The origins of the First World War are still
the cause of lively debate amongst historians more than 100 years after the assassination
of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne in June 1914. The complex July Crisis that followed the
deaths of Franz Ferdinand and Sophie Chotek led to a generalized Great Power war that
shaped the 20th century. But this crisis can also be seen in the broader
context of the so-called “long fuse”: long term causes that made war more likely
in post-Napoleonic Europe. So let’s take a look at the outbreak of
the First World Wwar. In the decades before the First World War
broke out in 1914, industrialization led to huge increases in wealth and urbanization,
but also created stark inequalities in society. Ruling groups needed to manage the resulting
tensions, so encouraging nationalism and pride in imperial expansion helped to channel the
anger and energy of the popular classes elsewhere – but this caused problems abroad. Britain, France, and Russia had well-established
empires by the late 1800s when a new player arrived on the scene. Germany became a unified state in 1871 and
eventually began to create its own overseas empire and bluewater navy to appease its growing
commercial class and to offset the powerful influence of social democratic parties at
home. Germany’s ambitions for its “place in
the sun” caused a spike in tensions between the Great Powers, who were already in competition
with each other. Great Power rivalries became part of popular
culture with jingoistic press, militaristic education in schools, and everything from
children’s toys to thriller novels and even movies focusing on feats of arms or dangerous
enemies. These political and social tensions caused
a growing anxiety among many Europeans, and the danger that they might lead to war was
heightened by increasing militarization. As the Great Powers expanded their empires
and worried about rivals, they also built up their military capability and political
alliances. Germany’s expansion and naval built up provoked
reactions from the other powers. The UK responded by building even more ships,
including the new Dreadnought class. Meanwhile, Austria-Hungary and Russia clashed
over influence in the Balkans, where new independent states had largely replaced the weakened Ottoman
Empire with Russian help. By 1914, a system of alliances bound most
of the Great Powers to each other for better or for worse. France and Russia had been allies since 1894,
and the Triple Alliance connected Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. Britain had maintained a policy of splendid
isolation for most of the 19th century, but its fear of German naval expansion brought
it closer to the Franco-Russian block to create the “Triple Entente.” The danger of such alliances was that a conflict
involving one or two powers was more likely to drag all of them into a European war. Germany felt surrounded by potential enemies,
so it tried to test Entente resolve during two diplomatic crises in Morocco in 1905 and
1911. The British and French held firm but there
was no war, which angered German Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke: “If we again slip away from this [Moroccan]
affair with our tail between our legs and if we cannot bring ourselves to put forward
a determined claim which we are prepared to force through with the sword, I shall despair
of the future of the German Empire. I shall then resign. But before handing in my resignation, I shall
move to abolish the Army and to place ourselves under Japanese protectorate, we shall then
be in a position to make money without interference and develop into ninnies.” (Berghahn 31) Germany’s worries about its situation in
Europe caused its government to shift priority from the navy, which had angered Britain,
back to the army, which caused France and Russia to expand their armies. To many in Berlin, it seemed that time was
on the Entente’s side and Germany’s chances would be better if war came sooner rather
than later. Historians still debate whether Germany’s
assertiveness or Franco-British refusal to share international power played a greater
role in increasing tensions. While Great Power alliances hardened across
Europe, more trouble was brewing in the Balkans. The Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia
from the Ottomans in 1908 upset Russia and angered Serbian nationalists, who wanted closer
ties with South Slav populations in Austria-Hungary. Russia then supported the independent Slav
states in the Balkans in the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, in which Serbia gained more
territory. Tensions between Austria-Hungary and Russia
rose sharply over the Serb issue, and got even worse when Austrian counterintelligence
officer Alfred Redl was exposed as a Russian spy in 1913. Long term causes of the war like imperial
competition or military alliances didn’t mean that war was inevitable. For a full-on war to break out, a crisis had
to come that would force governments to decide for war. Sarajevo On June 28, 1914 Serb nationalist
Gavrilo Princip assassinated Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie in Sarajevo. Those shots triggered the July Crisis. Following the killings, Austria-Hungary blamed
Serbia. Most historians agree today there was some
