Alexander III of Macedonia, known commonly
as Alexander the Great, is one of the most fascinatingly complex figures in history. In the course of just over 10 years, he conquered
the largest Empire the world had yet seen, spread Hellenic culture from Greece to the
borders of India and, in the process, changed the course of human history. For over 2,000 years, his life story has been
analyzed, written and rewritten. He began as a young king of Macedonia and
then developed into a hero and god during his own lifetime. After his death, his legend increased still
further, becoming the founding hero of many successor kingdoms and the ultimate aspirational
figure for politicians and military leaders across the Greco-Roman world. During the Middle Ages, he was viewed as a
romantic figure of a bygone era, a paragon of chivalric values of virtue. Later still, he was viewed as a tragic figure,
a Greek tragedy made real in a man who succeeded purely off the back of his own ambition and
drive before dying tragically young. Today, views of Alexander are more nuanced. Widely acknowledged as one of the greatest
military commanders in history, Alexander is also recognised as being a list of contradictions. He could be as vicious and brutal as he could
generous and kind, he was a forward thinking rationalist but also superstitious and paranoid,
he was in some ways terrible, and in other ways, truly great. In this video, we will tell the story of Alexander
from his first days as King of Macedonia to his conquest of Persia. One part of Alexander’s success was technological:
he inherited strong weapons, and developed strong tactics. In this spirit, here are some ways to use
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his invasion of the Achaemenid Empire, Philip II of Macedonia died to an assassin’s dagger,
leaving his ascendant kingdom to an uncertain future.The crown passed on to his 20 year
old son who had already proved himself both in court and on the battlefield, Alexander. This young king inherited three key things
from his father: firstly, the new Macedonian army with its stalwart phalanx and brilliant
cavalry. Secondly, a core of experienced and disciplined
marshals. Finally, Alexander inherited a Macedonian
bridgehead in western Asia Minor manned by 10,000 troops under generals Parmenion and
Attalus. But these inheritances were tenuous and to
keep them Alexander would have to fight for them. The first order of business was Attalus. Upon Philip's death, his most ardent opponent,
Demosthenes of Athens, had reportedly sent letters to Attalus urging him to overthrow
the young Alexander. Attalus himself was a long-term foe of Alexander,
but was not yet ready to make a significant play. In an attempt to save himself, he passed the
letters from Demosthenes to Alexander insisting that he had done nothing to instigate the
collusion. Alexander, however, was not appeased and had
Attalus executed, simultaneously sending agents to Asia Minor to secure Parmenion's loyalty
through promises of command and authority. Philip’s death had also left the wider geopolitical
situation incredibly unstable, triggering anti-Macedonian rumblings in the tenuously
allied Greek states, particularly Thebes and Athens, as well as unrest in subdued tribal
areas such as Thrace and Illyria. At this point it is worth making a quick comment
on terminology throughout this series. Alexander and the Macedonians were a Hellenic
people, as were the citizens of the Greek city-states. The Macedonians were, however, a politically
separate group and that divide between Macedonians and those from the Greek city-states is an
occasionally important one to make. As a result, this series will refer to people
from ancient Macedonia as Macedonians, and those from the Greek city-states as ‘Greeks’. When referring to both groups, they will be
referred to as Hellenes or Hellenic. Although advised by Antipater, an experienced
general who had served under Philip, to remain cautious, Alexander, as he ever would, instead
chose boldness and audacity. He grabbed 3,000 handpicked cavalry and sped
south along the coastal road in order to reassert royal authority. Arriving at the Vale of Tempe, Alexander found
the pass between Mount Olympus and Mount Ossa held against him by a strong Thessalian force,
who told the king to halt while they decided whether or not to admit him. Unwilling to sit by while this recalcitrant
vassal blocked his path, Alexander had his men carve steps into the seaward side of Mount
Ossa, rode his entire force over and came up on the Thessalians from behind. He was quickly acknowledged as their overlord
after that, and moved on unhindered. With blistering speed, Alexander rode south
and, at Thermopylae, was proclaimed hegemon of the largely symbolic Amphictyonic League. Then, before the Greeks even knew what was
happening, the Macedonian king materialised outside Thebes, shocking the proud city and
assuring its temporary submission. Athens, which always chafed under Macedonian
rule, nevertheless sent envoys north assuring Alexander of its loyalty. The Greek city-states had underestimated Alexander's
boldness, daring and ability and had been caught off-guard. As a result, Alexander convened the League
of Corinth and was elected hegemon, just as his father had been, before returning to Macedon. All that in the course of two months. The winter leading into 335 BC was spent giving
the Macedonian army a crash course in mountain warfare. Now that Greece had been dealt with, Alexander
needed to neutralise the rowdy tribes of Thrace and Illyria, so that they were not a threat
at home during the upcoming Persian invasion. When spring of 335 arrived, Alexander advanced
north from Amphipolis at the head of 12,000 heavy infantry Pezhetairoi, 8,000 lighter
infantry and 3,000 cavalry. Arrian states that the Macedonian army first
faced real Thracian opposition at ‘Mount Haemus’, ‘where the lower slopes of the
mountain rise through a narrow defile’. This was probably the modern Shipka Pass. There, a substantial force of Thracians occupied
the high pass, fronting their defensive position with a wagon fort. But Alexander, prescient both to his own weakness
and the Thracians’ offensive bent, realised that it was their plan to send the wagons
crashing into his locked phalanx. He warned the heavy infantry of this and carefully
instructed them how to deal with the situation. With that taken care of, Alexander ordered
the ascent - archers off to the right, phalanx regiments in the centre and his hypaspists
on the left. As predicted, the Thracians sent their wagons
careening down the mountain straight at the tightly packed Macedonians. Following their king’s instruction, the
phalangites calmly broke formation and opened gaps to let the wagons go by harmlessly if
terrain allowed, and lay prone with their locked shields above their head if not. Not a single soldier was lost to the Thracian
ploy and the Macedonians rose to their feet with a cheer, morale at a high. With the primary threat dealt with, Alexander
ordered the right flank archers to take up position in front of the phalanx, where they
repelled a number of weak Thracian attacks by loosing arrow volleys. When the heavy troops, whose advance was eased
by the archers, reached the lip of the pass, they easily dislodged an enemy whose armour
and weaponry was nowhere near as good as theirs. 1,500 tribesmen were killed, but a significant
number more managed to escape. Captured women, children, equipment and goods
were sent back to raise much needed funds. Descending onto the Danubian plain, and the
land of the Triballians, Alexander encamped three days' march from the Danube at a tributary
known as the Lyginus. Syrmus - King of the Triballians, had been
sending scouts to keep an eye on the Macedonian army’s movement ever since their incursion
began. Realising he had to take action, the chief
withdrew a large part of his population, warriors, women and children, to a large island in the
middle of the Danube. Alerted to this suspicious population movement,
Alexander pushed his army in that direction. However, he had only just set off when the
king had his line of retreat and communication cut by a second Triballian force, which slipped
in behind. Decisively turning about, Alexander found
this contingent in the process of encamping near the Lyginus. Hoping to lure the Triballians into the attack,
Alexander initially sent forward only his missile troops to harass them while keeping
his phalanx and cavalry hidden in the trees. The Thracians, peppered by arrows and slingstones,
quickly marshalled their force to chase off the missile troops and charged, just as Alexander
had planned. The Macedonian phalanx attacked the centre
while Alexander's cavalry, including the famous Companions or Hetairoi, charged the enemy’s
flanks. The battle was over in moments and was a decisive
victory, with Arrian reporting that the the Thracians lost roughly 3,000 while Alexander
suffered just 54 dead. These numbers are certainly questionable,
but it is clear that Alexander's attack was overwhelmingly successful. Three days’ march later and Alexander reached
the Danube directly opposite Syrmus’ island refuge, known as Peuce. There, as planned, he rendezvoused with a
small squadron of warships sent from Byzantium, manned them with heavy troops and archers,
and launched an attack on the island. Unfortunately for the Macedonians, a mixture
of dogged resistance, limited avenues of attack and a fierce current led to the failure of
this attack. Seeing he was getting nowhere, Alexander withdrew
the ships to the southern bank. By that time, a formidable band of 10,000
nomadic Getae infantry and 4,000 horsemen had gathered on the far side of the Danube. Rather than seeing this as a threat though,
Alexander saw an opportunity - smash the Getae and the island might well surrender out of
sheer terror. But his army had to cross the Danube, and
his small fleet was not enough. So, Alexander ordered that every single native
canoe and craft be gathered up, and that floats should be made from tents stuffed with hay. Thus provisioned with such a makeshift fleet,
that night, masked by the darkness, Alexander boldly ferried 4,000 of his infantry and 1,500
cavalry across the Danube. Successful, he disembarked them on a section
of the north bank which was masked from the nearby Getae by tall fields of grain. Just before dawn, the king drew up his forces
with infantry in front, to flatten the grain with their sarissae, and cavalry behind. The moment Alexander’s strikeforce broke
cover from the grain, the king personally charged his 1,500 cavalry straight at the
Getae, while the terrifyingly disciplined Macedonian phalanx went forward in lock-step. Impacted by the fearsome companion cavalry
and faced with the pincushion phalanx, the Getae collapsed and fled to a nearby town,
four miles from the river. But, hotly pursued by the Macedonians, the
semi-nomadic Getae mounted as many civilians as they could and fled onto the steppe. After leading his triumphant troops back to
camp on the south shore, Alexander’s prediction became reality. Syrmus and his Triballians, awed into submission
by this display of martial prowess, sent envoys of capitulation to the king. At about the same time, an embassy of tall
Celts arrived desiring Alexander’s friendship. The king asked these veritable giants what
they were scared of, hoping they would say his name. Much to Alexander’s disappointment, they
instead famously remarked that they feared that the sky would fall on their heads. Evidently not everybody found Alexander as
awe-inspiring as he hoped, but he nonetheless sent them off as friends. With the potential danger posed by Thrace
adequately cut down, the Macedonian army marched south via the Shipka Pass. Rather than turning south, Alexander pivoted
west and entered the domain of his ally - King Langarus of the Agrianians who had accompanied
the king on campaign with his force of deadly Agrianian skirmishers. There, he learned that three Illyrian rulers
- Cleitus, Glaucias and a prince of the Autariantes were in revolt against him. But for the moment, all of the king’s enemies
were scattered. So, leaving his faithful Agrianian colleague
to deal with the Autariantes2, Alexander sped to assail Cleitus’ mountain stronghold at
Pelium before the Illyrians could join forces. The plain on which this citadel stood, dominating
the Apsus valley, was surrounded on three sides by densely wooded hills which could
only be traversed by a narrow pass. It was hard to get in, but also hard to get
out. The moment Alexander marched his army onto
the plain before Pelium, its defenders withdrew to safety behind the walls. Such freedom of the land allowed the Macedonian
king to encamp and begin pulling forward his siege equipment. It was a rare tactical blunder for Alexander
which committed his army to the siege thus leaving his rear exposed. Sure enough, less than 24 hours later, Glaucias
and his Taulantian relief force arrived, occupying strong positions on the wooded heights encircling
Pelium and trapping Alexander. In need of supplies, the king dispatched the
baggage train and a mounted escort under Parmenion’s son, Philotas, to forage near the hills. Noticing this, Glaucias shifted his forces
and almost encircled Philotas, but Alexander reacted swiftly. Moving to Philotas’ aid with a picked force
of Agrianians, hypaspists and 400 cavalry, the king managed to save his comrade and send
Glaucias back onto the hills. Despite this small win, the fact remained
that the Macedonian army was in a bind, caused entirely by the king’s hasty miscalculation. If Alexander attempted to withdraw through
the narrow pass now, there was a danger that Cleitus’ Pelium garrison would assail his
men from behind. If he stayed where he was, unable to gather
supplies and ringed by enemies, the result would be inevitable destruction. To his credit, Alexander thought fast and
came up with a ploy. He drew up the sarissa phalanx into a mass
formation 120 ranks deep, flanked by 200 cavalry on either side. Then the king had his highly disciplined infantry
conduct drills. At a signal the phalangites would’ve, in
perfect unison, raised their sarissae to vertical, before lowering them to horizontal. Like a programmed machine of war, they pivoted
right, left, back and forth again, without a word being uttered. Disconcerted and enthralled by this unprecedented
display of martial prowess, the Illyrians were not ready when Alexander gave his final
signal. Suddenly, the infantry clattered their spears
against their shields and raised a war cry. At the same time, the left flank of the Macedonian
hetairoi seamlessly formed into a wedge and charged a portion of Glaucias’ men guarding
the hills. The demoralised Taulantians, taken aback by
the charge and the noise, mostly abandoned their hilltop positions and withdrew into
Pelium. Taking advantage of the opportunity his maneuvering
had created, Alexander marched his army towards an escape route - a ford in the Apsus just
east of Pelium. He secured a hill overlooking it without resistance
stationing 2,000 arches and agrianians on this high ground as a rearguard and ordered
the hypaspists to cross first, followed by the phalanx. Realising their quarry might be about to escape
the trap, the tribesmen turned, descending on the crossing point. But Alexander, the companions and Agrianians
valiantly protected it for long enough that siege catapults could be set up on the far
side, where they began bombarding the Illyrians, the first recorded use of siege weapons as
field artillery. This use of ‘field artillery’ and covering
fire from archers allowed the crossing to be completed, and all of a sudden, the Macedonians
were free. Not having lost a single man in extricating
his army and not content with just running away, Alexander withdrew a few miles from
the Pelium area and waited, sending out constant scouting parties to see what Glaucias and
Cleitus were doing. After three days of general recuperation,
a reconnaissance force returned with good news. Believing Alexander was gone, the Illyrians
were strung-out, encamped without sentries, fortifications or trenches3. Sensing that an opportunity was ripe for the
taking, Alexander assembled a crack force of hypaspists, archers, Agrianians and 3,000
phalangites and went on the attack. Under the cover of a dark night, the Macedonian
king moved back into the valley and, with his Agrianians at the forefront, assaulted
the unsuspecting Illyrians on a narrow front. It was a slaughter. As Arrian relates: “Some they killed in
their beds, others they took without difficulty as they tried to escape. Many were caught and killed on the spot, many
more as they fled in panic and disorder.” Cleitus, his entire army cut down or scattered
by an enemy he thought long gone, fled to Pelium, set it ablaze and then fled to refuge
in Taulantian territory with Glaucias, whose forces suffered a similar fate. Our primary sources do not detail exactly
where Alexander went next, but Peter Green believes that the Macedonians marched up the
county to a crossing in the Tscherna River, where they reunited with a victorious Langarus. With news of victory, however, the Agrianian
king brought Alexander ill tidings from Greece. Many Greek city-states had always harboured
resentment for their Macedonian overlords, Thebes and Athens in particular. Revolt had been bubbling for some time, but
when rumour began to circulate that Alexander and his entire army had been killed in Illyria,
key players in the Greek city-states, most notably Demosthenes of Athens, began to call
for an uprising. Thebes need little convincing. They seized the opportunity, killing both
senior Macedonian officers stationed there, besieging the Macedonian garrison on the Theban
citadel, the Cadmea, and raised the standard of rebellion. This was no spontaneous revolt, however. Demosthenes had likely been planning the revolt
for a number of years and had even managed to secure Persian funding. It was with this funding that Theban exiles
were able to take up arms and return to their home city, overthrowing the Macedonian garrison. To make matters worse, there is also archaeological
evidence to suggest that the Thebans also supported Alexander’s cousin, Amyntas, as
a rival claimant for the throne. Alexander knew that he was needed in Greece
to crush the revolt personally, but he also needed to make sure that the political situation
in Pella was under control. As such, he turned to the one person that
he could trust completely: his mother Olympias. On Alexander’s instruction, Olympias conducted
a purge of Alexander’s most dangerous political opponents, including Amyntas and Philip’s
wife Cleopatra. While Olympias consolidated his position in
Pella, Alexander gathered his army and moved over 30,000 troops 250 miles at a speed of
18 miles a day through rough mountain terrain,descended into Thessaly, passed Thermopylae and encamped
at Onchestus, in Boeotia. Not long after that, in September 335BC, he
and his grizzled army were taking up positions outside Thebes, much to the disbelief of the
city’s inhabitants. There was surely no way for an army of such
a scale to arrive with such speed. While the army had been approaching, the Thebans
had managed to convince themselves that Demosthenes was correct that Alexander was indeed dead,
and that the army was being led by one pf his generals, such as Antipater. Upon arriving at the city though, it became
clear to everyone that it was the Macedonian king himself in the flesh. Many Greek city-states had initially rallied
around the Thebans, with the Athenians and Spartans both throwing in their lot with them. Alexander’s arrival changed everything. The Athenians, in the midst of preparations
for war, decided to hang back and see how events would play out, while the Spartans
sent a force only as far as the Isthmus of Corinth. Soon, Thebes was left effectively stranded
and alone. Fortunately for Thebes, the king’s temper
had cooled and he was willing to be reasonable. Keen to reconcile with Greece so he could
look to his Panhellenic war against the Achaemenid Empire, Alexander merely demanded that two
of the uprising’s ringleaders - Phoenix and Prothytes, be handed over, and everything
else could be forgiven. The Thebans spat on this olive branch, making
a brazen counter-demand that Philotas and Antipater should instead be handed to them. Moreover, all who wanted Greece free from
this Macedonian tyrant should rally under the banner of the Great King and Thebes. As Alexander flew into a rage at this nerve-grazing
comment, Theban light infantry streamed from the gates and made lightning attacks on the
Macedonian siegeworks with ranged weapons, killing a decent number of the king’s troops
and even approaching his main position before they were repulsed. Night fell, passed and then the sun rose again,
at which time Alexander shifted his army south shifted his army to the south where the Cadmea
merged with the walls of Thebes. Here the Thebans had constructed two layers
of stockade to ensure the complete sieging of the Macedonian garrison and it was just
outside of these palisades that Alexander made his camp. The Thebans had freed slaves and armed as
