The Modernisation of the Chinese Navy: the Rise of a Great Naval Power

on the 17th of september 1894 two battle fleets approached one another at the mouth of the yalu river steaming out of the morning gloom were the protected cruises of japanese admiral ito sukayuki before them lay their prey the battle fleet of the king chinese emperor arranged in convoy formation in the battle to come the domination of the korean peninsula would be decided despite their disadvantage in protection and firepower superior quality of the japanese crews and the seamanship of their offices allowed them to gain a tactical advantage over their opponents although they inflicted significant damage on the japanese fleet the badly battered chinese vessels including two battleships abandoned the field leaving four cruisers rapidly sinking this force retreated to the chinese naval base at wihaway after the siege of the base by japanese forces the majority of the chinese fleet would be utterly destroyed the battle of the yalu river and its aftermath was a watershed in the great sano japanese rivalry for the two titans of east asia the first sono-japanese war would cement japan as the western pacific's premier naval power ending china's naval aspirations for over 100 years the first half of the 20th century was a deeply troubled time in the history of china defeated the hands of imperial japan precipitated a crisis in beijing the king empire was by the end of the 19th century an anachronism the various arms of government had calcified into brittle limbs vestiges of a time that was completely out of step with the modern world feeble attempts at reform only led to fracture in the aftermath of the wu-chang uprising the power of the king emperor was nominally vested in the premiere of the kumomentang sun yat-sen the leader of the republic of china the next 40 years of chinese history are a story of internal division and weakness although nominally a unified nation the central government struggled to exert its political control over the vast nation with warlords and local rulers effectively governing their own internal minor states this internal division was only magnified by the beginning of the civil war in the early 1930s as communist forces not only took control over significant areas of the country but steadfastly refused to be defeated with chiang kai-shek's attention firmly focused on his internal enemies the japanese were quick to exploit the weakness of the central government and in 1939 china would face its greatest challenge in the modern era the second sino-japanese war was a catastrophe between 4 and 10 million chinese would die in the conflict and most of the wealthy urbanized areas of the coast would fall to japan it was truly a war of national survival one that was only one with enormous sacrifice and the aid of the western allies this half century of chaos would only end with the defeat of chiang kai-shek by mao's communists and the establishment of the people's republic building a large and capable navy is truly a national enterprise at any time in history naval power has been a very expensive luxury navies require not only a high level of economic development but typically internal stability this is one of the key factors behind japan's rapid rise as a great naval power after the meiji restoration japan had the internal political stability to effectively implement sweeping economic reforms driving rapid industrialization but more importantly the inherent cohesion of the japanese state allowed the nation as a whole to sacrifice on a colossal scale in order to achieve its naval ambitions with the implementation of the 6-6 plan in a 10-year period from 1892 to 1902 japan became the fourth largest naval power in the world by 1921 some 32 of national expenditure was allocated to naval procurement and sustainment a truly colossal investment for a developing nation in peacetime it was individual japanese people who shouldered this burden as the nation as a whole was able to sacrifice in order to make japan a great naval power throughout the first half of the 20th century china was simply too divided and focused on internal affairs to even attempt to compete with japan leading to a half century of japanese naval hegemony in east asia although finally united communist china under mao was in no position to begin a large-scale naval expansion the nation had been devastated by decades of internal political disruption civil war and foreign invasion and it now faced the trauma of the great leap forward and cultural revolution as the developed western economies in north america and europe continue to flourish china languished under mao's heavy hand the cultural revolution again focused the nation on its perceived internal enemies and robbed china of a good deal of its intellectual base leaving the country in abject poverty despite its vast population of 800 million people chinese gdp was just 9 that of the united states in 1970. from 1949 to 1972 beijing neither had the resources nor the strategic interest to develop a large globally competitive navy china was a land power and its primary threat had now become the soviet union in 1969 a series of bloody border clashes erupted between soviet and chinese forces leading to a permanent rupture between the two great communist powers in one of the pivotal moments of the cold war in fact in modern history the united states exploited this deep fracture within the communist world in an inspired piece of diplomacy washington began to court beijing culminating in nixon's historic visit to china in 1972 although mao's china and nixon's america were polar opposites ideologically they both found common cause in the menace of the soviet union some have argued that the strategic realignment of beijing away from moscow and towards washington was the pivotal moment in the cold war in fact it would have far greater consequences than anyone could have predicted at the time as part of this new strategic partnership between the united states and communist china the two nations would begin one of the most consequential economic relationships in modern history under the new leader of the party deng xiaoping beijing opened its borders to foreign investment what china needed in order to stimulate economic development was capital and technology and in exchange for foreign investment beijing would allow american firms access to its nearly endless pool of low-cost labor thus began one of the greatest economic transformations in modern history supported by a business-friendly government western firms would build manufacturing industry in china and then export low-cost goods to the massive consumer markets in north america and europe aided by a series of free market economic reforms what began in a small number of international business parks in cities like shanghai would grow to utterly transform the nation driving decades of double-digit economic growth and lifting millions of average chinese citizens out of abject poverty it was this geopolitical and economic integration between the united states and china that gave beijing the financial resources and the fundamental strategic interest to begin large-scale naval expansion china under traditional communism did not rely heavily on trade much like the soviet union it strove for self-sufficiency in most industries and therefore having guaranteed access to the ocean was not essential but china's economic miracle revolutionized its relationship with the sea chinese growth required access to consumer markets in the developed world by 2019 china exported nearly two and a half trillion dollars worth of goods accounting for nearly 20 percent of gdp practically every dollars worth of those exports was loaded onto a ship and traversed the world's oceans that same year china was the world's largest importer of oil and natural gas much of which also came across the oceans