The first century BC was a time of great men
in Rome. Great, but destructive men such as Sulla,
Marius, Cicero, Cato, Crassus, Pompey, and Caesar. Each individually had the skills and abilities
to bring glory and prosperity to Rome, but they were often in conflict and the conflict
between Caesar and Pompey would lead to the destruction of the Republic which had lasted
for almost 450 years. This is the story of the Great Roman Civil
War. These long videos are very difficult to make,
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the subscription! In order to fully understand how the Great
Roman Civil War, also known as Caesar’s Civil War, began, we need to grasp the cultural
and historical background. Since the mid-2nd century BC the Roman Republic
had started fracturing with the assassination of the Gracchi brothers, who had campaigned
for land redistribution. Their deaths underlined the growing social
divide between the upper and lower classes in Rome, and the instability carried on into
the following decades with revolts in Sicily, the Social war with Italian allies, and ultimately
the civil wars of Sulla and Marius at the start of the first century BC. Those two showed the political rift between
those who believed power came from the plebs, the Populares like Marius, and those who believed
power came from the Senate, the Optimates, such as Sulla. Moreover, their war had exposed flaws in the
Roman Republican system, proving that politics could be easily subverted through military
power. Though after his victory Sulla had, as Dictator,
introduced legislation to try and stop anyone following in his footsteps, the precedent
had already been set; a general could march on Rome, take it by force, and impose his
own will on the Republic. If enough soldiers were personally loyal to
an individual general, the Senators could do little to curtail that man's power. Furthermore, the Republic’s constitution,
with its numerous checks and balances, was proving to be one of the crucial factors in
its destruction: powerful politicians were able to paralyze the government by blocking
the legislation they disagreed with. Often it took either a dictatorship or martial
law to break the stalemate. It was in this political environment that
the first triumvirate had emerged. Consisting of Crassus, Pompey and Caesar the
triumvirate dictated political life for the majority of the era. Crassus was an established politician and
the richest man in Rome, bankrolling the triumvirate and paying bribes as necessary. Pompey was Rome’s most accomplished general. Following the Social War, he fought alongside
Sulla in his Civil War and later led campaigns in Sicily, Africa, Pontus and Syria. This brought him large amounts of wealth,
numerous political allies, and the loyalty of thousands of veterans. Caesar, at 41 years old, was the youngest
and least established of the 3. He had held the positions of quaestor and
aedile, and had shown promise as a praetor in Spain. However, Caesar was pontifex maximus, the
highest religious official in Rome. Through this office, Caesar had the power
to pass divine laws and to postpone elections due to signs from the gods. Additionally, as one of the leaders of the
Populares, Caesar had already established himself as a populist, and had significant
clout with the masses. By 59 BC the Triumvirate was established. Caesar was already indebted to Crassus, and
his alliance with Pompey was solidified by marrying his daughter Julia to Pompey. Though never an official coalition, these
three men controlled almost every aspect of the Republic. Crassus influenced the Senate and aristocracy,
the Optimates, with bribes. Pompey's military prestige effectively gave
him control of the veterans and the way they would vote. And Caesar could control the masses. With the support of Pompey and Crassus, Caesar
was elected to the consulship in 59 BC, and immediately passed land reform legislation
to provide land to Pompey's veterans, and ratified Pompey’s Eastern conquests. Initially, following Caesar’s consulship,
the Senate made him an overseer of woods and pastures in Italy rather than a governor of
a province as was the norm for an ex-consul. However, the Triumvirate was able to overturn
this decision: Caesar was given the governorship of Illyria, Cisalpine Gaul and Transalpine
Gaul, along with four legions, for the extent of 5 years as opposed to the usual one. Though it is clear that the Triumvirates did
abuse their power to achieve their own means, it did benefit Rome in some ways, pushing
through much-needed laws, such as the settling of veterans, without risk of the Senate creating
a stalemate. In this same year, Clodius Pulcher became
Tribune of the Plebs. Clodius had given up his patrician status
to hold the position, and used it to push a number of populist reforms with the support
of the Triumvirate, such as the establishment of a grain dole. Clodius had also learned how effective violence
could be in politics and had put together trained gangs who would harass and assault
any politicians who got in his way, and he was even able to force the influential Cicero
into exile. After just one year of Clodius and his gangs
ruling the streets of Rome, it became clear that the Triumvirate would not be able to
control him. Clodius had even gone so far as to attempt
to assassinate Pompey when the latter suggested recalling Cicero from exile. In response, Pompey allowed another tribune,
Milo, an Optimate, to raise his own gangs to counter Clodius’. No weapons were meant to be allowed in Rome,
but each side secretly armed themselves with daggers and swords, employing thugs and even
gladiators. For the next few years, the two tribunes and
their gangs battled regularly in the streets. Rome was in chaos. In 56 BC Pompey and Crassus forced the extension
of Caesar’s governorship by another 5 years meaning that his term would now total 10 years,
from 59-49BC, while Caesar sent his veterans to Rome to ensure their election to the consulate
for the year 55-54BC. However, soon after, the Triumvirate began
to fracture. In 54 BC Julia died in childbirth, severing
the personal connection between the two triumvirs. In 53 BC Crassus embarked on his disastrous
Parthian campaign, subsequently dying at the Battle of Carrhae. Moreover, the following year, Clodius was
killed by Milo. With Clodius dead and the Triumvirate broke,
Pompey and Caesar were left as the two most powerful men in Rome. Chaos in the city only increased, as during
Clodius’ funeral, his supporters started a riot. His body was taken to the Senate house to
be burnt on a pyre, and the Senate building itself was destroyed. In desperation, the Senate turned to Pompey. In 52BC Pompey was named sole Consul and given
extraordinary powers. Soldiers were marched into the capital, trials
held under armed guard, and executions made. This was ruthless but effective, and order
was restored. The Senate awarded Pompey with an extended
term of governance of Hispania, as well as powers similar to those that Caesar held in
Gaul. Pompey decided to leave the governance of
his provinces to lieutenants. His quelling of the riots had bought him the
adoration of the Senate and Optimates, and he was not willing to give up such power and
influence by leaving Rome. The Senate had their own ambitions. With Clodius dead, Caesar was left as the
leader of the Populares. Cato and other Senators were becoming increasingly
worried that Caesar might choose to exploit his popularity and march on Rome. He was, in the Senate’s mind, a threat to
the Republic. The more this was said, the more Pompey agreed. When the Triumvirate was first formed, Pompey
had little to fear from Caesar. However, Caesar's Gallic Wars allowed him
to accumulate wealth, popularity with the masses, and a core of loyal, battle-hardened
veterans. Caesar had grown his army to around 10 Legions,
approximately 50,000 men, more than double what he had originally been assigned. Moreover, the majority of these legions had
been raised by Caesar personally, led by Caesar in battle, and thus would undoubtedly be loyal
to him. It had taken Sulla only six legions to march
on Rome, and there was every chance that Caesar could do the same. As a result, the Senate, and in particular
the prominent Cato the Younger, begun rallying an anti-Caesar alliance in the Senate, mainly
consisting of Optimates. With Pompey and Caesar already positioned
to confront each other as the two most powerful men in Rome, the Senate turned to Pompey to
lead the Optimates and remove Caesar as a threat. Caesar was simply too powerful: His army was
too large to be confronted head-on, and his popularity was too great for him to be defeated
in an election. At this time in 52 BC Caesar was still governor
of Gaul, and had applied to run for the office of consul in absentia for the year 48BC, his
term as governor ending at the end of 49BC. With 52BC being such a chaotic year with riots
in Rome, Caesar’s application had been allowed with little thought, but now presented a problem. Holding the office of governor or consul gave
Caesar legal immunity. If he ran in absentia for the consulship,
he would certainly win due to his vast popularity, and his legal immunity would continue. Moreover, he would be able to use this term
as consul to push legislation to protect himself. It was undeniable that Caesar had committed
crimes as consul, including stirring political violence against a fellow consul, as well
as crimes as a governor by instigating wars in Gaul and Britain that were not authorized
by the Senate. The Senate could not defeat Caesar militarily,
nor could they defeat him in the voting booths. A solution was needed. Cato had already made it clear that given
an opportunity, he would put Caesar on trial himself. All that was needed was for Caesar to be a
private citizen. To achieve this, in 52BC Cato ran for consulships
for the year 51BC, hoping to use consular power to deprive Caesar of his command. Cato lost, however, and Caesar’s governance
continued. For the next two years, the Senate, headed
by Cato, increasingly demanded Caesar’s resignation, whilst the Caesarean, headed
by Curio and Mark Antony, both Plebeian Tribunes, blocked and vetoed such legislation. Through a somewhat contrived reading of the
law that Pompey and Crassus had passed extending Caesar’s term, the Senate insisted that
Caesar’s term ended in 50BC, ordering him to relinquish his command. Caesar refused, knowing that as soon as he
lost his legal immunity the Senate would have him put on trial. He also knew that his governorship was, in
fact, legal, and that he had the right to continue it until the previously agreed date
at the end of 49BC. In December 50BC, Pompey offered to resign
his command if Caesar would first. The Caesareans opposed this, insisting that
Pompey be first to resign. Neither side was willing to be exposed. That same month, Caesar marched with one Legion
to Ravenna, and wrote a letter to the Senate attempting to negotiate, again insisting that
if Pompey resigned his command first, so would he. Whether Caesar marched his Legion to Ravenna
simply to winter there, or if he meant it as an actual threat, is not clear. However, rumours spread that Caesar, in fact,
had 4 Legions with him, not just one. To the Senate, it appeared Caesar was attempting
to threaten and blackmail them. In response, they again ordered him to step
down immediately, and authorised Pompey to start amassing legions to defend Rome. Caesar, once again, attempted to negotiate. He offered to resign his governorship of Transalpine
Gaul, Cisalpine Gaul and the majority of his Legions, but requested to keep governorship
of Illyricum, along with two Legions, until the original deadline - the end of 49BC - and
that he be allowed to run for consul for 48BC, hoping to extend his legal immunity. However, this was still a reasonable deal
for the Senate, and it would achieve their aim of severely limiting Caesar’s power
and influence. Cicero acted as a mediator for the deal and
negotiated Caesar down to just one Legion and one province. Pompey was willing to accept, however, key
Optimates, including Cato and the consul Lentulus, refused the deal. Not an idealist, Pompey was viewing the Optimate
as useful political allies, but hard-line Optimates like Cato and Lentulus hated the
idea of the Senate being pressured to negotiate. On the 7th of January, the Senate voted again
to immediately strip Caesar of all his powers and armies. Once again, Caesar’s Tribunes in the Senate,
Curio and Antony, vetoed the legislation. The Senate had expected as much and passed
the Senatus Consultum Ultimum, the Final Act, an un-vetoable act that suspended all laws
and gave all powers to the Consuls, effectively declaring a national emergency, and they declared
Caesar an enemy of the state. The Consuls for the year, Lentulus and Marcellus,
both hard-line Optimates, immediately passed all their powers to Pompey, effectively giving
Pompey full control of the Roman Republic. That same night, Caesar’s allies in Rome
fled to Ravenna to join him. The stage was now set. After years of attempted negotiations, a complete
impasse had been reached. The division between the two parties, the
Populares and Optimates, was the same division that had led to the deaths of the Gracchi,
and the wars of Sulla and Marius. The Populares largely consisted of younger
men from less established families, such as Mark Anthony, Trebonius and Curio, or lesser
members of noble families, such as Decimus Brutus. The Pompeiian Optimates, on the other hand,
were mainly aristocrats of noble families, including Pompey's two sons, Gnaeus and Sextus,
Ahenobarbus, Metellus Scipio, a descendant of the famous Scipio Africanus, Cato the Younger,
and Cicero. The societal rift between these two groups,
which had first become apparent almost 100 years ago with the deaths of the Gracchi,
was about to plunge the Republic into chaos once again. On the 10th of January 49BC, Caesar left Ravenna
with the 13th Legion and his allies from Rome. They halted at a small river that marked the
border of the province of Italy; the Rubicon. It was forbidden for any general to cross
this boundary with arms or an army; to do so would be a clear declaration of war. Caesar spent a long time weighing his options. Caesar’s own family had been persecuted
and hunted in the aftermath of Sulla’s Civil War, he knew well how destructive such wars
were. However, he also knew that if he disbanded
