On 23 June 2023, the world was captivated by
the news coming from Russia. Yevgeny Prigozhin, the owner of the Wagner Group private military
company, has launched a march on Moscow with a declared goal of removing Russia’s top military
figures, Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, from office. During the advance on Moscow,
Wagner shot down several Russian helicopters, with human casualties exceeding a dozen
men. Confused by what was going on, the media labelled the affair a mutiny, a
rebellion, a coup d'état, or even a civil war. Although the matter seems to have fizzled out
for now, it raised the question of whether an actual civil war in Russia is possible today.
In this video, we will try to answer this question by looking at Russia’s informal political
system, its main influence groups, and challenges that could potentially lead to a full-scale
military confrontation within Russia itself.
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and generals to check them out. Fake Political Institutions
Russia’s current political system can be best described by an election campaign slogan of the
United Russia party, “Strong president – strong country.” Vladimir Putin is a true autocrat who
stands above all branches of government and holds a monopoly on key decision-making. Russia’s formal
political system is largely decorative in nature. United Russia, the country’s largest political
party, holds over 72% of the seats in the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament.
United Russia’s leadership includes all major national figures, thus securing the loyalty of
the party, as well as the obedience of the Duma. The upper house of the parliament, the Federation
Council, is formed by the representatives of Russia’s regions, yet the lower house can dissolve
it. At last, there is the Security Council, a consultative body, which is formed by Putin, and
aimed to discuss key strategic national policies. This entire formal government structure includes
over 50,000 people, an absolute majority of which are replaceable.
Fake Federalism A similar picture of centralized rule can be seen
in Russia’s regions. Since 2001, the influence of the local elites has declined drastically through
the efforts of the Kremlin. Changes in the Russian tax system resulted in most regions becoming
dependent on the federal center financially, thus leaving little room for disobedience.
In addition, Kremlin has introduced a simple scheme to assign governors to the regions. There,
the head of the federal subject would resign from his office about 7 months before the local
elections and be replaced by an interim appointee from Moscow, who would then “win” the elections.
Those appointees were labelled “parachutists,” who have little to no connection to the region
they govern, have made their careers elsewhere, and are loyal to Kremlin rather
than their assigned federal subject. As of summer 2023, an overwhelming majority
of Russian governors are “parachutists.” Because of this system of strict vertical
subordination, it would be safe to say that the so-called Russian Federation is a federation
in name only. It would also mean that the hopes of those opposed to the Kremlin that Russia would
eventually get overwhelmed by a wave of separatism are largely misplaced. As of July 2023, in only
ten regions of Russia, the local elites are in charge of their region and would potentially have
the means to move against the federal government.
Politburo 2.0
The overall phoniness of Russia’s formal political system, however, doesn’t mean
that Russia has no politics. Putin might be an autocrat, but running a country alone, especially
one as large as Russia, is simply impossible. Inevitably, the autocrat has to delegate tasks
and responsibilities and allocate resources to his subordinates, thus diluting some of his
power in favor of maintaining overall control. Those subordinates form their own patronage
groups, which, in turn, compete against each other for a more favorable place in the system.
Putin accepts and encourages such competition, as too much cooperation between the groups could
pose a danger to the autocrat himself. The groups, in turn, accept the role of Putin as an
arbitrator in the intra-elite conflicts. In a series of analytical reports and
presentations, Minchenko Consulting proposes a system describing the state of
the top Russian elites called Politburo 2.0. This small group of men are Putin’s
closest and most trusted subordinates. They can get unscheduled personal audiences with
the autocrat, set meeting agendas, and accumulate a sizeable pool of resources, be it financial,
political, media, or brute force. As of May 2023, Politburo 2.0 is thought to include 11 men, with
Mikhail Mishustin and Sergey Kiriyenko being the most recent additions to the group.
Elite Groups The Ukrainian Institute for the Future proposed
another scheme describing the Russian elites. In a report from March 2023, the authors highlight
six groups of influence in the Kremlin, each of which has sufficient resources to exert
political influence and contest for power. Several of the groups are heterogeneous and
have their own internal divisions, disputes, and conflicts, yet on the strategic level,
they tend to defend their common interests. Perhaps the most infamous of the groups is that
of the Siloviki, a Russian term which can be roughly translated as strongmen, or enforcers.
