AUKUS and the Nuclear Option: the Life and Death of the Attack Class Submarine

at 7am on the 16th of september 2021 australians awoke to the news of the prime minister scott morrison was about to make a live television announcement joined remotely by the british prime minister boris johnson and u.s president joe biden morrison announced a new trilateral security partnership called orcas the new deal formalized the deepening security partnership between the three nations committing all to achieve and maintain technological parity amongst their various military branches as part of the deal the three leaders announced that they would pull their research and development capabilities giving australian and british institutions full and unfettered access to the us military-industrial base for the first time in history this included the joint development of technologies in cutting-edge areas of warfare and international competition including cyber space hypersonic weapons and quantum computing given the three nations are all members of the five eyes alliance which is the oldest and deepest intelligence sharing framework in the world one could argue that the emerging trilateral security alliance between the united kingdom australia and the united states is the deepest in the world a 21st century alliance orcas goes far beyond cold war era security guarantees the three democracies have agreed to completely open their doors to one another sharing not only intelligence but capabilities across the full spectrum of military technologies although this framework sets the foundation for cooperation between the three for many decades to come the immediate beneficiary is australia undeniably the front line in the confrontation between the western alliance and an increasingly assertive china australia has shown its willingness to hold the line against beijing the careful hedging of the kevin rudd administration which sought to simultaneously maintain australia's economic relationship with china and its military alliance with the united states a policy of walking and chewing gum at the same time as rudd called it is now long gone australia's threat perception of china has been revolutionized by beijing's overt aggression towards canberra including the use of economic coercion and large-scale cyber attacks on critical australian infrastructure clearly the china of 2021 is simply not the same beast it was in 2009 and the isolationist views of hugh white and paul keating have certainly not aged well although china was not mentioned by name orcas in combination with other alliance structures such as the quadrilateral security dialogue is absolutely aimed at balancing an increasingly capable assertive and dangerous beijing for the australian defense force the initial implications of the orcas agreement are an immediate increase in its long-range strike capability announced simultaneously with the new pact the adf will receive a range of new weapon systems that will be procured immediately these include the tomahawk land attack cruise missile which will initially be fielded on the hobart class destroyer the joints aired a surface standoff missile extended range which will provide the rwaf with a 500 nautical mile range standoff capability the long range anti-ship missile which is a 400 nautical mile range stealth maritime strike weapon a land-based long-range missile for deployed forces which is probably the high mars system and an acceleration of the one billion dollar investment in local missile and precision guided munitions manufacture additionally the agreement includes the rotation of both british and american military assets to australia from nuclear submarines to strategic air power and potentially the forward deployment of u.s munitions stockpiles although all are significant very few of these developments are actually new the requirement for the tomahawk as an example was first outlined in the 2009 defence whitepaper in 2020 rdaf tyndall australia's primary northern airbase received a 1.1 billion upgrade which included runway extension and additional fuel and munitions storage improvements that were specifically designed to support long-range strike platforms such as the b1b obviously the deployment of additional american capabilities to australia including those as potent as u.s strategic air power have been planned for several years additionally australia and the united kingdom have signed several bilateral security agreements over the last three years which include the joint development of unmanned undersea systems and the provision for basing uk military assets in australia but there was one element of the orcas framework that fell on the region and the world like a thunderclap the largest defense project in australian history the 12-boat attack-class submarine program under development by the french company naval group was to be immediately cancelled in instead the united kingdom and united states would jointly aid in the development of an australian nuclear submarine capability in doing so the united states agreed to share its nuclear reactor technology with australia granting canberra access to the most advanced submarine technology in the world this gift bestowed upon the government and people of australia by the united states is an almost unprecedented display of trust only one other nation has been granted this level of access to the united states's most advanced nuclear technology which is the united kingdom the uk and us jointly develop marine nuclear reactors now australia would be allowed to join that most trusted inner sanctum surely there can be no clearer sign of the foundational strength of the australian us alliance one forged in the battlefields of the south pacific and the tyres of kinship that bind london and canberra this was a truly shocking development in australia there had been no reporting that such an agreement was even being negotiated however the surprise felt in australia was nothing compared to the earthquake that was about to hit paris the french australia's partners in the attack class program were not given substantial forewarning of canberra's decision not to proceed although some french reaction had to be expected it's very obvious that no one predicted the depth of rage that erupted in paris amid cries of betrayal french president emmanuel macron recalled the ambassadors to both australia and the united states at the time this video was published macron is now trying to use his leverage within the european union to disrupt or even sabotage the ongoing trade negotiations between the eu and australia clearly whether justified or not this decision has generated a reaction in paris that has led to the lowest point in franco-australian relations since the vietnam war a relationship that was routinely referred to as a strategic partnership just a couple of weeks ago but why did all of this happen what was the now stillborn attack class submarine a military platform that has caused a global diplomatic incident why was it selected in the first place why was it cancelled was it because of delays and cost blowouts why didn't australia simply use a french nuclear submarine or indeed any nuclear submarine back in 2015 when it was selecting the collins replacement why would the french be so upset about this in fact why would australia go to such lengths and pay so much money for a submarine capability in the first place really to understand how we ended up in this situation we need to examine the history of the attack class program as a whole and why australia cares so much about submarines in fact we need to go back to the 1960s although the australian submarine arm was founded in 1911 with the delivery of the nation's first submarines ae1 and ae2 the establishment of the modern submarine service really has its roots with the purchase of the oberon class boats delivered through the 1960s the four boat oberon class marked the first time in half a century that the royal australian navy was operating its own submarines much beloved in australian service the o boats were highly capable even very late in life at operation rimpac 98 hmas oxley penetrated the usn's defenses and sank the carrier uss carl vinson the combination of high speed and submerged endurance especially when upgraded with modern weapons made the oberons highly competitive even well into the 1990s at the end of their service life it was australia's experience with the oberon class that shaped its fundamental view of submarine operations and sustainment which would dominate the foundational objectives of both the collins and attack classes one of the biggest challenges was the crippling cost of operating and sustaining the oberon class submarines because of the punishing undersea environment and the exceptionally high demands for safety submarines are maintenance intensive and the o boats were particularly so every five years each oberon-class submarine had to undergo a complete refit which involves stripping the hull and refurbishing or replacing practically every part on the submarine in the 1980s this process took over two years and consumed 1.25 million man-hours of labor the first refit of hmas oberon cost 76 of the purchase price which had to be done after only five years of operations as the oberons had been manufactured in the united kingdom sustaining the vessels in australia was a colossal challenge the ran did not even possess detailed builders schematics meaning that in many cases systems and components had to be repaired in situ this is hardly an efficient way to work considering the extremely confined quarters but more crippling was the availability of parts as submarines effectively have to be rebuilt every time