It’s early in the year 46 BC. After the decisive defeat at Thapsus all seemed
lost for the “Optimates” Most of their prominent members were either
dead or fleeing. A large portion of their armies was either
destroyed or captured, while any remaining troops scattered. But despite all of these disastrous set-backs,
the old political order of Rome proved to be a very hard nut to crack. The Optimates will soon prove that they still have some fight left in them. Two of Pompey Magnuses’s sons, Gnaeus and
Sextus, together with Titus Labienus, a former Caesarean who turned against him, managed
to escape the Caesar’s onslaught after their defeat at Thapsus. They made their way to Spain and slowly began
to recruit new legions in order to, once more, renew the hostilities against their nemesis. A couple of Pompey’s former veteran legions
that were stationed in Hispania Ulterior had declared themselves for the optimates and
drove out Caesar’s pro consul. Those two legions were soon joined by the
remnants of the army that was defeated in the North African campaign. By combining their forces they managed to
occupy most of the province, including the capital of the, Corduba. It didn’t take long after that for the optimates
to swell their ranks with newly recruited levies from roman citizens of the region and
from local Spanish inhabitants, as well as former slaves who were disillusioned with
Caesarean authorities. Caesar again had a full scale crisis on his
hands. The civil war has resurged within just a few
months after his victory at Thapsus. But this time around the leader of the populares
faced unique issues. Most of his veterans, after years of service
and numerous campaigns, were disbanded and retired. The majority of his loyal and so often victorious veterans would not follow their general to Spain. Nevertheless, Caesar’s favorite and most
loyal legion, the 10th, despite being severely understrength due to years of campaigning
and accumulated losses, together with the 5th legion, that so successfully managed to
counter the attack of the enemy elephants during the battle of Thapsus, were amongst
those who would follow Caesar to what would ultimately prove to be his final campaign. Caesar arrived in Spain in early December
46 BC after an epic march of almost 2400km which his army covered in less than a month,
a march that according to some ancient sources Caesar commemorated in a short poem that he wrote. When his presence became known to the region, many ambassadors approached him with a variety of requests. The ambassadors from Corduba, urged him to
march straight to their city and relieve it from the enemy who they claimed was not yet
aware of his presence. But at the same time, survivors from the garrison
of Ulia, beseeching Caesar to relieve the city that was under siege by Gnaeus Pompey
for some months now. Caesar thought it more prudent to march to
relieve Ulias first, since its’ citizens remained loyal under pressure. He detached 11 cohorts with a small cavalry
force, under the command of Julius Paciecus, and sent them during the night to lift the
siege of Ulia. When the detachment arrived near Ulia, a severe
tempest arose that reduced visibility to within just a few metres. Thinking quickly, Paciecus ordered his men
to attempt to sneak from within Pompey’s entrenchments, marching with his cavalry in
a very thin formation. After a Pompeian guard became aware of their
presence and required them to identify themselves, one of Paciecus’ legionaries yelled at him
to be silent, telling him that they were attempting to capture the walls! The trick worked and the Caesareans managed
to enter the city. Thanks to Paciecius’ cunning and the audacity of a single legionnaire, the siege of Ulia was lifted. When Caesar received news of this success
he immediately set off towards Corduba. He quickly built a bridge and forded the river Qualdacivir, setting his camp not far from the city. Pompey rushed to intercept Caesar and set
his camp just opposite of his rival’s position, across the bridge. As it was typical for Caesar he attempted
to completely block off his enemy from gaining access to the bridge by having his soldiers
dig an extended trench from his camp. As a result, a series of bloody skirmishes
ensued across the bridge. The Pompeians tried to gain access to the
bridge and the Caesareans tried to block it off. So severe were the losses for both sides due
to the narrow space in which they fought that that heaps of bodies piled up on both sides of
the bridge. Caesar realized that Pompey would not commit
to an open and decisive battle, so he did not linger for long. He instructed his soldiers to light many fires
to distract and deceive the enemy into thinking that the entire force was in the camp. Then, during that same night he forded the
river and marched against the city of Ategua, which was the strongest fort that the Optimates
had in the area. The veterans immediately began to besiege
the town of Ategua , forcing the new recruits to follow their lead and accustom themselves
with the heavy workload that was typical of the Caesarean way of waging war. It wasn’t long after that a series of ditches
and ramparts had fully surrounded the town. Around the same time Pompey who was informed
of Caesar’s departure and was marching to the aid of Ategua, happened to stumble upon
a strong detachment of enemy cavalry during some heavy mist and completely destroyed it. Despite his success, most of the strategic
eminences’ around the area were already occupied by Caesareans, so he was forced to
by-pass them and encamp himself in between Ategua and the nearby city of Ucubis, upon
some hills overlooking the enemy positions. From his position Pompey could not assist
the defenders so was in urgent need of a plan. After he assessed the situation he came up
with a plan of immediate action. There, across a nearby river, he saw a weakly
defended hill that overlooked the town, as well as Caesar’s communication lines and,