ever since 1945 global trade has been underwritten by the united states navy and its global footprint much like britain before it the united states ensures that the world's oceans remain the highways of global commerce with thousands of commercial vessels moving the world's goods and resources from one nation to another the usn's great carrier strike groups patrol the world's oceans preventing pirates and minor nations from interfering with the great arteries of globalization although this serves beijing's interests well as long as their relationship with washington is benign it also gives the united states vast potential leverage over china if the united states navy guarantees access to the world's oceans it can also act to deprive said access the simple reality is unless china can compete with the united states in aggregate it cannot escape the fact that with one stroke of a pen the white house can the chinese economy although obviously because of their integration this would have a devastating impact on the united states as well the integration of china within the global economic system means it can no longer turn its back on the ocean this is the deeper long-term objective of china's naval expansion two eventually be able to compete with the united states for global naval hegemony a nation the chinese have viewed as a strategic competitor for some time displacing it as the world's premier naval power if possible this objective is a core element of xi jinping's 2047 plan to further this grand strategic aim china has embarked on one of the greatest episodes of naval shipbuilding in human history in the two decades from 2000 to 2020 the total number of battle force ships mainline vessels like destroyers aircraft carriers and submarines has ballooned from 220 to 360. by 2030 that total force could number 425 in a four-year period over the last half of the 2010s china constructed the equivalent of the entire french surface fleet in 2000 the total number of aircraft carriers cruisers and destroyers in pla service was 19. in 2020 it was 43 by 2030 it could be 65. this trend is even greater in terms of minor vessels such as frigates or corvettes with the total now almost three times what it was just 20 years ago 102 compared to 38. although some of these vessels are still of soviet-era design the majority of the new additions are relatively modern indigenous chinese classes over 20 shipyards contribute to this massive naval production exceeding the united states in terms of size and throughput and in general terms chinese yards operate at a standard of efficiency which is comparable to their western counterparts it takes a chinese yard about as long as an american shipyard to produce a major surface combatant it is a naval expansion of truly historic proportions one that will almost certainly have a profound impact on the course of the 21st century as much as xi's long-term objectives may well be global beijing's immediate strategic priorities are absolutely regional in fact the vast majority of china's new maritime capabilities and force structure are optimized to fight a regional rather than a global conflict undoubtedly the most significant geostrategic and security issue for the people's republic is the independence of taiwan effectively the rump state of the republic of china taiwan served as the last safe haven for chiang kai-shek's nationalist chinese forces effectively a sovereign state without international recognition for 70 years now taiwan has remained beyond beijing's political and military control china's strategic obsession with taiwan can at first glance seem mysterious for many average chinese citizens taiwan is a matter of national pride a lost province that rightfully belongs to beijing nevertheless we should be highly skeptical that these emotive and historical claims are really the driver of chinese policy towards taipei yes historically taiwan was once ruled by king china but so was mongolia and parts of siberia and russia and these areas are certainly not under continual threat of chinese invasion and conquest furthermore considering the fact that japan ruled the island from 1895 to 1945 for only four of the last 125 years has taiwan actually formed part of the political entity that ruled mainland china thus china's historical claim is far weaker than it appears if we examine the history of europe as a counter-example how many geographical areas that were once under one nation's control are now part of another or are independent would we accept a german invasion of france based on a historical claim to be the rightful ruler of alsace and lorraine would we credit mexico with a rightful historical claim to california based on the mexican-american war should serbia be allowed to conquer macedonia bosnia croatia and slovenia simply because it believes it is the rightful legal inheritor of yugoslavia surely these arguments are an anachronism a relic of an age long past that are unlikely to carry much weight internationally a fact which is undoubtedly evident to beijing there is a far more likely explanation for beijing's strategic obsession with taiwan regime legitimacy one fundamental concept needs to be remembered when trying to understand the people's republic the interests of the party are synonymous with the interests of the state like all authoritarian regimes the chinese communist party faces a constant struggle for legitimacy unlike the democracies where legitimacy is essentially built into the system the ccp must constantly justify its political monopoly prior to the effective abandonment of communism under mao this domination of the chinese political system was justified by communist ideology only the rule of the party could protect the proletariat from counter-revolutionaries but now deprived of this firm ideological foundation the ccp's legitimacy rests on two pillars nationalism and economic development this internal insecurity is why beijing is so focused on taiwan not only is the republic of china essentially the chinese communist party's undefeated foe from the civil war it is one which for many decades maintained that it was the legitimate ruler of china as a whole although taipei no longer really asserts this claim it now represents a different kind of danger taiwan is now a flourishing liberal democracy with free and fair elections and a spectrum of political parties and therefore represents a realistic alternative to the people of china as a whole after all if democracy works in taiwan why can't it work in china thus much like the liberal culture of hong kong the very existence of the republic of china represents an existential threat to the authoritarian rule of the ccp and as the interests of the party are the interests of the state taiwan remains a core geopolitical objective despite the aggregate superiority china enjoys over taiwan one thing has prevented beijing from resolving the situation militarily the united states navy taiwan unlike tibet is separated from mainland china by 180 kilometers of water and washington is a long-standing ally of the republic of china in order for beijing to have any chance at utilizing its immense land power it has to gain sea control around the island therefore if beijing is to have any hope of successfully resolving its greatest strategic objective by force of arms it has to eject the united states navy from the western pacific in addition to taiwan specifically the u.s presence in east asia anchored along an area of geography called the first island chain is well placed to contain china preventing easy access to the pacific in the case of conflict it is this geostrategic environment combined with beijing's primary strategic objectives that has led to china's fundamental maritime strategy around which its naval procurement force structure and doctrine have been built this strategic concept is called the island chain strategy in essence