The Kokoda Track Campaign: July - November 1942

on the 7th of may 1942 two imperial japanese navy task groups were steaming south from the japanese base at reball they were headed for the coral sea close to the coast of papua a force of 11 transports steamed at a lazy eight knots on board with a 5 000 strong veteran south seas force their destination the last major allied base to the north of australia port moresby built around 144th infantry regiment with supporting engineer and artillery regiments the south seas force had been the spearhead of japan's southern offensive operations in early 1942. they were veterans of the wake island and ribal operations port moresby was the key to the allied position in the southwest pacific area essentially the only developed settlement in the australian territory of papua the town was quickly becoming a key allied air base if it could be captured by the japanese the keystone of their southern defensive perimeter rabal would be all the more secure without a foothold in papua any allied counter-attack would have to be staged from australia itself and the japanese would be able to put severe pressure on northeastern australia in accordance with the orders issued on the 29th of january the imperial general headquarters viewed the capture of port moresby as the primary objective of operations in the southwest pacific sector on the morning of the seventh the amphibious force escorted by the light carrier shoho one light cruiser and five destroyers was approaching the very tip of papua where they would make a hard right turn and enter the coral sea under the command of in a far admiral inaudible 600 kilometers to their west were the japanese ships of the fifth aircraft carrier division spearheaded by the fleet carriers shokaku and zuikaku several hundred kilometers to the south of the japanese formations under the command of admiral frank jack fletcher three allied task forces were steaming to intercept task forces 17 and 11 were based on the two u.s carriers lexington and yorktown in addition to their escorts the third task force 44 which was composed of the cruiser's hmas australia hmas hobart and uss chicago plus a pair of destroyers had been detached with the aim of intercepting the port moresby invasion force at dawn the american carriers launched several scout aircraft and by 8 30 they had located the japanese task force the battle of the coral sea had begun over the following two days waves of carrier aircraft exchanged heavy blows the first day of the battle went well for the allies as the japanese invasion force was detected first it was hit badly on the morning of the seventh the light carrier shoho was swarmed by the combined air groups of lexington and yorktown hit by 13 1000 bombs and seven torpedoes the carrier was blown to pieces with the loss of 631 men fearing additional air attacks the invasion force steamed north retreating from the battle but the japanese fleet carriers remained undetected at 8 20 am on the following morning the pilot of a dauntless dive bomber looked through a hole in the clouds to see the two japanese flat tops shokaku and zuikaku an hour later the flight decks of yorktown and lexington buzzed with the launching of strike aircraft however the japanese bombers were already on their way two waves of american aircraft reached the japanese carriers at 10 57 and 11 30 scoring three devastating bomb hits on shokaku although still seaworthy the japanese carrier was badly damaged and incapable of further flight operations at 11 13 the japanese aircraft struck 18 torpedo planes and 33 dive bombers fell on the pair of american carriers through rapid turns yorktown was able to evade the torpedo bombers although she did take minor damage from a 250 kilogram bomb lexington did not fare so well caught in a pincer between two groups of strike aircraft she was hit by a pair of type 95 torpedoes followed closely by two bomb hits although both carriers were damaged they were able to conduct flight operations after receiving the returning aircraft a fire broke out on board lexington which soon became uncontrollable rocked by a series of devastating explosions at five o'clock her crew began to abandon ship with his carrier force now badly depleted fletcher decided to withdraw although zuikaku was undamaged and the japanese invasion force was largely intact the japanese air group had been savaged by the day's fighting with only 24 zeros eight dive bombers and four torpedo planes operational it was clear that the fifth carrier division could not provide cover to the invasion force inouye had detected the cruisers of task force 44 which were now in a position to intercept the invasion force and without a potent carrier air wing he was not confident in his ability to protect the amphibious formation at 2 30 he postponed the port moresby operation and ordered all japanese naval forces to retreat the south seized attachment headed back to reball imperial general headquarters had intended to launch a second amphibious assault against port moresby after the midway operation had been completed but with the destruction of the carrier zakagi kaga hiroyu and sorry at the battle any hope of a large-scale amphibious operation in the port moresby area had vanished without carrier protection there was no way the full strength of the south sea's force could be risked in a seaborn operation in the coral sea again especially in the face of growing allied air power which was operating from port moresby and northern australia nevertheless the importance of the air base at port moresby was only growing by the month on july the 7th the ijn's operations section urged the cancellation of the wider fiji and new caledonia offensive codenamed operation fs arguing that the capture of port moresby had to be the primary objective in the area as more and more allied aircraft began operating from the airbase the air war in new guinea became highly attritional with constant attacks forcing the japanese into nearly daily air combat port moresby was within range of many vital japanese positions in the bismarck archipelago including their main base at reball meaning their thinly stretched air units were constantly forced to engage allied fighters even if the zeros did well these kinds of attritional battles were not to the japanese advantage as the allies could replace aircraft at a much higher rate without the airbase at port moresby it would be much harder for the allies to effectively deploy their air power given the continued strategic significance of the base attention immediately turned to a possible land advance towards port moresby on the 18th of may just after the battle of the coral sea the japanese 17th army was activated with its headquarters at devour the 17th army would be responsible for operations in the new guinea papua and solomon island regions and with the abortive amphibious operation now over the south seas detachment now came under 17th army command within weeks the imperial general headquarters began proposing an overland attack on port moresby prince takeda a member of the imperial royal family showed the staff of the 17th army a translation of a book written by an english explorer who mentioned a road from the north coast of papua across the towering owen stanley range down to the coastal plain around port mosby amazingly based on virtually this intelligence alone the imperial general headquarters ordered the 17th army to immediately cease all other operations and begin a feasibility study for the advance from the north coast of papua towards port moresby on july the first after conferring with fourth fleet command lieutenant general harakichi hayakitake the commander of the 17th army issued the following order to the south sea's detachment the army will carry out the necessary reconnaissance for a land attack against port moresby the south seas detachment commander will land a force in the vicinity of booner this force will advance rapidly to the pass over the owen stanley range south of kokoda and reconoy to rhodes for an overland advance on port moresby by the main body of the detachment a report of this reconnaissance will be made as soon as possible although the original plans for the reconnaissance operation now code named re or ri were still being made less than two weeks later the imperial general headquarters directed the 17th army to capture port moresby it was clear that tokyo had already decided upon an overland advance whether there was a road or not this development led to an updated order from general hayakutake on the 11th of june the army in cooperation with the navy will promptly affect the capture of port moresby at strategic points in eastern new guinea the south seas detachment will speedily land at buna push forward on the bunan kokoda road and capture port moresby and adjacent airfields it was clear to everyone that the south sea's detachment was going to march across the owen stanley range from the north shore of papua whether it was a sound tactical idea or not preliminary reconnaissance had shown that the roads around the coastal town of buna were good about a hundred kilometers inland of buna on the foothills of the mountains sat a small village of kokoda with its grass airstrip there was clearly a visible road from buna to kokoda but beyond that aerial reconnaissance could see nothing but jungle and mountains when summoned to devour to receive his orders major general horii the south seas detachments commander was unenthusiastic about the prospects for a successful advance across the owen stanley mountains he outlined his main concerns to the 17th army command which were logistical the problem is securing suppliers this would not be an issue if there was a road suitable for motor transport however without so much as a pack horse trail all suppliers would need to be transported by human carriers the current number of men on the front line would be approximately 5 000 given the average daily food requirement of 600 grams per person this would result in a daily supply requirement for the detachment amounting to 3 tons if each man could carry 25 kilograms of supplies this would limit a day's march in the mountains to 20 kilometers securing the daily 3-ton supply for the detachment would require approximately 230 carriers per day reaching the front line this amounts in total given the 20-day round-trip to a requirement of approximately 4 600 carriers if the front were to advance to port moresby some 360 kilometers distant from buna then to supply food alone would require 32 000 carriers if one considers munitions and other suppliers the requirement for carriers would be immense ultimately the overland route is probably not possible unless a road for motor transport can be pushed out from booner lieutenant general hayakutake was unmoved by these concerns the decision had already been made the imperial general headquarters had formulated a new joint army navy operational plan to take port moresby the south seas detachment reinforced by other elements of the 17th army would land at booner advance to kokoda and gain a foothold on the southern slopes of the owen stanley range in a concurrent navy operation a special naval landing force of japanese marines would attack and secure the air base at milne bay once that airbase was secured a small amphibious force would land elements of the 35th infantry brigade in the area around port moresby with the new beachhead secured port moresby would be taken in a simultaneous attack from the land and the sea it was an operational plan that looked good on paper a dramatic pinter attack with concurrent amphibious and land operations however if there was no road from kokoda to port moresby as general hori could already see then the japanese men would starve additionally given the reasonably small naval