many citizens as they could. These hastily mustered forces were assigned
to defend the walls of Thebes, while the more experienced hoplites and cavalry took up positions
within the palisades. What happened next is not entirely clear,
thanks to the contradictory nature of our sources, but a rough narrative can be established. Alexander split his army into three parts,
intending to use two to attack the stockade at various points and keeping one in reserve. The Thebans meanwhile marched part of their
force outside of the palisades, keeping another part defending the stockades. Seeing this, Alexander assigned one section
of his army to attack the Theban battle line while another attacked the defences. The fighting was fierce with little ground
being made, the Thebans successfully holding off the Macedonian forces and almost managing
to break the Macedonian line, forcing Alexander to commit his reserves. At some point in the battle, Perdiccas, one
of Alexander’s more talented generals, was able to force a way into the city, either
through the stockades or an unguarded postern gate. Perdiccas himself was badly wounded in the
fighting but his action allowed the Macedonians to begin flooding into the city. Upon hearing that the city had been breached,
the Thebans fighting at the palisade tried to withdraw into the walls but the chaotic
retreat led to many being trampled and the gate into the city becoming clogged. At the same time, the Macedonian garrison
from the Cadmea sallied out, attacking the Thebans from within. With the defensive line crumbled and the walls
breached, the Thebans staged a desperate defence in the streets of the city with individual
groups making last stands where possible. The Macedonians were ruthless, cutting down
any who stood in their way and, by the end of the fighting, 6,000 Thebans and 500 Macedonians
lay dead. The entire city of Thebes, a city which had
stood for centuries and was the setting for so many myths of the Greek world, was razed
to the ground, save for a few temples and the Cadmea, with the entire population being
enslaved. In Arrian’s account, this grim fate was
decided by anti-Theban allies of Alexander, namely the Phocians, Thespians and Plataeans. However, Arrian’s account was based primarily
on Ptolemy, another of Alexander’s more successful generals, and is often overly biased
in Alexander’s favour as a result. Other sources, such as Diodorus, make it clear
the decision was purely Alexander’s. It is difficult to say which is the more accurate,
but at the very least it can be said with certainty that if Alexander had wanted the
city spared, he had the power to do so. The sack of Thebes and enslavement of the
population was done if not on Alexander's explicit orders, then at least with his consent. It was a grim reminder that while Alexander
could be benevolent, charming and generous, he could also be brutal and ruthless. Thebes was one of the greatest cities in the
Greek world and her destruction would have been analogous to the destruction of a major
European capital today. It had served Alexander’s purposes perfectly,
however. Across Greece, anti-Macedonian sentiment was
quashed and any shouts of rebellion were quickly silenced. Compliance was the order of the day. Turning his burning gaze to Athens, which
had remained aloof despite having played an obvious role in the outbreak, Alexander coldly
ordered the great city to turn over ten strategoi who had ‘opposed his interests’. Instead, an Athenian known as Demades went
to Alexander and managed to persuade the king to forgive and forget, which he reluctantly
did. But this final clemency didn’t avail him
in the long term. With Thebes’ unprecedented and shocking
extermination, Alexander hammered the final nail into the coffin of his relationship with
other Greeks. ‘Outwardly they collaborated, with cynical
obsequiousness-’ as Peter Green tells us, ‘-But they never forgave him… After their first shocked terror had worn
off, the attitude of the Greeks towards Alexander hardened into a bitter and implacable hatred.” But for the moment, the king was not overly
concerned with that. After leaving behind him the smoldering pile
of rubble that was now Thebes, Alexander returned to Pella and gathered all the Macedonian magnates. Together, they began planning the invasion
of Persia1. During this meeting, the king’s advisors
counseled him to take a wife and sire an heir before departing. Alexander refused the suggestion, however. A marriage at this stage could have strengthened
his position in Macedonia, but also would have left behind a consort who could have
been manipulated against him. Similarly, if he left any heir in Macedonia
they would be raised away from Alexander and potentially turned against him. Moreover, Alexander’s ambitions lay in the
East: a marriage in the West would give him less bargaining power later down the line
if he needed it. Royal finances were also in a precarious state;
though Philp had been an excellent general and politician, he had cared little for Macedonia’s
economy and had left Alexander inheriting a large debt. A year of nonstop military campaigning put
further strain on the economy and so the king was forced to turn to his companions and nobles
for assistance. The propagandised account goes that Alexander
doled out sections of the Macedonian crownlands until the finances of each companion were
provided for. One of them - Perdiccas, is said to have asked
the king “But what have you left for yourself?” Alexander replied, “My hopes.” What the king was doing here, though, as Peter
Green bluntly points out, was borrowing money. Alexander was confident, however, that these
debts would be easily repaid with treasure soon to be taken from the Persian Empire. With the assembly thus concluded and all matters
prepared, Alexander, his companions, and the invasion army advanced through Macedonia and
Thrace via the route used by Xerxes I in 480BC, leaving Antipater as regent at home. As his invasion of the Achaemenid Empire begins,
it is worth going over what kind of army Alexander had at his command in 334BC. It was undeniably the most tactically and
technologically advanced military force of the age, a culmination of the ideas and advancements
made by some of the greatest military minds of the Greek world, including Epamninodas,
Iphicrates and Philip II, and borrowing tactics and strategies from various peoples such as
the Thessalians, Thracians and Greeks. This theme of adopting styles and manners
of warfare from other nations would be continued by Alexander throughout his career. The exact size of Alexander’s force varies
roughly between 35,000 and 45,000 depending on the source. Modern historians are similarly divided on
the matter, but it is possible to put together a general picture of Alexander’s force based
on what points are most agreed upon and using the source that gives the most detailed break-down
of numbers, Diodorus. A large proportion of the Macedonian standing
army, 18,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry, were kept in Macedonian under the command of Antipater
in order to check any further revolts from the League of Corinth . Nevertheless, this
still allowed Alexander to gather a truly formidable force for Persian campaign. 9,000 were phalangites, also called pezhetairoi,
literally foot companions, the sarissa armed backbone of the Macedonian army. These were broken up into battalions of 1,500
called taxeis, each commanded by one of the more experienced officers under Alexander’s
command. Supporting these were the elite hypaspists
under the command of Nicanor, a son of Parmenion. Whether these prestigious troops were armed
in the phalangite or hoplite style is still debated, but they seemed to have fulfilled
a flexible role and may have varied their arms depending on the situation. Rounding off the heavy infantry were 5,000
hired mercenaries armed in hoplite fashion and, lastly, 7,000 similarly armed soldiers
drawn from the cities of the League of Corinth under the command of the grizzled veteran
Antigonus the One-Eyed. Alexander’s propaganda pushed the idea of
the Persian invasion being panhellenic, and these 7,000 men were seemingly the fulfilment
of that idea. In reality though, Alexander never truly trusted
the League and these 7,000 were more akin to hostages to ensure good behaviour amongst
the Greek city-states and were used as garrisons and reserves, never as front line soldiers. Supplementing the heavy infantry were 7,000
Thracians, such as Odyrsians and Triballians, who were armed in the old peltast style and
fulfilled a light-infantry and skirmishing role, and lastly 1,000 archers and Agrianians. The Agrianians in particular were renowned
as expert light-infantry who have been called the ‘Gurkhas of the ancient world’ and
would prove to be one of Alexander’s most favoured units for missions requiring particular
stealth, courage and discipline. This infantry force was the Macedonian anvil,
the cavalry the hammer. The crowning jewel of this force was the famed
Companion cavalry, or hetairoi, 1,800 shock cavalry. Always stationed in the position of honour
on the right flank, this unit consisted of 7 squadrons of 200 under the command of another
of Parmenion’s sons, Philotas, and the royal squadron commanded by Alexander personally,
though he would often take direct command of all the squadrons when in battle. This royal squadron also contained Alexander’s
personal bodyguard as well as some of his closest friends, such as Hephaestion and Ptolemy. Supporting the Companions were the equally
formidable Thessalians. Armed in a similar fashion to the Companions,
they were often stationed on the opposite side of the battlefield on the left flank,
putting them under the direct command of Parmenion. Lastly among the cavalry were 900 light cavalry,
also called prodromoi, and 600 cavalry from allied Greek city-states. In total, Alexander’s force therefore consisted
of roughly 32,000 infantry and just over 5,000 cavalry. Accompanying the soldiery were auxiliary elements
such as siege-engineers, sappers, surveyors, administrators under a certain bookish Cardian
bureaucrat called Eumenes, and scholars who would study and document the exotic wonders
of the near-legendary ‘east’. Aristotle’s nephew and Alexander’s boyhood
friend Callisthenes also served as the king’s official historian. Twenty days and over three hundred miles later,
the Macedonians arrived in the Chersonese and prepared to cross the Hellespont. However, while Parmenion did the donkey work
and used 160 triremes from the League of Corinth to conduct a complex but unopposed crossing
from Sestos to Abydos, Alexander went south and crossed at Elaeus with a small force. According to one account, Just as the king’s
ship was about to make landfall in Asia, Alexander, clad in full armour, launched a spear into
the sand and thereby claimed the eastern continent as spear-won land. Making sacrifices to the gods and conducting
religious ceremonies the whole way, the king made a sojourn to the mythical city of Troy
taking a sacred shield from the temple there and partaking in a ritual for Achilles and
Patroclus with his own closest companion, Hephaestion. Alexander then went north with his entourage
and united with the main muster under Parmenion’s supervision on a plain near the town of Arisbe. Alexander marshaled the army to readiness
the following day. Then, almost certainly motivated by a mixture
of scouting reports and supply concerns, began a march eastward towards the satrapal capital
of Hellespontine Phrygia - Dascylium. Rather than taking the entire army, the king
left behind his 12,000 league and mercenary hoplites, perhaps suspecting their loyalty
if put up against other Greek mercenaries. Making good time with his core Macedonian
infantry and full 5,000 to 5,500 strength in horsemen, Alexander warned his men that
looting and burning en route would not be permitted, as this was Greek land under occupation. More deviously, the properties of a dangerous
Greek mercenary general in Persian employ - Memnon of Rhodes, were to be especially
respected in order to make the Achaemenids distrust him. The Achaemenid Empire was a colossal entity
of prodigious wealth, its dominions so vast that the Great King - a recently crowned Darius
III, did not feel it necessary to deal with such a petty frontier disturbance personally. Moreover, as Olmstead has suggested, a significant
part of the Persian army was possibly occupied in Egypt, having only recently quelled a revolt
there. Instead, several satraps from the western
provinces including Arsames, Spithridates, Arsites3, and several others mustered their
forces and met at Zeleia in May 334 together with Memnon of Rhodes, to take counsel on
the incursion. Fully realising just how lethal Alexander’s
meat-grinding infantry would be in the field and aware that the invaders were short on
supplies and money, Memnon gravely counseled the Persian satraps not to engage in a pitched
battle. Instead, they ought to enact a scorched earth
policy, burning crops, fodder, provisions, wells, and even burn villages down if necessary. By doing so, and opening a second front in
Greece using the Persian navy or by initiating another revolt, Alexander would have to scurry
back to Europe with his tail between his legs. This objectively shrewd advice meant possibly
unnecessary sacrifice on the part of Darius’ western satraps, and they balked at the prospect. Unwilling to torch their own lands and subtly
accusing the Greek sellsword Memnon of lapsing in his loyalty, the Persian governors universally
rejected the scorched earth plan and chose to fight it out. It is also possible that the satraps were
all too aware that the Great King had a reputation for scorning shirkers among his subordinate
rulers and weren’t about to suffer his ire for no good reason. A number of other factors may have contributed
to this choice, such as the Persian code of honour and internal politics. Satraps such as Arsites were used to getting
their own way, but Memnon, a Greek, owed his high position to Darius himself, rather than
them. Arsites in particular had reason to distrust
Memnon, as the latter held royally appointed estates in his own satrapy. Whatever the reason, the Persians mustered
their forces and marched west to a position on the River Granicus, set on facing Alexander. Following his departure from Arisbe, Alexander
took his smaller, mobile army up the Hellespontine coast via Percote and Lampascus before advancing
eastward. Arriving on the vast plain of which the Granicus
was the standout feature, the Macedonian army was arrayed in a standard preparatory formation
with two lines of phalangites in the center and the baggage train behind. Cavalry and light infantry screened the flanks
and served as reconnaissance troops in front. In the late afternoon, just before the Granicus,
Alexander’s scouts rode back and informed the impetuous king that a Persian army had
finally been sighted on the far side. This news prompted Alexander to redeploy his
forces in battle formation, a task he was swiftly able to accomplish due to the battle-ready
marching order. However, when the Macedonian army got to the
river, its generals quickly began having reservations about the prospect of immediate battle. Lined up atop the steep far bank were just
over 10,000 Persian satrapal cavalry from across the empire, roughly twice Alexander’s
total. Arsames and Memnon of Rhodes led Cilician
and Greek mercenary cavalry on the Achaemenid left, flanked to the right by Arsites and
his Paphlagonian horse, Hyrcanians under Spithridates, assorted mounted troops in the center, and
Bactrian cavalry to their flank. On the extreme right was Rheomithres leading
a contingent of mounted Median troops. As the Persians had ever since their empire’s
defeat in the fifth century Greco-Persian Wars, roughly 5,000 to 6,000 Greek mercenary
hoplites had been raised to serve as the satrapal army’s heavy infantry force. However, possibly because they had the same
suspicion of loyalty as Alexander had with his Greeks, the satraps positioned this hired
unit behind their front line of cavalry as a reserve force under the command of a Persian
known as Omasres. The rock-hard center of Alexander’s line
were six 1,500 strong brigades of the phalanx, led by Meleager, Philip, Amyntas, Craterus,
Coenus, and Perdiccas. To the right of the phalanx were Nicanor’s
3,000 hypaspists and then Philotas and Alexander himself at the forefront of 1,800 companion
cavalry, several hundred mounted skirmishers, agrianians, and some archers. 2,700 Thessalian, Thracian, and league cavalry
were on the left under Parmenion. Following the army’s deployment, Parmenion
rode over to Alexander’s position and counseled the king to delay any battle until the following
morning. A hasty and most probably failed attack over
such an obstacle as the Granicus now, he reasoned, would be a fatal blow to the entire expedition. However, if they waited until morning, the
Persians, observing Macedonian superiority in the infantry, might withdraw from their
position during the night and allow an unopposed crossing. Our sources disagree on what the response
was. However, most tell us that because of his
Homeric desire to achieve heroic status through great deeds or not wanting to buoy Persian
morale by hesitating, Alexander disregarded Parmenion’s cautionary advice, with Plutarch
claiming Alexander quipped that the Hellepsont would blush for shame if, having crossed that
strait, he would now be afraid of the Granicus, and prepared the army for an immediate attack. Clad in magnificent armour on the right wing,
he was easy for the enemy to see, and so a number of elite contingents under the satraps
shifted to oppose Alexander’s elite hetairoi hammer, hoping to kill him and end the incursion. The Battle of the River Granicus finally began
when the Macedonian king sent a mixed vanguard of prodromoi mounted skirmishers, Paeonian
light cavalry, a small unit of companions, and his agrianian favourites into the river,
with the outward aim of securing the far bank. However, facing some of the best Achaemenid
cavalry from the treacherous and slippery riverbed, they met predictably stiff resistance. Throwing spears and other pinpoint accurate
missile weapons rained down on the beleaguered advance force, causing terrible casualties
from a distance. Some of the satrapal units descended to meet
the Macedonian vanguard in melee combat in the riverbed itself, removing them from the
advantageous higher bank. This attack gradually drew in even more regiments
from the otherwise unengaged Persian line, disrupting the orderly formation on Arsites’
left and shaping the battlefield to Alexander’s requirements. With the enemy drawn out and exposed by his
sacrifice of the vanguard4, Alexander charged wholesale at the head of just under 2,000
companion cavalry, arrayed as it was in a wedge formation. Galloping into the river obliquely to the
right of the advance force and thereby meeting little resistance, the hetairoi and their
king were able to swing left and crash straight into the exposed Persian left wing in the
riverbed, where most of the enemy leaders were fighting. This struggle against the best Achaemenid
cavalry was, as Arrian relates ‘A cavalry battle with, as it were, infantry tactics:
horse against horse, man against man, locked together, the Macedonians did their utmost
to thrust the enemy once and for all back from the river bank and force him into open
ground, while the Persians fought to prevent the landings and hurl their opponents back
into the water.’ The companions’ discipline, skill, and armament
rapidly began turning the tide. In particular, the Macedonians’ efficient
use of the cornel wood xyston lance compared to the lighter spear of the Persian cavalry. However, despite this gradual forcing of the
Granicus on the Persian left, Alexander, in the thick of the fighting, became the target
of a concerted effort by the Persian leadership to kill him as the speartip of his forces
pushed their way onto the far bank. Accounts differ as to the nature of this clash,
but Arrian informs us that at some point after Alexander’s retinue penetrated the line,
his spear snapped and he was forced to get a new one from a bodyguard. Isolated on the far bank with just a few companions,
the king was quickly beset by several contingents of enemy cavalry. The leader of one - Darius III’s son-in-law
Mithridates, was slain when Alexander wheeled around and drove his newly-gotten spear into
the Persian’s face. It was only a moment later that another Persian
aristocrat - Rhoesaces, confronted Alexander and lopped off a part of his helmet before
himself being felled by the king’s lance. While locked in this mortal combat with Rhoesaces,
the latter’s brother Spithridates, satrap of Lydia, bore down on Alexander from behind
and prepared to deliver the coup de grace. The Persian’s sword was about to fall and
end the 21-year-old king’s life. However, at the last possible moment, an officer
known as Cleitus the Black swept in and severed Spithridates arm at the shoulder, saving Alexander
the Great’s life, the first of many near-death experiences for the young king. By that point, having inflicted fearsome casualties
and cut down many Persian commanders, the companions were getting the better of the
