The F-35B Option: the Future of Australian Naval Aviation?

on the 28th of november 2014 hmas canberra was commissioned into the royal australian navy at fleet base east in sydney at 230 meters in length 32 meters wide and displacing 27 000 tons at full load the two ship canberra class are the largest vessels ever operated by the ran being substantially longer wider and heavier than the majestic class aircraft carriers hmas melbourne and hma sydney although these large ships look like aircraft carriers with an island flat top runway and even a ski jump which is designed to facilitate short takeoff and vertical landing aircraft or stovall operations they actually are a different kind of ship these vessels are classified as a landing helicopter dock or lhd which are primarily designed to transport large numbers of personnel and their equipment and deploy these forces by both helicopter and landing craft although these vessels were intended from their initial selection to act as amphibious warfare assets their inherent aviation capability immediately stimulated debate over their possible use in the role of a light aircraft carrier centered on the potential acquisition of the f-35b in fact the spanish juan carlos one the design on which the canberra class is based routinely embarks av-8b harrier twos and the f-35b is under active consideration by the armata currently the adf has not made any public statements including in any defense white paper which indicates that the option of deploying the f-35b is under active consideration although this debate may be somewhat academic in nature given the lack of overt interest by the adf this has not prevented many notable elements of the australian strategic community weighing in including the australian strategic policy institute with the notable exception of some contributors to the navy league of australia the prevailing argument has been a resounding rejection of the f-35b option spearheaded by aspi and echoed by many serving adf members in outlets such as the strategist blog this negative argument rests on five basic pillars the canberra class lacks the aviation capacity to be effective carriers the inclusion of the f-35b would reduce their utility as amphibious warfare assets the air group would be too small to be of real utility australia has no need for this capability especially when it can rely on land-based fighters and its allies for air cover and finally the whole option would be far too costly arguably it is a fair statement to claim that these general points have dominated the public discussion of the f-35b option over the half-decades since canberra's commissioning the adf the think-taken academic community and indeed many informed commentators online can often be found making some version of this negative argument one that generally stymies any serious discussion on the future of naval air power in the adf but just how sound is this argument one which dominates this discussion within the australian strategic community is this conclusion the product of sound analysis based on solid reasoning and a dispassionate appreciation of not only the costs but also the benefits or is it at least potentially driven by other organizational factors such as inter-service rivalry fifedom syndrome or doctrinal conservatism to the contrary of what may seem apparent the purpose of this video is not to argue the case for the f-35b option certainly there may be very sound reasons for not walking down that path the objective here is simply to examine the arguments which have dominated our discussion of the f-35b and the canberra class so that discussion can be as informed as possible obviously accounting for the limitations of open source material given the hundreds of billions of dollars the australian people will be investing over the next decade in the nation's defence they deserve to be as informed as possible and arguably in this instance the australian strategic community has not served them well lastly in the interest of clarity we need to define what the f-35b option actually is arguably the simplest and cheapest path to australian naval aviation would not be to reconstitute the fleet air arm but to follow a model established by the united states marine corps and raf joint force harrier concept and keep the f-35bs in the raf let's imagine the following potential force structure about the year 2030 number one squadron rwaf replaces its 24 super hornets with 24 f-35bs around the same time hmas canberra and hmas adelaide undergo a mid-life upgrade program to allow for f-35b operations we could also consider the option of replacing the 16 000 tonne landing platform amphibious hmas tools which is due for decommissioning around 2030 with a third lhd although this last option is not essential to the concept it would provide substantial benefits in terms of both sustainment and flexibility under this model number one squadron would only deploy f-35b elements to these ships if required but would normally operate from the raf's land bases or forward operating bases this is easily the most achievable and cost-effective option and it will be this concept with which the anti-f-35b argument is compared throughout the following discussion the canberra class's aviation capability much has been made of the canberra class's lack of aviation capacity by detractors of the f-35b option both in the online community and by academic commentators such as aspi to be sure hmas canberra is not a dedicated aircraft carrier these vessels are lhds which are optimized for amphibious operations and would require modification to allow for f-35b deployment however the canberra class have a substantial amount of latent potential when it comes to stubble operations although not identical to the spanish juan colos 1 the design upon which they are based the canberra class are very similar in size displacement internal dimensions and capability the spanish armada routinely deploy av-8b harrier ii stable aircraft on the yuan colos-1 and in 2021 are currently planning to integrate the f-35b this is some indication of the canberra's latent potential as a stable carrier hmas canberra displaces 27 000 tons at full load which is some 35 percent larger than hmas melbourne and 22 larger than hms invincible both of which were dedicated aircraft carriers her flight deck and internal hanger space are equally as impressive the total flight deck is 202 meters long has a total area of 4750 meters squared and has a 13 degree ski jump designed to facilitate stubble operations under the flight deck is the dedicated