they undergo a substantial maintenance period the parts consumption is massive the oberons essentially required the majority of the parts which constituted the entire submarine to be replaced every five years however the ran was dependent on overseas suppliers for between 85 to 90 percent of its requirements this substantially increased cost and dragged out the maintenance period severely impacting submarine availability navy tried to source as many parts as it could from australian suppliers but as the ran had not purchased the intellectual property rights for the thousands of different parts it required enough to essentially build these vessels in the first place these could not be made domestically finally sending boats to the uk for maintenance would have fatally undermined the credibility of australia's submarine capability having to sail australian submarines to the other side of the planet for even reasonably minor repairs let alone deep maintenance periods which are called full cycle docking would drastically impact submarine availability not to mention the sovereignty or cost concerns so if you essentially have to rebuild a submarine every time it goes into full cycle docking and relying on foreign parts suppliers is crippling you from a cost and availability perspective then the obvious and really only answer is to simply build the submarine in australia it was this terrible experience with foreign-built submarines that drove the decision to build the collins class domestically if the submarine is built in australia then by definition the intellectual property to maintain it is also here which means a local supply chain and complete access to all of the blueprints and building information generally speaking when the public discusses the decision to build the collins and attack classes in australia they almost completely focus on jobs and local industry thinking the decision is dominated by partisan politics but in reality over and above the very real economic benefits of local manufacture is these lessons in sustainment which was so hard won by the ran and its experience with the oberon class that have made domestic submarine production such a high priority this painful experience needs to be remembered when short-sighted politicians and pundits advocate foreign manufacture citing higher procurement costs just as it did with the oberon class saving money in procurement may simply lead to far higher sustainment costs and lower availability rates over the life of the submarine leaving you substantially worse off overall another major weakness in the oberon-class submarines was something called the indiscretion rate diesel-electric submarines spend the majority of their time running off electric propulsion electric motors are inherently quiet making advanced conventional submarines highly stealthy but batteries only hold charge for so long once they are depleted the submarine will have to come up to the surface and snorkel which entails putting a tube above the water and running diesel engines to recharge the batteries during this time the submarine is highly vulnerable not only are diesel engines loud making the boat much less discreet but because it is snorkeling the submarine has to remain at periscope depth with elements above the surface making it both visible and vulnerable to detection by surface search radars although the oberon was a very quiet and deadly submarine when it was using electric propulsion it had to surface and recharge its batteries often this high indiscretion rate was compounded by the length of time to fully recharge over four hours if the batteries were dead flat for its next generation platform the ran wanted a submarine that could stay submerged longer and recharge its batteries faster the third major weakness of the oberons were its limited range and endurance australia is a unique diesel-electric submarine operator the vast majority of conventional submarines are relatively small short-range vessels that are designed to be operated in a nation's near seas even very large navies such as the plan have primarily operated smaller submarines in the 2 000 ton range such as the type 35 ming and type 39 song classes australia has two primary operational naval bases fleet base east in sydney and perth's fleet base west the current home of the ran submarine force because of australia's unique geography the ran submarines have to transit enormous distances to reach patrol stations the arafura sea just off the northern coast of australia is over four thousand kilometers from perth however the distance from fleet base west to the south china sea andaman sea or philippine sea areas australia would typically deploy at submarines are much further requiring an australian boat to transit as far as 6 000 kilometers just to reach its patrol area a journey that could take two weeks typically the nations who need to transit the submarines that far such as the us russia or the uk use far larger submarines with nuclear propulsion this was a significant problem for the oberon class one of the major limiting factors in how far a submarine can go is not actually its range on internal fuel in fact on paper the oberon and collins-class submarines have the same range over 10 000 nautical miles the real limiting factor for both nuclear and long-range conventional submarines is the endurance of the crew submarines are a punishing workplace the average submariner will spend weeks in what is essentially a steel box with limited personal space and no exposure to natural light or the outdoors this is why even nuclear submarines will typically limit their patrols to 90 days even though they are only limited by their food stocks the relatively high crewing requirement of the o boats typically around 60 combined with its small size just over 2 000 tons to have a negative impact on the endurance of the crew so many people in such a cramped space effectively limited the length of an average patrol additionally it placed a substantial burden on the submarine's life support systems meaning for example more trips to the surface to exchange air thus although the oh boats were highly successful capable and well-liked submarines in australian service their serious shortcomings were powerful lessons for the royal australian navy and the australian military generally over and above their generic capability as contemporary platforms with competitive sensor and weapon performance future australian submarines would have to meet three fundamental requirements one in order to reduce sustainment costs and increase availability the platforms need to be built and maintained in australia supported by a local supply chain and contain the smallest amount of foreign parts possible 2 australian submarines should have a very low indiscretion rate three australian submarines also require a very long endurance containing both the long range and reasonably generous crewing amenities once one understands these three fundamental objectives many choices in both the collins and attack program start to make a great deal more sense indeed obviously in addition to the fundamental attributes of submarines such as stealth and lethality the collins class submarine was absolutely designed around these three foundational parameters local manufacturer indiscretion rate and endurance originally envisaged in the early 1980s the collins class was a hugely ambitious project for australia the design manufacture and sustainment of a unique and world-leading submarine was a truly daunting task for a nation with an embryonic naval industry lacking the ability to design a submarine locally the australian government partnered with the swedish shipbuilder cockhams who proposed a heavily modified gotland class at a length of over 77 metres and a submerged displacement of nearly 3500 tons the collins was at the time of its construction one of the largest conventional submarines ever built the six boat collins class would be manufactured and sustained by the australian submarine corporation at the osborne shipyard in south australia perhaps predictably given australia had never built a submarine before there were cost increases and delays during the initial production of hmas collins several bow elements that have been manufactured in sweden were found to have defective welding and had to be rejected there were also persistent problems with the combat system and hull generated noise when the boat was moving at high speed as a result of these and other issues hmas collins would be delivered 18 months late as problems arose the various parties began to argue with one another as the australian government asc and cockham's fought over who would cover the cost of amendments this had a very negative impact in the local media much like the adf as a whole the australian people were not accustomed to the trials and tribulations of designing and manufacturing a world-class military platform historically the ran has simply purchased its ships from overseas with all of the bugs worked out the steady stream of bad news delays generated a widespread conception that the program was failing an unfair reputation that has stayed with collins to this day considering ase had never built a submarine the delays and cost overruns the collins class experienced were arguably reasonably mild military systems are amongst the most technologically advanced and challenging engineering projects on earth even the most experienced shipyards and companies experience setbacks and delays infamously hms astute the lead ship of the royal navy's current generation of nuclear attack submarine would be beset by delays and problems she would only become fully operational some 13 years after