Persian cavalry all across the right wing. Furthermore, the Agrianian skirmishers managed
to breach the Persian formation’s integrity and get in among the beleaguered enemy horsemen. As this hinge point on Alexander’s right
was being hotly contested, Parmenion’s wing was charged by Rheomithres’ Bactrians and
Medes, but managed to resist the assault. In the center, the six taxeis of phalangites
and hypaspists advanced inexorably across the Granicus, ineffectually showered by the
Persian missiles. When it became clear that the companions had
punched straight through the Achaemenid left, the satrapal army broke in a wave of panic
reverberating from Alexander’s point of impact on the right all the way to Parmenion
on the left, who had managed to hold the Persian cavalry there. A number of gallant Achaemenid units fought
to the death in the river, while an equally great quantity, included among them Memnon
of Rhodes, used their mounted mobility to escape the field and ride to Miletus. They were able to do so easily because Alexander,
Parmenion, and the phalanx - which was now on the far bank as well, didn’t give chase
to them. Instead, the Macedonian cavalry wrapped around
the unengaged and now woefully outnumbered Greek mercenaries on either side, encircling
them while the phalanx lowered their sarissae for another fight. We are left with no concrete reason as to
why the satraps’ hired infantry didn’t march forward and join the main battle. It is entirely possible that Alexander’s
lightning assault and victory, which according to Professor Michael Thompson was accomplished
in less than an hour, took the Greeks by surprise and left them with no ample opportunity to
react in time. Unfortunately, we can never know for sure,
but what happened next is universally recounted. As if all of a sudden realising their dire
situation and probably believing that a fellow Greek king wouldn’t be too draconian, the
mercenaries petitioned Alexander for mercy. Rather than granting it though, the Macedonian
monarch assailed the Greeks en masse, butchering thousands of them in a hard-fought last stand. Aristobolus claims that here, Alexander was
“influenced more by anger than by reason In doing so, Alexander may have intended to
send a message, “if you are a Greek mercenary, do not fight for Persian gold or you will
receive no mercy”. Plutarch, however, considered the violence
to be needless and personally motivated, arguing that Alexander was “influenced more by anger
than by reason”. This was a fair point: by the time the fighting
was over, 3,000 Greek mercenaries were slaughtered, the remaining 2,000, including some Athenians,
being captured and sent back to Macedonia in chains to labor in mines there, while Alexander
had lost more troops here than at any other point in the battle. This cost had gained Alexander very little
aside from showing him as being rather brutal, a reputation he could ill afford among the
Greek city-states. In the future, Alexander would be more cautious
in his handling of Greek prisoners and never fail to miss an opportunity to show his magnanimity
towards them. Between 1,000 and 2,500 of the 10,000 Persian
cavalry had also fallen in the battle, together with almost a dozen named higher officers
and governors. On the victorious Macedonian side, casualty
totals were far lower. Taking into account the possibility of propaganda
to glorify the victors, our sources state that 100 to 120 cavalry were lost and only
30 phalangites. When one remembers that all the sources stress
how bitter the fighting in the river and against the Greek mercenaries had been, it becomes
apparent just how low these numbers are. However disputable these figures are though,
the strategic result was not. All of Asia Minor now lay open to the taking. After visiting the wounded and giving an honourable
burial both to his own men and the fallen enemy warriors, Alexander appointed his own
replacement satrap for Hellespontine Phrygia5, instructed him to maintain the general status
quo, and then moved south. Zeleia was taken and pardoned, while Parmenion
was sent with a flying column to take over nearby Dascylium, which had been abandoned
by its Persian garrison. Then, about eight miles short of Sardis, the
garrison commander6 and many other leading figures came to meet the Macedonians, in order
to surrender the fortress, treasury, and the city in its entirety to Alexander. From initial insecurity and near collapse
after Philip’s death in 336, Alexander had managed, in just two years, to crush an Achaemenid
army in open battle and occupy one of the great capitals of the ancient Near East. But that was just the first step. Far to the east, in the heart of his massive
empire7, Darius III began raising an equally massive royal force to confront the invading
Macedonian king himself. As Alexander considered his first victory
from a newly dedicated shrine of Zeus at the Sardis acropolis, looking out onto the great
continent beyond, he had to have known that the real challenge was about to begin. Reports of what had occurred at the Granicus
reverberated throughout Asia Minor with prodigious speed, and to immediate effect. At Ephesus, the mercenary garrison together
with one of Alexander’s exiled court rivals - Amyntas, seized a pair of warships and abandoned
their post, making their way to the great king’s court. Marching from Sardis, the victorious Macedonian
king captured Ephesus without resistance after a three-day march, before rendezvousing with
his navy and receiving emissaries from other Lydian towns offering submission. Intent on securing his conquests before advancing
inland, Alexander installed large garrisons in the area, made predominantly of League
troops and gave Parmenion and Alcimachus each a contingent of several thousand troops and
sent them off to ensure the capitulation of settlements throughout Ionia, Lydia, and Aeolia. Their remit was clear - Greek cities were
to have ‘democratic’ governments installed, oligarchies were to be deposed, local custom
remained unchanged and, crucially, taxes cancelled - a gesture which never hurts a new ruler’s
popularity. At this point, while he was concluding affairs
in Ephesus, Alexander received a number of important messages in quick succession. First came welcome reports that the governor
of Miletus - Hegisistratus, was prepared to surrender his city. Then came the definitely less welcome news
that a massive Achaemenid war fleet had been spotted near Rhodes on its way to reinforce
the area. Finally, sometime later, Alexander got wind
that Hegisistratus, newly inspired by the knowledge that reinforcements were en route,
had recanted his surrender. Realising he had to act swiftly to prevent
the city becoming a nigh-impregnable Persian fortress, Alexander sent riders to recall
his generals and then immediately marched south with what soldiers he had. The king’s League fleet of about 160 ships
under the command of another Nicanor, not Parmenion’s son, was sent ahead. Racing along the coast, it succeeded in arriving
at Miletus before the incoming enemy fleet was anywhere close, where it set down anchor
at the adjacent island of Lade. Not long thereafter Alexander arrived with
the army1 and occupied Miletus’ landward outer suburbs without resistance, before establishing
a blockade of the inner districts. Then, to reinforce his anchored fleet at Lade,
the king further fortified the island with Thracian skirmishers and a few thousand mercenary
soldiers. The massive Persian fleet finally approached
Miletus a full three days after the Greek fleet had made its base at Lade. However, despite a numerical superiority of
more than 2:1 and the empire’s expert Phoenician and Cypriot crews, the Persians realised they
would not be able to dislodge Alexander’s navy from Lade nor easily deploy troops to
bolster Miletus’ defence. The 400 Persian ships were therefore forced
to circumvent the Hellenic navy and anchor at an exposed, suboptimal position off Mount
Mycale, further from the city and cut off from any source of freshwater by parties of
Macedonian cavalry. With Parmenion and Alcimachus having returned,
Alexander made the decision to keep his inferior fleet on the defensive at Lade, and began
readying his siege weaponry and infantry to breach the city fortifications. As the king’s preparations were nearing
completion, a prominent citizen came out on behalf of the mercenary garrison to parley. According to this messenger, the garrison
offered Miletus as an open city open to both Persians and Alexander alike if only the siege
was lifted. Alexander’s unimpressed response was simple:
prepare yourselves for the fight. The city was simply too vital for Alexander’s
supply line for him not to have complete control of it. Macedonian ballistae and catapults began hammering
the fortifications, clearing sections of the wall, and inflicting structural damage while
battering rams advanced to create breaches up close. The main body of infantry was drawn up as
this assault was ongoing, standing ready in preparation to rush in and widen any gap made
in the Milesian defences. However, due to the strength of the garrison
and abundance of missile fire, the initial Macedonian attack was blunted with relative
ease. Arrian recounts how the nearby Persian fleet
were closing in on the besieged allies, but were prevented from rendering any assistance
by the quick actions of Nicanor who placed his fleet across the mouth of the harbor,
blocking any access to the city from the city. With the Miletians now completely isolated,
Alexander’s army attacked again, this time managing to break through the walls. Of the Milesian defenders, just 300 mercenaries
and a scattering of other warriors managed to escape to a steep-sided islet slightly
offshore. When they surrendered soon after, Alexander
granted them mercy he had learned at the Granicus, also sparing the Greek civilian population
of Miletus, but enslaving those who were foreigners. Unable to prevent the fall of a city it had
come to reinforce and successfully prevented from foraging onshore, the still formidable
Persian fleet2 sailed to Samos, restocked with whatever they needed and then returned
to Miletus, looming in open water close to the harbour entrance. Five Persian vessels were sent as bait to
lure Alexander onto the open sea, but a swift hit-and-run assault by ten Greek triremes
destroyed one of them and sent the other four running back to the main fleet. Unable to accomplish anything of use, the
great king’s armada weighed anchor and sailed south to Halicarnassus. With Miletus conquered, it was at this moment
in mid to late 334 that Alexander made the strategic decision to disband his fleet. Not only would such an unconventional course
of action relieve Alexander of having to bear the massive cost3 required to maintain said
ships but, in truth, he did not totally trust their Greek crews. Moreover, the king was pragmatic enough to
realise that he could never hope to match Darius’ naval strength on the water with
or without a fleet of his own. Just 20 Athenian triremes were retained to
ferry the army’s siege engines. Based on his army’s pitched battle at the
Granicus and siege at Miletus, Alexander judged that investing everything in a land campaign
was his best shot at success. His army was ‘master of the continent’
and now that there was no way to retreat, its troops would fight on even harder. Still, Persian seaborne might was a firm threat
that had to be dealt with, or it might expand the war to a second front in Greece or even
inspire rebellions at home. So, rather than attempting to oppose Achaemenid
naval hegemony in the eastern Mediterranean by vainly headbutting it with ships of his
own, Alexander instead devised a plan to ‘conquer the ships from the land.’ He would embark on a Herculean endeavour within
his already titanic campaign, marching inexorably down the Mediterranean coastline and capturing
coastal cities from which the Persian navy operated. The first victim of Alexander’s new strategy
would be Halicarnassus, where Mausolus’ eponymous Mausoleum was constructed a few
decades earlier. Halicarnassus had strong natural defences
on high ground, was heavily fortified, possessed a fantastic harbour, and had its garrison
swollen by native troops alongside several thousand mercenaries under Memnon of Rhodes’
command. This Greek general, who had risen to new heights
following the Granicus debacle, was now Darius’ official commander of Achaemenid efforts in
the western satrapies4. En route to this showdown with Memnon, Alexander
stopped at the greatest fortress in the region - Alinda, and was introduced to the exiled
princess Ada - Mausolus’ sister. Until just a few years before the Macedonian
invasion, this region of southwestern Asia Minor - known as Caria, had been ruled by
a native dynasty known as the Hecatomnids, who were, in turn, autonomous satraps within
the Persian Empire. Ada, a Hecatomnid princess, had been the rightful
heir before being deposed and exiled by her brother Pixodarus5 in 340. He died a few years later, allowing the Persians
to marry the late dynast’s daughter to Orontobates and install him as satrap6. Now, Ada asked the king for aid in taking
back her rightful position. Alexander was more than happy to take up Ada’s
cause and secure an ally in the area. Moreover, the two reportedly became very close,
Alexander even referring to Ada as ‘mother’ and Ada eventually adopting Alexander as her
son and successor. Ada was popular in the area and, By accepting
her plea and gaining her approval, Diodorus Siculus tells us that Alexander won allegiance
from many of the Carian cities. The king subsequently moved on Halicarnassus
and approached the city, guarded as it was by crenellated walls and fronted by a large
encircling moat, from the northeast. Alexander encamped half a mile from the eastern
Mylasa Gate and began preparing the siege. However, Persian naval supremacy had succeeded
in preventing the Macedonian siege train from landing, so Alexander was forced to improvise
until it managed to do so. Mounting his steed, Alexander led a scouting
party forward to have a look at the formidable defences they faced. Memnon was on him in an instant. When this scouting force approached, the Rhodian
general had his archers and artillery fire upon the Macedonians from his walls. Then, not giving the invaders a second, he
sent a sortie of skirmishers out to niggle at Alexander’s men with javelins and other
missiles. A quick counterattack by the king managed
to drive them back inside Halicarnassus, but Alexander nevertheless pulled back to camp. Several days after this initial probe, Alexander
assembled his usual crack force of companions, hypaspists, and Agrianians, supplemented them
with three phalanx regiments7, and led them around to the western gate. While his primary aim in this endeavour was
to scout out this side of Halicarnassus, there had also been whisperings from sympathisers
inside the nearby port of Myndus located just a few miles to the northwest, that the city
would be surrendered if Alexander came to take it that night. Its possession would make seizing Halicarnassus
that much easier providing Alexander with a nearby port through which he could transport
his supplies and siege equipment. Under the cover of darkness, Alexander’s
forces approached Myndus at midnight, the prearranged time. Upon his arrival though, he found the city
to be defended with no sign of the surrender that the Macedonians had been promised. Unwilling or unable to abandon the gambit
entirely, Alexander began sapping the walls in an effort to take the town by force. One of Myndus’ guard towers fell with relative
speed, but the prepared garrison fiercely resisted until reinforcements arrived from
Halicarnassus by sea. Having been prepared to simply walk into Myndus,
Alexander wasn’t ready for another extended siege and so withdrew to the Mylasa Gate back
at Halicarnassus, rejoining the bulk of his army. In what was a truly fortunate twist of fate,
the twenty Athenian triremes bearing Alexander’s siege train managed to evade Memnon’s ships
and unload the city-taking weaponry in a nearby cove. After a rocky start, things were, at last,
looking up for the Macedonians. As the siege engines were made ready, Alexander
sent his soldiers, under the cover of portable roofed sheds, to fill in large sections of
the outer trench with earth and stones. With the ground prepared, the first proper
assault on Halicarnassus could begin in earnest. While trundling siege towers and artillery
were used to batter the fortifications, battering rams and mining operations gradually undermined
sections of the east curtain wall. When the Macedonian undermining efforts managed
to collapse a section of wall or bring down a tower, Alexander would throw his infantry
at the section in an attempt to secure a breach. The Macedonian soldiery fought exceptionally
well in these engagements as they always would, but Memnon’s equally disciplined Greek mercenaries,
supplemented by thousands of native troops and wall-archers managed to keep the invaders
at bay with relative ease. So far so good, but Memnon and his command
council quickly understood that their enemy’s efforts were destroying the walls with disconcerting
efficiency. A proactive stance had to be made to prevent
disaster. So that same night, while builders worked
to patch up the previous days’ damage with makeshift, secondary fortifications, a commando
unit of Halicarnassus’ defenders under Memnon slipped out of the Carian capital unnoticed
and quietly approached the dormant Macedonian siege machines. Getting close, the Greek general attempted
to burn down and destroy Alexander’s towers, rams and artillery pieces. Unfortunately for his raiding party, its presence
was discovered by sentinels who quickly sounded the alarm. Macedonian reinforcements converged and a
blind, desperate clash in the dark ensued. Beleaguered, unsuccessful and having lost
170 men killed, Achaemenid forces were eventually forced into retreat, but the hard nighttime
struggle had also resulted in 300 Macedonian wounded. Having suffered such casualties, neither side
made a move for several days and were temporarily content to lick their wounds. This state of affairs apparently changed three
days later at the behest of two rowdy Macedonian infantrymen from Perdiccas’ regiment. In the process of drinking together, each
man boasted of his exploits and declared how brave they were. Amusingly and almost certainly because of
the Dutch courage, the contest escalated into these two enterprising warriors taking up
their weapons and moving out, intent on putting words into action8. Perhaps somewhat bemused by the odd attack,
some guards saw the Macedonians coming and sallied out to assail them, but were in turn
killed and driven back by the partially inebriated warriors. Made aware that some of their comrades were
in danger, more men from Perdiccas’ regiment marched to the fight, drawing even more defenders. This haphazard engagement grew and grew until
the Macedonians eventually drove the defenders against the half-destroyed Mylasa section
of the wall. Suddenly, with the eastern fortifications
in such a bad state, it seemed as though Alexander’s forces might actually get into the city on
the back of this deadly drunken brawl. Unfortunately for the troops who started the
whole debacle, Halicarnassus’ surprise was matched by most of the Macedonian army which,
being unaware of what was actually happening, did not press the attack in time, and Perdiccas’
men were repelled. Alexander’s late intervention prevented
their destruction. To protect the area, Memnon had a crescent
brick wall built, but this slapdash measure was clearly a weakness. Still, the whimsical nature of this event
disguises the fact that it was a lethal clash that claimed the lives of many on both sides. So many Macedonians were killed, in fact,
that Alexander sent a herald forward to ask for a truce so bodies might be recovered. Two of Memnon’s Athenian comrades - Ephialtes
and Thrasybulus, advised their leader to deny this request. Memnon, in a move which allows us to see some
of the man’s honourable character, allowed it anyway. No real timescale is given by which we can
judge the siege for sure, but the defenders had managed to hold the city for at least
several weeks. Knowing that they would need to go on the
offensive if they were to win the battle, the trio concocted a daring strategy. Handpicking 2,000 mercenaries, Ephialtes sallied
out of the city and attacked the Macedonian position. While half formed a phalanx and doggedly held
off the king’s infantry, the other half wielded brands and caused a ‘great conflagration’
among his siege engines9. Ephialtes’ surprise attack, ably assisted
by missile fire from the walls, was pushing back Alexander’s infantry. The situation became even more critical when
Memnon sallied out of the northern gate of the city with Persian reserves, striking the
Macedonian infantry in the flanks and rear. At this moment, beset on all sides, Diodorus
states that ‘even Alexander found himself quite helpless.’ It seemed as though the Persians were close
to achieving a great victory and breaking the siege. However, it was at this final juncture that