hangar space which is 990 meters squared and is over five meters high this space is large enough for eight helicopters forward of the hangar is the light vehicle deck which provides an additional 1880 meters squared of potential hanger area all of which is simply one large open space providing a total area of 2870 meters squared as a point of comparison the 280 meter long 65 000 ton queen elizabeth class super carrier which is designed to support an air group of up to 36 f-35bs has a total hangar space of 5192 metres squared giving hmas canberra 55 of the internal aviation facilities including deck parking space this makes the camera class more than capable of deploying an air group composed of 12 f-35bs and 4-6 helicopters however it takes more than hanger space and a flight deck to successfully operate stable fighters indeed much has been made of the canberra class's lack of fuel munitions and supporting infrastructure to support stubble operations and unhelpfully there is a lack of information in the public domain regarding these internal features the armada however is much more willing to describe the juan colos-1's internals the spanish lhd has fuel bunkers with a capacity of 800 tons of aviation fuel again as a point of comparison hms queen elizabeth has a capacity of around 3 million liters or 2 400 tons considering hms queen elizabeth is almost three times the displacement and can deploy an air group three times the size her aviation fuel bunkers are three times the size as well thus if we posit a maximum air group of 12 f-35bs for canberra and 36 f-35bs for queen elizabeth the embarked fuel per aircraft is identical so how long could 800 tons of aviation fuel sustain f-35b operations the f-35b has an internal fuel capacity of just over six tons if we assumed every f-35 launched with full fuel tanks and returned with them completely empty that is enough fuel for 120 sorties obviously in real operations each aircraft would not have to land with completely empty fuel tanks which would extend the sortie count at a sustained operational tempo of 20 saudis per day allowing for two saudis per aircraft with two undergoing more substantial maintenance that is enough fuel to sustain combat operations for six days seven if we take bring back fuel into account a much higher operational tempo could be achieved if the camera was close to the area of combat as every sortie would not require a full fuel load making every aircraft effectively worth more in terms of combat effects this is the meaning of the term proximity equals capability we also have to remember that canberra can be refueled at sea and just one of the ran supply class replenishment oilers can deliver a further 1160 tons of aviation fuel therefore a deployed ran task force would have enough fuel to sustain reasonably high-intensity f-35b operations at the level of a squadron for at least two weeks the entire ground element of the falklands war was conducted in three weeks clearly the canberra class have enough fuel to sustain effective stubble operations but what about the other existing infrastructure weapons need to be stored in specialized magazines in order to allow for safe operations information on magazine space is also hard to find on the canberra class but again the spanish are less restricted with basic statistics the juan carlos one has dedicated ammunition magazine spaces equaling 520 metres squared an equivalent space to a room which is 50 meters long and 10 meters wide assuming these areas are around 3 meters high which would be typical that gives a total magazine space of 1 560 cubic meters a small diameter bomb takes up about .06 of a meter cubed an am9x is even smaller at .05 and an am120 just 0.14 although values for both missiles are without fins attached larger weapons such as the joint air-to-surface standoff missile will consume around one cubic meter per weapon even taking into account the containers in which these munitions are stored hmas canberra can deploy thousands of weapons in her magazines this truly is a very impressive magazine space which is unsurprising considering the canberra class is designed to support the high intensity combat operations of a whole battle group for weeks so what about other systems such as aircraft elevators the weapons handling system and fuel delivery system again we must rely on the spanish for information the juan carlos one has two aircraft elevators one forward and one at the rear of the vessel both elevators are rated at 27 tons and can accommodate the f-35b if the nose pokes out of the rear elevator the flight deck is serviced by a dedicated ammunition hoist which is rated at two tons and has direct access to the magazine's spaces fuel lines are equipped on the flight deck in order to service aircraft and although these may need to be upgraded to higher capacity systems extensive aircraft refueling infrastructure is already in place much of the analysis done here relies on published information on the yuan colors one rather than the canberra class as the armada is less conservative with the release of basic information regarding its lhd as has been illuminated here the yuan colors 1 has substantial potential as a stubble carrier so the question immediately arises as to how different the two classes actually are clearly there are some differences but do these include large-scale internal design features such as fuel bunkers magazines elevators and internal spaces without access to the exact specifications of the camera class including details of its internal layout it is impossible to be sure nonetheless even with the uncertainty imposed by relying on open source material there is good reason to believe that at least in terms of fuel bunkers and magazines the internal differences between the two classes are minor although there are some reports of an altered design within the superstructure others including the spanish website warships apparently citing the manufacturer in nevada claim that the primary differences between the two classes are the sensors and combat system indeed during the design phase large elements of the camera class which were completely superfluous to a primary amphibious mission such as the ski jump were maintained simply to avoid a costly redesign substantially altering the ship's fuel bunkers magazines ammunition handling system and elevators would require just such a redesign process as dramatically changing these features would have a substantial impact on the vessel's buoyancy and stability therefore it is safe to assume that in terms of these fundamental