the keel was laid down indeed after the second boat of the class hms ambush had achieved operational status this is from a design company bae and a shipyard marine barrow that have decades of experience in submarine construction and a country with the longest tradition of submarine manufacture in the world designing manufacturing and sustaining military submarines platforms that are often at the bleeding edge technologically is a very difficult thing to do the fact that many in the general public seem to habitually forget collins class were undeniably beset by early reliability problems during the first years of operations breakdowns were unacceptably excessive the majority of these reliability failures were the result of minor parts and subsystems that had been incorrectly specified it was not just the australian shipyards that had never built a submarine before the supply chain as a whole was showing its inexperience nevertheless many of these problems were relatively easily rectified by simply changing part specifications or suppliers for example when the propeller driveshaft seal was allowing too much water into the boat the supply was simply changed rectifying the problem when the bowel plane actuators were found to be squeaky simply replacing them immediately resolved the issue but the sheer number of problems increased as the submarines moved through their first 10-year sustainment cycle there are also some fundamental issues with the design the largest of which was the combat system or cds combat systems such as aegis are the brain of a ship or submarine they essentially take all of the information which is generated by the boat's various sensors and integrated to form one coherent tactical picture of the area around the vessel additionally the combat system connects sensors weapons and people to create one larger integrated warfighting system the original cds manufactured by rockwell severely underperformed the sensor specification for the collins class was impressive and the original system could simply not handle the amount of data the sonars produced greatly reducing the submarine's tactical performance asked to aid in solving this problem the united states provided the lockheed martin byg-1 the combat system used in the virginia class the new system not only solved the problem it transformed the collins class allowing the full potential of the advanced sensor suite to be realised it wasn't just a replacement of a faulty system but a potent upgrade the byg1 equipped australian boats were truly an entirely different beast but even after many of the faulty components had been replaced availability rates continued to fall a problem which came to a head in 2011. over the period covering 2006 to 2009 the availability of the collins class measured in days a platform was available for operations were amongst the worst in the world for a submarine fleet of this size as submarines are so maintenance intensive you expect to have a large portion of your fleet out of the water at any one time however in the late 2000s there were periods where only one out of the six columns class submarines were available for operational deployment confronted with an availability crisis the australian government commissioned a review of the collins class program by dr john coles the cole's review outlined five primary areas of mismanagement which originated in both the australian government and the australian submarine corporation that were leading to poor availability unclear availability requirements as stated by government a lack of a performance-based ethos at asc unclear lines of responsibility between the various companies and organizations poor planning and the lack of a single set of accurate information to inform decision making in essence dr kohl's concluded that the management structure that oversaw the collins class sustainment was a complete mess to the australian government's credit the recommendations of the coles review were immediately implemented a national submarine enterprise was established to oversee all elements of submarine production maintenance and development this new group included members from the royal australian navy defence material organisation department of finance and asc bringing the military finance and industry together under one roof this new structure immediately dissolved the hard borders and silos that had plagued the program ending the persistent blame shifting and providing everyone with clear guidance and expectations secondly the supply chain was reorganized in accordance with value chain principles which both increased the availability of spares and reduced total parts costs finally the whole submarine project was given enterprise performance indicators essentially kpis against which performance would be measured at the highest level this included the navy's overall operational requirement that two collins-class submarines be available for patrol deployments at any time to ensure this was achievable four submarines had to be under the command of the fleet commander with one undergoing minor repairs and three available for tasking including training leaving two boats out of the water undergoing refit and upgrade in 2014 the government tasked dr coles to review the progress that had been made in just three years the collins class program had seen a marked improvement with three boat availability of over sixty percent compared to zero percent in 2011 leading calls to conclude that the efforts to date had delivered availability rates which had exceeded the navy's requirements in 2016 collins exceeded international benchmarks across the board although it had taken substantial reform to get there by the latter half of the 2010s australia's naval industry had proven it was capable of building sustaining and upgrading world-class submarines at a standard of efficiency and cost that was as good as any submarine manufacturer globally undeniably the troubled early life of the collins class is best described as the growing pains of a naval industry that was still in its adolescence nevertheless the first major weakness of the oberon class had been rectified in terms of performance the collins class were from their first operational years highly capable submarines however in early testing hmas collins was found to have a significant issue with high speed noise as part of the modification of the original gotland design a larger bow sonar was fitted giving the collins its unique bulbous nose an unintended consequence of this hull shape was turbulent water flow at speeds in excess of 12 knots vortices that then interacted with the propeller increasing cavitation although this problem was relatively easily fixed by alterations to the outer shape of the submarine which is essentially a glass fiber skin that covers the pressure vessel collins gained a reputation in the australian media and public as a noisy submarine this is despite the fact that when traveling at a patrol quiet speed of 3 knots hmas collins has been measured to emit less sound than the background ocean noise within the submarine all equipment is isolated from the decks by vibration absorbent fittings and the decks themselves are similarly isolated from the hull undeniably what made the collins class unique was its size although a 3500 ton submarine is not unheard of in 2021 during the design period they were amongst the largest conventional submarines ever made with a substantially greater displacement than the russian kilo this increased internal volume allowed the collins to redress the two remaining fundamental weaknesses of the oberon endurance and indiscretion rate as the new submarine had over 50 greater displacement this allowed a far larger number of batteries to be installed greatly improving the collins submerged endurance three or four days between snorkeling is not uncommon if the boat is being frugal in essence the submerged performance of the colons is four times greater than the oberon which is simply a product of its volume and the size of the installed battery bank in addition to the greater number of batteries the boat's size allowed for much larger diesel generators the collins class have a combined onboard electricity generation capacity of 4.2 megawatts these diesel generators allow the boat to rapidly recharge its batteries again achieving a four times improvement over the oberons going at speed the collins can recharge its batteries from depletion to full charge in one hour during her initial sea trials hmas collins demonstrated that under typical patrol conditions when the boat was moving slowly and conserving energy she was able to run an energy cycle that required her to snorkel for just a couple of minutes every 24 hours in the mid-1990s the defense science and technology organization or dsto tested two air independent propulsion technologies one of which was reportedly the sterling system used today by cockhams however the submerged performance of the collins class was so good that these were immediately dropped as the space weight and cost for these systems which include oxidizer tanks did not offer a marked improvement over the baseline capability captain paul greenfield of the royal australian navy remarked sea trials of the first of class have proven that collins as it is now can stay submerged for such a long time and have such a low rate of indiscretion that the refit of an aip system is really not needed and would simply not have any cost benefit in essence by building a boat as large as collins and focusing the design around submerged endurance australia had been able to produce a submarine that had such a low indiscretion rate that aip technologies offered such a limited tactical