The First World War in the Middle East ended
in 1918, but the end of one war was just the beginning of another. The Allied powers have occupied parts of the
Ottoman Empire, but cannot impose a peace because of Turkish resistance. In the post-war chaos, Greece will attempt
to revive past glories – but the Greco-Turkish War will instead see the rise of modern Turkey
and the end of Greater Greece. In late October, 1918, the Armistice of Mudros
ended the fighting between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire – but lasting peace was
still a long way off in Asia Minor. British, French, and Italian troops occupied
much of the empire, including the imperial capital of Constantinople, the seat of the
now powerless Sultan Mehmet VI’s government. As the Allied governments discussed a future
peace treaty in Paris in 1919, their differences were clear for all to see. The French wanted to secure their financial
interests and their new mandates in Syria and Lebanon. The Italians wanted to extend their influence
into Asia Minor, and the British hoped to keep their First World War gains and secure
the Eastern Mediterranean route to British India. The United States had no appetite for involvement
in the region other than sending humanitarian aid, despite President Wilson’s hopes. The Greek government, led by Prime Minister
Eleftherios Venizelos, saw the defeat of the Ottomans as a historic chance to gain territory
and achieve at least some version of a Greater Greece, the Megali Idea. In May 1919, at the invitation of the Allies,
Greek troops landed at the city of Smyrna and occupied a zone in western Asia Minor. In light of the terrible violence and ethnic
cleansing between Greeks and Turks during the Balkan Wars and the First World War, the
move was a controversial one, including for the British General Staff:
“[Greek occupation] will create a source of continual unrest, possibly culminating
in an organised attempt by the Turks to reconquer this territory.” (Criss)
The very first day of the Greek army landings at Smyrna, Greek troops failed to establish
full control, which led to violence that saw several hundred Turks killed. In the months that followed, atrocities committed
by occupying Greek troops caused local Turks to form irregular groups attacked Greek soldiers
and villagers. This marked the beginning of the Greco-Turkish
War, known as the Asia Minor Campaign in Greece and the Turkish War of Liberation in Turkey. So the Greeks had established themselves in
and around Smyrna, and local Turkish resistance groups had organized in response. But in the Turkish Anatolian heartland, a
political and military national movement was growing. The impotence of the Ottoman government and
the violence at Smyrna caused many Turks to rally around a nationalist cause that wanted
to expel European and Greek troops and create a Turkish state. One Turkish nationalist described the effect
of the arrival of Greek troops: “After I learned about the details of the Smyrna occupation,
I hardly opened my mouth on any subject except when it concerned the sacred struggle which
was to be.” (Macmillan 444)
This movement coalesced around Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who had commanded Ottoman forces in
the Italo-Turkish, Balkan, and First World Wars. He and other nationalist leaders established
a National Assembly eventually based at Ankara. Kemal’s goal was simple: “[To] create
a new Turkish state, the sovereignty and independence of which would be unreservedly recognized
by the whole world.” (Karsh 328)
As Kemal’s nationalists organized in the east, the Sultan’s Grand Vizier Damad Ferid
Pasha also tried to preserve the country’s sovereignty in Paris, but the Allied Big Four
did not react to his pleas. In fact, the Allies were having trouble deciding
what would become of Asia Minor. Not only did they have clashing interests,
they were divided about what to do with Armenian and Kurdish hopes for independence, and were
worried by the reports of Greek atrocities. An Allied Commission compared the Greek occupation
around Smyrna to an annexation and recommended ending it, but Venizelos defended his position:
“The Greek claims on Smyrna and the neighbouring region were not only well known, but they
had been officially formulated to the conference […] In occupying Smyrna, Greece knew that
[if] she was not yet legally, she was at least morally, entitled to it.” (L-Smith 114)
The situation in Asia Minor got even more unstable in 1920. From January, French and Armenian troops fought
Turkish national forces around Marash, Urfa, and Antep with Turkish fighters murdering
10,000 Armenians at Marash and Armenian units murdering smaller numbers of Turkish civilians
in response. Ottoman elections saw Kemal’s Nationalists
win representation in parliament, but the British arrested many of them and formalized
the occupation of Constantinople. In April the Allied powers finally agreed
on the terms of the Treaty of Sevres to formally end the war with the Ottoman Empire. Britain got most of what it wanted, including
internationalisation of the Straits and a guarantee of Armenian and Kurdish states. France and Italy were to gain spheres of influence
in Anatolia, and more importantly, strong financial concessions. The Greeks were to gain the region of Eastern
Thrace, while Smyrna was to be administered by Greece but formally remain part of Turkey. After five years, a referendum would decide
on its final fate. Like the other peace treaties, the Ottomans
would pay reparations, and had to reduce their armed forces to 50,000 men and a handful of