chinese strategic planners have arranged its areas of strategic priority into geographical lines which correlate to three island chains in the western pacific the first island chain is an arbitrary line that runs from the southern tip of kyushu through okinawa to taiwan then through the philippines to malaysia and singapore the second island chain is two thousand five hundred kilometers further east running through the ogasawara islands to the marianas guam and into indonesia the third island chain extends out to hawaii in simple terms essentially all of the expansive maritime capabilities the prc have invested in over the past 25 years are designed to achieve one strategic aim to dominate the first island chain if us power can effectively be ejected from this area then not only would the tight ring of western containment be broken but large-scale amphibious operations against taiwan would become feasible despite the fact that if we simply count the number of hulls the plan is the world's largest navy and larger than the usn if it just sailed out to meet the seventh fleet in a large carrier battle somewhere between japan and hawaii it stands little chance of success the united states supercarrier force is still by far the greatest blue water naval capability on the planet even by 2040 given the current optimistic plans the plan's carrier force will only be half that of the usn if the united states can effectively operate carrier strike groups along the first island chain they can project such a devastating level of air power that any chinese offensives in this area are simply not a realistic possibility thus for beijing to achieve its first strategic objective it has to prevent the united states from deploying carrier strike groups into the western pacific given the fact that each 100 000 ton ford class supercarrier can deploy four fighter squadrons and upwards of 75 aircraft equivalent to the whole plan carrier force in 2021 a typical blue water naval battle is not a feasible way of ejecting american naval power from the first island chain in order to prevent the united states navy from operating its carrier forces within the proximity of the first island chain the chinese have developed a set of capabilities and systems that when used in combination are called an anti-access area denial or a2ad complex in simple terms this complex is designed to engage usn carrier strike groups with long range weapons staged from land sea and air it is the shield behind which the plan can effectively operate along the first island chain in essence this complex is designed to detect track and classify ships over a vast area of the western pacific allowing them to be engaged with long-range maritime strike systems such as anti-ship missiles it has three basic elements the first is a wide area ocean surveillance system having long-range weapons is useless if you cannot gain a firing solution on your enemy this surveillance system contains a number of different types of sensors which when used together provide a large and pervasive sensor footprint over the whole western pacific it must be remembered that different kinds of sensors have different strengths and weaknesses and thus must be used in combination satellites cover a very wide area in one dimension however as in low earth orbit they move at around eight kilometers per second they can only provide information for small windows of time this leads to area of uncertainty limitations as a ship traveling at 30 knots will have moved a large distance by the time a weapon has arrived making satellites unsuited to cruise missile targeting they are though well suited to wide area surveillance airborne sensors such as high altitude long endurance uavs can provide the constant track data required to support anti-ship cruise missiles that have a much smaller sensor footprint in comparison to space based surveillance the first element in the pla's ocean surveillance system is the yaogan satellite constellation arranged in a series of staggered polar orbits designed to cover the western pacific every hour or so the algan constellation contains both electro optical imaging and synthetic aperture radar systems the radar-equipped satellites are very effective at wide area surveillance and are not impacted by weather in the troposphere it is unlikely the chinese synthetic aperture radar satellites have sufficient resolution to classify ships as in general terms the higher the resolution the smaller the sensor footprint but they certainly can detect shipping over a very wide area for example the european space agency's sentinel sentinel-1 synthetic aperture radar satellite which orbits at 693 kilometers the same as the algan sar systems has a resolution of 5 meters and an 80 kilometer wide swath these radar satellites are supplemented by electro-optical imaging systems that operate in the infrared and visible spectrums although these eo systems are both impacted by weather and have swath limitations they are much more effective in classifying ships they have detected this is why eo and sar satellites are used in combination finally the constellation is rounded out by a number of electronic intelligent satellites although the yalgan constellation provides the pla with a highly effective space based isr capability considering how fast satellites move and how narrow their sensor footprint is it has serious limitations in an area of geography as vast as the western pacific thus it has to be supplemented by terrestrial systems the first is a low frequency over the horizon radar system located on mainland china with one transmitter in inner mongolia and the other at xiang yang over the horizon radars bounce low frequency radio waves off the ionosphere to achieve ranges between 2500 to 3000 kilometers potentially providing the pla with an effective means of constantly monitoring vessels detected by the yalgan constellation nonetheless it is unclear how technologically mature the chinese system is interested in australian research into over the horizon systems in the early 2000s a number of chinese scientists attended several conferences in australia it is clear from these proceedings that chinese research and development into skyway radars lagged far behind australia's jawn system at the time although clearly much ground has been made in chinese over the horizon radars we should be skeptical in accepting the grandiose claims made by chinese state media it seems as though these systems are only now reaching initial operating capability over the horizon backscatter radars pose many technological challenges because the radar beam bounces off the ionosphere it can often take multiple paths to and from the transmitter and receiver leading to both resolution and discrimination issues often single targets will appear as multiple contacts this also leads to uncertainty as to the exact location of targets on the earth's surface thus the radar track needs to be confirmed or adjusted by a complementary track from another system in order to verify the exact location the radar is observing additionally these systems are impacted by solar weather and ionospheric conditions and are vulnerable to electromagnetic countermeasures to supplement the over the horizon radars the pla deploys a large number of airborne surveillance systems the pla af currently has a number of maritime patrol aircraft the y8 and y9 however these man systems are being supplemented with a large number of high altitude long endurance unmanned aerial vehicles these include the harbin giant eagle and solar dragon both of which have a range in excess of 6 000 kilometers although the former is a medium altitude system by some reports over 50 of these vehicles are currently operational although most of them are low-speed propeller-driven aircraft these sensors are designed to be used in combination the low resolution wide area systems