benefit that it was not worth the installation this is despite the fact that these systems were budgeted for although it had taken several decades of tireless effort and investment by the mid-2010s australia had achieved all of its goals with the collins class program collins was now completely sustained by an australian supply chain finally giving the submarines much higher availability and much lower sustainment costs than the oberons they replaced there would be no more month-long delays waiting for international parts suppliers during refits the advantages of size had made the australian boats capable of 90-day patrols remaining on station for seven weeks at a range of 2500 nautical miles and given them submerged performance so good that contemporary aip systems were simply not worth utilizing finally the combination of the byg-1 combat system with a large and advanced sonar suite in addition to the mark 48 adcap sea bass heavyweight torpedo gave the colons a level of lethality and combat effectiveness that approached nuclear submarines at least in their ability to detect track classify and engage stealthy targets but even in 2009 as the potential of the collins class was finally close to being realized its successor was already being discussed the first outlines of the attack class emerged in the late 2000s a watershed document the 2009 defence white paper firmly placed china at the center of australian strategic planning seeing the already emerging trends in both economic growth and naval construction the rudd government outlines a very ambitious naval shipbuilding plan for the ran the centerpiece of this new maritime force structure was the future submarine called c1000 the project to replace the collins class called for a regionally superior submarine to enter service in the late 2020s critically the fleet would be doubled to 12. this is a very large investment in submarines for any middle power furthermore this high level of investment is underlined by the fact that in the force structure outlined in 2009 the number of major surface combatants frigates or destroyers would be equaled by submarines in most navies there are at least two major surface warships for every attack submarine which is certainly the case for the american british and french navies but why do submarines seem to matter more to australia than most other naval powers this is because submarines fundamentally are a platform of sea denial rather than sea control in very simple terms surface ships such as frigates or destroyers are best at achieving sea control their surface-to-wear missiles anti-ship missiles and anti-submarine warfare systems provide a local area of sea and air control this small bubble of safely sanitized battle space can then be used to achieve some greater purpose such as to move amphibious forces with the navy's canberra class lhds although in task force operations submarines can be used in the defensive role adding to this bubble of sea control by operating under a task group the submarine's forte is sea denial because of its inherent stealth a submarine cannot be tracked with typical wide area surveillance systems such as optical satellites aircraft or radar this combined with its range and persistence greatly magnifies the area of ocean which even a small number of submarines can simultaneously threaten substantially complicating an enemy's calculations additionally the submarine is the most potent anti-shipping platform that exists in contemporary warfare equipped with deadly heavyweight homing torpedoes if just one submarine can penetrate the defenses of a task force undetected it can potentially sync the whole formation with a single broadside these inherent attributes of submarines are why they are the favored platform of inferior naval powers in world war ii the kriegsmarine surface force was at times one-tenth the strength of the royal navy but by investing in the u-boat for a time the germans threatened to economically isolate the united kingdom and disrupt the build-up of u.s forces for d-day during 1942 and 1943 at a time where japan still enjoyed naval superiority before the massive fighting strength of the u.s carrier fleet had been resurrected by the mighty essex class u.s navy submarines were devastating the japanese merchant fleet when confronted with the immense naval power of the united states the soviet union built the largest submarine fleet in the world so too would the submarine be the rans premier platform of the 21st century even in 2009 the implications of china's rapid industrialization on australia's strategic environment were beginning to become apparent by the middle of the century australia would be living in a world where u.s naval dominance could no longer be guaranteed given australia's geography the single most significant strategic threat the nation can face is the existence of a great naval power in east asia one of the three major industrialized regions of the world the last time east asia contained such a power australia faced a war of national survival thus the australian military would have to invest in platforms and capability that would offset the naval superiority china would have achieved by the 2030s and the attack class was the centerpiece of that strategy it is against this strategic backdrop of great power competition in east asia that australia's future submarine was born the project to replace the collins class was labeled c1000 as can be seen from the requirements outlined in this program the future submarine would be built upon the experience and lessons the royal australian navy had learned in over half a century of submarine operations indeed the best aspects of the collins class would be foundational to the new design the rudds gillard and turnbull governments all outlined a set of requirements for the new submarine that were surprisingly similar the fleet size would be 12 boats the two labour governments committed to local manufacture while the 2016 defence white paper simply required a maximum of australian industry involvement allowing the possibility for foreign manufacture if the intellectual property concerns could be addressed the future submarine would have to have greater or at least similar range and endurance to the collins class close interoperability with the united states was a persistent requirement and by 2016 the byg1 combat system and mark 48 mod 7 heavyweight torpedo were specified nuclear propulsion for the future submarine was ruled out by rudd and gillard and although this stance was softened under the conservative liberal government it was never realistically considered this may seem like a strange choice considering the orcis announcement but this was simply an outcome of the available technology at the time reportedly france had offered australia the barracuda barracuda-class nuclear attack submarine in the 2015-2016 timeframe indeed there have been claims of australian hypocrisy refusing a french nuclear submarine but cancelling the attack class because australia now required nuclear propulsion however there are very good reasons why a nuclear barracuda was never an option for the future submarine during the early days of the c-1000 program the only forms of nuclear technology open to australia required reasonably frequent refuelling for example reportedly the technic atom k-15 150 megawatt reactor which powers the french barracuda requires refueling every 10 years refuelling a nuclear submarine is in simple terms similar to refueling a commercial nuclear reactor which requires something called the nuclear fuel cycle uranium cannot simply be mined and placed into a submarine it must be milled a process which extracts uranium from its ore creating yellow cake converted to uranium hexafluoride and then enriched to around 20 percent of u235 at that point the uranium can be manufactured into small ceramic fuel pellets once the fuel has been used in the reactor it has to be removed at which point it will be highly radioactive and has to be handled and housed in specialized facilities after the spent fuel has cooled it can be reprocessed extracting the unused u-235 and finally move to a long-term storage facility although australia mines and mills uranium as the country has no civilian nuclear industry none of these other processes are currently operational the cost of establishing and running enrichment conversion fuel manufacture and spent fuel handling and storage just for australia's submarine fleet are so high that this was never a realistic option even if manufactured fuel could be imported we still lack the specialized infrastructure and personnel to handle spent fuel which would greatly increase the cost and complexity of the already extremely expensive submarine program finally having another nation such as the french in this example refuel australian submarines posed unacceptable vulnerabilities although franco-australian relations were very friendly when the barracuda was reportedly offered to australia there is no guarantee that said relationship would remain as cordial for 50 years imagine a scenario where french and australian interests came into conflict paris could simply refuse to refuel australian barracuda-class boats rendering a critical australian defense capability impotent no fuel equals no submarine capability indeed even just the threat of ceasing support would give paris enormous leverage over australia therefore from a sovereignty perspective having another nation refuel australia's nuclear submarines is simply an unacceptable risk this is in addition to the impact on submarine availability sailing them to the other side of the planet for full cycle docking would impose given these immense complications