Up-Gunning the Arafura Class OPV

the arafura class offshore patrol vessel or opb is the royal australian navy's most modern class of minor vessel based on the pb80 design developed by the german shipbuilder lersen which is currently operational with the royal brunei navy as the jerusalem class hmas arafura is some 80 metres long 13 meters wide and displaces around 1650 tons at typical load the arafura class has a top speed of 20 knots a range of over 4 000 nautical miles and can accommodate up to 60 personnel although her typical crew is 40. the vessel contains a large helicopter capable flight deck and although there are no permanent hanging facilities refueling equipment can be installed this flight deck can support the operation of medium-sized unmanned aerial vehicles in addition to a number of 20-foot shipping containers as envisaged the arafura class will have four primary roles maritime border patrol maritime constabulary fisheries patrol and humanitarian and disaster relief reflecting this intended mission set the arafura class are only armed with a 25 millimeter typhoon auto cannon and a pair of 50 caliber heavy machine guns at least in their initial incarnation three deployable fast boats can be supported with a pair of 8.5 meter rhibs deployed by crane and provision for a 10 meter boat at the stern procured under project c1180 phase 1 the 12-ship arafura class opv is designed to replace the much smaller armadale and cape class patrol vessels currently under construction at adelaide's osborne shipyard once the first two units are launched the remainder will be assembled in the henderson facility in western australia the arafura is a much more capable platform in comparison to the vessels it will replace the armadale class patrol boats in comparison displace just 300 tons the largest size and greatest displacement not only means the arafura will be able to stay at sea for much longer periods but also operate in much more dangerous sea states something of a substantial value to australia considering the importance of its southern ocean possessions the sheer size of australia's exclusive economic zone by area the third largest in the world makes endurance and range critical capabilities for any patrol vessel and the improvement in these areas will enable the aerofura to achieve a significantly greater level of efficiency allowing the fleet to be in more places more of the time an important element of this increased endurance is the improved space and amenities for the crew enabling longer deployments generally the containerized aviation facilities are another substantial improvement unlike the armadale the arafura has the ability to generate its own over the horizon isr footprint through the use of medium-sized unmanned aerial vehicles greatly increasing the area which a single vessel can effectively patrol all told the arafura class is an excellent offshore patrol vessel one which will excel in the primary roles for which it has been procured nonetheless ever since the announcement of the opv program in the 2009 defence white paper questions have been raised as to the arafura's potential capability in a high-end war fighting scenario these calls have only become louder over the last few years including analysis conducted by aspi in addition to numerous editorials in the australian and financial review openly questioning why the war fighting capability of the arafura is being at least seemingly not only ignored by defense but deliberately designed out of the platform for example the 40 millimeter main gun has been deleted from the design although this may be replaced by another system at a later date and the helicopter refueling system which was integral to the initial pv80 and jerusalem jerusalem-class vessels has been removed it seems as though there is a tendency within the adf and department of defense to deliberately remove capabilities off a platform in order to avoid mission creep in this case currently the ran does not intend to utilize helicopters with the opv so any ability to support them is removed which in turn neuters any argument that the vessels may be useful in another role that envisages helicopter operations a similar process can be seen in the development of the canberra class lhd and its ability to support fixed wing aviation if this is the case then this is a deeply short-sighted manner in which to approach naval procurement mission creep is not inherently negative in fact through time and operation new roles and uses for platforms can be developed enhancing your aggregate capability indeed it seems rather hubristic to assume that defence planners in 2022 have a perfect understanding of the situation the nation will face in 2032 and therefore are inherently wise to remove capabilities from platforms that could in theory allow them to perform other roles than originally intended and even if mission creep has historically been a problem calcifying your platform's design by removing flexibility is not a wise way to negate it it is these intended missions and defenses focus upon them that explain why the arafura is so lightly arms unlike the minor vessels of most asian navies the arafura is very unlikely to engage a hostile naval vessel of similar