forces available if the australian resistance was greater than the imperial general headquarters assumed then the milan bay operation was likely to fail despite these obvious concerns tokyo had clearly made its decision one can almost feel the creeping desperation in the japanese general staff after the absolute disaster at midway this was the only chance they had to take port moresby which was by far the most important allied base in the south west pacific area the japanese land forces which had been amassed for the advance on port moresby were substantial the spearhead would be the elite south seas detachment veterans of operations in china wake island and reball the 5 000 strong detachment was optimized for jungle operations with attached engineer and mountain gun units in support of the south sea's detachment the 17th army allocated the 41st infantry regiment veterans of the malaya and philippines campaigns including the 35th infantry brigade force which was allocated to amphibious operations this brought the total japanese strength for the port moresby advance to nine battalions this is in addition to the several thousand marines which would be deployed to milne bay to put this force into perspective more japanese battalions were assigned to the advance on port moresby than were initially deployed to guadalcanal on the 20th of july the operation commenced under the command of rear admiral matsuyama an invasion force departed reball covered by the light cruiser's tenryu and tatsuta and a number of escorting destroyers and submarine chases on board three fast transports was the main force of the yokoyama advance party a battalion sized element of the south sea's force under the command of colonel yokoyama was the first battalion of the 144th infantry regiment and the first battalion of the 55th mountain artillery regiment as the name suggests this force was intended to be the advanced party and would secure the booner area and reconnoiter the roads to kokoda attached to this formation were several ijn land forces including anti-aircraft batteries and a 15th base establishment unit whose orders were to rapidly establish an airbase at buna at 5 pm on the 21st of july the japanese forces landed at two beaches in the buna and gonna area unopposed and the naval units rapidly began construction activities the next morning the beachhead was savaged by waves of allied aircraft stage from port moresby a b-17 struck the fast transport ayatsu-san maru which was later abandoned due to uncontrolled fires despite the best efforts of allied aircraft within three days the japanese-based buna was established the lead elements of the yokoyama advance party quickly began advancing towards kokoda they found the road network in the booner area to be in good condition and were able to use motor transport the lead elements rapidly advanced towards kokoda and by the 26th of july the main body was concentrated on the high ground at oivy about 16 kilometers to the west of the village the importance of taking port moresby was only underlined by the strength of allied air power in papua in the open areas around kokoda the advanced force was hit by several air attacks forcing them to move at night in the evening the whole battalion attacked an entrenched company of australian infantry at the village of kokoda itself after losing 21 kills in action including a company commander the japanese compelled the australian forces to withdraw into the mountains the japanese had secured the village and its airstrip the small village of kokoda after which the whole campaign would be named sits in the mambar river valley at an altitude of about a thousand feet the valley itself is the last area of open terrain between the north and south coasts beyond kokoda lay the fearsome owen stanley mountains the range cuts papua in two effectively isolating the north and south coasts from the village of kokoda itself the towering peak of mount victoria can be seen rising 4 000 meters above the surrounding jungle to the east and west of this great mountain was nothing but wilderness precipitous valleys and hillsides covered in dense rainforest and jungle there were no roads through the mountains only single-file mud tracks cut into the hillsides linking the few tiny mountain villages at its lower slopes the owen stanleys are blanketed by thick sweltering malaria-infested jungle but at higher altitudes the mountain peaks are often covered in snow and the passers are blanketed in frigid rain these mountains were truly some of the most treacherous and unforgiving terrain over which battle would be fought in the second world war the australian units operating around kokoda were companies of the 39th battalion perhaps the most famous single infantry unit in australian military history for many australians the story of the kokoda track campaign is synonymous with the exploit of this one infantry battalion but the 39th battalion was not an all-volunteer elite formation of the australian imperial force units which had won such great fame in the great war and were building an equal reputation in the western desert rather the 39th was a relatively poorly trained militia battalion partially composed of conscripts and with practically no combat experience it would be up to this lowly battalion to face the elite south seas force in the fearsome rainforest of the owen stanley mountains but to understand why the defense of australia's last bastion beyond its own shores rested upon the shoulders of these militiamen rather than its elite battle-hardened formations we need to appreciate the wider strategic circumstances facing the nation in 1942 at the beginning of the war against germany australia's general military policy was simply to repeat the strategy canberra had employed during the great war to aid great britain and the defense of the empire an expeditionary force would be raised and deployed to europe it was only legal under australian law for volunteer forces to fight overseas nonetheless there was a need for conscription to generate larger forces for home defense because of these legal constraints the australian army was effectively split in half during the great war the australian army units that fought in europe were called the australian imperial force or aif in honor of the great achievements australian fighting men achieved during the war of 1914-1918 it was decided to raise the australian imperial force again however in order to keep the legacy independent the new formation was called the second australian imperial force or two aif as the battalions were raised in this new aif their numbers started again so to distinguish these units a two was placed in front of their battalion or regiment number this makes the first battalion second australian imperial force the second first battalion obviously this can be confusing but all one needs to remember is aif formations have a two in front of their battalion or regiment number by 1941 five aif divisions had been raised the sixth seventh eighth and ninth which were all standard british patton infantry divisions and the first armoured division the sixth seventh and ninth divisions were all deployed to north africa and the eighth formed the foundation of the singapore garrison the first armoured division remained in australia for home defense the other half of the australian army were the citizen military forces or cmf which are generally known as the militia unlike the aif as these formations contained conscripts they could not be deployed overseas however it is incorrect to think of cmf units as conscript formations many men who for example wanted to serve in the army but did not want to be deployed to europe joined the cmf although often derided by members of the elite aif given enough training and equipment cmf divisions could acquit themselves very well but before pearl harbor the role of the cmf was not treated with the seriousness it deserved at its core the militia had a cadre of excellent and battle experienced officers who had all seen extensive action in the great war although these men tended to be a little older than their aif equivalents at the beginning of the war the cmf had a paper strength of four infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions although these were at a low state of combat readiness and not at full strength for the first two years priority was given to the aif the best regular officers from the australian army and the lion's share of the armament all went to divisions that were deployed overseas cmf units were identical in structure to aif equivalents standard divisions were composed of nine battalions in three infantry brigades in addition to artillery and other elements and each infantry battalion contained four rifle companies of just over 100 men each with the destruction of the u.s pacific fleet at pearl harbor and the devastating defeat at singapore which included the loss of the whole 8th division australian leadership began to appreciate the dire strategic circumstance the nation now faced the possibility of an invasion of australia and its territories was now very real and australia's primary fighting formations were all in north africa in response to this desperate situation the australian army embarked upon the greatest expansion in its history the mobilization was rapid by april 1942 the six standing cmf divisions were all brought up to full strength and a further two the fifth and tenth divisions were raised six months after pearl harbor the australian army was now over half a million strong although the rapid expansion had strained australia's resources the new units immediately led to a shortfall of key weapons and munitions australian industry was surging 12 000 rifles 300 brent guns and 80 25 pound artillery pieces were being produced every month enough to equip a whole division and by mid-1942 all of these formations would be adequately armed therefore by july general douglas macarthur the southwest pacific area supreme allied commander had a very large land force under his command in mainland australia he had nine australian divisions two of them motorized one armoured and when the aif headed home that would swell to 12. additionally there were two american divisions under his command the 32nd and 41st for a total of 14. this force was essentially an army group the problem however was time to effectively train these newly mobilized cmf formations the australian army had an internal grading system for the combat readiness of different divisions and brigades based on the amount of training they had received units were graded at a through f the lowest grade f designated units that had not completed basic training at 30 weeks of total training time units achieved a d rating these formations were certified for static defensive roles only and still required much higher levels of brigade level exercises only after 11 months of total training time with full equipment did a brigade achieve a b rating denoting the completion of all high level training and certifying the formation for full mobile offensive operations a was reserved for combat experienced units none of the australian cmf formations in port moresby had achieved b status by july 1940. the 39th battalion had been raised in october 1941 and although much of its establishment was composed of transferees from other units by january 1942 just three months later the battalion was deployed to papua the 39th was a victorian battalion raised primarily from the industrial city of melbourne it was joined by the 53rd battalion which had been formed in sydney the story of the 53rd battalion is one of almost criminal negligence although some of the battalion was in basic training in october by january the unit was rushed to port moresby with the 39th as its establishment was short by around 100 personnel