it is easy to see why nuclear propulsion was not considered to be a viable possibility for the future submarine it was some five years after the establishment of the c-1000 program that the first real progress was made although perhaps it did not gain the attention it deserved one of the primary foreign policy achievements of the abbott government was the deepening relationship between tokyo and canberra which included historic security and trade agreements between the two nations tony abbott and shinzo abe enjoyed a very close personal relationship perhaps most memorably in 2013 abbott made a public pronouncement that japan was australia's best friend in asia in 2015 press reports began to emerge that in a bid to cement the japanese australian relationship abbott had privately assured abe that australia would select the japanese soryu-class submarine if it was offered including japanese manufacture and assembly that same year a group of japanese officials toured australian shipyards in adelaide sydney and perth further fuelling speculation this immediately generated substantial criticism in australia from both the military and south australian politicians who were concerned with the economic losses although this was never an official position taken by the australian government if abbott really made this handshake deal with abe then it was a deeply irresponsible action this is absolutely not the way large-scale defense procurement should be conducted politicians are not experts on military platforms and through the reckless pursuit of his own foreign policy objectives abbott may have burdened the ran with a submarine that simply did not meet its needs worse he may have doomed australia to the nightmare of sustaining a foreign submarine without a local supply chain a lesson so painfully learned with the oberons as a result of this pressure on the 8th of february 2015 the abbott government announced the opening of a competitive evaluation process to select the c1000 design naval group of france tkms of germany and the government of japan were all selected as potential design partners they were asked to provide a proposal which would include a basic pre-concept submarine design rough costs for the program options to build in australia or overseas and positions on intellectual property rights the government's requirements for the designs were relatively straightforward the new submarine was to have a range and endurance that was similar to the collins class it was to have sensor performance and stealth characteristics that were better than the collins class and in line with the 2016 defense white paper the byg1 combat system and mark 48 seabass heavyweight torpedo were specified these very broad specifications gave the contenders a great deal of leeway in designing their submarine features like aip pump jet propulsion or lithium-ion batteries were not required although they could obviously be included tkms submitted the type 216 design which is essentially an enlarged type 212 submarine currently in service with the german and italian navies the type 216 was some 90 meters long eight meters wide and had a submerged displacement of 4 300 tons the german design included a hybrid diesel electric and air independent propulsion system the aip element was a methanol reformer system that combines methanol with liquid oxygen to drive a hydrogen fuel cell with the aip system activated the type 216 could remain submerged for a range of 2 600 nautical miles traveling at 4 knots equipped with lithium-ion batteries the diesel electric drive gave the boat an additional 10 400 nautical miles range its indiscretion rate was estimated to be around 20 the design included a crew of 33 with 60 bunks space for 18 torpedoes and a pressurized compartment for the deployment of divers special forces and drones although on paper the type 216 was a technologically advanced contender the largest submarine tkms had ever produced was the 2200 ton dolphin class for israel this would be by far the largest submarine they had ever designed or manufactured rather than being a development of an existing submarine the type 216 really was a brand new platform naval group formerly dcns proposed a conventional variant of the barracuda class nuclear submarine which was under construction for the french navy called the short finned barracuda block 1a at some 97 metres long 8 metres wide and with the submerged displacement approaching 5000 tons the french design was by far the largest the fundamental concept of the short fin barracuda was simple take an already proven hull design of the suffering and use diesel electric propulsion although this sounds relatively straightforward it actually required a complete redesign of the submarine as practically all of the internal spaces had to be modified the short fin barracuda design included neither lithium ion batteries nor aip systems but rather the same kind of lead acid batteries as used in the collins class by both having a larger submarine and keeping the propulsion conventional the french design achieved a massive range of some eighteen thousand nautical miles almost double columns additionally the amenities for the 60 crew were generous further increasing the boat's effective endurance although the energy storage technology was inferior to the german or japanese options the barracuda was the only design equipped with a pump jet instead of a propeller giving the submarine both a higher top speed and a higher speed without cavitation with room for 28 weapons the french design also had the most firepower unlike the type 216 the short fin barracuda was an adaptation of an existing submarine however the technical challenge of converting the barracuda design to conventional propulsion remained substantial the japanese government provided the soryu-class submarine however details as to what exactly the japanese presented to the australian government remains scarce we do not know if this was a large-scale redesign of the submarine to meet australian requirements or essentially a military off-the-shelf option the japanese maritime self-defense force currently operates 12 soryu class boats the soryu is 84 metres long has a beam of 9 meters and a submerged displacement of 4200 tons the first 10 platforms were equipped with an aip system which is comprised of four cockham sterling engines the same technology that was tested on the collins class in addition to a diesel electric system these aip equipped boats have a truly impressive submerged endurance of some 6 000 nautical miles without surfacing a submerged capability that is in terms of endurance very close to a nuclear submarine however there are still substantial performance trade-offs all aip systems require large oxidizer tanks which take up valuable room for both batteries and fuel consequently despite being 20 larger than the collins class the soryu has a significantly lower patrol range this penalty also includes internal space for the crew in fact again despite being much larger sorry's crew amenities are inferior to the collins class a problem raised as early as 2014. the final two boats in the class use a completely different propulsion layout beginning with oru the aip system has been completely removed the boat is now equipped with diesel generators and lithium-ion batteries these new batteries offer a significant improvement in performance over lead acid systems providing a level of energy density that essentially makes aip redundant reu's submerged performance is unknown but it is surely impressive nevertheless even a lithium-ion equipped sorry is inferior to the collins class in several key areas the crew spaces are still smaller and the onboard electricity generation capacity is around 70 meaning the collins can still recharge her batteries faster additionally there are serious concerns about the safety of lithium-ion batteries in submarines in 2008 a lithium-ion equipped mini submarine called the advanced seal delivery system exploded luckily the vessel was on dry land but it was completely destroyed a comparable explosion in an attack submarine operating at depth which surely have brought about the loss of the vessel additionally the japanese only require a 20-year life from their submarines rather than the 30 plus required by the ran this has substantial implications for the design from the grade of steel used to the quality of the worlds finally unlike the other two options the japanese consortium had never constructed a vessel internationally thus rather than being the obvious front runner the sure bet that many had thought it to be the japanese option was in fact highly problematic the c1000 competitive evaluation process was overseen by an apolitical expert advisory panel which deliberated on the merits of the three proposals on the 13th of april 2016 the expert advisory panel reported their findings to the national security committee of cabinet their unanimous decision was that the french proposal was the most likely to meet australian requirements with tony abbott now replaced as prime minister by malcolm turnbull the soyuz political backing was gone turnbull followed the expert advice and announced naval group as the winner of the competitive evaluation process the operations of the expert advisory panel were overseed by the australian national audit office reporting on their oversight of the process in april 2017 the anao concluded the cep had been fair that the recommendations of the panel were defensible and that cabinet had been provided with detailed information including the significant risk involved with proceeding with the french option although the selection of the short fin barracuda christened the attack class by the