because of the nature of the ground and the intervening river, he thought that Caesar
would not be able to reinforce the position in case of a surprise attack. Driven by this belief he sent a strong detachment
in a dramatic night march to storm the enemy’s position and dislodge the Caesareans. Things did not go according to Pompey’s
plan though. When his legionaries reached the position
the defenders were ready and showered them with their pila from a favorable and elevated
position. With the surprise being unsuccessful the ensuing
skirmish gave enough time to Caesar to react. Three legions from the main camp rushed to
the aid of their comrades and the Pompeians were caught in between the two forces. After a brief struggle the Pompeians fled
after losing about a hundred men during the flight. The loses would have probably been more severe
if the attack happened during daylight. After the failure of the surprise attack,
Pompey changed his tactics and attempted to force his way across the river and onto the
strategically located hill. He began digging a line across his camp to
the nearby river in order for his army to be able to safely reach the other side. Once again, skirmishes ensued around the entrenchments, but Pompey’s army was eventually able to reach the river and even build a new fort
on the opposite bank. The no-man’s-land between the two opposing
fortifications became a place of severe and intense clashes, with neither side being able
to achieve a major victory and both armies sustained minor setbacks. Pompey needed to break the stalemate and relieve
the town from his enemy. During the night he managed to sneak messages
to the besieged, imploring them to assemble and attack a specific point of Caesar’s
fortifications, in the hope that they could break out and unite with his forces outside. The garrison of Ategua complied and tried
a desperate breakthrough out of Caesar’s chokehold, but the effort was in vain. The Caesarean army proved to be way too prepared
and capable of repulsing the attempt. After a brief clash, in which the garrison
sustained heavy losses, it was eventually forced to retreat in disarray back within
its’ walls. After the failed breakthrough attempt, Pompey decided that he could do nothing more for besieged. Preparations began to break camp and march
towards the western part of the province where there were numerous well defended allied cities
and towns that he could assist and defend more effectively. Caesar intercepted this intelligence and decided
to inform the inhabitants of the besieged city about Pompey’s decision to abandon
them. And, as he had correctly predicted, it didn’t
take long before a letter arrived from governor L. Minatius who offered to surrender the town
as long as he received guarantees that their lives would be spared, which Caesar granted. The siege of Ategua was successfully concluded
in February of 45 BC. The fall of this key fortress incited a cascade
of defections around the whole province, in favour of Caesar’s cause. Pompey was retreating towards the city of
Ucubis and Caesar remained hot on his heels. After crossing yet another river close to
Ucubis, Pompey decided to encamp yet again and began entrenching himself on defendable
hilly area. The two armies were soon engaged in a ferocious
skirmish near the fordable area of the river during which the Caesareans were overwhelmed
and pushed back. Two of Caesar’s veteran centurions made
a heroic last stand in an attempt to slow down the Pompeian counter charge. Their eventual deaths gave enough time to
the opposing Caesarean horsemen who were rushing out of their camp to intervene and in their turn drove the Pompeians back to their own entrenchments. Both adversaries were carefully manoeuvring,
attempting to defend their lines, while at the same time endeavouring to exploit any
weakness and strike a knockout blow to the enemy. After marching a few miles westwards both
armies stopped and began to dig in. Pompey encamped just outside the city of Ucubis
and Caesar a few miles to the north. He immediately set his legionaries to dig
a protracted ditch along the communication and supply routes of his enemy that run towards
the city of Aspavia just off to the north of his position. After Pompey observed this he immediately
perceived the seriousness of the situation and decided to hazard an engagement against
the Caesarean forces, but he remained wary and cautious enough to march along the hills
and attempt to provoke an engagement from a favourable elevated position. The exact description of what happened next
is lost to us but it is reasonable to assume that Caesar’s forces managed to dislodge
the Pompeians from their position and that they were only saved by the onset of darkness. It was around that time that letters send
from Pompey to his allies in nearby cities were intercepted. In them he described a switch in his strategy
and that from now on he would attempt to defend every allied city, intending to hinder Caesar’s
army from using them as supply depots and provision sources that it so desperately needed. Pompey continued to retreat to the western
side of the province and Caesar followed him closely, managing to capture the city of Ventisponte
during the pursuit. The commander of the optimates, being faithful
to his aforementioned strategy has set out to enact it, burning the nearby city of Carruca
when its’ garrison refused to open the gates to him and from there marching southwards
to the nearby town of Munda, where he positioned his army upon the mountainous area to the
immediate vicinity of the town. Caesar, still on the pursuit, arrived in the
plains of Munda and pitched his camp opposite to that of Pompey. The next day, while Caesar was preparing to
once again set out with his army, scout reports stated that Pompey’s army was arranged in
battle order ever since midnight. Julius Caesar ordered for the battle standard
