Why The Allies Couldn't Overcome German Trenches in Spring 1917 (WW1 Documentary)

the bloody western front battles of 1916 show that in the first years of the first world war even if you won you lost for minimal territorial gains hundreds of thousands of men were killed or wounded by shot and shelled with both sides dealing with a growing manpower crisis british french and german commanders would attempt to develop new tactics for yet another year of fighting and one ambitious french general would soon put them all to the test in what he expected would be a war winning offensive [Applause] [Music] by early 1917 despite two and a half years of fighting the western front hadn't moved very far the germans had mostly held their early war gains in 1915 and 1916 and inflicted terrible casualties on the british and french but they were themselves running short of manpower as well in late 1916 chief of the admiralty henning von holzendorf warned the chancellor the war demands a decision by autumn 1917 if it is not to end with a general exhaustion of all parties and thus disastrously for us the antanta also wanted to end the war in 1917. the french who had a much larger army than the british planned a spectacular launch to a large multi-front offensive to push the germans out of france french commander-in-chief joseph jeffrey devised a plan in november 1916 that called for offensives on the italian and russian fronts to support a major franco-british push in the west new british prime minister david lloyd george was unimpressed and called the plan a complete farce it repeated all the bloody stupidities of 1915 and 1916 and the old fatuous tactics of hammering away with human flesh and sinews at the strongest fortresses of the enemy by january 1917 things had changed russia and italy were not able to sustain a major offensive and jaffra had been replaced by general robert nivel nivel was brimming with confidence after his victory at verdun and tweaked the plan to fit his particular style mass artillery followed by infantry assaults on narrow fronts his plan included a british diversionary attack around aras to force the germans to divert their reserves once the germans were distracted in the north the french army would launch the main attack against the nguyen salient along the chamande dam nivel expected it would be a knockout blow british commander field marshall douglas hague however was concerned by rumors that his forces would fall under french leadership it would be madness to place the british under the french and i do not believe our troops would fight under french leadership i am prepared to be tried by court martial rather than betray the army by agreeing to it being placed under the french eventually after threats of resignation on both sides they compromised the british first third and fifth armies would support the french attack but they would remain under british control hague also demanded more time to prepare and wanted the planned february offensive to be moved to may the compromise solution was april so the ontank was set to break open the stalemate on the western front in april 1917 but the german empire was also making plans that would make it a much tougher opponent to beat in 1914 and 1915 german doctrine had favored the offensive but its huge losses in 1916 caused a change while the antons could mostly replace their casualties with fresh reserves and colonial troops german losses were not so easily replenished so german commanders reluctantly accepted a move to the defense was necessary in september 1916 field marshal powell von hindenburg and general erich ludendorff took over the entire german war effort and they soon realized the situation in the west was extremely difficult for germany staff officer hermann von kuhl noted a conversation to this effect in his diary in 1916. i spoke with ludendorff alone about the overall situation we were in agreement that a large-scale positive outcome is now no longer possible we can only hold on and take the best opportunity for peace we made too many serious errors this year one of these german mistakes was keeping too many men crammed into the front line trenches where they were vulnerable to allied artillery instead the germans developed new principles of elastic defense in depth in a december 1916 document called the principles of command in the defensive battle in position warfare instead of holding a strong front line at all costs the germans would now allow the anton to enter into a deeper defensive zone where german positions would be split into three sectors the first was the four-felt zone consisting of one or two lightly defended trenches these trenches were fine for day-to-day trench warfare like raids or sniping but the troops would withdraw from them if the allies attacked in force the battle zone the gross campsona was the main line of resistance this would consist of new lines of trenches but also reinforced hardpoints buildings bunkers pillboxes and other obstacles behind this would be a rear battle zone with more trenches support facilities and units ready to counter attack these troops were to wait for the attackers to exhaust themselves and outrun their artillery support before launching aggressive counter-strikes and taking back any lost ground these form the principles of the new doctrine's elasticity the germans would bend withdraw and then snap back the germans also focused on how to better use terrain on the defensive especially reverse slopes the germans had learned that machine guns placed on the downward slope of the hill were actually more useful for defense than placing them on top of the hill despite a shallower field of fire they could surprise attackers and remain protected from enemy artillery behind the crest of the hill german divisions were also deployed differently stellung's division would be arranged as three regiments of breast with each battalion manning a different sector from front to back this allowed easier coordination and communication to withdraw or to counter-attack but perhaps the most drastic change in the german defense in the west was operation alberich a major withdrawal across the nguyen salient in february and march 1917. german forces abandoned their extended front line and moved back to the freshly constructed hindenburg line built with the new defensive principles in mind the new line was also significantly shorter and up to 72 kilometers further east which freed up 13 german divisions when anton forces cautiously followed them they found the germans had destroyed anything and