Alexander’s reserve battalion of grizzled veterans from Philip’s era, locked their
shields, lowered their spears, and entered the fray. These men smashed directly into Ephialtes’
spent ranks, an unbreakable shield wall, and ripped them to pieces. This action was enough to rally the rest of
the army who regathered and pressed the assault. In minutes following this intervention, the
Greek captain Ephialtes and hundreds of his soldiers were slain, leaving the sortie leaderless. Worse still was the psychological effect. The defenders had been on the edge of victory,
perhaps of winning the entire war. They were not prepared for another fresh foe,
and now they began routing. So panicked were the Halicarnassians at this
sudden turn of events that they closed the gates too hastily, trapping a portion of their
sally forces outside to be slaughtered against the ruined curtain wall. Over 1,000 of Memnon’s troops had been slain
in the risky action, and it hadn’t paid off. Still, Alexander, whose deployment of the
reserves had saved the day, cautiously pulled back to camp at nightfall. Unknown to him, the siege was over and he
had won. Inside the moonlit city, Memnon and Orontobates
took counsel and, taking into account all of their severe losses and the failure of
their final gamble, decided to give up a greater part of the city. Memnon installed the best of his remaining
soldiers in Halicarnassus’ seaboard citadels at Salmakis and the Arconesse before loading
the remainder onto his anchored and unchallenged navy, together with whatever movable supplies
he could get his hands on. Then, in a methodical, scorched earth attempt
to prevent Alexander from gaining too much from his conquest, the withdrawing Achaemenids
set fire to immovable stores, armouries, artillery, and houses next to the walls. It does not seem to have been a vindictive
act of wanton destruction against the civilian population, but seasonal autumn winds fanned
the flames and led to its spread over great areas of the ancient city. While Memnon raised anchor and embarked, Alexander
finally entered the burning city at midnight. At the king’s command, Macedonian regiments
marched respectfully through the liberated city, rescuing any inhabitant imperilled by
the fire and demolishing buildings to create fire breaks. Surveying the still-garrisoned fortresses,
Alexander had a wall built around Salmakis to prevent any sortie, but found himself unable
to do anything about the island strong-point of Arconesse. Leaving 3,000 mercenaries and 200 cavalry
to mop on Persian resistance in Caria, Alexander kept his promise and gave Ada the satrapy
before preparing to move deeper into Asia Minor. As he did so, the armies of Great King Darius
III were finally nearing readiness to the east. In the course of the next year - 333, they
would march west to the first great confrontation between the two greatest kings of the age
at Issus. Once affairs at Halicarnassus had been settled,
Alexander divided the army in two. Parmenion marched off to the north with orders
to secure the inland territories of Anatolia, while Alexander took the rest on an eastward
march along the coast, after which he planned to rejoin Parmenion in Gordium. Moving into Lycia as 334 passed into 333,
the Macedonians subdued and received the surrender of over 30 towns, including Telmessos, Xanthus,
and Phaselis. Following a brief spat with some Pisidian
hill-fort brigands, who reportedly burned their own families to death rather than have
them fall into Macedonian hands, Alexander passed into Phrygia and swiftly reached the
lynchpin town of Celaenae. As it possessed a nigh impregnable acropolis,
Alexander was forced to accept the defenders’ terms that if no relief arrived within a certain
period they would surrender. After personally waiting ten days, the king
decided to move on. To conclude matters at Celaenae, Alexander
appointed one of his most experienced and talented generals, Antigonus the One-Eyed,
the same Antigonus who had previously been commanding the League troops and would later
bec ome one of Alexander's greatest and most powerful successors. From Celaenae, Alexander marched north to
Gordium - the ancient royal seat of the mythological Phrygian monarch Midas, where he reunited
with Parmenion’s half of the army. It was also the location of the famous Gordian
knot, a fantastically complicated knot tied by Midas himself in such a way that it was
impossible to find the ends of the rope. Legend said that whoever could untie the knot
would become king of all Asia. Never one to pass up on such a propaganda
opportunity, Alexander rose to the challenge by either removing the lynchpin around which
the knot was tied or, the more popularly cited version, simply slicing through it with his
sword. Already, Alexander was showing himself to
be a shrewd ruler who understood the need to appeal to local customs in order to secure
his own legitimacy, and one who was not afraid to be bluntly pragmatic when needed. Fortunate events elsewhere were to grant further
credence to this newfound destiny… After his dogged albeit failed defence of
Halicarnassus, Memnon of Rhodes had finally been granted the Great King’s green light
to carry out the strategy he’d proposed before the Granicus - scorched earth and a
second front1. Darius also funneled his favourite Greek general
plenty of treasure, with which he energetically recruited another professional mercenary army
and saw to the maintenance of his 300 to 400 ship fleet. With this powerful seaborne force at his disposal,
Memnon launched an assault on the Aegean islands. Cos and Samos came over to the Persians, followed
by Chios and even the great port Mytilene on Lesbos. Meanwhile, the Rhodian’s agents and spies
went through Greece, priming the always-rebellious city-states to revolt against Alexander when
the time was right. In strategic command, Memnon seems to have
truly been in his element. All of a sudden, a Persian counter-invasion
of Greece looked entirely possible and Alexander’s overextension into Asia Minor seemed foolish
at best. However, at this moment of greatest danger
and Memnon’s highest point, the Rhodian general suddenly fell ill and died in summer
333. Alexander, who received the news at Ancyra
in May or June, was elated. The indirect second front plan was Memnon’s
own, and without its mastermind, the endeavour completely collapsed. Macedonia was safe. When the disastrous news reached Susa, Darius
III called together a conclave of senior advisors and allies to establish what exactly was to
be done. The majority of these Persian counsellors
advised Darius to confront Alexander now, in person - the troops would fight better
with their Great King alongside them. One of the detractors - a fervently anti-Macedonian
Athenian mercenary commander exiled by Alexander known as Charidemus, hotly argued that it
was sheer stupidity to risk the empire on such a gamble. An experienced general such as himself, he
argued somewhat self-servingly, ought to be sent to conduct the war. Darius agreed at first, but the throng of
Persian advisors balked at the idea and shouted it down, even accusing the Greek of wanting
to betray them to Alexander. Fiery-tempered Charidemus shot back, raving
about the Persian lack of fighting will and manliness. His tirade so offended Darius that the king
subsequently had Charidemus executed. From Susa therefore, the Great King marched
to Babylon, gathered his many vassals from across the empire, and summoned their armies. Meanwhile, at Ancyra, Alexander received the
altogether insincere submission of the provinces of Cappadocia and Paphlagonia before marching
southeast to the Cilician Gates, which was held by a small force of Arsames’ troops2. However, in a stroke of luck Alexander would
later recount as his greatest, Arsames and most of his men were busy burning and ruining
the Cilician plain in accordance to Memnon’s scorched earth strategy, allowing Alexander
to seize the mountain pass in a night attack. Realising what had just happened, Arsames
fled to rendezvous with the king and Alexander entered Tarsus on September 3rd 333. After jumping into the freezing Cydnus river,
the king was left debilitated by a bout of illness for several weeks. During this time, he sent Parmenion around
the Gulf of Alexandretta to scout out the situation and hold the crucial passes between
Syria, Mesopotamia, and Anatolia. Alexander’s condition worsened rapidly,
he developed a severe case of pneumonia and there was a serious concern that Alexander
would not survive. There was one doctor in Alexander’s camp
however, his friend Philip of Acarnia, who thought he would be able to treat the king
and concocted a medicine for him. Just before Alexander was about to drink this
tonic, a message arrived from Parmenion. It contained a grave warning that Alexander’s
doctors had been bribed by Darius and that they would soon attempt to poison him. Alexander read the letter carefully and then
passed it to Philip, drinking the medicine while his physician read it. Fortunately for Alexander, his friend had
been genuinely loyal and the king made a quick recovery soon after. However, one can not help but speculate as
to Parmenion’s intentions. Had the cautious general got word of a genuine
plot and attempted to warn his king, or were his motivations more sinister and he had hoped
that Alexander would refuse medical help? We can not say for sure, but certainly Alexander
must have pondered how trustworthy his second-in-command was. For now, though, Parmenion established a base
of operations at a small town called Issus and established that a massive Persian army
was occupying Sochii, beyond the Syrian Gates. Once Alexander had fully recovered, he marched
the entire army around the gulf. Perhaps acting on misinformation, the king
left his wounded at Issus before continuing south and arriving opposite the Syrian Gates,
where he expected Darius to come from. In a rare instance for Alexander though, he
had done exactly what Darius had wanted and had been outplayed. The Persian king, accompanied by his wife,
mother and children, as was Persian custom had already sent his baggage train to Damascus. With his now more mobile army, Darius made
a rapid move to the North passing through the undefended Amanic Gates and seizing Issus
and cutting off the hands of any Macedonian soldiers found there before taking up position
along the Pinarus River. Initially not believing that the Persians
were behind him, Alexander sent a galley up the coast to establish the truth. When the vessel returned with confirmation
that Darius was indeed at hand, the king immediately grasped the severity of his situation, It
had been a brilliant strategic move from the Persian king which left Alexander cut off
from his supply line and in a precarious position; to his south lay hostile territories and strongly
defended cities, to his north the Persian Army. With his supply line severed, Alexander had
little choice: he would need to turn north and attack Darius from the front and across
a river, a difficult task for any army. Alexander, who was about a dozen miles south
of the Persian position, fed the bulk of his army a hot meal in preparation for the coming
march. At the same time, the king sent mounted scouts
to scope out the road between the army and its destination. When night fell, Alexander marched his whole
army to the high ground at a pass known as the Pillar of Jonah, from where he could see
the Achaemenid campfires glimmering across the plain. The well-fed soldiery now also got the rest
and recuperation it required, sleeping for many hours. Just before daybreak, the army rose from its
slumber and began a disciplined march up the narrow coastal road. Although confined to columns at first due
to the terrain - with infantry units in front and cavalry behind, More Macedonian warriors
were gradually brought forward as the terrain opened up, slotting seamlessly into the formation. When Darius received word that Alexander was
closing in he sent a force of skirmishers and most of the cavalry to ford the Pinarus,
aiming to prevent the Macedonians interrupting or even seeing his deployment. It was probably around this time that Alexander
arrived opposite the stream with his infantry regiments lined up with the sea on his left
and foothills to the right. The majority of Alexander’s cavalry now
massed on the right flank and, all of a sudden, the long-awaited showdown was now imminent3. It is incredibly difficult to establish exactly
how many soldiers Darius III had with him at Issus in 333, a fact that makes charting
the course of the battle that much harder. Typically, hyperbolic ancient sources such
as Arrian and Plutarch estimate Persian strength as anywhere from 250,000 all the way to 600,000,
numbers which are clearly excessive. Modern scholars tend to be just as varied,
but the vast majority, notably Borza, Green, Worthington, and Hammond, agree on somewhere
between 80 and 100 thousand. King of Kings Darius III, manning the royal
chariot, was stationed in the centre behind the front line as Persian tradition dictated. Surrounding his immediate person were the
famous Persian Immortals - the royal bodyguard whose number never dropped below 10,000. Off to either flank were 10,000 Greek mercenaries
and further still were units of mixed Persian infantry known as Kardakes, fronted by archers. The second line was made up entirely of lightly
equipped levies. Now that the infantry was arrayed, Darius
brought his myriad cavalry back across the Pinarus. Our sources tell us of Medes and Hyrcanians,
but we can infer the presence of Paphlagonians, Cappadocians, Cilicians, Bactrians, Sogdians,
and even steppe nomads from beyond the frontier massing on the flatter, seaward side of the
battlefield. Another small Persian unit was sent to occupy
the hills beyond Darius’ extreme left flank to threaten the Macedonian right flank and
rear. As with his infantry deployment at the Granicus
a year earlier, Alexander’s main battle-line sarissa phalanx was divided into six brigades. They were led, from left to right, by officers
Amyntas, Ptolemy, Meleager, Craterus, Perdiccas, and Coenus. To the left of the standard phalanx were Cretan
archers and Thracian javelinmen, while to the right were the elite hypaspists under
Nicanor. They were flanked to the right by the Macedonian
king and his customary strike force - companion cavalry under Philotas, Paeonian light horse,
Agrianians, and archers, supplemented by the Thessalian division. His army was still about 40,000 strong in
total. Both forces were now prepared for the clash
to come, but Alexander saw two matters of concern that required attention. First and foremost was the overwhelming concentration
of devastating Achaemenid cavalry opposing Parmenion on the left. If the order of battle stayed as it was, Darius’
horse would simply sweep his army off the field. To remedy this, the king swiftly adjusted
his plan, sending the Thessalians across the battlefield to reinforce his second in command
as covertly as possible. Second but still troublesome were the Persians
positioned in the hills. Alexander dealt with them by detaching a force
of archers, slingers and Agrianians and light cavalry, and sending them to secure the heights.The
Persians did not put up any resistance however and were chased from the hills, Alexander
keeping 300 cavalry on the high ground while recalling the light infantry to secure his
flank. With his concerns dealt with, Alexander ordered
a slow, measured and deliberate advance to begin across his entire line, periodically
halting in order to bait Darius into attacking first. The Persian king did not fall for it, instead
of keeping his line solidly behind the Pinarus. At last, when the armies were about to enter
missile range, Alexander rode from one end of his line to the other, shouting words of
encouragement to the highest officer and the lowliest footman alike by name. He told the Macedonians of their valour and
Philip, the Greeks of the injuries Persia had inflicted upon them in centuries past
and the loot-oriented Thracians of the booty that was waiting just for them. According to Rufus, as Alexander galloped
back to his position at the head of his right wing, the Persian front raised a great cry
of battle, which was returned by the Macedonians with equal vigour. Then, almost simultaneously, both Darius’
massed cavalry on the seaward flank and Alexander’s strike force on the other side of the field,
together with the central Macedonian phalanx, launched their attempted hammer blows. It was now a question of time. Parmenion’s Thessalian and allied cavalry
was beleaguered and outnumbered and would eventually collapse, but would that crunch
point come before Alexander’s could win the battle? The warrior-king of Macedonia charged directly
across the Pinarus at the head of his picked force of companions and others, delivering
a critical strike to the units opposing him almost immediately. The xyston-wielding cavalry wedge first smashed
into the screen of Achaemenid archers, killing many and driving the rest back into the infantry
behind them. Without slowing for a moment, Alexander barrelled
on and smashed through the first line infantry as well, utterly collapsing Darius’ left
wing. Unfortunately for the king, the battle elsewhere
was taking a bad turn. Parmenion’s gallant horsemen were essentially
surrounded by the Persian cavalry and fighting a losing battle, but that was to be expected. More disconcerting was the situation in the
center of the battlefield. Perhaps drawn in the wake of their king’s
charge, some of the rightward phalanx regiments and hypaspists had drifted yet further to
the right, opening up a gap in the line. This, combined with the rough terrain near
the stream, diminished the integrity of the wall of Macedonian sarissa. Before the phalangites could regroup on the
far bank and reorder their formation, Darius’ highly trained Greek mercenary contingent
- thousands strong and armed with shorter spears that were better suited to such uneven
ground, came to grips with them. What ensued was a brutal slogging match - Macedonian
soldiers fighting tooth and nail to best their Greek enemies amid the steep, bramble-overgrown
bank of the Pinarus. The inflexible phalanx’s inexorable advance
proved itself exorable indeed. Noticing the newly opened gulf between Macedonian
infantry units, a force of Greek mercenaries attempted to drive into it and break the invaders’
phalanx apart. All of a sudden, the phalangites began withdrawing. The situation might have turned especially
sour if not for the prudent intervention of Ptolemy - son of Seleucus4, accompanied by
veterans and officers, who fought to keep the line steady and plug the gap. 120 of them lost their lives in this ferocious
melee, together with Ptolemy himself. Still, the momentum in the center was with
the Persians. Fresh from his relatively simple task of rolling
up Darius’ left wing, Alexander got as good a look as he could at the state of the battlefield
and quickly decided what to do next. Pivoting inward from the now-exposed Persian
left, the companions swung around and charged the flank and rear of the Greek mercenaries
in the center. This assault relieved a significant amount
of pressure on the Macedonian phalanx, allowing it to regain formation and continue advancing
across the river. The momentum had now shifted the other way. Now either by accident or on purpose, Alexander
and his elites found themselves tantalisingly close to Darius’ position. The king laid eyes on the Persian Great King
and with Homeric spirit launched an all-out attack, intent on seizing Darius and ending
the war. Observing the danger, Darius’ dutiful brother
Oxathres led the royal cavalry bodyguard into Alexander’s path who, despite fighting doggedly,
were promptly slaughtered. In the desperate struggle, one source relates
how Darius even managed to wound Alexander in the leg, before being carried into danger
by the spooked horses of his royal chariot. A second vehicle was quickly brought up, allowing
the king to flee the battlefield. Seeing the departure of their near-deific
monarch, and the collapse of their infantry, the Persian cavalry assailing Parmenion fell
apart and routed, along with the rest of the army. Arrian’s account of the battle, on the other
hand, differs significantly. In his version, once Alexander had routed
the Persians stationed on his side of the river, he slowly advanced his army to the
river. As soon as he came within missile range of
the Persians, the Macedonian king initiated the battle, charging across the river with
his Companions to minimise casualties from the arrow fire. His detachment crashed into the Persian left
flank, forcing them to give ground. In the center, however, the Persian force
was pushing back the Macedonian phalanx as it attempted to scale the banks of the river
and Greek mercenaries were also attacking the phalanx’s right flank, left exposed
due to Alexander’s charge. More importantly, the Persian right had charged
Parmenion’s wing once the phalanx was engaged, and was pushing back the Thessalians placed
against them. This, then, was the moment of crisis. The Macedonian center and left needed to hold
long enough for Alexander to rout the Persian left, and swing back to be the hammer on the