elements required for stubble operations as outlined here the two classes are very similar thus the camera class have the size bunkerage magazines and hanger space to deploy operate and maintain a squadron of f-35bs at sea for an extended period especially considering the f-35b is designed to be maintained in austere forward operating bases certainly we should maintain that assumption until open source information confirms otherwise would the f-35b option diminish the current amphibious capability of the camera class the argument that deploying the f-35b would diminish the canberra class's amphibious capability is perhaps the most widely circulated amongst the australian strategic community and if taken at face value it makes some sense after all the lhds which both deploy large numbers of f-35bs and amphibious forces such as the american wasp class are far larger than the canberra class displacing some 40 000 tonnes adding f-35bs their supporting personnel weapons and fuel requirements would certainly displace the tanks infantry helicopters and armored fighting vehicles which constitute the amphibious force therefore the argument goes adding the expensive f-35b would only reduce canberra and adelaide's ability to fulfill their primary role providing an amphibious force for deployment within the region however even a cursory examination reveals this argument's substantial flaws there are two very obvious problems with this line of reasoning the first is the simple fact that both canberra and adelaide currently spend a large amount of their time fulfilling other roles than full-blown amphibious warfare in fact the canberra class vessels can far more routinely be found acting as task force flagships and helicopter carriers beginning in 2017 the adf began deploying task groups throughout southeast asia designed to both demonstrate the adf's advanced naval capability and build partnerships throughout the region during these operations called indo-pacific endeavour along with several other warships either canberra or adelaide acted as the task force's flagship these deployments are typically several months long during which time they are certainly unavailable for large-scale amphibious warfare as an example during pacific endeavour 2018 only one platoon from two rar was deployed along with a comparable number of marines hardly a whole amphibious ready group during these operations the cameras are fulfilling the very same role as hmas melbourne did 30 years ago a flagship and an impressive symbol of australia's military capability the canberra class also uses anti-submarine warfare assets deploying a substantial number of 816 squadron mr60 romeo seahawk helicopters as demonstrated in exercises off the east coast of australia in june 2020 humanitarian assistance is also another role routinely undertaken by the canberra class including the deployment of hmas adelaide to fiji after the devastating impact of tropical cyclone yasser as is clearly evidenced by the way the adf actually uses hmas cambrian and hmas adelaide these vessels are simply much more than amphibious warfare assets they are task force flagships helicopter carriers anti-submarine warfare assets humanitarian relief vessels all in addition to their role as amphibious warfare ships they are multi-role vessels and as is the case with all multi-role assets they can be configured for the task which is demanded of them adding the role of light carrier to that list would no more reduce their amphibious capability than using them to respond to natural disasters if what you need is a carrier configure them as a carrier and embark the f-35s however if that need changes and for example governance breaks down in east timor again then simply embark the amphibious ready group instead apart from the reasonably minor internal changes adding the capability to operate the f-35b would not dilute the camera class's amphibious role but it would give both canberra and the adf a much wider range of options to respond to a spectrum of very different possible scenarios this is exactly how spain uses the yuan colors one the second major flaw in this general argument is the implicit assumption that when the adf deploys its amphibious forces all of its amphibious ships are not only required but their whole capacity is consumed by army equipment and personnel but this is simply not the case the adf has three different sized amphibious forces the first is the amphibious ready element this formation is composed of one combat team from the ground combat element essentially a combined arms formation of company strength including cavalry mortars and motorized infantry a pre-landing force from two rar which is a company strength formation and a troop of mrh-90 taipan multi-role helicopters this formation is equivalent to an under-strength battalion and requires one amphibious ship the next amphibious force is the amphibious ready unit the aru is composed of a battle group headquarters a pre-landing force from two rar two combat teams from the ground combat element a tiger attack helicopter troop a chinook troop and an mrh troop this formation is equivalent to a battalion battle group and requires two amphibious ships only the largest formation the amphibious ready group which is equivalent to an under strength brigade requires all three of the ren's amphibious vessels hmas canberra hmas adelaide and the bay class landing platform amphibious hmas tools this formation is composed of a battlegroup hq two pre-landing force elements from two rar four combat teams from the ground combat element a tiger a heart h squadron mrh squadron and chinook troop the lesson we can take from this amphibious force structure is that only at the very highest levels of forced deployment are all three ships utilized which certainly leaves room for the use of one lhd in other roles for example there may be situations where the air threat is substantial and only having fighters organic to the task force would permit the operation but also do not require the deployment of the full amphibious ready group in such a contingency one lhd could be configured to support fixed-wing aviation deploying a squadron of f-35bs whilst the other two vessels contain the amphibious ready unit which is still a substantial amphibious force on the order of a battle group this flexibility would be even greater if hmas tools was replaced with a third lhd obviously if what is required is the whole amphibious ready group and there is no room for f-35b deployment then there is no requirement to embark them once a rough forward