As Rome’s vaunted legions were fighting
Hannibal at the conclusion of the third century BC, another ancient civilisation far to the
east was entering its first true golden age. The dynasty of Qin Shi Huangdi had collapsed
soon after his death, but this first Chinese emperor paved the way for a Han Dynasty to
rise in its place. Reigning for four hundred years, the Han presided
over an empire whose territorial extent, cultural brilliance, and scientific advancement equaled
or surpassed that of the Romans. Like their far western counterparts, this
Chinese civilisation also needed protection from a multitude of threats, so Han China
developed one the most technologically sophisticated militaries in the ancient world. Welcome to our video on the armies of China’s
Han Dynasty, how they fought, and their progression throughout the era. This episode is brought to you by Ground News. Judge the truth for yourself. Ground News is an app run by a small team
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the Apple app store, google play store and your desktop web browser. Just click the link in the description below. The tumultuous centuries prior to Qin Shi
Huangdi’s unification of China played host to devastating bouts of violence, the likes
of which had never been seen before. Known as the Warring States period, it heralded
warfare’s increasing scale, in addition to organisational, tactical, and technological
progress. This legacy, which included Sun Tzu’s famous
work - the Art of War, would serve as a foundation for the Han imperial military. Aiming to change the fragmented political
organisation and identity of ‘China’ during the Warring States period, the Han Emperors
and their centralised bureaucracy immediately began propagating an ideology of loyalty to
one all-powerful divine monarch and a common sense of being Chinese, rather than an inhabitant
of the Chu, Wei or Qi Kingdoms. Though the dragon throne was imperial China’s
ultimate authority, any ruler requires subordinates to execute their will, military leaders among
them. Contrary to similar figures in other civilisations,
Han field commanders - known as Jiangjun - were appointed and dictated by traditions uniquely
eastern in nature. A method to prevent military coups or insurrections
against central authority was to have single armies led by two generals, rather than just
one - the ‘General of the Left’ and ‘General of the Right’. If one of the two commanders sought to turn
his army around and lead it against his sovereign, the logic was that, hopefully, his rival general
would remain loyal and foil the scheme. Also with treachery in mind, Han military
appointments were not permanent. Generals were sent on an ad hoc basis to lead
a specific army for a specific purpose, and given an official title which designated that
purpose. For example, the general of an expedition
to Korea was dubbed ‘General Charged with Crossing the Liao. Such Jiangjun were most often selected from
among court officials who were familiar with, and therefore directly answerable to, the
emperor. At surface level, such a system might seem
non-meritocratic and counterproductive, however this was in fact far from the case. In Chinese military custom, generals were
subject to outright execution if they were defeated in battle or failed to accomplish
their given mission. This way of doing things, sometimes regarded
with horror by western observers, was justified by a mixture of middle kingdom politics and
Taoist philosophy. High army officials were expected to be supreme
paragons of virtue, completely in tune with the Tao, or ‘flow of the universe’. Therefore, misfortune or defeat by bad luck
could never befall such an exemplary figure. This meant that if they were defeated, it
could only have been their fault for deviating from the right path. Consequently, the general could be held accountable
by execution. This high minded justification may have often
been a pretence for getting rid of a political rival. Knowing this potential fate, and realising
that they could be called on to command an army at any time if the sovereign decreed
it, imperial courtiers voraciously devoured China’s classic military texts in hopes
of increasing their prowess in tactics, strategy, and command. This savage incentive therefore gave Han emperors
a ready pool of studied men to select from if there was a need for imperial armies to
march. Management of the Han military as a whole
during the Western period fell to the Grand Commandant, who took care of broader scale
administration and empire-wide appointments. He was one of the emperor’s Three Excellencies
- a triad of chief ministers who were almost always at their monarch’s side. However, a further glimpse of paranoia about
the prospect of usurpers can be seen in that the Grand Commandant was not in control of
the palace guard, a part of China’s armed forces which was completely separate. As the Han Dynasty began to lose its central