size the chinese type 56 zhang dao corvette as an example is practically the same size as arafura however it deploys a 76 millimeter main gun two 30 millimeter auto cannons four yj83 anti-ship cruise missiles an 8 cell hq10 point defense surface-to-air missile system and two triple torpedo tubes these weapons are supported by a number of sensor systems including the type 360 two-dimensional air search radar type 347d fire control radar a bower sonar and the type 56a of variable depth sonar considering the zhang dao is actually a hair smaller than the arafura at least in terms of displacement it is practically a frigate when one considers the number of weapons and sensor systems it deploys this level of armament is similar in other regional navies the jerusalem class upon which the arafura is base deploys a 57 millimeter main gun and four exocet canister-launched anti-ship missiles the vietnamese deploy six classes of missile armed vessels that displace less than two thousand tons the primary reason why patrol vessels are so heavily armed in southeast asia is the sheer volume of disputed territory in the south china sea almost every nation in that area of maritime geography has a claim to offshore reefs that are disputed by other regional powers predominantly china it is the small patrol vessels that effectively assert a nation's sovereignty over these areas of ocean and with different regional powers all trying to do the same thing the threat of conflict between these minor vessels is a very real one even when operating below the level of open conflict it is important that a minor vessel not be completely outgunned by its adversaries in any standoff as maintaining a credible ability to react with lethal force is a key component of maintaining deterrence this is simply not the case for the royal australian navy not only does australia enjoy very friendly relations with all of its immediate neighbours it has no disputed maritime borders the chance of an arafura class getting into a standoff with a hostile nations minor patrol vessel is practically zero and considering the primary tasks will be such things as intercepting vessels containing illegal migrants and fishing australia's waters the lack of armament certainly makes some sense nonetheless although defense does not intend to use these vessels for anything other than eez and border protection there remain other roles that the arafura class could fulfill which include high intensity warfare in fact if embedded within a wider network and utilized within a specific concept of operations the arafura class could substantially contribute to a number of high-end warfighting scenarios there are two major areas where the arafura could if armed and equipped correctly significantly contribute to the adf's high-end warfighting capability the first is in a defensive naval campaign for the first time since 1945 australia now faces the prospect of great power naval battle in its immediate region but more concern is the fact that the alliance network in which australia is embedded is now in an openly antagonistic relationship with an emergent great naval power china the rise of communist china and especially the rapidly expanding people's liberation army navy poses the greatest strategic challenge the nation has faced since the existence of imperial japan much like world war ii in the event of general conflict in the indo-pacific the primary threat australia faces is the operation of hostile aircraft carrier forces to its north australia's geography alone poses a substantial strategic threat to china in any large-scale conflict the adf's northern basing infrastructure is well placed to stage u.s air power allowing the allies to potentially dominate vital areas of geography such as the malacca strait and south china sea therefore targeting the military facilities across australia's north will certainly be a key objective for the chinese in the event of any large-scale conflict there are three realistic methods by which the pla can effectively strike australia's northern bases the first is ballistic missiles australia's geography however provides a great deal of protection from this form of weapon although the pla has a large conventional ballistic missile arsenal the vast majority of these systems such as the df-21 and df-16 are short to medium range missiles the only tactical ballistic missile that can engage some parts of australia essentially just the very north of the northern territory is the dongfeng 26 which has an operational range of 5000 kilometers although the number of intermediate-range missiles is increasing so is the sophistication and capability of u.s ballistic missile defense systems the deployment of a thaad battery to northern australia as an example would go quite a long way to mitigating the ballistic missile threat such a system could be air deployed to australian bases within a matter of days the second major threat to australia's northern basing infrastructure is chinese strategic air power the pla af has a large number of h6 strategic bombers essentially a licensed copy of the 1950s era tu-16 badger although the original design is as old as the b-52 it has been kept relevant by improvements in avionics and