such as electronic intelligent satellites or over the horizon radars can cue other platforms that have a smaller sense of footprint such as a synthetic aperture radar satellite once a potential target is fixed it can be classified by an electro-optical imaging satellite pass persistent targeting information which is called a track can then be provided by long-range uavs or drones which can shadow the task force the over the horizon radars may also be able to fulfill this role depending on the resolution of chinese systems this last link is vital for engaging ships which move at 30 nautical miles an hour the fact that so many layers of sensors are required to reliably achieve detection track and classification shows just how difficult it is to find warships in the vast expanses of the pacific ocean all of these sensors and systems generate vast amounts of data which is routed through the pla satellite communications network to a dedicated data fusion center which plugs directly into the wider command and control system once this data is received by the data fusion center it is synthesized into a single coherent picture of the battlespace which can then be relayed to pla theatre command from there targeting information can be transmitted to the various maritime strike systems this command and control complex forms the second element in the a2ad system after the ocean surveillance system and command and control infrastructure the third element of the a2ad complex is long-range missile systems perhaps the most famous of these is the anti-ship ballistic missile the pla has recently filtered two ballistic missile systems that can at least theoretically hit moving targets at sea the first the df-21d is an anti-shipping variant of the dongfeng 21 medium-range ballistic missile it is a road mobile system that has a maximum engagement range of around 900 nautical miles the technology used on the df-21d has been adapted for use on the intermediate range df26 ballistic missile which has a much greater engagement envelope of just over 2 000 nautical miles for both systems the missile boosts the warhead into a ballistic trajectory as it re-enters the atmosphere at hypersonic velocity the warhead ionizes the air around it creating a sheath of plasma this prevents the weapon's sensors from functioning to alleviate this problem the warhead employs a pull-up maneuver in the terminal phase rapidly decelerating it to supersonic speeds as it enters the upper atmosphere this allows the weapons sensors to effectively acquire the target the warhead then completes a supersonic dive on the ship the announcement of the df-21d made quite an impression in the non-specialist media and as far back as 2014 it was already being hailed as a weapon that had made us carriers obsolete nevertheless the first confirmed test of the system against a moving target at sea was only conducted in august 2020 indicating the weapon is still far from reaching final operational capability another example of the need to remain skeptical of grandiose reports of new wunderwaffe from chinese state media it is not only the maturity of this technology that has been overstated by many in the wider defense media but also its lethality words like unstoppable and carrier killer are routinely used to describe the df-21d however a more balanced appraisal of the weapon reveals its limitations the need to decelerate to supersonic speeds combined with the warhead's lack of terminal maneuverability place it well within the performance envelope that the currently fielded ballistic missile defense interceptors such as the sm-3 sm-6 and sm-2 block 4 were designed to defeat the implementation of a hypersonic glide vehicle may complicate mid-course interception but in the terminal phase it is unlikely to significantly improve the lethality of the system given the inherent limitations of hypersonic weapons the real advantage of anti-ship ballistic missiles is not their ability to defeat shipboard defenses which actually may well be inferior to supersonic cruise missiles but the way they deal with area of uncertainty limitations ships move often at over 30 knots and thus a fleeting contact from a satellite must be supplemented by a persistent sensor like a uav otherwise when the weapon arrives in the area several hours later the ship will be long gone as the df-21d flies at hypersonic velocities and may be in the vicinity within 15 minutes of launch this drastically reduces the potential area where the ship could be this makes the long range engagement of ships with only satellite targeting data a theoretical possibility depending on the speed of the command and control complex nonetheless much like hypersonic weapons in general the impact of the anti-ship ballistic missile has probably been overestimated by many commentators which is not unusual when a new potentially disruptive form of military technology is developed arguably the real meat of the pla's a2ad complex is actually its anti-ship cruise missile capability the pla fields a range of highly capable long range ascms many of which are supersonic the yj18 is the pla's premier surface launch supersonic weapon which is currently fielded on several destroyer and submarine classes the yj-18 is a supersonic sea skimming missile with a 290 nautical mile range and a terminal attack speed of over mach 3. it is roughly equivalent to the ssn 27b sizzler ascm which is fielded on 8 of china's 12 russian-built kilo class ssks when launched from submarines the yj-18 is designed to strike u.s naval formations from beyond the reach of their outer asw perimeter with targeting data provided by the ocean surveillance system in terms of air-launched weapons the pla fields a number of modern missiles perhaps the most dangerous is the yj-12 this weapon is a long-range supersonic c-skimming missile essentially an enlarged kh-31 with a 200 nautical mile range the yj12 provides the launch platform such as the long range h6 bomber with a real standoff capability it can achieve terminal attack speeds in excess of mach 2 at low altitude the yj-12 is supplemented by a number of long-range subsonic weapons such as the yj-100 although less dangerous than its supersonic contemporaries with a range of around 500 nautical miles the yj-100 greatly enhances the missile footprint of pla surface warships although u.s battle forces have a formidable air defense missile capability based on the standard missile and aegis combat system the sheer number of chinese missiles and launch platforms available along the first island chain poses significant challenges not only is there a real possibility of a carrier strike group simply being saturated by incoming weapons but unlike the large and expensive anti-ship ballistic missiles the pla stockpiles of cruise missiles are vast this means the chinese can effectively achieve a mission kill on united states navy formations by simply exhausting their magazines even the mighty ali burke only has 96 vertical launch cells and with a perfectly effective defense it may only take a few air raids to exhaust a carrier strike group's missile magazines at that point with no defensive firepower left the force would be compelled to return to a friendly port to rearm mission killing the formation this tactic is called winning the salvo exchange understanding the aud complex is foundational in understanding chinese naval modernization as in general terms the whole plan 4 structure is built around it it is the shield behind which the pla can dominate the first island chain and many of the platforms and weapons in the plan's arsenal including submarines and surface warships are designed to operate within its sense of footprint for example the yj18 and club missiles which are fielded on the pla's kilo and yuan-class submarines have such a long range that they require targeting information to be provided by the wider ocean surveillance