semi-official Serbian involvement in the crime, although whether Serbian Prime Minister Nikola
Pašić and the rest of his government knew about the plot is hotly debated. In any case, in 1914 there was no proof of
Serbian involvement. The assassination itself did not bring about
war directly. Austria-Hungary was disappointed that other
European governments did not condemn the killings more forcefully, a view shared by German ambassador
to Russia Friedrich von Pourtalès: “Not only in the press, but also in society,
one meets almost only with unfriendly judgments on the murdered Archduke.” (McMeekin 49/50) But the Serbian response was the one that
mattered most to Austria-Hungary. Officially, Pašić issued condolences but
also claimed the assassinations were an internal Austro-Hungarian issue. The Serbian investigation lasted only a week
and found no evidence of government involvement. Serb nationalists and newspapers were less
diplomatic. Some openly blamed the Austro-Hungarians themselves
for the killings, while others praised the assassins. When the Austro-Hungarians complained, Pašić
said he had neither the tools nor inclination to censor the free Serbian press. Back in Vienna, the Imperial Council met to
discuss their options. Chief of Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf
had argued forcefully for war for years, and he wasn’t alone. The Foreign Ministry was flooded with letters
from Austro-Hungarian notables calling for an armed response. Austrian artist Joseph von Storck wrote on
June 30: “Last year I took the liberty of writing
[…] to say that we would have to learn how to tolerate Serbian impertinences without
resorting to war. Now, the matter has acquired an entirely different
aspect.” (Clark 392) Conrad put it more bluntly: “War! War! War!” (Clark 392) The Austrian government decided on a military
response to punish Serbia and resolve the issue of Greater Serb nationalism seen to
be destabilizing the empire. The war was meant to be local, and quick. But attacking Serbia meant risking conflict
with Russia, and for Austria that was unthinkable without Germany's support. After the assassinations, the German ambassador
to Vienna had urged restraint, but on July 6 Kaiser Wilhelm made Germany’s position
clear by giving Austria the so-called “blank cheque.” Austrian ambassador Count Laszlo SzÖgyeny-MarIch
reported the German promise to Vienna: “The Kaiser authorized me to inform our
Gracious Majesty that we might […] rely upon Germany’s full support […] If we
had really recognized the necessity of warlike action against Serbia, Kaiser Wilhelm would
regret if we did not make use of the present moment, which is all in our favor.” (Mombauer 14) Wilhelm went on to say that he felt Russia
was not ready for war, and if Austria attacked Serbia, it should do so as quickly as possible. And so, by early July, four possible outcomes
seemed possible. 1) A peaceful negotiated settlement. 2) an Austro-Serbian war in the Balkans. 3)
a continental war involving Austria, Russia, Germany, and likely France, or 4) a world
war if Britain and its empire joined France and Russia. Only Austria-Hungary and Russia had direct
interests in the Balkans, but the system of European alliances would likely draw other
states in. However, neither the Triple Alliance or Triple
Entente called for automatic participation in war. Instead each state had to decide how far they
were willing to go. The Triple Entente powers generally preferred
a negotiated settlement. If war did break out, Britain and France favoured
limiting the war to the Balkans, although Russia was more willing to accept a Great
Power war over Serbia. Russia wanted to keep its reputation as protector
of the Balkan Slavs, and potentially expand its influence in the area around the Turkish
Straits that were so important to Russian trade and power projection. If it came to a Great Power war, France would
support its ally Russia, and hope that Britain would join. In Britain, a major war was unpopular with
the public, business circles, and some members of cabinet. Some politicians, like Foreign Secretary Edward
Grey, reasoned that if a major war broke out the outcome would be better for Britain if
it joined Russia and France. If Germany and Austria defeated France and
Russia, British interests and security would badly suffer, but there was still significant
opposition in the UK. As far as the Entente Powers were concerned,
a major war still seemed unlikely. Understanding Austro-German intentions is
trickier, and historians still debate them. Their leaders saw little benefits in a negotiated
settlement: it wouldn’t resolve the issue of Serbian nationalism or improve Austria’s
position in the Balkans. The best outcome would probably come from
a localised Austro-Serbian war. At the same time, launching such a war meant
accepting the risk of a continental war against France and Russia, and possibly Britain. Germany had made plans for war against France
and Russia, and felt that the longer it waited, the more powerful Russia would become and
the greater the risk of defeat. Germany and Austria both decided to risk European
war against France and Russia to resolve the Serbian issue in Austria’s favour. If a general war came, victory would allow