at embarkation this shortfall was filled with freshly recruited conscripts these men generally 18 years old were pulled off the streets of sydney and ordered to board the transport many of them had barely fired a rifle before upon arrival at port moresby the 39th and 53rd battalions along with the 49th battalion which had been in popular for several months formed the 30th brigade although there was ample time to continue training around port moresby these formations spent most of their time on air base construction and other tasks in may they were reinforced by the 14th brigade another cmf formation but this unit was at an even lower level of training than the 30th brigade at its dispatch it was given a d rating certifying it for static defensive duties only but upon arrival this was reduced to an e the lowest level possible for any trained unit the decision to send such inexperienced formations to papua is certainly hard to comprehend given the very clear evidence of the japanese intention to take port moresby by july 1942 there were three combat experience brigades available and as time progressed the cmf formations in australia were reaching a full level of training as an example the well-trained 7th brigade performed just as well as the aif units which fought alongside it at the battle of milne bay the primary rationale behind sending d-rated infantry brigades to port moresby was that they were only ever intended to man the beach defenses the australian high command viewed an attack across the owen stanley range as impossible yes you could physically walk across the track that ran to kokoda but without supply by air the logistical constraints would eventually become crushing thus there would probably be no need for formations capable of mobile operations as japanese intentions began to become clearer major general morris the australian commander in papua outlined the fundamental australian strategy for the forthcoming campaign therefore even if the japanese do make this very difficult and impractical move let us meet them on ground of our own choosing and as close as possible to our own base let us merely help their own supply problem to strangle them while reducing our own supply difficulties to a minimum nevertheless morris was ordered by macarthur to deploy some forces across the mountains to kokoda with the aim of holding the airstrip there and on the 15th of july they were airlifted in nonetheless it was clear that allied command was taken by surprise by the movement of the yokoyama advance party 2 kokoda even if the australian generals thought an advance across the kokoda track was foolhardy and likely to fail the japanese were determined to prove them wrong after an abortive counter-attack on the kokoda airfield which briefly succeeded in retaking half of the strip the 39th battalion now codenamed maroubra force began moving up the kokoda track to isaraba after two weeks of inactivity the young men of the 39th battalion the average age of one section was only 18 had largely recovered from the initial fighting around kokoda the new battalion commander major cameron decided upon a counter-attack with the battalion concentrated he led 31 officers and 433 men down the track from the mountains towards kokoda the attack initially went well one of cameron's companies was able to ambush a large party of japanese infantry along the oivy track but was later forced to withdraw in the face of strong counter-attacks around kokoda itself two companies were able to retake large parts of the village the australians were in good defensive positions on high ground with cleared fields of fire and proved surprisingly difficult to dislodge a vigorous attack on the morning of the night was stopped cold in the face of the australian fighting positions for the rest of the day the japanese persisted in trying to take the hill but to no avail as night fell they switched to infiltration tactics a japanese officer wrote in his diary commenced an attack at 10 20 advanced stealthily on hands and knees and gradually moved in closer to the enemy suddenly encountered enemy guards in the shadow of large rubber trees corporal hamada killed one of them with the bayonet and engaged the others but the enemy's fire forced us to withdraw the morning of the 10th of august found the companies of the 39th battalion still holding their defensive position around the village but with the persistent japanese attacks ammunition was running low after stopping an assault estimated to be 200 strong at 5 pm the australian companies began as staggered withdrawal back towards israel as was typical the japanese pressed them hard making it very difficult to break contact but eventually the battalion made it back to israba the militiamen had fought extremely well given the amount of training they had received holding off yokoyama force for over two days of continuous battle was quite an achievement back on the 24th of july lieutenant general hayakutake arrived in reball although general horii still had serious reservations about operations through the owen stanley's very optimistic reports came in from colonel yokoyama on his estimation if the individual japanese soldier could carry 12 days worth of food four days march to kokoda on good roads and the eight days through the mountains they would have enough food to make the journey to port moresby 17th army command was overjoyed at this report however it was only based on how long it would take a typical papuan villager to walk the kokoda track any resistance at all would immediately impact the japanese supply situation thus the command was given on the 17th of august major general hori alerted his officers and the main body of the south sea's force departed reball followed a week later by the 41st regiment by the 21st of august hori had a formidable force concentrated at buna over 13 000 men 10 000 of which were a balanced and highly capable combat force indeed he still had a final battalion to come these men were battle-hardened veterans and the units they constituted were exceptionally high quality jungle warfare specialists equipped with mountain guns and dedicated engineer elements waiting for them at israba a pass in the owen stanley mountains were just over 2 000 australians half of them not rated by their own army as suitable for the battle they were about to fight that was all that stood between harry and port moresby both sides began conscripting papuan men as porters as papua was in australian mandated territory all papuans were liable to be conscripted under australian law papuans who served the military were paid a wage in cash between five and ten shillings a month for unskilled labor and there were specific restrictions on how many men could be conscripted from an area although during this time of emergency the last limit was lifted food and clothing was also to be provided thousands of papuans were mobilized for logistical operations along the kokoda track and there were even some papuan combat units fighting alongside the 39th battalion the japanese conversely paid papuan men with the bayonet the japanese official history details this episode with almost comical understatement approximately 2 000 natives were also commandeered this action had unfavorable repercussions for occupation administration and for later attempts to indoctrinate and pacify the local populace operational demands however took precedence there are accounts of japanese rape torture and murder of native papuans all throughout the papua and new guinea campaigns for example at milne bay the advancing australian forces found the mutilated bodies of numerous papuans men and women the indiscriminate and unwanted japanese cruelty to the local population is hard to understand perhaps they were trying to desensitise their fighting men to the act of killing whatever the justification was the people of papua suffered greatly under japanese occupation often an untold part of the story the reality is the kokoda track campaign was fought on the backs of the men of papua food munitions the wounded they were all carried in and out of that hellish country by locals called fuzzy wuzzy heroes in australia because of their hair the nation owes a great debt of gratitude to the people of papua as without them the campaign could not have been fought as the full body of the south sea's force was moving to buna allied command began to react by some miracle the 39th battalion had turned out to be a highly capable fighting force but there was no reason to assume that the other battalion stationed at port moresby would fare as well against the japanese even if the australian generals considered a japanese advance across the owen stanley mountains to be a fool's errand likely to end in disaster if they were determined to try then they had to be opposed on the 8th of august brigadier general potts flew into port moresby potts was a very experienced officer in both world wars he had served in gallipoli and france in the great war syria greece and north africa in the second as a major serving in the 2nd 16th battalion potts was awarded the distinguished service order for his actions at the battle of letani river and had risen fast to the rank of brigadier behind him on a small convoy was the main body of the 21st brigade a third of the veteran seventh division an aif formation the seventh had been in combat since 1940 in north africa greece and syria and was one of the best fighting formations in the australian army by the 15th of august two of the brigades combat battalions the second 14th and second 16th in addition to the brigade h2 were beginning the arduous journey over the mountains the 3rd battalion the 2nd 27th was retained to defend port moresby the green 53rd battalion had preceded them and the whole force was heading for a mountain pass on the north slopes called isaraba where the 39th battalion was waiting for them isaraba can be considered the first real mountain pass on the kokoda track from here as you move southwest the terrain becomes steeper colder and more formidable potts found the 39th dug in around the small village itself with its companies arranged for 360 degree defense about two kilometers further back the 53rd battalion was holding ayola where the track itself split before the battle began both sides were facing crippling supply issues even though the japanese were fighting on their side of the mountains the men were already running low on rations a specialist supply battalion had left reball on the 25th of august but as the battle of milan bay was going badly for the japanese air cover could not be provided and the convoy was forced to turn around given the defeat at milne bay some japanese staff officers advocated the abandonment of the drive to port moresby before the majority of the south seas force had entered the mountains these concerns were based purely on logistical considerations but they were overruled the australians were faring little better their lines of communication stretched over a hundred kilometers of single-file mountainous trail unlike the japanese they could resupply by air but this was extremely problematic in the cloudy mountainous terrain potts was already considering withdrawing from isarava just to improve his supply situation when the japanese attacked at the head of the 144th infantry regiment gemelhary advanced towards isuraba his plan for the battle was to envelop the forward australian formation identified as the 39th battalion and destroy it the 144th would advance in a regimental attack two battalions the first and third would assault the primary australian defenses at isuraba meanwhile the second battalion would execute a left hook through the jungle and flank the defenses along a secondary path called the yabuari track the attack began at dawn of the 26th of august two battalions