standoff weapons seen in the most modern variant the h6n equipped with the 1 500 kilometer range cj10 missile the chinese equivalent of the tomahawk the h6 does pose a threat to northern australia the major problem facing the h6 is how vulnerable it is to fighter defenses even a single flight of f-35as which could easily be forward deployed to stations well beyond the cj-10s launch envelope could pose a dire threat to an entire regiment of h6s because of the f-35a's very low signature in terms of both its radar cross-section and infrared emissions any escorting fighters will struggle to prevent long-range interception newer missiles are increasing the h6's capability but this is being counted by the development of longer-range air-to-air weapons although the pla's ballistic and long-range cruise missile capability is certainly some threat to australia's northern bases it pales in comparison to that posed by the plan's growing carrier capability there is an old saying in warfare proximity equals capability and this is one of the greatest advantages aircraft carriers provide in comparison to ballistic missiles as an example which can only be used once an aircraft carrier can deliver a colossal amount of firepower over a sustained period in terms of tons of high explosive delivered on target there is really nothing that compares to these vessels apart from a land air base this persistence is critical if you intend to overwhelm an enemy's ability to repair their infrastructure allowing for multiple attack waves using large strike packages an aircraft carrier task force stationed 300 nautical miles off the coast of darwin could over a week for example subject rwaf darwin and rwaf tyndall to such a sustained level of bombardment that these key australian bases could be crippled for months currently the plan's carrier capability is embryonic two units are operational shandong and lyon which are both derivatives of the soviet kuznetsov class design although reasonably large vessels displacing some 55 000 tons and equipped with a reasonably large air group their capability is somewhat limited the shandong for example can deploy an air group containing two squadrons of j15s essentially a reverse engineered su-33 about 32 in total both of these carriers use a stow bar arrangement which entails the fighter using a ski jump in combination with an angled flight deck this does reduce the total payload a j15 can deploy with although by using the long run up these aircraft can take off with just over 6 tonnes but this is dependent upon a strong headwind and limits the carrier's salty generation rate these two koznetsov based vessels are being supplemented by a pair of super carriers in the 100 000 ton range the type 3 and type 4. the latter of which will be nuclear powered these super carriers will be generally comparable to the us nimitz class unlike the stow bar designs these vessels will use an electromagnetic catapult allowing for the deployment of fixed wing airborne early warning and control and tanker aircraft two of these platforms should be operational by the mid-2030s each one of these vessels will be able to deploy a comparable amount of firepower to the frontline fighter strength of the raf with four squadrons of strike fighters both the fourth generation j-15 and the fifth generation j-31 unlike long-range bomber formations strike packages generated from the type 3 carrier will have integrated fighter escort suppression of enemy air defense and airborne early warning elements complete with its supporting battle group composed of type 52d and c-class destroyers and the type 55-class cruiser a type 3 carrier strike group poses a colossal risk to australia's northern basing infrastructure the bedrock of the nation's defenses additionally the operation of chinese amphibious forces in the indonesian or bismarck archipelagos with the objective of establishing forward operating bases around australia's periphery poses an equally significant threat obviously australia is not alone and a bilateral conflict just between the two nations is quite literally unthinkable but the united states carrier forces are dispersed around the globe it may well take weeks for substantial allied naval assets to arrive in any case during a general regional conflict with china u.s assets will be badly needed all along the first island chain so australia should not expect a disproportionate level of aid in short the adf must prepare for a large-scale high-intensity defensive naval campaign in its primary area of operations conducted with only a minimum amount of allied aid but what can australia do to parry such a threat considering it has no carriers of its own to meet the type 3 head on well one method which offers australia a real chance of meeting this challenge is a concept of operations called anti-access area denial ironically enough pioneered by the pla at least in its modern incarnation this concept relies upon the combination of long-range strike systems such as anti-ship cruise missiles and pervasive wide area surveillance systems the main idea is to have a very large sensor footprint that can rapidly detect track and classify ships over a massive area potentially whole ocean basins then saturate