small boats. No air force was allowed. For Mustafa Kemal’s nationalist movement,
the treaty would be their worst nightmare if it was implemented – but in summer 1920
it was a political gift for their cause. More Turks rallied to Kemal, and the Allies
did not have the military means or political will to impose the treaty by force – Marshal
Ferdinand Foch estimated they’d need 27 divisions to enforce it, and no one in Britain,
France, or the US was ready to commit them. Athens insisted that the situation would calm
down once the treaty had been signed, so the Allies gave permission to the Greeks to begin
an offensive. On June 22, Greek units crossed out of their
zone of occupation and advanced towards the Sea of Marmara, central Anatolia, and in Eastern
Thrace. Kemal was still in the early stages of creating
a nationalist army, so Turkish troops mostly withdrew on a fighting retreat, though both
sides accused the other of committing atrocities along the way. Greek troops captured Edirne, Iznik and Usak
before the French and Italians called for a stop to the advance. The Greeks had two options: to concentrate
on Eastern Thrace, or try to crush Kemal in Anatolia. The military favoured the Anatolian option,
but Venizelos chose to wait in the hopes the British would send more troops. But the British did not send more troops,
and even though the Sultan’s government reluctantly signed the Treaty of Sevres in
August, the reality on the ground looked nothing like the one envisioned on paper. By late 1920, the Turkish National Assembly’s
regular army had grown to 86,000 men, and the Greek Army of Asia Minor had grown to
100,000 and still stood deep in Anatolia without a political solution in sight. The Turks even launched their first serious
offensive along the Gediz river in October, and even though Greek forces stopped them
it was a sign of growing Turkish organization and skill. Kemal also took the offensive in the East
against the Armenians and pushed them back into the territory of the former Russian empire,
in fighting that saw widespread atrocities against civilians. At the same time, Greek political life had
been badly split between the Venizelos’ supporters and those of exiled King Constantine
since the First World war. By this time in the Greco-Turkish War, the
tensions within Greece deepened even further. The country had lost most of its Allied support,
was in an economic crisis, and in October King Alexander was bitten by a monkey and
died of the subsequent infection. This revived the schism between Venizelists
and royalist supporters of King Constantine. Venizelos was defeated in the elections that
fall, and Constantine – who was disliked by the Allies for his pro-German stance in
the First World War - returned to the throne of Greece in December 1920. Venizelos later reflected on his defeat:
“My mistake was that when the death of Alexander occurred, I failed to postpone the elections
in order to negotiate with Constantine and the Powers for the accession to the throne
of the constitutional heir. […] This was my great and, you might say,
unforgivable error. Because this solution, if it had been achieved,
would have restored national unity […]” (Danglis 396) So by the end of 1920 the Greek army was deep
in Anatolia, and Turkish resistance was organizing around Kemal. The leaders of an unstable Greece dependent
on vanishing Allied support were getting more desperate. The political situation continued to spiral
for Greece and improve for the Turkish Nationalists in early 1921. The Turkish Assembly passed a new constitution,
condemned the Sultan’s government in Constantinople, and signed a treaty with Bolshevik Russia
in March, which stabilized the eastern border and provided for more weapons shipments as
well. The London Conference was supposed to find
a diplomatic solution, but failed – and the violence on the ground continued. Greek reinforcements arrived in Anatolia,
Venizelist officers were replaced with royalists, and General Anastasios Papoulas took command
of the Army of Asia Minor. Greek strength in Anatolia grew to over 100,000
men, and with the new recruits came reports of plunder and violence against the local
population in the areas under Greek control. In April 1921, the Greek Governor General
of Smyrna admitted to a spike in violence against Turkish civilians, but the International
Red Cross report was far more direct: “Elements of the Greek army of occupation
have been employed I the extermination of the Muslim population…instead of being disarmed
or broken up, the bands have been assisted in their activities and have collaborated
hand-in-hand with regular troops.” (Gerwarth 238)
At the same time Greeks were killing Turks in the west, in the Pontic region Turkish
bands led by Topal Osman killed 8000 Greeks. One Greek resident recalled the atrocities:
“They stripped [the children] and threw them into wells. Then they threw stones on top of them. […] They filled the church, the schools
and the barns with the old people and set fire to them.” (Gerwarth 239)
Athens was desperate to bring the war to an end, but many felt there was no chance of
victory – even Greek General Ioannis Metaxas, who was now out of the army, bluntly said
the war could not be won. Still, Prime Minister Gounares’ government
decided to break the deadlock and save the Treaty of Sevres. -The Greeks attacked at the Battle of Inönü
in January, and although they executed a planned withdrawal after their advance, the Turks
saw the battle as a defensive victory that boosted morale. In March the Greeks attacked again, this time
to capture important rail links near Kütahya. More than 60,000 Greek troops made good progress