everything of use in their wake a british officer recalled his experience including booby traps from a captured german operation order it appears that our patrols entered the hostile trenches only one hour after they'd been vacated pretty sharp work the german trenches we've taken over are deep well constructed and surprisingly dry masses of beer bottles unfortunately empty are strewn about and gun cotton attached to shell cases and grenades has been left ready to explode when picked up or accidentally kicked we've lost five casualties in this way the germans adjusted their tactics after verdun and the somme but the british army had also learned from its mistakes and now looked for new ways to break the trench deadlock after the fighting in 1916 failed to break the stalemate british officers identified their own army's tactical shortcomings one of these was that british troops often advanced in linear fashion to maintain cohesion and ease of command the british had hoped that their artillery could destroy the germans before the infantry even left its own trenches but the sum showed this was not the case another issue concerned command when advancing troops came under fire confusion and panic often set in ncos and junior officers would wait for orders from higher up but in many cases their superior officers were either overwhelmed had been killed or communication with them had been cut to counter all this british empire troops began to adopt new assault tactics that relied more on tactical movement at the platoon level troops were now to advance in open formation moving from cover to cover to deal with issues of command the command structure was decentralized and junior officers could now take more initiative in leading their units attacking enemy strong points from the flanks and using enfilade fire was now a priority as well canadian corps commander lieutenant general julian bing reminded his officers of the importance of decision making in an emergency the man who does something is sometimes wrong but the man who does nothing is always wrong new weapons also began to reach british frontline troops in 1916 they often lacked the firepower to defend captured trenches against german counter-attacks 1917 british platoons had a lot more firepower including specially trained bombers and rifle grenadiers as well as one light luis machine gun per 60 man platoon heavy machine guns would also be used on the assault to provide suppressing fire british reports also singled out the artillery of 1916 for criticism on the song artillery barrages were spread along a wide front and consequently could not destroy the german defenses as intended especially targets behind the front lines like enemy artillery another problem was faulty ammunition many shells were duds and had older fuses that did not explode at the moment of impact which meant that they didn't cut german barbed wire very effectively in 1917 the british introduced new instantaneous fuse number 106 and improved coordination between artillery and observation especially aircraft british gunners also began to prioritize counter battery fire with the help of new methods like flash spotting and sound ranging the rolling barrage technique also became more refined with better synchronization and control at the psalm each british gun covered about 50 meters of german front but at aras it became one per 20 meters the british also became more active in underground warfare they dug more tunnels under no man's land to place mines under german positions and dug subways to move troops to the jumping off trenches under cover on april 9 1917 the diversionary british offensive began called the battle of aris in english and the australians in german 18 british divisions 3 000 guns and 48 tanks went over the top so let's take a look at what went right and what went wrong for british and empire troops in the fighting that followed in the opening stage of the battle of aras the canadian corps attack at vimy ridge proved to be one of the most successful british actions the germans had fortified defensive positions on the ridge which dominated the surrounding area but the canadians with british infantry and artillery support captured most of it in just one day british and canadian artillery smashed the german positions on the ridge which allowed the canadian infantry using the new small unit tactics to capture the first german lines of defense fairly quickly new canadian units then leapfrogged through the first exhausted wave and continued to assault the next german lions shell-shocked and disorganized surviving german troops surrendered in large numbers seventeen-year-old hermann kraft was one of the four thousand captured during the battle and left a partly fanciful account of his capture our sergeant ordered us up the stairs himself going first suddenly he yells tommy's and fell back dead tumbling down the stairs one of our old hands he was 22 came down the stairs and told us to abandon our weapons and come up as the position was hopeless and the english were all over us i walked up the stairs to a huge tommy who was brandishing a baseball bat one of the soldiers wore no helmet and had no hair apart from a small tuft on the top of his head he also had white and red paint on his face and was very fearsome looking i then realized that he was a red indian and our captors were canadians now that last part of this account is almost certainly a figment of the soldier's imagination but by the end of april 9th nearly the entire ridge was in canadian hands a lot had gone right for the canadians the new tactics allowed for a rapid advance and the counter battery fire had almost eliminated german artillery since 83 of german gun emplacements had been identified before the battle canadian troops like private bill tapper of the 38th battalion were glad for the help we went over supported by the lahore divisional artillery and were they cracker jack why the germans had been beaten before we got there it was a walk over in reality vimy ridge was far from a walk over but the germans also made their share of mistakes german command was unable to fully implement the elastic defense in depth and kept reserves too far behind the front lines to counter-attack while they still had the chance the loss of a position like vimy did not bode well for the german army the canadian corps took vimy ridge as planned on april 9th but not all the opening attacks of the battle of aras would go as smoothly south of aras near the village of bulkur the australians and new zealanders ended up having a