his army, he would be likely exiled or executed. After almost a day’s deliberation, Caesar
made his choice. Alea iacta est - the die is cast. The Great Roman Civil War had begun. Following the crossing, Caesar had moved with
his tell-tale swiftness and quickly seized key locations in Northern Italy in a matter
of days. There was little resistance; these cities
had not been garrisoned to defend against any significant force, and there were many
who sympathised with Caesar against Pompey and the Optimates. As he went, he sent orders to his Gallic Legions
for reinforcements to march south and join him. In Rome itself, there was mass confusion. Pompey may have thought that if Caesar was
to go to war, he would wait for his Legions from Gaul. He hesitated and did not know whether to defend
Rome, abandon the city and fight in Italy, or abandon the peninsula altogether. If Pompey had reacted quickly, he may have
been able to levy enough troops to defeat Caesar, stopping the war before it truly began. However, conflicting reports kept Pompey in
the dark, and he had no idea that Caesar had just one under-strength Legion with him. Though Pompey could levy large numbers in
Italy, he currently only had two full Legions in the area: the veteran 1st Legion and the
15th. Both had recently been handed over by Caesar
to the Senate to fight a planned war in Syria. The 1st, having been raised by Pompey could
be trusted to fight on his behalf, but the 15th was raised by Caesar and its loyalty
was questionable. Most of Pompey’s best Legions were abroad
in either Hispania or the East. Pompey knew he could not risk being trapped
or forced into a battle he wasn’t prepared for. He had the resources of the Republic at his
disposal and could afford to fight a prolonged war. As a result, Pompey made the difficult decision
to abandon Rome. With him went the majority of the Senate,
including the two Consuls. Plutarch wrote that many Romans considered
wherever Pompey went as their country. Cassius Dio gives a much more divisive picture
of the Roman mentality, saying that in doing this Pompey had made an enemy of his supporters. Moreover, in the rush to evacuate the city,
the treasury of Rome and the temple treasures were abandoned. For Caesar, this was ideal. With the city and treasure undefended, he
was content to bypass it and claim it later, focusing instead on trying to catch Pompey,
and capturing other cities in Italy to cut off support for the Pompeians and rally more
men to his cause. Despite this fortuitous start, Caesar also
suffered a blow in these early stages of the war. When the Final Act had been passed by the
Senate, the majority of Caesar’s supporters in Rome, including Mark Anthony and Curio,
had fled to join their general. However, one of Caesar’s lieutenants was
not so eager to abandon the Senate's cause: Labienus. Labienus was still in Gaul when Caesar crossed
the Rubicon, and it’s likely that Caesar would have wanted Labienus to march his Gallic
Legions to Italy and join the fight with him there. Instead, Labienus disavowed Caesar, promising
his allegiance to the Senate, and fleeing Gaul with a personal bodyguard to join Pompey. This was a blow to Caesar personally and militarily,
as Labienus was Caesar’s right-hand man and a highly capable general, who was familiar
with his tactics, and comparable even to both Pompey and Caesar. Despite Labienus fleeing Gaul, Caesar’s
Legions still followed their orders to move towards Italy. Two of the closest Legions, the 8th and 12th,
were already beginning to cross into Italy to support their general. As Caesar continued his push south, Pompey
began to rally the defences around Capua and raise an army in the South. He still had the veteran 1st Legion, the 15th
Legion had remained loyal to him, and he had ordered many cities to raise levies against
Caesar, quickly building his numbers. However, one man, Domitius Ahenobarbus, decided
to take the initiative against Caesar. Counter to Pompey’s orders he took 30 newly
levied cohorts, equivalent to around 3 Legions to Corfinium, an important crossroads town. By the time Caesar reached Corfinium, the
8th and 12th Legion had caught up with him, giving him 3 battle-hardened Legions. Faced with such a formidable force, the Pompeian
levies lost all desire to fight. They implored Ahenobarbus to surrender, and
he reluctantly agreed. Caesar showed clemency to both the levies
and Ahenobarbus. Ahenobarbus was pardoned, but he quickly returned
to Pompey in Southern Italy to continue the fight. The levies, on the other hand, were made to
swear allegiance to Caesar, forming the 15th, 16th and 17th Legions, swelling his numbers
even further, and reducing Pompey’s without a battle even being fought. He immediately sent these men to prepare for
an invasion of Sicily and Sardinia whilst he continued south. Caesar’s leniency at Corfinium gained him
popularity across Italy, ensuring that there would be no popular uprising against him on
behalf of Pompey, and he was able to raise a further 3 Legions, the 18th, 19th and 20th,
as he marched. Pompey now had to change his plan. He knew that he would no longer be able to
fight Caesar in Italy any time soon. He abandoned his plan of fighting Caesar in
the South, and instead marched his force to Brundisium, preparing to evacuate from the
peninsula. He would go across the Adriatic and into Greece,
where Legions from the East, battle-tested and loyal, would join him, and he would be
able to muster even more men from allies and cities of the East. Moreover, he had numerous legions in Hispania,
and with their help could encircle Caesar in Italy. But first, he had to escape. Caesar needed to move fast. If he could catch Pompey in Southern Italy,
he would be able to corner and defeat him, much as had happened to Spartacus decades
earlier. As he pursued Pompey into the South, he continuously
sent envoys, insisting he would step down from command if Pompey would do the same. All such offers were refused: Pompey legally
had the authority to command armies, and Caesar was now a criminal. The time for negotiations was long gone and
it is likely Caesar himself knew this, so the envoy's true intention was likely to continue
to buy him favour with the populace as he continued to chase the Senate. In early March, Caesar and his 6 Legions caught
up with Pompey at Brundisium. By the time that Caesar arrived, Pompey had
already managed to transport half his force across the Adriatic. Caesar wasted no time, immediately besieging
the city and beginning construction of a breakwater across the harbour to block it. In response, Pompey built large towers on
merchant ships that could fire down on Caesar’s engineers to hamper their progress. The strategy was effective, and Caesar’s
engineers were unable to complete the breakwater in time. Pompey’s navy returned from Greece and,
at night, Pompey was able to evacuate his remaining force from the city. Once in Greece, Pompey marched to Thessalonica. He established his base, levying new Legions
and sending envoys to all the client kings he had made in the East, gathering Roman Legions
and foreign soldiers alike to his banner. Meanwhile, he sent subordinates to Sicily,
Sardinia and North Africa, the three key grain suppliers of Rome. Pompey would mobilise forces from across the
world to effectively besiege the whole of Italy, cutting off the grain supplies and
starving Caesar into submission. It had taken Caesar just 3 months to force
Pompey out of Rome and take Italy. Despite this, Caesar’s initial plan to end
the war quickly by capturing Pompey and the Senate, had failed. With Pompey’s escape, and with no ships
to pursue him, the chance for any quick resolution disappeared. Caesar began preparing for a prolonged war. He first marched on Rome, entering in a triumph. Quickly, he convened what was left of the
Senate in Rome, professing his ambition to save the Republic and declaring Pompey an
enemy of the state. He also plundered the treasury and temples
of Rome, allowing him to fully equip the 6 newly acquired Legions, and issued orders
for ships from all the provinces loyal to him to gather at Brundisium. These ships would take at least a year to
muster though, and Caesar could not linger for long. He realised that he could not risk being trapped
in Italy and resolved to secure his western flank. Spanish Legions constituted a significant
number of Pompey’s best soldiers and posed a threat to Gaul. Furthermore, with Pompey in the East, the
Spanish Legions, though well trained, were in Caesar’s words “an army without a leader”. Caesar would attack Pompey’s force in the
west individually, attempting to defeat them in detail before turning to Pompey. To achieve this, he sent one of the newly
raised Legions, the 16th, under his Legate Valerius to Sardinia, and two Legions, likely
the 15th and 17th, under Curio to Sicily. Together, they were to take control of the
islands and then push into Africa, securing the grain supply. Sardinia was currently held by Cotta on behalf
of Pompey, and Sicily by Cato. Cotta had no real force to speak of, and as
soon as the citizens of Sardinian capital of Caralis heard that Valerius was en route
with a Legion, they ejected Cotta, seeing no sense in attempting to resist the Caesareans. Cotta fled to Africa, and Valerius quickly
took control of the province. Cato in Sicily had attempted to make better
preparations, raising levies across Sicily, but had also not been provided with any Legions
by Pompey. He too saw a fight against two Legions with
his levies as a fruitless task, also deciding to abandon the province, joining Pompey in
Greece. With the islands taken without any resistance,
Valerius and Curio gathered their force in Sicily and prepared for the attack on Africa. Meanwhile, Caesar, after spending less than
a month in Rome, took the newly raised 18th and 19th and began his march to Spain, leaving
Mark Anthony in charge of Rome and the 8th, 12th and 13th Legions in Italy to recover,
with the 20th ready to support Curio if needed. Caesar himself aimed to march through Gaul
to Spain and meet 7 of his Legions along the way. However, Ahenobarbus, who had previously attempted
to stall Caesar at Corfinium, had already been dispatched by Pompey to Gaul and he was
currently on his way to the city of Massilia, an important city on the route to Spain. Caesar arrived at the city before Ahenobarbus
sometime in early April, but found the gates already closed and the Massilians preparing
their defences, calling on local tribes for help and collecting in grain. Caesar attempted to negotiate with the Massilians
who, perhaps stalling for time, stated their neutrality in the war. However, once Ahenobarbus did arrive they
became more proactive, attacking nearby shipping in order to bolster their supplies. With their force numbering approximately 8,000
men, this could have developed into a prolonged siege, something Caesar simply did not have
the time for. He needed to be in Spain, not bogged down
in a siege in Gaul. As such, he left the 3 legions with Trebonius
in control, while Decimus Brutus, who had proved his knack for naval command against
the Venetii, was to command 12 ships. Caesar then continued to Spain with a bodyguard
of approximately 900 cavalry. Another Legate of Caesar’s, Fabius, had
been sent with 3 Legions in advance to make a foothold in Spain, taking control of the
Pyrenean passes. Soon another 3 legions from Gaul, as well
as auxiliaries, joined them. Caesarion forces would have been approximately
25-30,000 legionaries, 5,000 auxiliaries and 6,000 cavalry, all veterans of the Gallic
Wars. Now united, they began to push past the Pyrenees
and into the Iberian Peninsula. The Pompeian forces in Spain were just as
formidable. Spain had been assigned to Pompey as his province
to govern, but he had left this responsibility to three of his Legates: Marcus Varro was
more a scholar than a soldier, but Lucius Afranius and Marcus Petreius each had almost
30 years military experience behind them, as well as experience fighting in Iberia during
the Sertorian Wars. Afranius and Petreius would take 5 Legions
plus auxiliaries to confront Caesar, while Varro would defend Further Spain with two
Legions as a reserve. In total, by Caesar’s account, Afranius
and Petreius commanded approximately 27,500 legionaries, 8,000 auxiliaries, and perhaps
10,000 cavalry. The Pompeian forces had encamped in a strong
position on high ground on the west side of the River Sicoris, just outside the hilltop
town of Ilerda which controlled a stone bridge - a key access point into the peninsula. When Fabius arrived with Caesar’s Legions,
he saw that crossing the bridge would be nigh impossible given the Pompeians strong position,
and so constructed two new wooden bridges across the river, 6km apart, and also encamped
on the western bank. As the Pompeians had arrived beforehand, they
had already stripped the western bank of most supplies, forcing Fabius to send foraging
parties across the bridges to the eastern bank. These foraging parties and their escorts often
skirmished with the Pompeian cavalry, but there was no major conflict. However, on one of these occasions, Fabius
sent two Legions across to the east bank to forage, with a strong cavalry escort to follow
and protect the foraging parties, when a sudden storm swept in, destroying the bridge nearest
to the Fabian camp. The cavalry was stuck on the western bank,
with the Legions and foraging party on the eastern bank. Afranius wasted no time in seizing upon such
an opportunity, immediately sending 4 Legions and all his cavalry across the stone bridge
to attack the beleaguered Caesareans. The Caesarean Legions were well trained and
experienced, quickly forming a defensive square on high ground with the foraging party in
the center. Heavily outnumbered, the Caesarean forces
held their formation while being assaulted from all sides by Pompeian infantry and cavalry. Despite their discipline, it would only be
a matter of time before the formation broke and the soldiers were slaughtered. Fortunately, Fabius had also reacted quickly
to the situation, sending another 2 Legions across the river via the second bridge 6km
away. Upon their arrival, the Pompeians broke off
their attack, not wanting to wholly commit without their full force. They returned to camp, allowing the Caesareans
to make an orderly retreat back to theirs. The sources do not give us an idea of how
