The end of the Cold War and the discovery
of oil on the Southern edge of the Arabian peninsula created a new situation in Yemen.
After centuries of colonial rule and decades of division, Yemen was not only going to gain
its independence but be united as well. However, the economic problems, poor governance and
internal fragmentation that had plagued the region in the previous decades had not gone
anywhere and very soon after the unification, all these problems reared their ugly heads.
Welcome to our video on the modern history of Yemen, its civil wars, the Houthi movement, and
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and we hope you’ll consider joining in too. YEMEN IN THE EARLY YEARS OF UNIFICATION
After the formal unification of the Yemen Arab Republic and the People’s Democratic Republic of
Yemen into one nation, the leader of the former, Ali Abdullah Saleh, became the president of
the country, while the leader of the latter, Ali Salem al-Beidh, was given the position of vice
president. North Yemen had a higher population than the South, with approximately 12 million
people compared to 2-3 million. Because of this, the North would be given a higher proportion of
representation in the new state apparatus, with 26 individuals from North Yemen taking part in
the election of the presidential council alongside 17 Southern Yemeni counterparts. These 43
representatives would rule the country during its transitional period. Beneath them, a provisional
parliament with 159 members from the north and 111 from the south was established to carry out
lawmaking until proper elections could be held. North Yemen’s larger population, combined with
the fact that South Yemen was transitioning into the political and economic system of North Yemen,
inevitably made Sana’a the senior partner in this coalition. Thus, it was only a matter of time
before the Southern Yemeni people began to sense that they were being eaten by a larger neighbour
and grow discontent with this new status quo. Despite the unification and the oil the
country was now selling, Yemen was still a pretty poor country, particularly by the
standards of the other countries of the Arabian peninsula. Because of this, many Yemenis
left the country to find work in Saudi Arabia. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Yemeni
government refused to support the military intervention in Iraq. Saudi Arabia was one of
the key members of the anti-Saddam coalition, and in retaliation, they expelled 800,000
Yemeni labourers from their country. This was a major economic burden for an already
economically embattled Yemen. Before long, there were food shortages across the
country, and hunger riots broke out in 1992. In April 1993, unified Yemen held its
first parliamentary election. In it, Saleh’s General People’s Congress received
the most votes and earned 122 seats, while the Islamist party of Al-Islah came in
second. Meanwhile, the Yemeni Socialist Party, the former ruling party of South Yemen,
trailed behind as a distant third, winning only 56 seats. Although these three
parties formed a coalition, Saleh and his party were now the most dominant force in Yemeni
politics, and Southern influence in the newly unified nation was gradually dissipating. At the
time of unification, the South was poorer, but basic services such as healthcare and education
were at a higher level than in the North. However, the more populous, wealthy and powerful North was
gradually imposing its dominance over the South and weakening the pre-existing systems there.
Moreover, several Southern politicians were assassinated by the Jihadists, and many blamed
Saleh for the orchestration of this violence. The breaking point in the North-South
relations occurred when Vice President al-Beidh left the capital, Sanaa, for Aden in
protest of the marginalization of the South. He stated that he would return to Sanaa only if
the violence against his party and the economic marginalization of the South stopped. This
impasse lasted for several months until the Document of Pledge and Agreement between
the two sides was signed in January 1994. The agreement called for the review of the
constitution and Yemen’s economic programs, but ultimately, it did nothing to stop another
civil war in Yemen. Even after the unification, the armies of the two former Yemens had not been
integrated together. Occasional skirmishes would occur between the north and south throughout the
spring of 1993, which culminated in a tank battle in Amran in April of 1993. The point of no return
occurred on May 4, when the two belligerent forces started bombarding each other. Another civil war
in Yemen had officially begun. The Northern army, supported by the Jihadists, very
quickly gained the upper hand and, on May 20, captured the Al Anad Airbase on
the doorstep of the Southern capital of Aden. The South responded by officially seceding
from the unified Yemeni state and declaring the Democratic Republic of Yemen with al-Beidh as the
president. However, on May 24, the Northern army captured Ataq, an important city on the way to
Yemen’s southern oil fields. Both sides targeted the oil installations of the other, inflicting
severe damage to Yemen’s economy that would impact the nation long after the conclusion of
the civil war. In July, the North captured Aden. A few days later, the Southern leaders fled Yemen,
bringing the war to a conclusion, with the North as the victors. Now, Saleh and the North were
in full control of a unified Yemen. Once again, the South was represented by a vice president,
this time named Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi. However, according to Stephen Day, Saleh was “mainly
interested in the appearance of power-sharing, not genuine representation of southern
