How Tough Are They? The True Size of Russian Defenses in Ukraine - 3D DOCUMENTARY

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Cool, but irrelevant.

We're talking about the defensive lines UKRAINE HASN'T EVEN REACHED YET.

👍︎︎ 31 👤︎︎ u/Astalano 📅︎︎ Jul 12 2023 🗫︎ replies

Arguments about the state of Russian military and society will age as well as this video has.

👍︎︎ 8 👤︎︎ u/anonymous_divinity 📅︎︎ Jul 12 2023 🗫︎ replies

I subscribe to this channel for various reasons, mostly ancient historical... but here we have a detailed and interesting analysis of Russia's current defensive lines in Ukraine.

Agree or disagree with the points made... up to you... but I hope you find it informative and thought-provoking.

👍︎︎ 8 👤︎︎ u/RejectTheNarrative 📅︎︎ Jul 12 2023 🗫︎ replies

Doubt this counteroffensive will even reach the first lines of defense, they seems to be pretty stuck at the Russian forward positions...

👍︎︎ 3 👤︎︎ u/Longjumping-Rule-581 📅︎︎ Jul 12 2023 🗫︎ replies

Invicta doing modern wars now like Kings & Generals? 😳

👍︎︎ 3 👤︎︎ u/Eddyzodiak 📅︎︎ Jul 13 2023 🗫︎ replies

Pretty good analysis.

The lines can be overcome. By being overwhelmed. It would take much larger forces than have been sent forward so far. That they can is not the same as they will. I am not suggesting either way will happen.

I think this is a good point to mention what happened to all those T55's. They are in hull down dug outs like explained for 'support vehicles'. I've seen people say they (T55) will be decent as 'pill boxes'. This is approaching the actual use which is dug in. They can still be moved to another (perhaps prepared) position. A mobile pill box.

