be left alive, and he was executed at the start of 42BC. Around this same time, Brutus, nervous of a potential revolt in Macedonia, crossed back into Europe to handle any potential dissenters. He also undertook a minor expedition in Thrace, winning the Thracian king Rhascupolis to the Pompeian cause. After reaffirming his control of Macedonia, he once again pulled back to Asia Minor. Meanwhile, in Syria, Cassius, following the death of Dolabella, had planned to march on Egypt. Out of the 12 Legions that Cassius had procured from the Governors of the East, 4 had been sent by Cleopatra to assist Dolabella before being intercepted en route. It was apparent then that Cleopatra intended to side with the Triumvirs, and Cassius aimed to quash this possibility early. As he began his march on Cleopatra however, word reached him of the formation of the Second Triumvirate and that they had already begun moving forces into Greece, sailing 8 Legions across the Adriatic. Immediately, Cassius abandoned his plan, marching to Asia Minor with all speed to combine with Brutus, requesting aid from Eastern client kings, and even the Parthians, as he marched. The two men met in Smyrna in Anatolia around late January 42BC. Initially, Brutus suggested that they take their entire force of 20 Legions immediately to Macedonia to confront the Triumvirs. He reasoned that if they attacked now, they would be able to crush the 8 Legions and prevent any more from landing in Macedonia. Cassius, on the other hand, disagreed. The triumvirs had their hands full in Rome, and would also be nervous of Sextus Pompey amassing forces in Sicily. Moreover, the Caesareans also had a number of allies in the area, namely the Rhodians and Lycians, with strong navies that could effectively pin Cassius and Brutus in Greece if they were not careful. Cassius thus suggested that their focus should be to eliminate these allies. In doing so, they could flip the tables, forcing the Triumvirs to land a large force in Greece without an adequate naval supply line to support them. Cassius was the more experienced and talented general: he had fought in Crassus’ Parthian campaign and had distinguished himself in the aftermath. As such, the two men decided to follow Cassius’ strategy. Brutus would handle the Lycians, and Cassius the Rhodians. Cassius made for Myndus and began amassing a fleet of 80 ships to sail for Rhodes. He had been partly raised and educated on the island and was well known in the city. Upon hearing of his approach, the Rhodians sent peace delegations. Rhodes was technically an ally of the Roman Republic; the Rhodians had a peace treaty with Rome and had promised to assist the Senate in times of war. With the Senate now effectively controlled by the triumvirate, the Rhodians could not side against them. Cassius rejected these arguments. He claimed the Senate was run by dictators, that he and Brutus now were the true embodiment of the Republic, and that the Rhodians thus owed their allegiance to them. Still, the Rhodians refused Cassius and began preparing their fleet for war. In a large ditch effort to make peace, they sent Archelaus, Cassius’ old teacher, to negotiate. Tearfully, Archelaus begged Cassius to spare the city. Cassius again refused. He pointed out that the Senate had previously ordered all people east of the Adriatic should assist himself and Brutus. This was true. However, if the Rhodians abided by that decree and assisted Cassius and Brutus, they would simultaneously be breaking their peace treaty by going to war with the Roman Senate. After many days of debating, they finally came to a conclusion. Sailing with 33 of their best ships, they sailed to Myndus to fight Cassius’ navy. Cassius reluctantly sailed out of port to meet them. Rhodians were renowned as some of the best sailors of the ancient world and their ships were light and quick. The fighting was hard, but Cassius’ larger navy was eventually able to surround the Rhodian fleet. Without room to manoeuvre, the lighter Rhodian ships lost their advantage, and the heavy Roman ships were able to close in. 3 Rhodian ships were captured, 2 sunk and many badly damaged before the Rhodians withdrew from the battle. Cassius quickly made any necessary repairs to his fleet before pushing his advantage and landing a force on the island. The Rhodian navy attempted to sally out of its port, but was again quickly crushed. Cassius now had Rhodes besieged from both land and sea. Rather than suffer the horrors of a prolonged siege, a faction within the city opened the gates to Cassius. 50 leading Rhodians were executed, and their vast treasury was seized, but the city was spared, Cassius forbidding his men from violence or looting. Brutus, meanwhile, led his 8 Legions against important city of Xanthus in Lycia. The Xanthians had prepared themselves well, creating a trench and embankment around the city. However, many of the men under Brutus’ command had served under Caesar and had experience of siege craft. Working day and night and under the protection of movable defences, The Legions were able to completely besiege the city in a matter of days. Battering rams were swiftly brought up to attack the walls and gates. The defences were strong though, and Brutus’ men having only managed to inflict minor damage on the defences, abandoned their siege engines. That night, the Xanthians sallied out to burn the rams. Suddenly, Brutus’ men fell upon them in the darkness: the Xanthians had been lured into a trap. Desperately, they tried to retreat into the city, but finding the gate had been closed, they were trapped outside and many were killed in front of the gates. The next day, the Xanthians again sallied out to burn the rams, and the Romans again attacked. This time, the Xanthians kept their gate open, allowing their men to retreat back into the city, but this also resulted in about 2,000 Romans also getting through. The Xanthians suddenly dropped their portcullis, trapping the Romans inside. They too had lured the Romans into a trap. Desperately, the 2,000 Legionaries trapped inside fought their way to the forum under constant missile fire, taking refure in the temple of Sarpedon. At the same time, their colleagues on the outside were determined to break in to rescue them, attempting to use grappling hooks to scale the walls, some using crags in the wall to climb their way up. A small group was able to scale the walls, and opened a small side gate allowing more legionaries inside. They fought their way to the portcullis and with men hacking at it form the inside and outside were finally able to break it down, allowing Brutus’ force to pour into the city. The city was lost and, according to Appian, many of the citizens killed themselves, with Brutus only taking 150 men captive. Following this siege, other cities in Lycia such as Patara and Myra, quickly surrendered to Brutus. Soon, all of Lycia was pledged to him militarily and paid heavy tributes to him. In a few months, Brutus and Cassius between them had thus neutered two powerful naval allies of the triumvirs, as well as massively increasing their finances, ensuring that they would be able to keep their legions loyal when the time came to confront the triumvirs in Greece. Cassius and Brutus, hearing that Cleopatra was also sending a fleet to the Peloponnese sent 80 ships of their fleet under Murcus to keep an eye out for her arrival. Fortunately for the Liberators though, a storm had devastated Cleopatra’s fleet, forcing her to return to Egypt. Not wanting to keep such a large fleet idle, Murcus instead sailed to Brundisium to blockade the port and prevent the triumvirs from sending more men across the Adriatic. Antony, in command of the forces in the area, attempted to break the blockade with his own ships, but did not have the numbers, and was forced to send for Octavian to assist him. Octavian was currently engaged in a campaign against Sextus Pompey. The son of Pompey the Great had taken advantage of the chaos caused by the assassination of Caesar, its aftermath, and the conflict between the Senate and Antony to rebuild his position in Sicily. Gathering men from across the Mediterranean, he had gradually been building his force. This force grow larger still during the proscriptions of the Triumvirate which had forced many influential men to take refuge with him. Shortly after the formation of the triumvirate, he had used this force to besiege the governor of Sicily and, with the help of some of the Senators who had fled to him, forced him to surrender the province. The triumvirs had only just begun treating him as a serious threat, Octavian sending his top general at the time, Salvidienus, to handle the matter. However, Sextus had dealt Salvidienus a minor but important victory in the straits of Messina. Octavian had taken up the campaign himself, but upon receiving Antony’s summons, immediately sailed to Brundisium, leaving Sicily and Sextus alone for the time being. Upon Octavian’s arrival, Murcus retreated not wanting to be trapped between the forces of Antony and Octavian. Instead, he planned to harass any ships attempting to cross the Adriatic. The triumvirs were far more audacious than Murcus assumed, however, and with favourable winds they made a number of quick and risky crossings, without military ships so as not to draw too much attention. Soon, Antony and Octavian had managed to move 11 Legions across the Adriatic, leaving Lepidus in Rome to control the city. Murcus was furious, but nevertheless held his position determined to at the very least prevent any supplies or munitions from reaching the triumvirs. Ahenobarbus, son of the same man who had fought against Caesar, was sent with a further 50 ships to support him, giving him a total of 130. Octavian and Antony quickly sent the 8 Legions who had landed in Greece earlier in the year towards Thrace under the command of Decidus and Norbanus to hold the Corpilan and Sapaean passes, two important routes into Greece for any force crossing from Asia Minor. Meanwhile, Brutus and Cassius crossed the Aegean into Greece, landing in Sestus in August 42BC. Thrace, at the time, was ruled by two brothers, Rhascupolis and Rhascus. Brutus had previously won Rhascupolis to his side, and the Thracian king now went with 3,000 cavalry to reinforce the Liberators, while his brother Rhascus sided with the triumvirs, leading 3,000 cavalry to Decidus and Norbanus. The board was now set. Appian claims that Antony and Octavian had roughly 100,000 men consisting of 19 Legions, the eleven recently transported from Italy and the 8 holding the Thracian passes, as well as 13,000 cavalry. Cassius and Brutus also had approximately 100,000, consisting of 19 Legions, some of which were understrength, 20,000 allied cavalry and 4,000 horse archers from the Parthians, Medes and Arabs. Some modern historians, however, have questioned whether such large armies could realistically be maintained logistically and have suggested numbers closer to 60,000 on both sides. Whatever the true number, it is agreed that the triumvirs had a slightly infantry advantage and the Liberators a slight edge in the number of cavalry. Even if the more modest number of 60,000 each side is accepted, both armies would still be colossal, larger even than the armies fielded by Caesar and Pompey at Pharsalus. In many ways, it was a case of history repeating itself. The Caesareans, this time under Antony and Octavian, had landed a large army in Greece but had a precarious supply route with their enemies controlling the sea behind them. The Pompeians, under Cassius and Brutus, also had a large army and with a secure supply line, they could focus on trying to force a situation where they could starve their opponents into submission. The successors to the Caesarean and Pompeian party, the Triumvirs and Liberators respectively, both had amassed colossal armies. Many of the Legions on both sides had served under Caesar. Legions that Caesar had located in the East, likely including the 27th, 31st, 33rd, 36th and 37th, some of whom had been made of Pompeian forces after Pharsalus and that had later fought with Caesar at Alexandria and at the Nile. The triumvirs force, on the other hand, boasted some of Caesar’s longest-serving Legions including the 6th, 7th, 8th, and Caesar’s favourite 10th. Caesar’s Legions would thus once again determine the fate of the Roman Republic near a small town in the province of Macedonia called Philippi. In August 42BC Cassius and Brutus were the ones who held the upper hand. Their army, though smaller than the total force that the triumvirs could muster, was roughly the same size as the one the triumvirs had in Greece. Sextus’ presence in Sicily ensured that part of the Caesarean fleet would always be pinned, giving Cassius and Brutus naval supremacy in the area. Moreover, the past decades of Civil War had effectively drained Italy of much of its money and manpower. Cassius and Brutus, on the other hand, had plenty of both thanks in part to their campaigns against the Lycians and Rhodians, and also because the East had suffered far less in the previous wars. Lastly, the presence of Murcus and Ahenobarbus in the Adriatic meant that the triumvirs supply line was precarious, while Cassius and Brutus’ was well secured. They were confident and prepared their forces for the campaign. The two began by securing the loyalties of their Legions, paying them a large amount before even beginning the campaign, particularly to any Legions that had served under Caesar. Cassius made an impassioned speech to the men, justifying their war. He defended the assassination of Caesar, saying that “We could no longer endure that one man…should be a law in places of the laws, a sovereign in place of a sovereign people, an autocrat in place of the Senate’s authority.” Next, he targeted the triumvirs condemning their tyrannical actions in Rome calling them “leaders of evil men…who proscribe their own brothers, uncles and guardians first”. Finally, he addressed the men who had served under Caesar: “Let it give no concern that he has been one of Caesar’s soldiers. We were not his soldiers then, but our country’s. The pay and the rewards given were not Caesar’s, but the Republics. For the same reason you are not now the soldiers of Cassius, or of Brutus, but of Rome”. It was an excellent speech. With their Legions' loyalties ensured, the Liberators began their march into Greece, but first they needed to pass the Legions of Decidus in the Corpilian Pass, and Norbanus in the Sapaean. Cassius, in a brilliant strategic move, sent Tillius Cimber, one of the assassins of Caesar, with one Legion to sail around their position, making sure he was seen doing so. Once he had landed, he made a huge show of making a number of camps. Norbanus, fearing that a large force had outflanked him and that he was in danger of being attacked from two sides, requested Decidus to come to his position so that they could more strongly hold one position. Decidus agreed, marching quickly to Norbanus. The liberators immediately moved through the now abandoned Corpilian Pass; their feint had worked perfectly. The Sapaean Pass was now well defended though and would be almost impenetrable. Fortunately, Rhascupolis knew his land well and told the triumvirs of a route around the pass. It would take 4 days over difficult terrain, but with little other option, the Liberators accepted the suggestion. Rhascus, however, was also aware of this pass, spotted the manoeuvre and warned Norbanus of the threat. Realising that his position was now effectively useless, Norbanus withdrew his force in the night, marching to Amphipolis. So far, the Liberators had been remarkably successful, bypassing two extremely strong defensive positions without any losses. Knowing that the main triumvir force would be somewhere nearby, Cassius and Brutus prepared their force for battle near Philippi in Eastern Macedonia sometime around September 42BC. They encamped on two sets of hills linking their two camps with a continuous wall, with an open plain in front of them, forest to their north, gorges and mountains to their rear in the east, and marsh in the south extending to the sea. To their south east was the port town of Neapolis, which was acting as their supply base. It was an excellent defensive position. Antony, learning of their position and eager for the fight, merged his force with the 8 Legions of Norbanus and began marching to Philippi, leaving Octavian, who had been struck with an illness, in Epidamnus. He encamped on the plain, approximately 1.5km from the Liberators position. It was an audacious move, his position not having much in terms of natural defences. Nevertheless, he began the construction of his own fortifications including palisades, towers and embankments. For days, the two armies engaged in minor cavalry skirmishes, with little effect. Octavian, carried on a litter, arrived at the battle, assuming command of half the army. A close friend of Octavian’s, Marcus Vispanius Agrippa, was likely also in this half of the army, though his precise role is unclear. Determined to force an engagement, Antony marched the army out of camp. Cassius and Brutus also drew their force out of camp, but reluctant to give up the high ground, they refused to engage. They have the better defensive position and planned to wait until Antony’s supplies ran out, starving him into submission. Knowing he must force a battle soon, Antony sent a detachment of his men to discreetly construct a causeway through the marshes in order to provide a route behind Cassius’ defences. Cassius, upon seeing this, aimed to head off the causeway by extending his fortifications and building a palisade through the marshes. With a significant part of Cassius’ force focused on this task, Antony seized the chance to attack on the 3rd October. He mustered his Legions and charged at Cassius’ defences, aiming at the point where the first wall met with this new palisade. It was an incredibly audacious attack, uphill and under missile fire, but with many of Cassius’ men caught in the midst of constructing the palisade, Antony’s men were able to break through the defences, storming Cassius’ camp as Cassius’ men tried to rally an organised defence. At the same time, on the other wing, Brutus’ half of the army, charged across the plain to Octavian’s force drawn up in front of their camp. Brutus had not given this order, and it is unclear whether the officers under his command had seized the initiative themselves or if his men, frustrated at seeing their allies losing, had taken it upon themselves to act. Whatever the cause, Brutus’ Legions overpowered the 4th Legion on Octavian’s flank and turned on the rest, forcing them to retreat back into their camp. As they did, a general rout began with many of Octavian’s men being cut down, and Brutus’ Legions streaming into the camp. Octavian’ tent was found empty, and Octavian would later write that he had been warned in a dream of the attack and escaped. Pliny, far more believably, claims that Octavian was carried into the marshes where he hid. Either way, Brutus’ men had been hugely successful, looting the camp and claiming 3 Legion’s eagles in the process. However, Antony had been equally successful. He had repelled charges from the men working on the palisade in the marches and completely overrun Cassius’ camp, forcing Cassius to retreat to high ground. His men also looted the camp, before retreating back to their position. Brutus and Antony’s Legions crossed the plain at the same time, but due to the distance between them and the huge amount of dust thrown up by the forces, each assumed that the other were their allies and did not engage. It was only when the two forces made it to their respective camps that they realised the truth: the first Battle of Philippi had ended with both sides having won and lost in different areas of the battlefield. According to Appian, the Liberators had lost around 8,000 men, the triumvirs 16,000. Cassius, on the high ground and seeing his camp overran, assumed the battle was lost. A group of Brutus’ cavalry rode to his position to give him the news of their success. However, Cassius instead assumed that they were enemies who were coming to capture him. Not willing to risk being taken prisoner, Cassius ordered his freedman Pindarus to kill him. With his death, the Liberator’s army lost one its most experienced commanders, and total control of the army passed to Brutus. The same day, news reached Antony that a fleet under the command of Domitius Calvinus that was transporting 2 Legions and supplies across the Adriatic had been destroyed by the Liberator fleet in the area. Antony’s supplies would be running out soon, and he needed to force Brutus into a decisive battle. He marched his army out of camp, hoping to tempt Brutus out from his defences, but Brutus held firm. With his force now weakened from the previous battle, however, Brutus tried to consolidate his position by making his defensive perimeter shorter. In doing so, he abandoned a small hill to the south that Cassius had previously garrisoned. Antony immediately seized upon this small advantage, sending 4 Legions to take and defend the hill. Over the next few weeks, more and more Legions were funneled in this direction, constructing a line of defences parallel to the coast. In a similar style to one of Caesar’s favourite tactics, he had seized upon this small advantage and was using it to slowly make his way into a position where he could threaten Brutus’ supply line. In response, Brutus made his own fortifications opposite Antony’s line. In doing so, he effectively negated his previous strategy of consolidating his position, finding his defensive line being stretched further and further. Brutus’ officers, wary of their supply line and being overstretched, became more and more frustrated with him, losing faith in his command ability. They demanded that he take action and do battle, a demand to which Brutus reluctantly gave in to saying “You have chosen to fight…you have forced me to battle when I would conquer otherwise”. He drew his army out of their fortifications and prepared for battle in the classic Roman formation of triple lines, placing himself on the right wing. He also placed more Legions on his right wing than in his centre and left, stretching the Legions on the left to prevent them being surrounded. He was effectively hoping to mimic his Legion’s success in the previous battle by crushing one flank, and then turning on the rest. Antony and Octavian eagerly also drew out their own forces in a triple axis with Antony on the left and Octavian on the right, their Legions evenly distributed throughout. There was little manoeuvring or strategy to the battle, both sides crashing into one another. With veterans on both sides, the fighting was particularly brutal. Brutus was slowly winning the fight on his wing, gradually pushing Antony’s back. At the same time though, Octavian’s men, outnumbering their opponents, were also winning, forcing Brutus’ left flank to retreat step by step. Whichever flank broke first would decide the battle. In the end, it was Brutus’ left, overstretched and outnumbered, that collapsed first. The first line broke and then the second, triggering a mass rout of the entire left wing. Octavian’s men pressed their advantage, some storming the camp, others falling upon Brutus’ center and other wing. Brutus’ men, finding themselves almost surrounded, began to break around him. Brutus was able to cut his way out with four Legions, retreating to nearby high ground, but the battle had been decisively lost. Seeing his death or capture at the hands of his enemies as certain, Brutus ordered his friend Strato to kill him. We do not know the number of casualties either side, though the tough infantry dominant fighting may mean that they were high on both sides. What is known is that the entirety of the Liberator army that had survived the battle surrendered to Antony and Octavian, the Legions being divided between the two. Alongside Brutus, many other influential Pompeians had also died in the battle. Marcus Cato, son of the famous rival to Caesar, died fighting heroically to buy time for Brutus to escape and was reportedly found surrounded by many dead enemies. Antony