interests in government.” There were now fewer Southerners in the cabinet, as Saleh
chose to form a coalition with the Islah party. A Yemen analyst, April Longley Alley,
argued that the civil war of 1993 created two different narratives in Yemen:
“Under one version, the war laid to rest the notion of separation and solidified
national unity. According to the other, the war laid to rest the notion of unity and
ushered in a period of northern occupation of the South.” The second perception
was, of course, prevalent in the South. Throughout the rest of the 1990s and until the
Arab Spring, Saleh’s position gradually became even stronger. Without needing to share his
power with the Southerners, he began to rule like a strongman, placing his family members
and allies in key positions in Government. Many members of his Sanhan tribe got positions in the
army and security. When Saleh was finally deposed, a UN experts’ panel estimated that he had
amassed between 32-60 billion dollars while in office. Having said that, it is tough to
deny that he was the only Yemeni president who had a long rule, which was due to his
ability to maintain stability against the background of a complicated system of tribal,
sectarian and ideological relations in Yemen. Saleh himself compared his rule to “dancing on
the heads of snakes.” Although Saleh sought to weaken and control his political opponents, unlike
many Arab countries, he tolerated some degree of opposition to his rule. In both the 1999 and 2003
parliamentary elections, GPC got the majority, but Al-Islah gained a considerable number of
seats, too. However, in 2009, he postponed the elections, an act which reminded the world of the
dictator that Saleh really was. In foreign policy, Yemen stabilized relations with Saudi Arabia
initially by signing the Treaty of Jeddah, which defined the border between the two countries. But
the Saudis later erected a wall on the border, citing smuggling from Yemen as the cause. In
general, relations with the Saudis have been problematic ever since Yemen became independent.
Saudi Arabia has interfered in every civil war fought in Yemen and has routinely engaged in
border skirmishes with Yemeni forces. Saudi meddling in Yemeni affairs continues to this
day. In America’s war on terror, Saleh sided with the United States, allowing the Americans
to strike Al Qaeda on Yemeni soil. However, it was claimed that Saleh was simultaneously helping
and even directing Al Qaeda in Yemen. As usual, the Yemeni strongman was trying to manipulate
the complicated situation in his favour, this time by playing both sides of the conflict.
His long reign suggests that he was quite good at this kind of political maneuvering.
However, such things don’t last forever. SADAH WARS AND THE HOUTHIS. THE SOUTHERN MOVEMENT
Although Saleh was firmly in control of Yemen, he was far from winning the hearts and
minds of all the Yemeni people. This is particularly true of the Zaydis of the
North, some 40% of the Yemeni population, whose political power had been waning ever
since the North Yemen civil war in 1970. According to Marieke Brandt, “the economic and
political marginalization of the Sa’dah region, the uneven distribution of economic
resources and political participation, and the religious discrimination against its
Zaydi population provided fertile soil in which the Houthi movement could take root and blossom.”
In the 1990s, Hussein al-Houthi formed a Zaydi revivalist religious movement called the Believing
Youth. He also formed his own political party, although it did not achieve much success
in the conventional political process. The American invasion of Iraq and the rise of
anti-American sentiments in Yemen, along with the rest of the Arab world and Saleh’s support
of the United States, were some of the factors that led to the radicalization of this revivalist
Houthi movement. Across Zaydi mosques and schools, Hussein’s slogan was repeated time and
again: “death to America, death to Israel, curse upon the Jews, victory to Islam.” Saleh saw
this growing movement as a threat to his regime, and in 2004, hundreds of al-Houthi’s supporters
were arrested. After this, Saleh ordered the arrest of Hussein himself. However, Hussein evaded
capture and responded by starting a rebellion against the Yemeni government. Even though
Hussein al-Houthi was killed in September 2004, his death gave the Zaydi movement a martyr
figure and eventually its name - the Houthis. al-Houthi’s death ended the first round of
fighting in the Zaydi stronghold of Saada. After this, the government declared victory
despite the fact that the rebellion was far from being defeated. The second round of
fighting took place in the spring of 2005, with Hussein’s father, Badr al-Din
al-Houthi, leading the rebels. Again, Saleh declared victory without actually achieving
it. He also amnestied some arrested members of the Houthi movement to alleviate tensions. Ultimately,
this did little to soothe the political climate, and the third Sadah war started in November 2005,
with fighting breaking out between pro-government and pro-Houthi tribes. The government interfered,
but again was unable to crash the insurgency. Instead, Saleh once more attempted to placate
the rebels by ordering the return of Hussein al-Houthi’s house and assigning a government
pension to the Houthi family. Evidently, however, the government’s overtures did not
really work because, in January of 2007, the fourth Sadah war started. The government
accused the Houthis of harassing the local Jewish community and of being supported by Iran
and Libya. Saleh also decided to recruit tribal forces to his attack on Saada this time,
which transformed the complexion of the conflict. According to Christopher Boucek,
the war between the Yemeni government and the Houthis had now acquired another layer.