ran as a shock to many in australia when one considers australia's specific requirements including its experience with the collins and oberon classes it was obviously the best choice although the french option lacked prestige capabilities like aip and lithium-ion batteries these were clearly not critical technologies for the ran just as it had found with the collins class a large enough battery bank combined with larger electricity generation capacity can make the indiscretion rate so small that the advantages of aip systems are minimal in real world operations how important is your ability to avoid snorkeling when this only takes a few minutes every 24 hours is it worth the substantial penalties you pay in range and endurance although the total electricity generation capacity of the attack class was never specified given the very large displacement and available internal volume in the design we can surmise that this would have been a large advantage over its contenders as can be seen in the capability requirements the submerged performance of the collins class is already so good that it did not require an improvement in this area even with old-fashioned lead-acid batteries the size of the submarine alone provides substantial advantages in submerged performance if the indiscretion rate is prioritized additionally although lithium-ion batteries were not specified they could have been retrofitted at a later time when the risks were better understood these safety concerns were by no means trivial and were clearly why naval group chose lead acid batteries as a former submarine engineer paul greenfield noted australia's future submarine would require over 100 000 cells in some 500 modules in the life of 100 000 cells and a fleet of 12 submarines there is likely to be a failure that cannot be stopped or controlled with a catastrophic outcome the simple fact is as technologically advanced as the sorry proposal was it simply did not meet australia's specific requirements the lack of patrol range and small crew spaces were fatal shortcomings and there was real concern about the ability of the japanese to facilitate an australian build and local supply chain indeed in one of the areas that matter most to the royal australian navy range and endurance the soryu was not only worse than the barracuda it was worse than collins although many have criticized the attack class as being too risky the german option was worse rather than converting an existing hull tkms had to scale up the type 212 to more than double its size a scale at which they had never built a submarine in the attack class the aryan had selected a platform with the best range endurance kinematic performance and firepower one that would be manufactured in australia and much like the collins it would be one of the largest conventional submarines ever built bringing substantial submerged performance advantages it's not hard to see why it was selected the attack class incorporated all of the lessons australia had learned in over half a century of operating diesel electric submarines although the competitive evaluation process was surely a sound method of selecting a platform it had one major weakness australia lacked the resources to oversee two simultaneous design processes thus only preliminary designs were provided to the cep which lacked much critical detail the only reason this was problematic was that it removed competitive pressure from the design phase as without a competitor naval group had less incentive to keep costs down to rectify this weakness the anao suggested that defense explore alternative options to the attack class program which included a major rebuild of the collins-class submarine called a life of type extension which would buy the government time to explore other options perhaps one of the greatest areas of confusion regarding the attack class program is its overall cost a quick google search will immediately return dozens of articles that cite the cost of the attack class submarine program as 90 billion australian dollars however the reality is that at no time was a formal detailed cost estimate ever released to the public the best we have are a number of quite vague estimations which surfaced as early as 2016. the problem with quoting military platform costs is they can include different things at different times some will just quote the estimated cost to build the platform some will include the estimated cost of running it for its entire life and as money decreases in value over time some cost estimates will be in out turned then year dollars the australian prime minister malcolm turnbull estimated that the total investment in the future submarine project would be around 50 billion including the design and construction of 12 submarines and about 5 billion for weapons and other systems presumably this included upgrades to the osborne shipyard nevertheless he provided no detail or rationale as to how the government had actually arrived at this number aspi's marcus helya estimated that the total cost of the program including operating costs would be 79 billion through to 2060. in october 2018 during a senate estimates hearing re-admiral samut gave the clearest cost estimate to date whilst we are confident it was greater than 50 billion out turned we didn't have what i would call figures we wanted to be public on that stage all i can say is that that was the figure that was entered into the public defense integrated investment program the point i would make is that the cost of the program have not changed since the completion of the cep and the allocation within the defense iip which is not publicly releasable has not changed for the program once the costs of the program were established after the cep as can clearly be seen from admiral samut's comments here we should not pretend that we have a good understanding of the total program cost this early in the project 50 billion out turned dollars could be as low as 30 billion 2021 estimates of operating costs for the platform are also highly speculative one thing we can be sure of though is naval group was not responsible for the total estimated program cost increasing from the very tentative numbers being thrown around in 2011. these estimates did not change from the competitive evaluation process which shows no cost blowout caused by either naval group or issues with the attack class design in this area the french have definitely been treated unfairly by the australian press on the 30th of september 2016 the australian government signed its first contract for the attack class called the designer mobilization contract which funded the development of the australian shipyards and initial design work on the submarine itself it also included the foundation for a larger set of contracts that would govern the whole program this larger contract called the strategic partnering agreement would prove to be the most difficult element of the attack class program in its history although this overarching agreement was expected to be finalized by october 2017 it would not be signed until february 2019 almost 18 months later although such a lengthy series of negotiations were an area of concern it is unsurprising that this one agreement was the hardest to negotiate the strategic partnering agreement would act as the overarching framework under which all of the other specific program contracts would operate it clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of naval group and the australian government perhaps most critically it also covered areas of technology transfer and intellectual property ownership we must remember that a submarine is more than just a single object it is a system of thousands of subsystems and parts all of which have their own intellectual property requirements it was a core objective of the attack class program that the maximum amount of intellectual property remain under the australian government's legal position just as it was in the collins class this would be critical for domestic upgrade and repair work but also so parts and subsystems could be sourced locally if required with much of the information on the contract still confidential it seems as though negotiating these very complex technology transfers was the primary cause for the delays experienced although the australian national audit office expressed concern over the length of time the strategic partnering agreement took to negotiate once it was signed it deemed the framework to be essentially sound and fit for purpose the contracts for the future submarine were structured in a way that they progressed from one stage to the next naval group was never given a contract to build 12 submarines the way this worked was the strategic partnering agreement provided an overarching framework under which actual contracts would be issued for various stages of the project only once one program contract was completed would the next be issued to naval group this structure allowed the australian government to evaluate the wider strategic environment and the performance of the program as it progressed providing several off-ramps if they no longer wanted to proceed for any reason there was never a guarantee that once one phase of the program was completed the australian government would move to the next phase this structure was specifically designed to avoid the contractual pitfalls australia had faced in the collins and air warfare destroyer programs and it ensured that naval group would be paid for the work they had actually undertaken additionally as they only had to meet the immediate contractual requirements this arrangement would allow the french to scale up australian operations over time this structure was agreed