the enemy formations with long-range strike systems which can be launched from a range that is well beyond the battle group's defenses this has been a core element in china's wider maritime strategy and it allows you to rely on missiles rather than ships to successfully engage aircraft carrier strike groups and other powerful task forces the adf has invested heavily in anti-access area denial capabilities the first link in this kill chain is john over 40 years in the making jon is the world's most advanced over the horizon radar network and provides the adf with a massive sensor footprint its range is over 3500 kilometers from the three transmission stations by bouncing low frequency radio waves off the ionosphere john provides both a wide area surveillance and potentially target acquisition capability over a vast area of maritime geography nonetheless john still faces calibration and discrimination challenges inherent problems with over the horizon systems because of the uncertain propagation path through the atmosphere it is often hard to know with certainty the exact area on the earth's surface that the radar is observing another issue is phantom contacts because a single radar beam can take multiple paths to and from the target a single contact can often present as a group of ships therefore john has to be supplemented with other surveillance systems powerful synergies exist between over the horizon radars and space-based surveillance systems if an imaging satellite can take a picture of the target formation while it is being observed by the radar this information can be used to calibrate the system greatly increasing drawn's accuracy a satellite pass would also provide classification of the target a key link in the kill chain the australian government does not publicly possess an imaging satellite capability however as has been indicated in several defence white papers the australian government does seem to have access to allied imaging satellites which is probably the american keyhole constellation finally the adf has several long-range surveillance aircraft which can supplement a jawn track such as the mq4c triton high altitude long endurance unmanned aerial vehicle and the p8 poseidon the mq4c is a game-changing capability for the adf for maritime development of the rq4 global hawk the triton can stay aloft for over 30 hours and an altitude of 50 000 feet it has a total range of over 8 000 nautical miles what makes the triton so capable over and above its endurance are its sensors its primary isr system is the an zpy3 multifunction active sensor an aesa radar with a 360 degree field of view the zpy3 can provide synthetic aperture radar images over a vast area some 7 million square kilometers in a 24 hour period the system is capable of taking synthetic radar images of vessels classifying them in all weather conditions the triton is also equipped with the raytheon mtsb multi-spectral electro-optical infrared sensor which is the same system used in the mq-9 reaper the most critical capability the triton provides in this hypothetical defensive naval battle is its electronic intelligence suite essentially the same system as utilized in the ep3 electronic surveillance aircraft the triton's esm systems can be used to passively detect classify and geolocate hostile electronic emissions including radar signals because of how sensitive the triton systems are they can detect classify and triangulate the position of a hostile radar from a range that is far beyond its detection radius this is obviously quite important when trying to engage a carrier battle group that can deploy dozens of fighters in combination jawn imaging satellites and triton will allow the adf to locate classify and track hostile naval task forces including carrier strike groups at a range well in excess of a thousand nautical miles from australia's shores including potentially the southern south china sea this information constitutes a firing solution on the formation the next step in the a2ad kill chain is the use of long-range strike systems to engage the formation before it poses a serious threat to australian infrastructure of course accounting for long-range cruise missiles in the adf the maritime strike weapon of choice is the imaginatively named long-range anti-ship missile or lrasm the lrasm is one of the most lethal anti-shipping systems currently operational anywhere in the world at development of the j-a-s-s-m-e-r the weapon retains its stealthy body power plant and warhead simply adding a new seeker to allow for counter-maritime operations unlike the supersonic russian and chinese systems which rely on speed to reduce the effectiveness of shipboard defenses the lrasm utilizes stealth its low rcs airframe is combined with its passive sensors the weapon emits very little electromagnetic radiation apart from its lpi data link the lrasm uses a combination of passive electronic and imaging infrared sensors to find its target revolutionarily for an anti-ship weapon the lrasm has advanced targeting software even if all communication has been lost the missile can generate an electromagnetic picture of the battle space plotting any hostile or friendly transmissions the weapon is smart enough to then