Germany to dominate the continent. The wildcard, of course, was Britain. If the UK fought against them, an Austro-German
victory was much less likely and would amount to a worst-case scenario. So in the face of rival alliances, and conflicting
goals and expectations, the Great Powers of Europe faced the July Crisis of 1914. After Germany’s blank cheque to Austria
on July 6, Austria-Hungary planned to move quickly against Serbia, but that was easier
said than done. On July 7, the Austro-Hungarians planned their
next step. Although many were eager for war, the government
was not united. Hungarian Prime Minister István Tisza was
at first hesitant. The Kingdom of Hungary already included many
Serbs, and war with Serbia would only increase tensions. Tisza insisted that Austria-Hungary deliver
an ultimatum to Serbia to give one last opportunity for peace, or to justify eventual military
action. Crafting the ultimatum took time, and Tisza
only approved the final text on July 19. The ultimatum text was not the only delay. Many Austro-Hungarian troops were on leave
for the harvest, and mobilization would take two weeks. Internationally, the French President and
Prime Minister arrived in St Petersburg on July 20 for a scheduled meeting with the Russians,
so if the Austrians gave the ultimatum to Serbia before the French went home, Moscow
and Paris might quickly develop a joint response. It's debated how much the French and Russians
may have already known about the coming Austrian ultimatum, but they did use the meeting to
portray an image of ironclad unity. As President Raymond Poincaré told the Russians,
his primary concern was Britain: “We shall have weighty matters to discuss. I am sure we shall agree on all points… But there is one question which is very much
in my mind - our understanding with England. We must get her to come into our alliance.” (Clark 443) The Austro-Hungarians waited until the French
leaders were at sea on July 23 to send the ultimatum to the Serbs. Of the ten demands, most concerned the arrest
of Serbian officials and the suppression of anti-Habsburg propaganda. To carry this out, the ultimatum demanded
Serbia “accept the collaboration in Serbia of organs of the Imperial and Royal Government
[of Austria-Hungary]”. This was tantamount to surrendering Serbian
sovereignty, and the Austrians had deliberately drafted the ultimatum so the Serbs would have
no choice but to reject it, and war could be declared. Belgrade replied within the 48-hour deadline
and accepted all the points except for those contrary to the Serbian constitution, like
allowing Austro-Hungarian officials to prosecute Serbian citizens. The ultimatum triggered a wave of feverish
diplomatic activity. The Entente Powers now fully realised the
seriousness of the crisis, which had mostly been driven behind closed doors in Vienna
and Berlin until now. London, Paris and St Petersburg condemned
the ultimatum, though Britain suggested mediation talks including Britain, France, Germany and
Italy. Berlin refused. Russo-Austrian relations were by now red hot. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov actually
shouted at the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in a meeting: “I know what it is. You want to make war on Serbia! The German newspapers have been egging you
on. You are setting fire to Europe. It’s a great responsibility you are taking
on, you will see what effect this has in London and Paris and maybe elsewhere too.” (Clark 472) The Tsar ordered partial mobilisation of four
military districts on July 24, followed by the “Period Preparatory to War” on the
26th. The Russian army began to call up reservists,
gather supplies and promote officers. At the same time, the Tsar wanted to make
sure that these measures did not appear to be directed at Germany. So Austria-Hungary had a blank cheque from
Germany and had made sure that its ultimatum to Serbia was unacceptable. On July 28, 1914 Austria-Hungary declared
war on Serbia. The war was still a regional one, but that
would all change in the cascade of events in the coming days. In reality, partial Russian mobilisation was
an illusion. The General Staff had no plans to partially
mobilise and Tsar Nicholas’s generals told him that partial mobilisation would disrupt
a potential full mobilisation and still likely alarm the Germans. Military and political leaders of all powers
were confronted with the same problem: if one army mobilized, its neighbor would feel
pressure to do the same, or run the risk of an early defeat thanks to modern railways
bringing enemy troops to the border within days. This dilemma gave the generals increased influence
in the crisis. On July 30, after overcoming last minute nerves,
the Tsar announced full mobilisation. All eyes now turned to Germany. From July 29 to August 1, Tsar Nicholas and
Kaiser Wilhelm exchanged a series of urgent telegrams. Affectionately signing ‘Nicky’ or ‘Willy’,
the two cousins spoke of their affection for each other, but also issued demands. On July 30, Willy wrote to Nicky: “I now receive authentic news of serious
preparations for war on my Eastern frontier. Responsibility for the safety of my empire
forces preventive measures of defence upon me… My friendship for you and your empire, transmitted
to me by my grandfather on his deathbed has always been sacred to me and I have honestly