many casualties the Caesareans sustained, but it is likely given the situation that
they would have been significant, and certainly more than the Pompeians. A couple of days after this engagement, sometime
in June, Caesar arrived at the camp with his bodyguard. Fabius, despite the prior engagement, had
fulfilled his duties well; he had pushed through the Pyrenees, established a foothold, and
kept Afranius in place until Caesar arrived. Nonetheless, Caesar quickly took control of
the situation, finishing the repairs on the first bridge started by Fabius and then going
on the offensive. Leaving just 500 men in the first Fabian camp,
Caesar marched the rest of his force nearer the town of Ilerda, offering battle to Afranius. Afranius did bring his force out of camp,
but held them on the high ground refusing to attack. He was no fool, and would not sacrifice his
strong position so easily. Seeing that Afranius would not be drawn into
a pitched battle, Caesar deployed his Legions in three lines just 200m from Afranius’
camp. The first two acted as a screen whilst the
backline dug trenches as the start of a fortified camp. The plan worked, and Caesar’s force was
able to retreat behind these defences for the night. The next day, he expanded on the defences,
assigning one Legion to each side of the camp, the other 3 acting as a defensive line. Afranius tried to use his force to harass
the workers, but Caesar’s 3 defensive Legions were able to prevent them from doing any real
damage. With the camp now fully fortified, Caesar
ordered the 500 men and baggage from the Fabian camp to join him in the new camp. Caesar soon noted a mound between Afranius’
camp and Ilerda, and determined to take and fortify it, thereby cutting off Afranius from
the supplies in the town. Starving out an enemy by such tactics was
a favoured strategy of Caesar, and he had tried something very similar at Gergovia against
Vercingetorix. Gathering 3 legions, the 9th, 14th and likely
the 10th, he drew them up for battle. Caesar first sent the vanguard of the 14th
to charge the mound, hoping to take it quickly and hold it while the rest of Caesar’s Legions
followed up in good order. However, Afranius was quick to react, sending
his own force to charge the mound. Afranius’ men gained the top first and with
the advantage of the high ground, forced the men of the 14th to retreat back to their standards. Afranius reinforced his men and attempted
to push his advantage, chasing Caesar’s men and beginning to push the now shaken 14th
Legion on Caesar’s right flank. Caesar himself notes how fiercely Afranius’
men fought. Long campaigns against Iberian tribes had
made these men battle-hardened and fierce fighters, who fought in a looser formation
than Caesar’s Legions. Caesar’s right flank began slowly giving
ground, the 14th attempting to retreat to higher ground. Seeing his line on the brink of breaking,
Caesar ordered the 9th legion to support his right flank, pushing back the Pompeian forces. The Pompeians quickly retreated to a stronger
defensive location, taking up positions on the high ground outside the walls of Ilerda. The 9th Legion, thinking the Pompeians were
routing, pursued them, but quickly found themselves caught in a precarious situation. The slope of the hill that Ilerda was situated
on was narrow, funneling the 9th, and exposing them to a hail of missiles from the Pompeians
on the high ground. The fighting was bitter, with each force sending
reinforcing cohorts to refresh the front lines. For 5 hours the two forces struggled on the
slope below the town. In a last bid to salvage the situation, Caesar
ordered his infantry to charge the lines, pushing over the crest of the slope and forcing
the Pompeians against the walls of the city. With the crest of the slope gained, Caesar’s
cavalry was finally allowed room to maneuver, and charged between the forces, allowing Caesar’s
Legions to retreat in good order to their camp. In Caesar’s account, he portrays this as
a draw, saying 70 of his men died, with 600 wounded, compared to 200 Pompeiians dead. The reality is that Caesar lost the day. Given the situation that Caesar’s Legions
were fighting in and their need to retreat, it is far more likely that Caesar’s men
suffered more casualties. Moreover, Caesar had failed to take the mound
as he had originally hoped. Instead, by the end of the day, the Pompeians
held and fortified the mound. This was Caesar’s first fight against other
Roman Legions. He had underestimated them, overcommitted
his forces, and paid the consequences. Caesar’s situation then continued to worsen. A second storm brought a huge flood down the
river, destroying both the bridges constructed by himself and Fabius. Caesar was cut off from his supply line, and
the supplies he did have were dwindling. Afranius, on the other hand, had an abundance
of supplies he had collected in Ilerda prior to Fabius’ arrival, as well as control of
the Ilerdan stone bridge. Caesar did have supplies and almost 6,000
auxiliary reinforcements of archers and cavalry en route from Gaul, but with control of the
bridge, Afranius was able to send 3 Legions to attack them, killing 200 and forcing the
rest to make camp on high ground. Caesar’s campaign in Spain seemed to be
on the edge of disaster. He was stuck in the middle of enemy territory,
cut off from his almost 6,000 auxiliary reinforcements and the precious supplies they were bringing,
and was days from being starved out. If he was to reclaim the situation, Caesar
would need to retake control of the eastern bank of the river Sicoris and secure his supply
line. With the bridges unable to be repaired due
to high water and marauding Pompeian forces, Caesar came up with a different plan. He began construction of several small boats
of the kind he had seen in Brittany, made of lightweight timber and animal hides. He then ordered a small detachment to take
these boats by wagon at night almost 34km up the river. These men then crossed the river, fortifying
a small hill, giving Caesar a small foothold on the eastern bank. Once this was established, a Legion was sent
from the main Caesarean camp up the river to construct a bridge from the western bank,
while the initial detachment assisted from the eastern bank. Within days of beginning, they had the bridge
constructed, providing a route between the eastern bank and Caesar’s camp, stabilising
his supply line and allowing the reinforcements from Gaul to meet up with his Legion encamped
on the west side. With this influx of troops, particularly the
prized Gallic cavalry, Caesar was finally able to harass Pompeian foraging parties on
the Eastern bank and begin to regain control of the situation. While the Ilerdan campaign was underway, the
Siege of Massilia was still being fought. For the most part, the siege had thus far
been uneventful; Ahenobarbus had largely spent his time amassing a larger navy, and the Romans
had been building siege equipment while Brutus’ ships blockaded the port. But once his fleet was suitably built up,
Ahenobarbus sailed his force out of harbour, hoping to break the blockade and thus bring
supplies into the city. He had managed to put together a force of
17 warships, as well as several smaller vessels manned by archers, against Brutus’ 12. The Massilian ships were also lighter and
more navigable, compared to the rather cumbersome ships that the Legions had built. However, Brutus did have the advantage in
quality of fighters. Ahenobarbus’ men were largely farmers and
local Massilians pressed into service, alongside allied archers, while Brutus’ ships were
crewed by legionaries who had specifically volunteered for the task. If Brutus could catch Ahenobarbus in close
quarters fighting, the battle would be his. As the fleets met, the Massilians used their
agility and range to their advantage, circling the Caesarean ships and peppering them with
missiles, or sailing past to sweep Brutus’ decks with arrows and smash his oars. But when the Massilians got too close in this
manner, the legionaries would throw across grappling hooks, pulling the Massilian ships
close, holding them fast and boarding them. In these situations, the Legions had a clear
advantage. Their heavy armour and training allowed them
to cut through the Massilians on board, on occasion even boarding two Massilians ships
at once, one on either side. Though Caesar notes the bravery of the Massilians,
they were simply not equipped to fight hand to hand with legionaries like this. The Massilians were forced back into port
having lost more than half their ships, and the blockade continued. This victory at Massilia coincided with a
continuous change of fortune at Ilerda. With the new bridge completed Caesar’s superior
Gallic horsemen were able to harass the Pompeian foragers, and were even able to force them
to resort to foraging at night. The odds were turning in Caesar’s favour. As a result, numerous local tribes began supporting
him with grain, as well as some more auxiliaries. Seeking to apply even more pressure to Afranius,
he began construction of a number of ditches to divert the river Sicoris and create a ford
close to his camp, which would allow even more of his men easy access to the eastern
bank, rather than taking the circuitous route to the bridge up the river, thus completely
removing the Pompeians’ chances of foraging. Afranius recognised how precarious his situation
was becoming. Running out of food and with local tribes
pledging allegiance to Caesar threatening to surround his position, he decided to make
a tactical withdrawal to Further Spain to continue the fight on his own terms with the
advantage of Varro’s two extra legions. Afranius ordered a few ships on the River
Ebro to construct a pontoon bridge 30 miles to the south, providing an escape route. At the same time, Afranius ordered two Legions
across the stone bridge to the eastern bank, establishing a fortified position in preparation
for the evacuation of the rest of the army. When Caesar learned of this, he saw his opportunity
to catch Afranius. He ordered his men to work day and night on
the river works, managing to lower the water level enough to move his cavalry across the
Sicoris to try and harass the Pompeians. However, the Pompeian Legions had been quick
and were already dug in, leaving little for the cavalry to do. Afranius then moved his full force across
the Sicoris into the new camp, leaving just two auxiliary cohorts to garrison Ilerda itself. In the early hours of the following morning,
Afranius and Petreius began moving their entire army out of camp and to the south, heading
towards the Ebro and the pontoon bridge. Caesar needed to act fast. If the Pompeians could reach the pontoon bridge,
they would be able to escape to Further Spain, merging with Varro’s legions and prolonging
the Spanish campaign. He first sent his cavalry to harass the Pompeians,
attacking the rear of their column, slowing the Pompeian Legions to a crawl as they fended
off the attackers. Though the ford was not wholly completed,
Caesar ordered pack animals to wade into the river to help slow the current, and marched
five of his Legions across, leaving one to guard the camp. Taking these legions, Caesar marched quickly
to try and cut off his enemies’ escape, and, thanks to the harassment of the Caesarean
cavalry, by mid-afternoon his army had caught up with the Pompeian Legions. Both armies were now camped on the eastern
bank, the Pompeians slightly further south than the Caesareans. Scouts for both sides reported that the only
way south to the Ebro was through the mountain passes, just under 8km away. Whoever controlled these passes would easily
be able to defend them from the other, and a brief standoff ensued. Afranius did not want to risk attempting to
march his army through the narrow defiles with Caesar pursuing him, and Caesar did not
want to try and force a way through the Pompeians to the mountains. Afranius did consider attempting a night march
to the mountains but decided that, with Caesar’s cavalry patrolling the area at night, they
would quickly be found out. Night battles were extremely risky and difficult,
and so Afranius decided that it was better instead to attempt a fighting retreat the
next day. Caesar, meanwhile, had also concocted a plan. At first light, he feigned a withdrawal to
the Sicoris and Ilerda, then rapidly changed direction, marching quickly for the mountains. Seeing this maneuverer, the Pompeians immediately
broke camp, racing towards the mountain passes. The Caesarean route was a harder march, with
the terrain slowing down the Legions, but the Pompeian forces found themselves constantly
harassed by Caesar’s cavalry, and this proved, once again, to be the difference. Caesar reached the passes first, drawing his
army into a line, cutting off the Pompeian escape. Afranius tried sending light auxiliaries to
quickly seize high ground ahead of his main force, but the Caesarean cavalry was quickly
able to surround them, and, without support, they were easily cut down. With his opportunity to escape cut off, Afranius
saw little choice but to encamp on a small hill and contemplate his next move. Caesar was happy to let him do so and saw
no point in risking the lives of his men in another battle. With the road south now blocked, it would
only be a matter of time before Afranius ran out of food and water. The Pompeians could try and retreat back to
Ilerda, but Caesar’s Legion left in the camp would be able to cross the ford and block
the stone bridge, whilst Caesar’s main force could attack them from behind. If the Pompeiians stayed, they would eventually
run out of supplies. If they retreated, they would be caught in
a pincer. Caesar fortified his position, setting up
outposts in the mountains, and awaited his enemy’s next move. Afranius’ priority was to secure his water
supply. He had sent men to the river to gather water,
but they had faced constant harassment from the Caesarean cavalry. In response, his Legions had built a rampart
from his camp to the river, allowing his men to collect water from behind the defences,
bringing the fighting to a pause. As the Caesarean troops also came to the river
for water, men from both sides began talking to the other. Caesar’s Legions contained many Iberians,
and they began to ask the Pompeian Legions about family, friends, and discussed the politics
of the war. Old friends and acquaintances from both sides