system however even when operating within the protection of the a2ad complex deployed pla naval formations still require local air defense and close air support to facilitate this beijing has been investing heavily in the development of aircraft carriers as with most chinese military technology the pla's carrier force has followed a well-trodden development trajectory stage one buy a foreign-built platform stage 2 locally produce a licensed or reverse-engineered foreign design and stage 3 move to the production of an indigenous chinese design the pla's interest in aircraft carriers dates back to the 1980s in 1985 the chinese government inspected the australian aircraft carrier hmas melbourne which had been sold to china for scrapping this included stripping all of the equipment which was still on board the vessel allowing for detailed inspection a surprisingly large amount of material remained on board according to chinese sources china's first real investment in aircraft carriers was the purchase of the barriag an unfinished kuznetsov class carrier which was rusting in a ukrainian shipyard when the vessel arrived in china in 1998 it was little more than a hulk and it took some 14 years of refurbishment until the new ship now named liaoning was finally commissioned the vessel is 270 meters long at the waterline has a beam of 35 meters and displaces around 50 000 tons a typical load like all kuznetsov class carriers she sits between the queen elizabeth and charles de gaulle in terms of size and displacement and uses a stow bar or short takeoff barrier assisted recovery arrangement the vessel can deploy around two squadrons of fighters primarily the j15 which is a reverse engineered su-33 although a naval variant of the 5th generation j-31 is currently under development and a squadron of airborne early warning and anti-submarine warfare helicopters amounting to 40 aircraft in total stow bar carriers use a ski jump to enable short takeoffs as opposed to a steam or electromagnetic powered catapult as used on american carriers the aircraft uses its own propulsion to reach the required takeoff speed which is reduced by the use of the ski jump when the aircraft returns from its sortie it lands on the angled flight deck and uses a functionally equivalent arrestor system to more conventional carriers if you include the research and development required to develop truly capable stable aircraft jump jets like the f-35b stowbar carriers are by far the simplest to design as there is no catapult the vessel is much simpler mechanically especially when you consider the supporting infrastructure and the stow bar carrier can deploy navalised variants of land-based fighters such as the mig-29k and su-33 which are far less expensive to develop than equivalent stable fighters it is these inherent advantages that drove the soviets to base their first true aircraft carriers around this design a path which has wisely been followed by the chinese with all of the experience gained from the refurbishment of variag it's no surprise that their first indigenous carrier is essentially a kuznetsov class commissioned as shandong the soviet design lineage of the type 2 aircraft carrier is immediately evident shandong is in essence a modernized kuznetsov with various minor improvements including the hq10 air defense system much like its sister the vessel uses a stow bar layout with ski jump and angled flight deck is around 300 meters long and displaces some 55 000 ton standard and 65 000 tons full load displacement nonetheless stobar imposes several limitations on aircraft carrier operations the first is aircraft weight as the fighter has to have sufficient thrust-to-weight ratio to achieve the required takeoff speed it cannot reach its true maximum takeoff weight this is less important in an air defense mission where the fighter will be deploying light air-to-air missiles but it severely limits its potential in the strike role the second related limitation is the inability of stow bar carriers to deploy non-jet aircraft which lack the required thrust away to make a short takeoff these include many critical supporting assets such as tankers and airborne early warning and control platforms such as the e2d roles which have to be filled by helicopters finally as the fighter has to effectively use the carrier as a runway this takes up vital deck space even on the massive ford class super carrier space is a premium especially when landing and launching operations are being conducted the fact that fighters have to make a rolling takeoff significantly impacts the sortie generation rate having a negative impact on asset efficiency in general terms if you can afford a catapult it is usually the best option china's second generation of aircraft carrier will be much more formidable vessels other than chinese state media reports very little is known about the type iii aircraft carrier the first unit is currently under construction at jyn agnan satellite images reveal its size at 300 meters in length the new design will certainly rival the ford class in terms of size and displacement three or four catapults will be fitted to the vessel which will probably displace between 80 000 and 100 000 tons reportedly the ship will use an electromagnetic catapult although as this will place significant demands on the internal electrical system and diesel propulsion steam was still being considered as late as 2018. we should expect the type 3 to be launched in 2022 although commissioning will take several additional years the type 3 is being followed by the semi-mythical type 4 which will be essentially a nuclear-powered derivative of the type 3. these ships will be a quantum leap in capability for the pla like many areas of chinese procurement it is hard to estimate exactly how many of these vessels we should expect to finally see sailing the world's oceans the combination of chinese opacity and the tendency of state-run media to exaggerate the pla's capabilities complicate the analysis we should expect a total carrier force of four platforms all of which should be in the water and fully operational by the mid-2030s any additional units will be entirely dependent upon the state of the wider economy and clearly given recent events above average growth in china can no longer simply be assumed furthermore in november 2019 before the economic impact of the covert pandemic the construction of the type 4 was postponed due to budgetary and technical constraints not only will these ships be massive allowing for the deployment of an air group twice that of the kuznetsov based vessels they will enable the deployment of fixed wing airborne early warning and control aircraft although these ships will be comparable to the ford class and capability we should not expect the chinese to plan on fighting a main force blue water naval battle with the usn somewhere west of midway atoll especially given the projected disparity in forces in a general regional conflict these ships will remain within the a-2-a-d footprint providing air defense and close air support for amphibious operations in areas such as the south china sea nevertheless with these carriers the pla will have a truly impressive global power projection capability in the more mundane scenarios where china is not at war with the united states if for example a beijing-backed regime in africa is having a dispute with its neighbours the deployment of a chinese carrier battle group based on a type 3 will have a significant impact on local geopolitics we are truly on the verge of witnessing the emergence of a global chinese navy spearheaded by its super carriers that will undeniably change the way the world works as impressive as these warships are it must be stressed that in terms of a truly deployable operational capability the chinese carrier force is embryonic the ships may well be leaving chinese shipyards quickly but