anvil. Fortunately, Alexander’s initial charge
had been devastating and the Persian left soon crumbled. Quickly he gathered his force together once
again and rode to the rescue of the phalanx, hitting the Persian centre in the flank and
rear. It was at this point that Darius, seeing his
left flank destroyed and his centre near surrounded, fled the battle. The Persian right flank, though having been
rather successful in their fight against Parmenion’s flank, saw that the battle was now lost and
pulled back, initiating a general rout. By all accounts the Battle of Issus was over
by early evening, but Alexander wasn’t close to finished yet. To destroy the Persian king’s army wasn’t
enough, he wanted Darius. So, while the Macedonian soldiery set about
killing Persian stragglers and looting the great king’s staggeringly lavish camp, the
victorious monarch began chasing Darius, who was about half a mile ahead of his cavalry. Only twenty five miles later, when darkness
finally fell, did Alexander return empty-handed, Darius having escaped across the mountains. In the meantime, the triumphant Macedonian
army had been dividing the spoils of victory in the Persian camp. This included vast quantities of gold, silver,
fine clothes, jewelry, and, as a consequence of Persian custom, all of the royal women
who had accompanied their King of Kings to the battlefield. The less noteworthy of these captives were
treated incredibly poorly by the soldiery. Ancient sources, particularly Arrian, stress
the cowardliness of Darius and blame the Persian defeat on his abandoning of the battlefield. However, it is worth noting that Arrian is
certainly one of the most pro-Alexander, and thus anti-Persian sources. Other sources make it clear that Darius fought
courageously, which is more likely given the fact that he had become king of Persia partly
because of his renowned bravery. Modern historians largely agree that Darius
had fought well, almost breaking the Macedonian left, but was ultimately out-generalled by
the more daring Alexander, and was forced to retreat or else risk being captured or
killed, losing the war outright in the process. It was one of many examples that displayed
just how deeply Alexander understood the psychology of warfare and how he could manipulate an
enemy. There are myriad stories about what Alexander
did when he returned. These include Alexander’s care and reverence
toward Darius’ immediate family, and the king’s good humour when Darius’ mother
mistook the king’s friend and likely lover Hephaestion for Alexander. But the most telling is related by Plutarch. Upon returning from pursuit, Alexander came
to the royal tent which had been prepared for him by pages, overflowing as it was with
luxurious furniture, beautiful servants and treasures beyond count. Walking further into the magnificent property
at the fore of his closest compatriots, Alexander saw the great golden bath of the king, ‘the
basins and pitchers and tubs and caskets, all of gold and curiously wrought’. Although a royal and used to comfort, the
Macedonians would’ve almost certainly never seen anything like this, let alone owned it. So, after surveying his prodigious new wealth,
Alexander turned to his friends and said the words “This, as it would seem, is to be
a king.” These post-battle anecdotes are particularly
illustrative to us. Arrian writes how he ‘cannot but admire
Alexander’ for treating the royal women with such respect and being magnanimous in
victory, thereby highlighting the king’s admirable personality. But this initial taste of ‘oriental’ luxury
and Alexander’s reaction to it foreshadows the near-despot that he would eventually become,
believing he was to be worshipped like a god. But for now, Alexander had won the Battle
of Issus in emphatic fashion. With it, the western half of the Achaemenid
Empire was now open for conquest. Despite a victory at Issus Alexander couldn’t
heedlessly chase Darius deep into the Achaemenid heartland now. This wouldn’t just draw him into an unknown,
hostile land, and a possible guerilla war, but would also leave behind potentially fatal
issues in his rear. Much of the royal army’s massive cavalry
contingent had escaped north of the Taurus, where they were sure to wreak havoc on Macedonian
supply and communication lines1. Of even greater importance still was the Great
King’s Phoenician armada which, under the command of satrap Pharnabazus, had renewed
a campaign in the Aegean and now dominated most of it. So, while Darius began raising another army
from his eastern provinces, Alexander decided to continue with his plan to take over Persia’s
naval bases. A few days of rest after Issus and the army
was on the move once more, pressing south into Phoenicia. Following the surrender of Marathus that Alexander
received envoys bearing an offer from Darius III: if Alexander restored to him his wife,
mother and children, signed a treaty of alliance and called off the invasion, he would cede
all Asia Minor west of the Halys River - from Cilicia to Sinope to Macedon. If Philip’s old guard led by Parmenion caught
wind of this offer, they would argue that the invasion had achieved all its objectives,
so Alexander omitted the offer of territory during his war council and the proposal was
rejected. It was in response that Alexander penned his
famous arrogant rebuttal: “...And in future let any communication you wish to make with
me be addressed to the King of all Asia. Do not write to me as an equal. Everything you possess is now mine; so, if
you should want anything, let me know in the proper terms, or I shall take steps to deal
with you as a criminal. If, on the other hand, you wish to dispute
your throne, stand and fight for it and do not run away. Wherever you may hide yourself, be sure I
shall seek you out.” Alexander continued marching south, accepting
the surrender of Phoenician cities such as Byblos and Sidon and the kings of Cyprus. Moving on even further south, the army neared
the mother city of Carthage - Tyre at the turn of 332 BC. This most famous of Phoenician cities was
composed of two separate segments. Old Tyre was on the mainland, while the primary,
walled city of New Tyre had been constructed on a rocky island half a mile offshore. As Alexander approached the unique city he
was met by Tyrian dignitaries, among them the son of Tyre’s king Azemilcus who, along
with many other Phoenician rulers, was away at sea with the Persian navy2. Their demeanor was respectful and hospitable,
offering alliance, provisions and gifts. However, they were not about to hand Tyre
over to the Macedonians. In response, Alexander expressed a desire
to offer sacrifice at the Tyrian great temple within the island city itself. To allow Alexander to do this would essentially
recognise him as Tyre’s rightful overlord, so the envoys declined Alexander’s request,
offering the king to make sacrifice at an equally revered temple in the Old Tyre. Alexander exploded in anger, as he sometimes
would, and dismissed the envoys with a threat that they should not be so confident in their
island fortress, as it would soon be part of the mainland. Once the envoys returned home, they counselled
the Tyrians to submit. However, buoyed by their formidable island
fortress, its distance from the mainland and the strength of their natural and constructed
fortifications, the city decided to fight. If they hadn’t been sure enough that this
was the right path, a recently arrived delegation of Carthaginians began encouraging the people
of their parent city to defend themselves, promising great reinforcement from their own
city, which was a great naval power already. Despite his anger, neither Alexander nor his
soldiers were too enthusiastic about besieging the island city with a purely land army, as
it would delay the campaign for a long time. The king’s temper cooled and he sent some
envoys over the strait in order to urge the people of Tyre to accept peace terms. Possibly mistaking this as a sign of weakness,
the Tyrians murdered Alexander’s envoys and threw their bodies into the sea. The battle became inevitable. Despite the grandstanding and emotional language
from each party, both the Tyrians and Alexander had serious strategic concerns at the forefront
of their minds. The Tyrians were an autonomous vassal of the
Persian Empire and their loyalties remained with Darius. The island city had been sieged many times
in the past, most notably for 13 years by Nebuchadnezzar II, and had successfully defended
itself. If they could keep the Macedonians pinned
in Phoenicia, then it would allow Darius time to muster his armies and send forces to strike
at Alexander’s more vulnerable rear in Asia Minor, which was still being held by Antigonus. Alexander, on the other hand, could not risk
bypassing the city. The idea of occupying the old city and simply
besieging the island had been suggested by his generals, but rejected by Alexander. Tyre’s harbours were large enough to hold
the majority of the Persian fleet and therefore presented the risk of the Persians landing
forces behind his front line, either in Asia Minor or Greece. It was simply too dangerous; Alexander would
have to take Tyre no matter the cost. A great portion of the Macedonian officers
and soldiers alike were daunted by the staggering task ahead of them. But Alexander, in his typically daring manner,
had a plan in his head that just might work. He really would make island Tyre part of the
mainland. To enact his scheme, the king had Old Tyre
torn down and harvested its stone as raw material. At the same time, parties were dispatched
inland to the Beqaa Valley, where they fetched timber from the cedar trees on the mountain
slopes. To supplement the soldiers in their efforts,
entire populations of nearby towns and cities were drafted to serve as a labour corps which
supposedly totalled many tens of thousands strong. Now possessing the materiel and the men to
use it, Alexander began slowly constructing a 200 foot-wide mole from the mainland across
to Tyre, - where it would connect just south of the Sidonian Harbour. The king’s engineers would sink wooden piles
into the mud, pack stone between them to serve as a foundation, and then lay massive timber
beams to complete the work. In the muddy terrain and shallow water adjacent
to the shore, the going was relatively easy and the mole’s construction got underway
with haste. Alexander was constantly present at the forefront
of the effort, precisely instructing his workers how to proceed, motivating them with words
of encouragement and even handing out rewards for men who had particularly impressed him
with their skill and gusto on the job. The Tyrians, initially believing the mole
to be some kind of joke, rowed out and mocked Alexander, jeering and asking the king if
he thought himself greater than Poseidon. The Macedonian efforts were so disconcertingly
effective, and the work being enacted in such efficient time however, that the people of
Tyre quickly changed their mocking tune. Some of the city’s women and children were
evacuated by sea, the Tyrian fleet was made ready and the defenders began constructing
extra artillery pieces in anticipation of a proper fight in the very near future3. Trouble began for Alexander’s besieging
army when the mole reached deeper water4, taking the construction near missile range. Aiming to stop Alexander’s effort in its
tracks, Tyre dispatched a squadron of skiffs to each side of the mole. Near unopposed on the sea and loaded with
missile troops and light catapults, these skirmishing vessels darted in close and unleashed
a focused cross-fire into the massed labour corps working on the land bridge. The draftees along with Alexander’s soldiers,
who worked without their usual armour, suffered terrible casualties in this initial naval
sortie and were unable to continue working. To counter this kind of attack, a series of
hide and canvas screens were rigged to serve as a barrier against arrow fire, allowing
the workers to resume. Two siege towers were also constructed at
the end of the mole to allow Alexander’s own missile troops a platform from which to
respond. Difficulties now began increasing for both
sides, and with that difficulty came superstition. Rumours of ill portents spread of Macedonian
ration bread leaking blood, Tyrian defenders having visions of Apollo and it is even said
a great ocean leviathan smashed into the mole, before swimming away again. To make matters worse, Alexander’s timber
supply from the mountains had slowed thanks to near constant harassing raids from Arab
tribes local to the area. The Tyrians now embarked upon a daring and
ingenious strategy. They brought forward a large transport ship
and loaded it to the brim with brushwood, pitch, sulphur and other fiercely burning
materials. This fire ship was towed in the mole’s direction
by a pair of Phoenician triremes who then, at the last moment, peeled away and flung
the makeshift, floating bomb at Alexander’s siege bridge like an ancient cruise missile. It struck the edge and burst into an oily,
blazing inferno, severely damaging the mole5, burning down the towers and killing a great
many of the king’s troops. At the same time, the Tyrians launched another
sortie, landing at various points along the mole, attacking the vulnerable laborers carrying
materials, tearing down the defensive screens and setting fire to any siege equipment that
had so far escaped the inferno. Soon, all along the mole was fire and death. Alexander was seemingly losing control of
the situation. Something had to be done. After directing his dependable lieutenants
Perdiccas and Craterus to rebuild the mole even wider than before with towers and artillery,
Alexander departed with his usual strike-force of favourites and rode north to Sidon in search
of a fleet. As Arrian tells us ‘for clearly, so long
as the Tyrians were masters of the sea, the siege of Tyre would be no easy matter.’ It was during the king’s short stay in Sidon
that perhaps the greatest strategic bounty of the Issus campaign revealed itself, however
delayed it might have been. Having defected from Darius’ naval war after
the Great King’s crushing defeat, the Phoenician rulers of Byblos and Aradus pledged their
seaborne strength to Alexander. Together with the Sidonians, that totalled
around 80 high-quality vessels with equally high-quality crews. Other scattered vessels sailed from Lycia,
Macedon, Rhodes and other places. More promising still, the Kings of Cyprus,
seeing which way the wind was blowing, brought 120 ships and added them with Alexander’s
growing armada a day later. While the burgeoning fleet was being brought
up to snuff and armed with artillery, the king ventured out on a punitive expedition
into the Beqaa Valley, where he successfully handled the Arab tribes who had been raiding
his wood-gatherers. Plutarch tells us that during this venture,
Alexander snuck up to one of the tribal campfires during the night and personally slew two Arab
warriors there with a dagger. Upon returning to Sidon the king not only
found the fleet ready for action but 4,000 additional mercenaries at his command. With his new armada of loyal client-kings
and reinforcements in tow, Alexander sailed back to Tyre. Initially, the Tyrians arrayed slightly off
the city to face the Macedonian attempt at sea, but this giant force was far more than
they were prepared for. Wisely, the Tyrian fleet withdrew to the safety
of their harbours, which they blockaded with vessels. The balance of power was now firmly on Alexander’s
side. The Macedonian-allied fleet spent the night
sheltering near the mole, ready to deploy when the sun came up. As soon as it did, Alexander ordered the Phoenician
contingent to blockade Tyre’s southern ‘Egyptian’ harbour, while sending the Cypriots to do
the same at the northern ‘Sidonian’ harbour, effectively neutralising and reversing Tyre’s
previous dominance on the seas. With that security, work on the mole began
apace once more. Unfortunately for Alexander, a ferocious storm
began not before the mole was set to reach the walls. Rain hammered down from the sky in torrents,
gale-force winds blew and the sea became rough. This turn of luck not only made it impossible
to make further progress, but ravaged the existing structure, setting the construction
back considerably. To remedy this, the king had a number of massive
uncut trees floated into position on the windward side of the mole, where they absorbed most
of the impact. When the storm at last subsided, these wave
breaks were built into the structure as bulwarks and the damage was soon repaired and expanded
upon, taking the Macedonian bridge into the missile range of the walls. Intent on giving his workmen cover for the
final stretch, Alexander massed his available siege catapults and stone-throwers on the
edge of the mole. Together with the artillery-armed fleet and
supported by archers and slingers, they launched a withering bombardment against the Tyrian
battlements, clearing the defenders from the walls. Alexander also introduced a new kind of weapon:
ships armed with battering rams to assault and break down the Tyrian’s defenses, the
first known use of such weapons. Although under immense pressure, the Tyrians
held on with great tenacity, hanging up screens to break the force of Alexander’s artillery
and building wooden towers on their battlements. From these Tyre’s archers loosed volley
after volley of fire arrows at the Macedonian vessels, while the citizens worked at terrific
speed to repair any breaches. In some places that wasn’t viable, so they
constructed a number of secondary curtain walls to plug the gap. At day’s end, the situation in the city
was dire, but the defences opposite the mole still stood firm. Sailing around to the seaward side of Tyre
in the dark of night, Alexander attempted to take the city while it was sleeping, but
was foiled only by a short but another violent storm and forced to pull back. The Tyrians used this moment of breathing
space to scatter large chunks of stone into the shallow water adjacent to the walls, making
it incredibly difficult for the Macedonian ships to get close. Growing increasingly desperate, the Tyrians
sent out small rowing boats at nights with divers who would plunge into the waters and
cut their enemies rope anchor lines in an attempt to disrupt the fleet, forcing Alexander
to equip all his ships with chain anchors. On land, Tyre’s inventors and engineers
began devising strange weapons to repel the invaders, including a fire-thrower that belched
molten metal, barbed tridents, rope-cutting scythes and even militarised fishing nets
to ensnare any Macedonian escalade. This last-ditch attitude was exacerbated by
bad news from abroad. Thirty more Carthaginian emissaries arrived
with words of encouragement, but they regretted to inform their mother city that aid would
not, in fact, be arriving - war at home made that impossible. Alexander spent some time clearing the stones
which had been dumped into the water, allowing his ships to once again get close to the walls. At the same time, following a final Herculean
burst of industry, the mole stretching all the way from the Phoenician coast to Tyre
finally connected. As Alexander had vowed to the envoys of Tyre
months earlier, he really had made the island city part of the mainland. The time for a full-scale attack had come. At the advent of midsummer, the Macedonians
launched an assault via land - from the end of the mole, and from the sea on their assault
ships. Massive stones launched by catapults smashed
into the walls of Tyre, gouging out huge portions of stone and sending it crashing onto the
rocks and into the water below. Ballista bolts and archery fire raked the
battlements, killing defenders and making others duck for cover. Under the cover of this bombardment Alexander’s
infantry used boarding gangways and ladders to attempt an escalade that would finally
take the defiant city. They put fierce pressure onto the Tyrians
who fought back ferociously in a conventional manner, but also used their mad inventions
to turn the attackers away. Especially mentioned for their effectiveness
were a number of metal pots filled with sand and gravel, heated until it was glowing. This fine mixture was then tipped onto Alexander’s
advancing soldiers, where it sifted behind armour plates and burned into flesh. After a long struggle which yielded no real
results except for brutal casualties, the king was once again forced to abandon the
effort at nightfall. Dejected and exhausted, Alexander even briefly
considered abandoning the siege of Tyre completely and marching onto Egypt, but Alexander held
on, if only because giving up now would be costlier even than doggedly soldiering on. His persistence was to be rewarded. As they themselves were now in a desperate
situation, the Tyrian ships at the Sidonian Harbour launched a massive naval sortie completely
by surprise. As the crews were at rest, dozens of Macedonian-allied
Cypriot vessels were sunk in the initial attack and for a moment it seemed as though the Tyrians
were about to make a breakthrough. However, Alexander personally led a squadron
of ships from the Egyptian harbour and cut off the overextended Tyrian squadron, destroying