met, bringing them back to their camps to drink and reconnect. Some of Afranius’ Spanish allies, and even
some officers, went over to Caesar’s camp to speak with Caesar personally. Caesar attributes these actions to his not
having committed to a full pitched battle the day prior, and that the Pompeians saw
this as an act of leniency. While this might be true to an extent, the
main motivator was more likely that the Pompeian forces understood the situation they were
in; it was only a matter of time before they would be starved into defeat, and they were
losing the will to fight. Afranius did little to quell such stirrings. It seems that he too had lost the desire to
continue the battle. Petreius, however, had not. To restore discipline in the camp, he demanded
oaths of loyalty from Afranius and the entire army, and then ordered any Caesarean soldier
found in the camp to be executed. There had been a brief moment of peace in
the chaos of the Civil War where men, who just the day before had been fighting each
other, had come together in peace. But now the peace was broken. The soldiers returned to their respective
camps and prepared once again for battle. In a last-ditch attempt to retake control
of the situation, Petreius attempted to retreat back to Ilerda. The entire way the Pompeians were harassed
by Caesar’s cavalry, and shadowed by his legions, blocking them from crossing the Sicoris
at every turn, and slowing them down to a gruelling pace. On the third day of this harassment, the Pompeians
were forced to set up camp on unfavourable terrain. Caesar saw his opportunity and began work
on his own earthworks surrounding the Pompeian camp, a similar tactic to Alesia, cutting
off any possibility of foraging. Blockaded on all sides, devoid of water and
having been harassed for days, the Pompeians finally sued for peace. Caesar, never one to miss out on a public
relations opportunity, promised leniency for all the men and officers, including Afranius
and Petreius, in exchange for the complete surrender of the army and the promise that
none of them would take up arms against him. The Pompeians gratefully accepted. With the surrender of this main Pompeian army,
Caesar assigned 4 legions, the 6th, 9th, 11th, and 14th, to accompany the Pompeians to a
safe location and disband them, before heading back to Italy. Caesar, meanwhile, took the 10th and 7th into
Further Spain to confront Varro. Varro, who had initially been encouraged by
the early reports of Afranius’ success at Ilerda, had been gathering more forces, raising
another two legions, giving him a total of four. When news came to him of Caesar’s victory
at Ilerda, he began to march 2 legions to Gades, where he planned to hold out and prolong
Caesar’s war in Spain. However, news of Caesar’s victory at Ilerda
had spread fast and the locals had seen the writing on the wall. The chiefs of local tribes met Caesar at Corduba
and pledged allegiance to him, and the chief of the Gades closed the gates of the city
to Varro. To make matters worse, one of Varro’s legions
that was with him mutinied, striking their colours. Having lost the support of his army and the
locals, Varro sent word to Caesar that he was ready to surrender. Quintus Cassius Longinus was assigned as governor
of Spain by Caesar, and assumed command of Varro’s four legions, making them the 21st,
22nd 23rd, and 24th. Pompey’s entire Spanish army had now either
been disbanded, or had sided with Caesar, after just a couple of months. Taking his two veteran Legions, the 7th and
10th, Caesar left Hispania to re-join his forces at Massilia. The siege of Massilia was still ongoing. Trebonius, who had been left in command of
legions during the siege, had constructed trenches, walls and towers blocking off the
peninsula upon which the city stood. Brutus maintained the blockade from the sea,
so together they effectively surrounded Massilia. The city would not be easy to take though. Its position was ideal for defence, funnelling
any land forces on to one front, and the city was protected by high, strong walls, topped
with ballistae. Trebonius had ordered the construction of
a siege ramp, as well as a battering ram, but the Massilian ballistae and numerous sorties
had been effective in slowing the Romans’ construction of their engines and had, so
far, dissuaded any serious assault on the city's walls. The Massilians had also made repairs to their
fleet following their previous defeat, bringing the number of warships back up to 17. However, most of these ships were refitted
merchant vessels or old warships, crewed by lightly armed archers. The Massilians simply could not afford to
move their best infantry from the walls to the ships. Fortunately for them, however, Pompey had
sent a fleet of 16 ships to reinforce them. These were commanded by Lucius Nasidius, and
though most were hastily built smaller ships, some had bronze rams, presenting a serious
threat to Brutus’ navy. A small vessel was sent to the Massilians
to alert them of the coming reinforcements, and Ahenobarbus seized the opportunity. Sending the Massilian navy out, they slipped
Brutus’ blockade and met Nasidius’ fleet at Taurois, just down the coast from Massilia. Brutus too had increased the size of his fleet,
having captured 6 ships in the previous battle, and manned them with legionaries. Although outnumbered almost 2:1 by the combined
navies of Nasidius and the Massilians, Brutus had the distinct advantage in quality when
it came to hand to hand fighting. Buoyed by his previous victory, Brutus gave
chase and set sail for Taurois. The Massilian ships were stationed on the
right, with Nasidius and his fleet on the left. Knowing that the Massilians would favour a
missile battle, Brutus determined that it would be best to engage the Massilians first,
catching them in close quarters, before facing Nasidius’ ships. He therefore determined to focus almost all
his ships on the Massilians. As they had done previously, the Massilians
attempted to use their agility and superior seamanship to outmanoeuvre and separate Brutus’
ships. This was an effective tactic, and when they
could separate a Caesarean ship, they would pepper it with javelins and arrows, inflicting
numerous casualties. However, once again, whenever they drifted
too close, Brutus’ men would cast their grappling hooks, pulling their foes close
and boarding them. Once boarded, despite the bravery and determination
of the Massilians and their allies, they were simply outclassed by Roman discipline and
weaponry and were butchered on the decks. In a frantic attempt to win the engagement
in one decisive move, the Massilians targeted Brutus’ own ship, distinguished by its standard. Two Massilians ships attempted to ram the
ship from either side, catching Brutus in a pincer. Just as they closed in though, Brutus’ ship
darted forward, the two Massilian vessels colliding into each other head on. Now disabled, they made easy prey for Brutus’
ships who quickly set on them, sinking them both. It was at this point that Nasidius abandoned
the battle, taking his entire fleet with him. Seeing there was no chance of victory, the
Massilians quickly followed suit. Brutus had won without losing a single ship
and sustaining only light casualties, while the Massilians lost a total of 9 ships; 5
sunk and 4 captured. It is unknown why Nasidius did not commit
his men. Caesar blames it on cowardice, however, given
that he and the fleet sailed to Spain immediately following the battle, it is possible that
Nasidius, upon seeing the Massilians being decimated by Brutus’ men, thought it better
to pick a later engagement where the odds would be more in his favour. Whatever the reason, he had not lost a man,
never having engaged in the battle. The remainder of the Massilian fleet limped
back to its home port and would not emerge from it again. Caesar was consistently complimentary of the
Massilians who manned their ships, most only being citizens wanting to fight for their
city, and he admired their bravery and determination. Against the skill and heavy arms of Roman
legionaries however, they simply did not stand a chance. With the naval battle won, the Romans turned
in earnest to the land assault. A way was needed to assault the walls without
risk of missile fire, and without risk of the siege engines being burnt during a sortie. As such, Trebonius began work on a huge tower. The tower was 9 metres each way with walls
almost 2 metres thick of brick and clay. The Romans built the first layer of this tower,
topping it with a lid with long screens attached to the sides. They then used screws and levers to raise
this lid, the screens hanging down to cover the gap between lid and wall and would then
build the wall up to the height of the lid. They continued this process until the tower
was 6 stories, building in shooting platforms for archers and ballistae as they did, allowing
their men to fire down on the enemies on the wall. With this completed, Trebonius’ men next
began work on a 20m long gallery, starting from the base of the tower, which provided
protection. In effect, this was almost like a huge, covered
sledge. It could be pushed forward and backward and
was topped by a sloped roof covered in tiles and clay to prevent it being burnt down. When it was completed, it was pushed forward
from the base of the Roman tower, to the base of a tower in the Massilian wall. Under this protection, legionary engineers
began the work of undermining the Massilian tower, removing bricks with crowbar and chisel. The Massilians attempted to throw rocks and
pitch down onto the engineers, but the Roman defences proved sturdy and the men were protected. In due time, the undermining began to pay
off; the Massilian wall began to crumple and tilt. The Massilians quickly came out of the city. They acknowledged that Trebonius had now won
the siege, realising that as soon as their tower collapsed, the Legions would flood the
city. They requested a truce, asking if they could
await Caesar’s arrival to negotiate with him personally. Trebonius, seeing little reason in risking
his men’s life, accepted, and the Legions pulled back from the walls to wait for Caesar. But the Massilians were bluffing. Once the Romans’ guard was down, they sallied
out at night, burning down the Roman siege ramp and battering ram. Though Trebonius’ and his men quickly caught
on to what was happening and tried to fight back the sortie, missiles from the Massilian
walls prevented them from doing so effectively. The Massilians were even able to set fire
to the Roman tower from the inside, as well as the gallery, destroying months of work
in a single night. However, this was only a small success for
the Massilians. The siege had been going on now for 4 and
a half months. With their navy destroyed, they had no means
of bringing in fresh supplies into the city. The supplies they did have were running low,
and disease had begun to spread among the populace. Moreover, the Romans had once again started
constructing siege works, this time building a gallery extending to the walls made of brick. To make matters worse, Caesar arrived with
his two extra Legions. His arrival also made it clear to the Massilians
that Spain had indeed fallen to Caesar, and that they would not be receiving any reinforcements
or supplies. Diseased, starved and now horrifically outnumbered,
the Massilians finally surrendered. Just before they did, however, Ahenobarbus
escaped. He was still not ready to give up the fight
and, commandeering 3 ships, made a daring dash past Brutus’ blockade during a storm. Brutus’ ships pursued, catching 2, but the
one Ahenobarbus was on slipped away in the storm. He would live to fight another day. Caesar left the 18th and 19th legions to garrison
the city, while he marched to Italy with the 5th, 7th and 10th to rejoin his main army. In 7 months, Caesar had chased Pompey from
Italy, secured his western flank, disbanded 5 of Pompey’s Legions and absorbed a further
4. So far, the war was going very much in Caesar’s
favour. But this was still just the start. Ahenobarbus had managed to escape to Greece
to re-join Pompey, and was soon followed by Varro, Afranius and Petreius, despite the
latter two’s oath to Caesar. Pompey was amassing a vast army in Greece,
and he still held the lucrative territories in the East, as well as the important grain
hub of North Africa. The war in the West might have been over for
now, but the war for the rest of the Roman world was about to begin. While Caesar was on his way to confront Pompey’s
Legions in Spain, his Legates were fighting the Civil War in the Mediterranean and African
theatre. Before Caesar even reached Spain, Valerius
had taken Sardinia with the 16th Legion, and Curio had claimed Sicily with the 15th and
17th. Together, around the end of April - early
May of 49BC, they combined their forces in Sicily, along with the 20th Legion from Italy,
making a total of 4 Legions and about 1500 cavalry, and began preparing to invade North
Africa. Alongside Sardinia and Sicily, North Africa,
specifically, modern Tunis, was one of the biggest suppliers of grain feeding the Roman
Republic at the time. Taking North Africa would, therefore, give
Caesar control of all the major grain centers, ensuring he could supply his armies throughout
the war, and robbing Pompey of any opportunity to starve him out of Italy. Command of this invasion was assigned to Curio,
who was a skilled politician, but lacked military command experience. He had been crucial to Caesar in the Senate,
however, and this was his reward. To compensate for his lack of experience,
he was assigned a body of talented Legates, including Rebilus, a Legate who had served
with Caesar in Gaul and fought with distinction at Alesia. The Legions Curio commanded were largely raw,
all having been raised just a few months earlier while Caesar was pushing south through Italy. However, Caesar knew that Pompey’s best
troops were in Spain and the East, and so any Pompeian troops in Africa would be equally
raw. It was thought that, with four Legions, Curio
had enough men and talented advisors to invade successfully. However, Curio did not want to invade Africa
without first hearing news from Spain, just in case his men would be needed to support
Caesar, so, for now, he remained in Sicily. Africa was under the control of the Pompeian
Publius Attius Varus. Varus had previously been propraetor of the
province, and was dismayed to find it woefully unprepared for war with only 1 Legion present