much more difficult time british fifth army commander general hubert gough was anxious to get the anzac corps into the fight near aras but his artillery support was delayed so he decided to rely on the support of a dozen tanks to spearhead an attack along a one kilometer wide front and crush the enemy wire that the artillery had not yet been able to destroy the tanks had little time to prepare but they moved out towards no man's land in the early hours of april 11th they did knock out some german machine gun positions but most of the machines bogged down or were knocked out before reaching the wire australian major percy black reportedly called out to his men come on boys bugger the tanks and the infantry attacked on its own although some forces did break through the line they were too weak to push any further a key position in the german defense held out with exhaustion mounting the germans launched counter-attacks in some cases getting behind the australians and cutting off their lines of retreat the anzacs were pushed back to their starting lines and the assault failed so what went wrong goff's impatience had led to a lack of preparation while there was also a lack of communication with the artillery who often believed that german positions had been captured when they hadn't australians like lieutenant colonel e drake brockman of the 16th australian infantry battalion blamed the tanks the tank crew seemed to know little or nothing of an attack by infantry and nothing whatsoever about the particular operation they were to participate in for instance in the case of number two tank the tank commander had not even synchronized his watch his time being five minutes behind true time as given to the infantry further tank crews did not even know the direction of the enemy of the 11 tanks committed to the battle only two survived on the german side unlike at vimy ridge the defense in depth at burkur held out strong points like the village itself fired on the flanks of the anzacs as they approached and the germans timed their counter-attacks well to hit the exhausted australians at just the right moment so the british offensive around aras in april 1917 had some successes like vimy ridge and some disappointments like bulkur but of course it was a diversion and the main allied effort was focused on the ains sector even though the germans had changed the line through their strategic withdrawal in march general nivel's offensive went ahead anyway the french plan involved three army groups two-thirds of the french army in the west the reserve army group would lead the assault with the central and northern army groups providing supporting and diversionary attacks two armies of the reserve army group would attack the german line in the ayn sector with the goal of breaking through within 24 to 48 hours a third army would then pass through the breach and act as a so-called master maneuver and lead a battle of maneuver in the german rear nivel planned to use his successful redund tactics but on a larger scale instead of a broad methodical advance which gave the enemy time to redeploy he wanted to achieve narrow penetrations and breakthroughs with massive artillery support nivel felt that high morale and an offensive spirit were essential to overcome enemy obstacles and then broken german lines could be rolled up on either side nivelle did not lack confidence after his success at verdun the experience is conclusive our method has proven itself but nivel did have his critics british liaison officer to the french edward spears questioned the tactics as well as nivelle's experience commanding larger formations what remained to be seen was whether the glorified raids of redund were applicable on a large scale above all whether nivel was strong enough to keep his head in the lonely and dizzy height of supreme command the french also introduced some tactical changes but the focus wasn't on reforming infantry assault since the french had already done so it was now on increased firepower they increased the number of light machine guns to 16 for every 250 men even though nivel was skeptical about tanks the reserve army received 160 schneider and 16 sanchamo tanks the french command concentrated its efforts mostly on artillery and they had around 6 100 guns in position by january they plan to increase the speed of the rolling barrages to hasten the breakthrough and especially the all-important maneuver stage that would follow it however as april approached nivea's own subordinates lost faith in the plan especially general joseph michele the commander of the reserve army group he pointed out that the german withdrawal had changed the situation on the ground but nivelle felt that it made little difference general philippe peter questioned the impact of massive but localized artillery attacks on such a broad front even the waters of lake geneva would have but little effect if dispersed over the length and breadth of the sahara desert perhaps most concerning was evidence that the germans knew of the coming attack nivel had a reputation for lacks operational security and spoke openly of the coming offensive and on april 4th the germans captured documents revealing french plans the french plan for a quick breakthrough based on concentrated firepower was ready despite internal reservations and the likely loss of the element of surprise nivel ordered the offensive to begin as planned on april 16th but promised to call it off if there was no breakthrough within 48 hours nivelle himself reckoned it would take only three following a massive 14-day preparatory barrage the reserve army group's fifth and sixth armies attacked a 40-kilometer front around the chamande dam ridge at 6 a.m on april 16 1917. they captured the first german line and reached the ridge within the first hour but the german defenders badly mauled the advancing french who came up against uncut wire and concrete emplacements the senegalese troops of the 10th colonial division suffered particularly high casualties with an entire battalion almost wiped out when they came up against the reverse slope position just as the german's elastic defense tactics envisioned the commander of the second colonial corps general blondar recalled the effects infantrymen descended into the valley of the ellet river there they were welcomed and fixed in place by the deadly fire of numerous machine guns that located on the reverse side of the slope outside the reach of our projectiles have remained undamaged in general the troops suffer considerable losses in a few minutes particularly