had also made it a priority of his cavalry to chase the routing enemy, capturing or killing whichever officers and other influential men they could. Cimber, one of the assassins of Caesar, was likely one of these men killed. Philippi marked the end of the Liberators. Out of the main ringleaders of the conspiracy against Caesar, all were gone. Decimus Brutus had been killed by Gallic chieftains on Antony’s orders, Trebonius had been executed by Dolabella, and Cassius and Brutus were now both also dead. Cassius had been buried somewhere near Thasos in secret by Brutus, who had been worried that a public funeral would dishearten the men. As for Brutus, Suetonius claims that Antony beheaded his body, planning to display the grisly trophy in front of a statue to Caesar, but that it was lost in a storm crossing the Adriatic. Suetonius is somewhat known for his exaggeration and tall tales, however, and other sources say that Antony treated the body with respect, covering the body in purple, burning it in the Roman custom and sending the ashes back to Brutus’ wife. While much later sources tend to vilify Cassius and Brutus, the Roman sources were often rather torn by the two. On the one hand, they had betrayed and murdered Julius Caesar a man who was already deified and would be further lauded during the Empire as the ancestor of the first Emperors. On the other, the two were viewed as brave, virtuous men who had genuinely believed that they had done what was necessary to defend their country. Though Cassius was the assassin who arguably had the most personal reasons for hating Caesar, he had also been a man of principles and was eulogised by Brutus as “the last of the Romans”. He had fought alongside Pompey, had refused to fight against Pompeians where he had later been taken into service under Caesar, and genuinely considered Caesar a threat to the Republic. The most active member of the conspiracy, it is probable that the assassination of Caesar may well have never happened without him, for better or worse. Appian, in his account, points out how extraordinary it was that the two could win over even ex-soldiers of Caesar, and motivate them to fight against both Caesar’s right-hand man and his son. This should suggest to us that Brutus and Cassius had not been alone in thinking that they truly had the Republic’s best interest at heart. At the same time, Appian cannot excuse the assassination and views Brutus and Cassius as tragic figures divinely punished by the gods for their sacrilege in attacking Caesar. The resistance against the triumvirs would continue without Brutus and Cassius, but in Appian’s words none would hold “the same glory…as attended Brutus and Cassius”. The Liberators had been destroyed at Philippi, but the Pompeian cause overall still persisted. Sons of some of the original leaders such as Sextus Pompey and Quintus Labienus, son of the prolific Labienus who had served under Caesar, still resisted the triumvirs. More importantly, the destruction of the Liberators put Antony, Octavian and Lepidus as the undisputed masters of the Roman world. The three men, who had previously been allied out of common cause, would soon find themselves in conflict with one another. Rome’s Civil Wars would continue. Following Philippi, the dynamic of the Second Triumvirate changed drastically. As the primary commander, Antony received much of the acclaim and was thus the most powerful of the trio; Octavian, having participated in some capacity, also received some credit while Lepidus, having been left behind in Rome, received none. Moreover, the campaign had also left thousands of veterans with loyalties to either Antony or Octavia, but none to Lepidus. In their division of the Republic, Octavian and Antony leveraged this against Lepidus and even accused him of having passed information to Sextus. Whether there was any truth in this accusation is hard to say, and it is just as likely that the rumours were spread by Antony and Octavian to blackmail Lepidus. As a result, Antony was assigned the East, a now-unified Gallic province, and the province of Africa Vetus; Octavian was given control of the Hispanic provinces, Sardinia, Africa Nova, and, nominally, Sicily; Lepidus was given nothing. Instead, it was agreed that Lepidus would be given the African provinces only once it had been proven that he was innocent, a decision that was left to Octavian to decide. As well as dividing the territories, Antony and Octavian also had to divide control of the Legions leftover from the Philippi campaign, the 19 they had brought with them as well those who had served under the Liberators. Many of these were retired, but 6 Legions and 10,000 horsemen were assigned to Antony, and 5 Legions and 4,000 horsemen to Octavian. However, the retired Legions, as well as many others whose military service was coming to an end, resulting in a huge number of soldiers in need of land to retire to. Prior to the Philippi campaign, Antony and Octavian had promised these soldiers retirement to colonies in some of Italy’s best lands, and it was now time for them to fulfill this obligation. Antony went to administer the Eastern Provinces, while Octavian returned to Italy with the task of resettling the veterans. It is likely, though not definite, that Antony had deliberately assigned this task to Octavian, knowing how politically unpopular it would be. If Octavian stuck to their earlier promises, he would certainly infuriate much of the common populace who would be displaced from their homes; if he tried to find new lands for the veterans rather than those promised, he would risk angering them; and if he tried to take land from the wealthy, he would alienate the Senators. Faced with the problem of who to side with, Octavian chose the veterans. His entire political career so far had been built on the army and he could not risk alienating them and driving more to Antony’s side. As such, despite the unpopularity of the decision, Octavian began the process of resettling veterans in the areas previously promised to them. There were initially 28 Legions that needed to be resettled, a number that swelled to 34 as Octavian granted more land to try and curry favour with the veterans: taking into account losses, this may have amounted to more than 150,000 people. Such a huge redistribution of land required a colossal amount of money and Octavian was forced to sell all the remaining property that he had confiscated during the proscriptions, as well as taking vast loans and sums of money from temples. He did try to make concessions to the Senate, avoiding buying too much of their land, and judging Lepidus not guilty and assigning him governorship of Africa to try and keep them sweet. Instead, it was the agrarian middle class of the Republic that suffered the most. Their land was bought at cut rate prices and redistributed, with entire towns being displaced. In 41BC, the new consuls came into power, Publius Servilius Isauricus and Lucius Antony, another brother of Mark Antony. Lucius and Mark Antony’s wife, Fulvia, saw that if Octavian was seen as the only man redistributing land, his popularity amongst the military would outweigh Antony’s. As such, they initially tried to delay the settlements until Antony, who was by this point in Egypt with Cleopatra, returned to Rome. When it became apparent that Octavian would not allow any delay, they instead insisted that Octavian assign a number of Antony’s friends as leaders of some of the colonies, thus making it seem like Antony had taken part. With Octavian having been ill for much of Philippi, it was Antony who was considered the hero of the Caesarean party, and Octavian could not risk angering him. He was forced to relent to Lucius and Fulvia’s demands. The situation was becoming an agrarian and social disaster. Many people were being stripped of their livelihood, and near constant war had already deprived Italy of much of its food and the division of farmlands made the situation all the worse. Compounding this were the navies around Italy. Previously stationed in the Adriatic, after Philippi Murcus had joined Sextus in Sicily, while Ahenobarbus remained in the Adriatic. Between the navies of Sextus and Ahenobarbus, the Italian peninsula was effectively blockaded. Famine soon began to spread in Rome and other Italian cities, and with the famine came riots and violence. Lucius, with the help of Fulvia, began positioning himself as the champion of the Italian peoples. He argued that, as a triumvir, Octavian could only act with the consent of the other two triumvirs, most importantly Antony. He also pointed out that the Second Triumvirate had initially been established to punish the Liberators and that, because this had been achieved, the Triumvirate was now nothing more than tyranny. His party also pointed out that there was plenty of land outside of Italy to settle the veterans in, and that it was unfair for the Italians alone to be bearing the burden. These arguments were well received, and Lucius and Fulvia’s popularity rose drastically. Octavian attempted to counter their claims by painting Lucius as being anti-veteran and claiming that Antony had given him authority to distribute the land as he saw fit. Nevertheless, Italy was starting to become divided between those that supported Octavian, mainly the ex-soldiers, and those that supported Lucius and Fulvia, primarily the aristocracy and Italian farmers. The situation worsened when Lucius claimed that Octavian had sent men to attack Antony’s children and himself, prompting Lucius to form a bodyguard from some of Antony’s veterans. Whether this truly did happen, or if Lucius fabricated the account, is impossible to say. What can be said with certainty, however, is that the situation was quickly spiraling out of hand and officers in the army took it upon themselves to try and arbitrate the issue, but with little success. The stakes rose once again when Fulvia went to Lepidus, claiming she feared for her life and those of Antony’s children, and both sent letters to Antony telling him the same. Once again, the Legions intervened suggesting that the matter be taken to an official trial. Both Lucius and Octavian agreed. En route, however, both men sent advanced guards ahead of them to scout for any opposition. The two groups met each other on the road, and violence broke out, men on both sides being killed. Octavian pressed on nonetheless, but Lucius refused to go any further, even under promise that he would be guarded. The negotiations had failed completely, war was inevitable. Lucius’ allies began mobilising, Titus Sextius, a Caesarean and longtime supporter of Mark Antony, retaking the province of Africa, while Ahenobarbus in the Adriatic sailing south and attacking Brundisium, burning a significant part of Octavian’s fleet in port. The war had started poorly for Octavian, who immediately summoned a meeting of the Senate. He insisted that there was no bad blood between himself and Mark Antony and implored them to reason with Lucius. However, one of Fulvia’s men in the Senate, Manius, produced a letter apparently from Mark Antony that said that Lucius should make war if Mark’s dignitas was attacked. It was a suspiciously vague letter, and the Senate proposed that the matter be put to trial to establish if Antony’s dignity had indeed been attacked. Manius filibustered though, and the issue was dropped. Octavian left the city, once again leaving Lepidus in command of its defence. War would have to be the solution. Lucius had 6 Legions under his command, and a further 11 that were commanded by Antony’s lieutenants, Asinius and Ventidius around Cisalpine Gaul. Octavian, on the other hand, had 4 under his command, and 6 under Salvidienus located just south of Cisalpine Gaul. Despite his advantageous start, Lucius soon ran into trouble when two of his Legions in Alba Longa mutinied. Both Lucius and Octavian began a race to Alba, but it was Lucius who got their first and he was able to bribe the Legions to keep them on his side. Octavian was, however, able to attack a reinforcing army, forcing them to make camp around the city of Sentium, which Octavian promptly besieged. Lucius in turn marched on Rome, which was taken without bloodshed thanks to his supporters in the city opening the gates to him, forcing Lepidus to flee to Octavian. While in Rome, Lucius received official approval from the Senate to make war as Consul, seemingly legitimising his cause. Octavian could not, however, leave Rome in his hands and so, leaving Salvidienus in charge of the siege of Sentium, he took a force back to march on Rome. The city, having suffered through a famine, was not prepared for a siege, and Lucius withdrew to his armies conceding Rome to Octavian without a fight. Salvidienus, meanwhile, had been aggressive, storming Sentium and taking the city. To counter that, Lucius quickly positioned himself between Octavian and Salvidienus, stopping the two from merging. Asinius and Ventidius, meanwhile, were approaching Salvidienus from the north, threatening to encircle him. Seeing the danger, another of Octavian’s generals, Agrippa, seized the initiative and took the important stronghold of Sutrium, forcing Lucius to abandon his position to face this new threat. As soon as he did, Salvidienus and Agrippa both marched against him, threatening to pin Lucius between the two. Lucius was forced to retreat north, harassed by Octavian’s generals. This is the first time in the Civil War that Agrippa can be said, with certainty, to have had a full command and he was already proving himself to be talented: his maneuver had effectively turned a potentially disastrous situation into an advantage. Lucius was compelled to make camp around the city of Perusia sometime late in 41BC or else be picked apart by Octavian’s forces. He was quickly besieged by the armies of Octavian, Agrippa and Salvidienus. With Lucius besieged, Fulvia sent messages to Asinius and Ventidius to march to his aid, but both men seem to have been reluctant to commit. Some sources attribute this to rank insubordination or laziness, however, it is important to remember that these men were loyal to Mark Antony, not his brother or wife. They took orders from Antony, and Antony had thus far sent no commands. Furthermore, Lucius’ cause was not particularly popular which much of the soldiery, and they may have thought it prudent to avoid the possibility of their men defecting to Octavian. Whatever the true reason, the two held back and when Octavian sent detachments of his army to confront them, they both withdrew, Asinius to Ravenna and Ventidius to Ariminum. Another force, command by Plancus, was also en route, but hearing that Asinius and Ventidius had not committed, he too held his forces back in Spoletium. Lucius pulled his men, likely 4 Legions roughly 25,000 men inside the walls of Perusia. The city was well defended with strong walls and situated on a high hill. Lucius’ men fortified the base of the hill, providing a second line of defences, while Octavian’s forces, constituting as many as 9 Legions - approximately 40,000 men, constructed two lines of fortifications with ditches, one facing inwards and one outwards, just as Julius Caesar had done at Alesia. The rampant famine had left little food in Italy and Lucius’ men were already running low. They launched a daring night attack during a festival, hoping to cut a way out, but Octavian’s men were waiting and they were beaten back after brutal fighting. The siege, it seemed, would be decided by Antony’s generals. After approximately 2 months, Ventidius and Asinius at last broke camp, marching to Lucius’ position. Agrippa moved quickly though, taking his force to cut the two off, and forcing them to encamp in the city of Fulginium where they united with the force of Plancus. They were less than 20 miles from Lucius and lit large signal fires to alert him of their location, massively raising moral in Lucius’ besieged men. Asinius and Ventidius were, apparently, eager to press on and overrun Agrippa, however, Plancus pointed out that if they tried this, Octavian’s men could quickly march to their position and pin them between two armies. A decision had to be made. In Perusia, Lucius’ men watched the fires anxiously waiting for reinforcements. When none came, they assumed that they were simply delayed. They continued to wait until one night, there were no more fires. Ventidius, Asinius and Plancus had made their decision: Lucius would fight alone. Growing more desperate, Lucius ordered another night attack, attacking almost the entire length of Octavian’s defences. The battle continued throughout the night, but ultimately Octavian’s men were able to hold the line and force Lucius to retreat. The food shortage in the city was becoming dire. Lucius ordered that no slave be given any food, and most were forced outside between the walls of Lucius and Octavian where they tried to eat grass to survive. Many of them died here. Lucius’ men, in desperation, begged to try a final sally. They gathered all the ladders, siege hooks and what Appian calls “folding towers”. Rather than attack across the length of the line, this time they focused their attacks a few specific locations, hoping to disperse Octavian’s forces as much as possible while still keeping theirs concentrated enough to make a breach. Lucius’ men fought bravely, scaling the walls and initially seeming to hold the upper hand. Octavian, however, had held his best troops in reserve. Once the men fighting on the walls on both sides were exhausted, Octavian committed his fresh reserves, throwing Lucius’ men from the walls and destroying the planks that led from the siege towers to the walls. Lucius’ forces were trapped on the ground and under near constant missile fire. He ordered a retreat, but some of his men, driven by desperation and bravery, tried again to scale the wall with ladders, only to be repulsed. Again, Lucius called the retreat leading his force back inside the walls. The siege, which had lasted for no more than 6 months, was effectively lost. Lucius’ men had suffered many losses, still more were beginning to desert, and it was clear that reinforcements would not be coming. Lucius could do little more than try and preserve the lives of his men. A delegation of peace was sent to Octavian, who replied that he would be lenient to all except his enemies. Lucius and his men surrendered. Octavian spared the soldiers, welcoming many of Antony’s old veterans into his ranks. The nobles on Lucius’ side were not so lucky, with perhaps as many as 300 equites and a number of Senators being executed. The city of Perusia itself was burned, the sources disagreeing on whether this was on Octavian’s orders or by accident. Lucius however, was forgiven, and Octavian soon made him a governor in Iberia, attempting to pit him against his brother. Lucius’ motivation has long been the source of speculation. Some consider him to have been an opportunist who capitalised on the frustration of the agrarian population only because it was politically convenient to do so. Others have a more sympathetic view, suggesting that Lucius truly did believe that Octavian was abusing his position as triumvir, and that he fought for the rights of the Italian people. Appian certainly is of this opinion as can be seen from a speech reportedly given by Lucius and recorded by Appian: "I undertook this war against you, not in order to succeed to the leadership by destroying you but to restore to the country the patrician government which had been subverted by the triumvirate… These are the causes of the war I waged and these alone: not for my brother, nor Manius, nor Fulvia, nor the colonization of those who fought at Philippi… you brought this charge against me before the soldiers, shifting the cause of the war from yourself to the land distribution, and in this way chiefly you drew them to your side and overcame me”. Whether Lucius truly said this is hard to say, and it is perhaps more likely an invention of Appian designed to capture an idea of what Lucius would have said. Either way, it is clear that Appian truly did consider him a man fighting for principles, not power. Fulvia’s motivation is even more difficult to establish. As a powerful woman, she is often treated with a degree of hostility by Roman sources, and they attribute her little motivation aside from quote “womanly jealousy”. Though somewhat dismissive, the sources are also clear that she was a highly influential figure, and Dio even made the comment that she was so powerful that she was effectively a Consul for 41BC. Given Antony’s highly publicised affair with Cleopatra, perhaps jealousy was a factor. However, it is also possible that Fulvia was simply an ambitious and powerful woman who used her position as wife of a powerful man to further her own interests, in this case, trying to oust Octavian. Powerful wives would soon become a recurring motif in Roman Imperial History, and Fulvia was one of the first to truly exploit her position. Following the conclusion of the war, Antony’s lieutenants dispersed. Agrippa was able to convince two Legions to defect to Octavian, but the majority, along with Asinius, Plancus and Ventidius merged with Ahenobarbus, who was then convinced to side with Antony. Octavian himself began planning to take Gaul from Antony, but in a stroke of luck, Antony’s governor of Gaul died, allowing Octavian to seize control of the province. Antony’s family was also forced to flee Italy, Fulvia taking refuge in Athens, and Antony’s mother going to Sextus in Sicily. Antony in the East had seemingly been content to allow the situation in Italy to play itself out. It’s unlikely that he agreed with his brother's sentiments. Antony was by no means a Republican and, as a military man whose power was built on the army, it is improbable that he would have endorsed a position that threatened that relationship. Instead, he had spent much of 41- 40BC in Alexandria with Cleopatra and preparing for a campaign against the Parthians who had recently started making incursions into Syria. The loss of Gaul, his brother’s defeat and the flight of his family, however, made him look weak and so he was forced to postpone the invasion and return to Italy. While he was en route, he was met by one of Sextus’ advisors, Lucius Scriobnius Libo, who was escorting Antony’s mother to safety. In return for this favor, Antony promised to ally with Sextus against their common enemy, Octavian, and to reconcile the two once the war was over. Both of these promises would prove to be short-lived. For now, however, Antony pushed on, landing around Brundisium sometime in mid-40BC. The city was garrisoned by Octavian’s men and Antony was forced to besiege the city, simultaneously sending word to Sextus to attack wherever he could. Sextus acted swiftly landing in Sardinia with 4 Legions and seizing the island and sending an invading force to Thurii. Agrippa was able to repel this force, but all-out war, once again, seemed to being fought in the heart of the Republic. News suddenly reached Antony though that his wife, Fulvia, had died of an illness. This presented an opportunity. There were many in the camps of Octavian and Antony who did not want to fight, having been comrades just two years earlier at Philippi, and they implored both men to make peace. Neither man could risk losing the loyalty of their Legions, and both were on rocky grounds: Octavian had fought Antony’s own brother in Italy itself, while Antony had encouraged Sextus to attack Italy. The hypocrisy of Antony previously accusing Lepidus of conspiring with Sextus, while now doing it himself was not lost on anyone. The situation was a mess and both men were eager to save face. As such, around September 40BC, the two made an agreement: the Treaty of Brundisium. The treaty reaffirmed the Second Triumvirate and redistributed territory, Octavian receiving all territories West of Scorda, as well as the right to fight Sextus if a peaceful solution could not be found, and Antony everything to the East, while Lepidus was given Africa. The treaty was cemented by the marriage of Antony to Octavian’s sister, Octavia. The two men returned to Rome in triumphal fashion to celebrate the marriage. As a sign of their renewed friendship, Antony also