authority, however, the post of Grand Commandant was abolished. In its place, effective control over the troops
in each commandery was handled by the respective regional commandant, who was usually an experienced
military veteran. The vast manpower at the disposal of a Western
Han general was drawn from three primary sources: conscripts, volunteers and convicts. Throughout the four century long dynasty,
this system did not remain static, instead changing to meet the empire’s needs at varying
times. Taking inspiration from their Qin predecessors
and the later Warring States kingdoms before that, early Han armies were made up mainly
of a mass of conscript peasant infantry. In standard circumstances, these levies were
between 23 and 56 years of age, but this scope could be widened in emergency situations. After their forced recruitment, Chinese conscripts
spent their first year of service in training and drill, followed by another year at the
capital, in one of the empire’s commandery armies, or in a frontier garrison. After the completion of mandatory service
in the son of heaven’s army, former soldiers returned home and frequently served as part
of their local militia - or ‘pen-ming’, a reserve force which could be called up when
necessary. Contrary to the bulk of infantry conscripts,
the Han cavalry forces were generally considered elite by comparison. Imperial horsemen usually originated from
highborn clans from across China, who could afford to maintain horses and the proper equipment
of a cavalryman - which will be discussed later. In addition to these ‘native’ horsemen,
mounted units were also raised from the Han Empire’s dependent dominions, or ‘shu-kuo’,
a trend which increased exponentially in frequency after the nomadic Xiongnu’s defeat at Chinese
hands during the mid second century BC. Employing ‘barbarian’ horsemen was a logical
and sound choice for the Han Dynasty, as their riders’ experience and equipment was already
suited for warfare on the northwestern steppe frontier. Of these foreign auxiliaries, the proto-Mongolic
Wuhuan people were highly regarded as being lethal in battle, and consequently saw action
throughout China from the first century onwards. A similar policy of geographical deployment
was employed in the tropical south, where troops raised in north and central China would
suffer terrible attrition due to the hostile climate. Therefore, local troops were raised for military
duties there instead. Warring States kingdoms had used convicts
in a similar manner to Soviet use of Shtrafbat or Wehrmacht employed Strafbataillon penal
units in World War II. Such unfortunate malcontents were given the
most hazardous tasks and suffered grievous casualties as a consequence, sometimes even
forming what Chinese military expert Chris Peers calls ‘fanatical assault forces’. By Han times, however, this brutal approach
fell out of favour. Most of an army’s criminal element was instead
used as a forced labour corps, which would dig trenches, construct fortifications, and
perform other manual activities which did not involve fighting. In especially dire situations, generals would
arm their convicts for war, usually with promises of freedom. Each clad in a red robe, restrained by an
iron neck collar, and possessing a shaved head as a symbolic alternative to decapitation,
large quantities of such criminals on the march would appear almost identical to one
another. In organisation, the smallest unit within
imperial armies was the sui, or ‘section’, composed of one officer and four soldiers. Several sui made up a hou, or ‘platoon’,
and five hou made up a hou-kuan - a ‘company’. This structure was universal at lower levels
of command, but the higher echelons differed based upon what kind of army it was. Provincial or frontier garrisons had a sector
headquarters, or tu-wei fu which served as the next rung on the military ladder, while
hou-kuan of field armies would be organised into ying - the Han equivalent of a division. It was this formation which was under the
ultimate control of a Jiangjun and his temporarily appointed Hsiao-wei, or colonels. For protection, Han Chinese infantry were
usually clad in lamellar armour made of either leather or iron. This kind of equipment was made up of many
small platelets of material which, when bound together, formed a patchwork sheet which went
over the body. On their heads, soldiers would wear caps or
iron helmets. Bows, swords, spears, and halberds were used
as weapons, often in combination with shields, but undoubtedly the most notorious and iconic
armament of the Han Dynasty was the crossbow. In contrast to traditional bows, which required
specialised skills to use effectively, crossbows could be given to a conscript with little
training and massed to devastating effect. These ranged weapons were manufactured in
various sizes, from light crossbows which could be utilised by mounted troops to heavy