in Hadrumetum. He immediately took control and strengthened
the province, raising another 2 Legions and encamping them outside Utica. Furthermore, he requested the aid of the nearby
client king, Juba of Numidia. Juba was an old ally of Pompey, who owed his
kingship to Pompey’s earlier campaign, and had a personal hatred of Caesar and Curio
as both had insulted him in the past. He readily agreed to side with the Pompeians,
and would prove to be a crucial ally for Varus. It wasn’t until August, after receiving
word of Caesar’s victory in Spain, that Curio began his crossing into Africa. Curio did not think much of his opponents,
disdaining both Varus and Juba, and so instead of bringing his full force across, he only
brought 2 Legions, likely the 15th and 16th, and 500 cavalry, along with a sizable navy. Landing at Anquillaria, between Utica and
Hadrumetum, Curio decided to engage the larger force first, and so began his march to Utica,
reaching the River Bagradas 2 days later. Here, he left Rebilus in charge of the Legions
while he took the cavalry ahead to scout the Castra Cornelia, an old Roman fort on a small,
elevated peninsula that was left over from the Punic Wars. This camp was just 5km from Utica, and from
the higher ground, Curio reconnoitered Varus’ camp. The Pompeian camp was in a strong position,
using the walls of Utica as part of its defences on one side, and the outdoor amphitheatre
of Utica blocking another, making any approach to the camp narrow and difficult. When observing the town Curio saw a large
number of supplies being brought into the city on the roads from the local populace
seeking refuge. Looking to hamper Varus’ supplies and take
some for himself, Curio sent his cavalry to attack them. Varus was quick to react though and sent his
own force of 600 Numidian horsemen and 400 Numidian infantry to defend them. The Numidian cavalry, which had raced ahead
of the infantry, clashed with the Roman horse first. But the Numidians were lightly armed and best
accustomed to skirmishing rather than melee fighting. Curio’s men were able to inflict significant
casualties in the fight, forcing the Numidian cavalry to flee back to the town and camp,
quickly followed by the infantry. Traders and their goods were seized by Curio
and taken back to the Castra Cornelia, which he planned to use as his main base for the
invasion. Meanwhile, Curios’ navy had moved into position
outside the port of Utica, which harboured possibly as many as 200 merchant ships with
no military ships for protection. Curio sent a proclamation declaring that any
merchant ship that did not transfer their supplies to the Castra Cornelia would be treated
as an enemy, and boarded by his navy. With no naval protection, the merchants saw
little choice and sailed their goods to the Castra Cornelia, providing the Caesareans
with a further abundance of supplies. Curio’s campaign was off to a good start. Leaving a small force in the Castra Cornelia
to guard the supplies, he returned to his troops at the Bagradas with news of his achievements,
where they recognised him as Imperator. Bolstered by this success, the next day he
moved his army to go on the offensive, aiming to encamp just outside the town of Utica,
displaying a similar kind of aggression to Caesar. While this camp was being constructed, Curio
received word from the pickets that a large Numidian force was approaching. Curio had failed to scout the area properly
and was surprised by this sudden new force. Quickly, he ordered his men to abandon the
construction of the camp and form battle lines, while he sent his cavalry to engage the Numidians
in a delaying action. The Numidians did not march in a tight formation
and so were vulnerable to cavalry charges. As soon as Curio’s cavalry made contact,
the Numidian cavalry fled into Utica, followed swiftly by the infantry. The Roman cavalry harassed the Numidian infantry,
inflicting some casualties, but the bulk of the Numidian force successfully made it into
the camp. Caesar describes the Numidians as having been
routed, but it seems more likely that this was a tactical withdrawal. The Numidians likely had not been seeking
an engagement in the first place and prioritised combining with Varus’ forces rather than
being drawn into a pitched battle. Though Curio had, so far, been largely successful,
the following day, 2 of his centurions and 22 of their men defected to Varus. They told Varus that Curio’s army did not
have faith in him, and that Varus would be able to win them over to his side. Their motivation for doing this is not known. Curio had performed well so far, aside from
poor scouting, and had apparently been hailed as Imperator, so it is unlikely that Curio’s
men lacked confidence in him as is portrayed. The more likely reason is that Curio’s men
were still effectively raw recruits. They had not fought a pitched battle before,
and some of the officers in Varus’ army had trained and led Curio’s men at Corfinium. It is likely, therefore, that the men were
motivated more out of either fear, or an unwillingness to fight former comrades, than dissatisfaction
with Curio. Nevertheless, the next day Varus marched his
force out of camp, Curio following suit. An officer in Varus’ army, Sextus Varus,
who had been one of the officers at Corfinium, appealed to Curio’s men. He reminded them that they had previously
sworn oaths to Pompey, Ahenobarbus, and to himself, and that they should not fight the
men they trained with and had been prepared to fight alongside. Though Curio’s army showed little reaction,
Varus withdrew his force back into camp, confident that, given time, this appeal would strike
a chord with Curio’s men. Though the message had been received in silence
at first, when Curio’s Legions were back in camp, the men began to talk amongst themselves. Oaths held a strong religious connotation,
and they were not broken easily. The more the men talked, the more they began
to fear that they had made a mistake by switching their allegiance from Pompey to Caesar. Rumour likely exaggerated the number of men
who were of this mindset, though some certainly were, and Curio was soon worried that his
whole army was on the brink of mutiny. Curio gathered his officers and sought advice
for how to address the situation. The officers suggested two options. Firstly, that they attack the Pompeian camp
immediately, thinking that keeping the men busy would be best, rather than allowing any
rumours to circulate; or secondly, to withdraw back to the Cornelia Castra to try and calm
the men there. Curio was not convinced of either option. He saw an all-out attack on the camp as foolhardy,
and a retreat as a show of cowardice. Furthermore, he believed the number of men
who were genuinely feeling disloyal had been overplayed. As such, he gathered the soldiers and addressed
them. He gave a rousing speech, pointing out that
Ahenobarbus had surrendered at Corfinium, voiding any oaths the men had made to him,
and that their oaths to Caesar now took precedent. He espoused the achievements of Caesar in
Spain, saying that they were on the winning side, so why join the losing one? Finally he listed his own achievements in
Africa so far, and that they had hailed him as imperator. The men were moved by the speech and acclaimed
Curio, putting to rest any ideas of mutiny. It’s possible that not a lot of men felt
that way in the first place, but either way, Curio was continuing to show himself as a
man with leadership potential; with a simple speech he had regained full control of the
army without needing to resort to any harsh discipline or excessive time wasting. Determined to draw Varus into a pitched battle,
Curio marched his men out of camp the following day. Varus followed suit, the two armies facing
off with each other across a large ditch. The ditch was not particularly deep, only
around 2.5 meters, but its sides were steep and would present a disadvantage to any trying
to scramble up. Varus made the first move, sending his Numidian
cavalry from the left flank supported by light infantry to flank Curio’s force. Curio countered by sending two cohorts of
the 16th along with all his cavalry. The Numidian cavalry charged the Roman legionaries,
but lightly armed, they were easily repulsed and routed. The light infantry was left exposed and, surrounded
by Curio’s heavy infantry and cavalry, were slaughtered. Rebilus urged Curio to capitalise on this
success and charge Varus’ force to instigate a mass rout. Curio heeded the advice and led his men across
the ditch, but even as they were scaling the other side, Varus’ force, seeing that Curio
now had a cavalry advantage and could easily outflank them, had begun to flee the battlefield. They did not retreat in good order, and Varus
himself was wounded and almost killed in the retreat. As his army tried to push through the narrow
pass to their camp, they became caught in a bottle neck and many were slain by Curio’s
pursuing force. Indeed, more of Varus’ men died here than
in the battle. However, when Varus’ men had made the safety
of the camp, Curio did not push any further, not having the equipment needed to siege the
camp. Caesar gives Curio’s casualties as being
just 1 man; this is surely not accurate, but it is likely that his casualties were minimal,
while Varus had lost almost 600 dead and 1,000 wounded. This battle might seem unbelievable in how
quickly Varus’ men broke, but there are a few points to consider. Firstly, Varus misused his Numidian cavalry. The Numidians were light cavalry and skilled
skirmishers, but due to their light arms and armour, were not equipped for melee fighting
against heavy cavalry and infantry. Secondly, Varus’ whole army had only recently
been levied, less than 6 months ago. Likely, very few of his men had any military
experience, which explains why they were so quick to rout. Compare for instance, the actions of Caesar’s
Legions in Spain who, when cut off from the army and in risk of being surrounded, retreated
in order to high ground and formed a defensive square. That is the difference between veterans and
raw recruits. Under the cover of darkness, Varus moved what
was left of his force into the city of Utica, leaving just a small detachment of men, trumpeters
and tents in the camp to give the illusion it was still garrisoned. Curio was quick to discover the ploy and began
the creation of earthworks around Utica to besiege the city. Initially, the citizens of Utica appealed
to Varus to surrender, not wanting to go through the gruelling experience of a siege. However, a messenger arrived in Utica with
information that Juba, king of Numidia, was on his way and nearby to support Varus. It is not known how large Juba’s army was,
aside from 60 elephants, but given that this was the royal army, it surely numbered in
the 10s of thousands. With these reinforcements on the way, Varus
soothed the citizens' concerns, confident that he would be able to defeat Curio. Curio soon discovered the same information. Initially he did not believe the reports,
confident that he was on the brink of victory, and continued the siege. More reports came in, however, verifying the
information and saying that Juba was now just 36km miles away. Upon learning this, Curio abandoned his plans
of besieging Utica, withdrawing to the Castra Cornelia instead. He began further fortifying the fort and sent
word to Sicily to send over the 2 Legions and all the cavalry left in Sicily. This was a good plan; the Castra Cornelia
could be easily defended, and with access to the sea, Curio could maintain a supply
line and safely await reinforcements. Juba was a cunning opponent though. He sent men from Utica under the guise of
deserters to Curio, saying that Juba had had to redirect his force to suppress a rebellion,
and that the Numidian force was only a small force commanded by his lieutenant Saburra. Curio, still riding the wave of his previous
victories and keen to prove himself, believed these reports and sought to crush the Numidians
in a pitched battle. Abandoning his defensive position around 3am,
he marched his force to the Bagradas to confront them, leaving 5 cohorts in the Castra Cornelia. Having learnt his lesson previously, Curio
sent his cavalry ahead of his Legions as a scouting party, and they quickly discovered
Saburra’s own advanced units. Curio’s cavalry fell upon the Numidians
who, taken by surprise and with no encampment, suffered heavy casualties before retreating
back to Saburra’s main force. However, instead of staying to hold the area
or scouting further ahead, Curio’s cavalry headed back to Curio’s main force with a
few prisoners to tell him of their success. Curio had already marched 10km from the Castra
Cornelia when his cavalry returned. He questioned the prisoners as to who their
commander was, and they replied that Saburra was, confirming in Curio’s mind that he
was only facing a small portion of the Numidian army. Determined, Curio pushed his men to march
on. In the meantime, however, Saburra had sent
word to Juba about the night battle and in response, Juba had sent ahead 2,000 Spanish
and Gallic cavalry, part of his personal guard, and his best infantry to bolster Saburra’s
army, while Juba continued his advance with the main force. Saburra kept withdrawing his force, feigning
retreats and pulling the Romans after him. Curio was being lured into a trap. Curio’s army had now marched almost 28km
since breaking camp, and his men were exhausted from the early start. They now found themselves a large, flat open
plain. This was what Saburra had been waiting for. He lined up his infantry for battle but kept
them a fair distance from the Roman force: enough to be a threat but far away enough
to not be caught by the Romans, and left most of the fighting to his cavalry. The previous engagements had already depleted
Curio’s cavalry, and still more had paused to rest and water their horses, leaving Curio
with just 200 horsemen when the forces engaged, and the Numidians used this to their advantage. Their heavier Gallic and Spanish cavalry would
charge the Roman flanks and rear, while the lighter Numidian cavalry skirmished and harassed
them. Curio tried to use his cavalry to chase away
the enemy charges, but they were too tired to pursue and Saburra’s men would simply
withdraw and then strike in another place. When the Numidians could draw a cohort into
breaking ranks and charging, the cohort would find itself utterly surrounded by horsemen