that does not mean the requisite skills doctrine tactics and wider institutional knowledge can simply be generated at an equivalent pace although liaoning has been in commission since 2012 it has thus far only made a couple of regional deployments the pla declared a kind of initial operating capability in 2018 six years after commission but has primarily used a vessel to train pilots and develop skills it will likely be another 10 years before the plan is routinely and efficiently using the carriers they have today developing the requisite institutional skills and doctrine to utilize aircraft carriers efficiently is no easy task but the pla seems to be making slow but steady progress towards that goal although less glamorous than aircraft carriers amphibious warships are arguably just as important for blue water naval operations the ability to rapidly put assure amphibious forces in a contested battle space although not necessarily a contested landing complete with all of their supporting assets is a foundational power projection capability and here the pla has also been making significant investments in april 2021 the first of the type 75 landing helicopter dock or lhd was commissioned at 237 metres in length and displacing between 30 to 40 000 tons the type 75 are some of the largest lhds operational anywhere in the world they are broadly comparable to the u.s wasp class hainan the first vessel has aircraft accommodation for 30 helicopters and can deploy around 1200 troops it contains a well deck at the rear of the vessel for the deployment of landing craft two more vessels are under construction and a total of eight are planned however much like the plans carrier forces this construction run may well end up being quite optimistic we should expect at least four vessels to be commissioned although obviously 8 is a possibility the type 75 is supported by the smaller type 71 landing platform dock or lpd which each displace just under 20 000 tons and can deploy around half the embarked personnel and only four helicopters eight of these vessels are already in service there are plans for a far more capable type 76 lhd complete with an angled flight deck and single catapult for launching stealth uavs but until more credible details of this vessel are released it should be considered vaporware unlike the carrier forces the plan's amphibious vessels are very well suited to operations along the first island chain much like world war ii any conflict in this maritime geography will be dominated by the possession of island bases from which air and missile forces can be staged under the protection of the a2ad complex with amphibious assets as capable as these the pla will be able to counter large-scale amphibious offensives all throughout the region arguably even more than their new super carriers it is this investment in amphibious warfare that poses the greatest challenge to the western alliance within the region as part of a wider offensive the pla will have the assets to conduct multiple brigade to division level amphibious operations in various parts of the theatre simultaneously in terms of hulls and assets it is a level of amphibious capability that is only surpassed by the united states that does not mean however that the pla has developed the skills and doctrine required to allow complex amphibious maneuver in the style of the united states marine corps again this takes time to develop and having the hulls does not necessarily mean you have the capability for example it took the australian defense force five years to certify its ambiguous capability after the commissioning of the canberra class lhds and that was with the help and guidance of the usmc something the pla certainly lacks nevertheless china's amphibious assets are very significant in global terms and dominant regionally on paper at least it is a very impressive capability perhaps the most revolutionary element of the pla's naval modernization are in its major surface combatants its cruisers frigates and destroyers prior to the 2000s the pla relied upon russian and soviet ships such as the sovereign many-class destroyers four of which are still in active service although these have now been supplemented by several classes of indigenous destroyers the plan iteratively developed its destroyer designs throughout the 2000s with several two ship classes eventually settling on the much more modern type 52c and type 52d these vessels are outwardly similar to western destroyer designs they have two vls complexes containing 64 cells in total a single 130 millimeter main gun a point defense missile and a close-in weapon system the type 52 d's main air search sensor is the type 346 a active electronically scanned array radar arrayed in a comparable fashion to the spy-1d although an active as opposed to a passive array which does provide several benefits in radar performance the type 346 is generally speaking technologically comparable to the spy 1d with a similar number of radar elements in each of the four radar faces although it does not use gallium nitride technology the type 346a is certainly comparable to western equivalents the type 52d's primary air defense missile is the hhq-9 which is a domestic variant of the ubiquitous s300 sam system like other s 300 derivatives the hhq-9 has a very long range some 200 kilometers in total although this maximum range is drastically reduced by radar horizon limitations it is a very capable air defense weapon although in comparison to its most modern western contemporaries such as the sm-6 and sm-2 block 3c which contain active radar seekers 2-way data links and imaging infrared sensors it is beginning to look somewhat dated the warships are equipped with a variable depth towed array sonar in addition to a mid-frequency bow mounted system although practically nothing reliable is known about their performance in open source material at least each vessel has accommodation for a single anti-submarine helicopter the primary anti-surface weapon is the supersonic yj18 which is launched from the vls complex outwardly the type 52d looks very much like a western destroyer a four panel phased array air search radar 64 cell vls complex close in weapon system and towed array sonar in fact in terms of basic weapons and sensors the type 52d is essentially equivalent to the australian hobart class destroyer especially considering the yj18 is vls launched and the essm can be quad packed nevertheless there is more to a destroyer than its hull sensors and weapons a critical element in modern warship design is the combat data system a complex which processes the data generated by the various sensors and fuses it into a coherent picture of the battle space presents this information to the crew and then controls the various on-board weapon systems for example if your radar can track 200 threats simultaneously but your combat system cannot manage that number of contacts your sensors will have effectively been bottlenecked perhaps the premier naval combat system in the world is aegis the world's first complete battle management system aegis has undergone 50 years of continuous research and development and is now approaching the baseline 10 architecture the type 52d destroyers employ the zkj5 combat data system essentially the same system as the italian ipn 20 used on the aircraft carrier garibaldi but information on their aggregate capabilities is scarce compared to the aegis baseline 7 ipn 20 is a reasonably basic combat data system which does give some indication of the zk5's capability in all the pla now has 24 type 52c and d-class destroyers in service with an additional 7 on order the type 52 class destroyers are now being supplemented by the much larger type 55 class large destroyer which is classified as a cruiser by western navies the type 55 is in simple terms an enlarged type 52d with a length of 180 meters and a maximum displacement