upon by all parties involved in the future submarine program the first major program contract issued to naval group in march 2019 was the 605 million dollar submarine design contract which covered work through to 2021 as part of this contract naval group would deliver a detailed and mature submarine design which would enable construction to begin this included all of the mandated australian systems and weapons within this design process there were several review points where the australian government could decide not to proceed the contract gateways as developed in the strategic partnering agreement one of which was the system's requirements review the timing of the design contract was extended by nine months fueling speculation that the conversion of the nuclear barracuda to the conventional attack class was more difficult than anticipated however when questioned about this delay by the auditor general the australian defense department responded that the commonwealth simply wanted a higher level of design maturity before proceeding to the next phase to put it bluntly they wanted to measure twice and cut once as changing the design once construction had started would be highly costly an issue they experienced with the hobart and collins classes in the third quarter of 2021 the attack class entered a mandatory systems review process which it passed on the 15th of september naval group was informed that this element of the contract had been fulfilled however the same day news broke around the world that the attack class had been cancelled the history of the attack class is as short as it is confusing this stillborn submarine had the potential to be as the australian prime minister scott morrison stated the most lethal and capable conventional submarine ever created the brains of a virginia-class ssn in a sleek and stealthy french body driven close to the speed of a nuclear submarine by pump jet propulsion building on the lessons of the collins class hmas attack's size and displacement would have given her impressive submerged performance and a very low indiscretion rate in addition to practically unmatched range and endurance for a conventional submarine her impressive weapons payload included 28 deadly heavyweight homing torpedoes and advanced cruise missiles and her sensor suite would have been amongst the best in the world so what happened why was the attack class as promising and impressive as it was on paper so abruptly cancelled when it had just passed a design review many have jumped to the conclusion that the attack class was cancelled because it was a problematic program beset by ballooning costs and expensive delays obviously without insight into the thinking of australian military and political leadership we can't know for sure but this seems to be an unlikely explanation in january 2020 the auditor-general of australia published an oversight report on the future submarine program called future submarine transition to design although several areas of risk in the program were highlighted including the nine month delay in the design process the report concluded that all 12 of the contract goals within the strategic partnership agreement had been met and the framework was sound and fit for purpose it certainly did not reveal any issues with the attack class that would suggest that the program should be cancelled its most damning conclusion was that due to the nine-month delay defense could not demonstrate that the 396 million dollars spent in the design phase had yet achieved its results as admiral samut testified to the australian senate the projected cost of the program had not changed since the competitive evaluation process certainly the strategic partnership agreement and the design phase had both experienced delays but these are arguably the most difficult elements of the project and just in general terms considering the attack class was the most complex defense program in australian history delays of one to two years in the critical early stages should probably be expected after all how many ambitious military projects are delivered according to the early estimates of time and cost a far more likely explanation for why the attack class was cancelled is simply what the australian prime minister government and military have said australia's requirements have changed the strategic environment facing australia is worse than was anticipated in 2009 additionally the tactical and operational challenges the ran will face trying to operate at submarines in places like the south china sea are growing more and more severe driven by these changes circumstances that were not envisaged a decade ago australia has now decided that it needs a nuclear submarine as impressive as the attack class was there are still substantial advantages of nuclear propulsion advantages which the ran have determined are critical to its operational requirements these changing requirements are clearly being driven by increasing chinese capabilities one area where the chinese have been making steadily increasing investments is satellite intelligence the yaogan satellite constellation contains over 30 active electro-optical imaging and synthetic aperture radar systems arranged in a staggered series of polar orbits these satellites make passes over the western pacific every hour or so playing a key part in the pla's wide area ocean surveillance system itself a critical element in their a2ad complex as chinese imaging sensors continue to improve they will pose a greater and greater threat to submarines operating near the surface furthermore as chinese satellite coverage grows more and more pervasive this will make diesel electric submarines vulnerable to detection while they are snorkeling in the wide open areas of the pacific or indian oceans this may not be a critical problem as by the time an enemy asset is in the area the submarine will have vanished but in heavily defended areas like the south china sea this will be an increasingly dangerous vulnerability even aip will not fundamentally address this issue generally speaking aip is used to supplement rather than replace diesel electric systems as can be seen in the type 216 proposal and those submarines that rely primarily on aip systems such as the first 10 soyu-class boats lack the range to meet australian requirements therefore during a 90-day patrol an aip-equipped submarine will still have to regularly snorkel however a nuclear submarine can stay deep throughout its entire patrol completely avoiding this problem essentially the indiscretion rate for a nuclear submarine is zero one of the other major advantages nuclear propulsion provides a submarine is the colossal amount of electricity a nuclear reactor produces well over 10 times in comparison to a diesel electric system called the hotel electric power this is the spare electricity a submarine has to use other than to move the vessel sonars computer systems fridges lights everything in a conventional submarine as everything runs off the battery bank the more power you use for other systems the more your submerged endurance is impacted there are several new technologies that are now being developed for submarine warfare that will need more and more power the us navy is currently developing a high energy laser for the virginia-class submarine fired from the photonics mask what used to be a periscope this laser will be able to target drones and anti-submarine helicopters as cool as lasers firing from a periscope is the real need for more electric power will probably be to support the operations of underwater drones or unmanned undersea systems in the very near future a single submarine may act as the mothership to a fleet of drones that will act as the boat's eyes and ears extending its sense of footprint dramatically these will all require electrical power and finally just in more general terms the submarines australia will now be building are just bigger badder and more capable boats than the attack class ever could have been the astute displaces 3 000 tons more while surfaced whilst the monster block 5 virginia is literally twice the size of the attack class they carry more weapons can steam faster can transit greater distances much more quickly and therefore can remain on station longer although the pump jet equipped hmas attack could have reached top speeds well in excess of 20 knots doing so would have rapidly drained its batteries while a virginia or astute can steam at over 30 knots indefinitely both vessels have room for at least 10 additional weapons giving them a much more credible land attack capability all of this means australia's nuclear submarine will be much better suited to operations in east asia posing a far greater threat to chinese maritime assets and maritime trade across the whole indo-pacific they will even pose a very real threat to the chinese mainland but why didn't australian defense planners realize that these advantages of nuclear submarines would be critical to australia in 2016 when the attack class was selected undeniably the deterioration of the relationship between canberra and beijing which has now nearly reached the level of open hostility has something to do with this recalculation nevertheless the fundamental reality is that no matter how much australia may desire a nuclear submarine without a nuclear fuel cycle this just isn't viable with the vast majority of marine nuclear reactors there is only one reason why an australian nuclear submarine is even possible the british and americans have agreed to share their nuclear technology refueling the nuclear reactor is one of the largest single costs in sustaining the los angeles class attack submarines in order to reduce the lifetime