almost all of it and bottling the rest up in the harbour, from where they could now
do nothing to hinder his efforts. The king’s troops and ships followed up
this success by first testing an area of wall near the northern harbour, but he was pushed
away. From there his forces turned to assault a
section of the Tyrian walls just south of the southern harbour, which Alexander judged
to be weak. Artillery let loose once more and a breach
was made. Rather than throwing everything into this
action, the king launched a brief probing attack and then withdrew. He was, however, now sure that the Macedonians
had found Tyre’s soft underbelly. A further few days passed as Alexander rested
his men in preparation for the final assault and waited for good weather to return. When the wind and sea quietened down on the
third day, the Macedonian army boarded its assault vessels and launched a massive attack
on the weakened southern area. Artillery once again hammered the area, collapsing
a breach that was then widened even further. Simultaneous attacks were made from the mole
and by the fleets on both harbours in order to keep the Tyrians busy. When the main breach was wide enough, the
men of the elite hypaspist brigade and their valiant king strode through, closely followed
by mighty Craterus and his battalion of the phalanx and others. As though suddenly realising their ultimate
peril the defenders of Tyre fought back doggedly, contesting the Macedonians for every step. The fighting was so brutal that Admetus - captain
of the hypaspists, was slain by an axe to the skull. But Alexander’s men had done it at last,
surmounting the broken walls, taking the battlements and gaining a firm foothold in the city. At the same time, Phoenician and Cypriot squadrons
penetrated both harbours and prompted the retreat of most remaining defenders on the
walls to the city centre, lest they be encircled by enemy soldiers. They ran and ran, pursued by the Macedonians,
until they reached the Shrine of Agenar. There they fought the last stand and died
almost to the last man. With the end of organised resistance, chaos
broke out: On Alexander's orders, the Macedonian soldiers conducted a savage rampage throughout
the city, massacring thousands. Peter Green paints a picture of the mood and
the scene in those hours. “All restraint, abandoned, hysterical and
half-crazy after the long rigours of that dreadful siege, mere butchers now, striking
and trampling and tearing limb from limb until Tyre became a bloody, reeking abattoir.” 7,000 soldiers and citizens were butchered
in this sack, and a further 2,000 crucified by Alexander when the soldiers’ fury died
down. The casualty figures would’ve been far worse
had the Sidonians not turned into unlikely heroes. Although entering the conquered, hated city
of Tyre on Alexander’s side it is said that they, feeling the plight of their Phoenician
cousins, hid 15,000 people and ferried them to safety at Sidon. Alexander’s casualties are unknown, but
Arrian’s suggestion of only 400 dead is certainly too low. The attacks on the mole, the numerous repelled
assaults and bitter fighting all suggest a higher number though it is impossible to make
any kind of accurate guess. Tyre, already aflame, was utterly destroyed,
and the remainder of its population, roughly 30,000 people, were sold into slavery. The siege of Tyre is perhaps the greatest
example of Alexander’s ingenuity, adaptability and mastery of siegecraft, however, as with
Thebes before, it was also a harsh reminder of how brutal Alexander could be to those
who resisted him. When news of Tyre’s end spread, almost every
remaining city on the Mediterranean seaboard prepared to surrender and Darius III, who
had been keeping a close eye on the situation, sent even more favourable peace terms. They were denied once more by Alexander, who
turned his gaze toward the kingdom of the Pharaohs. As he went, time passed and the elements took
their course. Gradually the rough edges and sharp joints
of the Macedonian king’s infamous mole, which so boldly connected Tyre to the mainland,
softened. Sand gathered and winds blew, connecting Tyre
permanently to the Asian mainland. Today, as Green tells us ‘deep under the
asphalt streets and apartment blocks, the stone core of that fantastic causeway still
stands: one of Alexander’s most tangible and permanent legacies to posterity.’ Following the capture and destruction of Tyre
in July of 332 BC, Alexander the Great had once more rejected generous peace overtures
from Darius III. Alongside the taking of Tyre, other theatres
had been turning in Alexander’s favour. In the Aegean, his lieutenants had been able
to use the spoils of victory from Issus to gather a fleet and defeat the Persian squadrons
in the area, retaking Lesbos and Chios. In Asia Minor, remnants of Darius’ army
from Issus had attempted to retake Lydia, only to be defeated in three battles by the
veteran Antigonus. With these victories under his belt, Alexander
didn’t just want acco mmodation or riches now, he wanted the entirety of the Persian
Empire and perhaps beyond. The next objective was to the south - Egypt. As the Alexander’s army, victorious in every
major engagement since crossing into Asia, pushed into Palestine, it received the immediate
surrender of every single city in the region except one. That single defiant was Gaza - a formidable
hilltop stronghold controlling the approaches to Egypt. Like Tyre, it too would have to be taken. Unfortunately for Alexander, Gaza’s Persian
governor Batis had been proactive during the siege on Tyre, taking the measure of hiring
Arab mercenaries and stocking up his city with plentiful stores to withstand a siege
of his own domain. The 160 mile march south through Phoenicia
and Palestine was a harsh one, despite the lack of conflict. Refreshment was hard to come by and the climate
- during the near-eastern summer, was incredibly arid. The army’s salvation was the fleet element
commanded by Alexander’s closest companion Hephaestion, which kept the advancing soldiers
supplied with food and water. Ákē - known during the Crusades as Acre,
was passed first, followed by Joppa and Ascalon. The simple progress finally came to a swift
halt when Gaza loomed large on the horizon in September of 332 BC. Alexander’s army took up position opposite
a section of the fortification on the southern side of the city - which the Macedonians considered
weakest. The city of Gaza was situated upon a large
mound, which would make any assault of the city extremely difficult. Alexander initially tried to move his siege
towers, effectively large artillery platforms, in range of the walls, but the shifting sands
bogged them down, slowing progress. As with Tyre, however, Alexander had an ingenious
engineering solution in mind. Rather than moving across the flat sands,
Alexander had a mound constructed to the same height as Gaza’s walls, allowing his siege
engines to fire more easily upon the defenses. During the course of these operations, the
king made a traditional sacrifice, asking for the gods’ aid. While the ritual was ongoing, it is said that
a crow flew overhead and dropped a lump of dry mud on Alexander’s head before taking
a perch on the nearest siege tower and this was viewed as a grim omen by the soldiery
and their monarch. Alexander consulted his personal soothsayer
Aristander, who interpreted the event to foretell the fall of the city, but also harm that would
come to Alexander during the clash. He recommended that the army take no action
that day, and as a sign of just how superstitious Alexander was, the king acquiesced. Deciding that the passivity of their foes
to be a sign of weakness, Batis’ mercenary Arab troops launched a brazen sortie out of
the city gates in an attempt to destroy Alexander’s siege towers and kill as many Macedonians
as they could. Having taken the first of the enemy soldiers
by surprise, Batis’ Arabs initially met with some success and reached the towers with
relatively little struggle. However, when Alexander caught onto what exactly
was happening, he led his companions and hypaspists into battle from the front line, crashing
into the spot where the fighting was fiercest. This decisive intervention stabilised the
engagement and tipped the momentum toward the Macedonians, but the king was not going
to escape unscathed, as the soothsayer had predicted. Quintus Curtius Rufus, always fond of the
more dramatic and mystical anecdotes of Alexander, tells us how one of Batis’ hired swords
pretended to be a deserter and threw himself before the king, asking for pardon. Alexander, decided to be magnanimous on this
day, telling the man to rise and be received. Thus able to get close, the Arab suddenly
retrieved his sword and lunged at the king’s neck. The plausibility of this can rightfully be
questioned, but one thing that all the sources do agree on is that, while in the midst of
the fighting, Alexander was wounded by either an arrow or ballista bolt smashing into his
shoulder. It was a serious wound and while Alexander
initially tried to stay on the battlefield, he soon lost consciousness due to blood loss. Batis, thinking that his men had killed the
Macedonian king, withdrew his men back into the city in triumph. Alexander, meanwhile, was carried back to
his camp where, after much difficulty, his doctor, Philip, was able to staunch the bleeding
and save his life. While the king recovered from yet another
near miss, progress on the mound continued, with it finally extending to over 1,000 feet
wide and 250 feet high, according to Arrian, while at the same time, Hephaestion ferried
yet more siege engines that had been taken from Tyre to the siege. By the time Alexander had recovered enough
to continue the fight, it was October, two months after the king’s initial investment
of the city. With increased firepower, Alexander ordered
another assault on the city with his siege engines hammering at the walls while sappers
mined underneath them. Eventually, the walls were breached and the
Macedonian army pushed into the city. Batis’ men resisted determinedly though,
pushing back the attackers three times, despite taking heavy casualties. Alexander, not yet fully recovered, led the
fourth attack personally and, according to Quintus Curtius Rufus, was wounded yet again
when a ballista rock smashed his leg. Nevertheless, this attack proved to be decisive
and Alexander’s men soon swarmed into the city. The sources record Persian losses being as
high as 10,000, which may include the male civilian population, with the women and children
being sold into slavery. Moreover, Curtius Rufus also reports a particularly
grim fate for the Persian commander, Batis. According to him, Batis was captured alive,
having fought bravely to the last and brought to Alexander. Alexander demanded his surrender, and when
Batis refused to reply, Alexander flew into a rage and ordered that Batis be tied behind
his chariot and dragged him around the city until he was dead. Curtius Rufus did have a particular fondness
for these kinds of stories, and it is important to note that no other source mentions this
grisly fate for Batis, and that the parallels to Achilles’ treatment of Hector are perhaps
too obvious. It may, therefore, be one of the many rumors
and tall tales that became associated with Alexander, but it is also worth remembering
that our other sources for Alexander are often more forgiving of him and actively avoided
reporting some of his more questionable actions. Alexander finally crossed into Egypt now that
the way was clear, reaching the gateway to the Nile - Pelusium, in just a week. When he and his army arrived, they were met
not by a dogged garrison of defenders, but by a cheering crowd of overjoyed people who
regarded the invading Macedonians as liberators. After many attempted revolts, the Egyptians
had successfully broken away from Persian rule in 404BC, but were reconquered just 11
years earlier. The Achaemenid governor Mazaces realised his
unstable position and received Alexander with friendship, granting the king open access
to Egypt and its treasuries. From Pelusium Alexander sailed up the Nile
to Memphis - the ancient capital of the Nile Kingdom in the days of its strength. In contrast to the first Achaemenid conqueror
of Egypt - Cambyses, who is said to have profaned the divine Apis, Alexander showed himself
as a friend by offering the god special sacrifice. The Egyptians welcomed Alexander as their
liberator and, though he was never officially crowned as Pharaoh, he was honored with many
of the same titles and titles, King of Upper and Lower Egypt, Son of Ra and Beloved of
Amun. Alexander departed Memphis in January of 331,
sailing toward the Mediterranean until he reached Lake Mareotis. There, inspired by the quality of the site
opposite the island of Pharos, Alexander ordered that planning and construction efforts on
a new city begin immediately. So enthusiastic was Alexander about this new
project that he supposedly designated the layout of the town and the limit of its defenses
himself. That city would, over the next few decades,
become Alexandria - the cosmopolitan capital of the ancient world. While his architects and labourers continued
preparatory work on the new Greece-facing city, Alexander found himself consumed by
a sudden desire to visit a famous oracle of the god Zeus-Ammon, a combination of the Greek
and Egyptian deities . This religious figure had previously been consulted by king Croesus
of Lydia, Athens during the Peloponnesian War, and many other historical giants. It was seen with equal reverence to the oracle
at Delphi. The problem was that this oracle resided within
a desert oasis known as Siwah - fully three-hundred miles distant to the west. A crucial stage of the campaign against Persia
was upcoming, however, and divine backing would be a great boon. Setting out in late January with only a small
band, among whom was the future Egyptian ruler Ptolemy, Alexander travelled 170 miles west
along the coastal road and eventually reached the small settlement of Paraetonium on the
borders of Cyrenaica. There, the adventuring king received a delegation
of emissaries from Cyrene. They granted him a number of grandiose gifts
including fine horses and chariots, and he concluded a treaty of peace and alliance with
them. The party then continued on their way, turning
inland from the Mediterranean. What followed was a gruelling slog through
the parched, desolate and utterly inhospitable Libyan Desert. The band’s water supplies ran out four days
into the venture, but they were saved by a great rainstorm that came just at the right
time. Not content with just dehydrating the Macedonians,
the desert then saw fit to disorient them as well. Khamsin desert winds picked up, blasting away
all landmarks in a withering sandstorm that made Alexander’s guides lose their bearings. Finally, almost a month after setting out
from Lake Mareotis, the party managed to follow a flight of birds to the verdant Siwah oasis,
which they reached in late February 331. While the group remained behind and enjoyed
the relative luxury of the oasis, Alexander went directly to the temple. What happened next is not clear, thanks to
contradictions in our sources, and is still much debated to this day. Arrian, who used sources written by companions
of Alexander, gives little information, aside from the fact that Alexander, “heard what
was agreeable to him”. Diodorus, Justin and Quintus Curitus Rufus,
whose main source was the Ptolemaic historian Cleitarchus, write that Alexander was welcomed
by the eldest priest as the son of Zeus-Ammon, that he would rule the whole earth and, in
response to a question from Alexander, that all of his father’s assassins had been punished. Plutarch, whose sources included Alexander's
historian Callisthenes, gives a similar account, but also includes the possibility that the
priest had attempted to welcome Alexander by saying “O paidon”, meaning “oh my
son”, but due to his accent mispronounced the word to “O paidos” meaning “o son
of Zeus”, but that Alexander happily exploited the mistake. The truth of what happened is now impossible
to determine with certainty. Alexander during his own lifetime made masterful
use of propaganda to push the idea that he was, in some form divine, and all accounts
of his life succumb to this to a greater or lesser extent. Indeed, whether Alexander even really believed
in his divinity or simply used it as a convenient political tool is similarly impossible to
say. However, what can be said with certainty is
that Alexander at least actively encouraged the idea that he was, and that his visit to
Zeus-Ammon was an important part of this propaganda. After rewarding the Siwah shrine with plentiful
gifts of gold, the party returned to the embryonic city of Alexandria by the route they had come. The first indications of spring were now upon
the Macedonians. After the relatively simple foray into Egypt,
it was nearly time to resume the campaign against Darius III. Before the titans locked horns again however,
there were important administrative matters to conclude. Leaving the great work at Alexandria in the
capable hands of his builders, engineers and architects, Alexander sailed south to Memphis,
where he was once again infatuated by the ancient city’s air of quasi-divine Pharaonic
majesty. The monarch was fawned on by his Egyptian
subjects as though he was a deity on earth and artists began depicting their new beloved
ruler on temple walls across the country. Though it would later become a point of serious
contention, there were many Greeks who were willing to indulge Alexander’s newfound
love for ‘oriental’ divinity, realising that it could be exploited for their own ends. Several embassies of Greeks were waiting for
the king at Memphis with petitions, all of which Arrian tells us were generously granted. It is tempting to say that their flattery
might’ve swayed the king, but it is equally possible that a mix of success and elation
at the Siwah revelation had Alexander in a good mood. Beyond mere emotion, Alexander also had a
more pragmatic motivation to begin treating the Greeks more gently at the beginning of
331. As feared, Persian assistance had allowed
Sparta’s King Agis III to start making trouble at home. Throughout Alexander’s time in Egypt, Agis
had managed to take over most of Crete and stood poised to attack the mainland with a
large mercenary force. The situation was a volatile tinderbox just
waiting to be lit, and being unduly harsh to other Greek states seemed likely to make
the situation explode more violently. Alexander paid special attention to the governance
of Egypt, which he immediately viewed as both a plentiful cornucopia and a potential threat. It had presented two primary threats to occupying
empires in the past - ‘nationalist’ rebellions by disaffected natives and attempts by devious
governors to leverage Egypt’s supreme strength in revolt against the larger empire. The king now set out a number of reforms aiming
at avoiding both of these nightmare scenarios. He separated the Nile kingdom’s administration
into civil and military branches. Routine day-to-day bureaucracy remained in
the hands of local Egyptians, a move which gained Alexander the favour of the locals. Not only that, but if those same bureaucrats
began making a mess of things, the population wouldn’t blame him. The traditional geographical division of upper
and lower Egypt was also employed, with a district governor known as a ‘nomarch’
serving as steward over each segment. Geographical divide and rule tactics of this
kind were also used on the military front, although Greeks were employed rather than
Egyptians. The country’s eastern and western districts
would be commanded by Cleomenes of Naucratis and Apollonius, son of Charinus respectively. Macedonian garrison commanders were also instituted
at Memphis and Pelusium in order to keep order in the delicate, fertile and often revolt-prone
breadbasket that was Egypt. With matters of governance finalised, Alexander
took his whole army back north to Tyre. In the Achaemenid heartland, Darius had been
using the time since his defeat at Issus to gather a fresh, even more, numerous force
to throw Alexander back. This army was made up of a multitude of peoples
from every realm of Asia still under Persian control, including India, Scythia and Bactria. Predominant among the Persian aristocracy
was Bessus - governor of Bactria, who not only brought to bear a powerful force, but
also possessed kingly ambitions. Ever since his epochal triumph at Issus two
years earlier, Alexander had been methodically reducing every potential center of resistance
in the western part of the Achaemenid Empire. Syria had been secured and administered, followed
by Phoenicia, Palestine, and - Egypt. But as spring of 331 BC arrived, it was once
more time to move on, this time into Persia’s imperial heartland. The advance would be risky - disconcerting
news was even now arriving from Greece concerning Agis’ revolt. All the king could feasibly do at this point
without abandoning everything he had accomplished was to send a great fleet of 100 ships to
aid any harbour supporting the Macedonian cause. Apart from that, putting down the Greek rebels
would be left to Antipater and the men under his command. With that considered Alexander again turned