operating base has been established they can deploy from the australian mainland in such an arrangement the total amphibious capacity which has been lost is zero multi-role platforms are after all multi-role and configuring them for one task does not mean they cannot be configured for another the air group would be too small to be of real utility the argument that the potential air group deployed by the camera class is too small to be of any real value again is one that has been circulated widely amongst the australian strategic community indeed this was one of aspi's main conclusions and is an argument which has been made in several other places however if we look in very general terms at the utilization of squadron size stubble deployments on warships it seems as though many naval powers would disagree with this conclusion the most obvious user of the small stubble carrier was the united kingdom with the invincible class carriers and the harrier the famous role of these pocket carriers during the falklands campaign and the legendary exploits of the sea harrier illustrate just how useful a squadron level deployment of stubble aircraft can be in high-end war fighting scenarios in fact given the air threat the royal navy faced in the falklands it is safe to say that without the deployment of her two stable carriers the operation would not have been possible because these fighters were based with the task force allowing for high sorting rates just 28 sea harriers about two squadrons were able to effectively counter an air threat well over five times their size these small carriers each of which deployed a single squadron of harriers were also utilized to great effect during the bombing of serbia in 1999 and operations during the 2003 invasion of iraq so the historical record seems to indicate that even with the harrier which is far less capable compared to its contemporary aircraft than the f-35b these squadron level stubble carriers have been very useful even against high-end air threats if we look at this generation of warships and aircraft it also appears that many nations including those in australia's region disagree with aspire's conclusion spain currently operates around a squadron of av-8b harriers from juan carlos 1 and is looking to replace those with the f-35b the italian navy has a comparable capability with the 30 000 ton cavua in addition to the soon to be replaced 13 000 ton garibaldi both of which deploy a squadron of harriers much like the spanish the italians plan to replace the harrier with the f-35b turkey is currently constructing a derivative of the yuan carlos 1 a close cousin of the canberra class and intends to procure stable fighters finally the two ship izumo-class helicopter destroyers of the japanese navy are currently being converted into stable capable warships and reportedly they will be capable of deploying an air group of around 12 f-35bs so even without delving into the specifics it seems that many nations around the world countries that are comparable naval powers to australia do think that an air group composed of a squadron of f-35bs is definitely worth investing in in fact once we delve into the specifics this general point looks even weaker the primary argument against these kinds of minor carriers is they cannot cope with the very highest levels of air threat this is a form of false dichotomy which is prevalent in this debate if your small carrier can be overmatched by the enemy if they can mass all of their maritime strike assets then it is of no use of course if the adf was to sail a task force 300 nautical miles of hainan island and begin striking chinese air bases it will quickly get overwhelmed but there are many other situations where organic air cover at the level of a squadron would not only be important but a key capability to understand why we need to look at how long range maritime strike aircraft like the h6 bomber of the plaf sink ships the primary weapon used by maritime strike aircraft is the anti-ship cruise missile most effective anti-ship missiles such as the supersonic yj-12 have a range of between 100 and 500 nautical miles this is generally the practical limit imposed by area of uncertainty limitations these weapons are typically launched from the safety of the radar horizon where the ship's defensive radar systems cannot see either the aircraft or the missiles however because ships move at up to 30 knots some platform needs to maintain a track on the target so the missiles have accurate targeting information typically this cannot be provided by satellites the most common way of providing targeting data to strike aircraft is either by a maritime patrol aircraft or a long-range unmanned aerial vehicle these aircraft will typically loiter outside the ship's defensive missile range and use its own long-range sensors to provide the required track what this means for a task group without organic fighter cover is an mpa can simply lurk outside the ship's missile defenses making the task force vulnerable to missile shots it can do nothing to prevent even if the hobart and anzac classes defensive systems can shoot down the incoming missiles their magazine capacity is not large and this alone would likely compel the task force to withdraw whether it suffered damage or not the tactic of gaining a mission kill by depleting defensive missile magazines is termed winning the salvo exchange and in these situations land-based aircraft always have the advantage so as we can see even in the area of moderate air threat out to 1 500 nautical miles from chinese bases the adf would not be able to operate its surface forces independently this remains true even in a general regional conflict where the threat would be diluted over a wide area however even with a minimal amount of sustained fighter cover this kill chain is immediately broken no longer can maritime patrol aircraft shadow the task force and without that persistent tracking information the attack aircraft have to use their own radars from a very long range and at higher altitudes this makes them far more vulnerable to long-range surface-to-air missile systems such as the sm-6 which has a range of 130 nautical miles the other major advantage of organic fighter cover is the strike aircraft can no longer stand off and launch their weapons from a safe distance the f-35b has an air-to-air combat radius of some 500 nautical miles allowing for the interception of incoming strike aircraft well beyond their practical launch range even in very small numbers the f-35 poses a deadly threat to long-range maritime