revealed to Octavian that he had letters showing that Salvidienus, one of Octavian’s oldest friends and a highly talented general, had secretly been planning to desert Octavian. Betrayed, Octavian ordered Salvidienus to Rome where he was promptly executed. Agrippa would now indisputably be Octavian’s right-hand man. The Perusine War ended with the Treaty of Brundisium, however the endless cycle of war seemed to show no signs of stopping. While Antony had been diverted to Italy, the Parthian incursion, led in part by Quintus Labienus, had made massive progress, seizing many of the Republic’s Eastern provinces. Following the division of lands and Legions that occurred after Philippi, Octavian returned to Italy while Antony briefly wintered in Athens, enjoying the literary and philosophical pleasures of the city, before crossing to Asia Minor in the spring of 41BC. Much of the area had sworn allegiance to Brutus and Cassius, and it was up to Antony to re-establish control over these provinces, as well as collect the funds to cover the Triumvirs' colossal expenses. For cities that had sided with the Liberators, such as many of the Ionian cities, a heavy tribute of 9 years' worth of taxes was demanded. Kings, tyrants, and vassals who had sided against him were replaced with pro-Caesareans. Powerful Romans, such as governors, came to him asking for mercy Antony sparing most of these, except any that had been involved or known about the conspiracy to assassinate Caesar. At the same time, Antony was also careful to reward those who had remained loyal. The Rhodians, for example, were given more land, and he exempted the Lycians from taxes. It was a rare insight into how talented an administrator Antony could be, using threats and mercy in equal measure to quickly bring many of the Eastern provinces back into the fold. During this journey around the provinces of Asia Minor, Antony was already planning for an invasion of Parthia, an invasion for which Egypt, Rome’s most powerful vassal in the East, would be vital. As such, he requested that Cleopatra meet him in Cilicia. It is unlikely that this was the first time the two had met, as Antony had probably met Cleopatra when she had lived in Rome for a time as Caesar’s lover. However, it was apparently at this meeting that Antony, like Caesar before him, fell for Cleopatra’s wit and beauty. Antony spent the Summer in Syria, replacing tyrants and nobles who had sided with the Liberators with pro-Caesareans, many of the deposed men fleeing to Parthia. Once this administration was handled, Antony traveled to Alexandria to spend the winter with his new lover, Cleopatra. As he had in Athens, Antony spent his time in Alexandria frequenting schools, temples, and other places of learning, enjoying and embracing the Greek style of dress and way of life. He also spent a lot of his time with Cleopatra, which eventually resulted in twins, Alexander and Cleopatra. His affinity for the Greek lifestyle and affair with Cleopatra would later be scorned by ancient historians. Appian wrote that he cared less and less for Roman affairs, obliging every one of Cleopatra’s demands, Cassius Dio referred to Antony as Cleopatra’s slave, and Plutarch wrote that Cleopatra “dissipated and destroyed what good and saving qualities” Antony had. These assessments are damning, but it is important to note that Roman sources such as these were, almost uniformly, scathing of powerful women and also influenced by later Augustan propaganda. Whether such claims about their relationship are true or not is impossible to say with certainty, but the alliance between the Triumvir and Queen was, at least initially, beneficial to both parties. On the one hand, Antony benefitted from making sure that he had a strong Egyptian ally that he could rely upon for supplies and logistics to support his Parthian campaign, on the other, Cleopatra was able to use Antony’s power to further her own position and remove her rivals, notably having her sister Arsinoe killed on Antony’s orders. It was while Antony was in Alexandria, sometime in early 40BC, that the Parthians began raiding Syria, led by Quintus Labienus, son of the renowned Titus Labienus, and the Parthian prince Pacorus. The precise size of the army is hard to distinguish, but it is hinted at being approximately 20,000 consisting of a mix of cataphracts and horse archers. Lucius Decidius Saxa, the governor Antony had appointed to the province, quickly gathered an army, likely around 2 Legions, to fight the invaders, but was easily defeated in open battle by the more numerous Parthians and their excellent cavalry, with the Roman eagles being captured. Saxa fled to Antioch, and then Cilicia, but was soon caught and executed. Despite Antony’s efforts in the East, there were still many Pompeian sympathisers, particularly in Syria which had previously been Cassius’ province. Moreover, Quintus Labienus’ father had been an incredibly popular Pompeian military leader and the Parthians bought with them a number of the Pompeians Antony had deposed. As a result, with Saxa dead, many garrisons and cities in Syria welcomed Quintus, surrendering without a fight, including Antioch. The force then split, Labienus pushing into Cilicia and Asia Minor while Pacorus focused on subjugating the rest of Syria. With next to no resistance, he was able to seize control of almost the entire province, save for the notoriously well-defended city of Tyre, and pushed on to the Roman tributary of Judea, installing the anti-Roman Antigonus II as king. Labienus, meanwhile, was able to win over many cities in Cilicia only facing serious resistance from Mylasa and Alabanda, both of which repelled initial attacks before eventually being taken and sacked. All of this had taken place in only a matter of months. Antony had thus far failed to act, either due to laziness and being too distracted by the luxuries of Alexandria as Cassius Dio says, or because the Parthians had moved too fast for Antony to muster a concerted response. Either way, it wasn’t until Spring that he sailed from Alexandria to Tyre to address the issue. However, it was at this point that he received news of his brother and wife’s defeat in Italy and of the loss of Gaul to Octavian. With his political position in jeopardy, Antony rushed back to Italy with the majority of his Legions, effectively abandoning the Eastern provinces. Their absence allowed Labienus to make even greater gains, pushing through the southern coast of Asia Minor to Ionia. Even Mithridates VI, one of the great enemies of Rome, had not been so successful. Despite Octavian and Antony managing to reconcile with the Treaty of Brundisium and Antony’s marriage to Octavia, Sextus Pompey still presented a problem. The piracy and blockades of his fleet continued, and so did the famines. While Antony and Octavian were in Rome, the people, now at breaking point, rioted in the forum. Octavian, attempting to calm the crowd, was pelted with stones and attacked, forcing Antony to intervene, bringing soldiers into the forum. The soldiers held back the crowd, but also killed some of the civilians, triggering a panic that resulted in the deaths of even more. It was clear that this could not continue. To prepare for peace talks, Octavian married Scribonia, the sister of Libo, one of Sextus’ closest adviors. It was Libo who had facilitated the earlier alliance between Antony and Sextus, and he was once again vital, arranging a meeting of the three in Misenum at the start of 39BC. The negotiations started off poorly, Sextus assuming he would be offered a place in the Triumvirate instead of Lepidus, which Antony and Octavian flatly refused. The negotiations continued, Antony and Octavian agreeing to forgive any who had been proscribed and to return part of their property to them. Many in Sextus’ camp had been proscribed, and upon hearing this they immediately jumped at the chance, pressuring Sextus to accept. Sextus had hoped to draw out negotiations, knowing that the famine put him in a powerful position that would only become stronger the longer he waited. Under the mounting pressure from his own faction though, Sextus was forced to make peace quickly. The trio agreed to the following: Sextus would cease his blockades and piracy, remove any troops he still had in continental Italy, and immediately send grain to Rome. In return, the proscribed Pompeians would be allowed to return to Rome and have ¼ of their property restored; the many slaves that Sextus had welcomed into his army would be freed and rewarded fully upon completing their term of military service, and, finally, Sextus would be allowed to govern Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and Achaea. The treaty was sealed by another marriage, Sextus’ daughter Pompeia, to Octavian’s nephew Marcellus, the son-in-law of Antony. For how powerful a position Sextus had going into the negotiations, it was a relatively poor deal. He already had effective control of Sicily, Sardinia and with his naval supremacy likely could have taken Corsica with ease. The only real benefit he got was Achaea. Sextus was well aware of this and was furious at the advisors who had pressured him to accept, rather than allowing him to wait for better terms. Part of his faction even suggested that he act now and kill both Octavian and Antony, but Sextus refused. Meanwhile, Octavian and Antony had benefitted from the treaty massively. The recalling of Sextus’ ships and the grain he sent quickly ended the famine and the two Triumvirs returned to a hero’s welcome in Rome. With affairs in Italy settled for now, Antony headquartered himself in Athens, simultaneously monitoring affairs in Italy and mustering his forces for a huge counter-invasion of Parthia, selecting his general Ventidius to confront Labienus and Pacorus. This was the same Ventidius that had been in Italy while Lucius Antony was besieged in Perusia but had not come to his aid. He was novos homo, a new man, who had started as a mule driver before joining the army and serving under Caesar in Gaul. Little else is known about his early life, but he seems to have caught Caesar’s eye as he was assigned as a Praetor by the Dictator in 43BC. Since Caesar’s assassination, he had also proved himself loyal to Antony and was one of the men Antony relied upon in the lead up to Mutina years earlier. He had held military commands, but never had control over a full campaign as he now did. The fact that Antony, a sound military strategist, entrusted command to him shows not only the level of trust Antony had in Ventidius, but perhaps also that Ventidius had correctly done what Antony would have wanted by not supporting Lucius. At the start of Spring 39BC, Ventidius crossed into Asia Minor with a force of probably 4 Legions alongside a sizable number of light infantry, aiming to establish a foothold for Antony. Though Labienus had moved quickly and seized a lot of land, he had thus far not been able to consolidate his position and had distanced himself significantly from his Parthian allies in Syria. The only force he had with him were local auxiliaries who had sided with him, and perhaps 2 Legions from Syria. Confronted with Ventidius’ larger force, Labienus had little option but to retreat back to Cilicia to try and join forces with a portion of the Parthian force in Syria. Ventidius pursued, splitting his army and leading the light infantry and cavalry ahead to try and cut off Labienus. Ventidius was able to overtake Labienus around the Taurus mountains, encamping on the high ground. Ventidius was hesitant to attack with only his light infantry, and so a stand-off ensued, Ventidius waiting for his heavy infantry, and Labienus for his Parthian allies. This carried on for almost a week until the reinforcements for both sides arrived apparently on the same day. Ventidius kept his entire force on the high ground, but the reinforcing Parthians, buoyed by their victory over Saxa the previous year did not wait to coordinate an attack with Labienus, forming up at the base of the hill for battle. The standard Roman military doctrine was to draw up for battle in front of an encampment so as not to be surrounded, as can be seen from Caesar’s tactics at Zela for instance. Ventidius, though, kept his force in camp. Encouraged by this perceived cowardice, the Parthians began to charge up the incline. Once they were part way up the slope, however, Ventidius suddenly ordered his men to sally out and attack. Caught unawares and fighting uphill, the Parthian cavalry stood little chance against the heavy Roman infantry, and many were killed before quickly routing. The stampede of horses downhill caused even more casualties and the Parthians fled the field completely, leaving Labienus and his men deployed in battle formation outside their camp. Ventidius marshalled his forces once again but did not attack Labienus. The latter had been relying upon the Parthians for the battle, and with them routed it is peculiar that Ventidius did not press home his advantage, though he may have wanted to avoid exhausting his men, or perhaps attempted to negotiate with Labienus to surrender. Whichever the reason, both forces returned to their encampments for the night. At this point, Labienus attempted to slip away in the darkness, but deserters from his camp informed Ventidius of this. He quickly took action, ambushing Labienus’ retreating force in the night, killing a number of them and capturing the rest. What exactly happened to Labienus next is unclear. Cassius says he was able to slip away, but was soon arrested and executed, while Festus claims he was killed in the ambush. Whatever the case, it is clear that Ventidius had won an impressive victory thus securing Asia Minor. In order to safeguard Cilicia against any counter-attack, Ventidius marched his force to the Amanus Pass, bordering Syria. Finding it garrisoned by the Parthians, Ventidius had 2 Legions wait in ambush, while he sent a force of cavalry ahead to provoke the Parthians. The Roman cavalry feigned a retreat, luring the Parthians directly into Ventidius’ trap. The Legions sprung to the attack, killing many Parthians, including their commander, and routing the rest. Upon hearing news of this second defeat, Pacorus, the Parthian prince, withdrew the remainder of his forces from Syria. Ventidius was thus able to retake the remainder of the province without a fight. Ventidius then began the process of readministering the provinces, including sending a small detachment of his force to Herod the Roman-supported son of the deposed king of Judea, in order to try and retake the kingdom from the Parthian installed Antigonus. The Parthian invasion had only been stalled though, it had not been completely halted. At the start of the following year, 38BC, Pacorus began amassing a second invasion force, totaling between 20,000 and 30,000 soldiers. At this time, Ventidius’ Legions were still in their winter quarters, and some in Cappadocia. According to Cassius Dio, in order to buy himself more time, Ventidius used a local prince who was known to be close to the Parthians to spread disinformation. The prince claimed that Ventidius was not afraid of the Parthians crossing the Euphrates in their usual place near Zeugma, saying that the Legions would easily be able to hold the crossing thanks to the hilly terrain, but that he was worried about the Parthians crossing further down the river where the flat plains would make it difficult for his men to fight the Parthian cavalry. Pacorus, as a result of this, aimed for the flat plains, wasting as many as 40 days marching his army downstream and building a bridge. This was enough time for Ventidius to muster his forces and be prepared for the invasion. Though this is the version of events given by Cassius Dio, some modern historians have questioned it. They point out, justifiably, that our only source for the events is Roman and thus would have an undeniable bias against the Parthians, depicting them as gullible and easily fooled. Pacorus was a talented commander and some, therefore, think it is unlikely that he would have been so easily hoodwinked. It has also been suggested that Pacorus deliberately waited for Ventidius to amass his Legions, in order to be able to hopefully strike one decisive blow and destroy the Roman army in the east in one battle. In either scenario, the outcome is the same: Ventidius had enough time to gather his army to counter Pacorus. The forces met around Mount Gindarus, Ventidius once again encamping on the high ground. His army of perhaps 4 Legions plus light infantry was approximately the same size as Pacorus’, but since his victories the previous year, Ventidius had also incorporated slingers into his army, likely from local populations. When the Parthians drew up for battle, Ventidius once again used the same ploy as before, keeping his army inside their camp to lure the Parthians close. The Parthian horse-archers advanced up the slope first, and Ventidius waited until the last moment to unleash part of his force. Some of the Parthians were caught by this sally and cut down, the remainder retreating past the Roman fort with part of Ventidius’ force in pursuit. Pacorus, assuming that his horse-archers had lured out the entirety of Ventidius’ army, now advanced uphill towards the camp with his cataphracts. Suddenly Ventidius attacked with the remainder of his Legions and slingers. With the advantage of the high ground, they were easily able to blunt the charge of the cataphracts, and repel them forcing them back down the hill. Pacorus was able to rally his men at the base of the hill and organised a proper resistance. The Parthians, however, found themselves under a hail of missiles from the Roman slingers on the high ground, and Pacorus was killed in the fighting. Some of his guard fought fiercely for his body, but a combination of Roman heavy infantry and intense fire from the slingers proved too much, the Parthian army breaking completely. Parts of the army attempted to flee back across the Euphrates, but were cut off and killed, others successfully managing to reach the safety of Commagene, a Parthian ally. The majority of the Parthian army, however, had been killed. Ventidius’ casualties are unknown, but they seem to have been minimal as he immediately marched to Commagene and besieged the capital. Antony arrived from Greece soon afterwards, taking over the siege and accepting tribute from the Commagene king in return for peace. Antony seems to have been somewhat jealous of Ventidius’ achievements, and not without reason. Ventidius had won three battles in succession, including Rome’s first victory over a full Parthian army, and the death of Pacorus sparked a succession crisis in Parthia, further securing Rome’s eastern border. Antony removed the general from command, and Ventidius returned to Rome a hero, becoming the first Roman to be awarded a triumph for a victory over the Parthians. Ventidius then disappears from the historical record, the assumption being that he died soon afterwards, though whether by natural causes or not is unknown. The death of Quintus Labienus meant that there was effectively only one Pompeian leader left: Sextus Pompey. And while Ventidius had been securing the East, the peace that had been agreed at Misenum had frayed quickly. While Antony was in Athens, Sextus had requested control of the province of Achaea as agreed. In return, Antony demanded the tax revenue of the province in order to fund his Parthian campaign, a demand that Sextus refused. To make matters worse for Sextus, one of his generals and governors, Menas, had defected to Octavian, handing over control of Sardinia and three Legions. In response, Sextus had once again sent out his fleet to pirate the Mediterranean and by the start of 38BC, the peace was in tatters. War, once again, loomed on the horizon. Octavian likely had been actively looking for reasons to undermine the peace treaty and declare war on Sextus. Antony’s extortion of Sextus’ provinces and the defection of Menas’ to Octavian had certainly been significant factors, but, more importantly, Octavian’s forces had also captured pirates around the Mediterranean who, Octavian proclaimed, were in service to Sextus, despite Sextus denying this. To add personal insult to this, Octavian divorced Scribonia, the daughter of Sextus’ brother-in-law. Even more egregiously, Octavian had declared this divorce in October 39 BC, immediately after Scribonia gave birth to his only natural child, Julia. In all likelihood, Octavian had used the pact of Misenum merely to buy time to consolidate his position until he was ready. By the Spring of 38 BC, his forces were amassed, though the precise numbers for this time are unclear. Almost non-stop war had drained Italy of its manpower, but soldiers had been raised from provinces in Illyria, Gaul, and Hispania. Octavian would have had approximately 25 Legions under his command, though how many he had immediate access to is unknown. His fleet size is also hard to know, though it must have been large enough for Octavian to feel confident to challenge Sextus, so perhaps 150-200 warships would be a reasonable estimate. Octavian split this force into two parts, planning to attack Sicily from two fronts. The first, sailing from Etruria, would be commanded by the defector Menas and Calvisius Sabinus, an officer who had served competently under Caesar’s command during the Pharsalus campaign. The second, leaving from Tarentum would be commanded by Octavian himself. The army, meanwhile, would march down to Rhegium in preparation to be transported across to Sicily once the Pompeian fleet had been annihilated. Upon hearing of these movements, Sextus similarly divided his navy in two, commanding one portion in Messana, awaiting Octavian’s arrival, while sending a second portion under his freedman Menecrates to confront Menas and Calvisius. Menecrates’ fleet came upon the Etrurian fleet at night near Cumae, however, neither side wished to risk a dangerous night battle, so Menas and Calvisius retreated into the bay. When morning broke, they drew their fleet up on a defensive crescent formation with Menas commanding the left and Calvisius the right, positioning themselves as close to the shore as possible so that Menecrates’ ships would not be able to break through their line. Menecrates exploited this, attacking across the line and pushing Octavian’s fleet back, where many of their ships were either beached or caught on rocks and rendered immobile. Menecrates, with the advantage of the open sea at his back, was able to continually cycle fresh ships into the fight while much of the Caesarean fleet was effectively stranded. In Appian’s words, it was as if Menas and Calvisius’ men were like “land forces contending against sea forces.” As the battle raged, Menecrates caught sight of Menas’ ship and ordered his vessel to attack. The two ships rammed into each other, and grapples were thrown, binding the two ships together with fierce fighting breaking out on the decks. Menas’ ship was slightly taller than Menecrates’, so his men had a slight advantage as arrows, stones, and javelins flew between the two crews. During the fighting, both commanders were wounded: Menas was shot through the arm with an arrow, and Menecrates took a javelin to the thigh. The latter was rendered unable to fight, but continued to urge his men on. Despite their brave fighting, however, Menas’ men gradually got the upper hand, and rather than be taken captive, Menecrates flung himself into the sea and drowned. Calvisius, keen to capitalize on this success, moved his ship and a few others to Menas’ flank, managing to cut off part of the Pompeian ships there and forcing them to retreat with Calvisus in pursuit. Nonetheless, the move had weakened the Caesarean right, and many were destroyed or burnt on the rocks, the remnants only being saved by the return of Calvisius’ ships. The battle ended as night fell. The Caesareans had had the worst of the fighting, losing far more vessels than the Pompeians. Nevertheless, with the death of Menecrates, the Pompeians had lost one of their most talented naval commanders and the fleet, now under the command of Menecrates’ lieutenant Demochares, retreated to Sicily. The Caesareans cautiously maintained their