and cut down. Fighting in such a manner and on such open
and flat terrain was ideal for the Numidians. By this point, the whole of Curio’s army
was surrounded by Saburra’s force and more of Juba’s men were trickling in, providing
a constant supply of fresh reinforcements against the exhausted Romans. Desperately, Curio ordered some of his men
to take the Legion’s standards and to fight their way out of the encirclement to some
nearby hills. The Numidians allowed them to break through
the ring at first, but soon quickly surrounded them and cut them down to a man. The battle was a disaster. Curio’s army had lost all hope, some men
broke down and cried to the gods or their mothers, others simply abandoned their weapons
and waited to die. Gnaeus Domitius, the prefect of horse, gathered
what little cavalry was left around Curio and urged him to try and save himself and
retreat to the Castra Cornelia. Curio replied that he would never be able
to face Caesar after such a disaster. He died fighting alongside his men. Both the 15th and 16th Legions were completely
destroyed, around 11,000 men. The Roman cavalry that had been watering their
horses had watched the destruction from a distance and raced back to the Cornelia Castra
to inform the 5 cohorts and the quaestor left in charge, Marcius Rufus, of the disaster. He tried to organise an evacuation by sea
back to Sicily of the men left, but panic had already taken over as rumour spread that
Varus might be closing in for the kill. Men pushed past one another to scramble onto
the ships, and some became so overburdened that they sank. The captains of the ships grew equally as
nervous and, in the end, only a few high-ranking officers, including Rebilus and Rufus, made
it onto the ships before the captains set sail. The men that were left in the Castra Cornelia
sent centurions to Varus and surrendered. The African campaign had been an unmitigated
disaster and Africa would remain in Pompeian hands. So far, Caesar himself had been largely successful
in the Civil War. His campaign in Spain had secured the west
as well as neutralising some of Pompey’s best Legions, and he had been recruiting in
Gaul and Italy, adding at least another 6 Legions. However, his subordinates had not been as
effective. Curio had lost 2 Legions in North Africa,
and his inability to take the province meant that supplies of grain in Rome would still
be stretched. Around the same time, Gaius Antonius, the
brother of Mark Antony, had lost a Legion and a half in Illyria to defection. To make matters worse, the veteran 9th, dismayed
at their recent heavy casualties in Ilerda and lack of promised pay, had mutinied. Consular elections were due in Rome and, with
both the consuls having fled with Pompey, there was no one to oversee them, threatening
the legitimacy of Caesar’s cause. His first priority was the 9th Legion, as
he wanted to stop mutiny from spreading to other legions in similar position. Rushing to their camp, Caesar made an impassioned
speech, pointing out that as a general renowned for his quick action he could not be blamed
for prolonging the war. He then chastised the men, saying that he
had brought them fame and fortune and they now repaid him by mutineering; the only suitable
punishment for the Legion would be decimation. The legion begged Caesar to reconsider. Magnanimous as ever, Caesar only executed
12 of the ringleaders and brought the legion back into the fold. Caesar needed to maintain an air of legitimacy,
but with no consuls in Rome the elections could not be held. Lepidus, a praetor and close ally of Caesar,
suggested Caesar be named Dictator so that he could preside over the election. This was done and Caesar was appointed Consul,
alongside another ally, Publius Servilius. With consular power, Caesar no longer needed
the position of Dictator and resigned after just 11 days. With these issues now handled, Caesar gathered
his force at Brundisium to finally confront Pompey. The latter was gathering a huge force from
all corners of the Roman world in Thessalonica. In total, Pompey had around 60,000 men; 9
full Legions, approximately 4,000 archers and slingers, 7,000 cavalry, plus some auxiliaries. There were a further 2 Legions en route from
Syria under the command of Metellus Scipio. Pompey had spent time drilling and equipping
his men. However, only 4 of his Legions were veterans. Cicero, who was with Pompey, described the
bulk of the force as raw recruits. Mixed cultures and languages made organisation
difficult. Trusting in his numbers though, Pompey marched
to the west of Greece, preparing to create a defensive line down the coast. Caesar, in Brundisium, had gathered his 10
veteran legions, all understrength due to years of campaigning, and 2 newly recruited
ones. However, he only had enough ships to move
half his force across, and the Adriatic was being guarded by Pompey’s vast navy under
the command of Bibulus. With the path through Illyria being too mountainous
for rapid movement, Caesar would have to find a way of crossing the sea. However, he did have one key advantage. The Roman calendar drifted over time and needed
to be constantly updated by the Pontifex Maximus. Caesar had not performed this duty due to
his constant campaigning, but he nonetheless knew the true date – it was late Autumn. Bibulus was operating under the impression
that it was Winter, and had therefore kept his ships in port, confident that Caesar would
not attempt a winter crossing. Ordering his men to leave slaves and baggage
behind, Caesar set sail with 7 of his veteran legions. By the time Bibulus found out, Caesar and
his men had already landed. Frustrated, Bibulus began a blockade, capturing
and burning 30 of Caesar’s ships as they returned to Brundisium, and preventing the
rest from transporting the remainder of Caesar’s army. Soon after his landing Caesar was able to
take both Oricum and Apollonia. He then sent Vibullius Rufus, a man who Caesar
had captured twice, once at Corfinium and once at Ilerda, to treat with Pompey. With his force divided, Caesar was possibly
having second thoughts and was seeking a truce, offering the same terms as before. Nonetheless, Caesar continued marching his
force towards Dyrrhachium, an important supply center for the Pompeians. Caesar’s sending Vibullius was a mistake,
as the latter met Pompey and informed him of Caesar’s location, army composition,
and strategy and Pompey would exploit it. He could not allow Dyrrhachium to fall into
Caesar’s hands, and pushed his men on a forced march. Caesar still had 70 miles and 3 rivers to
cross before reaching the city, and Pompey could still beat him there. The march took its toll on his more inexperienced
men, with some of his Epirote allies deserting due to this push and their fear of Caesar,
but he was ultimately successful, reaching Dyrrhachium first. Labienus quickly restored morale by publicly
swearing to follow Pompey at whatever cost, and the army encamped outside Dyrrhachium,
forcing Caesar to stop his advance, withdrawing to a defensible position on the southern bank
of the river Apsus. Pompey knew that Caesar had legitimacy as
consul and could force his claim to be the rightful leader of Rome, so he had to defeat
Caesar in the field. He moved his army south, encamping on the
opposite side of the river to Caesar. Once again though, Pompey proved indecisive. Caesar had just around 30,000 men, compared
to Pompey’s 60,000. But Pompey did not trust his less experienced
men to be able to defeat Caesar’s veterans in a strong defensive position. A standoff continued for weeks. Caesar used this time to his advantage. Bibulus’ navy had to constantly come ashore
to resupply. Caesar dispatched small raiding parties to
attack these men whenever they came ashore, forcing Bibulus to go further and further
afield to get supplies. Bibulus knew he could not abandon his position,
but after weeks of harassment, his men were resorting to drinking the dew collected on
leather awnings. In desperation, he tried to parley with Caesar,
offering to send peace envoys on his behalf to Pompey if Caesar would stop. Caesar countered by saying that he would want
to send his own envoys, and that if Bibulus wanted to resupply unmolested, he would have
to allow Caesar’s transports to pass. All these talks had done was reveal to Caesar
how effective his strategy was. Soon after, old and now in increasingly poor
health, Bibulus died, leaving the fleet leaderless. Antony had tried numerous times to break the
blockade, but had been stopped every time. The Pompeians had kept him under significant
pressure, even taking a small island in the harbour to try and trap Antony even further. However, Antony was a talented lieutenant,
and quickly retook the island and kept his men on alert for any opportunity. It came in January 48BC. Antony only had enough ships to transport
the three remaining veteran legions and one newly recruited. He made a dash for Caesar with these ships,
and was almost intercepted by Pompey's ships, being forced to land at Nymphaeum. Both Pompey and Caesar had to rush to Antony’s
position, Pompey to cut him off, and Caesar to unite his forces. Pompey had a head start and a shorter route,
Caesar having to march a considerable distance in order to be able to ford the river, and
Pompey got to Antony’s position first. He ordered his men not to light any fires
and lie in wait to try and ambush Antony as he moved to meet Caesar. However, some locals sympathetic to the Caesarean
cause alerted Antony, and he set up camp, sending a messenger to inform Caesar of his
location. When Pompey found Antony encamped and Caesar
closing in, he realised he was in danger of being attacked on two sides and withdrew to
a safer position near Asparagium. With his full army now joined, Caesar started
to be more aggressive. Hearing that Scipio was now in Macedonia with
his Syrian legions, Caesar sent two Legions under Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus to cut him
off. The Thessalians and Aetolians had sent envoys
saying they’d support Caesar in return for garrisons, and so Caesar sent the rookie 27th
Legion under Cassius Longinus to Thessaly and G. Calvisius Sabinus with 5 cohorts to
Aetolia to acquire more grain. Scipio did march his force towards Thessaly,
threatening Longinus, but Calvinus and his Legions were able to apply enough pressure
to stop him uniting his force with Pompey. Meanwhile, one of Pompey’s son, Gnaeus,
attacked Caesar’s ships, destroying his whole navy in the area, leaving Caesar stranded
in Greece and cut off from Italy. With his navy destroyed, Caesar knew he had
to force an engagement with Pompey soon. He first attempted to do this at Asparagium,
drawing up his army for battle. But Pompey, on the high ground, refused to
commit. In order to force Pompey’s hand, Caesar
decided to march on Dyrrhachium. By threatening this crucial supply centre,
Pompey would be forced to respond. However, he did not want to reveal his strategy
to Pompey, and so planned on taking a circuitous route to hide his intentions. He struck camp early in the morning in April. The plan worked: initially Pompey thought
Caesar was withdrawing due to lack of supplies, and it was only after his scouts reported
Caesar’s movements that Pompey realised what Caesar was planning. He then gave chase. Caesar marched through the night, only giving
his men a brief break, and was able to reach Dyrrhachium first, setting up his camp on
high ground outside the city. Pompey arrived soon after and encamped his
force on high ground just south of Caesar’s position. Pompey’s army outnumbered Caesar’s considerably. Having sent part of his force to stall Scipio
and part to southern Greece, Caesar had just 35,000-40,000 men and 3,000 cavalry. Pompey, on the other hand, had around 53,000
infantry and 7,000 cavalry. Though Caesar’s men were more experienced,
Pompey did have the crucial advantage of having a better supply line. Using his navy, he could ship supplies from
Dyrrhachium to his camp, whereas Caesar would be forced to live off the land and requisition
food from local tribes; even this would be difficult as Pompey’s forces had already
plundered the area in the previous months. Noting the particularly hilly topography of
the area, Caesar decided to fall back on one of his most favoured tactics and fortify the
hills around Pompey’s position, encircling his enemy and cutting off their supplies. This would be a difficult task considering
the size of the armies but the natural topography simplified the task. When Pompey realised what Caesar was doing,
he countered by constructing his own defences. He ordered his men to fortify as many hills
as possible, forcing Caesar to extend his own fortifications further and further, stretching
his army. Frequent skirmishes broke out between the
two forces, each harassing the other to try and slow their build. On one occasion, the 9th legion, attempting
to fortify a camp on a hilltop, came under intense masses of missile fire from the Pompeians
on a nearby hill. Caesar, who was with the 9th at the time,
ordered them to abandon the construction and retreat down the slope, commanding legionary
engineers to place wattle screens to dig trenches behind to hinder the enemy from pursuing the
legion. He then placed slingers in commanding positions
to cover the withdrawal. The 9th was pursued by the Pompeian missiles
and light infantry who pushed the screens into the trenches to cross them. Caesar, fearing a rout, ordered Antony, commander
of the 9th, to charge the Pompeians. In a brilliant display of discipline, the
9th immediately turned, flung their javelins and charged back up the slope. The Pompeians, only being lightly armed, retreated
and the 9th was able to withdraw in good order. Soon after, Caesar’s defences were complete;
it was now late June. Due to his men’s greater experience and
discipline, he now had Pompey’s force pinned against the sea. This was a great achievement. A smaller, less supplied force had never done
this before against superior numbers. Though low on grain, Caesar did manage to
level the playing field by having control of all the sources of fresh water in the area. Pompey was now forced to dig wells and rely
on supplies from the sea. Furthermore, Caesar could now send his men
further afield to gather supplies without fear of harassment. Pompey, however, was a skilled general and
had his own strategies to keep Caesar under pressure, sending missile units to harass