👍︎︎ 2 👤︎︎ u/VikingTeo 📅︎︎ Jul 12 2023 🗫︎ replies
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With the pressures of a Ukrainian offensive  and internal unrest gaining steam,   Russia’s defenses may be all that stand in the way   of a complete unraveling of one of the  greatest geopolitical events of our era. In their hands rests the fate of the front  line, of the war, of Putin, and of perhaps the   entire Russian Federation. Therefore Russia’s  defenses in Ukraine are well worth studying. Since the end of 2022, Russian  troops have been digging in.   The Ukrainian countryside has become  scarred with hundreds of miles of trenches,   lines of concrete dragon’s  teeth, and acres of minefields.   These now pose a significant impediment to  Ukraine’s long awaited counter-offensive. From the comfort of our homes, it can  be difficult to properly understand the   realities on the ground. So today let  us explore the historical context for   these fortifications and bring to life the  True Size of Russian Defenses in Ukraine. as this conflict makes clear quickly getting  supplies to the front line is of utmost   importance now you can get your own rapid  delivery of goods using today's sponsor timu   timu is a new Online Marketplace where you can  find bargain deals and wholesale prices to save   a bunch of money from Top suppliers and Brands  across the world Teemu is the number one free app   on the App Store by downloading it new users get  first purchase discounts for even more savings on   top of a 100 discount coupon for all users for our  viewers timu is offering a special discount code   that lets you get a Nintendo switch OLED for just  259 bucks compared to the original price of 328.99   other deals I loved were the various die sets  and props which I'm always in Need for as a DM   even just a solid wood chess set  was great for tokens I could use   to decorate a Game of Thrones  style war room I've been planning it sucked into were all the Minifigs they had on  offer especially the custom Warriors from Gondor   or Mordor or the set which contained  all the major armies of World War II so start saving today and browse  for more awesome deals by going to   teemu.com or downloading the app using  the links in the description enjoy To understand why Russia has  gone to all this trouble,   we need to rewind the clock back a few months. By the winter of 2022, Russia  was in a difficult situation.   Months of grinding offensives had worn  down Russia’s frontline forces. Around   9,000 armored vehicles had been wrecked and  around 100,000 men were dead or wounded.   Among the hardest hit were the elite  troops best-equipped for modern combat.   For example, up to half of Russia’s airborne  troops were gone. Shrinking stockpiles,   industrial bottlenecks, logistical failures,  outright corruption, and internal squabbles meant   sufficient amounts of ammunition and other  vital supplies weren’t reaching the front. To make matters worse, Ukrainian  counterattacks in the fall had   unexpectedly routed the Russian right and  left flanks at Kharkiv and Kherson. So,   Russian forces did what exposed, exhausted armies  have done historically. They started digging in. From October of 2022 to the present,  Russians have built a vast network of   field fortifications in occupied Ukraine  and along the Russo-Ukrainian border.   In some places, these fortifications  mark the front lines. But in most places,   these defenses are kilometers behind the  active front. In either case, these defenses   allow Russia to contest a Ukrainian mechanized  offensive with fewer, lower-quality troops. But how have these Russian defenses  stacked up to the greatest defensive   lines of history and have they repeated the  same mistakes which doomed many of them? When making historical analogies, we have  to pick the right points of comparison.  Broadly speaking, the most  infamous defensive lines   in history have either been pre-war border  fortresses or wartime field fortifications. In origin, form and purpose, Russian  defenses in Ukraine are not like the   WWII-era French Maginot Line or the Greek  Metaxas Line. First, these historic lines   were primarily built to defend pre-war  borders, not secure wartime conquests. Second, these lines were built around  large, multi-story fortresses armed with   heavy artillery batteries. The largest fort  on the Maginot Line could fire 4 metric tons   of shells in a single minute. And to build the  5,500 bunkers and pillboxes of the Maginot Line,   the French poured 1.5 million cubic meters,  enough to build over 31 Empire State Buildings.   The Russians have not built these kinds  of concrete battleships in Ukraine. Third, these lines had exposed flanks  that attackers historically exploited.   In April of 1941, the Metaxas line on the  Greek-Bulgarian Border was outflanked by an   attack through Yugoslavia. And the strongest  portion of the Maginot Line was infamously   bypassed by a German attack through the  Ardennes in May 1940. By contrast, Russian   defenses are anchored by the Belarussian border  in the north and the Black Sea in the South.   In theory an attacker might be able to outflank  these but such conditions do not currently exist.   Thus, in the present day, there is no  easy flank for the Ukrainians to turn. That all being said, there are some similarities.  