position but, once they had become certain that the Pompeian fleet had left, began repairs on their ships in preparation for uniting with Octavian around Rhegium. Octavian had, by now, already reached Rhegium. Hearing that Sextus only had 40 ships in Messana, his generals urged him to attack immediately. However, not knowing of the events at Cumae, Octavian insisted on waiting for Calvisius and Menas. It proved a serious blunder, as the time he spent waiting allowed Menecrates to return to Sicily successfully and reunite with Sextus. When news of the battle did reach Octavian, he decided to sail through the straits to meet the other portion of his fleet. As he did, however, his fleet was harassed by Sextus’ ships that attacked along various points of the line. Octavian, either reluctant to fight in the straits or determined not to give battle without the reinforcements, ordered his ships to continue without engaging, and several were cut off and destroyed. Some of his captains disobeyed the orders turning to meet the Pompeians, one even successfully taking the flagship of Demochares, though the Pompeian managed to escape. Calvisius’ fleet also arrived on the scene, but night soon fell, ending any fighting. Octavian’s Sicilian invasion had got off to a poor start, many ships having been lost in the previous battle, and still more to Sextus’ harassing tactics. Attempting to consolidate his forces, Octavian drew Calvisius’ fleet up in a defensive formation while he pulled his vessels close to the shore to conduct repairs. Disaster struck yet again, however, when a massive storm swept through. The Pompeian ships, which had managed to make it into Sicilian harbours, were safe, while Octavian’s, close to the coast, were dashed against rocks. The notoriously treacherous waters of the straits crashed his ships into one another, with the infamous whirlpools drowning many who fell into the sea. Only Menas’ squadron, which had the foresight to put out to open water, managed to void calamity. It was a scene of utter carnage, with the cries of men thrown overboard lasting throughout the night and crushing his men’s morale. By the time the storm finally broke, most of Octavian’s fleet, including the sailors, had been lost. By approximately the Summer of 38BC, Octavian realised that his invasion had been a failure, leaving the fleet and making for Vibo, warning his friends and generals to be prepared for any potential uprisings against him, and stationing men along the coast in preparation for an invasion of Italy by Sextus. When Sextus got wind of these events and how devastating the storm had been, he interpreted it as a sign of the gods’ favour and proclaimed himself the Son of Neptune. Despite the significant losses Octavian had suffered, Sextus did not press his advantage, likely because he was not confident that he would have the manpower to pull off an invasion of the mainland. Octavian, however, was not a man to give up easily. He sent word to Antony requesting his support and, perhaps most importantly, recalled Agrippa, who had been governing in Gaul and quelling revolts. Octavian would prepare for yet another attempted invasion, and this time, Agrippa would lead. Agrippa was made consul for 37BC, despite being significantly under the traditional minimum age for the office, and immediately undertook the task of creating a vast fleet for Octavian, however, he soon realised that there was no harbour on the west coast of Italy to house such a large fleet. More importantly, he would need a port where the ships could be constructed secretively, free from attacks from Sextus’ forces. Undeterred, Agrippa began the construction of one of the Roman Republic’s greatest engineering achievements, the Portus Julius. Agrippa knew that Lake Averno would be hidden from any ships sailing the coast, so he planned this to the base of his harbour, linking Lake Averno to Lake Lucrino with a canal, and from Lucrino to the sea with a second canal. The harbour he built would prove to be large enough to hold the whole fleet and conduct training maneuvers. Combined with a large tunnel that led to the port from Cumae, the Portus Julius could build ships, train sailors, and supply without any risk of detection from the sea. It was a marvel of logistics and engineering, the ruins of which can still be seen under the waters today. Octavian’s position improved further in the Spring of 37 BC when Antony arrived in Tarentum with 300 ships to assist in the invasion and messages sent to Lepidus in Africa to prepare his forces for the attack. Octavian was not yet ready, though, as many of his ships were still under construction. Antony, who was organizing his Parthian Campaign, was frustrated at this delay but persisted, hoping that Octavian would repay the favour by assisting whenever Antony’s invasion of Parthia began. Octavian, however, was still angry at Antony for not having sent men to help the previous year. It is even possible that Octavian deliberately slowed the production of his own fleet to frustrate Antony’s plans. On this occasion, Antony acted as the bigger man, probably listening to the advice of his wife, Octavian’s sister, Octavia. He assured Octavian they were allies with no bad blood, working towards the same common goal. The two were reconciled, declaring that they and Lepidus would hold Triumviral power for another five years, without consulting anyone else, including Lepidus himself. Octavian nonetheless felt he had no choice but to delay the invasion again the following year. Antony, unable to postpone his Parthian invasion any longer, offered a compromise by gifting Octavian 130 ships in return for the promise of 4 of Octavian’s Legions. Octavian gladly accepted the offer. Meanwhile, Menas, for unknown reasons, defected yet again, going back to Sextus’ side. Calvisius, who failed to report this to Octavian, was removed from his position, and Agrippa was made overall commander of Octavian’s navy. By the Spring of 36 BC, Octavian was ready. He had roughly 300 ships, including the 130 of Antony under Antony’s lieutenant Taurus, and 21 Legions picked for the invasion. Lepidus was also ready in Africa with 70 warships, 12 Legions, and auxiliaries. The plan was simple: Taurus would attack Sicily from the east, Lepidus from the south and west, and Octavian and Agrippa from the north. They would effectively attack Sicily from all sides and overwhelm it. The invasion began, but yet again, it was plagued by disaster. Lepidus, sailing from Africa, was hit by a large storm that destroyed almost 1000 supply ships in the crossing. The same storm also hit Octavian and Agrippa’s section, forcing them to return to Italy to spend 30 days repairing their vessels. Despite these setbacks, however, Lepidus’ contingent had successfully landed on Sicily, besieging Lilybaeum and winning over other cities in the area. In an attempt to capitalize on this foothold, Lepidus tried to transport four more Legions over. However, they had not been provided with an escort to move them quickly, and elements of Sextus’ fleet could attack them in the crossing, causing two legions worth of men to be lost in the fight. Nevertheless, Sextus still acted cautiously, keeping his fleet safe in port and sending a relieving force to Lilybaeum. This lack of offensive action caused Menas to, once more, change sides, defecting back to Octavian, who readily accepted him but ordered him to be watched closely and only hold limited command. When Octavian sailed his portion of the fleet to the Aeolian islands and still got no response from Sextus, it encouraged him to be even more aggressive. Leaving Agrippa in command of the fleet, he returned to Italy to take 3 Legions to Taurus in Tarentum, intending to lead Taurus’ force personally to attack from the east. At the same time, Agrippa would continue attacking Sicily from the north. Agrippa left around 50 ships in port at Hiera and sailed with perhaps 100 ships to Mylae, where he had learned that Demochares was stationed with 40 ships, hoping to win a quick and easy victory. Sextus, meanwhile, heard of this movement and sailed personally to Demochares position with a further 115 ships. When Agrippa realised he was now facing almost all of the Pompeian navy, he immediately sent word back to Hiera to bring up the rest of his ships as quickly as they could and drew his fleet up for battle. Sextus choose not to command the battle personally, instead observing from the shoreline and assigning command to a lieutenant, Papias. The Pompeian fleet was slightly larger and, with years of naval experience, were the better sailors, sailing in slightly smaller and faster ships, prioritizing naval skill, and trained to disable enemy vessels. On the other hand, Agrippa's fleet had heavier and slower ships built primarily for boarding enemy ships to better utilize the Caesarean advantage in more experienced infantry. On top of this, the greater size of Agrippa’s ships meant that his missile troops on the ship’s towers would have a slight height advantage. The battle commenced, the Pompeian ships using their greater maneuverability to destroy the Caesarean oars, aiming to isolate individual or small groups of the enemy to take them out of the battle. Pompeian ships that got too close were quickly grappled by the Caesareans and pulled closer. The Caesarean, from their higher decks and towers, showered the Pompeians with arrows and javelins before boarding, many Pompeians abandoning their ships and jumping overboard. During the course of the battle, Agrippa located Papias’ ships and engaged it with his own, shattering the hull with the initial ram. Papias was able to escape to another ship nearby and reengaged. Still, Sextus, from the shore, realised that the battle was going poorly and, seeing Agrippa’s reinforcements approaching on the horizon, ordered a withdrawal. The Pompeian ships were able to execute a well-ordered withdrawal to nearby shoals where Agrippa’s heavier and larger vessels would not be able to pursue them. Initially, Agrippa planned to blockade the fleet to keep them pinned, but convinced by his captains that he should not risk losing his victory to a storm, he agreed to withdraw. It had, nonetheless, been an overwhelming victory for the Caesareans, Agrippa losing just five ships and managing to capture or destroy 30. After numerous disastrous setbacks, Octavian’s invasion of Sicily finally had its first significant success under Agrippa. Lepidus’ siege of Lilybaeum was still ongoing, and the capture of some smaller towns in the area had given him a foothold in western Sicily and Octavian. Hearing of Agrippa’s success, Octavian was eager to capitalize on his success and secure a similar base in the east, sailing with three legions and the rest of the navy, and landing around Tauromenium. Sextus, however, was a shrewd commander and not be underestimated. Leaving a small portion of his fleet at Mylae to give the impression that the harbour was still full, Sextus sailed with most of his ships under cover of darkness towards Tauromenium. Octavian would soon find himself almost completely surrounded and fighting for his life. Agrippa's victory had been well-earned, and he had managed to take advantage of the situation by landing a portion of his forces in the North of Sicily around Tyndaris. Though he had not been able to cripple the Pompeian navy, most of the surviving vessels had managed to slip past Agrippa's force and rejoin Sextus. Octavian, meanwhile, was attempting to capitalize on Agrippa's victory and lead his portion of the army and fleet, totalling 3 legions and perhaps 150 ships, to the west of Sicily, landing around Tauromenium in the early summer of 36 BC. He had underestimated Sextus. As his men began to fortify their camp, they saw the Pompeian fleet closing in while the Pompeian army advanced parallel along the coast. Seeing that Octavian's forces were distracted, fortifying their position, Sextus ordered his cavalry to attack, harassing the Caesarean legions where they could. Still, Octavian's men were able to fend off the attacks and complete their defences. Nevertheless, Octavian was in a bad position with his land forces surrounded in their fort, his navy blockaded, and his supply line to the Italian mainland cut off. Recognizing that the situation would be unwinnable without a secure supply line, Octavian assigned Cornificius, a man who had distinguished himself under Caesar, as commander of the land forces. At the same time, Octavian took control of the ships. Having heard of Agrippa's victory over the Pompeian fleet, he assumed that his larger fleet would be able to find similar success. Still, the resulting battle once again proved to be a disaster for Octavian. The extant sources do not give a detailed account of the battle itself, but they report that Octavian lost many ships, many of the sailors who abandoned ships and made it to shore getting cut down by the Pompeian cavalry. Octavian barely escaped with his life and, rather than retreating to his legions on Sicily, was forced back to the Italian mainland. He desperately sent messages to Agrippa requesting all his forces to move as quickly as possible to Cornificius' position and ordered another three legions to cross the straits from Italy to Sicily, planning to follow shortly after. Effectively abandoned in Sicily, Cornificius realised how dire his situation was. With the supply line cut, it was only a matter of time before he and his men were starved out of their position. He drew his men up for battle, but the Pompeians refused the engagement. With few other options available, Octavian's general prepared his men to fight north toward Agrippa's men. The legions marched in a hollow square, with the unarmed and wounded men in the centre, and were constantly harassed by the missile and light cavalry troops, including some of the renowned Numidian light cavalry that had sided with Sextus. Broken terrain and constant Pompeian attacks made their march painfully slow. To make things worse, the army had also moved with very few supplies and the combination of the summer heat and harassing tactics from Sextus' men made it almost impossible for the men to find water. Cornificius was eventually forced to abandon his wounded men to make a better pace. After five days of dehydration and constant harassment, Cornficus' men were at their breaking point and in no fit shape to fight. Sextus' men began to close in to deal the final blow, but suddenly 3 of Agrippa's legions, under the command of one of his lieutenants, emerged. The Pompeian force retreated in the face of these reinforcements, and the remnants of Cornficus' troops were finally able to ensure Agrippa's camp's safety around Mylae. Agrippa successfully managed to take the stronghold of Tyndaris in the meantime, and Octavian rejoined him here, bringing more legions from the Italian mainland. In total, he now had a staggering 21 legions in Sicily, not including the forces under Lepidus. In the face of such opposition, Sextus was forced to retreat to the Pelorus peninsula. Lepidus' operations around Lilybaeum had been largely successful, but he had failed to take the city itself, and a reinforcing force sent by Sextus made him give up the endeavour. Rather than tying up his legions in a prolonged siege, he marched across the island to Octavian and Agrippa. From this point, the Pompeian's fate was effectively sealed. The Caesareans had an overwhelming numerical superiority on land and at sea. Sextus was effectively pinned in the peninsula, with Messana as his last significant holdout on the island's East. Initially, Octavian and Agrippa planned to starve Sextus into submission. Still, Lepidus had become an increasing problem, consistently arguing with Octavian and insisting that he should have just as much command as Octavian. He was not wrong; politically, Octavian was in a dangerous position. Lepidus so far had reasonable success in Sicily, while Octavian's forces had suffered numerous setbacks. As a result, there was a real threat that Lepidus would be able to supplant Octavian as the joint most powerful man in Rome. Rumours had even circulated that Lepidus was in secret communication with Sextus. Octavian no longer had the time to defeat Sextus at his leisure; he needed a decisive victory to crush Sextus and establish himself as the undisputed victor over Lepidus. In order to achieve this, Octavian and Agrippa began increasing the amount of pressure on Sextus' position, Octavian taking any towns that continued to supply the Pompeians while Agrippa maintained a blockade at sea. With time running out, Sextus had no choice but to draw his navy out for battle, hoping to break Agrippa's fleet and open up a route for supplies and retreat. The two fleets, roughly equal in size to approximately 300 ships, met just off the coast of Naulochus. Sextus had learnt much from his navy's previous engagement at Mylae, increasing the size of ships to match the larger Caesarean ones. Agrippa, however, had made his own adaptations, inventing a new kind of weapon, the harpax. Roman ships had previously used the corvus, a bridge with a large nail at one end, to pin enemy ships for boarding. The harpax, on the other hand, was a large grappling hook fired from a ballista-like device. It could be fired from a distance and then used a winch to drag the enemy ship close for boarding and was fitted with a long metal sheath near the hook to prevent the ropes from being cut; it was an ingenious device. The battle began, and it quickly became apparent that Agrippa's new invention was as formidable as it was creative. Sextus' men had never fought against such a device and thus had no means of defence against it. Some that were caught by the harpax tried to backpaddle, but this only tired the men and made their ships slower and more sluggish. Many were caught and dragged toward Agrippa's forces and boarded. Sextus' men, to their credit, fought bravely on the decks, each ship becoming its own miniature battlefield. From the shoreline, the armies of both sides watched helplessly, unable to distinguish between them, urging their allies on with shouts of encouragement. However, it soon became apparent to all that Agrippa had the decisive advantage. Sextus' fleet attempted to withdraw through the straits, but many ships were caught and forced onto the beaches, the vessels burnt, and the sailors captured. The precise number of ships lost on each side is hard to gauge though Appian claims that only 17 of Sextus' ships escaped, Sextus among them, with Agrippa's men successfully capturing or burning the vast majority of the Pompeian fleet, thanks mainly to the harpax. Whether this figure is accurate or not is hard to say, but it certainly seems that Sextus' navy lost most of its ships, while Agrippa's losses were comparatively light. It had been Agrippa's finest hour so far and had given Octavian the clear victory he so badly needed. In the immediate aftermath, Sextus fled to Messana, abandoning his army in the area. Leaderless, they quickly surrendered to Octavian. Sextus recalled the eight legions around Lilybaeum, seemingly intending to make a stand with them around Messana. However, before they arrived, more and more of Sextus' inner circle began to defect, and Sextus abandoned the island of Sicily with his family, sailing in secrecy to Antony, hoping that he would find safety there in recompense for Sextus having given sanctuary to Antony's mother in the past. The Pompeian legions that arrived in Messana found themselves leaderless and were quickly besieged by the Caesarean armies under the command of Lepidus and Agrippa. The Pompeians quickly sent peace envoys to negotiate, Agrippa being ordered not to concede anything until Octavian arrived on the scene. Lepidus, however, had other plans and agreed to allow the Pompeian legions to join him, granting them the right to sack Messana in return. Lepidus and Pompey's men thus plundered the city throughout the night, Agrippa's legions maintaining their position outside the city. Combined with his forces from Africa, Lepidus now had a total of 21 legions under his personal command, roughly equal to those under Octavian and Agrippa. He now chose to make his move. Declaring himself as the conqueror of Sicily, Lepidus sent word to towns in Sicily to reject any envoys sent from Octavian and listen only to those sent by himself. Octavian reacted quickly, confronting Lepidus, who offered Octavian control of Sicily and North Africa in return for Gaul, Hispania and Illyricum. Effectively, it was an offer to restore the separation initially agreed upon in 43 BC by the Second Triumvirate. Octavian, of course, refused. The soldiers began to worry that after just having proved victorious in the Sicilian campaign against Sextus, they would be swept into another war between Lepidus and Octavian. The latter got wind of these misgivings and initially sent agents into Lepidus' camp to gauge the loyalties of the Legions before entering himself, leaving a significant cavalry bodyguard at the gates. Many of the previously Pompeian Legions were worried that the peace treaty would not be valid unless Octavian endorsed it. Many of Lepidus' men were embittered that they had to share the spoils of looting Messana with men they had only recently been fighting against. Octavian proclaimed that he would accept all who wanted to join him, and many pledged their loyalty there and then. In his tent, Lepidus heard that his army was dissolving and stormed out. A fight of some kind broke out, one of Octavian's entourage getting killed and Octavian himself almost getting wounded. Octavian retreated to his cavalry, and what happened next is not entirely clear. Appian paints a picture of Octavian with only his cavalry engaging in some kind of fighting with Lepidus' men that remained loyal, but that eventually, more and more of his men defected, a trickle becoming a flood. Cassius Dio's version differs. According to his account, after entering Lepidus' camp, Octavian was soundly rebuffed by the men and resorted to besieging the camp, Lepidus' men defecting throughout the course of the siege as the only practical option, despite having high respect for Lepidus. Effectively, one version has Octavian's power of personality convincing droves of men to his side, with an incompetent Lepidus being unaware of what was going on and losing almost all his Legions after a short scuffle with Octavian, while the other has Octavian needing to effectively force Lepidus' men to join him through the threat of siege. Octavian, a master propagandist, managed to heavily control the narrative following the end of the Civil War. Such discrepancies are relatively common, and there is often bias in favour of Octavian and against his enemies. The consensus of modern historians is that the most likely course of events was somewhere in the middle. Octavian marched into the camp with his bodyguard, managing to win over some men, but the majority stayed loyal to Lepidus. As a result, Octavian used force to threaten the loyalists to join his side. The end result, however, is clear. The entirety of Lepidus' army, all 21 legions, passed over to Octavian's command. This was, in effect, the end of Lepidus' career. In the aftermath, he was stripped of the powers of a triumvir, and Octavian and Antony stood alone as the rulers of the Republic. Lepidus has gone down in history as incompetent and a bit of a fool, largely thanks to pro-Octavian and anti-Lepidus, biased sources. It is a rather damning evaluation. Lepidus had played the game well, but the decks were, arguably, stacked against him. Antony and Octavian both had the benefit of being much more apparent heirs to Caesar's legacy, and both benefited from the resources left by Caesar after he died. His final gambit in Sicily was possibly the best move he could make given the circumstances: he had a strong army in the area, and the offer he made to Octavian was not as unfair as it may initially seem. Africa and Sicily, now that they had been reigned in under Caesarean control, had long been two of the Republics' most productive areas, and Lepidus did not try to cut Octavian out of the Triumvirate entirely. Unfortunately for him, however, he was matched against one of the greatest