devise its own attack profile determining the appropriate route to the formation and selecting high value targets such as aircraft carriers if numerous weapons are operating together they form a network sharing targeting data it then drops to wave top level and relies on its imaging infrared seeker for terminal guidance as the weapon emits nothing and has a low rcs airframe it will be detected late compressing the amount of time the ship's defenses have to react because of the addition of the seeker the lrasm has a slightly lower range in the j-a-s-e-m-e-r probably around 400 nautical miles longer rage variants are very likely to be developed the lrasm contains the original 1 000 pound broach warhead which is probably unnecessary for an anti-ship missile reducing that to a perfectly adequate 500 pounds would provide substantially more room for greater internal fuel volume launching from a surface platform may also decrease the total range depending on the rocket booster australia has already purchased 200 weapons for use with the super hornet fleet and lockheed martin and thales australia pronounced tales if you are a frenchman are jointly developing the surface-launched variant which will be able to be deployed by warships and potentially ground vehicles as well the key advantage the lrasm provides over other contemporary anti-ship systems is its range the weapon allows the launch platform to stand off well beyond the ship's missile defenses so this all sounds great but where does the arafura class come in well what the adf has constructed with this greater complex this system of systems is a battle network the term battle network means much more than computerized data links a battle network is any arrangement of military systems where the sensor and weapon are separated by a significant distance an artillery observer and their parent battery are a battle network what this means is the arafura class can in theory at least play its part in the wider a2ad complex the name of the game when engaging a hostile naval formation with anti-ship cruise missiles is saturation despite the lrasm's lethality warships have formidable layered defensive systems the type 52d as an example deploys the hhq-9 long-range surface-to-air missile essentially a navalised s-300 pmu the hq-10 point defense missile and a 30 millimeter close-in weapon system these defenses are compounded when the task force has four or five such warships in order to penetrate these defenses you have to fire enough missiles at the targeted vessel that they simply cannot shoot them all down in time the lrism stealth only decreases the number of missiles required to achieve saturation it does not eliminate this requirement it is in this area that the arafura class can play a meaningful role in this defensive naval battle one of the main ways the pla has made its a2ad complex so formidable is simply by the number of launch platforms it can deploy even its yangdao corvettes have a capable anti-ship missile the jerusalem class the design upon which the arafura was based currently fields the exit set anti-ship missile in four canisters just behind the bridge the exact is a much lighter weapon just some 780 kilograms compared to the lrasm's two tons when equipped with its solid rocket booster therefore there may be some challenges in deploying the lrasm on the aerofura class especially with an additional 8 tons of weight that high up on the ship however if the lrism can be deployed on the arafura then this offers a real opportunity to increase the volume of fire the adf can direct at a hostile naval formation let's imagine a strike on a hostile carrier battle group as it enters the maluka sea off the island of sulawesi about 1200 kilometers north of darwin a squadron of 16 super hornets departs rwaf tyndall with two lrasms apiece deploying a total of 32 weapons now what if just five of the arafura class opvs are operating in indonesian waters hiding in the littorals the long range of the missiles means the small opvs can open fire from the other side of islands like timor or sulawesi making them very difficult to detect with a coordinated strike using both lands and air launched lrasms the hostile naval formation now faces 52 incoming missiles which can time their approach to ensure simultaneous prosecution if only 10 percent make it through the defenses which is a low estimate then the carrier would have sustained five crippling blows in essence because it is part of a wider battle network the arafura class would play a valuable role simply by acting as an lrasm launch platform all it needs is a data link and the weapon itself there is another area in which an lrasm equipped arafura class could substantially aid in a defensive naval battle this is a concept called distributed lethality which is a new development in the united states navy's doctrine in essence the core idea behind the distributed lethality concept of operations is to overwhelm your enemy's isr and targeting capacity by increasing both the number of platforms that pose a substantial threat and distributing those assets over a vast geographical area basically instead of simply sailing into battle with two or three carrier strike groups small task forces where