For instance, segments of Russian lines do   resemble portions of one border megaproject –  Germany’s Westwall, better known as the Siegfried   Line. Both use similar belts of minefields,  ditches, and concrete anti-tank obstacles.   Although nominally built as a border defense,  the Westwall was still part of Germany’s   offensive strategy in the late 1930s, freeing  up troops once needed for border defense duty   for offensive action. Russia’s current lines  likely serve a similar strategic purpose. In design and function, current Russian defenses  are really field fortifications more similar to   the Hindenburg Line of World War I or Rommel’s  “Devils Garden” of the North African Campaign.   For context, let us briefly examine both of these. In the latter half of World War I, Germany was on  the defensive on the Western Front. Under growing   pressure, the newly appointed German supreme  commander, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg,   would order the construction of a series of  defensive lines. British troops would nickname   these the “Hindenburg Line.” Built around the  concept of a defense in depth, they used deep   belts of wire to stop infantry,  primitive minefields to stop tanks,   and strongpoints with concrete pillboxes  to stop bullets and artillery shells.   Any breakthrough would be met with an  immediate counterattack by German reserves. Jumping forward about 25 years, both sides  of the North African campaign in World War   2 built and fought over literal lines  in the sand. Perhaps the most fiercely   contested were the Devil’s Gardens at El  Alamein. With his army literally out of gas,   Afrika Korps commander Erwin Rommel had to  halt his offensive in July 1942 and dig in.   When Bernard Montgomery’s Eighth Army attacked  in October, they would face a network of mutually   supporting strongpoints guarded by integrated  anti-tank guns like the infamous “88” which   were in turn surrounded by the nearly half  a million landmines that gave the Devil’s   Gardens their name. Behind the lines, German and  Italian tanks waited, ready to counterattack. These and other historic field fortifications  share critical similarities with Russian defenses:  First, these defenses secured gains made  by an invading army, allowing them to take   an operational pause to gather strength and  supplies before launching further offensives.  Second, with strong defenses, fewer  troops could hold a given piece of ground,   allowing commanders to build larger reserves for  decisive counterattacks or future offensives.  Third, these defensive lines  used obstacles like barbed wire,   land mines, and anti-tank ditches to  slow and disrupt attacking enemy forces.  Fourth, most of the frontline defenders occupied  entrenched strongpoints, preferably high ground,   in villages, or near critical  transit routes. When possible,   these strongpoints were linked by trenches. Finally, these defenses also relied on   counterattacks by mobile reserves to  defeat enemy footholds and breakthroughs. With this context in mind, let’s now take  a closer look at our current example. Russia has built defenses along the length  of the territory it occupies in Ukraine,   as well as along a roughly 400-mile long  strip of the Russo-Ukrainian border. But   the most extensive defenses are on the  nearly 250 mile-long front anchored by   the Dnieper River and the Russia-Ukraine border. Without natural obstacles like major rivers,   Russian commanders have opted to shore up their  lines using man-made obstacles and entrenchments   Although described as a “line”,  Russian defenses in Ukraine are not   an extended line of linked trenches, like  something from the Western Front of WWI. Behind the actual front lines, Russian commanders  have laid down defensive clusters that control   towns, block key roads, secure bridges. Russian  defenses are also multilayered. Some areas are   defended by multiple defensive lines. And key  roads are blocked by successive strongpoints. Ukrainian forces will therefore have  to breach and breakthrough multiple   Russian lines as they push deeper  into Russian-occupied territory. Let’s take a closer look at how  these defenses have been laid out.   Now we should note, there is no such thing as a  typical Russian defensive position in Ukraine.   Differences in terrain and strategic  priorities mean some areas are more   heavily fortified than others. Different  groups, including the Russian military,   PMCs, and local authorities have also built  defenses – to varying degrees of success. However, given the sheer scale of the frontlines,  some indicative battlefields do exist.   For our purposes we have chosen a section of the  line about 18 kilometers east of Bakhmut near the   village of Vyskryva which has many of the features  seen in Russian fortifications in the region. Like many Russian defenses in Ukraine,  it controls a road Ukrainian forces might   advance down. Now on a map like this, it can be  somewhat deceptive to think that just a few dots   indicate an area which is thinly defended.  This is not the case. But to understand the   reality of the situation on the ground, let  us render the battlefield in its True Size. This is what Russian Defenses  in Ukraine really look like… Our rendered battlefield is about 5  square kilometers or 3 square miles.   