began advancing up the track towards isuraba when they encountered the main concentration of the 29th the australians were in a formidable defensive position dug in on the steep slope of the mountain and covered by thick jungle the five companies that had been reinforced by one from the 2nd 14th battalion were arranged in a circle after engaging a forward australian patrol the japanese stumbled into the defences the australians held their fire until the advancing infantry was within grenade throwing range but the japanese could not see the defenders fighting positions through the thick jungle the initial encounter was costly for the japanese withering bren gunfire tore into their front ranks and the attack immediately stalled as was japanese doctrine they immediately began moving around the flanks of the australian position advancing towards the high ground on the australian left despite this maneuver as the jungle cover was so thick they could still not see the australians for hours the first and third battalions threw themselves against the defenses to no avail the performance of the 39th battalion at isurava was exemplary outnumbered more than two to one the militiamen fought tenaciously the commander of the 144th regiment colonel cusonote noted the exceptionally high fighting spirit of the australians when ordering the reserve 3rd battalion into the attack the japanese were surprised by the australian stubbornness as the defenders would resort to engaging in hand-to-hand combat rather than retreating because of the thick vegetation the combat was viciously intimate point-blank grenade jewels were common dawn on the next day found the australians holding the same ground with dead japanese piling up in front of their fighting positions but the ferocity of the japanese assault was only increasing the 39th battalion's historian records one of these attacks across the creek they swept in swift thrust that sliced through e-company's thin front line cutting off dalby's left platoon and a section of the right platoon and swarming behind them forced them forward and out of their posts through the widening breach poured another flood of the attackers to swirl round behind the remainder of the right platoon from the rear they were met with bren gun and tommy gun with bayonet and grenade but still they came to close with a buffet of fist and boot and rifle butt the steel of crashing helmets and of straining strangling fingers in this vicious fighting man to man and hand to hand merits men were in imminent peril of annihilation but two quick counter-attacks turned that furious tide while the 39th was stopping the japanese advance cold their rear was under severe threat by the flanking attack of the japanese second battalion the japanese had crossed the river and were now approaching the village of ayola from the australian right wing an area which was primarily held by the 53rd battalion although several aif companies had reinforced this sector potts was deeply concerned about the mounting threat to aiola he had no confidence in the 53rd battalion's combat capability which he communicated to his divisional commander this unit should never have been placed in this situation if the japanese broke through in this sector the 39th would be cut off and destroyed the veteran 2nd 16th battalion was moving up in support but as the japanese continued to probe forward the situation was growing more dire by the hour somehow three days into the battle the australians were still holding the position together the tight defensive perimeter of the 39th battalion had been reinforced by three companies of the second 14th and the bulk of the 2nd 16th battalion had deployed to the front of the 53rd position by the 30th of august hori was displeased with the situation clearly the 144th regiment alone was not able to dislodge the australians from this formidable defensive position he decided to commit the main body of the fresh 41st infantry regiment to battle in a good piece of generalship hori ordered the 41st to reinforce the attack on ayola and bypass the main strength of the 39th battalion which was taking an increasingly severe toll on the japanese at that very time potts was doing everything he could to hold together a deteriorating situation he repeatedly requested that the remainder of his brigade the 2nd 27th battalion be moved forward to relieve both the 39th and the 53rd but with japanese now in commanding positions around ayola the whole force was in danger of being enveloped that day potts ordered the 39th and 2nd 14th battalions to begin withdrawing from isarava towards his hq at ayola the japanese pursued in their typically dogged and aggressive style constantly keeping contact with the australian companies as they withdrew at the same time the forces deployed down the abawari track forward of the 53rd battalion's position began to move back to the village the performance of the 39th battalion at the battle of isaraba was truly exceptional for the better part of a week the victorian militiamen with the aid of the 2nd 14th battalion had stopped the japanese cold but how could this barely trained battalion from temperate victoria perform so well in some of the most vicious jungle fighting the army had seen indeed they were every bit as formidable and committed as the veteran aif companies who fought alongside them this is especially perplexing considering how poorly the 53rd battalion had performed considering it had a comparable amount of training the answer comes down to the fundamental elements of unit cohesion the process by which a group of men are forged into a cohesive whole the fighting spirit of the 39th is certainly explained at least partially by the quality of the battalion's officers although many were older men the vast majority were great war veterans this world of experience infused the young riflemen who made up the battalion's rank and file increasing their confidence cohesion and esprit de corps that experience was only improved by the injection of 16 officers from the aif prior to the deployment of the 39th to kokoda this group of mostly young men had forged a bond which would drive them to heroic feats at isaraba they performed far better than anyone could have hoped in fact the lead companies of the 144th regiment who had engaged the 39th battalion during the week-long battle were now at 50 percent strength such was the toll the battle had taken on the japanese as pots began withdrawing from israel the australian forces entered one of the most harrowing episodes of the whole campaign the two-week fighting withdrawal to ioribaiwa on the south slopes of the owen stanley mountains withdrawing in close contact with the enemy is one of the most difficult operations in warfare there is always the danger that an orderly fighting withdrawal will devolve into a route this danger is even more acute when your enemy is as skillful and committed as the japanese the battalions began withdrawing one by one the 39th moving back to a river crossing atiora as the two aif battalions began a staggered withdrawal intense combat raged the clear front lines had dissolved and small groups of australian and japanese soldiers did battle all along the track as the japanese were more comfortable cutting through the jungle they intercepted the australian column at different places numerous tales of heroism and horror are hidden in these vicious little battles where groups of men would simply be lost forever without a trace by the 31st the 2nd 14th battalion had suffered dearly with over 140 men missing the second 16th covered the depleted second 14th from the high ground alongside the track but they were hard-pressed by their enemy a sharp day-long battle was fought at the iora river as the 2nd 16th battalion held the oncoming japanese over two days the 41st regiment which was leading the pursuit of the australians suffered over 100 casualties but the freshmen of the koiwai battalion continued to probe forward the other australian battalions moved in column towards the rear upon reaching myola about halfway along the track the 53rd battalion were ordered to drop their weapons and march onto port moresby as the 21st brigade continued its withdrawal towards afoge it was joined by the 2nd 27th battalion allowing the 39th to finally be relieved potter's brigade was now complete but the 2nd 16th and 2nd 14th battalions were at roughly half strength including sick and wounded a nasty day-long battle was fought at templeton's crossing where the second track met the main line this time it was up to the second 14th to hold the japanese they attacked at 8am hitting the forward companies hard in another vicious close quarters fight conducted with bayonet and submachine gun the australians stopped the main attack nonetheless as was japanese doctrine they immediately began moving around the flanks through the jungle by 10 o'clock the 2nd 16th battalion farther towards the rear was heavily engaged and the forward elements now threatened with encirclement were forced to withdraw japanese jungle warfare doctrine emphasized flanking attacks and it had proven to be extremely effective along the kokoda track although when holding good defensive positions the australians had shown that they were more than a match for the japanese in close quarters battle as soon as the combat grew mobile the japanese immediately flanked through the jungle as the 39th and 2nd 14th reached miola on the 3rd of september potts began to evaluate his situation his brigade was exhausted by a week of fighting they had lost the 53rd battalion and the men were now entering the cold upper altitudes for which they were unprepared given the superior strength of the japanese forces there was no way his exhausted men could hold them on the 2nd of september he told his divisional commander major general alan that he now planned to draw the japanese further and further into the mountains with the explicit aim of stretching their supply lines considering how bad the australian supply situation was without aerial resupply it had to be worse for the japanese so the withdrawal continued on the 6th of september the brigade was engaged again east of afoge the second 27th was able to halt the primary assault down the track but as was japanese doctrine they immediately began probing around the flanks a few hours later the lead japanese elements were within sight of the brigade headquarters the staff and hq company found themselves in a very hot engagement with machine gun and mortifier landing amongst them potts himself joined the defense and the japanese were only held off with great difficulty as the situation had grown desperate the brigade's three battalions counter-attacked towards the brigade hq relieving it by nightfall the second 27th battalion was cut off around the fogey and many thought it had been destroyed it eventually arrived back at australian held positions almost a month later after a tortuous march through the jungle without supply or communication badly bruised and beaten hungry tired and footsaw by the 12th of september potts had extricated most of his brigade from the worst and highest parts of the mountains he had reached a feature known as iorui baiwa a ridge in the imita range beyond which lay the foothills of the owen stanley mountains potts was met by brigadier general porter and ordered to return to port moresby and report to divisional command as the australians were now firmly on their side of the mountains their logistical considerations had eased substantially the 39th and 53rd had been replaced by the 3rd battalion a cmf unit which had seen some action around afoge but the 2nd 14th and 2nd 16th battalions were exhausted they had been in nearly constant battle and as these were the two senior units it had been up to them to slow the japanese