ships are concentrated in order to provide mutual support numerous vessels may operate independently as all of these warships will be equipped with long-range strike weapons such as lrasm and tomahawk and all will be provided with targeting data from a centralized fire control complex deciding what targets deserve priority engagement becomes increasingly difficult when offensive cyber and electronic warfare techniques are added to this operational picture which will increase friction uncertainty and the number of false or phantom targets the information burden will at least in theory saturate the enemy's command and control complex specifically their ability to make tactical decisions this burden may become crippling when the u.s begins striking command and control infrastructure by increasing the number of platforms from which long range strike systems can be launched the adf can achieve a similar effect a hostile carrier strike group would under this concept of operations have to contend with dozens of surface platforms that can launch lrisms in addition to the raf and potentially the future submarine vastly complicating their tactical picture especially considering the adf's electronic warfare capability thus in terms of both the additional throw weight of an lrasm strike and in the generation of a more complex enemy targeting picture equipping the arafura class with the lrasm would do much to increase the adf's overall capability in a high-end defensive naval campaign this would require the development of a canister launched variant of the lrasm which could certainly be funded by the adf alone especially considering australian defense industry is already developing the missile if the arafura class was intended to be used in this high-end warfighting role where the anti-ship cruise missile threat is substantial there is a case for arming the vessels with a point defense gun or missile capability a weapon like this c-ram a version of the rolling airframe missile which has its own dedicated radar system would be ideal allowing the vessel to engage air threats at a range of up to 10 kilometers nonetheless even a phalanx close-in weapon system would probably do these weapons could even be placed in the area which is currently reserved for the 40 millimeter gun as they would be of much more utility within this operational concept an arafura class armed in such a fashion could also be useful for task force operations operating a long way from home adding a pair of opvs to a task force would provide the same lrasm capacity as a single destroyer the other major area of naval combat where the arafura class could be of substantial value is in the role of anti-submarine warfare just like the a2ad concept in order to utilize the arafura to hunt submarines it needs to be part of a battle network these small vessels will never be able to have the weapons and sensors to prosecute hostile submarines alone but when used in combination with a hunter or hobart class destroyer they could significantly increase a task force's sensor footprint the arafura is designed to use modular containerized mission packages a mine warfare package is already under development for the class in essence if you want to change the role of the vessel you simply load the specific mission package two 20-foot containers can be accommodated on the flight deck allowing for uav or mine warfare operations there is a possibility that an anti-submarine warfare module could also be acquired ultra electronics the manufacturer of the hobart class's sonar suite has developed a small containerized towed array sonar system called the sea lancer mission module the single 20-foot container contains the towed array and its supporting computer systems the sealant can be configured as a passive or active sonar with low frequency active modes enabled by a horizonal projector array the container is a standard 20 foot size and weighs 14 tons when fully loaded all that is required to support sonar operations is a 30 kilowatt electrical power source with the sealant module installed the humble arafura class now poses a serious threat to enemy submarines when paired with a major surface combatant such as an anzac class frigate the arafura can data link its sonar to the larger warship allowing for off-board signal processing with two passive tone-array sonars in combination the task force can rapidly triangulate detected targets but its real advantage is realized in a multi-static architecture in a biostatic or multi-static sonar complex a single active source or ping is received by multiple passive sonars multi-static sonars offer significant increases in performance as the two or more receiving sonars are widely separated it is much easier to filter out background reflections greatly increasing the system's resolution additionally as the echoes are received at multiple positions they can be rapidly triangulated giving precise track data this effect is increased with multiple active systems one of the main new capabilities the hunter class frigate will provide the adf is a high power low frequency active sonar system low frequency active systems are specifically designed to detect and track very quiet submarines at long range if