Caesar’s lines at night, targeting the light of their campfires. He also attempted to bring his cavalry into
play which, stuck behind the fortifications, had done little so far. Boarding them onto ships, he sent them up
the coast to Dyrrhachium; from here they would be free from the confines of the fortifications
and could forage without putting a burden on Pompey’s supplies, as well as attack
Caesar’s line from the rear. Around this same time, in early July, Caesar
received word that there were citizens of Dyrrhachium who were willing to be bribed
and give him the town. Looking to capitalise, Caesar went to the
town with a small armed escort, leaving Publius Cornelius Sulla in charge. However, when he reached the outskirts of
the city, he was attacked by the Pompeian cavalry who attempted to surround Caesar,
and he only just managed to cut his way out with his men and survive the ambush. While Caesar was away from the main line,
Pompey had also launched three simultaneous offensives on the fortifications. He ordered 4 Legions to concentrate on a point
in the center of the line, and one Legion each to attack two other points in the line. The point the 4 Legions were attacking was
atop a hill, and well-fortified, but only defended by 500 men of the 6th Legion. The cohort was hard pressed, thousands of
missiles being fired into their position, but the men held on doggedly, confident that
reinforcements would be arriving soon. They were correct; quickly as he could, Sulla
had marched two Legions to their relief, and, upon seeing this new force, the Pompeians’
retreated. According to Caesar, every man of this unit
suffered some kind of injury. The other two attacks had also been repelled,
one by 3 cohorts, and another by Caesar’s German auxiliaries, who sallied out taking
heavy losses. In total, Caesar claims that the Pompeians
lost 2000 men, and the Caesareans just 20, though his own losses were surely much higher. It is likely that the citizens of Dyrrhachium
were Pompey’s agents who had lured Caesar into a trap. Pompey was proving a worthy and cunning enemy,
but Caesar’s veterans had proved their mettle. Bolstered by the confidence of their victories,
Caesar marched his army out in battle formation to offer battle to Pompey, as a sign of strength. Pompey also drew his army up for battle so
as not to lose face but refused to engage. He would need to orchestrate a situation where
he could use his overwhelming numbers in order to contend with Caesar’s veterans. Meanwhile, Longinus and Sabinus had been successful
in taking Aetolia and had taken all the towns between Epirus and Corinth. They now planned to push past the Isthmus
of Corinth and into the Peloponnese but found their path blocked by a Pompeian force. Nonetheless, their success was crucial in
giving Caesar an abundance of supplies from these new Greek territories. With more successes under his belt, Caesar
again sent a peace delegation, this time to Scipio, hoping to convince the latter to talk
to Pompey. But even though Scipio at first listened with
interest, his officers were having none of it. At Dyrrhachium, Caesar fortified the two approaches
to the town, cutting the Pompeian cavalry in the area off from the supplies there. With the cavalry now unable to sustain themselves,
Pompey withdrew them by sea back to his entrenchments. But Pompey’s food was still running low
and he knew he would have to soon force a breakout. To try and achieve this, Pompey’s men occupied
the original fortifications of the 9th, which were between the two armies’ fortifications,
and expanded on them, making a second larger camp that encompassed the first. He also added a long wall from the camp to
a nearby river to secure a water supply. This would act as a forward base from where
Pompey could strike. Pompey suddenly had a stroke of luck when
two Gallic officers who served Caesar during the Gallic Wars deserted. They had detailed intel about Caesar’s defences
and knew where the weak points were, and they now passed all this information to Pompey. At the southern end of Caesar’s defences,
where the fortifications met the coast, Caesar’s 9th legion was stationed under Marcellinus. After having been forced to withdraw from
their original camp, they had constructed a second camp and fortifications that stretched
to the coast. Behind this, they had constructed a second
line of defences facing south, preventing Pompey landing troops behind and attacking
their rear. To complete the defences, an extra line of
defences would need to be made between the 2 walls, linking them together and blocking
any attack from the sea. But these defences were incomplete. Pompey formulated his plan. He would attack the inner wall with his legions,
landing light infantry and missile troops to the south to attack the outer wall, while
even more troops would be landed between the 2 walls. In doing so, he would attack the 9th from
3 sides. This took a lot of careful planning and timing,
and he withdrew his legions from the 9th’s old fort and behind his own lines to coordinate. After a couple days of preparation, he was
ready. He moved 60 cohorts of legionaries, around
30,000 men, to attack Caesar’s inner fortifications, while the light infantry was moved by boat
behind the outer wall. As they began their attack, more men were
simultaneously landed at the gap between the entrenchments. There were only 2 cohorts of the 9th present
at the time, the rest still being in camp. These 1,000 men now found themselves under
furious attack from 3 sides by overwhelming numbers. Desperately they tried to form a line and
sent word to Marcellinus for help. But the numbers were too much and the men
broke and ran. As they did, they ran into the reinforcing
cohorts sent by Marcellinus, causing chaos in the narrow gap between the walls. The Pompeians closed in on Marcellinus’
camp, which was now only defended by a couple of cohorts. Luckily, Antony, who was close at hand, managed
to organize 6000 men, and came to their aid, stopping the Pompeian advance. He was soon joined by Caesar, alerted by smoke
signals, and another 6500 men. Both forces now had most of their men committed
to this part of the line. While Pompey's main force had been pushing
onto the 9th’s camp, more men had already begun construction of a fort outside of Caesar’s
fortifications to the south; the blockade had been broken. Caesar ordered his men to begin construction
of a trench plugging the gap between the two walls. While this was being done, Caesar’s scouts
spotted a Pompeian Legion moving back into the 9th Legion’s old fort. If Pompey took this fort, he would be able
to make a link between his new fort in the south and his old fortifications. Caesar was determined to stop this from happening. Gathering around 17,000 men and leaving 1000
to continue entrenching, Caesar took a circuitous route, concealing his force as long as possible,
and then launched the attack. His left wing, where Caesar himself was, pushed
into the fort, forcing the Pompeian Legion back into the inner camp. Caesar’s right wing however, had stumbled
across the Pompeian entrenchments that lead to the river. Thinking these were part of the fort, they
followed them looking for a gate through. When they reached the river and realised their
mistake, they managed to break down points in the defences, breaking through followed
by the cavalry, but they had wasted precious time. Pompey had seen what was happening and sent
all his heavy infantry - 25,000 men - to assist the Legion in the fort. The cavalry rode ahead of the legions and
fell upon the Caesarean cavalry of the right flank, routing them almost instantly. The infantry around them, seeing their comrades
fleeing and Pompey’s men closing in, also ran. The narrow passages they had made through
the entrenchments became clogged and some men took to jumping from the ramparts into
the ditches to try and escape. Many were trampled to death. Inside the fort itself, Pompey’s legion
was fighting back with renewed courage. Caesar’s left, afraid that they were about
to be trapped inside the narrow confines of the fort, also began to break, retreating
through the gate. Caesar tried to stop the rout, grabbing onto
fleeing standard bearers and ordering them to stand their ground. One, overcome by panic, even tried to stab
Caesar but he was saved by his bodyguards. Caesar’s entire force that had been committed
to the attack had retreated, broken. But Pompey, fearing Caesar had laid a trap,
did not pursue, and the narrow breaches in the defences stopped his cavalry pursuing
further. If he had, he may well have been able to to
destroy Caesar’s army. In total, Caesar gives his dead as being 32
officers, centurions and tribunes, almost 1000 legionaries and 200 hundred horsemen. He had also lost many men as prisoners, perhaps
as many as 1,000. On the orders of Labienus, all of these men
were killed. Pompey was hailed as imperator, but as a sign
of respect, refused the symbolic bay leaves that went with the title, due to his victory
being over fellow Romans. Caesar, after having committed almost 3 months
to the battle, pulled away his full force from Dyrrhachium, defeated. The Pompeians took this as a full retreat,
and word was sent to eastern kings that the war was already won. However, Pompey had failed to strike a killing
blow. He had done well to break out of Caesar’s
encirclement, but had missed the opportunity to use his overwhelming numbers. Caesar was a dangerous enemy who could not
be left any space to regroup. Nonetheless, Caesar was able to carry out
an ordered withdrawal of his army with only light harassment from Pompey’s forces, pulling
back to Apollonia. As he did so, he comforted his men, saying
that just as Gergovia had preceded Alesia, so too would this defeat at Dyrrhachium would
be followed by a far greater victory. Still, Caesar was in a precarious position. The army under his command was by now heavily
depleted, and his other Legions were scattered around Greece; two under Domitius Calvinus
around Macedonia, and one in Southern Greece under Longinus and Sabinus. Caesar’s defeat also meant that his supporters
would be wavering. He needed a victory soon, and it would need
to be decisive. Caesar’s priority was to get his army back
into fighting condition, so he first marched to Apollonia where he left his wounded, and
sent 7 cohorts to garrison various towns and cities under his control. Longinus’ legion would be safe in Southern
Greece, but Domitius and his two veteran Legions of Gallic campaigns, who had been stalling
and pinning Scipio Metellus during Dyrrhachium, were now exposed. All of Caesar’s plans now revolved around
merging his depleted army with Domitius: if Pompey marched on Italy, Caesar would meet
up with Domitius and march through Illyria to attack Pompey from the rear; if Pompey
marched on Caesar, Caesar would march to Domitius and fight a battle with the merged army; if
Pompey besieged Caesar’s allied towns in Greece, Caesar would march to Domitius and
attack Scipio, forcing Pompey to react or lose an ally. Before any of these plans could be put into
effect though, Caesar had to get to Domitius. He began his march at full pace from Apollonia. Pompey, however, had also come to a similar
conclusion: If Scipio was caught unsupported, his legions would surely be lost. Both Caesar and Pompey were once again in
a race with each other, each hoping to reach their ally before the other. Leaving Cato in control of Dyrrhachium, Pompey
began his march to Scipio. As he did, he took measures to slow Caesar,
spreading the word of his defeat at Dyrrhachium and as a result, Caesar found little support
on his march, and his scouts and messengers found it impossible to reach Domitius. When both armies were just 4 hours from the
positions of Domitius and Scipio, Caesar had a stroke of luck. Some of the Gauls who had defected to Pompey
at Dyrrhachium had yet another change of heart, racing to Domitius and warning him of Pompey’s
approach and Caesar’s location. Armed with this knowledge, Domitius was able
to safely reposition and merge with Caesar. Caesar’s whole army in the region, aside
from the 27th, was now united. Nonetheless, Pompey still held the upper hand;
he had more local support and supplies and so his intention was now to avoid another
confrontation with Caesar. Despite his numbers, he was still aware of
both how much more experienced the enemy forces were compared to many of his own, and how
dangerous Caesar was in the field. In Plutarch’s words: “Caesar and that
army, who had stormed a thousand cities, subdued over 3000 nations, gained numberless battles
of the Germans and Gauls, taken a million prisoners and killed as many in the field”. Pompey was confident that, in time, Caesar
would run out of supplies and that his army would break down. This was known as the Fabian strategy and
had been used to great effect by Fabius Maximus against Hannibal in the Second Punic War. Many high-ranking members of Pompey’s army,
however, were pushing for a decisive battle. Ahenobarbus, Scipio, Afranius, and Cicero
applied pressure to Pompey, accusing the general variously of cowardice and even of having
been bribed. Pompey would have to act soon or risk his
army fracturing. Caesar, on the other hand, had wasted no time. He marched quickly to Gomphi, an important
town with many supplies and home to the praetor of Thessaly, Androsthenes. Andrsothenes had previously promised his and
Thessaly’s support for Caesar but following Dyrrhachium had defected to Pompey, closing
the gates of the city to Caesar. Caesar did not have the supplies or time to
conduct a prolonged siege, so he decided to storm the town. The attack started at 3 in the afternoon and
was all over by sunset; a number of nobles, likely including Androsthenes, committing
suicide. Despite their defeat at Dyrrhachium, Caesar’s
veterans were still a force to be reckoned with. After resupplying, Caesar marched to Metropolis,
which surrendered upon hearing the fate of Gomphi. Many other towns soon followed suit, and Caesar
soon had enough local support to resupply his army for the time being. Pompey knew that if he could keep Caesar pinned
in Thessaly, he would still eventually run out of supplies and be starved out. But the pressure from his officers was continually
mounting. Finally, Pompey relented to their demands
and marched his army to Pharsalus to give battle, setting up his camp on the high ground. Morale amongst Pompey’s men was high and