A largely sectarian conflict was now a tribal conflict as well. This got other groups
within Yemeni society involved in the war. In June 2007, the two sides agreed to a
Qatar-brokered deal, which envisaged the halt of all hostilities, the release of all prisoners
within a month, the reconstruction of Saada, and the exile of the Houthi leaders. The
fighting largely stopped after this agreement, but most of its provisions were not fulfilled,
which paved the way for another round of conflict, which started in March 2008. This time, the
geography of the conflict expanded, as some fighting took place as far from Saada as Banu
Hushaysh on the northern outskirts of Sanaa. The result was inconclusive once again, and in July
2008, Saleh unilaterally declared a ceasefire. The sixth and last round of the conflict between
Saleh and the Houthis started in August 2009, triggered by an accusation by the government
that the Houthis had kidnapped international aid workers. Saleh launched Operation Scorched
Earth in August 2009 with the intention of defeating the Houthi insurgency once and for all.
The government deployed 40,000 troops to Saada, recruited tribal forces to their cause, and
subjected Houthi lands to heavy bombardment. Despite the fact that the government
attacked with such overwhelming firepower, Saleh was unable to defeat the Houthis once
again, and in February 2010, another ceasefire was signed. However, the fighting between the
Houthis and the government was far from over. The aggressive policy of the government
pushed even the non-religious people in the North to side with the Houthis, expanding
their participation in the Houthi rebellion. Meanwhile, political fissures were appearing
elsewhere in Yemen as well. The losing side of the 1994 civil war, the South, was growing
increasingly unhappy with their state of affairs. Many southern bureaucrats and military personnel
were forced to retire following Saleh’s victory in the civil war. In 2006, protests largely
led by the above groups were carried out, and the government’s response was violent. This
led to the emergence of the Al-Hirak movement, which aimed to gain more rights for the people
in the South and more parity in resource sharing in Yemen. The heavy-handed response of Saleh
and the fierce resistance of the Houthis in the North gradually made the protests in the
South more powerful. Between 2007 and 2009, some 100 protesters were killed by the government.
By the time the Arab Spring started to shake the Middle East to its foundations, the calls
for the secession of the South had increased. THE ARAB SPRING
By late 2010, when protests erupted in Tunisia and Egypt, discontent with
Saleh’s rule reached a boiling point as the Yemeni people grew fed up with his corruption, cronyism,
the very poor economic situation in the country, and lack of representation of many Yemenis. All
this made the arrival of the Arab Spring to Yemen inevitable. In January 2011, protests erupted
in Sanaa, later spreading to Aden and Taizz. Initially, the protesters demanded government
reform, but the violent suppression of the protests by the government and the victory of the
revolution in Egypt changed the situation. Now, the broad protest coalition, which comprised the
urban classes, marginalized Southerners, Houthis, Shafis, and youths from different groups, were
demanding the resignation of Saleh and a complete transformation of Yemen. The brutal crackdown
on protests prompted new groups, including several major tribes, to join demonstrations.
Understanding the gravity of the situation, Saleh called for a national unity government and
elections, but the opposition was not seeking compromises anymore and rejected this, continuing
to demand Saleh’s immediate resignation. Despite the mounting pressure, Saleh continued
to insist on remaining in power. On March 18th, 45 protesters were killed in Sanaa. Things were
spiralling out of control, and Saleh declared a state of emergency. He was trying to manipulate
and deceive his way out of another crisis, but this time, the coalition against him was much
bigger, while his base was crumbling. On May 23rd, the Hashid Tribe joined the opposition, and
its armed supporters clashed with the army in Sanaa. Both sides began shelling each
other, which was the first signal of yet another civil war in Yemen. Although the
belligerents eventually signed a truce, Saleh made another mistake a few days later.