mounted artillery pieces similar to ballistae. However, the largest Chinese crossbows required
a pull of over 350 pounds to lock their firing mechanism in place. Strong men capable of doing this were known
as chueh chang, and were considered to be important specialists. Akin to their dismounted counterparts, cavalry
also used a variety of weapons, but perhaps the most commonly portrayed troop type during
the dynasty was horse archers. Although shown prominently in many pieces
of Han art, it is nevertheless difficult to tell whether the depicted warrior is a Chinese
horseman trained in mounted bowmanship or a nomadic auxiliary. Some riders would wear armour for protection,
similar to their counterparts on foot, but armoured horses were not present until the
dynasty’s twilight days. Shields were used at times, but were rare
because the majority of cavalry specific weapons required two hands to use. When the Han Dynasty started fraying at the
end of the second century of our era, its misfortunes initiated the famous Three Kingdoms
period, widely regarded as one of the greatest ages of Chinese warfare. Similar to developments in the Roman Empire
during the same period, armoured shock cavalry seems to have been emphasized more after 200
than in previous eras. Utilised weapons were still primarily lances
and bows, but horse archery was no longer only utilised by nomadic auxiliaries. The civil war era kingdom of Shu Han possessed
a so-called ‘flying army’ composed wholly of native mounted bowmen, implying that steppe
practices of warfare were filtering into China. Moreover, the king of Wu in 258 is said to
have carried a bow on horseback during warfare. This era of constant warfare gave rise to
unorthodox and desperate tactics, shown clearly in the ‘dare-to-die’ shock troops. Reviving ancient traditions, men in these
units would discard long weapons such as spears and instead arm themselves with swords and
shields before charging at the enemy and engaging them at close range. During a battle between the Wei and Wu kingdoms
in 253, the Wu general even ordered his ‘suicide unit’ to remove their armour and storm a
position atop a dam, almost definitely because it would only hinder them in climbing the
slope. Wei defenders laughed when they saw their
enemy doing this, but were chastened when the fanatical Wu swordsmen routed them soon
after. Much like during the Han period, however,
the greatest number of footsoldiers were still either archers or crossbowmen. During the Three Kingdoms, it seems as though
the use of ranged contingents became more sophisticated, and they were commonly applied
in support of melee infantry as a combined arms force. As armour, weaponry, unit composition and
deployment changed in the foreground, the philosophy of warfare also shifted in the
background as Qin progressed to Han and then Han disintegrated into the Three Kingdoms. During the Warring States period, for example,
there seems to have been an almost Homeric ethos of combat, but this was merged with
a typically Sun Tzu-like intelligence which progressed into the Han Dynasty. During the Wu revolt of 154BC, for example,
Kuan Fu’s father was slain by the rebels. For the purpose of avenging his death, Kuan
Fu stormed a Wu camp with only a dozen mounted followers and was immediately outnumbered
and overwhelmed. Nevertheless, he is said to have slain up
to thirty Wu soldiers and returned from his endeavor alive, but covered with wounds. Word of his brave exploits and filial piety
spread throughout the empire and he was made a general by the emperor. Alongside this heroism there existed a bureaucratic
philosophy of conducting campaigns, which was suited to maintaining a large empire. During the Western Han period, a text known
as the Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung states that ‘The basis of complete victory
is military administration’. Another Han general - Huo Chu-ping - was notorious
in his age for absolute contempt for ancient texts such as Sun Tzu. Once again, thanks to the Ground News for
sponsoring this video. Ground News is the world’s first news comparison
platform and it enables the reader to easily compare how sources from the left, center
and right are reporting on a story, empowering you to see *exactly* how the story is being
spun to fit a political narrative. Get the tools you need to quickly analyze
the news and judge the truth for yourself. Ground News is a free app now available on
the Apple app store, google play store and your desktop web browser. Just click the link in the description below. We have more videos on Chinese history on
the way, so make sure you are subscribed to our channel and have pressed the bell button. We would like to express our gratitude to
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we will catch you on the next one.
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That is an amazing video series. Thank you very much for sharing.