strike aircraft such as the subsonic h6 equipped with the 100 plus nautical mile ranged am260 joint advanced tactical missile the f-35 will be able to break up incoming strike packages well beyond the radar horizon and therefore before they are able to launch their missiles because the h6 is so vulnerable at the very first hint of fighter activity they would have no choice but to jettison their missiles and become evasive effectively achieving a mission kill therefore even a very small number of defensive fighters perhaps as few as a four-ship flight could have a disproportionate impact countering even a multi-squadron attack but there's more to the story the f-35b is not the same as an ordinary fighter what makes the f-35 so special isn't the fact that it's a supersonic stealth stoppable fighter but its revolutionary sensor package the aircraft contains a comparable radar to previous generation a-wax aircraft a comparable electronic intelligence capability to dedicated systems such as rivet joint and has the most capable infrared system ever placed on a fighter what these capabilities mean in practical terms is you don't have to use the f-35b as a fighter you can use it as an a-wax platform by having a single f-35b orbiting at 30 000 ft even if it was unarmed the task force commander would have a much improved picture of the battle space the asq-239 barracuda electronic warfare system could detect radar emissions from hundreds of miles away and the powerful an apg-81 radar would extend the group's radar horizon by a factor of 10 providing early warning on incoming threats including cruise missiles the distributed aperture system provides 360 degrees of continuous infrared coverage and would rapidly detect the emissions of sea skimming anti-ship missiles at very long range as these weapons have extremely large signatures but in addition to all of that additional surveillance capability that single unarmed f-35b can effectively allow the hobart class destroyer's missiles to reach over the radar horizon this technique is called naval integrated fire control counter air the way this works is the f-35b uses its very powerful sensors to gain a track on targets the warship cannot see which it then transmits via data link on board the destroyer the aegis combat system calculates a firing solution and then launches the sm-6 surface-to-air missile the sm-6 is equipped with the active radar seeker from an amram and has a range of 130 nautical miles allowing the missile to reach targets well beyond the radar horizon 10 times farther for c-skimming targets therefore even having a single f-35b airborne above the task force would vastly increase the air defense capability of its defending warships such as the hobart class destroyer giving them an over-the-horizon engagement capability the synergistic benefits of even having unarmed f-35bs deployed with the task force are massive what use would this capability be to australia in practical terms after the substantial deployments east timor in 1999 an operation which showed the inadequacy of australia's amphibious forces it became clear to canberra that no other major naval power had sufficient interest in oceania to intervene in this area of instability additionally the rise of global terrorism had shown the dangers of allowing governance to fail in developing nations failed states were a risk to everyone in the region the canberra class were specifically designed to meet this requirement along with the transition of two rar into the army's dedicated amphibious warfare battalion and the development of the adf's joint amphibious warfare doctrine the primary role of the canberra class is to move an amphibious warfare force and deploy it within the region by 2019 this whole amphibious force was now certified for deployment providing the adf with a world-class amphibious warfare capability undeniably the use of fixed-wing aviation was never realistically considered during the canberra selection and acquisition process although close air support is always valuable to amphibious forces the potential threat the australian military would face in a regional failed state scenario like east timor is reasonably low the ability of the adf to deploy assets like the m1 abrams main battle tank m triple 7777 155 millimeter howitzer and forthcoming ah 64e apache attack helicopter would provide an over-match capability for the kind of militaries and non-state actors in oceania therefore in a region without any other first-tier military powers the emission of fixed-wing naval aviation in a capability which is designed to operate in a low to medium threat environment is a logical force structure however we are now entering into a very different strategic era australia's strategic concerns are no longer limited to the breakdown of law and order in oceania and the presence of islamist terrorist organizations in the region unlike the last 20 years where the international system was dominated by u.s power the coming decades will be a story of geopolitical competition between washington and beijing as is illustrated by the 2020 defense strategic update canberra's almost sole strategic focus is now on the possibility of large-scale high-intensity warfare between the great powers in the indo-pacific one of which is australia's treaty ally and primary security partner therefore the whole adf is now facing the possibility that its assets will be deployed into a kind of conflict which is much different to those characterized by failed states and non-state actors which dominated the global war on terror period but against the armed forces of an emergent superpower in the event of that kind of conflict the threat environment is likely to be far higher than any faced by the adf in decades therefore many of the assumptions of the defense of australia and global war on terror periods including fixed-wing naval aviation's lack of utility in the adf now deserve serious scrutiny australia's wider region is a vast area of maritime geography dominated by island chains and maritime choke points although clearly not the original intention behind the canberra class acquisition in a high-intensity conflict between the western alliance and china amphibious forces will be extremely valuable the ability to for example rapidly establish island bases in micronesia or the indonesian archipelago where assets such as anti-ship missiles can be deployed could be critical in both maintaining australia's communication with its allies and holding enemy naval assets at arm's length in a situation such as this where the amphibious