political titans of history, Octavian. One point regarding Lepidus that perhaps is too easily overlooked is that he survived despite losing his triumvir powers. He would later die at the ripe old age of 76. Though his career was admittedly rather lacklustre after the Sicilian Campaign, few men could claim to have supported Julius Caesar, survived the aftermath of his assassination, and challenged Octavian but nonetheless lived to tell the tale. He was shrewd often to avoid the frequent conflicts between Octavian and Antony. Though we should not get ahead of ourselves and laud him as a political genius, dismissing him as an incompetent fool seems inaccurate and unjust. With Sextus having fled the island and his Legions deserted to the Caesarean side, Octavian's invasion of Sicily was over. Disasters had plagued it at the beginning, but a combination of sheer tenacity on his behalf and the talented generalship of Agrippa, had assured victory. With the taking of Sicily, the last Pompeian holdout, the faction was effectively crushed. However, Sextus survived the ordeal and successfully made it to Asia Minor. There, he hoped to find mercy under the protection of the only man now powerful enough to challenge Octavian, Antony. Antony, however, was currently in the middle of his own military expedition: the Roman invasion of Parthia. Antony had been planning the campaign for a significant amount of time and had, in 37BC, been forced to delay the invasion in order to assist Octavian’s war against Sextus, lending naval support in return for the promise of 4 of Octavian’s Legions. Before these promised men could arrive, however, an opportunity presented itself to Antony. Ventidius’ victory over the Parthians included the death of the Parthian heir, Pacorus. In 37BC, his brother, Phraates IV, took the throne and, in order to secure his position, purged the royal court, executing many family members and nobles. Many nobles fled for their lives, and one of these, Monaeses, came to Antony informing him of the internal chaos in Parthia and claiming that he would be able to bring much of Parthia over to Antony’s side. For Antony, this was a golden opportunity: the Parthians were still recovering from the defeats suffered at the hands of Ventidius and were seemingly fractured internally. Seizing on the opportunity, Antony put his plans into motion. Near the start of 36BC, a lieutenant of his, Publius Canidius Crassus, was sent to the Caucasus to guarantee the loyalty of the Armenian king, Artavasdes III, and lead a rapid campaign into Iberia and Albania to secure the northern flank. Antony meanwhile massed his Legions and prepared to attack. Phraates, however, became aware of Monaeses' defection and, likely through the use of huge bribes and promises, was able to win him back over to the Parthian side. Antony tried to capitalise on the situation by demanding the return of the Roman prisoners and eagle standards that had been lost by Crassus at Carrhae, effectively trying to turn Monaeses defection into an agreed-upon deal, but Phraates refused. This must have been a blow to Antony’s strategy, but, nevertheless, the Parthians still seemed vulnerable, so Antony continued with his plan. A campaign against the Parthians had supposedly been originally planned by Caesar, and preparations for this had already begun by the time he was assassinated. Having learned from Crassus’ disastrous mistake at Carrhae of facing the Parthians on flat, open ground, Caesar instead intended to attack from the north into Media Atropatene, where the mountainous terrain would favour Roman Legions over Parthian cavalry. Antony would follow a similar route, using Armenia as a staging ground for the invasion and enrolling the help of Artavasdes, and his thousands of cavalry, an invaluable counter to the Parthian’s mobile armies. Moreover, Media Atropatene was not, in fact, part of the Parthian Empire proper. Instead, it was ruled by its own Median king, also called Artavasdes, who was a close ally, effectively a vassal, of the Parthians. The Median and Armenian kings were bitter enemies, so Antony was confident of Armenian support. Initially, Antony appeared to have planned to cross the Euphrates and make a dash for Armenia before the Parthian forces could react. However, when he reached the Euphrates, he found the crossing was already defended, so he was forced to take a longer route to Armenia instead. This and the need to wait for Canidius’ campaign to finish delayed Antony. By the time all pieces were in place, the campaign season was nearing an end, and winter was looming on the horizon. Antony had, however, always been a risk-taker. He planned to make a bold attack on the Median capital, Phraata, where the wife and children of the Median king were, and quickly take the city, presumably to use the royal family as leverage. If he moved quickly enough and all went well, there was just enough time left in the season to seize this objective before winter set in. In order to conduct the campaign, Antony had gathered a huge force. There is a dispute among the sources, with his troops ranging from 13-18 legions, though most modern historians tend to favour a number around 16-18 Legions. Depending on the strength of these Legions and when adding allies to the total, Antony may have had anywhere between 60 and 100,000 men, a truly colossal number, far larger than Caesar’s armies used to conquer Gaul and rivalling the size of the armies that fought at the climatic battle of Philippi. Even without the Armenians, Antony’s force included nearly 10,000 cavalry and thousands of missile troops, particularly slingers. Antony, it seems, had learnt from both Crassus and Ventidius that cavalry and light infantry were crucial for fighting the Parthians and had planned accordingly. Despite winter closing in, Antony launched his campaign. To allow his Legions to move faster, he separated the slow-moving supplies and siege engines under the command of Statianus with two Legions and the Armenians to defend them while he moved ahead with the majority of his force to attack Phraata. Upon reaching the city, Antony immediately launched several assaults against it, but the defences were strong, and his men were repulsed. Antony began the construction of siege works and encamped his army around the city, awaiting the arrival of the siege engines. The Parthians had not, however, been idle. While Antony had been making his preparations, Phraates had managed to assemble a force of 40,000 cataphract and horse archers to assist the Medians. These Parthians and their Median allies fell upon Statianus’ force. The two Legions left to guard the supplies and siege were easily wiped out, and their standards were taken, Statianus dying in the fighting. The Armenians, now cut off from Antony, abandoned the campaign completely, returning home, while the Parthian-Median force destroyed all of the Roman siege equipment. It was a devastating start to the campaign for the Romans. When this news reached Antony, he gathered 10 of his Legions and marched quickly to try and save Statianus, leaving the rest of his army to continue the siege of Phraata. By the time he arrived, though, the fighting was long over. Antony nevertheless pursued the Parthians, looking to force a pitched battle. He eventually managed to find them in the field, drawing his infantry into a tight formation and having his cavalry charge whenever the Parthians drew close, followed quickly by the Roman infantry, thus chasing the Parthians from the field with the Roman cavalry in hot pursuit. Antony initially thought he had won a decisive victory, but by the end of the day, less than 100 Parthains lay dead, the vast majority easily outpacing their pursuers. Furthermore, upon returning to Phraaspa, he learned that the defenders had sallied out, pushing the Romans back and sabotaging some of their siege equipment. Antony was apparently so furious that he had some of the Legions charged with sieging the city decimated. Antony was now in a potentially disastrous situation. With no siege engines, the siege of Phrasspa would drag even longer, and with winter around the corner and a Parthian army behind him, Antony’s position was completely untenable. Fortunately for him, Phraates was eager for a quick conclusion to the war, likely because the winter would take its toll on his own men and because he was looking to further secure his rule over Parthia. As a result, Phraates offered Antony very generous terms, urging Antony to simply leave Media peacefully before he lost more men to famine and winter. Antony initially tried again to request the Roman prisoners and standards from Carrhae but was once again rebuffed. With no strength in his bargaining position, Antony’s force lifted the siege, broke camp, and made for the Araxes River, the border between Media and Armenia. As he was breaking camp, a guide approached Antony, either a prisoner from Carrhae who had made it to the Roman lines or a son of Monaeses. He warned Antony that the Parthians were planning to attack while the Romans were in the open, marching back to Armenia, and urged Antony to take a different route home. The Roman general took the advice, and for three days, the army followed the guide, avoiding all conflict with the Parthians. On the fourth day, though, the Parthian force found them. The forces drew up for battle, the Parthians threatening to encircle the Romans. In response, Antony had his light infantry and missiles charge out from his lines and attack, the slingers and skirmishers inflicting many casualties on the Parthians before amassing a bulk of his cavalry to charge and scatter the enemy. Antony knew that he could not afford to be bogged down, however. If the army stopped moving, he would be surrounded and likely destroyed. Instead, he formed his army into a hollow square with light infantry and missiles on the flanks and rear with cavalry in support. When the Parthians drew too close, the missile troops would skirmish with them before the Roman cavalry would charge and chase the Parthians off but not pursue them. Using these tactics, Antony was able to keep his army slowly moving toward the Araxes, with minimal losses for about four days. On the fifth, one of his officers, Gallus, requested a force of light infantry and cavalry to attack the Parthians and try to break the cycle. Antony agreed, and Gallus’ force launched their attack. Initially, they were successful, but rather than withdrawing back to the Roman lines, they attempted to press the attack. This, inevitably, resulted in Gallus being cut off. Antony’s officers seem to have been rather reluctant to commit to the fight, only sending small reinforcement groups were sent to try and relieve Gallus, all of which were subsequently surrounded and destroyed. Antony himself eventually had to come to Gallus’ rescue with the entirety of the 3rd Legion. According to Plutarch, by the time Antony was able to intervene, 3,000 of his men lay dead and another 5,000 wounded. By this point, the Romans' lack of supplies was also starting to take its toll. The army was forced to scavenge what they could from the land, and unfamiliar with the territory, a significant number became sick after eating poisonous herbs and consuming unclean drinking water. Nevertheless, Antony was able to keep the army moving. Attacked once more by the Parthians, he had the Legions form testudos and again fended the attack with light infantry and cavalry. Finally, the river was in sight, and the Romans began the process of transporting their men across. To their surprise, at least in Plutarch’s telling of events, the Parthians effectively let them leave without attacking the Romans when they were at their most vulnerable, some Parthian soldiers supposedly even shouting farewells to the Romans. It had been 27 days since the army had left Phraata, with as many as 18 engagements with the Parthians being fought. The army was ragged, and, despite now being in friendly territory, they were still weak and vulnerable. The Armenian winter would result in the deaths of thousands more before they could reach safety. While Antony was furious with the Armenian king for his earlier betrayal, he was currently desperate for supplies. He was in no position to force a military confrontation and was forced to feign friendship and bide his time. The total number of casualties that Antony’s army had sustained vary significantly depending on the source. Livy gives the 2 Legions lost under Statianus and another 8,000 to weather, Paterculus suggests 25% of Antony’s military force, Florus a third, and Plutarch approximately 45,000. The huge amount of propaganda that surrounded this campaign makes it almost impossible to distinguish the real number. At the very least, all the sources agree that Antony lost at least two legions and thousands more to weather and disease. While it is certainly true that Antony’s losses were significant then, it is worth recognising some of Antony’s achievements. He had been forced into a very similar position to Crassus, low on supplies, in hostile territory and hounded by a large Parthian force. Whereas Crassus’ generalship had resulted in the complete annihilation of his army, Antony had managed to conduct an admirable fighting withdrawal and avoided the complete destruction of his force. Moreover, Plutarch, though often critical of Antony, also stresses that his men never lost faith in him, even proclaiming him imperator. A flawed man in many ways, Antony was nevertheless an excellent soldier, well-liked, and excelled in seemingly disastrous situations: without his generalship, it is possible that the entire force would have been annihilated. Antony’s Atropatene Campaign remains a topic of debate among modern scholars, not least because of the propaganda surrounding it. Both Antony and Octavian were masters of spin and knew the importance of controlling a narrative. In the immediate aftermath of Antony’s campaign, both men pushed their own agendas, Antony claiming the campaign to be a resounding success, Octavian damning it as an abject failure, blurring the truth almost immediately. There are several sources that have survived which discuss the campaign, including Livy, Paterculus, Josephus, Frontinus, Strabo and Florus, but the most detailed accounts come from Plutarch and Cassius Dio. Neither are ideal sources: Plutarch, by his own admission, was not a historian, but a biographer, while Cassius Dio was writing centuries after the events, with more of an interest in politics than military affairs, and with a distinct bias towards Augustus. Where any of these writers originally got their information regarding the campaign is an ongoing topic of debate. A participant and eyewitness of the campaign, Quintus Dellius, wrote a history of it, which is now lost and may have been used by later writers. There is, however, very little evidence to show to what extent he was used. More importantly, some very significant differences between the sources show that they were not all using Dellius and that multiple narratives were circulating. Moreover, Dellius himself has his own problems. He had fought under Antony, and so it might be thought that he would have a pro-Antony bias, but Dellius was notorious for changing sides multiple times and wrote his history while siding with Augustus, so he may, in fact, have presented a damning view of Antony. In either case, he is inevitably biased. In all likelihood, some of the surviving sources were instead based on the accounts pushed by either Antony or Octavian. The extent to which they can be trusted, and therefore the extent to which Antony either failed or succeeded, is debatable. The first question we need to consider is what Antony attempted to achieve. Historian Kenneth Jones, for example, has argued that Antony was far more successful than he is usually given credit for. In his interpretation, Antony’s aim was much less extravagant: he only wanted to invade Media Atropatene and force the Median king into a client-king relationship, thereby weakening Parthia indirectly and improving Antony’s position in the East. This, Jones argues, is why Antony rushed for Phraata, where much of the Median royal family was. Moreover, Jones claims that the Parthians were somewhat reluctant to get heavily involved, citing as evidence the lack of an all-out Parthian attack on Antony’s main force and their allowing Antony to cross back into Armenia without attacking. The campaign was, therefore, largely a Roman-Median affair, with the Parthians only committing enough to defend their ally but not enough to wipe out the Romans. The fact that Antony was claimed as imperator by his own men and that the Median king would indeed abandon Parthia and side with Antony are all cited as evidence that Antony was successful, even if costly, and the idea that his campaign was a failure is largely the result of Augustan propaganda. It is certainly an interesting theory and one that should not be discarded lightly, but there are some compelling arguments against it. Sherwin-White claims that the campaign was, in fact, intended to conquer Parthia. Caesar’s planned campaign against the Parthians, which Antony seems to have used as a blueprint to some extent, was due to be a campaign of conquest, and the numbers that Antony amassed were similar to those planned by Caesar. If Antony only wanted to intervene in Media, why the need for such a large army? Secondly, the lack of a major battle does not inherently imply a lack of Parthian interest. It may well have been the case that the Parthians were simply confident that enough damage could be done to the Romans without needing to risk a pitched battle. The reality is perhaps somewhere in the middle. Antony likely did plan to have a long-lasting campaign against the Parthians, starting with an intervention into Media. When the campaign began poorly, Antony mitigated his objectives and, therefore, later claimed victory, having moved the goalposts. Syme’s evaluation that it was “a defeat, but not a disaster” is perhaps the fairest summary. While Antony had been defeated in the East, Octavian had finally prevailed in Sicily, chasing Sextus Pompey from the island and effectively ousting Lepidus. The last son of Pompey had fled to Mytilene with a few soldiers, where he awaited Antony’s return from the East. Upon hearing of his defeat, Sextus tried to send messengers to the Parthians, while Antony sent a lieutenant, Titius, to offer Sextus mercy if he joined Antony, an offer that Sextus delayed responding to. Antony’s officers in Asia Minor grew wary of Sextus and began manoeuvring to encircle him. In a last desperate gamble, Sextus took the city of Lampsacus through treachery and pressed thousands of its citizens into his army. Using this force, Sextus attacked targets of opportunity around Ionia, eventually taking Nicea and Nicomedia. Eventually, though, Antony was able to send a proper army to confront Sextus, including 120 ships, while Sextus burnt his fleet and armed his sailors, preparing to make his last stand. The nobles that were with him, including his father-in-law Libo, though, had finally had enough. Rather than join Sextus in his desperate last stand, they defected to Antony’s side. Sextus attempted to flee with his men to Armenia but was hounded by forces under Titius, the governor of Asia Minor, Furnius, and the allied king of Galatia, Amyntas. Despite managing to inflict some casualties by night attacks, Sextus’ supplies were cut off, and his rag-tag force was stranded. His men began to desert him, and Sextus was finally left alone and, at last, captured. The last son of Pompey the Great was executed months later in Mytilene after having fought Caesar, Antony, Octavian and Agrippa for roughly a decade. In popular retellings of the Civil Wars, Sextus is often sidelined compared to the bigger players. However, it’s worth bearing in mind how close Sextus had come to succeeding. In 39BC, he was in an incredibly strong position militarily, and his blockade of Italy had effectively brought Rome to its knees. Just like his father, however, the political interests of his allies had been his undoing, and the moment had slipped through his hands. Though he was ultimately unsuccessful, one can not help but admire his stubbornness and tenacity, and one wonders how different things would have been if Octavian did not have the fortune to have a commander as talented as Agrippa on his side. More than a decade after Caesar crossed the Rubicon, his heir and his right-hand man were the only two major players left standing. An out-and-out conflict between Antony and Octavian had been largely avoided for years, replaced by proxy wars and political manoeuvring. Both men had been able to claim that they were acting in accordance with Caesar’s legacy and could legitimise their wars as being necessary for the stability of the Republic. The destruction of the last remnants of the Pompeian faction and the sidelining of Lepidus meant that, in theory, the ultimate goal of the Civil War had been achieved: Caesar had been avenged, and the Republic was fully under the control of the Caesareans. In reality, though, all that had been achieved was the removal of the final buffers separating the two. The last great Civil War of the Roman Republic to decide who would be the master of Rome loomed on the horizon. The end of 36 BC had seen Octavian build upon his position by completing the conquest of Sicily from Sextus Pompey and then ousting Lepidus and absorbing many of his powers and Legions into his own. Antony, meanwhile, had faired poorly in his Parthian Campaign and returned to Alexandria to regroup. Both men were aware that with Lepidus out of the equation, a direct confrontation was inevitable and began consolidating their positions. In the West, Octavian launched a series of campaigns along the Adriatic coast against the Pannonians in 35 BC, whom Cassius Dio, an eventual governor of the area, describes as “leading the most miserable existence of all mankind” but also as “the bravest of all men of whom we have knowledge”. The details regarding the campaign are rather minimal, and it seems to have been over rather quickly, with Octavian successfully taking the city of Siscia and leaving a subordinate, Geminus, to govern the area. A year later, Octavian and Agrippa would launch a similarly quick, yet successful campaign in Dalmatia. While there is, again, little information about this conflict, the most important detail is that in both instances, Octavian and Agrippa fought a campaign on both land and sea, giving their army and navy crucial experience that would prove invaluable in the coming years. Meanwhile, in the East, Antony set his plans in motion to avenge himself on the Armenian king, Artavasdes, who had deserted him so early during the campaign in Atropatene. In the following years, Antony made numerous attempts to lure the Armenian king out of his kingdom and to Alexandria, but Artavasdes was a cautious man and refused the invitations. At last, in 34 BC, after many bribes, envoys, and other means, Antony was able to convince Artavasdes to meet him. When he did, Antony immediately had him seized and imprisoned and moved all his 16 Legions into Armenia. The details for this campaign are, again, vague: there seems to have been some resistance led by Artavasdes’ son, but there does not seem to have been any large-scale battles. Rather, Antony’s intervention in Armenia seems to have been more like a raid intended to remind the locals of Rome’s supremacy and the cost of going against her rather than a war of conquest. Simultaneous to these military affairs, Antony and Octavian were both making moves politically. With Lepidus out of the picture, Octavian targeted his formidable propaganda machine squarely at Antony and Cleopatra. A crucial figure in this, and one often sidelined in discussions of the time period, was Octavian’s sister, Octavia. She had already played an important role in Octavian’s career, cementing the triumviral alliance in 40 BC by marrying Antony, and had been a crucial go-between for the two triumvirs, helping to negotiate the treaty and promises of mutual support in 37 BC. Moreover, Octavia was renowned in Roman society as a paragon of wife and motherhood. In 