On May 29th, he ordered the army to restore control over the central square of Taizz, which
was taken over by peaceful protesters. Dozens of protesters were killed. In early June, more
protestors, now armed, fought back. Consequently, street battles broke out in Taizz. By June 7th,
the government forces were pushed out of the city. The government chose violence against the people
of Yemen, and violence was the response of the people. Fighting regularly broke out in Sanaa,
Taizz, and other cities in Yemen. On June 3rd, there was a bombing at the Presidential palace
in Sanaa, which left Saleh severely injured, prompting him to leave for Saudi Arabia.
The violence would not stop in his absence. According to Human Rights Watch, by October 2011,
at least 225 people were confirmed dead since the start of the Yemeni revolution. Saleh would
return to Yemen in September, but when even his staunch Saudi allies who had supported his
fight against the Houthis advised him to leave, he finally agreed to sign the agreement proposed
by the Gulf Cooperation Council. Saleh transferred his authority to Vice President Abd Rabbuh
Mansur Hadi in exchange for legal immunity for him and his family. After 33 years in
power, Ali Abdullah Saleh was finally ousted. Hadi was elected president in February 2012
in an election without an alternative for a 2-year transition period. The unity government was
evenly divided between the GPC and the opposition coalition Joint Meeting Parties. Despite this,
Yemen was far from restoring stability. In 2013, the National Dialogue Conference headed by
President Hadi and representatives of all major political forces in the country was established
with the goal of offering a program to solve a wide range of problems in Yemen. However, the lack
of public trust in Hadi, who had long been Saleh’s close ally, the inability of the government to
solve the economic and political crisis in the country and the absence of a reasonable program to
address the grievances of the Zaydis and Southern Yemenis was eroding confidence in the ability of
the coalition to govern Yemen. Pro-Saleh forces and the Houthis carried out measures to sabotage
the government as well, which included damaging the vital infrastructure of the country, such
as water and power supply. In January 2014, the National Dialogue Conference signed the
NDC Document, which agreed on extending Hadi’s presidency for another year, the 50-50 division of
the parliament, the transformation of Yemen into a federal state and the establishment of freedom of
religion, the last of which was meant to placate the Shi’ite Zaydis. However, this document was
not accepted by the Houthis and some Southern forces and the absence of a consensus ultimately
made this attempt at reform meaningless.
THE 2014 CIVIL WAR
Clearly, the transitional government was crumbling, and the sides which
were most interested in its demise - the Houthis and the former president Saleh, who wanted to
make a comeback, sought to take advantage. After defeating the Salafis in Dammaj, the emboldened
Houthis expanded their area of control into the province of Amran. Despite fighting a war with
the Houthis for several years, Saleh decided to join forces with them to fight against the
government. He still had sympathizers in the army who defected to join him. In September, the
Houthis and Saleh attacked Sanaa, where people were protesting against the rise in fuel prices.