operation is likely to be unopposed by ground forces having additional air cover would be a far more value than deploying the larger amphibious force in fact these kinds of operations could very well determine the course of such a conflict and a reasonably large and capable amphibious force forward deployed in the region could not only be a critical capability for australia but the alliance as a whole however without any deployable air cover the cruise missile threat posed by the chinese long-range maritime strike capability alone would effectively prevent the use of australia's amphibious forces over the majority of this vast area of maritime geography obviously long-range land-based missiles such as the df-21d also pose a threat but these can be counted by shipboard defenses such as the hypervelocity projectile and advanced air defense missiles this is the primary advantage of the f-35b option it would allow the adf to deploy its amphibious forces in a vastly higher air threat environment which could very well be a critical capability in the event of a high-intensity regional war this advantage is in addition to the gracely improved strike recon close air support and maritime strike capability that a squadron level deployment of f-35bs would provide can't the iwaf just use its current fighter force with tanker support one of the major objections to the f-35b option is the existence of the rwaf's tanker fleet currently the rwaf operates seven kc-30 multi-role tanker transports and an additional two units are under consideration given this reasonably extensive tanker fleet why can't the rwaf simply deploy its fighters from its own bases the short answer is it can and currently this is the primary way the adf intends to provide air cover for its amphibious forces but if land-based air cover can effectively provide air defense for naval forces then why do other naval powers such as japan who face very similar operational circumstances bother with naval aviation they have large tanker fleets too the reason so many powers are investing in naval aviation is the simple fact that relying on land-based aircraft has substantial limitations and in reality only provides a bare minimum of air cover for task force operations the primary problem with relying on land-based fighters is transit time let's imagine a hypothetical operation to establish a base in the real archipelago during the opening phases of a regional conflict with the objective of effectively closing the java c the closest rwaf base to this area is rwf curtain which is around 1 500 nautical miles away the iwaf's primary fighter is the f-35a which has enough fuel to fly about 600 nautical miles conduct an air combat mission and then return home this is called a combat radius the f-35a cruises at around 500 nautical miles an hour or knots meaning it will take about three hours to reach the target area it then requires a substantial amount of fuel to loiter over the task force so let's say we want to provide a three hour combat air patrol over the task force the flight of four f-35as would deploy rwaf curtin then refuel about halfway to the target area it would then refuel again at a tanker which was deployed as close to the task force as possible after a three-hour transit flight it conducts a three-hour combat air patrol refuels again and begins the three-hour flight home the problem here is the drastic losses in asset efficiency as we can see every time a flight of fighters spends three hours on station it spends six hours in transit this means for every four fighters above the task force 12 have to be airborne as eight are in transit at any one time one flight inbound and one outbound what compounds this problem is the amount of time a fighter has to be on the ground between sorties after every mission a large number of maintenance operations have to be conducted on the aircraft in addition to refueling and rearming currently around 40 man hours per flight hour for the f-35a although this should come down over time if we imagine 20 man hours per flight hour for a mature f-35a each aircraft will require 180 man hours of work depending on how well staffed the ground crews are and how much sleep they've had the aircraft may be operational again in eight hours or so therefore if we take this example which has obviously been simplified for clarification to maintain a 4-ship combat air patrol over the task force at 1 500 nautical miles range requires the commitment of 24 f-35as 12 in the air and 12 on the ground being ready for their next sortie although these assets are much less maintenance intensive the same logic applies to the rwas tankers having two on station would probably require at least one more committed to the operation probably too therefore simply to provide a combat air patrol over the task force would require assets from two rwaf fighter squadrons and the majority of its seven tankers all in the context of a large-scale regional conflict where the rwafs will certainly have its handful with other tasks now if we compare that to the f-35b option assuming the same maintenance requirements because there is no transit time the four fighters airborne above the task group only require an additional four fighters preparing for their next sortie indeed you may not even require a combat air patrol as the fighters are deployed with the task force you may be able to provide the same level of air defense by only having a single f-35b airborne acting as a quasi-a-wax and maintaining a flight of f-35bs on alert 5 status this status essentially means waiting to launch at any time within 5 minutes of the call to scramble although the example here has been simplified to illustrate the concept and may not be completely realistic the elimination of transit losses means a 66 reduction in the fighter assets required 75 if the alert 5 posture is used and a 100 reduction in tanker assets this difference in efficiency is another meaning of the term proximity equals capability and is one of the main reasons why so many nations still invest in naval air power even though they have large tanker fleets can't we just rely on our allies to provide air cover australia's treaty ally and primary security partner is the united states the greatest naval power on earth the united states navy currently deploys 11 dedicated aircraft carriers 10 nimitz class and one of the new ford class displacing over 100 000 tons these massive vessels are the most powerful warships ever deployed each containing a peacetime airwing composed of four strike fighter squadrons one electronic