of 12 000 tons these are very large vessels comparable to the ticonderoga class cruiser in size and displacement the type 55 deploys the same weapons sensors systems and basic layout as the type 52d simply in a hull that is nearly twice the size the radar panels are a little larger allowing for greater power output and instead of the 64 vls of its little sibling the type 55 contains a massive 112 cell vls complex deploying the same primary weapons hhq-9 air defense missile yj-18 anti-ship cruise missile and cj-10 land attack cruise missile the type 55 has accommodation for two anti-submarine helicopters instead of one and is equipped with the yu7 homing torpedo these very heavily armed warships are intended to form the foundation of future carrier battle groups providing a formidable air umbrella for the force as a whole three of these warships have been commissioned and another five are currently under construction supplementing this large and new destroyer force are the plans frigates the most modern of which are the type 54a these vessels have been built in very large numbers between the type 54 and type 54a classes the pla has launched 33 of these vessels they are 134 metres long and displace around 4 000 tons at full load the type 54 is much less capable than the type 52 destroyers not only do they employ a 32 cell vls complex they are equipped with less capable weapons the primary air defense missile is the hq-16 which is a chinese derivative of the russian book m1 medium-range surface-to-air missile system although an effective weapon the total engagement envelope is in the 40-kilometer range making the missile less capable than essm type 54's primary anti-ship weapon is the subsonic yj-83 and it lacks a land attack cruise missile it is equipped with a reasonably capable though dated set of air search radars such as the chinese derivative of the russian mr70 top plate as used on the sobremeni class although there are efforts to upgrade the older type 54 class frigates they remain less formidable warships well suited to operations under the land-based air cover of the plaf an often overlooked element of china's naval procurement is its minor surface warships such as corvettes but these small vessels are critical in the less glamorous but more common gray zone actions in contested areas such as the south china sea from intimidating malaysian fishermen to intercepting foreign naval traffic it is china's flotilla of minor vessels that are fighting the battle to enforce its nine-dash claim the most prolific is the type 56-class corvette this small 1300 ton vessel is the single most numerous warship in the plan built in four shipyards the pla has been commissioning these vessels at an eye watering rate of 8 per year with a total of 72 now in the water the type 56 is for a light patrol vessel very well armed in terms of surface warfare it sports a 76 millimeter main gun four canister launched yj18 subsonic anti-ship cruise missiles and two 30 millimeter auto cannons a point defense missile system the hq10 which is comparable to the rolling airframe missile in terms of roll is equipped for air defense amazingly the type 56 also deploys a mid frequency bow mounted sonar and a variable depth towed array both of which appear to be reverse engineered italian systems and a pair of torpedo tubes finally they fueled the type 360 2d air search radar which is also a battalion origin these small vessels really are frigates in miniature and with that level of armament are truly capable of meaningfully contributing to a high-end warfighting scenario finally in the gray zone their level of firepower gives them an overmatch over the patrol vessels of other regional navies one area of chinese naval capability which has not seen the same level of development and investment is its submarine service the pla has for decades now had a massive submarine arm nevertheless it is probably in this area where china is weakest technologically which is all the more damaging considering the commanding lead the western powers have in both manned and unmanned subsurface platforms in very general terms chinese submarines are still inferior to both advanced russian and western systems especially in terms of stealth the total numbers of submarines in pla service has not increased significantly since the year 2000 although older types have been supplemented and replaced by more modern classes and a slowly increasing number of nuclear boats over the last 20 years the total number of ssks is actually decreased from 56 to 55 and only two additional ssns have been brought into service historically the majority of these submarines have been small short range coastal defense units in the 2 000 ton range although these are being replaced with larger more capable ssks the oldest unit in the pla submarine force is the type 35b min class which has been in service since the year 2000 a relic of the cold war the 2000 ton ming is a derivative of the soviet romeo class attack submarine its low range payload and poor signature make it essentially obsolete these units were joined by the much more capable russian kilo class which fields advanced anti-ship cruise missiles such as the ssn 27b sizzler although technologically inferior to western counterparts such as the australian collins or japanese soryu the kilo has a well-deserved reputation as a very quiet and dangerous submarine 12 of these boats are currently in service the first class of domestic diesel electric submarine produced by china are the type 39 song class much like its predecessor the ming the song class is a small short range coastal defense submarine designed to be used in china's near seas it lacks the range to effectively operate in the indian ocean or central pacific it is equipped with a very outdated yu4 torpedo a development of 1970 soviet torpedo technology and is capable of mine laying the real backbone of the plan submarine service are its 20 type 39a yuan class boats easily the most modern indigenous diesel electric submarine the 3500 tanjuan class fields modern weapons and sensors perhaps the best way to think of the yuan is china's equivalent of the kilo class although it is certainly not a copy the yuan feels the much more modern yu6 torpedo which unlike the yu4 is capable of wired guidance active and passive search and engaging both submarines and surface ships some commentators have called the yu6 the equivalent of the mark 48 and while this may be true of the original versions of the weapon it is very unlikely to be as capable as the most modern ad cap sea bass variant given how primitive the yu4 is we should be very skeptical the pla has bridged a technological gap that wide complementing the torpedoes is the ubiquitous yj18 supersonic anti-ship cruise missile it is in their use as guided missile platforms that the yuan pose the greatest danger to western navies when embedded in the wider a2ad complex the yuan can engage hostile naval formations for a range that is well outside its own sensor footprint internally the yuan sonars and combat data system are almost certainly equivalent to the russian kilo class given the chinese proclivity to reverse-engineer russian technology the yuan is reportedly equipped with some kind of air independent propulsion system which has been in active development since the late 2000s and newer units may feature lithium-ion batteries nonetheless we must remember that confirming any open source information on chinese systems is always difficult so an element of speculation is unavoidable in this analysis in summation although the yuan is probably still technologically inferior to its western opponents the collins and soryu it is likely to be much more competitive the chinese have been investing in nuclear submarines for some time however this continues to be an area of technological challenge for the pla nuclear submarines are solely