advance so the other battalions could withdraw they were about half strength including sick and lightly wounded word came that substantial reinforcements were about to arrive the veteran 25th brigade of the seventh division under the command of the young and energetic brigadier general ether although the australian position was now improving by the day major general allen began to feel significant pressure from brisbane macarthur was growing more and more anxious about the situation on the 30th of august the night the japanese attack on milne bay had been disastrously defeated by the australians macarthur cabled the joint chiefs of staff in a tone that can only be described as panic unless the strategic situation is constantly reviewed in the light of current enemy potentialities in the pacific and unless moves are made to meet the changing conditions a disastrous outcome is bound to result shortly it is no longer a question here of preparing a projected offensive without additional naval forces either british or american and unless steps are taken to match the heavy air and ground forces the enemy is assembling i predict the development shortly of a situation similar to those that have successfully overwhelmed our forces in the pacific since the beginning of the war this level of alarm was totally unwarranted lieutenant general rao the commander of all forces in new guinea and the man who had replaced major general murray recalled later that at no time did i ever consider the capture of port moresby by the enemy from the north as possible sentiments shared by major general allen on the 6th of september with the japanese forces in milne bay decisively defeated mcarthur told general george marshall the australians have proven themselves to be unable to match the enemy in jungle fighting more aggressive leadership is needed the same sentiments were communicated to general allen in port moresby but what macarthur clearly did not understand sitting in his plush office at ghq his more aggressive leadership was not going to change the facts on the ground along the kokoda track at this time major general george vasi the australian chief of staff for home forces wrote in a personal letter to general rao general headquarters is like a bloody barometer in a cyclone up and down every two minutes they like the militia they need to be blooded vassy was right macarthur was simply showing his inexperience the simple fact was with all of the prestige which came with the appointment of general macarthur to south west pacific area command he was actually far less experienced than virtually all of the australian generals he commanded mcarthur's early career had been very successful a man of great personal courage macarthur had received numerous awards for bravery for his actions as a junior officer at the battle of veracruz where he had led a small body of men in a daring raid macarthur was nominated for the medal of honor the american equivalent to the victoria cross despite the personal courage macarthur displayed his only real battle experience as a large unit commander came from a six-month stint as a brigade co in the 42nd rainbow division during 1918. however the 84th infantry brigade never operated independently additionally the brigade was only in combat for about half of the time macarthur was in command roughly three months macarthur's meteoric rise meant he skipped the long years most general officers had spent commanding companies and battalions this led to disengagement with the more mundane practical aspects of warfare such as ensuring that your men were well fed and well trained more aggressive leadership was not going to mean the men on the kokoda track had something to eat at night and enough rifle rounds to fight the enemy yet all throughout 1942 when a battle was not going to plan macarthur would blame the local leadership both australian and american without ever taking the time to really understand the nature of the battle being fought the reality was 1942 was his first real test as an operational commander and it showed macarthur was an excellent military theorist and strategist he was able to compose operational plans that were brilliant but once battle was joined and the time for planning was over he clearly lacked both patience and a cool temperament in the real world battle has a flow a give and take which is the result of the fact that your enemy also has their own plans sometimes even when it appears that your enemy is doing well the tide of battle may be decisively shifting in your favor irwin rommel famously described understanding this flow as feeling a battle through the tips of your fingers and this skill really only comes with experience virtually all of the australian generals macarthur continually disparaged had spent the best part of four years in the great war leading companies and battalions rather than the three months macarthur had and then two years commanding divisions and corps in north africa for example major general allen the commander of the australian 7th division had commanded a platoon in 1915. he was promoted to captain in march 1916 where he led a company of the 45th battalion in 1918 allen eventually achieved the rank of lieutenant colonel and led the 45th battalion itself till the end of the war while serving in the 45th battalion allen led his company at posiers the somme missine and then led the battalion as a whole at monument wood in the current conflict he commanded the 16th brigade in 1940 which fought at bardia to brook greece and syria and was then promoted to the command of 7th division that is the level of disparity in command experience we are talking about the fact that the australian generals were not panicking simply reflected both their greater level of familiarity with situations such as this and the fact that they had a better understanding of the battle itself alan and rowell knew that the tide was beginning to turn in their favor as the australians were digging in at ioribaiwa events elsewhere in the theater were having a serious impact on the south sea's force the american offensive at guadalcanal was a strategic master stroke the 17th army command had been almost entirely focused on the capture of port moresby in july but as the combat on guadalcanal intensified they were forced to react to the allied advance like a great magnet the naval battle around guadalcanal sucked in japanese air and naval assets and by september general hayao kotake was becoming increasingly anxious about the japanese position at buna the navy simply no longer had the aircraft or ships to defend the base and the possibility of a naval or airborne landing in horry's rear was a continual concern for 17th army command hori was ordered to deploy one battalion back to buna as a garrison and withdraw the remainder of the 41st regiment out of the mountains to kokoda the reality was hari could not support two regiments on the south slopes in any case the japanese still had a formidable force facing the australians the whole 144th regiment which was heavily reinforced with mountain gun and engineer regiments there were probably between three thousand five thousand japanese facing the australians at yoribaiwa outnumbering them by a margin of about two to one although all of these forces may not have been committed to battle the morning of the fourteenth found the rigid yori baiwa held by the exhausted 21st brigade which was now less than two battalion strong the second 14th and 2nd 16th had been merged into one composite battalion which was not at full strength these two formations had held off the japanese throughout the withdrawal and as the south seas force had substantially more battalions available hari was able to rotate his front line units this had allowed the japanese to share the burden between all of their formations this composite battalion held the center of the line with the third holding the right flank and the fresh 25th brigade moving up behind them the newly arrived second 31st battalion had taken up a position on the far left flank and the other battalions were still moving up behind the ridge when the japanese attacked in what can only be described as a very skillful operation the 144th regiment began a series of meticulous and careful attacks probing the australian position for weaknesses the japanese had carried a mountain gun all the way over the owen stanley mountains and the lull in the fighting had allowed them to finally bring it into action the composite battalion in the center were the most exposed and the japanese artillery soon began to take its toll the second 14th battalion historian recorded the day's fighting the strain was beginning to tell on all members of the unit and some of the lads in the forward positions who had stood up to it well and had done a wonderful job right through began to crack up enemy mortar mg and field peace continue to do deadly work on our forward positions all morning and our casualties mounted just as they had all throughout the campaign the japanese infantry began feeling around the flanks during the night of the 14th platoons of japanese had crept close to the australian positions and entrenched their machine guns the exhausted battalions were not patrolling the aggressive style that was typical of australian doctrine allowing the japanese to approach close to their positions on the 15th ether decided to try and flank the japanese and order the fresh second 31st battalion to move to the left but they were met by a large japanese force that was advancing in this area leading to a day-long firefight on the australian right wing a probing japanese patrol had exploited a gap between the 3rd and 2nd 33rd battalions and had reached the summit of the ridge commanding the high ground the japanese infantry dug in and withstood two australian counter-attacks as the battle raged throughout the day the australian positions were suffering badly to well-placed japanese machine gun artillery and mortars as the japanese infantry battalions had been reinforced with large numbers of these supporting arms more concerning was the increasing japanese activity around the australian flanks ether was in a tough position although now at the head of a fresh brigade that had been reinforced with a pioneer battalion the japanese had attacked before he could effectively deploy his forces at this point the exhausted 21st brigade was barely capable of putting up resistance and his own battalions had been deployed in a haphazard manner about five kilometers to the rear across a forested valley was another good defensive position the emitter ridge a withdrawal to this terrain feature made perfectly good tactical sense it would allow him to properly place his battalions in good defensive order and relieve the 21st brigade the only problem with this decision was emitter is the last ridgeline of the owen stanley mountains beyond this lay the open river valleys of the coast there were obviously other good defensive positions between here and moresby but the psychological impact of being pushed from the mountains was substantial ether reported the situation to seventh division headquarters and asked for permission to withdraw to imitate general allen impressed on aether the importance of holding yori baiwa but left the decision up to him on the 16th ether decided that holding was not advisable considering the position had already been penetrated his orders were to begin offensive operations but that was impossible given the current disordered state of his brigade at 11 a.m the second 14th and the 2nd 16th battalions began to withdraw covered by the 2nd 25th in a well executed and orderly movement the battalions began a leap frogging through one another and by 4 pm the last australians had left baiwa by midnight ether was in a solid defensive position