attack squadron one airborne le warning squadron and an asw helicopter squadron this collection of air power is more capable than the air forces of most nations on earth with allies capable of deploying such impressive amounts of naval power why would the adf need to provide for its own at first glance this argument seems convincing but a more detailed analysis reveals its limitations although the united states carrier capability is truly awesome these are not vessels that can be everywhere simultaneously the united states is a power which has global commitments and the deployment of its carrier strike groups reflects this global posture like any vessel not all are operational at any one time only one is based in asia currently the uss ronald reagan which is forward deployed to japan and the usn routinely deploys carrier strike groups to the mediterranean and persian gulf this global posture means that in the event of a sudden outbreak of conflict within the region it may take up to a month for the united states to reposition the bulk of its carrier formations to the theatre as a whole for example if one of the nimitz-class carriers stationed at san diego was operational fully armed and ready to depart literally ideal circumstances it would still take about two weeks to reach the east coast of australia the forces deployed in the atlantic or europe would take even longer therefore in the critical opening phases of a general regional conflict a period which could be up to a month the united states is unlikely to be able to provide naval air cover for atf formations we also need to remember that as powerful as the united states is it is not omnipotent the usn may only be able to deploy five or six carrier strike groups to the whole of asia given its other commitments and there simply may not be enough resources to cover adf operations in such a large-scale conflict even if there is there may be other more useful missions for the united states carrier forces if the adf can provide its own fighter defense at the level of a squadron this will substantially reduce the burden australia places on its allies in addition to increasing the possibility of using the ran surface forces over a much larger area of the region this is especially important in the early phases of a conflict where seizing bases and dominating maritime choke points may be critical again the japanese have a u.s carrier strike group based in japan and they are still investing in the f-35b and their own carrier capability the whole thing will just cost too much the final argument made against the f-35b option is cost that the whole idea would just be prohibitively expensive the true costs of large-scale military acquisition and upgrade programs are often hard to estimate and can even be hard to determine once completed some estimations of acquisition cost will include things like through life cost accounting for maintenance and mid-life upgrades which can confuse matters this example is even more difficult as we do not have an open source accounting of exactly what is required to refit the camera class for f-35b operations this opacity allows for detractors of the f-35b concept to hide behind the lack of information allowing for easy exaggeration without an accurate cost estimation there is no way for an informed public debate over this capability and there is also limited opportunity for external analysis nonetheless the best we can do is try and come up with an order of magnitude estimation aspi for example whose analysis and conclusions have been critiqued heavily in this video estimated 500 million dollars per ship but just how accurate is that as discussed previously the canberra class have a substantial latent aviation capability however they require some significant upgrades to allow for f-35b operations the first is a new deck coating to protect from the f-35b's exhaust heat there are several companies which have developed deck coatings which have solved this problem fermion is used by the us navy and the usn reportedly spends 27 million dollars per year on all of its east coast ships given the scale of the united states navy we could estimate this cost to be on the order of 1 to five million australian dollars for both the canberra and adelaide the second major upgrade is the integration of an instrument landing system currently the united states is upgrading its f-35 capable warships with the raytheon joint precision approach and landing system j-pals is a very small system designed to be moved and deployed on a c-130 transport aircraft it's about the size of a truck in 2019 the usn signed a contract with raytheon for 23 systems at the cost of 234 million us dollars a per unit cost of just over 10 million usd obviously installation costs would be substantially more than this however we are certainly still in the tens of millions of dollars it is unclear just how much modification would be required to the fuel and ammunition handling systems but they are certainly already designed to support helicopter operations the royal navy uses the highly mechanized weapon handling system which is a fully automated ammunition delivery system that automatically delivers palletized munitions directly from the magazines to the loading areas the system cost the uk government 17 million pounds per unit in 2008 about 38 million australian dollars in 2021 this system is cutting-edge technology and may not even be required in the canberra class but it is an example of the cost of an ammunition handling system additionally the fuel lines may need to be upgraded within the camera class but again the cost for this is likely to be at maximum in the tens of millions the obvious unknown here is the cost of installing these various systems but this is unlikely to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars unless there needs to be substantial work upgrading the ammunition lifts in the ship which is unlikely given how similar the camera is to the yuan colors one this is actually a reasonably minor refit as a point of comparison as part of the anti-ship missile defense upgrade program the ran's eight anzac class frigates received a totally redesigned superstructure with 4 000 metres squared of new steel sheet a brand new primary air warfare sensor system with two new aesa radars and an x-band illuminator and an upgraded combat system each ship required 600 000 man hours of work to go through the program unless there is a major element which is missing in this analysis perhaps something that is classified the kind of refit being proposed for the