east, where Darius and a colossal Persian army were waiting for him. Following one final bout of administrative
fine-tuning, the king marched his army to Thapsacus - a major link between Syria and
Mesopotamia. He arrived between July and August, but an
advance force under Hephaestion had already been present for some time, and managed to
construct two pontoon bridges over the Euphrates ready for the army’s use. As a sign of the Macedonian engineers’ skill,
these bridges lacked a final stretch on the far bank, preventing any enemy force from
effectively using them and this proved to be a wise precaution. Observing the invaders’ crossing from a
safe distance was a force of 3,000 Persian cavalry outriders commanded by one of Darius’
satraps - Mazaeus. Arrian seems to imply that Mazaeus’ horsemen
were supposed to stop the crossing of Alexander’s vastly superior army, but it is more probable
that Darius simply required intelligence as to what the Macedonians were doing. There was, realistically, no chance for Mazaeus
to prevent the crossing by himself. Having learned from previous defeats, Darius
III had come up with a plan. He had done well at Issus to get behind Alexander
and force a battle while in a defensive position. Nevertheless, the narrow confines of that
battlefield had limited the maneuverability of his cavalry, the most effective portion
of the Persian army. Moreover, there were numerous crossing points
across both the Euphrates and Tigris, and Darius had no means of determining which ones
Alexander would use. As a result, he instead decided upon a large
open plain for his battle: Gaugamela. Here, he would be able to better use his numerical
superiority and have ample room for his cavalry to dominate the battlefield. Moreover, the flat terrain would also lend
itself well to the 200 scythed chariots that Darius had recently added to his army. Darius had learned well that Alexander was
a cunning enemy, and this time he would have complete control of the battlefield. By the time Alexander got near, Darius’
army would be ready and waiting. Meanwhile, Alexander himself was still crossing
the arid Mesopotamian plain, capturing a few of Mazaeus’ scouts in the process. It was from these captives that the Macedonians
learned, somewhat vaguely, that the main Persian army had taken up a position on the Tigris
and was set to throw the Macedonians back if they attempted to ford the river. Moreover, estimates of the sheer size of Darius’
massive army were also obtained. Upon finally arriving at the upper reaches
of the Tigris in mid-September, the Macedonian king and his army found neither Darius nor
his hundred-thousand plus men - faulty or deceptive intelligence from the captured scout,
it seemed. This was just as well, as, at least according
to Arrian, the strong, swift currents of the Tigris made the crossing treacherous. Nevertheless, despite these difficulties,
Alexander as able to ford the river successfully with his whole army, taking a few days to
rest before marching on. The two armies, now on the same side of the
Tigris, were getting perilously close to one another. While Alexander continued pressing on with
the river on his right and the mountains on his left, Darius , at Gaugamela, began the
task of perfecting his battlefield, flattening hills, clearing rocks and trees, and employing
every possible measure to make the plain as flat as possible. The Great King was so distracted by this that
he failed to take the low hills three miles west. En route, Alexander had two minor encounters
with Persian cavalry forces under Mazaeus, but they were easily put to flight. Further prisoners taken in these engagements
revealed that Darius’ massive army was at Gaugamela, by that point only around ten miles
away. Further investigation uncovered the ground-leveling
operations and made Alexander realise that Darius didn’t intend to move from this pre-selected
battlefield, allowing him to encamp and give his men another substantial rest before the
climactic battle. During this short lull, the Persians utilised
infiltration and assassination tactics, attempting to turn the Greek soldiers against Alexander
with promises of gold and other good things. One of these letters was intercepted and the
king debated reading it aloud before the Greeks to emphasize his trust in them. He was deterred from doing so by the ever-cautious
Parmenion, who reasoned that avarice recognised nothing as a crime, not even the murder of
a king. Instead, the letter was suppressed and the
camp fortified. It was around this same time that Darius made
his third and final offer for peace with Alexander. Twice, he had offered substantial sums of
money as well as most of Asia Minor in return for ending the war, now, he offered even more. In order to achieve peace, Darius was prepared
to offer 30,000 talents, roughly 45 billion dollars today, all the territories West of
the Euphrates, approximately half the Persian Empire, as well as one of his daughter's hands
in marriage. It was a staggeringly generous offer that
would have allowed Alexander to consolidate his considerable gains without having to risk
another major battle, and would have meant that he could return to Greece to deal with
the troublesome Agis. If it had been Philip receiving the offer,
he surely would have accepted and the veteran Parmenion even advised that “If I were Alexander,
I would accept this offer,” to which Alexander famously replied “So would I, if I were
Parmenion”. Alexander’s ambitions were greater than
Philip, Parmenion or Darius could fathom: he was aiming for the entirety of the Persian
Empire and in order to achieve that, he was willing to gamble everything. While most of the army recuperated in camp,
Alexander assembled a strong cavalry escort and went to personally scout both the battlefield
terrain and Darius’ army. When he crested the hill overlooking it, Peter
Green suggests that the Macedonian king might’ve second-guessed his earlier bravado about facing
the Persians so brazenly. For what he saw was an army larger even than
that he had faced at Issus. More than that, it seemed far superior in
armament and skill, possessing a large quantity of fearsome eastern cavalry. That night, Alexander sat awake in his tent
for hours on end, analysing the potential of each Persian unit and considering the potential
damage they might inflict, along with the tactics he could use to gain victory. At some point, Parmenion arrived and suggested
that a night attack be carried out, but Alexander stated that he would “Not demean victory
by stealing victory like a thief. Alexander must defeat his enemies openly and
honestly.” But even Arrian, who usually gushes with praise
over the Macedonian king, found it likely that this haughty response was just a smokescreen. He believed instead that ‘these lofty words
probably indicated confidence in danger rather than vanity.’ Rather than the morality of victory, refusal
to engage in an incredibly risky, potentially catastrophic night attack was instead simply
a sound tactical decision. Pitched battles had worked wonders thus far
and so there was no need to gamble everything in the dark. This proved to be a shrewd decision indeed. While the Alexander’s men were resting in
preparation for the coming battle, Darius’ troops, lacking a camp with fortifications,
were actually drawn up in full battle order throughout the night in fear of any surprise
assault by the enemy. Not only did the consequential lack of sleep
exhaust the vast array of Achaemenid warriors, but waiting hour after hour with nothing to
show for it demoralised the Persians greatly, sapping their spirit. Back in the secure Macedonian camp, Alexander
at last crossed the T’s and dotted the I’s of his intricate battle plan and then simply
went to sleep in the early morning hours. When the sun rose above the horizon on the
morning of the great Battle of Gaugamela, Alexander did not rise with it. Instead, unconcerned by the gravity of the
occasion, he slept. On their own volition, the various battalions
had breakfast and assembled for battle. Only when knowledge of Alexander’s plan
became necessary for deployment did Parmenion go and rouse the king from his slumber. No doubt curious as to just how the king was
able to sleep so soundly Parmenion asked him. Alexander simply responded by saying that
he had indeed been worried when the Persians had been retreating and laying waste to the
line of march, but now that pitched battle was on the cards ‘By Heracles, he has done
exactly what I wanted!’ Finally, the Macedonian king and his Persian
counterpart were face to face once more, and the great battle for Asia was about to begin. Darius’ army was so massive that its flanks
extended beyond Alexander’s by a significant margin and outflanking was virtually assured. The Persian left and right wings were commanded
by Bessus and Mazaeus respectively, while the Great King Darius III himself was stationed
in the center. Having seemingly learnt his lesson from Issus,
Darius stacked a large amount of his cavalry on the left flank, opposite where Alexander
and his Companions would be. Here, Bessus commanded thousands of cavalry
from his own satrapy of Bactria, together with Sogdians and Arachosians. Additional mounted strength was drawn from
the nomadic peoples beyond Persia’s northern frontier who were in military alliance with
the empire, such as the Sacae and Dahae Scythians fighting as cataphracts or horse archers. On the right, Mazaeus had Syrians, Mesopotamians,
and Medes under his leadership, flanked toward the center by Parthian and even more Sacae
cavalry. Tapurians, Hyrcanians, Albanians, and Sacesinians
from the Caucasus and the areas around the Caspian sea formed the link between right
and center. The vanguard of Mazaeus’ wing was composed
of Armenian and Cappadocian riders. Mixed Persian infantry and Greek mercenaries
formed Darius’ center, together with the king’s personal cavalry, immortals, and
the Indian cavalry. Darius’ army also included two more exotic
units. First were the Great King’s 200 scythed
chariots - somewhat experimental shock vehicles with blades on their wheels tailored to break
apart Alexander’s formations and cause chaos in his lines. 100 of these chariots were drawn up just to
the right of Bessus’ Bactrians, and 50 each in front of the Indians and next to Mazaeus’
Armenians. Second, were 15 majestic elephants who accompanied
the Indian contingents though, Darius chose not to deploy these in the battle itself,
perhaps due to his unfamiliarity fighting with such unpredictable units. The ancient sources give wildly exaggerated
numbers for the Persian army, Arrian, Diodorus and Plutarch, all claiming it was over 1,000,000. Modern historians, such as Borza, Worthington
and Green, dismiss these numbers as the propaganda that they obviously are and tend to agree
on somewhere in the ballpark of 100,000, with roughly 30-40,000 of that being cavalry, the
rest infantry. Alexander’s army, on the other hand, is
better attested to, with the majority of sources and historians agreeing on a number of around
40,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry opposed this gargantuan force. Knowing that he was almost guaranteed to be
outflanked, Alexander drew up his force for battle with his flanks angled inward slightly
to better withstand a Persian encirclement. The Companion, Paeonian and allied Greek cavalry
were located on the right flank, supported by half of both the Agrianians and archers,
while the other halves were stationed in front of the Companions Royal Squadron as a screening
force. Next to this strike force were the hypaspists
and then the 6 phalangites battalions of the main phalanx. On the left flank was Thracian and Greek mercenary
infantry, the remaining allied Greek and other light cavalry and the formidable Thessalian
cavalry. Lastly, acting as Alexander’s reserve, were
the soldiers from the League of Corinth. Command of the left half of the army was entrusted
entirely to Parmenion, who would need to fight a difficult holding action, while Alexander,
in command of the right half of the army, would aim to strike the killing blow. Confident in his army’s supreme discipline
and fully prepared to exploit Darius’ plan, Alexander ordered his entire line to advance
in oblique fashion, the right flank slightly ahead of the left. Simultaneously, the king personally took strike
force on the right and moved almost parallel to the Persian line as though aiming to outflank
the Persian line with his numerically inferior forces. At once reacting to this unexpected maneuver,
Bessus flexed his strength by stretching his cavalry even further out, always keeping outside
of the Macedonians. This, in turn, dragged units away from the
Persian center. All of a sudden, it became obvious to the
Achaemenid leadership that by edging his army to the right, Alexander was attempting to
move the battle away from the leveled plain, thereby rendering much of Darius’ long-planned
strategy null and void. Regardless of his lacking numbers, Alexander
continued drifting right until he was just short of the cleared zone. Anxious to avoid fighting on the rough ground,
Bessus finally committed his wing by launching a direct charge against the Macedonian right. This commitment was precisely the move Alexander
had been attempting to provoke. Keeping his Companion cavalry close by, Alexander
sent the Paeonians, and Greek mercenary and allied cavalry to join battle with the ferocious
Sacae-Bactrian horse that formed Bessus’ vanguard. The fighting here was brutal, Alexander’s
men barely succeeding in holding off the attack, with Alexander trickling in reinforcing squadrons
to lure in as much of the enemy as he could. To try and support the attack and crush Alexander’s
right flank entirely, Darius sent the chariots to support Bessus aiming for Alexander directly. Alexander’s Agrianians and archers had been
prepared for just such an attack, however. They intercepted the charge, decimating the
Persian charioteers with arrows and javelins and quickly parting ranks, allowing the hypaspists
to mop up any survivors. Though the chariots had been easily neutralized,
the battle was still very much on the wire. Alexander’s cavalry on the right was under
serious pressure, with some of the Persian cavalry even having made it around to the
Macedonian camp, and Parmenion’s left half of army had also been engaged, the extreme
left flank having to bend inwards to absorb the attack. Moreover, all the dust that had been kicked
up by the battle made it impossible for Alexander and Parmenion to have a solid understanding
of how the battle was progressing on either flank. At this point, Darius committed the last of
Bessus’ cavalry to flank around Alexander’s extreme right to encircle the Macedonians
there and destroy them. It was a sound move but, in doing so, it created
a gap between Darius’ center and the now engaged cavalry on his left. This, was the moment that Alexander had been
waiting for. While his last cavalry reserves were sent
to check the encircling move, Alexander ordered his half of the phalanx to attack the Persian
center while he charged at the head of the Companion cavalry through the gap straight
for Darius. Fierce fighting broke out around the two kings,
both fighting alongside some of their most elite forces. Arrian, often more flattering of Alexander
and damning of Darius, claims that the Persian king fled almost instantly, however, this
is contradicted by both Diodorus and Curtius Rufus. In their accounts, the Persian king fought
bravely from his chariot alongside his men, while Alexander and his Companions cut a path
towards him, Darius’ chariot driver getting killed by a javelin just inches from Darius
himself. Realizing now that his section of the battle
was lost, Darius once again decided it was best to live and fight another day and fled
the battle. Many of the units around Darius’ position
also began to rout and Bessus’ cavalry, still locked in combat, was forced to disengage
and withdraw, lest they be surrounded. As Alexander’s portion of the army gave
chase, it seemed that victory had been achieved and that all that was needed was to catch
Darius and the Persian Empire would fall. It was at this moment though, that a messenger
arrived from Parmenion: his half of the army was on the brink of destruction. They had been fighting a desperate holding
action against Mazaeus’ forces throughout the battle, and when Alexander had ordered
the fateful advance, the left battalions of the phalanx had become bogged down in fighting,
creating a gap in Alexander’s line. Persian and Indian cavalry had broken through
this gap, engaging Alexander’s Greek reserves, while more cavalry flanked around Parmenion’s
position to attack from the flank. Faced with the choice of capturing Darius
or saving Parmenion, Alexander chose Parmenion, rallying the Companions and smashing into
the Persian right flank from the rear. The fighting was not easy, Hephaestion and
Coenus both getting injured in the struggle here, but they were finally able to rout the
last Persian elements and win the battle. How many casualties were sustained on either
side is, as is often the case with Alexander’s battles, almost impossible to know, with ancient
sources suggesting Alexander's losses were roughly 1,000 while the Persians lost 30,000. While these numbers should be taken with a
pinch of salt, one thing is for sure: Gaugamela was Alexander’s masterpiece. Against a numerically superior foe who had
chosen and prepared the battlefield specifically for the battle, Alexander had won a brilliant
victory. His strategy of enticing Darius’ entire
left flank before charging through the gap was ingenious and would be echoed by two other
great military leaders, Napoleon at Austerlitz and the Duke of Marlborough at Blenheim. Undeniably, the victory was partly a result
of the discipline of Alexander’s army as well as the talent of his subordinates, most
notably Parmenion. But the turning point of the battle rested
solely upon Alexander’s ability to read the battlefield, his timing, and his personal
leadership. Alexander had gambled everything on himself,
and he had won. With the defeat of the last of the Great King’s
organized forces, the Persian heartland, which had some of the greatest cities in the world
at the time, was left open to Alexander. It was now time to move east into the great
expanse of the Persian Empire, where Darius was to be captured, and Alexander could move
on to the world's edge. Following his defeat at Gaugamela, Darius
withdrew to Media, effectively abandoning two of Persia’s greatest cities, Babylon
and Susa, as he knew that Eastern Provinces could sustain the war effort. The main thing Darius needed was time and
he hoped that Alexander would be distracted by two of the wealthiest cities of the Empire
long enough for Darius to rebuild his forces. Alexander arrived at Babylon around October
23rd, 331BC. The city, which had rebelled against Persian
rule numerous times in its history, welcomed him with gifts. Babylon was one of the most impressive cities
in the world and Alexander treated his men to a well-deserved month-long rest during
which they were reinforced by men from Greece, Macedonia, and Thrace, including approximately
15,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. While his men enjoyed the luxuries, wine,
and women, Alexander occupied himself with administration. Satraps were appointed, mainly Hellenes from
Macedonia or the Greek city-states, but with one notable exception: the Persian satrap
of Babylon, Mazaeus. This was the same Mazaeus who had so nearly
overrun the Macedonian left flank at Gaugamela and was allowed to retain his position as
satrap, having surrendered Babylon without a fight. This, combined with Alexander’s partaking
in Babylonian religious ceremonies, made some of Alexander’s companions uneasy. Alexander had professed to be invading Persia
as revenge for the Persian attacks on the Greeks: appointing Persians and taking part
in Eastern rites seemed to fly in the face of that agenda. This attempt to blend Eastern and Hellenic
cultures would prove to be a consistent theme in Alexander’s life from this point onwards. From Babylon, Alexander marched the 200 miles
to Susa in 20 days. Following Gaugamela, he had already sent men
ahead to secure the city's surrender, and once again the city was taken without a fight,
Alexander also finding almost 50,000 talents worth of gold and silver. Back in Greece, Agis III of Sparta’s revolt
had finally begun and Alexander was now able to send a large amount of money back to Macedonia
to help Antipater stay on top of the situation, as well making sure to pay his own troops
a generous bonus for their service so far. With the funds provided by Alexander, and
having dealt with a minor revolt in Thrace, Antipater now turned his attention to the
rebellious Spartan king. Agis had attempted to stir up many of the
Greek city-states, particularly Athens. However, even Demosthenes, the long-term rival
of Philip and Alexander, now accepted that Macedonian hegemony was too powerful: Agis
and his Spartans were left with only a handful of allies from the Peloponnese on their side. The Persians had also only been able to fund