35 BC, in the aftermath of the Atropatene Campaign, Octavia had headed East with gifts for Antony and, according to some sources, 2,000 of the 20,0000 men that Octavian had promised to Antony. Rather than meeting her in Greece, however, Antony sent her a letter telling her to stay in Athens while he himself went to Alexandria. Octavian and his allies leapt upon the scandal, arguing that it clearly showed Antony’s allegiances lay with a foreign queen rather than the most ideal Roman wife. In the autumn of 34 BC, in Alexandria, Antony carried out a kind of triumph to mark his success in Armenia, riding through the streets on a chariot and parading the Armenian king in his procession. In the end, according to the sources, Antony and Cleopatra sat upon ornate, oriental chairs with Antony dressed in Eastern garb as Dionysus and Isis. It was here that Antony supposedly made his infamous Donations. In front of a large crowd, Antony purportedly recognised Caesarion as the legitimate heir to Julius Caesar and proclaimed King of Kings, while Cleopatra was proclaimed Queen of Kings and gifted the lands of Egypt and Cyprus. Moreover, the children of Antony and Cleopatra were all also given land: the yet-to-be-conquered Armenia, Media and Parthia to Alexander, Cyrenaica and Libya to Selene and lastly, Syria, Phoenicia and Cilicia to Ptolemy. Antony apparently went so far as to send dispatches to Rome to repeat the proclamation to the Senate and get their approval of it, though the Consuls at the time, Gaius Sosius and Domitius Ahenobarbus, both loyal friends of Antony, refused to allow the proclamation to be read knowing how damaging it would be, much to Octavian’s frustration. These ‘Donations’ remain a topic of some debate among historians to this day. It must be remembered, after all, that the surviving sources for this period are largely pro-Octavian, with some of them being based directly on Octavian’s own memoirs and thus presenting the narrative that Octavian wanted to present. Some, such as Halfmann, argue that Antony was embracing his complicated mixed role of being both a Roman and a kind of Hellenic dynast and perhaps articulating what his later vision for the East was. In this interpretation, Antony was not actually promising to hand over land to Cleopatra or her children but would have placed them as more symbolic rulers of the areas, while existing client kings would be kept in power but subordinate to Cleopatra and Caesarion. Others say that the proclamation was meant purely for a local audience, a declaration to the Alexandrians specifically that he would aim to restore the Ptolemaic Empire to its previous glory and that the donations were simply a rhetorical device. Finally, there are those, such as Patterson, who doubt how realistic the episode is entirely: Antony was a talented politician and well aware of the importance of public opinion, so is it really believable that Antony, in the midst of repairing his reputation after his defeat in Parthia would make such an obviously disastrous and poorly judged move as the Donations? After all, even if Antony did not intend to give over the land directly and intended the titles to be more symbolic, it was still a slight to the famously anti-monarchist Romans and other allied monarchs. Patterson instead argues that some aspects are likely true, such as Antony proclaiming Caesarion to be Julius Caesar’s true heir and proclaiming Caesarion and Cleopatra as king and queen of Egypt, both of which would be sensible and logical steps for Antony to take. The other donations, particularly those to Antony and Cleopatra’s own children, could very well be fabrications of Octavian’s propaganda. Almost all, however, agree that Antony did confirm Cleopatra as queen of Egypt and Caesarion as Julius Caesar’s heir, thereby establishing him as a direct rival to Octavian and further increasing tensions between the two. News of these affairs, true or false, soon reached Rome and was quickly capitalised on by Octavian, who attacked Antony as being bewitched by Cleopatra and scorning Roman values by his style of dress and actions. It is something of an irony that the Octavian propaganda focused on Antony’s style of dress and chair when these same arguments had been used against Octavian’s adopted father, Caesar, to demonise him. In retaliation, Antony accused Octavian of being a tyrant, removing Lepidus from the triumvirate without Antony's approval and taking all of Lepidus’ Legions and Sicily for himself rather than splitting them. Octavian, in turn, accused Antony of retaining control over Egypt instead of giving it to the Senate to distribute, murdering Sextus, and dishonourably tricking the Armenian king. Meanwhile, Octavia, who had returned from Athens and was living in Antony’s home in Rome, was using her position to strengthen Octavian further. As Antony’s wife, it was her responsibility to handle his affairs in his absence, including dealing with Antony’s clients, many of whom she subtly moved into her brother’s pocket, chipping away at Antony’s support structure in the city. Indeed, Octavia had been so useful to Octavian’s political campaign that historian Barry Strauss credits her with having done “as much for the house of Caesar as any military commander.” While Octavia was rather subtle and cunning in turning people against Antony, other agents of Octavian were less so. Calvisius, for example, spread still more rumours about Antony, that he had given hundreds of thousands of books to Cleopatra, that he read love notes from her while dealing with foreign kings, that he once left in the middle of a gripping lecture after seeing Cleopatra passing by and escorted her instead of staying to hear the speech and, shockingly, gave Cleopatra a foot-rub at a banquet. Most of these were dismissed as baseless slander, however, and though Octavian had eroded some of Antony’s base, he still did not have enough cause to openly declare war against Antony. In order for that to happen, he would need some far more serious and damaging information. Fortunately for Octavian, such information soon presented itself. Among the numerous people who defected to Octavian were two men in particular, Marcus Titius and Lucius Munatius Plancus. Both men had fought under Antony, Plancus during the Perusine War and Titius during the Atropatene campaign. Why exactly they now betrayed Antony is unclear: opportunism, bribes, or fracturing of their relationship with Antony are all possibilities. Whatever the case was, they brought with them information that was useful to Octavian, most importantly, some details regarding Antony’s will. Encouraged by their words, Octavian determined to see the will himself and ordered his men to seize it from the Vestal Virgins where it had been stored, a grossly blasphemous act. Octavian must have known how sacrilegious this would be but considered this a price worth paying for the information. Gathering the Senate together, Octavian read the will aloud in which Antony had supposedly reaffirmed the legitimacy of Caesarion, promised yet more lands to Cleopatra and their children and, worst of all, requested to be buried in Alexandria rather than Rome. Once again, it is hard not to think that Octavian fabricated many of the details. Antony’s will was very likely entrusted to the Vestal Virgins, but it is incredibly unlikely that he had committed to writing such politically damaging ideas if he ever actually had them. As Aeschylus had written before though, “In war, truth is the first casualty.” It did not matter if the contents were true or not, what mattered was that they were believed. To many, the will seemed to legitimise many of the worst accusations made against Antony and Cleopatra, namely that Antony intended to rule Rome as a Hellenic-style monarch with Cleopatra at his side. It was a significant blow to Antony’s reputation, and it was enough for Octavian to weaponize the Senate against him. Declaring that Antony’s actions were all the result of Cleopatra, Octavian had the Senate declare war against Cleopatra. This was an important detail. By declaring war on Cleopatra, Octavian could avoid calling it another Civil War, he could portray himself as a Roman fighting a threatening foreign power, and he forced Antony into a position where he would need to actively align himself with Cleopatra and against Rome. As Octavian knew he would, Antony announced his support for Cleopatra and was subsequently labeled a traitor and stripped of all his powers and authority, leaving Octavian as the only man with full, legitimate triumviral powers. While many Senators sided with Octavian, a good many, including the two consuls for the year, Ahenobarbus and Sosius, viewed Octavian as a tyrant and threw their lot in with Antony, fleeing to his side. The last war of the Roman Republic had begun. While the propaganda war had been raging, Antony and Cleopatra had moved to Ephesus near the end of 33 BC, where they began mustering their forces. Pulling together all their resources in the East, they had put together a colossal force of 500 warships, 300 supply ships and 120,000 soldiers. The navy was mostly triremes and quinqueremes, also called ‘threes’ and ‘fives,’ respectively, but they also had a few heavier ships ranging from sixes to tens. These ships, thanks to their large size, were somewhat ineffective in naval battles and were instead designed to smash the defences of fortified harbours, such as those at Brundisium and Tarentum. Though no source confirms it directly, the inclusion of these kinds of ships, as well as the size of the army, strongly implies what Antony and Cleopatra had planned: a full-scale invasion of Italy. With this kind of force, such a feat was certainly possible but would be a huge logistical challenge. After all, alongside the 120,000 soldiers, their navy would have consisted of a further 200,000 men. The key to their success would be maintaining a strong supply line from Egypt to their frontlines in Greece and then on to Italy. Already though, some cracks were starting to emerge. Ahenobarbus and Sosius both implored Antony to send Cleopatra back to Egypt. Both were respected men, and Ahenobarbus, in particular, had proved himself as a talented admiral, having commanded fleets in the Adriatic for the Liberators against the Triumvirate decades earlier. Both men considered the reputational damage of Cleopatra to be too much, especially if they were to invade Italy: it would all seem to confirm Octavian’s propaganda if the invading force landed with a foreign queen at their head. Nevertheless, Antony had good reason for keeping Cleopatra with him. She was providing the vast majority of the funding for the campaign, as well as 60 of the warships, all of which Antony desperately needed to keep on hand. Moreover, sending Cleopatra away may have potentially alienated other allied monarchs. Cleopatra also had her own reasons for wanting to stay. Not only had she already invested heavily into the expedition, but there was always the threat that Octavian would offer to repair the marriage of Octavia and Antony, leaving her isolated. In the end, Cleopatra, with the help of some well-placed bribes to other officers close to Antony, was able to convince him of her usefulness, and the force sailed for Greece in the late Summer of 32 BC. Their army and navy were large and well-supplied, and they had far more funds than Octavian did, all of which tipped the scales in their favor. However, rather than invading Italy immediately, Antony delayed. This was a rather uncharacteristically cautious move and perhaps reflects that either the force was not completely organised yet, or that Antony was trying to avoid his previous mistake of rushing the invasion of Atropatene before Winter. Either way, he decided to bide his time, stationing garrisons along the supply lines in key places like Corcyra, Leucas, and Methone, while the majority of the fleet put in at the Gulf of Ambracia, and Antony and Cleopatra themselves made for Patrae where they planned to spend the Winter months. It would prove to be a costly decision. Though Antony and Cleopatra had many factors in their favour, Octavian had a few advantages of his own, the most important of which was his friend and right-hand man, Agrippa. Having defeated Sextus Pompey around Sicily and led a successful naval campaign in the Adriatic, Agrippa was undoubtedly the most talented and experienced Roman admiral of his time, as was signified by the naval crown gifted to him by Octavian. Octavian was well aware of his limitations, as well as the talents of his friend, and so was more than willing to allow Agrippa to take the lead in planning the campaign. It was clear to him that attacking Antony’s navy at Actium head-on would be ill-advised; their defensive position was simply too strong and the fleet too large. At the same time, Agrippa could not risk transporting the entirety of Octavian’s army across the Adriatic with Antony’s ships so close. Years earlier, Julius Caesar had found himself in an almost identical situation with an enemy fleet thwarting his ability to cross the Adriatic in force and had only eventually succeeded in doing so, thanks largely to the incompetence of his opponents. However, it was unlikely that Antony would be as clumsy, particularly considering that he and one of his lieutenants, Ahenobarbus, were veterans of fighting in these waters. Agrippa would need a more cunning strategy. Rather than confronting the enemy directly, he instead planned to slowly choke them into submission. Attack on Methone and Antony’s Supply Problems In the early months of 31BC, Antony and Cleopatra moved to their fleet at Actium in the Ambracian Gulf and began to rally their army there from winter quarters when suddenly Agrippa struck at the supply hub of Methone. The precise details surrounding this crucial event are, unfortunately, somewhat scarce. However, small references and comparisons to other similar assaults have allowed modern historians to piece together a likely narrative. Methone was an important link in Antony’s supply chain and so had a significant garrison under the command of Bogud, king of Mauretania, a talented and experienced soldier, as well as a one-time ally of Julius Caesar. However, it is likely that Antony had his best troops picked out for the invasion of Italy, and so the garrison likely consisted of auxiliaries or irregulars rather than legionaries. Given that any attack on Methone from the sea would require significant coordination and discipline, Agrippa, on the other hand, would have selected an elite force for the assault, likely consisting of roughly 50 ships with 5,000 heavy infantry. Considering how similar attacks were made, it is also likely that Agrippa launched the assault in the early hours of the morning, taking the garrison largely unawares. How effective this surprise attack would have been and how difficult the fighting was can only be speculated. Whatever the case, Agrippa’s legionaries would very probably have had the advantage in hand-to-hand combat over whichever auxiliary force Antony had garrisoned there. King Bogud was killed during the fighting, and the city quickly fell to Agrippa. It was the kind of bold strategy that Caesar himself would have conducted. Indeed, modern historians often consider it to be one of Agrippa’s greatest achievements and Barry Strauss ranks the taking of Methone as one of the most daring and risky attacks in military history. The small amount of information that has survived about this crucially important event may well be yet another result of Octavian’s propaganda that did want to credit his friend with having done too much. Nevertheless, the fact that we know little about the attack today does not change how impactful it was at the time. Through this one attack, Agrippa had stolen the initiative from Antony and put significant pressure on his fragile supply chain. Moreover, using Methone as a base, Agrippa, with roughly half of Octavian’s fleet, launched hit-and-run attacks across Antony’s supply line, evading major engagements and fracturing Antony’s supply chain. Due to the size of Antony’s force, the impact of Agrippa’s assaults was almost instantaneous: with their supply line back to Egypt cut, Antony was forced to demand large grain levies from the Greek cities, sometimes needing to use force to get them. Furthermore, Agrippa’s constant harassment kept Antony’s navy occupied and after a minor naval engagement, Agrippa had successfully taken the island of Corcyra, allowing Octavian to successfully cross the 75,000-strong army and the remainder of his fleet into Greece sometime in the Spring of 31BC. As well as the army, Octavian, cunning as ever, had brought with him many of the Senators and equites who had not gone over to Antony: Octavian was taking no chances of being betrayed in Rome. The fleet was docked near the mouth of the Acheron River, one of the supposed entries into the underworld, while the army encamped around Parga, roughly 35 miles north of Actium. Maneuvers before Actium Meanwhile, at Actium, Antony had strengthened the position with towers controlling the entrance to the gulf and establishing a fortified encampment on the southern promontory. While this provided an excellent and well-protected harbour for the fleet, the area was not ideal for his army, with their little access to food and water and marshes with mosquitoes nearby. Evidently, Antony had only intended to use Actium as a rallying point for his army before progressing to the next stage of his plan, the invasion of Italy. Agrippa’s aggressive actions had, however, forced Antony to put this plan on hold. Even though he had dispatched numerous garrisons along his supply line, Antony’s land force was still colossal, perhaps as many as 100,000, and it would still be weeks until the entire army could be gathered at Actium. Though Octavian had a slightly smaller army on paper, he had already managed to move his entire force and even went so far as to draw up his army to offer battle, which Antony refused. The advantage that Antony had enjoyed just a few months earlier was rapidly slipping away. With little options available to him, Antony sent out skirmishing forces for the next three weeks until the entirety of his army had mustered. Finally ready to retaliate, Antony established a second camp on the north promontory of the Ambracian Gulf and, closed in on Octavian’s position and formed up his army for battle. It was now Octavian’s turn to refuse, and Antony’s forces began the process of besieging Octavian’s force. Once again, echoes of the prior Civil War between Caesar and Pompey can be seen. Just as Caesar had besieged Pompey’s force in Dyrrachium to try and starve them into submission, Antony besieged Octavian, attempting to cut off all his access to fresh food and water. Antony’s fleet in the Ambracian Gulf controlled the surrounding waters, meaning that Octavian’s supply line was now also tenuous. If Antony could cut Octavian off from resources on land and cut off his supply lines to Italy, he could force a land battle where his military experience over Octavian would really pay off. However, Agrippa once again destroyed Antony’s plans. He won two naval victories, one at Patrae, where Antony and Cleopatra had wintered, and one at Leucas, just south of Actium. Gaining control of Leucas allowed Agrippa’s fleet to effectively blockade Antony’s fleet inside the gulf, as well as securing Octavian’s supply line. The noose that Agrippa had tied around Antony at Metone was becoming tighter and tighter, and as it did so, fractures in Antony’s camp began to emerge. Senators, such as Quintus Nasidius, a one-time follower of Sextus Pompey, defected to Octavian’s side. Moreover, as Antony’s forces were trying to besiege Octavian, Octavian had agents inside Antony’s camp negotiating and bribing, eventually winning over Deiotarus and Rhoemetacles, two Thracian kings, and their auxiliaries. Yet more desertions followed, and Antony himself was almost assassinated within his camp. Antony abandoned his plans and returned to Actium, but even this would prove to be disastrous as disease began taking hold in his camp. From posing a very real threat of being able to invade Italy itself, Antony was now faced with a broken supply line, a disease-ridden camp and a blockaded fleet. Around this time, Domitius Ahenobarbus, by far Antony’s most experienced and talented admiral, also deserted him. Sick with a fever, he would die before reaching Octavian’s lines, but his desertion was indicative of the dwindling morale of Antony’s force. In an effort to regain control, Antony began enacting harsh punishments and executing those he suspected of disloyalty, but it proved ineffective, with the sources reporting that he was losing men every day to Octavian. Hoping to bolster his numbers, Antony sent the Galatian king, Amyntas, son of an ally of Caesar, north to Macedonia and Thrace to try and hire mercenaries, but he, too, deserted. Instead, Antony tried a different angle, ordering his new admiral, Sosius, to attempt a naval breakout. Sosius launched his attack on a foggy day to avoid detection for as long as possible, attacking the ships under the command of Lucius Tarius Rufus. Sosius’ surprise attack was met with initial success, routing Rufus’ squadron, but Agrippa was quick to react and amass enough reinforcements to drive Sosius’ assault back. By this point, likely August of 31 BC, Antony would have known that his position was hopeless. The size of his army and the composition of his navy all show that he had originally planned to invade Italy. Such a strategy relied upon him being able to keep the initiative and move his force quickly in order not to drain supplies. Instead, Agrippa had taken the initiative from him and kept his colossal force barricaded in one small area. Desertion and disease had already crippled Antony’s force, and every attempt that he had made to break out or force a battle had failed. Some of his subordinates advised him to abandon the naval campaign and make a break for Thrace and Macedonia with the army to continue the battle. Antony knew, however, that this was not an option. With the sea conceded to Octavian, Antony would be commanding an army with no supply lines and would eventually be picked apart. With growing desperation, Antony settled on one final gambit. With his ranks thinning dramatically over the last few months, Antony recalled all his Legions to the camp in south, manned what ships he could, roughly 230, burnt the rest and drew up his battle plans. Exactly what Antony and Cleopatra had planned at this point is hard to say. Some think that they were planning to break out of the blockade and flee, some that they were preparing for a battle, while others think that the plan was flexible, perhaps built around an idea of a breakout, but able to pivot towards a battle of annihilation if things were going well. An overlooked point, however, is that it was at this time that Dellius, later to be a historian, betrayed Antony and went over to Octavian, taking with him the battle plans. As a result, it seems likely that whatever plans Antony and Cleopatra initially made, they changed them at the last minute, knowing that Dellius would have revealed their plans to Octavian and Agrippa. Battle of Actium Whatever the case, on 2nd September 31BC, around approximately 6 am, Antony and Cleopatra loaded the treasury they had with them on their ships, gathered what was left of their navy and drew them up in two lines across the bay. The first line consisted of 170 ships, Sosius commanding the left and Antony on the right, while the second line of 60 Egyptian ships was commanded by Cleopatra. In total, they would have had approximately 40,000 crew, 20,000 marines and 2,000 archers. Our sources claim that Antony’s fleet consisted of gigantic ships, while Octavian’s were far smaller, a David vs Goliath situation. This idea persisted for centuries, but modern historians, thanks mainly to the archaeological work of Dr. William Murray, now dismiss this as propaganda. Murray’s research shows that, while Antony did have some large vessels, ranging from sixes to tens, as in the number of tiers of oars, these would have likely numbered no more than 30. The