often backed up Russia… The peace of Europe may still be maintained
by you, if Russia will agree to stop the milit[ary] measures which must threaten Germany and Austria-Hungary.” (Kaiser Wilhelm II 48) London now tried mediation again, including
a proposal for Austro-Hungarian forces to stop at Belgrade. On the 29th, German Chancellor Theobald von
Bethman Hollweg asked Britain to stay neutral if Germany promised not to touch French possessions. Foreign Secretary Edward Grey now desperately
sought clarification from his own cabinet, two-thirds of which had previously opposed
war. Cabinet member John Burns summed up the decision: “Situation seriously reviewed from all points
of view. It was decided not to decide.” (Herbig 458) Britain still would not say if it would join
the Entente in case of a general war. Hollweg was now unsure of British intentions
and tried to reign in the Austro-Hungarians, including suggesting the Halt in Belgrade
plan. Meanwhile, the German Chief of Staff Helmuth
von Moltke was encouraging Conrad to attack. This led to Conrad exclaiming: “Who actually rules in Berlin, Bethmann
or Moltke?” (Levy 252) But the Austro-Hungarians claimed it was now
too late to change course, and a temporary occupation of Belgrade would not achieve their
aims. Moltke also began to push for Germany to mobilize,
since the German war plan depended on speed to avoid a two-front war. The Schlieffen Plan called for German armies
to first defeat France while Russia was still mobilizing, then shift German troops east. If Russia was allowed to mobilize first, Germany
would be at a disadvantage. The Germans had started preparing on July
28, but on the 31st Kaiser Wilhelm announced pre-mobilization, the Kriegsgefahrzustand
or state of threatening danger of war. The decision led to another flurry of telegrams. Germany demanded Russia cease mobilisation,
while simultaneously asking Austria-Hungary to prepare for operations against Russia. The Germans also asked for French and British
neutrality in a seemingly imminent Russo-German War. In Britain, a third royal cousin - King George
- now called on the Tsar to end mobilisation. Prime Minister Herbert Asquith recalled the
moment he presented a draft telegram to the king: “The poor king was hauled from his bed and
one of my strangest experiences… was sitting with him… I read the message & the proposed answer. All he did was suggest that it should be made
more personal and direct - by the insertion of the words ‘My dear Nicky’ - and the
addition at the end of the signature: ‘Georgie’!” (Clark 535) And so, as July came to an end, there was
a frenzy of diplomatic messages between European capitals. For many military leaders though, it was too
late for more talk – and they began to pressure the politicians to act. On July 31, French General Joseph Joffre asked
his government to reverse its more passive policy and mobilize. President Poincaré described the meeting,
which lasted into the wee hours of August 1: “Joffre appeared with the placid face of
a calm, resolute man whose only fear is lest France, outstripped by German mobilisation,
the most rapid of them all, might speedily find herself in an irreparable state of inferiority.” (Albertini 100) France finally mobilised at 4pm on August
1. In Berlin, Moltke was having the same conversation
with Chancellor Hollweg and 30 minutes later, Germany announced their mobilisation. By 7pm, Moscow told Berlin that Russia would
not stop its mobilization, and so Germany declared war on Russia. On August 2, German troops were on the move
- not east, but west into neutral Luxembourg. This was in accordance with the Schlieffen
Plan, which the Germans said was a strategic necessity. The British position was still not clear. London sent ambiguous messages to Berlin suggesting
that Britain might remain neutral if Germany did not attack France. Kaiser Wilhelm now asked Moltke to abandon
the Schlieffen Plan and stop his armies from marching across the French border. Von Moltke replied that stopping the massive
and complex mobilization was impossible and suicidal. The Kaiser was angry, and his answer showed
he did not fully understand his own military machine: “Your illustrious uncle [Von Moltke the
Elder] would not have given me such an answer. If I order it, it must be possible.” (Clark 531) Soon after, the Kaiser learned that there
was no formal British offer to stay neutral, and gave his armies the green light to follow
the plan and invade Belgium, Luxembourg, and France. By August 2, the mood in Britain had shifted
towards intervention. The British informed the French they would
block any German naval movements in the channel, and would uphold Belgian neutrality. Belgian neutrality was Britain’s final red
line - but it was a line Germany had already begun to cross. The same day, Germany delivered an ultimatum
to Belgium it had prepared back on July 26. The Germans claimed the French planned to
enter Belgium, so Germany had no choice but to move in pre-emptively. If Belgium resisted, the Germans would consider
it an enemy. Brussels replied to Berlin on August 3: “The intentions [Germany] ascribes to France
are in contradiction with the formal declarations made to us…The infringement of [Belgium’s]
independence with which the German Government threatens her would constitute a flagrant
violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies such a breach
of law… The Belgian Government is firmly resolved
to repel every infringement of its rights by all means in its power.” (Albertini 465) That same day, the final dominoes began to
fall. Italy declared that it would remain neutral
and would not join its Triple Alliance partners in war. Germany claimed France was about to attack
it, which was not true, and declared war on France. On August 4, German troops marched into Belgium. Belgium appealed to Britain, France and Russia
to guarantee her independence - and Britain declared war on Germany. By August 4, the Great Powers of Europe were
at war, and the First World War had begun. In the next four years, roughly 20 million
people would be killed – but even before the killing stopped, debates were raging about
the war’s origins and who was to blame, and they haven’t stopped since. After the outbreak of the war, each of the
powers published a “color book” making its case as to how to understand the July
Crisis, and, basically blamed the other side. After the war, each side still blamed the
other and the Allies put the responsibility squarely on the Central Powers in the post-war
peace treaties. Since then, the evidence of 1914 has been
interpreted in many different ways as historians have tried to answer who was at fault for
starting the war. For years, many historians concluded that
all the Powers shared some of the blame for the war. In the 1960s, German historian Fritz Fischer
made one of the most influential arguments. He claimed that German government and military
elites had grandiose plans and wanted to achieve them through war. The Fischer school claims Germany had long
planned a war aimed against Russia and France and directly led Austro-Hungarian actions
to escalate events. More recently, other single Powers have been
fingered for their role in the crisis. Sean McMeekin emphasized that Russia’s actions
turned a Balkan war into a continental one, and Niall Ferguson blamed Britain for its
mistakes and naivete. Some other recent interpretations, like Christopher
Clark’s ‘sleepwalker theory’, suggest the war was largely unintended and resulted
from miscalculations, misunderstandings, and perceived insecurities. He argues Germany felt Russia and Britain
were unlikely to become involved and tried its best to localise the conflict in the Balkans. Another debate centres around whether the
war was inevitable. Here, the recent consensus is that the alliance
system did not force any state to fight, as Italy proved by staying neutral in 1914. This line of thinking stresses that there
were many times when things might have taken a different turn, like if Austria had acted
more quickly against Serbia, or if Britain had taken a clear position from the start
of the crisis. There is also the discussion about culture
and mentality in 1914. Historian James Joll for example, suggests
that the cultural, military and strategic zeitgeist saw war as a practical, and indeed
desirable, tool for societal change and defence of national interests. Since modern war also involved the need for
a quick mobilization via rail timetables, military commanders became as or more important
than politicians in the crisis. But their inflexible strategies could not
respond to the political needs, so perceived military necessity dictated political action. Russian politicians wanted partial mobilization
not to scare Germany but did just that, and German politicians did not want to bring Britain
into the war but their armies marched into Belgium and did just that. This was the exact opposite of Clausewitz’
concept that war is politics by other means, and is an important aspect of understanding
how the crisis ended in a world war. The war that started with the July Crisis
in 1914 lasted more than 4 years, the war amongst historians to make sense of it all
still rages more than a century later. The dramatic events that led to the First
World War changed the world forever. 31 years after the July Crisis, Europe saw
the end of the Second World War which was born from unsettled scores and further radicalisation
after 1918. In 1945 there would be no peace until total
surrender and in April that year the Soviet Army launched their final offensive on the
German capital Berlin. In our 4.5 hour, 18 part documentary series
16 Days in Berlin we chronicle this final battle. It features original film footage from Soviet
cameramen, never before seen photos of the battle, detailed maps and animations and expert
interviews with David Willey from the Tank Museum, Ian from Forgotten Weapons and more. Unfortunately, we can’t upload this series
to YouTube because it shows the grim reality of the 2nd World War – and that would get
as demonetized or worse. So where can you watch 16 Days in Berlin in
4k resolution? On Nebula, a streaming service we built together
with other creators and where we can upload and ad-free. We want to thank Mark Newton for his help
with this episode. And we also want to thank our supporters on
Patreon and Nebula for making our work possible. We couldn’t do what we do without your support. I’m Jesse Alexander and this is The Great
War 1922, a production of Real Time History and the only Youtube history channel that
refuses to develop into ninnies.