In pre-war settings, someone could make the  crossing by car in about 3 minutes whilst   following rural speed limits (90 km/h) while  a bicyclist (25 km/h) could make the crossing   in about 15 minutes and a pedestrian (5 km/h)  could make the crossing in about 60 minutes. While at war however, an attacker  could take weeks if not months or   even years to make the crossing with  progress measured in mere meters.   But to understand why, we can now explain how  the Russians have fortified their position. Defenses in this sector are  layered, with rows of obstacles   blocking movement down roads and across  fields towards dug-in fighting positions. The outer layer consists of various  anti-tank features including hedgehogs,   dragon’s teeth, and large ditches. Interspersed  between these are invisible minefields which   together form a formidable thicket  of obstacles for would-be attackers. Let us now inspect each of these in turn. In the outermost layer you can see two bands of  concrete dragon’s teeth. These simple anti-tank   obstacles are laid out in long lines of 2 or more  rows that can run for miles across open terrain.   On the WWII-era Siegfried Line, these  obstacles were cast in place by laborers   with concrete molds. The Russians  have opted for a faster technique. Hundreds of thousands of pre-fabricated pieces   have been ordered from factories in  Belarus, Russia, and occupied Ukraine.   These pieces are then trucked into place  and dropped off by trucks with cranes.   While this technique allows defenses to be  rapidly installed, it has some serious tradeoffs. First, it means the dragon’s teeth have to  be built relatively lightly. Some may even   be hollow. Subcontracting also seems to have  led to uneven quality control. For instance,   despite allegedly being built of high-grade  concrete, some are already falling apart. Furthermore, unlike the partially  buried Siegfried Line teeth,   the Russian obstacles have been placed on  the surface. And their convenient lifting   eyes could make it fairly easy for Ukrainie  attackers to simply drag them out of the way.   Yet so long as they are not displaced, vehicles  will nonetheless still struggle to pass them. Another location where anti-tank obstacles  may be easy to remove are along the roads   where steel hedgehogs have typically been placed. However this is intentional as the Russian’s  do still plan on using these highways for their   own movements and as such have opted for more  maneuverable pieces. Yet we should not discount   the idea that such hedgehogs can still pose quite  the impediment to vehicles in the thick of combat. The next layer of anti-tank defenses are  a series of ditches which, in this case,   are offset about 100 meters from the  prior layers of manufactured traps. These holes in the ground are each about 3-4  meters wide and 1-2 meters deep. Primitive yet   effective, they will prove sufficient to stop  or at least slow tracked and wheeled vehicles. In order to quickly dig these large ditches,  the Russians have turned to specialized   earthmovers like the MDK-3. This model is  a combat engineering vehicle developed by   the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Operating  in reverse it excavates large amounts of   material at an average of 50 to 100 meters  per hour depending on soil conditions. Returning to our 5 km wide battlefield, we  might estimate that a single crew operating   at about 100 meters per hour, 8 hours a day  would take roughly 1-2 weeks to complete the   excavations in this sector. Though of course  some additional time is needed for refueling,   maintenance, and other delays. Yet given that  the Russians have had months to prepare it is   no surprise that they have so widely adopted this  simple but effective form of defensive earthwork. Yet at this point you might be thinking that these  defenses seem annoying but not necessarily deadly.   Indeed, on their own, such obstacles could easily  be neutralized by combat engineers and specialized   vehicles. To prevent this, Russian forces have  laid vast fields of mines in the open space   around their obstacle belts, creating an unseen  threat to attackers. For our simulation we have   only been able to represent a few possible  locations. In reality they could be anywhere. It is these invisible killers which are  likely to take a heavy toll on Ukrainians   who are not able to detect, avoid or  destroy them upon the advance. Sadly,   the same can be said of all those who return to  this battlefield long after the war has ended. But mine and anti-tank features alone will  not be able to stop a determined offensive.   As the military maxim goes: “an obstacle  isn’t an obstacle unless it’s defended.”   To this end and to their credit the Russians have  generally tried to build an integrated defense   which places the obstacles we have reviewed at  a logical distance from their manned frontline   positions. Which in this case, is a series  of infantry trenches and vehicle revetments. Regarding their placement, it seems that  these have been located along a ridgeline   with high-ground advantages over the fields ahead. The outermost anti-tank obstacles are about  500 meters ahead of the entrenched defensive   positions. This puts them well within the  effective range of Light Machine Guns and RPGs. The last anti-tank ditch is about 300  meters away and is thus within range of   assault rifles and 40mm grenade launchers.  