along the imata ridge with all of his exhausted units in the rear including the third pioneers five fresh and full-strength battalions were dug in along the ridgeline which immediately began dispatching patrols into the valley aggressive patrol activity was a key to australian infantry doctrine and this immediately produced results several japanese parties were ambushed in the darkness inflicting significant casualties the australians noted a considerable change in japanese aggression as for the first time in a month australian patrols began to dominate no man's land indeed for the first time since israel the australians were in a good position although brigadier general ether had brought the situation under control concern was growing in canberra on the 9th of september the war cabinet asked general blamey the southwest pacific area land commander and highest ranking australian general to go to port moresby and survey the situation after flying to port moore's been conferring with general rowell and general allen blamey was back in australia on the 14th in a report to the war council on the 16th blaming stated that he had full confidence in the outcome of the campaign that port moresby was strongly held and the japanese success thus far had been due to their superior numbers in the forward area which had primarily been an outcome of allied logistical problems two additional brigades were on route and he had full confidence in local leadership that day the australian prime minister john curtin received a phone call from general macarthur macarthur contradicting blamey told curtin that the primary reason for the current situation was simply the poor performance of the australian fighting men he was convinced that the japanese forces on the kokoda track were smaller than the australians who opposed them and australian leadership had been poor the supply problems in macarthur's opinion were being overstated as clearly the japanese had supply issues as well however they were attacking not retreating finally macarthur concluded by stating that it does not matter how many more australians were sent to port moresby if they would not fight mcarthur's proposed solution was that general blamey should go to port moresby himself and take command of the situation there courtney macarthur had a good relationship curtin like many politicians was untrusting of his own generals who would often dominate military discussions in macarthur curtin found a political ally a method by which he could effectively circumvent his own military leadership in curtin macarthur also found both a willing ally and a method of actually exercising direct control over australian forces although clearly blamey did not want to undermine confidence in rao and as supreme land force commander he had a force of over half a million men to administer and control with pressure being applied from both macarthur and curtin he had little choice blaming departed for port moresby on the 23rd of september he arrived only to find rao furious the two men immediately fell out and after a week of arguing rao was relieved of command one ill-advised phone call to the prime minister had precipitated a command crisis in new guinea despite the furore in australia the reality on the ground was the campaign had decisively turned in favor of the allies the japanese were now in a position to see the searchlights at port moresby indeed the japanese official history treats the taking of the iori biwa bridge as a crowning moment of glory they had driven the australians from the mountains true horya had only been ordered to take a foothold on the south slopes of the owen stanley mountains but he had already exceeded his orders nevertheless the japanese account of the battle amidst the fact that hari's men were starving the diary of a japanese officer reads 17 september selected camping ground we are to wait here until the middle of next month before further operations not a grain of rice left each unit gathered about two days of supply of food which had been scattered about dreamed all night of lost subordinates 18th of september transportation of rations reported to be difficult how will we live in our present condition without any food in another few days we will have to eat tree roots or tree bark her distant rifle shots slept and dreamt of home 19th of september inspected tents and noticed the scarcity of food entire company turned out to forage for food 13 malaria 6 diarrhea and 5 other patients are getting worse no medicines have arrived went to battalion headquarters to report the food situation and requisition supplies returned empty-handed wonder what general headquarters is doing patients will die and we will soon starve how can we fight against this just as general morris had predicted and just as brigadier general potts had intended the further the australians had drawn the superior japanese forces into the mountains the worse and worse their supply situation had become they were now quite literally starving the reality was without airborne resupply a formation the size of the south sea's force could not operate on the south side of the owen stanley mountains the lines of communication to buna were just too poor the attack at ioribaiwa had been one last maximum effort from huri's men but now their condition was deteriorating by the day they too had been fighting almost continually for a month and their casualties had been severe well over a thousand the tactical situation was now reversed as the starving and exhausted japanese faced fresh and comparatively well-fed australian units who continually harassed them with patrols and ambushes for the first time in the campaign australian artillery was engaged in a herculean effort the men of the 14th field regiment had hauled a pair of 25 pounders upper jungle covered mountain at ower's corner which now began to bombard the japanese positions on the ioribaiowa ridge the australian plan had worked after a couple of days at the immediate ridge ether was ready for a counter-attack his orders had been to begin offensive operations although that was impossible given the situation at ioribaiwa as intended the withdrawal to the imitator ridge had stabilized the situation and with his battle depleted units relieved the brigade staff began planning the australian force was not large 132 officers and 2492 men but the japanese were badly weakened although the full strength of the 144th regiment was in the forward area most of the 41st regiment was strung out along the track to kokoda by the 23rd of september a week after the retreat to imita ridge the australians were advancing the 2nd 25th battalion began slowly probing along the track into the valley they met no resistance these were the first tentative steps in the australian counter-offensive one that would take the allies all the way to booner that evening the australian lead elements had retaken iori biowar ridge after a sharp battle and the japanese were now in full retreat back across the mountains the south seas force was quite literally out of provisions of all kinds the starving battle-weary men were ordered to withdraw back to kokoda just as general hori had predicted before the operation had begun the whole advance over the owen stanley mountains was ending in disaster one of the premier jungle war fighting units in the japanese army was simply wasting away major kiowa recounted the scene our bodies were completely fatigued so climbing even the smallest hill required a great effort the majority of the members of the unit were carrying wounded on stretchers my battalion seventh company was meant to be protecting the rear but they were carrying casualties from the field hospital as were members of the forces wireless radio unit because there was no life-sustaining rice every step seemed to exhaust one's entire strength progress was exceedingly slow as we climbed the mountain counting each step gasping for each breath despite some encouragement to struggle through the pain many were stooped over their eyes filled with tears and without even the strength to urge themselves on my heart was filled with sorrow the australians pursued carefully on the first of october the third battalion began to advance followed closely by the rest of the brigade sending out from ioribaiwa towards the hill passes around manari their progress was good and in five days they had retaken half of the kokoda track and had patrols moving through the jungle towards templeton's crossing ifogi minari miola places that had witnessed such desperate fighting as potter's brigade had tried to withdraw were taken without resistance evidence of the hardships of the japanese was everywhere dead japanese men who clearly died from starvation or sickness widespread signs of dysentery even evidence that they were eating wood as the australians advanced through a fergie they found the battlefields that had seen such savage combat just one month before hundreds of australian and japanese dead littered the hillsides this included some australian prisoners who had been beheaded the lead units caught up with the japanese regard at templeton's crossing less than 10 kilometers from isaraba by this point the advance began to slow even with a force of just over 2 000 men ether was struggling to sustain them although increasing air support was available for resupply this was a very difficult and dangerous task for the air crew and initially results were poor organizational integration between the us army air corps transports australian logistics personnel and the ground force was difficult but after the intervention of lieutenant general herring rau's successor the situation improved it was dangerous and monotonous work for the american pilots flying through the cloudy mountains looking for small clearings in the jungle by the 11th the supply situation was improving and eartha felt confident in advancing further just in front of templeton's crossing the japanese rearguard had dug in the australian advance met its first real resistance the main defensive position lay in the crest of a valley with steep hillsides on either side from the 12th to the 14th of october the 2nd 33rd battalion began proving forward in a painfully slow advance the japanese had dug one man fighting pits that were very hard to see and engage after a day of constant fighting a company had been able to flank the main japanese loan by climbing a ridge but making any further progress still required clawing the japanese out of their fighting positions one at a time the second 25th battalion was moving down a tributary track that approached templeton's crossing from the left flank resistance here was determined but the terrain was less formidable and the australians made steady gains with reasonably light casualties after flanking a japanese heavy machine gun position and killing the gunner with a grenade a corporal named cook found some suspicious looking meat after taking it back to the battalion medic it was deemed to be human evidence of just how critical the japanese supply situation had become even with the japanese so hungry as to resort to cannibalism in the face of thick bush and continued resistance progress began to slow and casualties began to mount by the 15th of october the third battalion had moved up in support and continued a well-executed wide flanking movement through the jungle but when the australians reached the japanese fighting positions they found them empty with the fall of templeton's crossing the australians were now on the north slope of the mountains a day's march from isuraba where the campaign had started the main force of the 25th brigade advanced with three battalions in close formation the third moved along the track while the 2nd 25th and 2nd 33rd advanced through the rainforest on either flank about 500 meters down