to be raised immediately. The final showdown of the largest and most
catastrophic civil war of the ancient world, was imminent… The two camps were divided from one another
by a plain extending about five miles. Pompey enjoyed a double defence of sorts,
due to the nature of the country and because the town was situated on elevated ground. Across this valley ran a small river or rivulet, which rendered the approach to the mountain very difficult. Due to perfect weather conditions on the day,
Pompey’s numerical superiority, and the flat plain that lay between them, Caesar thought
that by moving towards his already arrayed enemy would entice him to move down from his
hill and engage in battle. But Pompey stayed put, and it soon became
obvious that the commander of the Optimates would not dare leave the high ground, even
though Caesar’s army was composed largely of new recruits. When they reached the edge of the plain, which
was the most disadvantageous location to initiate a battle, Caesar pointed that out to his largely
inexperienced troops. The subsequent delay of their advance enlivened
the Pompeians who advanced a little way, but without abandoning their advantageous position. Cautiously but steadily, Caesar’s legions
began the slow upward march towards Pompey’s position. The army of the Optimates consisted of thirteen
legions arranged in three lines. The cavalry that was about 6000 men strong
was positioned on the wings and was commanded by Titus Labienus, with an equal number of
light troops dispersed among them. In total, the Pompeian army numbered around
70.000 men During that day Julius Caesar led a total
of 8 legions that were almost at their full strength numbering around 40.000 men and he
also had a slight numerical advantage in cavalry with a total of 8000 horsemen under his command,
who were all placed on his left wing. His infantry was arranged in the usual triple
line with the elite 10th legion of veterans occupying its’ usual position on the right
wing, with the 5th and 3rd legion on his left. The battle that was about to come was to be,
by far, the largest clash of the civil war in terms of scale. But the main bulk of the Caesarean legions
were not composed of the battle hardened and victorious veterans who had campaigned with
Caesar for over a decade, but were manned mainly by new levies and recruits who were
not accustomed to large scale engagements. Needless to say, they proceeded hesitantly
against an enemy who was numerically superior and in an advantageous position. Sensing this, Caesar ran up and down the line
encouraging his soldiers, with one of our sources claiming that he seized a shield from
a soldier and advanced against the enemy by himself, saying to the officers around him
that this shall be the end of his life and their military service. While he shamed them to their faces and exhorted
them to advance, the he was soon joined by tribunes who took position by his side, something that encouraged the rest of the army to rush towards the enemy. The bulky mass of the two armies had no room
to manoeuvre on this rocky and inclined battleground and cavalry action could not be easily initiated
due to the rugged terrain, so the infantry was to play a decisive role. The battle proved a much longer affair than
the clash at Thapsus and the Pompeians managed to withstand the initial and most formidable
charge of their adversaries. After the exchange of more than 30.000 pila,
the similarly equipped and trained armies engaged in a long drawn out and exhaustive
contest, in which no one seemed to be gaining the upper hand. For hours they were battling it out with neither
the Pompeians being able to brake the line of their enemy nor the Caesareans being able
to push back the multitude of shields that were blocking their advance. After hours of this exhaustive hand to hand
fighting Caesar’s right wing began to edge out their opponents. Once more it was the grizzled veterans of
the 10th legion who managed to take the better of their enemies, despite being severely understrength. With only a fraction of their manpower still
able to fight, the men of the 10th, most of them in their 40s and 50s, who were the spearhead
of numerous campaigns and battles, did what they have done countless times before, displaying
an unparalleled courage and endurance as they began to push Pompey’s numerically superior
left flank back uphill. With this severe crisis unfolding, Pompey
was forced to remove a whole legion from his right wing and bring it to the rescue of his
hard pressed left wing. This was the moment that Caesar was waiting
for. He ordered his cavalry to charge directly
against Pompey’s weakened right wing and send part of his auxiliaries to charge Pompey’s
undefended camp. Labienus who commanded the cavalry saw the
movement of Caesar’s auxiliary cavalry and charged with some of the troops to intercept
them. Amidst this turmoil Pompey’s hard pressed
infantry perceived Labienus’ movement as an attempted retreat. It was the turning point in the battle and
soon the army of the optimates routed in panic began towards the city of Munda. The Caesareans mercilessly pursued the remnants
of the Pompeian army all the way to the city of Munda which they soon placed under siege. 30.000 Pompeians laid dead on the battlefield
that day, while loses on the Caesarean side were much lighter, ranging around 1000 men. Munda was to be the last battle that Caesar ever fought but it was also one of his hardest fought ones. He was later recorded as saying: “I often
fought for victory, but at Munda I fought for my very existence”. This was the largest civil war of the ancient
world. The optimates fought against Caesar tooth
and nail and it took all of Caesar’s determination, drive, genius and tenacity in order to achieve
the final victory. Gaius Julius Caesar was triumphant, but his
triumph would last for only one year, until the ides of March 44 BC...