vast majority of the fleet was standard-sized, threes, fours and fives, or triremes, quadriremes and quinqueremes. Octavian’s fleet, meanwhile, was mostly the same as the one that had triumphed over Sextus Pompey. Part of the reason for this fleet’s success had been the size of their ships compared to Pompey’s small vessels. In all likelihood, the majority of Octavian and Agrippa’s fleet would have been comparable ships to Antony and Cleopatras, triremes, quadriremes and quinqueremes, alongside a small number of small ships called liburnae. Octavian’s propaganda then overplayed the number of these smaller ships in order to make the battle more dramatic. This 400-strong fleet now stretched across the bay in front of Antony’s forces, Octavian on the left and Agrippa on the right. The fact that Agrippa was given this traditional place of command shows that Octavian was relying upon his friend to win the battle; Octavian knew what his strengths were, and he knew that battlefield strategy was not one of them. For almost 6 hours, the two fleets stared each other down, each waiting for the other to make the first move. Eventually, Antony’s fleet made the first move, advancing cautiously, while Agrippa, in response, bent the flanks of his line forward, forming a crescent formation that threatened to surround Antony’s fleet. Seeing the danger, Antony ordered his Sosius to attack Octavian while he brought ships from the centre to extend his northern flank in response to Agrippa. In response, Octavian’s ships backpaddled, drawing Sosius’ ships further out of formation and tiring the rowers. Antony’s line was already beginning to lose cohesion, a gap emerging between Sosius’ forces and the centre, and the centre having been stretched to support Antony’s flank. It was at this point that the battle began in earnest across the line. Catapults and ballistas fired the first salvos, joined by archers, slingers and javelinmen as the ships grew closer together before finally ramming into each other. Utilising their greater numbers, Agrippa and Octavian’s ships would exploit gaps in Antony’s line and use multiple ships to attack one of Antony’s vessels from numerous sides, grappling them in order to keep them in place. The result was almost similar to mini sieges, Antony’s ships being assaulted from all directions and trying to fend off the attackers. Meanwhile, the lighter liburnae of Agrippa and Octavian would dart among the larger ships, ramming when possible and quickly disengaging, looking for targets of opportunity. It was a brutal battle, with neither side seeming to be able to gain an advantage. And then everything changed. Cleopatra’s squadron, which had so far not engaged at all in the battle, suddenly darted forward. With both sides engaged across the entire length of the line, Cleopatra led her ships through a gap in Agrippa’s line unopposed and made for open sea. Antony, having seen the manoeuvre, quickly transferred into a smaller ship and followed in Cleopatra’s wake. Many of Antony’s ships attempted to follow, throwing various bits of weaponry into the sea to try and make themselves lighter. Some were successful, but others were surrounded by Agrippa and Octavian’s forces and captured or destroyed. It is often thought that the battle ended when Antony and Cleopatra left the battlefield, but in reality, much of their fleet continued the fight for hours afterwards. In fact, they put up such stiff resistance that Agrippa and Octavian gave up trying to capture the ships and resorted to setting them on fire. Those on the lower decks were effectively trapped before suffocating in the smoke, while those on the upper decks were burnt alive or leapt into the water, where they either drowned or, at least according to Cassius Dio, were eaten by sea creatures. By 8 pm, the battle was over. What Happened? So why did Cleopatra do what she did? Our sources for Actium are thin, but the two most detailed ones, Plutarch and Cassius Dio, give damning accounts, the former painting Antony as a lovestruck fool, and the latter dismissing Cleopatra as a coward. Both of these sources were pushing a pro-Octavian narrative. Cleopatra is rarely given unbiased treatment, Dio frequently referring to her as an “accursed woman” who fled the battle simply because it was in her nature as an Egyptian and a woman. This xenophobic and misogynistic view has led modern historians to be cautious of Dio’s assessment and suggest other possibilities. Barry Strauss, for example, thinks that it is a certainty that Antony and Cleopatra had planned the move together. In his opinion, Antony knew that his situation was dire and that he had little chance of winning, so he committed to saving as much of the fleet as possible. If this was indeed the objective, then it would have to be said that Antony and Cleopatra were rather successful, saving maybe a third of their fleet as well as the treasury. It has also been suggested that Cleopatra was acting purely on her own initiative, that she considered the battle to be going against Antony and rather than risking her ships needlessly, she made the decision to withdraw her forces independently. Antony then saw Cleopatra’s squadron leaving the battle, realised that the battle would be hopeless without them, and so followed suit. Lastly, scientists have conjectured that Cleopatra’s squadron may have been trapped in ‘dead water’, which prevented them from moving and that, by the time they freed themselves, the battle was already turning against them and so they abandoned the battlefield. The truth is simply impossible to know for sure today. However, when one considers the strategic ability of Antony, the numerous breakout attempts beforehand, and the decision to lead the treasury onto Cleopatra’s ships, Strauss’ theory that it was a coordinated breakout appears the most likely. In any case, Agrippa had won yet another crucial victory for Octavian. It is a testament to Octavian’s mastery of propaganda that the months-long campaign waged by Agrippa to strangle Antony’s forces is given little attention and that Octavian would be credited with the victory. In reality, the Actium campaign was Agrippa’s masterpiece. Though fighting an enemy better funded and better supplied, Agrippa had managed to cripple Antony’s gigantic force before it had even taken to the battlefield by slicing its arteries at Methone and elsewhere along the supply line. Every move Antony had made had been countered by Agrippa until Antony had been forced to give battle on Agrippa’s terms. Agrippa was, however, happy to allow his friend to take the credit. Agrippa was a military man, Octavian a political one, and though Agrippa had achieved the victory, it was Octavian who would be able to utilise it to change the course of history. In the immediate aftermath of the Battle of Actium in September of 31 BC, two-thirds of Antony’s fleet was either captured or destroyed, but his army was still in the field. Antony’s orders were for them to march to Macedonia and then cross back into Asia Minor. Antony himself, however, would not lead them, a testament to how slim he considered their chances of success. Octavian’s army shadowed Antony’s 19 Legions weakened by disease and lack of resources. No fit to do battle, the army’s leader, Canidius, gathered what riches he could and fled to Egypt, abandoning his men. With few other options available, the Legions made a deal with Octavian, and the entirety of the army surrendered to him without a fight. In exchange, Octavian spared all of the rank and file and many of the equites and Senators who had sided with Antony. There were some, however, who were too politically dangerous to be kept alive, chief among them Cassius Parmensis, one of the last two surviving assassins of Caesar, and Gaius Scribonius Curio. This last figure was the son of the Curio who had once served as one of Caesar’s commanders in North Africa, and, more importantly, of Fulvia, the ex-wife of Antony. Fulvia had proven to be a fierce supporter of Antony, helping to wage war in Italy on his behalf, and Octavian was not taking any chances that her son might follow her example. The mass surrender of the army did result in some significant problems for Octavian, however. Firstly, was the large amount of allied Eastern rulers who had now fallen into Octavian’s purview. Many of these, particularly the more insignificant ones, were deposed and replaced, while the more powerful kings, such as Amyntas of Galatia and Archelaus of Cappadocia, were allowed to remain in power. Octavian was sending a clear message that the East now had a new master, whilst avoiding too much destabilisation in the region. The second, and perhaps even more importantly, was that Octavian now had tens of thousands of men that needed food, water and, just as importantly, payment. At least four of the Legions were retained, but the rest, approximately 60,000 men, were disbanded and sent back to Italy. Octavian had, for years, been strapped for cash and, having failed to take the treasury of Antony and Cleopatra at Actium, he could do little more than make promises of payments to these troops. He was well aware that this would eventually be a problem and so Agrippa was sent to Italy along with the veterans to try and keep things under control for as long as possible. Agrippa, along with another of Octavian’s close friends, Maecenas, were both given copies of Octavian’s signet ring allowing them to conduct official business on his behalf. With much of the hard fighting already done, Octavian probably left these two to maintain affairs in Italy while he finished up operations in the East, ensuring that he would be able to take credit for the final defeat of Antony. Agrippa and Maecenas had been given an impossible task, however. Shortly after the veterans’ arrival in Italy, there were rumblings of mutiny. Agrippa, for all his popularity and success, was not the man who had made promises to the soldiers and so they were forced to call Octavian back to Italy personally to handle the matter. Sailing in the midst of winter from Asia Minor to Brundisium, Octavian and his small escort fleet were caught in a tempest, sinking some of the ships. By pure luck, Octavian was on one of the ships that survived with only its rigging and rudder destroyed, and he made it to Brundisium a couple of days later. At Brundisium, Octavian was reportedly met by almost the entire Senate as well as thousands of equites, all keen to show their fealty. There were also thousands of the mutinous veterans. Octavian met with them and reaffirmed his promise of payment, as well as giving orders to parcel out various pieces of land to them. Communities in Italy that had supported Antony were displaced and moved outside the peninsula with the veterans given their lands instead. Moreover, Octavian also went so far as to put his own property up for auction to help raise funds. Whether or not anyone had the courage to actually buy anything from him is not recorded, but the gesture served its purpose and the veterans were, for now, pacified. This was only temporary however, and Octavian was now against the clock. He needed to take Egypt and the vast treasury hoarded there or else face mass mutinies in Italy which could be disastrous for his ambitions. Antony and Cleopatra would not, however, make this an easy task for him. In the immediate aftermath of Actium Antony had gone to Paraetonium in North Africa to secure command of four Legions he had previously posted there, while Cleopatra returned to Alexandria. Upon her arrival, Cleopatra immediately began gathering as much wealth from Egypt as possible, including stripping temples, and bringing it all to her Mausoleum in Alexandria, whilst simultaneously sending out envoys desperately looking for allies. Antony, meanwhile, sent messengers to the Legions at Paraetonium under the command of Lucius Pinarius Scarpus who had served as a Legate under Antony during the Philippi campaign and had minted coins on his behalf, hailing Antony as imperator. He was also a nephew of Caesar’s, however, and thereby a cousin of Octavian. Evidently, word had reached Scarpus of his cousin’s victory at Actium and so when Antony’s delegates arrived requesting he hand over command of the Legions, Scarpus had them executed, along with those in his staff who disagreed with the decision. When Antony appeared in person to take command, Scarpus simply refused to allow him in, forcing Antony to give up the endeavour. Scarpus would be well rewarded for his betrayal, Octavian later appointing him as governor of Cyrenaica. For Antony, on the other hand, it was one of his lowest moments. A year ago, he had been one of the most powerful men in the world, capable of mustering hundreds of thousands of men and rallying dozens of kings to his banner: now he was unable to take command of just four Legions and was humiliated by an old friend and subordinate. According to Plutarch, Antony was so depressed by the state of affairs that he tried to kill himself, but was prevented from doing so by some of the few friends he had left with him and returned to Alexandria. Whether Plutarch’s claim is true or not is hard to say. Plutarch certainly dedicated a significant amount of time talking about Antony’s depression, including a report that Antony built himself a secluded pier on the Pharos island where he lived in solitude, emulating the misanthropic Timon of Athens, but some of these claims appear almost too farfetched to be believed. If Antony did do such things, then it is possible, as American historian Barry Strauss suggests, that it was not act of depression, but instead propaganda by Antony to highlight how many friends had betrayed him and to try and shame them. Whichever the case may be, Antony was by no means giving up, both he and Cleopatra still had cards left to play. They built up what forces they could, including enrolling two of their sons into the junior ranks of the army, hoping to bolster support, and the ships that had survived Actium were prepared to continue the war at sea. The two also had contingency plans, one of which was to sail to Hispania and stir up dissent there as the sons of Pompey had decades earlier, another of which was to build a fleet in the Arabian Gulf which would provide a route to Egyptian allies in India if needed. This ambitious plan was thwarted, however, by Arab tribes from Petra who burnt the fleet on the instigation of Octavian’s governor in Syria. Nevertheless, the couple kept looking for angles. Numerous bribes, and assassins, were sent to Octavian, none of which succeeded but that kept him occupied and slowed him down. Moreover, envoys were sent to Octavian from Antony and Cleopatra together, and from both separately. Behind Antony’s back, Cleopatra supposedly sent Octavian a crown and sceptre, effectively offering to become a vassal in exchange for her and her family’s safety. Octavian accepted the gifts and publicly proclaimed that if Cleopatra abandoned her armies and kingdom, he would consider sparing her. In private, however, he made a separate offer: Cleopatra would be spared and allowed to stay a vassal monarch if she killed Antony. The latter, for his part, gave up the last of Caesar’s assassins, Turullius, who had taken refuge with him, and offered to live in exile as a private citizen in Athens. Octavian promptly had Turullius executed and ignored Antony’s other offers. Dio even claims that Antony offered to kill himself in exchange for Cleopatra and their children’s safety, but it is hard to say how accurate this is. For Octavian’s part, he still needed to tread carefully. The wealth of Egypt was gathered in Alexandria under Cleopatra’s watchful eye and he could not risk her fleeing with it or worse destroying it entirely. As such, Octavian was cautious to always respond to Cleopatra’s appeals with various offers of clemency and, some sources claim, even went so far as to send messengers saying that he was in love with Cleopatra. He would need to ensure Cleopatra always had hopes up until the moment that he could seize control of the treasury. Plutarch paints a tragic view of the mood in Alexandria. Antony and Cleopatra disbanded their social group of so-called Inimitable Livers and replaced it with the society of “Partners in Death”. All too aware of the approach of Octavian’s armies, the couple and their friends partied late into the nights, each one presumably counting the days until Octavian’s arrival. Meanwhile, Cleopatra began testing numerous poisons to find the ones that acted the fastest and were the least painful. Plutarch should be taken with a pinch of salt, but it is likely that his writings did reflect a genuine feel at the time: everyone knew that it was only a matter of time before Octavian’s forces arrived, and then it would be a matter of choosing to die on the battlefield or by their own hand. By now, Octavian was ready. To the West of Egypt, he sent Cornelius Gallus to take over command of Scarpus’ 4 Legions, while he marched a separate force of tens of thousands through Syria, planning to attack Egypt from two sides. Antony in turn marched his army with naval support to Gallus. Once again, he tried to appeal to the Legions to rejoin him, but Gallus drowned out his appeals with a fanfare of trumpets. Frustrated, Antony attempted an attack from both land and sea but he was quickly repulsed. In all likelihood, Antony’s force was smaller than that of Gallus and the attack was one of near desperation. In any case, Antony was forced to return to Alexandria empty handed. Meanwhile, in the East, Octavian’s forces had taken the stronghold of Pelusium, an important strategic point that Antony had banked on securing his eastern flank. While some sources do say that Octavian took it by force, others say that it was handed over by agents of Cleopatra to try and ingratiate herself with him. Whatever the case may be, Octavian was able to advance quickly and reached the outskirts of Alexandria just 10 days later, in the summer of 30BC. As at Actium, Antony tried his best to keep searching for new angles to victory. He led his cavalry out of the city in an audacious sally against Octavian’s cavalry that was still exhausted from their march, routing them and chasing them back to Octavian’s camp. Ultimately though, it was of little consequence save for a boost to morale. Antony even went so far as to challenge Octavian to single combat, an offer that Octavian answered saying that Antony had many ways to die. By this point, Antony had exhausted his options. Diplomacy and espionage had failed, the escape plan to India had been foiled, he had been unable to amass more Legions to his side, and the chances of him defeating Octavian in the field were slim to none. Nonetheless, Antony steeled himself for battle one final time and marched out of the city with what was left of his army and navy. In all probability, he knew that victory was next to impossible and had instead decided to go down fighting taking as much of the enemy with him as he could. The forces lined up, Antony’s infantry on the high ground, cavalry on the flanks and the navy hugging the coast. Just before the battle was to commence however, Antony’s entire cavalry defected to Octavian, leaving Antony with just his infantry. Still determined though, Antony ordered the navy to engage Octavian’s ships while he and his infantry fought against Octavian’s Legions. As the ships drew close however, they too deserted Antony, raising their oars in salutation to the opposition. Antony and his infantry were quickly defeated and forced to retreat back into the city. Antony had been deserted yet again and denied the glorious end that Antony had probably been seeking. Upon hearing of the defeat, Cleopatra barricaded herself within her own Mausoleum with the treasure of Egypt and a handful of attendants. Messengers were also sent to Antony informing him that Cleopatra was dead. Precisely who sent these messengers and why is unclear: perhaps there had been a genuine error with people assuming that Cleopatra had already killed herself, or perhaps Cleopatra had sent the messengers personally, possibly hoping that Antony would kill himself after hearing the news. Whichever the case, Antony believed the message. He ordered his slave to kill him, but the slave refused, killing himself instead. Antony took up his sword and stabbed himself in the abdomen, but the wound did not kill him. Badly wounded, Antony appealed to those still around him to finish him off, but they fled the scene; the last in a string of betrayals and desertions. His cries of pain were heard throughout the palace until Diomedes, Cleopatra’s secretary, arrived with orders to bring Antony to Cleopatra. Antony was shocked at the news that his queen still lived and was carried to her Mausoleum. With Cleopatra unwilling to open the gates, Antony was instead hoisted up and inside the as-of-yet unfinished building by pulleys. Cleopatra was apparently devastated when she saw him, tearing her clothes, scratching her face and breasts and smearing her face with his blood. Antony comforted her as best he could, and died in her arms. For Octavian, things were now incredibly delicate: Cleopatra was at her most vulnerable, and yet he needed to get access to her and the treasure before she could kill herself or destroy all the wealth. As such, he first sent a subordinate that Antony had been close with, Proculeius, to negotiate with her. Cleopatra was clearly on her guard, though and rebuffed him. Proculeius then requested the help of Gallus, who approached the gate of the Mausoleum and once again engaged Cleopatra in negotiations. Whilst he did, Proculeius took a ladder and snuck into the Mausoleum with a couple of servants. They were spotted by one of Cleopatra’s attendants who shouted a warning to her, Cleopatra taking up a dagger to kill herself, before being restrained by Proculeius. The queen and treasure of Egypt were now all in Octavian’s hands. Cleopatra was effectively kept under house arrest in the Mausoleum. She was also under suicide watch, with Octavian being careful to make sure she was eating and drinking properly. After about a week of confinement, Octavian met her in person, probably for the first time. What happened in this meeting is largely unknown. Cassius Dio says that Cleopatra tried to seduce Octavian with portraits of Julius Caesar on clear display to try to win him over. Plutarch, on the other hand, writes that Cleopatra tried to appeal to Octavian’s pity, laying still in mourning with her self-inflicted injuries clear to see. Given what the ancient writers claim about the cunning nature of Cleopatra, either scenario is plausible. Octavian left the meeting assured that Cleopatra was intent on surviving the war and would thus form a part of his triumph in Rome. This, however, had been precisely what Cleopatra intended. With his guard lowered, Cleopatra was able to smuggle in the means to kill herself. Precisely what this was is, again, unknown, with Plutarch and Cassius Dio both saying that no one can know for certain. Multiple early sources do, however, claim she used venomous snakes to kill herself, smuggled in water jars or in a basket of figs. At the same time though, the sources are explicit that no wounds were found on Cleopatra, which in turn suggests she may have ingested poison. In either case, she had sent a final message to Octavian requesting to be buried alongside Antony. Immediately, Octavian sent men to stop her, but by the time they burst into the room, Cleopatra already lay dead along with her attendants, the last of the Ptolemaic dynasty. The deaths of Antony and Cleopatra marked the end of the final civil war of the Roman Republic. The two hold a confusing and often contentious place in history. Antony, in particular, is often maligned as a drunk, incompetent and foolish, a damning assessment that does not quite stand up to scrutiny. As a soldier, he was a brilliant leader of men demonstrating courage and clear thinking in disastrous situations, such as the retreat in the Atropatene campaign. As a military strategist, he was not comparable to a man like Caesar, but he was certainly talented and competent: the fact that he was one of Julius Caesar’s most trusted captains is proof enough of that. He was also an excellent politician. It is easy to forget that when the war broke out, hundreds of equites and Senators, including consuls, sided with Antony, not Octavian. Moreover, Antony was able to hold together the East and its myriad of petty kings and leverage all the resources of the East against Octavian. His adoption of Hellenic and Eastern customs was used against him supposedly showing him as being decadent, but in reality, he shows a cunning man who knew how to act the role expected of him. Even Cassius Dio, largely hostile to Antony, credits him as one of the greatest Romans of his day. He was, of course, a flawed man. He was a better military subordinate than the supreme commander, and though he could be creative and adaptable on the battlefield, his grasp over grander strategy was less strong, as shown by the Actium campaign. He arguably also allowed his love for Cleopatra to cloud his judgment on occasion. It must be recognised, however, that Antony has been the victim of some of the greatest propagandists in history, first Cicero, then Octaivan, and centuries later, Shakespeare, and so much of his true character may now be lost to time. Similarly, it is also important to note that Antony had the misfortune of going up against Octavian, arguably the finest politician Rome produced, and Agrippa, one of Rome’s most talented generals. No one should be judged too harshly for losing to such titans, and against lesser opponents, Antony may well have been victorious. Cleopatra’s reputation tends to swing violently from being viewed as cowardly, manipulative and conniving person, to a nigh infallible political mastermind. The reality, as is so often the case, is likely somewhere in the middle. By all accounts, Cleopatra was a cunning politician who used her position as queen of Egypt to make her one of the most powerful individuals of her time. As queen, she was well-liked by her people and managed to become one of the most successful Ptolemaic rulers. She was intelligent and creative, arguably outplaying Octavian in her final moments, deciding the nature of her own death. Ultimately, she was bested by Octavian but, once again, there is little shame in losing to such an opponent. Undeniably, though, her power derived largely from her relationships with men like Caesar and Antony, using her charm, wit and sex to draw such individuals to her and enjoy the benefits of their status. While such actions could be described as manipulative, it also needs to be recognised that such methods were one of the few ways that women in the ancient world could wield power. It could also be argued that, while Antony was the source of much of her power, he was ultimately a poisoned chalice and Cleopatra made an ultimately disastrous decision in tying herself too closely to him. It also needs to be recognised though that, as with Antony, the ancient sources were largely biased against Cleopatra, resulting in many unanswerable questions surrounding her and her true nature potentially being lost to time. What can be said for certain is that Cleopatra inherited a relatively weak position as queen of a heavily indebted and divided Egypt, and managed to leverage her position to being a major player in world affairs, an impressive feat by itself. The deaths of Antony and Cleopatra left Octavian as the indisputably most powerful man in Rome and, in all probability, the world. The huge amount of treasure taken from Egypt allowed him to pay off all the debts he had accumulated throughout the war and made him rich beyond measure. 