integrated with the hunter class a sea lancer equipped arafura class opv would allow the creation of a biostatic low frequency active sonar complex substantially increasing the capability of the hunter's sensors once a target is detected and tracked it can be engaged by the hunter's anti-submarine helicopter the dipping sonar equipped mh-60 romeo seahawk australia just in general terms has to maximize the capability of its limited assets the nation's sea lines of communication are vast and there is only a limited number of warships available for commerce protection by equipping the arafura with its own toad array sonar this will greatly increase the capability of the rans major surface combatants one could easily imagine the formation of several hunter killer groups composed of a hunter class frigate and arafura class opv operating in tandem anti-submarine warfare is a multi-platform game and coordinated prosecution by multiple vessels and aircraft is the primary way submarines are sunk by surface forces by equipping the arafuras with their own highly capable sonar systems this allows the hunter-class frigates to operate individually each teamed with an arafura meaning the vessels can be in more places at once the modularity of the sea lancer system and those like it allow the arafura to be reconfigured for border protection or mine warfare in a matter of hours meaning no capability has been lost in real terms if the arafura class opv was equipped to fulfill these high end war fighting roles it could provide the royal australian navy with essential mass all at comparatively low cost perhaps a good comparison is the rwaf's loyal wingman combat drone otherwise known as boeing's air power teaming system each loyal wingman drone is much less capable than an f-35a but when used in a networked team they greatly enhance the capability of the much more expensive platform they can also take over the more mundane roles such as defending tankers and airborne early warning and control aircraft allowing the manned fighters to tackle more critical missions in a similar way the small and cheap arafura could supplement or replace australia's high-end warships enhancing their capability and allowing them to be in more places simultaneously this is critical for the adf which technologically advanced though it is has to make a limited number of assets go a long way originally a class of 20 opvs were envisaged by the 2009 defense white paper however that has now been curtailed to 12 in addition to two dedicated mine countermeasure vessels there is spare capacity both in the budget and in australian shipyards to increase the total number of arafura class vessels to 20. the total program cost for the c1180 project is currently estimated to be 3.6 billion dollars leading to a unit cost of around 300 million in 2018 nevertheless as unit costs tend to decrease with time over a production run we should expect any additional units to cost far less perhaps down to the 100 million range an additional eight units may only increase the total program cost of c1180 by 1 billion just to put that into perspective in 2021 over a single year australia allocated 15.8 billion dollars to platform acquisition obviously the additional capabilities discussed here such as sealant and lrasm would increase the cost somewhat but this is certainly achievable given the current budgetary environment unlike the other major classes of warship that are being built in australia there is spare manufacturing capacity the first two vessels arafura and air are being constructed at adelaide's osborne shipyard but after that production is being moved to the henderson facility in western australia once the 12th vessel is delivered in 2030 the naval shipbuilding plan only requires the replacement of the cape class patrol boats and the two ship leon class survey vessels these programs can certainly be moved to bae shipyard in melbourne therefore there is certainly spare capacity at the henderson yard to allow for continuous opb production well into the 2030s finally an increased opb fleet should not be overly difficult to man with a complement of 40 the eight additional vessels would only impose a base crew requirement of 320 certainly not a deal breaker for an organization with over 15 000 active personnel the arafura class promises to be a highly capable patrol vessel and will certainly be a substantial improvement over the platform it is replacing in its intended roles it is perfectly well fitted to be a highly effective patrol vessel maintaining the integrity of australia's maritime borders and its fisheries nevertheless as has been shown here the vessel has significant potential to be much more than a glorified patrol boat it could be a serious warship one that could substantially increase australia's ability to fight a high-end naval battle and secure our sea lines of communication the lifelines of any island nation it is probably unlikely that defence will look to utilize the opv in these other roles but if we do choose to do so the arafura could certainly be a key element in the adf's wider warfighting capability

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Length: 37min 41sec (2261 seconds)

Published: Sun Mar 06 2022