his officers were confident of victory; they had a huge numerical advantage and had already
defeated Caesar once. Already, talks were being had about who would
be the consuls and praetors after the war, who would get the property of Caesar and his
allies, and who would hold Caesar’s position of pontifex maximus after his defeat. According to Caesar, “they were not concerned
with the means by which they could gain the upper hand, but with the way in which they
ought to use their victory”. Their confidence was not unfounded: Pompey’s
army numbered around 47,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry. Caesar’s army, on the hand, now numbered
only around 21,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, according to his own account. It is likely that Caesar underplayed his numbers,
and Appian suggests he had nearer 30,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, as Caesar failed to add
his auxiliaries to his total. Caesar was equally confident though. His army was not as numerous, but it was more
experienced and disciplined. Only a handful of Pompey’s Legions were
true veterans, most having been recruited specifically for the war and only having seen
their first action at Dyrrhachium. Furthermore, while the bulk of Pompey’s
infantry were Roman Legions, they were supported by auxiliaries and allies from the East making
up the majority of light infantry and cavalry. These men, though all skilled warriors, would
not have been trained to fight in the Roman style, and the multitude of languages spoken
in Pompey’s army would have made coordination difficult. The men Caesar had under his command were
from his 10 veteran Legions, all of whom had fought with him since his Gallic campaigns,
some for as many as 12 years. Every day, Caesar would march his army out
of the camp to the base of Pompey’s hill, offering battle. Pompey each time refused to commit, pulling
his men out of camp but never moving from the high ground; it is clear that he was still
not wholly committed to a pitched battle and did not want to give up his advantageous position,
only being willing to commit to minor skirmishes. While these manoeuvres were going on, Caesar
also mounted some of his infantry, drilling them each day to increase his cavalry to 2,000;
it was still much less than Pompey’s, but enough to at least stall them. It had been almost a month now since the Battle
of Dyrrhachium and Caesar eventually decided that if Pompey would not give battle, his
best strategy would be to keep his army on the march, moving camp every day, forcing
Pompey to shadow him and wearing out Pompey’s less disciplined force. On the 9th August 48 BC, Caesar was about
to put this plan into action and had his army prepared to decamp, when Pompey’s army suddenly
moved off from their position on the hill to the plains to give battle. It is not entirely clear why Pompey chose
to do this. The most likely answer is that he was pressured
by his supporters who, upon seeing Caesar ready to move, were worried Caesar would slip
away and had pressed Pompey to seize the opportunity and give battle. Whatever the reason, Caesar took it as a blessing
and also prepared his army for a battle on now even terrain. Pompey knew that his key advantages were his
cavalry and his numbers, and he drew up his army to best maximize their effectiveness. His infantry was formed into the classic Roman
triplex acies, but slightly deeper than the usual 10 men depth order to better hold a
defensive line. On his left wing, he stationed two Legions
under the command of Lucius Lentulus. These were two of Pompey’s most experienced
Legions, one raised by himself, and the other having been raised by Caesar for the Gallic
Wars and later handed to Pompey just before the Civil War. In his centre, he stationed Scipio and his
Syrian Legions, while the right would be held by two legions combined into one with a river
to their right protecting their flank. Within this Twin Legion were veterans from
Cilicia and from Spain, likely survivors from the Battle of Ilerda. They were commanded by Ahenobarbus, one of
Caesar’s most active opponents. All these Legions were Pompey’s best men;
they would take the brunt of the attack while Pompey’s less experienced Legions, allies
and auxiliaries, would form the two back lines. On Pompey’s extreme left were his 7,000
cavalry under the command of Labienus, supported by Pompey’s skirmishers and archers. A further 2,000 infantry were held in reserve
in Pompey’s camp under the command of Afranius and Pompey’s son, Gnaeus. Pompey positioned himself on the left. His plan was to use the tactic of his hero,
Alexander the Great; with Ahenobarbus and the river guarding his right flank, Pompey’s
infantry would hold the line, while the entire cavalry force would flank left, destroying
Caesar’s cavalry before falling on his Legions from behind, becoming the hammer to the anvil
of the defending legions. Caesar also drew his army up in the triplex
axis formation. The 10th Legion, Caesar’s personal favourite
and some of his best troops, were stationed on his right opposite Pompey. These men were commanded by Sulla, who had
distinguished himself at Dyrrhachium, and this was also where Caesar positioned himself. On the left, Caesar positioned two of his
other most experienced Legions, the 8th and 9th, with the river to their left. These two Legions had suffered so many casualties
over recent campaigns that they were ordered to work as one Legion under the command of
Antony. The centre would be held by the 11th and 12th
under the command of Domitius. Caesar’s remaining Legions filled the second
and third lines, the third having strict orders not to engage until Caesar gave the signal. In order to match Pompey’s line, Caesar
had to stretch his own thin, only 6 men deep. Caesar’s cavalry was stationed opposite
Pompey’s. They were hopelessly outnumbered, and Caesar
was well aware that they would not be able to stall Pompey’s horse for long. As such, he also pulled 3,000 men from various
Legions, arming them with spears, forming them into a 4th line. Caesar was the one to begin the engagement,
ordering his front two lines to charge Pompey’s. Caesar’s men expected Pompey’s infantry
to counter-charge, as was standard military custom, but they instead stood fast holding
their line. In a brilliant display of discipline, Caesar’s
men spontaneously halted mid charge and reassembled. After a brief pause to regain their stamina,
they moved slowly forward only breaking into a charge once again when nearer to Pompey’s
line. Javelins were hurled from both sides, and
Pompey’s men, braced and with interlocked shields, held the line. An intense melee ensued with brutal close-quarters
fighting. Pompey now put his plan into action. Labienus led the Pompeian cavalry to Caesar’s
right flank supported by the skirmishers and archers, smashing into the Caesarian cavalry. Caesar’s men could not hold off the onslaught
for long, gradually being forced back, before retreating entirely. They had, however, performed their role. Whilst Pompey’s cavalry had been fighting
with Caesar’s, Caesar had given the order for his 4th line of spear-armed infantry to
wheel around to face Labienus and his cavalry. The Pompeian cavalry had been preparing to
charge Caesar’s Legions in the rear, but with Caesar’s cavalry acting as a screen,
they hadn’t seen Caesar’s 4th line move into position and they now found themselves
being attacked by 3,000 heavily armoured spearmen. Pompey’s cavalry, though numerous, were
not heavy cavalry and many were young nobles with little experience of warfare; fighting
veteran spearmen head-on was not something they were cut out for. They were routed quickly, being forced to
retreat to distant high ground to try and regroup, but the damage had already been done. Caesar’s fourth line pushed on into Pompey’s
missile troops, easily crushing them. As they pushed on, it was now Pompey who was
being flanked. His left flank legions, both who had previously
fought alongside Caesar and his Legions, now found themselves attacked on multiple fronts
by their old comrades, the 10th Legion from the front, and the 4th line from the left
flank and rear. It was at this point that Caesar committed
his 3rd line of fresh troops, throwing every man he had into the battle. Under this huge pressure, Pompey’s line
began to break, starting with the 1st and 3rd. This was also where Pompey had stationed himself
and, almost becoming surrounded, he had little choice but to flee the battlefield and retreat
to his camp. The rest of Pompey’s line broke in quick
succession, Caesar’s 4th line rolling up the flank while his fresh 3rd line pushed
from the front. Some attempted to follow their general and
retreat to their camp, others simply fled the battlefield. Caesar, knowing his victory needed to be complete,
stormed the camp, easily overwhelming the few thousand reserves and men who had retreated. Those that had retreated from the battlefield
were soon surrounded on a hill and forced to surrender. Caesar had won. By the time Caesar stormed the camp, however,
Pompey had already gone, fleeing with 30 bodyguards. Many other high ranking Pompeians, such as
Labienus, Afranius, Scipio, and Pompey’s son Gnaeus, had also managed to escape. Nonetheless, not all had been so lucky. Ahenobarbus “brave but ill-starred” had
been cut down in the retreat, possibly by Antony himself. Many others had been captured in Pompey’s
camp and in the immediate aftermath. Among these was a young man, Marcus Junius
Brutus. The son of Caesar’s mistress, Brutus was
held in high regard by Caesar, who had given his men orders not to kill Brutus. When Brutus surrendered, Caesar was overjoyed,
welcoming him with open arms. Caesar showed his customary leniency to Pompey’s
soldiers as well, with more than 24,000 surrendering to him. In total, Caesar claims to only have lost
200 men and 30 centurions in the battle while giving the Pompeian losses as 15,000 dead
and the 24,000 surrendered. These numbers seem suspiciously exaggerated
and Appian suggests it was more likely 1,200 of Caesar’s men dead, and 6,000 of Pompey’s,
the rest surrendering or fleeing. Whichever is closer to the truth, the fact
remains that Caesar’s victory was decisive. Aside from having broken Pompey’s largest
army, he had scattered the Pompeian officers, many fleeing to North Africa, and absorbed
many of Pompey’s surrendered men into his army, almost doubling its size. Pompey himself sailed first to the Greek islands
of Lesbos and Mytilene meeting his wife Cornelia and his youngest son, Sextus. His intent was to get his family far away
from Caesar and use his connections in the East to rebuild an army to resist Caesar. By the time he reached Cyprus, he had taken
out private loans and put together a fleet along with 2,000 men. His defeat, however, had cost him much public
support. Pompey had initially planned to head to the
province of Syria, but they turned against him and he was forced to look elsewhere. He decided on Egypt. The boy-pharaoh, Ptolemy XIII owed his throne
to Pompey; Pompey having supported Ptolemy’s father, and guaranteeing his will that made
Ptolemy pharaoh. Pompey had also lent a number of officers
and soldiers from his Eastern command to the pharaoh’s army. Confident he would find support there, Pompey
sailed to Egypt. He was met off the coast by a small rowing
boat which would take Pompey to shore. Aboard were a man called Savius, the head
of the Egyptian army Achillas, and an ex-officer of Pompey’s, Lucius Septimius. Pompey’s wife was worried about this lack
of pomp and suspected something was not right, but Pompey was reassured by the presence of
Septimius. Stepping off his ship, he quoted a line of
Sophocles to his wife: “He who enters a tyrant’s door becomes his slave, even if
he leaves a free man”. As the small boat rowed to shore, Pompey tried
to alleviate the tense atmosphere, telling Septimius he was an old comrade; he received
only a nod of recognition in response. Septimius then struck, stabbing the old general,
quickly followed by both Achillas and Savius. Septimius then beheaded his corpse, throwing
the body naked into the sea. Ptolemy, upon the counsel of his advisors,
had betrayed Pompey in order to try and win approval from Caesar. Pompey the Great, 3 times consul, conqueror
of the East and one of the Roman Republic’s most prolific generals was dead. It is worth noting how revered Pompey was. Plutarch despaired that he and Caesar had
gone to war: “Had they been willing to enjoy the fruits of their labours in peace and tranquillity,
the greatest and best part of the world was their own. If they must have victories and triumphs…what
Scythian horse, what Parthian arrows, what Indian treasures could have resisted 70,000
Romans, led on by Pompey and Caesar?”. Though arguably past his prime at Pharsalus,
Pompey had not at all fought badly; his plan was solid and the best that could be done. The reason for his defeat was not poor generalship,
but the skill and experience of Caesar and his infantry, and the lack of experience of
Pompey’s cavalry. Pompey and Caesar were both incredibly talented
generals, and it is telling how often the two decided on similar strategies. When Caesar reached Egypt having pursued Pompey,
he was first presented with Pompey’s head. Disgusted, he turned away. He was next presented the seal of Pompey,
at which point Caesar broke down in tears. Though enemies in later life, it is worth
remembering that Caesar and Pompey had been political allies for around 8 years, had effectively
ruled Rome together and had even been related by marriage. Caesar was well aware that, despite being
his enemy, Pompey had been a titan of his time, worthy of his respect. Caesar’s victory marked a turning point
in the war. It was now the Optimates who would find themselves
on the back foot. Nevertheless, the war was far from over. Pompey’s staunchest supporters, Cato, Scipio,
and Pompey’s sons Gnaeus and Sextus, had all fled to North Africa to continue the resistance. With them also was Labienus, now undoubtedly
the best commander amongst the Optimates. The war against Pompey was done, but the Civil
War was still ongoing and there were external enemies daring to challenge Caesar. In our next video we will talk about Caesar’s
battles, military and political, that took place after the death of Pompey, so make sure
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