This group is also the most heterogeneous, including various organizations related to
the army, state security, and law enforcement. Those include the Ministry of Defence,
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB, the Foreign Intelligence Service,
and Rosgvardiya to name a few. An undisputed leader of the group is Nikolai
Patrushev, an extremely conservative, hawkish, and anti-Western figure known to be a conspiracy
theorist. A less-known yet still very important figure in this group is the Kremlin Chief of Staff
Anton Vaino, whose main role is presumed to be that of communication with other political groups.
The Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu undoubtedly belongs to the Siloviki too, as well as the head
of the FSB Alexander Bortnikov, however, their influence on the decision-making process in Russia
is presumed to be weaker. Of particular interest is the head of Rosgvardiya Viktor Zolotov. As the
man who runs Russia’s internal military force, he might be the person able to play kingmaker in
case Russia finds itself in a political crisis. Although the Siloviki seem to be powerful,
they don’t have that much to offer besides brute force. Besides the military budget,
they have some financial sources of their own, but not their own bank. They control the Roscosmos
corporation, yet their general influence on the economy is exaggerated. The Siloviki have control
over 19 regions (notably, most of North Caucasus), however, they have little influence over Russia’s
formal political system. The greatest weakness of this group is a lack of media. It is unsurprising
then, that in the long conflict between Shoigu and Prigozhin, the former more often than the
latter became an object of public ridicule. An often overlooked influence group in Russia is
the one of Sergey Chemezov, roughly corresponding to the Military–industrial complex. In a state as
belligerent as Russia, the person responsible for the arms industry inevitably exerts a great deal
of political influence. Most other groups need Chemezov, yet the Military–industrial complex
has a function too specific for this group to be sizeable. Chemezov is the CEO of Rostec, which
owns Novikombank, thus making it possible to keep financial flows within the group. In Parliament,
the MIC has control over the committees relevant to its operations, as well as over the Federal
Agency for Mineral Resources. Chemezov exerts control over just 4 regions (although ones that
are rich in natural resources). However, the MIC has no muscle of its own, as the state already
guards its enterprises. Just as in the case of the Siloviki, the Military–industrial complex
has little to offer when it comes to media. Perhaps the group most important for the Russian
economy is that of Gas industry interests. It is comprised of Russia’s two largest natural
gas producers, Gazprom and Novatec, as well as several billionaires with
businesses related to the gas industry. The most important figures of the group
include the CEO of Gazprom Alexey Miller, a gas pipeline supplier Arkady Rotenberg,
an energy market investor Gennady Timchenko, and last but probably not least, Dmitry
Medvedev, former chairman of Gazprom. This group is much more than just a gas extraction
business. Gazprom, Russia’s largest company, is almost a state within a state. It has its own
military force, Gazprom’s security service. There are representatives of the group in the Russian
government as well as Parliament. Combined, Gazprom and Novatec exert control over 9
Russian regions, key for the gas industry. Surprisingly for an outside viewer, Gazprom owns
one of Russia’s most important media holdings. This group controls several TV channels,
production studios, radio stations, newspapers, and web hosting services, with its content ranging
from crime dramas to stand-up shows to football match broadcasts to business analytics. Combined
with the largest source of revenue available in Russia, the Gas industry interests group
is one of the most influential of them all, with an array of resources wide enough to
potentially threaten even Putin himself. Gas, however, is not the only energy resource
Russia exports. Similarly, there is a group formed around Oil industry interests. Of particular
importance here is the Rosneft company and its CEO, Igor Sechin. Just like Gazprom, Rosneft has
its own security service and a substantial source of revenue. However, in other aspects, Rosneft
has been on a steady decline. This group never had a sizeable media empire to begin with, while
its influence in the Russian parliament, as well as Russian regions, has decreased significantly
in the past 10 years. However, Rosneft has found itself a different niche, that of communication
with Western politicians and businessmen. It is thus unsurprising that one of the Rosneft
chairmen is the infamous Gerhard Schröder. The most unusual of the groups of influence
in the Kremlin is the Kovalchuk group. Rather than forming a clan around an industry or
a sphere of activity, the two Kovalchuk brothers, Yury and Mikhail, have built their network of
support on personal friendship with Vladimir Putin. Shortly after coming to power, Putin
elevated a mediocre regional Rossiya Bank, owned by Yury Kovalchuk, to one of the key Russian
financial institutions. Although lacking its own military force, this group has sponsored the
emergence of multiple Russian private military companies (including Wagner) and has promoted its
proteges into governmental positions, notably the Natural resources committee, the Ministry of
Energy, and the Ministry of Industry and Trade. Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin is thought to
be, at least to some extent, a Kovalchuk figure. With the National Media Group as well
as the VGTRK broadcasting company, the Kovalchuks have a significant media presence,
mostly targeting an old, conservative audience that prefers TV as the main source of information.