Agis with a fraction of the money he had wanted, but this nevertheless had been enough to raise
an army of approximately 20,000. Included in these ranks were 8,000 Greek mercenaries
that had fought on the Persian side at Issus, providing Agis with a well-trained and disciplined
force. He had already achieved a minor victory over
a Macedonian force in the Peloponnese and so had good cause to be confident as he laid
siege to Megalopolis, which had remained loyal to the Macedonians. Antipater, however, was not an easy foe: he
was a veteran politician and general who had served for many years under Philip prior to
Alexander’s reign. He now amassed a force of 40,000 and marched
South, meeting the Spartans for battle on a narrow plain just outside Megalopolis. Details about the battle are, unfortunately,
very sparse. What we do know is that the battle was closely
fought, the narrowness of the battlefield allowing the Spartans to hold out for a remarkably
long time, despite being outnumbered almost 2:1 and at one point even managing to break
the Macedonian line. Just as the battle seemed to be turning in
the Spartan’s favor, however, Agis III was badly wounded a number of times and was carried
from the battle. His men continued to fight, but without their
commander they began to lose cohesion and Antipater’s force was finally able to break
the Spartan line. The Spartan army retreated, taking the wounded
Agis with them. Agis knew that his wounds were fatal however,
and ordered that he be left behind. On his knees, Agis is said to have fought
on in an attempt to buy time for his countrymen to escape, before finally being killed by
a javelin. By the end of the day, the Spartan army had
suffered 5,300 dead in exchange for 1,000-3,000 Macedonians. The defeat and death of Agis put an end to
the revolt, with Sparta and her allies paying homage to Alexander in the aftermath. It had been an important battle that could
have seriously jeopardize Alexander’s campaign if Antipater had lost, but when Alexander
heard news of his victory, he dismissed it as a battle between mice. Alexander did not spend long in Susa, though. Darius was still his priority and so, rather
than wait out the winter in the city, Alexander headed to the Zagros Mountains. The Zagros Mountains were in the territory
of the warlike Uxian tribe. The Persians had never been able to completely
subdue the tribe, settling for an agreement, where the Persians paid a fee to the Uxians
if they needed to pass through their lands, in return for which the Uxians would not bother
the Persians. When Alexander approached, the Uxians similarly
demanded that he also pay the fee. Alexander seemed to agree to this, sending
messengers requesting a meeting in the defiles to pay the tax. Precisely what happened next is not clear,
and our sources differ drastically. According to Arrian, after sending the messengers
to the Uxians, Alexander was informed by men from Susa about a pass around the defile and
took a force of 1,000 hypaspists and another 8,000 infantry along this path. He fell upon some Uxian villages in the night,
killing many and forcing the remainders to flee into the mountains. Alexander then split his force, sending some
under Craterus to wait in ambush on high ground, while Alexander took his portion of the army
on a forced march to the defile, reaching it before the Uxians. From this commanding position, Alexander was
easily able to rout the Uxians, who tried to flee to the high ground but were ambushed
there by Craterus’ force and cut down. Quintus Curtius Rufus, however, gives a very
different account. He claims that Alexander sent a force of 2,500
light infantry under Tauron, one of his lieutenants, to take the path around the Uxians position. Alexander, meanwhile, led the main force in
a difficult siege of an Uxian city. Siege towers were built, and the Uxians inflicted
many casualties from their strong defensive position. Alexander kept up the attacks, however, until
Tauron finally emerged behind the Uxians position, at which point they surrendered. The two accounts have enough similarities
that they are surely discussing the same battle, but they seem almost impossible to reconcile. In general, Arrian’s history was better
researched, as he primarily used two eye-witness accounts. His work undoubtedly has flaws, often overlooking
some of the more negative actions of Alexander and assuming some of the biases of the eye-witness
sources, but as a military man, he was more reliable when it comes to military affairs. In comparison, Rufus’ has only one source
- Cleitarchus, who was not an eyewitness, and was generally considered by the ancients
to be an excellent writer, but an inaccurate historian. Rufus did use other sources as well, but his
work was often more interested in the psychology of Alexander than the military details. As such, Arrian’s version is generally the
one that is preferred. Whichever version is favored though, the outcome
was the same. The Uxians sued for peace, sending messages
to Darius’ mother to entreat on their behalf. Alexander agreed, enforcing a yearly tribute
of horses and livestock from the Uxians and then pressing on into Persis, the heart of
the Persian Empire. Before crossing the mountains into Persis,
Alexander split his army in two. Parmenion would take the less direct, but
easier route, leading the Thessalian cavalry, Greek allies and other mercenaries along with
the baggage train. Alexander, meanwhile, would lead the main
phalanx, Companions, light cavalry, Agrarians, and archers, approximately 14,000-20,000 men,
on a forced march through the mountains, aiming for the Persian ceremonial capital of Persepolis. Unbeknownst to Alexander, a Persian force
under the command of Ariobarzanes, a veteran of Gaugamela, had built a makeshift wall across
the narrow pass through the mountains, known as the Persian Gate, and was waiting for him. The exact size of Ariobarzanes’ army is
of some debate. Ancient sources give Ariobarzanes numbers
as being between 40,000 and 25,000 infantry with a few hundred cavalry, while some modern
writers give a number as low as 700 total. The number of 40,000 is likely exaggerated,
as was the often case with Greek sources giving Persian numbers, but the number of 700 is
almost certainly too low. In order to arrive at such a low number, one
would have to almost completely disregard the ancient sources entirely, and assume that
the Persians fielded only a fraction of their total military power to defend the capital. Leading experts on Alexander, such as Heckel,
Worthington, Borza and Lane Fox, tend to agree that the ancient sources which claim 40,000
are too large, usually preferring the sources that give their numbers as, at maximum, 25,000. Alexander’s force passed through the narrow
gorge, until they found their way blocked by the wall. Suddenly, Ariboarzanes men attacked the Macedonian
column from both sides, showering Alexander’s ranks with a mix of missile fire and rocks. The Macedonians took severe casualties in
this initial ambush, with the terrain making it almost impossible for Alexander’s men
to fight effectively. As more of his men were killed or wounded,
Alexander signaled a retreat. The narrow pass made such a withdrawal difficult
however, and his men were continuously harassed by arrows and javelins from the Persians. Finally, though, Alexander’s force managed
to extract itself from the gorge and establish a camp. While encamped, Alexander had any Persian
prisoners that had recently been taken brought to him, and questioned about any other routes
around the Persian position. One of these prisoners had been a shepherd
in the area and, in return for a hefty reward, agreed to show Alexander a path around Arizobarnes
defences. Taking the majority of the army with himself,
Alexander made for this path, leaving Craterus with approximately 3,000 infantry, 500 cavalry
and archers in the camp and with orders to light extra fires at night to make it appear
as if the entire army was still there. Alexander’s force departed in the night. It was still mid-winter, and the mountain
cold and rough terrain made it a particularly difficult journey. Part way through, Alexander came to a split
in the mountain path; one of these led more directly to Ariobarzanes position, the other
circled even further behind, leading to the Persian camp. Alexander ordered Philotas and 3,000 men to
take the first, while he led the remaining force along the second path around the Persian
camp. After a day and two nights of grueling marching,
Alexander’s men were finally in position. After resting his men, Alexander began the
attack falling upon the Persian camp and blasting trumpets as he did so. At this signal, the forces of Craterus and
Philotas also attacked the Persians who now found themselves attacked on three sides. Ariobarzanes' men fought back bravely and
desperately, despite being almost completely surrounded. It soon became clear, however, that the battle
was lost, and Ariobarzanes, along with 40 cavalry, were able to cut their way out of
the encirclement and escape. The rest of the Persian force was cut down
to a man. It is not exactly clear how long Ariobarzanes
and his men had been able to delay Alexander, but some modern sources suggest it had been
almost a month. The amount of casualties the Macedonians took
is also not given in the sources, though it seems clear that they were significant. Though Ariobarzanes had fought bravely, his
fate is not clear. Arrian says he simply escaped into the hills,
while Rufus says that he fled to Persepolis but found the gates barred to him, and was
eventually killed by Alexander’s men. Despite the losses and delay, however, Alexander
had once again managed to salvage victory and the route to Persepolis now lay open to
him. The governor of Persepolis sent messages to
Alexander and, with Ariobarzanes force having been destroyed, offered to turn the city over
to Alexander, an offer he gladly accepted. En route to the city, a number of sources
mention that Alexander’s army came across a group of Greeks on the road, usually given
as numbering 800, all of whom were old and mutilated. They had all apparently been skilled craftsmen,
captured by the Persians and mutilated in order to prevent them from escaping. Moved to pity at the sight of them, Alexander
made sure to award land, riches, and grain to all of them, ensuring that they would live
out their remaining days in luxury. How true or not this story is, is hard to
say. Alexander certainly was known as a generous
man who often gave lavish gifts, however, given the later actions of Alexander and his
army in Persepolis, it may be that these mutilated Greeks were an invention of pro-Alexander
sources to justify the subsequent events. Upon entering Persepolis, sometime in January
of 330BC, Alexander claimed the Persian massive Persian treasury of 120,000 talents, sending
the majority back to Susa. Persepolis was one of the richest and most
brilliant cities in the world at the time, and many of Alexander’s men took to looting
the city. Whether this was on Alexander’s orders,
and the extent of the looting, is debated. Arrian is silent on the issue, but Diodorus
and Rufus paint a grim picture. According to them, looting was ordered by
Alexander specifically, and the Macedonians proceeded to kill many civilians, with some
Persians preferring to kill themselves instead. The Macedonians spent an entire day looting
houses and palaces, and even fought and killed one another in order to get the most, and
best riches. Alexander himself celebrated his winning of
the city by banqueting and drinking in the palaces of the Persian kings with his Companions
and courtesans. Diodorus, Plutarch, and Rufus all claim that
during this drinking session, an Athenian courtesan, called Thais, proposed that they
should burn the Persian palaces down, pointing out how ironic it would be for an Athenian
woman to be burning the Persian capital after they had burned Athens 150 years earlier. The drunk Macedonians welcomed the suggestion
and led by either Thais or inebriated Alexander himself, burned the renowned palaces of Persepolis. A slightly different account is given by Arrian,
who does not mention Thais or Alexander being drunk, instead saying that Alexander burnt
the palaces as a calculated act of revenge for the burning of Athens. It is possible that Thais was simply being
used as a scapegoat to try and exonerate Alexander, whose destruction of Thebes had already shown
that he certainly had the capacity to destroy great cities to make a political statement. What is clear from all the sources, however,
is that none of them approved of this decision. Arrian says that it was, in essence, simply
a foolish decision by Alexander, particularly because he was effectively burning what was
now his own property. Plutarch includes a hasty apologia that Alexander
regretted his decision and ordered the fires to be put out. Diodorus says that it was done by Alexander
in a “drunken madness”. Rufus’ account is perhaps the most poignant:
“Such was the end of the capital of the entire Orient, from which so many nations
once sought jurisdiction, the birthplace of so many kings, once the special terror of
Greece…and not even in the long age which followed its destruction did it rise again”. Rufus was exaggerating somewhat, much of the
city remained standing, the fire being concentrated on the palaces and surrounding buildings,
but it nonetheless gives us an insight into how ancient authors viewed the episode: it
was a case of needless and pointless destruction. Alexander spent approximately four months
in and around Persepolis, at some point during this time making a 30-day excursion to Pasargadae,
the old Persian capital. Sometime around May, the Macedonian king continued
his pursuit of Darius, heading into Media. Darius, who had been in Ecbatana, heard of
Alexander’s movements. Though Darius had been planning to amass a
third great army to fight Alexander, he had thus far been unsuccessful and so, with a
few thousand men, he fled Ecbatana, hoping to retreat further into the Eastern provinces
of the Empire. Alexander, in turn, sent Parmenion and the
slow-moving baggage train, loaded with money, to seize the now abandoned Ecbatana, while
he led approximately 20,000 men in pursuit of Darius. His plan, initially, was to catch Darius before
he could pass through the Caspian Gates, the passes in the Alborz Mountains that led from
Media to Parthia and Hyrcania. Alexander led his men on a grueling 10 day
forced march through the difficult terrain, enduring their dehydration and suffering alongside
them. Despite their efforts though, upon reaching
the gates they discovered that Darius had already passed through them. Alexander allowed his men a few days of rest,
before pushing on again through the Gates towards Parthia. The speed of Alexander’s march was having
an effect though. In Darius’ camp, more and more of his remaining
generals and advisors were losing faith in him. Led primarily by Bessus, the satrap of Bactria,
a conspiracy formed against the Great King. Some in the army remained loyal, notably the
remaining Greek mercenaries, commanded by a man named Patron, and Artabazos. Nevertheless, the cracks were clear; Bessus’
faction even suggested to Darius that he make Bessus king instead, on the understanding
that Bessus would return the kingship after defeating Alexander, an offer Darius, understandably,
refused. Patron tried to convince Darius to accept
his Greek mercenaries as his bodyguards, but Darius refused not wanting to seem like he
was favouring the Greeks. Eventually, Darius accepted his fate. He dismissed his servants and inner circle,
assuring them that he would “prefer to die by another’s crime rather than my own”. He then waited in his tent, and was promptly
seized by Bessus and his allies and put in chains. Bessus, a part of the Achaemenid dynasty himself,
proclaimed himself King, taking the name Artaxerxes V. The Greek mercenaries and others who had been
loyal to Darius, dispersed, the remaining troops continuing under Bessus’ command. Word of Darius' capture soon reached Alexander
late one night through deserters. Alexander immediately picked 500 of his best
cavalry and set off in pursuit. They rode at breakneck pace for a day and
two nights, and by dawn of the second day, they had closed in on Bessus’ party. Bessus’ force, having been on a continuous
march and depleted by numerous desertions, was in no position to fight, and many fled
seeing Alexander closing in, Bessus and his Bactrians among them. Before he fled however, Bessus made sure that
Darius would not be able to concede the crown to Alexander, ordering him to be killed. A small skirmish was fought between Alexander
and the few Persians that had not fled, and a search for Darius began. He was soon found by one of Alexander’s
Companions, Polystratus. The Great King had been stabbed by javelins
and was on the brink of death. He asked for water, and after drinking thanked
Polystratus and, according to some sources, asked that Alexander be thanked for treating
his family with kindness. By the time that Alexander arrived on the
scene, Darius had died. Alexander ordered that his body be transported
back to Persepolis, where he received a magnificent funeral and was buried alongside the other
Persian kings. Darius III is often seen by many as having
been an incompetent coward. This is thanks largely to a passage of Arrian
who calls him “pre-eminently effeminate” in military matters, a view that, for a while,
was largely agreed upon even in academic scholarship. More recently though, this idea has been challenged,
notably by Badian and Marsden. In terms of his personal bravery, Justin and
Diodorus both agree that Darius was renowned for his courage, having in his youth killed
a Cadusian champion in single combat. Indeed, it was partly because of his bravery
that he was chosen to be King. The fact that at both Issus and Gaugamela,
Darius took to the field personally rather than delegating to a subordinate is a further
testament to his courage. Though he retreated in each battle, the sources
are clear that Darius only fled when things were looking disastrous. At Issus, for instance, the horses pulling
his chariot had both been badly wounded, almost leaving him stranded, and at Gaugamela, his
chariot driver was killed and himself possibly wounded. In terms of military matters, while there
is no need to portray Darius as a military genius, he was not utterly incompetent. Darius was forced to take to the field after
the death of Memnon of Rhodes, and in just a few months had amassed a significant army
to confront Alexander at Issus; no small feat of logistics. At Issus, Darius had actually managed to get
a leg up on Alexander by cutting off his supply line and forcing a battle. Moreover, he had chosen a reasonable battlefield
that gave him a strong defensive position, albeit at the cost of not giving his cavalry
room to move. But Darius learned from the mistake and picked
an excellent location for his next battle at Gaugamela where he would be able to best
utilise his key strengths, his numbers and cavalry. Prior to battle, he also made sure to drill
his troops extensively to increase their discipline. On both occasions, he was outmatched by Alexander. However, being defeated by one of history’s
greatest tacticians is no source of shame. It is also worth pointing out that, at Gaugamela
in particular, the Persians were able to force a gap in the Macedonian line and almost crush
the Macedonian left. The battle was only won because of Alexander’s
masterful and audacious generalship, and Darius may well have been victorious against a lesser
opponent. Darius’ fleeing from both battles is often
cited as clear evidence of his incompetence. However, it is worth pointing out that on
both occasions retreating was, probably, the best strategic decision. If Darius had died or been captured at Issus,
for example, it is likely that Alexander would have been easily able to proclaim himself
as the King of Persia there and then. Darius’ survival from both battles was crucial
for there to be any kind of organized Persian resistance to the invaders. As a result, it is perhaps better to treat
Darius as Alexander did: with respect. The death of Darius III marks the end of the
first half of Alexander’s campaign. The apparent goal of the campaign, the destruction
of the Persian Empire, had been effectively achieved. However, if there is one aspect of Alexander
that is agreed upon by all historians, it is that he was relentlessly ambitious. As a young boy, Aristotle had taught Alexander
geography, and he was aware of lands to the East and the great Ocean that lay that way. Already, he was making plans for the next
phase of his campaign. Why stick to the confines of the borders of
Persia when the world seemed to be within his grasp? Our next episode will deal with Alexander’s
campaigns in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, as well as his route back to his capital,
the reforms he tried to enact and his death. These long episodes are difficult to make,
so we hope you will consider liking, commenting, sharing, subscribing and pressing the bell
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