cost of the virginia class general electric developed a nuclear reactor that does not need to be refueled for 33 years it achieves this remarkable feat by using highly enriched uranium as a fuel source essentially the uranium fuel for the reactor contains much higher levels of u-235 although it's unclear whether this reaches a level of weapons-grade material the sg9 reactor is designed to be installed in a virginia-class submarine at its construction and left there until the boat requires decommissioning obviously the reactor will require regular maintenance but the core will remain sealed throughout its operational life this is a truly revolutionary technology for australia under the orcas agreement the reactor will be almost certainly manufactured in the united states or possibly the united kingdom and shipped to australia it will arrive in a sealed steel box ready to be installed in the submarine during the life of the submarine no highly radioactive material will have to be handled or removed by any australian personnel in very basic terms without the need to refuel or even open the reactor the maintenance of the submarine will be similar to the attack class after the 30-year life of the submarine is over it will undergo a process of decommissioning the steel sealed box containing the reactor will be removed and transported to the united states for disposal basically with american reactor technology australia does not need to have a nuclear fuel cycle in order to have a nuclear submarine this arrangement is totally in accordance with australia's commitments under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as under article 3 the use of fissile material for military reactive fuel by non-nuclear weapon states is not prohibited therefore the most likely explanation for the cancellation of the attack class program is simply the deteriorating sino-australian relationship and the american decision to transfer its nuclear reactor technology to australia itself a reflection of the deteriorating security environment in the indo-pacific considering that neither of those two developments is a reflection on the performance of naval group france or the attack class submarine then why are the french so upset about this clearly the french reaction has come as quite a shock especially to australia in the united states there have been accusations of betrayal and dishonesty by the french government aimed at all three orcas partners indeed paris went to the extreme measure of recalling its ambassadors from washington and canberra in protest over the orcas announcement and has tried to disrupt australian trade negotiations with the eu but just how much of a point does paris have here have they been treated badly by australia there are two areas that require consideration the legal and diplomatic angles in order to protect both australian and french material that is commercially sensitive much of the contracts remain confidential however given the information that has been disclosed publicly including by the australian national audit office it seems very clear that from a legal perspective the french do not have a leg to stand on as discussed previously the strategic partnering agreement and submarine design contract contained certain review periods where the australian government could decide not to proceed with the program there was no provision at all that the australian government should inform naval group of its intentions thought process or deliberations prior to completing a systems review or making a decision the very notion of requiring a contractual partner to disclose their internal deliberations or their negotiations with other companies is from a business or legal perspective ridiculous there certainly was no contractual obligation that the australian government should inform naval group if it was considering alternatives to the attack class either australia simply decided it did not want to issue the next program contract the legal framework was specifically designed to allow the government to end the program at this stage for any reason if the french or naval group assumed that the project would continue simply because australia had not complained then this really was no more than a product of their own hubris why would these contractual gateways exist if there was no chance australia may choose to use them given the information we have now it appears as though from a legal perspective the australian government acted in good faith and has met all of its contractual requirements however it is clear that from a diplomatic perspective australia has miscalculated undeniably the french reaction has been at times histrionic the french foreign minister accused australia of lying about the program claiming that his government received a letter on the day the orcish deal was announced which indicated that australia was intending to continue with the program rather embarrassingly under a freedom of information request two newspapers the australian and the guardian gained access to the letter which simply said that the system review process was over it even explicitly stated that the matters addressed in this correspondence do not provide any authorization to continue work under the next phase of the contract this level of petulance is from an australian perspective hard to understand this was after all simply a commercial agreement to help australia build submarines in line with the contract that everyone agreed to australia has decided to go in another direction a naval group will be well paid for the work it has completed to this date so what exactly is the big deal but herein lies the problem clearly from a french perspective this was not just about submarines plainly the australian government has just flat out misunderstood how the french viewed not only the attack class program but their relationship with australia certainly some of this has to do with paris concern for french national prestige no matter what the australian government says many will speculate the attack class was cancelled because of the performance of naval group and france has a history of overreaction when it believes its standing in the world has been tarnished additionally there is probably concern that the attack class will be viewed as a failure by many international observers which will hurt arm's export potential in future that being said arguably the melodramatic reaction has much more to do with how paris feels it was treated and what this means for france's importance within the western alliance for france the attack class program was part of a wider strategic partnership with australia one that was foundational to its indo-pacific strategy indeed french military leadership was referring to the franco-australian relationship in those terms as far back as 2017 the fact that neither scott morrison nor joe biden thought it important enough to contact macron personally prior to the orca's announcement is to paris evidence of just how little thought was given to french interests or the french relationship this neglect of french interests occurred at a time of growing anxiety in european capitals as the sino-american contest gathers pace the indo-pacific rather than europe is fast becoming the geopolitical center of the world even within the eye-rolling melodrama of the french diplomatic reaction to orcas they have generally speaking not claimed that australia isn't free to choose its own submarine nor have they really argued that the australian government has breached its contractual requirements their main complaint is simply that this is not how friends should be treated whether you think the french government a trusted friend and partner to australia did deserve to be treated with more respect and attention or you believe they are just ridiculously overreacting it's abundantly clear that this episode is clearly an australian diplomatic failure whether paris's reaction to the orca's announcement was reasonable or not if we had really understood the french position we should have been able to both predict and manage it very clearly this situation required much more diplomatic tact than the morrison government displayed at the very least macron probably deserved a phone call a few days before the announcement to allow him to manage the political fallout in france but on reflection maybe this required a personal meeting between morrison and macron to assure the french that australia still value the franco-australian partnership if nothing else it is interesting to wonder what might have been with the attack class a truly unique diesel-electric submarine with the capabilities of a nuclear boat well almost in all of the beauty of her french lines the philosophy of the collins class would reach its center the apex of australian design and the culmination of 50 years of diesel electric submarine operations australian built with unrivaled range and the unique performance advantages of size the attack class was truly a distinctively australian submarine one that would have surely served the nation well now as only the seventh power in history to operate a nuclear-powered submarine the nation begins a new chapter australia will not simply possess a nuclear submarine it will build one this will be no easy feat and we can expect challenges and delays along the way but the capabilities and experience we will gain during this most difficult endeavor will not only drive australian science technology and industry but will form the foundation of the nation's growing naval power throughout this increasingly dangerous century

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Length: 79min 31sec (4771 seconds)

Published: Thu Oct 14 2021