Public disillusionment with the government was at an all-time high, and ordinary people were
not inclined to defend it against an attack. Moreover, the Houthis stated that their
target was the corrupt political elite, expanding their popularity among the general
population with this populist message. Meanwhile, Saleh positioned himself as the person who
could restore stability in Yemen. This unlikely partnership between Saleh and the Houthis
captured Sanaa in September 2014 and forced Hadi to resign in early 2015 and flee to Saudi
Arabia. There, Hadi called on the UN Security Council to stop the Houthi advance in Yemen. The
UN Security Council Resolution 2216 recognized the Hadi government as the legitimate
authority in Yemen, calling on all sides, including the Houthis, to lay down their
arms and return to the negotiation table. Shortly before the resolution passed, Saudi
Arabia, together with several other Arab states, launched an intervention to defeat the Houthi
rebellion in Yemen and reinstall the government to power. The still ongoing Saudi intervention
in the Yemeni civil war has proved deadly for thousands of people. They have conducted regular
air strikes on Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen that have caused a humanitarian disaster that
the Yemenis are still suffering from. This Saudi intervention forced the Houthis to retreat
towards the north and the west in some areas, nevertheless, the Houthi-Saleh coalition
still controlled most of Northwestern Yemen, including Sanaa and Taizz, where
the majority of Yemenis lived. As they fought with Al Qaeda in the South
and government forces in the South and East, the Houthis were also becoming more powerful than
their pro-Saleh allies, particularly after taking the remnants of the Republican Guard under
their control. Eventually and inevitably, infighting started. In 2017, Saleh publicly
denounced the Houthis and called on everyone to fight them. However, only two days later,
his demarche was defeated, and he was killed by the Houthis. The UAE-backed nephew of former
president, Tareq Saleh, now had his own faction and had since announced himself by capturing
the Hodeida port and the area surrounding it on the Red Sea coast. In December 2018, the UN
brought the government and the Houthis together, but despite a preliminary agreement, the talks
eventually fell through. In 2020-21, the Houthis made a significant advance in the oil-rich Marib
province despite heavy bombardment by the Saudis. In September 2021, they also announced the
capture of Al Bayda province. The fighting between the Houthis and the government forces
have largely decreased in intensity by 2023. The Houthis, pro-Saleh forces and the Saudi-backed
government were not the only actors fighting in this civil war. Another important force was
the Southern Transitional Council. The idea of Southern secessionism never really disappeared,
and even though the South nominally sided with the government, the relations were never smooth. In
April 2017, President Hadi dismissed the governor of Aden Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, accusing him of close
ties with the United Arab Emirates. In response, al-Zoubaidi declared the Southern Transitional
Council, or STC, and took over the control of Aden. The Council was supported by the UAE and
was now in open rebellion against the Saudi-backed government. Government forces tried to regain
Aden and came close to it in August 2019, but the UAE airstrikes stopped their advance.
In April 2020, the STC declared self-governance, which essentially meant independence. The Council
indeed took control over the southwestern part of Yemen, including Aden, Hadramawt, Abyan and
so on. Under Saudi pressure, the UAE forces eventually left Yemen in 2020, as the STC joined
the Presidential Leadership Council, which has been an internationally recognized government of
Yemen, despite still having a secessionist agenda. Al-Zoubaidi is currently the vice president
of the Presidential Leadership Council. So, at this point, the de facto political map of
Yemen looks quite messy, comprised of the central government, its Houthi enemies, the separatist
Southern Transitional Council, Tareq Saleh, and semi-independent tribal warlords
and fundamentalist groups like Al Qaeda. Additionally, none of the factions, including the
government, enjoy legitimacy given by the people or cross-community support. The government
relies on Saudi Arabia and tribal support and is being led by the Presidential Leadership
Council, consisting of people with very different interests. The Houthis, meanwhile, depend on
Iran’s political and military support. However, reducing them to mere proxies of Tehran would
be too simplistic. They have been fighting Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for over
a decade, and it was only natural for them to seek allies. Iran was more than happy to boost
a force that was fighting one of its main foes, Saudi Arabia and to expand its geopolitical
influence in the process. The fact that both sides are Shia made this alliance, in which Iran is the
definitive senior partner, easier to establish. The Houthis have a decisively anti-American and
anti-Israeli stance. This is not surprising, seeing as they have been one of the most active
and significant actors in the Middle East since the war broke out in Gaza. They have attracted
international attention for attacking military and commercial vessels in the Red Sea, inflicting
major damage to international trade. They have openly supported Palestine and declared war on
Israel and, just like other Iranian allies or proxies, depending on your perspective, have
been regularly attacking American military assets in the Middle East. The United States has
brought together a coalition to protect the Red Sea from the Houthi attacks and has conducted
air strikes against them, along with seeking diplomatic means to persuade the Houthis to
stop their attacks. However, at this point, it looks like the Houthis aggression
will continue for the foreseeable future. CONCLUSION
The latest civil war in Yemen is still going on, and neither of the numerous sides fighting seems
likely to achieve any meaningful victory any time soon. According to the UN, as of 2021, 377,000
people have died in Yemen’s modern civil wars, while millions more are at risk of famine. All
sides have committed war crimes and human rights violations, and the Houthis have been accused
of slavery. There is a lull in the fighting now, but it could escalate again since the profound
disagreements between the sides have not gone anywhere, and there is not much history of
finding common political ground in modern Yemen. Unfortunately, Yemen is going through yet
another cycle of violence and human suffering, and the end to it is not in sight. More videos
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