canberra class is much less than the asmd program therefore it is very hard to see where aspi's informal estimation of 500 million dollars per vessel actually comes from given the analysis conducted here the costs seem to be more in the range of 50 to 100 million dollars an order of magnitude less the other major cost is the f-35b itself in the fourth structure proposed here number one squadron super hornets would be replaced with f-35bs instead of the current plan which is to replace them with f-35as therefore the only additional acquisition cost indeed the only major additional cost in general is the difference between the versions current contracted prices for the f-35a are 78 million us dollars for lot 14 jets in the same lot the usmc will pay 101 million us dollars for each f-35b a difference of 23 million usd therefore the total acquisition cost would be 552 million us dollars about 700 million aud operating and manning costs between the f-35 variants are very similar so the additional acquisition cost really is the only major difference therefore given the analysis conducted here the total cost to convert the canberra class and add the f-35b to the rwaf's order of battle would be around 1 billion australian dollars that sounds like quite a bit of money until one realises that the current annual adf budget is 42.7 billion which will grow to over 70 billion per year by 2030. indeed defense intends to spend 8 billion on a developmental hypersonic weapon over the next 10 years alone a very speculative and high risk program even if the estimate here is off by a factor of four and the total cost is more like four billion dollars the f-35b option would clearly be within australia's means if the adf decided to acquire the capability conclusion although this video may seem like a glowing endorsement of the f-35b option that was not actually its intent there are indeed some very major downsides to acquiring the f-35b outside of expeditionary warfare either using the canberra class as a light carrier or operating from a rough forward operating base the f-35b is simply an inferior f-35a when operating from the rwaf spaces in a more typical fashion the adf would be paying a 25 premium for an aircraft that has less range less internal payload and a lower g limit should the rwaf essentially be weakened in its primary role in order to improve the adf's expeditionary warfare capability this is certainly something which needs to be considered however as the analysis conducted in this video has hopefully shown the current public debate over the f-35b option is polluted with disinformation surprisingly much of this very poor reasoning which sometimes verges on dishonesty emanates from some of australia's most respected academics and think tanks even adf personnel indeed the very subject of naval aviation often generates a strangely strong response from those who oppose the idea one which is simply a military capability like any other historically other militaries have been plagued by organizational factors which can inhibit rational decision making obviously one cannot assume that these organizational issues are distorting the argument here however we cannot rule out the possibility organizational resistance to change can be driven by forces such as inter-service rivalry and doctrinal conservatism historically many militaries have suffered from organizational dysfunction such as inter-service rivalry and although the adf has expended much effort to become a joint and integrated force we cannot rule out these kinds of internal pressures for example the army has expended a vast amount of effort over the last decade to become a fully competent amphibious force even substantially altering the order of battle and taking on an amphibious identity given that context are key members of the hierarchy likely to support the idea that the vessels they need to fulfill their amphibious mission may be filled with raf assets and used as a carrier or perhaps is the army's leadership more likely to be hostile to such an idea unlike organizations like the usmc the raf has never had a maritime identity is its leadership going to be supportive of one of the four fighter squadrons becoming navalised and spending a good deal of its time operating from the canberra class or perhaps is the r-double-af simply going to see this as an unwelcome distraction from what it believes to be its core mission conducting an air battle to australia's north in fact the rwaf has never considered the f-35b as a realistic option in this situation each of the services may be looking to pursue their own priorities rather than viewing the adf's capability as a whole although there is no evidence that that is what is taking place here these kinds of organizational pressures can often distort decision-making and have historically been evident in other militaries another factor which can prevent a military from readily adapting is doctrinal conservatism this kind of conservatism manifests when individuals in dominant positions within the military hierarchy are unwilling to adapt because of their prior beliefs about the nature of warfare this was infamously the case with the persistence of u.s tank destroyer doctrine during world war ii often these prejudices can permeate throughout the wider strategic community again that is not to say that these processes are at work within the australian military but they are pitfalls of which we must be aware the f-35b remains a tantalising option for the adf to many australians the prestige of reforming an australian carrier capability will always stimulate interest in this form of military platform in fact it may be the desire to avoid having an ornamental carrier one that is of little practical military use which drives some of the prejudice against the idea nonetheless there are sound strategic and operational grounds for seriously considering the acquisition of the f-35b australia's strategic landscape is not what it was in 2004 when the decision to acquire the canberra class was made and the strategic assumptions which may very well dominate australia's conception of its amphibious capability including the role of its amphibious warships demand re-examination if the f-35b really would improve australia's strategic position and its ability to wage high-intensity warfare in a maritime environment then surely it demands cool rational and most importantly fair consideration you

Channel: hypohystericalhistory

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Length: 54min 39sec (3279 seconds)

Published: Sun Apr 18 2021