Their control over regions, however, is modest and is comprised of only 5 border regions.
The youngest of the groups, and already one of the most important ones, is the Technocrats.
They tend to support economic liberalization, raising the efficiency of the state apparatus,
and are generally considered to have a more modern outlook. It would be wrong, however, to consider
them liberal paragons of freedom and democracy. The most prominent of the Technocrats are Sergey
Kiriyenko and Herman Gref. The key asset of this group is an established system of raising and
cultivating professional cadres for the Russian elite. Multiple programs, such as “Russia, the
Land of Opportunities”, “Leaders of Russia”, and “School of Governors”, has already produced
a huge number of rather competent administrators. In the foreseeable future, it can be the main
driver of the refreshment of Russian elites. The Technocrats also have access to other
resources. Herman Gref is the Chairman and CEO of Sberbank, the largest bank in Russia. The
graduates of the Technocrats have a significant presence in Parliament, as well as strikingly
large control over Russian regions (26 in total). Most impressively, the Technocrats have a
defacto monopoly on the Internet sphere. Sberbank is the owner of Rambler while the
son of Sergey Kiriyenko heads the VK Group, which has control over all the Russian social
networks, as well as the information services of Yandex.
Trustees Alongside the elite groups, there are
also trustees, people who have their own assigned functions, and respond directly
to Putin rather than to any of the groups. Typical trustees include Yury Trutnev (responsible
for the Far East), Deputy Chief of Staff Dmitry Kozak, and a designated liberal Alexey
Nechayev, leader of the New People party. Arguably the most influential of the trustees
is the Mayor of Moscow Sergey Sobyanin. He is included in Politburo 2.0, and
his functions, besides being the head of Russia’s capital city, also include
patronage over local elites in general. The infamous Ramzan Kadyrov, an undeclared Sultan
of Chechnya, is a trustee as well. He controls a region with a recent history of insurgency and is
also an informal communicator with the elites of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Interestingly enough,
multiple military formations collectively known as the Kadyrovites are technically a part of
Rosgvardiya, and Kadyrov himself is a figure somewhat aligned with Viktor Zolotov.
Yevgeny Prigozhin is also a trustee (or, at least, he used to be one). However,
his role in the system, and his ambitions to improve it, deserve a video of its own.
Threats to the System and a Possible Civil War Now, that we know more about the way
Russia is governed, we can think about how this informal political system can be put
down. The elites face multiple challenges, such as military defeats on the battlefields of
Ukraine, an increasingly costly confrontation with the West, or a decrease in
revenue from gas and oil export. Kremlin is threatened by two groups of citizens,
who have the potential for protest sentiments. One is that of the Western-aligned younger
generation, residents of large cities, and generally people who consider themselves
liberals. The other is comprised of extremist, revanchist, and chauvinist radicals, who consider
Putin to be too soft, inefficient, and ultimately undeserving to be the Russian autocrat. With
the right amount of propaganda, repression, concessions, and cosmetic changes to the formal
political system, both groups can ultimately be managed, but in the case of a major crisis, they
can pose a significant danger to the status quo. The system’s most significant weakness,
however, is Vladimir Putin himself. In this political configuration, he doesn’t
and can’t safely have an undisputed heir. Once Putin’s political career ends (one way or
another), the system will lose its key element and would have to react. None of the groups
would have a decisive advantage, and it is likely to see them organized into coalitions with
one another, as well as with some of the trustees. In a scenario optimistic for Kremlin, the
political groups would find an agreement, and appoint a new Russian autocrat, thus preserving
the system as a whole. If a working solution isn’t found, however, the groups would have to mobilize
resources from the regions they control. By that time, the level of escalation in the struggle
between the groups might be quite high, and this is not outside the realm of possibility to see a
civil war being waged between the elite groups. In such circumstances, the role of the local
elites would rise, and the ideas of separatism would get more relevant every day. This is a sort
of scenario, that would lead to an outcome desired by many of the Kremlin’s enemies, that of Russia’s
dismemberment and cessation as a unified entity. More video on this topic are on the way, so make
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