the track they ran into another line of japanese resistance again fighting from well-concealed foxholes after the 3rd battalion dug in for the night the next morning the second 25th began moving around the left flank a company commander captain atkinson recalled the attack they had first to dispose of a machine gun and tongs did it he crawled up a fire lane under fire and tossed a grenade which lobbed right in the pit the two japs in the pit were blown clean out and sprawled one on each other dead that started the ball rolling the men got excited and began yelling and whooping as the right flank had now been penetrated the whole position began to collapse and the japanese retreated towards iora creek the 16th brigade now moved up to replaced aether's 21st which had over 700 casualties to sickness alone at this point such was the difficulty of fighting in these godforsaken mountains the 16th brigade was a veteran formation which had seen extensive action in greece syria and north africa but this would be its first encounter with the japanese the brigade was led by brigadier general lloyd like many aif officers lloyd had a long and extensive first world war career and had performed well at the siege of dubrook as he led his divisions towards the fighting at euro creek the second first second second and second third the difficulty that awaited his men became apparent the main japanese defensive line was now anchored on the iora creek village in this area the track follows the deep ravine of the iora creek with thickly wooded steep slopes at the village the track crossed from one side of the valley to the other the japanese defense rested primarily along the track itself just forward of the village the task of clearing this defensive line was given to the 2nd 2nd battalion commanded by major edgar edgar's plans were to attack with four companies in a great right hook he would move around the back of the 3rd battalion which was currently engaging the enemy two companies would climb to the top of the mountains to the right some 500 meters above the valley floor and an altitude of over 2000 metres and continue along the ridgeline once these units had advanced towards the crossing they would cut back to the track behind the defenses the other two companies would move through the rainforest closer to the valley floor but still to the right of the 3rd battalion by 11am on the 20th the two lead companies had reached their assembly positions on the ridge and began the attack the australians advanced in single file and quiet mountain fog eventually the far-right company made contact with the main japanese defensive position a number of machine guns and fighting positions arranged in depth throughout the day the australians methodically engaged these machine gun positions taking them one at a time the weapon of choice for this kind of fighting was the hand grenade men would crawl up to within five meters and throw their bombs it was hard and dangerous fighting and throughout the day casualties mounted the second company on the left met with far less resistance as it had flanked the japanese forward positions but as it moved up in support it was forced to engage the entrenched machine guns after hours of this vicious close range fighting the japanese broke and ran to the rear leaving machine guns and rifles but as the two companies pursued them towards the crossing they ran into yet another defensive line preventing further gains and as night fell they bible-whacked in a box formation the other two companies that moved along the valley floor had a very similar days fighting clearly the japanese had deployed their defenses in considerable depth the next morning the fresh second 1st battalion moved through the australian positions and attacked in another multi-company right-flanking move through the forest but they found their japanese positions empty they had retreated under the cover of darkness the australians now had to contend with the iora creek crossing itself perhaps the most formidable piece of terrain along the whole track as the australians pushed on by the 22nd of october they found themselves on a bare ridge looking down on the village of eora itself the second first battalion kept attacking with the same energy it had in the days before however the defenses were formidable the attackers would have to cross two bridges which were dominated by japanese machine gun positions there really was no easy way to flank them as the river was treacherous the battalion co decided on a silent knight attack none of the company commanders were impressed with the idea but in reality there really wasn't an easy alternative at 4am the men moved out miraculously two companies were able to cross in the darkness before the japanese were alerted even as machine gun fire erupted around them the third company made it across the river with only two casualties in the darkness the different companies and platoons lost contact with each other the japanese third battalion of the 144th regiment had skillfully entrenched on the surrounding high ground which dominated the bridges and valley one platoon was pinned between the river and the cliff and only saved when a corporal climbed the escarpment and killed a pair of japanese soldiers who were sniping from above as day broke fire from the dominating japanese position slowed the australian progress to a standstill and by nightfall the positions had not changed appreciably for two days the lead elements of the 2nd 1st battalion remained pinned just under the japanese positions but the reserve 2nd 2nd battalion could do precious little to help brigadier lloyd approved a plan to try and flank the whole japanese position with the force of two companies from the 2nd 3rd battalion but this also proved to be a painfully slow advance in the face of entrenched japanese positions on the ridges for a week the australian brigade tried in vain to dislodge the japanese from their formidable defenses all to the growing consternation of general headquarters but in reality the terrain was treacherous the whole of the 2nd 3rd battalion had advanced up the high ground on the australian left and was slowly encroaching on the japanese right flank but the steepness of the valley made this extremely difficult the second first battalion was still in the bottom of the valley taking the japanese positions one at a time but only a tremendous cost the japanese had built a formidable fortification on the ridge with interlocking trenches connecting heavy machine gun positions it took the second third days of fighting to finally take the position on the 28th of october with the japanese right flank finally turned they were forced to withdraw to isarava the japanese had also suffered badly in the two weeks of fighting through templeton's crossing and aura creek although ordered to stop the australians at these positions hari was concerned that the whole regiment would be destroyed by the flanking attack of the second third battalion considering this was the exact situation faced by pots at the beginning of the campaign the roles truly had been reversed creek had been the last stand of the 144th regiment in the owen stanley mountains it had held up the 16th brigade for a week this delay cost major general allen his position under pressure from macarthur he was relieved of command of the seventh division this was a shame considering how much the forces under his command had achieved but even before his replacement major general vasi had arrived to take command the japanese were in full blown retreat by the 30th of october the 16th brigade had taken ayola and were sleeping in the isuraba rest house the scene of the heroic defence by the 39th battalion the brigade advanced down the two tracks the main path to kokoda and the secondary track used by hori to flank the 53rd battalion they met little resistance and by the 3rd of november a platoon under lieutenant black had penetrated as far as the town of kokoda itself finding it empty that day the australians quietly entered kokoda unopposed with the capture of the kokoda airfield they had a firm logistical base on the north slope of the owen stanley mountains nevertheless one final battle remained before the australians broke out of the hills and into the coastal plain kokoda sits in a high valley and is essentially surrounded by mountains the exit of the valley ran through the small village of oyvi to the east and on the high ground here fresh elements of the 41st regiment which had been withdrawn to kokoda several weeks before had taken up strong blocking positions the japanese had assembled most of what remained of the south sea's force for the battle of oybee in the centre on the high ground facing kokoda there were three battalions of the crack 41st regiment these covered the main kokodabuna road the exhausted 144th which had retreated all the way back from ioribaiwa was positioned to guard the left flank a little to the rear of the 41st covering a secondary trail from isaraba hori positioned his headquarters about five kilometers to the rear at the front at gorari with the kokoda airfield in allied hands the supply situation had vastly improved the new seventh division commander vassi was able to sustain two brigades in the kokoda valley for the first time in the whole campaign the japanese were about to face the australians on something approaching even terms by november the 4th vasi had both the 16th and 25th brigades deployed in the valley facing the japanese the second sixth field company was at work repairing the airstrip and the seventh division headquarters entered the village that afternoon in an official ceremony to the delight of the assembled men vasi hoisted the australian flag over the village of kokoda the first dakota transport arrived to kokoda at 9am the next day and supplies accumulated rapidly for the first time in weeks the men were issued chocolate this underlined the difference between the allies and the japanese the australians could support a whole division across the owen stanley mountains and they would not starve because of allied air power as the 16th brigade began advancing down the main track towards oivy they came into contact with the forward deployed japanese units the australians now employed a standard tactic when engaging japanese regard formations the lead company would pin while the second company in line would immediately flank this new drill proved to be extremely effective as many japanese elements were forced to withdraw without inflicting significant casualties on the 5th of november the lead elements of the 2nd 2nd and 2nd 3rd battalions made contact with the main concentrations of the 41st regiment along the high ground near ivy the japanese were well dug in and the australians made slow progress however with the kokoda airfield operational mortar ammunition was now plentiful and the australians were able to use these weapons liberally inflicting significant japanese casualties for two days the australians probed the defenses making slow but steady progress on the right flank the 2nd 1st battalion had found a new track starting from the small village of kobara it ran parallel to the main road to buna but was a few kilometers south along the lower slopes of the mountains on the fourth vasi ordered the australians to begin probing along this new track and the whole battalion advanced meeting little opposition in a two-day reconnaissance in force the second first battalion march down this track meeting nothing but friendly locals eventually they reached a hill overlooking the camusi river about five kilometers to the rear of the japanese positions as vasey noted the progress of the second first battalion on the australian right flank and the stubbornness of the japanese defenses on the left he decided to commit the whole 