produced at the hulu dale shipyard and a single unit hits the water about every two years each new boat typically undergoes a two to four year process of fitting out and sea trials before it becomes operational the first class of domestically produced chinese nuclear attack submarine which is still currently in service is the 5 500 tonne type 95 han class this is a very primitive nuclear submarine essentially equivalent to 1960s era technology the han is noisy has a limited top speed radiation shielding issues and is apparently incapable of submerged missile firing reportedly despite their abject obsolescence the plan still maintains three of these boats in active service from 2006 the hans were supplemented by the much more modern shang class the shang is at least externally more equivalent to contemporary russian and american ssn designs with a top speed of around 30 knots a submerged displacement of some 7 000 tons and fielding a vertical launch system for the yj-18 anti-ship cruise missile the shang is broadly speaking equivalent to a 688i improved los angeles class in terms of aggregate capability chinese sources claimed the shang's noise signature is equivalent to both the 688i and russian akula class boats averaging 110 decibels nonetheless the u.s office of naval intelligence was much less flattering estimating the shang's signature to be significantly worse than on a cooler and closer to a victor iii the evidence seems to indicate that in terms of signature management the pla n submarine 4 still lags far behind the west six song class ssns are in active service currently a third generation nuclear attack submarine is under development the type 95 but practically nothing reliable is known about it the force structure of china's submarine service is indicative of both the technological maturity of chinese naval systems and the pla strategic objectives short-range diesel diesel-electric submarines are perfectly adequate for operations along the first island chain especially when equipped with long-range missiles and integrated into the wider targeting network thus the vast majority of china's attack submarine force is designed for operations in the western pacific rather than farther flung missions such as trade interdiction in the indian ocean conventional submarines can also be much more easily modernized with commercial off-the-shelf technology such as lithium-ion batteries and electric propulsion is inherently stealthy building a nuclear submarine and most importantly making it quiet represents a daunting set of technical and technological challenges although the chinese ssn fleet is expected to grow to 16 by 2040 its submarine force will still be dominated by conventional boats until the middle of this century one final area to consider is the development of nuclear ballistic missile submarines currently the pla is moving towards the development of a true nuclear triad with credible air surface and submerged forms of nuclear delivery systems the naval element of this triad is the type 95 gin class ssbn in commission from 2007 the 11 000 ton gin class is probably a ballistic missile variant of the type 93 shang class ssn the gin deploys 12 ballistic missiles which are currently the jl2 a derivative of the rode mobile df-31 icbm the jl-2 sits between a trident and polaris in terms of aggregate capability it is capable of delivering a single one megaton nuclear warhead or three multiple independent re-entry vehicles each with a yield of 200 kilotons over a maximum range of 700 kilometers the pla-n has between four and six active ssbns although this force could balloon out to 10 units by 2040 given the gin is technologically equivalent to the shang we should expect a comparable acoustic signature what we are currently witnessing in china is a naval expansion of truly historic proportions in terms of its scale depth and fundamental ambition there are very few historical parallels a land power that for almost 150 years had neither the ability nor the inclination to invest in a globally competitive navy has in the space of just two decades grown to rival the greatest naval power the world has ever seen the united states only the expansion of the german navy in the early 20th century is really comparable the investment is occurring across the entire force with whole scale modernisation and expansion in capital ships destroyers and corvettes in combination with the a2ad complex over the next two decades the pla may well be in a position to achieve its regional strategic aims by force of arms if it chooses to do so it has a coherent strategy enormous resources and a naval manufacturing capacity that is now greater than the united states with the completion of its carrier forces we are likely to see global power projection that is only surpassed by the usn allowing for the growth of chinese soft and hard power in areas which are of strategic interest to beijing including africa and the middle east global chinese military interventions may well become the norm make no mistake the people's republic represents a challenge to u.s global hegemony that is absolutely on the same scale as the soviet union a nation its global power projection capability is set to surpass obviously the military capability of the united states and its allies remains a truly daunting challenge for beijing and china's rise to global ascendancy as outlined in xi jinping's 2047 plan is by no means assured in 2050 even at the current rates of investment total u.s battle forces especially its capital ships will still dominate the blue waters of the central pacific the united states stands at the head of a global democratic alliance that includes the region's other major naval powers japan and australia and enjoys a growing strategic partnership with india given the deployment of french and british carrier strike groups to the south china sea it is clear that the major european powers are aligning with the united states in this contest china is also trapped by its geography hemmed in on its near seas by a line of u.s presence along the first island chain and contained by a countervailing partnership of democratic powers a quickly solidifying alliance called the quad as can be seen by the orcas announcement china's regional rivals are also taking their own not insignificant countermeasures the west still holds a technological edge over the pla which is in some areas such as subsurface warfare commanding nevertheless in other areas this technological gap is narrowing or has already been bridged as the chinese industrial base improves we can expect that edge to continue to erode unless serious countermeasures are implemented by the western powers the first half of the 21st century will surely be a story of the contest between china and the united states for global hegemony and the foundation of beijing's challenge is its new navy historically great naval arms races have led to war and the potential for conflict between the great powers has not been this higher since the fall of the soviet union indeed since the mid 1980s we cannot predict who will prevail in this global contest or what the world will look like in 2050 but there is one thing we can be sure of the unipolar moment when american power dominated the globe uncontested is now over the primacy of the united states or as a matter of fact of the liberal democratic order in general cannot be taken for granted the fundamental foundation of said primacy is u.s naval power and america's dominance of the ocean has not been under this much pressure since it was first achieved in fact given the scale of the challenge the people's republic poses the liberal democratic order may well be facing its greatest tests since the second world war to use a well trodden apocryphal cliche we are truly living in interesting times

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Published: Sun Dec 26 2021