in leaders and after not succeeding in crossing this deadly zone halt take cover and at some points withdraw to the first trench to their rear the second french assault wave then went in but it got tangled up with the retreating first wave that afternoon the tanks helped capture the village of juventus but they were vulnerable targets and the germans knocked many of them out with the french infantry struggling the germans launched counter-attacks in many places the french troops held their modest gains but casualties were mounting where french troops had advanced they had to stop if neighboring unit struggles left their flanks exposed by the end of the first day french troops were forced to dig in in terrible conditions morale especially among the colonial troops plummeted the french tried again to break through starting the next day they did make some gains and took more than 5000 germans prisoner but it was clear to both sides by the 20th of april that the attack had failed german officer herman von kuhl later wrote of his certainty that the battle had already been won the first two days had decided the fate of the offensive since the breakthrough had not occurred immediately it would never occur many things had gone wrong for the french firstly the weather was abysmal slowing the advance and preventing artillery observation and in any case the germans famously had practical air superiority in april 1917 which limited french aerial observation the defenders had also been heavily reinforced in some areas doubling the number of divisions a fact noted by french intelligence where the french artillery did play a role the creeping barrage was too fast and left the infantry exposed in its wake in some cases the germans had time to repair breaches in the wire by the time the french infantry attacked the german's vast tunnel networks under the ridge also gave them some protection from the 11 million shells fired by french guns since the french command expected a short battle ammunition stocks quickly dried up which limited the support that the artillery could give more importantly however the german elastic defense had worked as intended the french continued to try to advance into may but the shemendidam offensive broke down 134 000 french troops were killed and tens of thousands of french troops mutiny so nivel's war winning offensive had failed along the aim and the british attack to support it had some local successes but failed to draw german reserves away from the french the battles of aras and the ain both started with some gains but ended in grinding nutritional fighting the allies could take more ground than they could in 1916 but they hadn't yet solved the riddle of trench warfare some tactical successes held out the promise of helping the allies turn the tide in the future but in spring 1917 they could not achieve their objectives of decisively breaking the german lines nivel was replaced in may and has come under particular criticism for the failure he seems to have been affected by the so-called strategic blinkers the inability to deviate from a long-established plan when new information came to light after arguing for months with field marshall hegg as well as his own colleagues he stubbornly defended his plan against any alterations when informed of german reinforcements in the sector he simply said it meant the victory would be even more impressive and when the germans shortened the front he refused to adapt lloyd george who had supported nivel in the past later changed his mind general level in december was a cool and competent planner by april he'd become a crazy plunger on the other hand it must be said that if nivelle's plan had gone ahead in february as he'd originally wanted it could have been more successful the french would have had the element of surprise and the germans still would have been overstretched in the nuong salient before their withdrawal but perhaps most damaging of all nivel saw the german defenders as a passive force which would not behave proactively he also assumed that they would fight in the same manner that they did at verdun in 1916 which they did not the new german tactics allowed them to maintain initiative even on the defense and quickly dictate the flow of battle in 1917 nivel learned the hard way then in battle the enemy also gets a vote for us here at the great war in real time history military history is our bread and butter we love giving topics like the 1917 spring offensive the time that they won't get anywhere else but military history content is a risk on youtube and over the years the platform has changed their rules on advertising friendly content several times and we never know when our kind of content will be caught in this sort of trap so together with other creators we're building our own streaming platform called nebula a streaming service where we can put our content out there without the fear of demonetization we can put content there that we couldn't put on youtube like our world war ii documentary series 16 days in berlin and rhineland 45. other creators are doing the same thing if you want to watch real life lore's modern conflict series you can only do so on nebula if you want to check out our platform this episode's sponsor curiositystream has a pretty sweet bundle deal for you if you sign up at curiositystream.com the great war you can get access to nebula and curiosity stream for less than 15 for an entire year so you can watch exclusive nebula documentaries from the creators that you like or you can watch classic documentaries like castle siege defense about the reality behind defending a castle under siege on curiosity street that's curiositystream.com the great war for less than 15 a year we'd like to thank mark newton for his help with this episode as usual you can find all our sources for this episode in the video description below i'm jesse alexander and this is the great war a production of real-time history and the only youtube history channel that's going to bring back the phrase crackerjack you

Channel: The Great War

Views: 821,397

Keywords: History, World War 1, WW1, First World War, Documentary, Documentary Series, The Great War, Indy Neidell, 1919, Interwar Period, 1920s, Educational, Russian Civil War, Revolution, Interbelum, Battle of Arras, Chemins Des Dames, Battle of the Aisne

Id: 2foTijS7NyQ

Length: 29min 9sec (1749 seconds)

Published: Fri Apr 22 2022

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[u/Plague_Evockation]

This made my day! Thank you for the hard work and excellent video, Flo.