25th brigade to a daring flank attack by the eighth they had reached their starting position about halfway down the track at a place named lianey's corner as ether set up his brigade hq the australians were in an excellent tactical situation as the main body of the 16th brigade was engaging the 41st regiment in a close fight around oivy at the main defensive line three fresh battalions were now in a position to potentially envelop the whole japanese position the japanese arrayed their forces in depth with the 144th regiment deployed to the rear of the 41st however the australians were now in position to cut the kokoda buna road behind them on the eight the decisive attack began ether committed all three battalions his main strength the second 33rd and second 25th battalions would attack the main defensive line from the rear trapping the 41st regiment in a pincer with the 16th brigade his third battalion the second 31st was ordered to advance on gorari a village about five kilometers behind oivy where there was a large japanese concentration finally the second first battalion which had temporarily been transferred to his command would continue probing east with the aim of penetrating deeply into the japanese rear the attack on the 8th of november fell like an avalanche on the japanese position the 25th brigade engaged the majority of the exhausted 144th regiment the three fresh australian battalions immediately made headway on the australian right the second 31st began extending its companies to the right probing for the open flank by midday they had found it they penetrated a gap between the first battalion of the 144th infantry regiment and a mountain gun battalion reaching the main track in fact they had penetrated the headquarters area of the south sea's force and major general hurry was in grave danger of being killed as the other two battalions smashed into the japanese left flank the 144th regiment began to disintegrate confusion reigned in the japanese force the commander of the 41st regiment had lost contact with 144th and had no idea where any of its elements were all he knew was he now had strong enemy formations in his rear area the japanese position was now catastrophic by the night the whole 25th brigade was concentrated at gorari holding strong defensive position along the 41st regiment's only means of escape as japanese elements flung themselves on the australian defenses bodies began to pile up in front of their bren gun positions faced with encirclement large elements of the 41st regiment took to the forest abandoning their equipment as they went small japanese formations held their ground and fought to the death but these were steadily reduced by the 16th brigade as the retreating 144th regiment tried to cross the kamushi river they were engaged by the 2nd 1st battalion major general hori fearing that an allied attack on bunit was imminent decided to travel down the river by raft hurry was a brave man but this was a foolhardy decision the river was swollen with rain and the out of control raft capsized in his hasty retreat major general hori drowned out maneuvered by vassy in a brilliant piece of generalship hurry like so many of his men paid for the japanese defeat with his life the south seas force utterly defeated strangled down the kamushi river towards buna in companies and platoons the kokoda track campaign was over the australians had won the kokoda track campaign was a brilliant australian victory although japanese numbers are hard to gauge accurately given the available source material it is safe to say that australian units were outnumbered until the battle of oevi throughout the campaign the forward japanese combat units probably had a strength of around 6 000 although not all of these units would have been facing the australians at the same time against them never more than a single brigade was deployed not until the final operations around kokoda often outnumbered 2-1 and facing battle-hardened jungle warfare specialists the australian units had performed exceptionally well one cannot speak highly enough of the 39th battalion no one could have dared to hope that those men would fight so well under such horrific circumstances by november the australian army had showed that it was not only the equal of the japanese in jungle warfare but it may have surpassed them australian combat casualties for the whole campaign were 103 officers and 1577 men with killed in action totaling 39 officers and 586 enlisted japanese casualties are much harder to determine the japanese official history estimates that total casualty sustained during the advance to iori biwa was just over one thousand but considering the hardest fighting and worst defeat occurred after that point and the acute starvation of horiz forces total casualties must be in the range of three to four thousand the japanese had undoubtedly fought brilliantly their attacks at isurava ifogi and ioribaiwa were conducted with tactical skill and determination corey was an extremely able commander and the men he led endured unimaginable hardship the fighting quality of the japanese soldier is often overlooked in western accounts of the pacific war but the truth is the japanese were a truly formidable enemy capable of so much more than suicidal bonsai attacks the individual men were extremely tough they lived off simple food and they were unafraid of the jungle in attack they pressed with both unrelenting pressure and always felt for the flanks in defense they positioned their heavy weapons with skill and held their positions with determination nonetheless in truth the whole owen stanley offensive was a blunder japanese logistical organization was to be blunt amateurish the idea that hari's men could fight across that country with 12 days rations was simply ludicrous the australians had been proven correct it was simply not possible for the japanese to sustain sufficient forces across the owen stanley mountains to ever be a realistic threat to port moresby especially with the australians opposing them the further they advanced the worse their situation became and by the time they had reached emitter ridge they were starving to say that the whole operation was foolhardy is an understatement just as they had throughout 1942 the japanese had gambled on a quick allied collapse when it had not come they faced catastrophe the australian generals had performed well vassi's leadership at oivy had been inspired as hori had simply been out generalled outmaneuvered and destroyed through the campaign general raul and general allen had provided cool heads and steady hands and it was through their planning that the 25th brigade arrived at yori biowa at the critical time brigadier potts facing a crippling supply situation and enemy superiority fought a skillfully executed dogged and determined defensive campaign especially at isuraba although he caught a disaster at a fogey without that fighting retreat to ioribaiwa the 144th regiment would not have been as badly depleted as it was but like many other fine australian generals he was sidelined after the battle major general allen lieutenant general rao brigadier general potts and major general claus the commander of the battle of milne bay were all sidelined after winning battles against the japanese because in macarthur's opinion they were not aggressive enough what macarthur never really took the time to understand was the simple fact that the australian army was not the united states army australian doctrine much more like the british did not emphasize simple aggression in the same way as the americans the australian way of war was more cautious more deliberate less reckless maintaining balance through reserves was always emphasized and withdrawals were not automatically viewed in the negative terms in which many american generals perceived them as much as the retreat across the mountains had drawn withering criticism from macarthur that very withdrawal was the single maneuver that had defeated the japanese on the kokoda track had the australians simply stood at isarava and fought to the death they would have been destroyed and hari's advance would have been virtually unopposed but by drawing him into the mountains the australians starved his forces to death this is the very reason why the australian generals were never that concerned and it showed the limited sophistication of macarthur's understanding of the campaign indeed of macarthur's understanding of warfare in general the reality was macarthur was a poor choice for supreme allied commander southwest pacific area what most americans do not know to this day is that if you remove the philippines this theatre was primarily an australian theatre all throughout the war even including the philippine offensive macarthur's forces were primarily australian all the way until 1944. that made this theatre different to any other in the pacific command here was a coalition just like europe tight integration between two allies was required to fight the war effectively at lower levels of command this was certainly achieved especially in the air forces but macarthur's treatment of australian forces was at times comical he did not understand the australian army and is constant meddling not only destroyed careers but also had a negative impact on its effectiveness compare macarthur to eisenhower perhaps the greatest coalition leader in modern history polite humble diplomatic and always willing to respect the capability and experience of his subordinates eisenhower forged an anglo-american alliance that would successfully complete some of the most difficult operations ever seen in warfare in reality had the philippines been transferred to the central pacific area there is no reason at all why an australian general could not have served as supreme allied commander southwest pacific as the majority of the forces deployed to mainland new guinea and the dutch east indies all throughout the war were australian indeed once macarthur no longer required australian forces he simply discarded them as can be seen in 1944 even if it made sense to appoint an american general if only to ensure that the theater was not neglected by the combined joint chiefs of staff there were far better choices than macarthur what was required in this theatre was not a flamboyant former press officer who could to be fair come up with brilliant operational plans but rather a general who could work well with allies as the australian army had shown all throughout the war as long as it was supported with moderate levels of air and naval power it was more than capable of defeating the japanese in both new guinea and the dutch east indies its generals were more than capable its organization was more than capable and its fighting men were more than capable there really was no need to burden the australian army with a commander like macarthur nonetheless the campaign was not over for the australians of kokoda before them lay the last bastion in all of papua buna the japanese base had been turned into a swampy fortress in one of the most hellish battles of the pacific war the 7th australian division along with their american brothers of the 32nd would have to root out one japanese bunker after another often in waste deep disgusting swamp the battle of buna and gohna had its own unique form of hell and every inch gained there would be paid for in allied blood it was in that swampy hell hole that the south seas force would make its final stand and the japanese presence in papua would be finally annihilated

Channel: hypohystericalhistory

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Id: tpoZvxbJzrk

Length: 92min 6sec (5526 seconds)

Published: Fri Jun 18 2021

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[u/BullShatStats]

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