Without proper support, Ukrainian dismounts   trying to breach the obstacles could find  themselves pinned down by withering fire. Once more we should note that Russian trenches  are not long, unbroken lines that go on for miles.   Rather they tend to be platoon- or company-size  strong points that overlook or directly control   critical terrain. In this section of  the line, Russian engineers have dug a   company-sized position on a piece of  high ground that commands the road. Most of the strongpoint is composed of simple   trenches deep enough for a man to  stand in without being exposed. Some trenches have been dug by hand, but the  rapid construction of these trenches is mostly   owed to specialized digging machines like the  BTM-3. Also dating back to the cold war era, it   is a rather robust machine capable of excavating  around 800 meters of man-sized trench in one hour. Once the bulk of the earth has been removed,  additional work can be done to improve the   functionality of the trench section. This includes  adding structural elements to prevent erosion,   planking to mitigate mud and  improve movement in wet conditions,   sandbags for added protection, carve  outs for observation or firing positions,   ladders and step boxes for popping  out over the lip, and more. Overall these simple, open-topped trenches are  effective force multipliers which provide good   protection from direct fire weapons like rifles.   However they are vulnerable to indirect  fire from mortars and artillery.   Their impact though has been somewhat mitigated by  the practice of adopting zig-zag pattern trenches   which can help block lateral explosions and direct  fire weaponry. However during heavy bombardments,   each seven-man squad has a dugout  within which they may seek shelter. These are often deeper, more fortified positions  which can also double as places to rest, eat,   and sleep while on the front. As such soldiers  will often personalize them to meet their needs.   Given enough time these dugouts  can almost start to feel like home. Zooming back out of this position, we can see  that our defenders here appear to be tasked   with covering about 800 meters of the line. This  can be a tall order for a Russian company to hold.   After wartime reorganization,  full-strength Russian motor rifle   companies only have about 75 men – and few  formations currently are at full strength.   This makes the firepower of supporting tanks and  the company’s own vehicles even more important. To this end, just as the strength of the  infantry has been improved using trenches,   such vehicles have also seen their effectiveness  increased by the creation of revetments.   These are holes dug into the ground  which allow vehicles to fire from   hull-down positions, presenting a much  smaller target to Ukrainian attackers. Zooming back out once more we can see how  this Russian company does not stand alone.   Besides it are several other  positions which cover their flanks.   To the rear are additional  positions for HQ and reserve units…   and atop a nearby hill are additional emplacements  dating back to before the war which have a   commanding view of this battlefield. From here  spotting and fire support can be provided.   Beyond this simulated area are even more layers  of defenses with mechanized reserves backed by   artillery ready to pounce on any Ukrainians  attempting a breakthrough. I’ll let all this   soak in as the scope of modern warfare can  often be difficult to grasp in our minds. Returning to our strategic view, we are now  reminded that everything we have just described   is represented by a few symbols on a map. As we  continue to zoom out you can now hopefully grasp   the sheer scope of Russia’s defenses not just  in the region but across the entire warfront. Without a doubt, taking on these  fortifications is an uphill fight.   This is something which those tasked with  planning out and certainly carrying out the   offensive are well aware of but which  many of us at home fail to grasp as we   scroll through the headlines wondering  what is taking the offensive so long. In this episode I hope we  have provided a grounded,   True Size view of what the Ukrainians  are actually facing in this war.   But the task is not impossible.  Many, even more formidable defenses,   have been overcome in the past. So join us next  time as we explore how victory can be achieved. If you enjoyed this content, please  consider supporting us on Patreon   where we post downloads of all our art, share  script previews, and run polls for new content.   A big thanks to the current Patrons for funding  the channel and to the researchers, writers,   and artists for making this episode possible. Be sure to like and subscribe for more content  and check out these other related episodes.   See you in the next one.
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Channel: Invicta
Views: 672,987
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Keywords: invicta, invicta history, ukraine war, war in ukraine, Ukrainian offensive, ukraine offensive, ukraine trench, ukraine offensive today, ukraine offensive fail, russian defenses, russian defenses ukraine, ukraine war documentary, bakhmut, william spaniel, kings and generals, true size, maginot line, devils garden, erwin rommel, ukraine combat, ukraine offensive explained, ukraine war explained
Id: vb7ORi4Axos
Channel Id: undefined
Length: 21min 42sec (1302 seconds)
Published: Wed Jul 12 2023
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