14 years after the assassination of Caesar, the cycle of civil wars that it had begun was finally over. It was a turning point in the lift of Octavian. For the last decade and a half, he had been ruthless in his pursuit of power, leaving death and destruction in his wake. Now, having outplayed all his rivals, he could afford to be magnanimous and generous in victory. He could be Augustus. Though Antony and Cleopatra were dead, one major threat to Octavian's power remained: Caesarion. Though Julius Caesar had never officially recognised the child as his own, he had allowed the boy to be named after him. Many did believe in his fatherhood, and Antony had publicly endorsed it. In all likelihood, these rumours were indeed true, meaning that Octavian was the adopted half-brother of Caesarion, giving Caesarion a possible claim to the now-deified Julius Caesar's legacy. Moreover, though he was only 17, Antony had already proclaimed Caesarion the pharaoh of Egypt, and Cleopatra had him enrolled as part of the army. These proclamations had been intended to establish him as a powerful ruler in his own right, but they instead painted a target on his back. Octavian could suffer no rivals, certainly not one who could challenge his position as Caesar's heir. In the words of Octavian's advisor, Didymus: "too many Caesars is not good." The boy would need to die. Cleopatra had already seen this coming, and before Octavian's forces reached Alexandria, she sent her son down the Nile, with the likely aim being that he would eventually find refuge at the courts of allied kings in India. Precisely what happened next is not entirely clear. Dio simply says that Octavian's agents were able to catch up to him and capture him on the road. Plutarch gives a more tragic account. In his version, Caesarion is betrayed by his tutor, who lures him back to Alexandria under the pretext of Octavian, who keeps him as a puppet ruler. Naively, the boy returned to the city and was immediately seized. Around the same time, his step-brother, the 18-year-old Antyllus, the son of Antony and Fulvia, was also taken. He, too, had been betrayed by his tutor and had taken refuge in the Temple of the Divine Julius Caesar in Alexandria, begging for mercy before being dragged out by Octavian's men. Both Antyllus and Caesarion were executed on the same day, just weeks after the deaths of their parents. This left the three children of Antony and Cleopatra: the 11-year-old twins Alexander Helios and Cleopatra Selene, and the infant Ptolemy Philadelphus. Caesarion and Antyllus, though young by modern standards, were men in the Roman world and had both held positions of political and military authority. These three, however, were helpless, and Octavian knew well that publicly executing children would do little to endear him to the populace. They were, for now, spared. Octavian extended this same mercy to the inhabitants of Alexandria and Egypt, sparing them. Many minor kings and princes of the East had been captured along with the city, and Octavian used them as leverage to rearrange some of the kingdoms in the East to his liking. While in Alexandria, Octavian also toured the city, including visiting the tomb of Alexander the Great. When 33-year-old Caesar saw a statue of Alexander, he is said to have broken down in tears at the thought that, by his age, Alexander was the most powerful and famous man of his age, while Caesar himself was yet to achieve anything. One cannot help but wonder what Octavian, himself the same age as Alexander was when he died, thought to himself when he considered his own achievements. In any case, Octavian supposedly had eyes only for Alexander as, when the Alexandrians offered to show Octavian the tombs of the Ptolemies, however, he declined, saying: "I came to see a king, not corpses". The economic power of Egypt was such that Octavian was easily able to take vast amounts of wealth, enough to pay all his soldiers, debts and more. This power also presented a problem, though. Egypt was now an official province of Rome, which would mean that it would need a governor appointed by the Senate to rule over it. This would easily be the most wealthy province at that time, so whoever governed it would have huge amounts of power, enough to potentially threaten Octavian's position. His solution was simple: rather than being managed by a Senator, Egypt would instead be governed by an equites picked by Octavian personally and who would thus be subservient to him. Effectively, Octavian would rule the province by proxy. This annexation of Egypt also marked a turning point in history. The Mediterranean had been the fighting ground for many great empires over the centuries, but now the entirety of the sea was enclosed by a single Empire. The Romans would now start to refer to it simply as Mare Nostrum, Our Sea. Having settled affairs in Egypt and made a short tour of the East, Octavian began his journey back to Rome, returning there early in 29BC. News of his victory and the deaths of Antony and Cleopatra had, of course, already reached the city, and the Senate had wasted no time proclaiming their loyalty to Octavian in as clear terms as they could. Hundreds of Senators, including Consuls, had flocked to Antony's side at the start of the war. Now, they voted for any honours for him to be revoked, memorials destroyed, and his birthday declared a cursed and unlucky day. Simultaneously, they voted endless honours for Octavian, including celebrations on the anniversary of Actium every four years and making his birthday a public celebration. Octavian accepted many of these, though he was always careful to refuse those that were too egregious. Indeed, some of the suggestions were so outrageously extravagant that it seems likely that Octavian had agents deliberately suggest them in order for him to refuse them graciously such as the suggestion that the entire populace of Rome should welcome him whenever he entered the city. If this were indeed the case, then it would certainly have been a tactic that Caesar, with his famous refusal of the crown, would have approved. Most important among these initial honours were three triumphs awarded to Octavian, one for Dalmatia, one for Actium and one for Alexandria, to be held back-to-back across three consecutive days. Octavian, masterfully propagandistic as always, was careful not to portray any of these as victories over other Romans, instead making Cleopatra and the Egyptians the focal point of the last two triumphs. During the Alexandrian triumph, an effigy of Cleopatra on her deathbed was paraded. Her youngest child, Ptolemy, does not seem to have survived the journey to Rome, but Alexander and Cleopatra had and were made to march behind the effigy of their mother, dressed up as the son god Helios and the moon goddess Selene, respectively. It was customary for the Senators and consuls to meet the Triumphant general outside of the city and then lead him into the city. On these occasions, though, it was Octavian who walked ahead of all the Senators and magistrates. It was a clear indicator of the new status quo, with Octavian as the first among equals. After the triumphs, huge games were held, and hippos and rhinos were displayed in Rome for the first time. Furthermore, the Doors of Janus, ceremoniously kept open during times of war, were also closed to mark this new period of peace. Rome was, in fact, still engaged in wars with frontier tribes and kingdoms, but Octavian was not one to let such an unimportant detail as the truth get in the way of a prime moment of propaganda. Octavian was also hugely generous with his newly amassed fortune. 400 sesterces, roughly a half-year wage for a legionary, was given to 250,000 citizens, and an entire year's wage to 120,000 veterans. The Civil Wars resulted in a huge number of Legions being raised across the Roman world, and by 29BC, there were as many as 60. Octavian had just over half of these disbanded, cutting the total number down to 27 and purchasing vast amounts of land to settle the demobilized soldiers, taking care to make sure they were widely spread out to prevent any one area becoming too powerful thanks to the number of veterans present. In addition to trimming the Legions, Octavian also trimmed the Senate, which had swelled in numbers over the years. 200 were either expelled or pressured to leave. Any remaining senators were men who effectively owed their position to Octavian. In 28BC, Octavian took the consulship for the 6th time, along with Agrippa. It would prove to be an important year in Octavian's career as he began to distance himself from the ruthless young man with divine ties that he had been for so long, instead crafting an image of a humble, generous and unassuming statesman. He ordered silver statues that had been made in his likeness melted down and took a particular interest in restoring and refurbishing 82 temples throughout the city. The great temple that Agrippa had been sponsoring, which was originally intended to be dedicated to Octavian, was changed to be dedicated to all the gods instead, and its rebuilt version survives today as the Pantheon. Octavian tied himself even closer to Agrippa, by having his niece marry him, thus making the two men related by marriage. Together, they embarked on a popularity campaign of sorts, quadrupling the grain allowance and giving magnificent gifts to many Senators. They were so generous that, combined with their earlier gifts of money to hundreds of thousands of people, they inadvertently caused significant inflation. Nonetheless, their popularity soared, and this same year, Octavian received the honorific title of princeps senatus, the first senator. This had been a traditional role within the Republic for centuries but had lost much of its significance after Sulla's reign. Octavian effectively revived the traditional office and gave it a new meaning, more akin to first citizen, rather than just the first senator. Most notably, during this year, Octavian and Agrippa announced that the national emergency that had been declared in 43BC was now over, and the laws and rights of citizens were restored. It was a precursor for what was to follow. On the 1st January 27BC, Octavian entered the Senate to make one of the most important speeches in human history. He began by highlighting how powerful he was. He had all the money, the loyalty of all the Legions, more power and influence than any man had ever had in Roman history. It would, he pointed out, be so easy for him to use just a fraction of those resources and seize power on his own in entirety. He had, he claimed, never wanted any of this power, but circumstances demanded to take up the mantle, and he did what was needed for the good of Rome. But now, he had avenged Caesar and restored order. Octavian had achieved what he set out to do. And so addressed the Senate as follows: "The gods as my witness, I who have so many brave soldiers and devoted allies, who holds supreme power within the Pillars of Hercules, who possess cities and provinces in every continent, at a time when there are no enemies abroad or at home when you are all at peace, are strong and united and would yield to me, I, despite all of this, voluntarily and by my own design resign so great a dominion and gave up these vast possessions." The most powerful man in the world would willingly give all his power back to the Senate and the people and retire as a private citizen. It was masterfully done. Some in the Senate knew Octavian's cunning and knew what he was truly doing, but there were many who truly believed him. Out of these, some were genuinely disappointed as they really did think that Rome needed one man at their head to govern them. The ones who thought a return to a true Republic was best were just as nervous. After all, even as a private citizen, Octavian would still have the entirety of the Senate in his pocket and would be outside the political establishment. Octavian had effectively check-mated them all. Whether motivated by fear, greed, resignation or genuine support, there was only one course of action to take. In short order, the Senate unanimously implored Octavian not to retire and take power for himself. Graciously, Octavian refused, but the appeals kept coming until, eventually, Octavian gave in and allowed himself to be forced back into government. The powers given to him in this First Settlement, as it is now called, were extraordinary. Octavian would now, by law, be appointed to one of the Consulships yearly. He was also given a 10-year governorship of an extended province that constituted the entirety of Hispania, Gaul, Cilicia and Syria. Egypt would remain a special province governed by an equites appointed by Octavian. It was no coincidence that these provinces also contained the majority of the Legions, giving Octavian direct control of 20, while the Senate had just 6. He was also to be awarded a new title. Octavian had initially considered taking the name Romulus to show himself as the founder of a new Rome, but upon deliberation, he thought that this was too unsubtle. Instead, he would take a more unique title: Augustus, meaning 'revered one'. The ruthless Octavian had forged the path to power, but now it would be the merciful and magnanimous Augustus who would wield it. From an outside perspective, it may have seemed that Augustus, as he would now always be known, had indeed largely restored the Republic. The Senate still appointed magistrates as they always had been, laws were proposed and passed in the traditional way, and, though Augustus' powers were quite extraordinary, they had been legally assigned. In practice, though, Augustus ruled almost the entirety of the Republic. His power, at the moment, rested upon three pillars. The first was his position as consul, which allowed him to speak in the Senate, propose bills, granting him legitimacy. The second was his powers as governor and which, by extension, meant control of the majority of Rome's Legions, always giving him the subtle threat of military force if necessary. The last, and probably the most important, pillar of power was his network. This power was unofficial and nebulous, but it effectively consisted of all the gifts, political favours, patronage and appointments that Augustus had made, which put anyone in any position of power in his debt. The Romans called this auctoritas, a combination of prestige and influence. In many ways, one could think of the Rome of this era as a shadow puppet: it looked and acted like a Republic, but it was Augustus who controlled the strings. The Republic was, for all intents and purposes, dead. The only real vestiges of Senatorial power left were in the provinces Augustus had allowed them to govern, and in some of the more senior magistrate positions, such as the other consul. Even these, however, would eventually be stamped out. In 24BC, Marcus Primus, the governor of Macedonia, a Senatorial province, declared war on a neighbouring Thracian kingdom, without Senate approval. The Senate put him on trial to answer for his action, and Primus defended himself by saying that Augustus had ordered the attack. This was dangerous. Augustus had no legal authority over a Senatorial province, and the accusation threatened to shatter the façade and show Augustus as the sole ruler of Rome. Augustus flatly denied the charges, and Primus was found guilty of treason. Shortly after, the men who had led the trial were implicated in a mysterious conspiracy against Augustus and put to death. The whole affair had shown that, while Augustus' powers were enormous, they were not quite universal. This would not do. Thus, in 23BC, a Second Settlement was made between Augustus and the Senate. In this Settlement, Augustus streamlined his powers and made them more universal. His powers as governor were expanded and made more flexible. He still retained power over the original provinces assigned to him, but he was also given authority over all other governors. Though men appointed by the Senate would still govern Senatorial provinces, these governors would now be junior to Augustus, who could intervene in any province if he so desired. Traditionally, the powers of governors ended as soon as they crossed the Pomerium, the sacred boundary of Rome. This was no longer the case for Augustus, and his powers as governor were extended to exist within the city as well. Lastly, he was given Tribunal powers for life. The office of Tribune of the Plebs was, in the traditional functioning of the Republic, a rather junior one, but it held the important power of being able to propose legislation, as well as the ability to veto any laws. Augustus now completely controlled the Roman world. His extended and extraordinary governorship gave him power throughout all the provinces, and his tribunal powers allowed him to dictate politics in Rome in any way he saw fit. As a result, Augustus willingly resigned the consulship and never held it again, aside from on a couple of ceremonial occasions: it was no longer needed. The office of the consul, which had been the most important office in Rome for centuries, was now almost entirely powerless, entirely eclipsed by Augustus' powers. Though he never took any monarchical title, he was now, in every sense, the Emperor of Rome. In 49BC, Caesar's Civil War had begun. Caesar's power over three provinces and command of 10 Legions had been considered far too dangerous by the Senate of the time, who had demanded he relinquish his powers. After 5 years of civil war, Caesar emerged with even more power and, as a result, was assassinated by the Senate in 44BC. It had been an ironic twist that the attack had happened in the Theatre of Pompey, Caesar dying at the base of a statue of his great rival. Now, 20 years later, the Senate gathered for every meeting in the Curia Julia, built by and named for Julius Caesar. In that building, Gaius Julius Caesar Augustus presided as the most powerful man in the Roman world, with control over every province and 27 Legions. Augustus had played the game perfectly. Whereas Caesar had arguably been too merciful and spared too many enemies, Octavian had been absolutely brutal in his pursuit of power and ordered the deaths of hundreds, including innocents. He had contended with some of the most illustrious figures of the ancient world, including the likes of Brutus, Cassius, Cicero, Sextus, Lepidus, Cleopatra, and Antony, and emerged triumphant. As Augustus, there were now none that could threaten him. Powers beyond imagining had been voluntarily and legally given to him, powers that put even those of Caesar to shame. And yet, Augustus was hailed as one of the greatest Romans in history. For centuries after his death, people would pray that new Emperors would be as blessed and fortunate as Augustus. Memories of what he had done to gain power faded, and Augustus' reputation became one of humility, piety and wisdom, a reputation that he still holds today. His life was a masterclass in politics, and, without a doubt, he was one of the most talented, cunning and clever statesmen in human history. When Augustus had begun his career, the Republic was broken. With his assistance, it became the bloody and tyrannical Second Triumvirate. Now, under his guidance, Rome had become something else again. The Roman Empire had begun. The next season of this series will talk about what Augustus did for the rest of his career and how his extended dynasty, called Julio-Claudian by historians, ruled after him. If you don’t want to miss that and many other historical videos, make sure you are subscribed and have pressed the bell button to see them. Please consider liking, subscribing, commenting, and sharing - it helps immensely. Recently, we have started releasing weekly patron and YouTube member exclusive content, consider joining their ranks via the link in the description or button under the video to watch these weekly videos, learn about our schedule, get early access to our videos, access our private discord, and much more. This is the Kings and Generals channel, and we will catch you on the next one.

Channel: Kings and Generals

Views: 443,458

Keywords: how, became, enemies, parthia, atropatene, campaign, crassus, carrhae, pompey, mylae, parthian, pompeian, invasion, war, octavian, antony, xanthos, brutus, cassius, civil, battle, pharsalus, roman empire, julius caesar, animated documentary, documentary history, ancient history, kings and generals, world history, military history, full documentary, history channel, decisive battles, history documentary, ancient rome, documentary film, roman history, caesar, philippi, methone, actium, alexandria, augustus

Id: OgoEPs3FxaM

Length: 276min 22sec (16582 seconds)

Published: Sun May 05 2024