in the north and the south, where they captured the town of Afyon Karahisar, but poor coordination
and a Turkish counterattack pushed them back. The Second Battle of Inonu was another Turkish
defensive victory. The next Greek attempt to break the stalemate
began on July 10, 1921. By this time the Army of Asia Minor, which
had grown to 200,000 troops, 4000 machine guns, and 410 artillery pieces. The Turks had also reorganized their 122,000
men, 700 machine guns, and 160 artillery pieces guns under Ismet Pasha. This time the Greeks tried to encircle and
destroy the Turkish army near Kütahya. By the 20th, they had re-taken Afyon Karahisar,
pushed the Turks across the river Sakarya and occupied the towns of Kütahya Eskişehir. The Turks counterattacked, but failed to gain
the lost ground. The Greeks had won a clear victory at the
Battle of Kütahya-Eskisehir, but the Army of Asia Minor had failed in its main objective
of destroying the Turkish army. The battle had cost the Greeks about 8000
men, and the Turks about 30,000 – though many of these had lost contact with their
units and could fight another day. The Greek advance caused panic in Ankara,
and the Council of Ministers ordered the government to evacuate. But Kemal and Fevzi Paşa declared the army
would stay and fight, and the Assembly voted for the politicians to stay. The Greek Army didn’t have the strength
to continue the offensive, but Greek command was unwilling to admit its failure, and planned
one last gamble at the Battle of Sakarya. British observer Arnold Toynbee felt the Greeks
had no chance: “It was a crazy enterprise, for every rational
objective had disappeared. The annihilation of the enemy? Three times already that stroke had missed
its aim. The occupation of his temporary capital? As if the loss of An[ka]ra would break a Turkish
moral which had survived the loss of Constantinople, or would prevent the Great National Assembly
from resuming its activities [elsewhere]. Everything was against the invaders.” (Toynbee 476)
The Greek plan was to distract Turkish forces near the river, and then surround and destroy
them. To achieve this goal, the Greeks had some
124, 000 men, 684 machine guns, 2085 light machine guns, and 296 artillery pieces. The defending Turks had around 100, 000 soldiers,
826 machine guns and 169 artillery pieces. The Greeks opened the battle on August 13,
and at first made good progress. Kemal was worried, and convinced the nation
assembly to temporarily give him near-dictatorial powers to deal with the crisis. Kemal later stated that at this point he issued
a dramatic order: “I said there was no line of defense but an area of defense, and that
this area was the whole country. Not an inch of the country should be abandoned
until it was drenched with the blood of the citizens.” (Gazi 826) He used his new powers to rush
Russian weapons to the front and requisition enormous amounts of supplies from an already
impoverished population. Turkish resistance stiffened as the Greeks
made it to within 50km of Ankara but also outran their supplies, and on September 3
General Papoulas ordered a retreat. At that moment the Turkish cavalry hit the
Greeks in the flank, accelerating the retreat and taking many prisoners. Turkish nationalist Halide Edib Edivar later
recounted the scene: “Through the information we obtained from
the Greek prisoners we learned that they had lost one third of their forces already, and
that their [modern] transport was no good in the wilderness of the [soft] and dangerous
marshes. (…) A young prisoner told me with a grin:
‘They tell us that Angora is behind every mountain we attack: but sixteen days have
passed and no Angora. They tell us that if we fall into the hands
of the Turks we’ll be killed, and they drive us on with machine-guns.’” (Edib 220)
Turkish forces harassed the Greeks as they pulled back, and the Greek army’s policy
of scorched earth left a trail of destruction and burning Turkish villages in their wake. The offensive spirit of the Greek army was
broken, as historian Michael Llewelyn-Smith explained:
“The Greek army had shot its bolt. The retreat from the Sakarya marked the end
of the Greek hopes of imposing a settlement on Turkey by force of arms, and the beginning
of a new period in which the Government recognized that a face-saving settlement must come through
the diplomacy of the Powers.” (Llewelyn-Smith 234)
The month-long battle of Sakarya had ended in a victory for the Turkish nationalist army
by attrition. 3700 Turkish troops were killed and 18,000 wounded, while the Greeks lost
4000 killed and 19,000 wounded. In the fall of 1921, Greece suffered another
diplomatic defeat, when France signed the Treaty of Ankara with the Turkish National
Assembly ending what it is sometimes referred to as the Franco-Turkish War. This helped legitimize his rival government
and delegitimize the Treaty of Sevres. French troops withdrew from Cilicia, leaving
behind valuable weapons for the Turks and freeing up Kemal’s southern front. The French withdrawal also led to a mass exodus
of Christians from the region, including more than 100,000 Armenian refugees who had returned
under French protection after fleeing the Armenian genocide of 1915-1918. The Greek offensive of 1921 had failed and
Allied support for Greece was evaporating, and the Turkish Nationalists and their army
were growing stronger. Kemal was now ready to go over to the offensive
once and for all. The winter of 1921-1922 confirmed the swing
in momentum. the Turks grew stronger and more organized. They signed another treaty with Bolshevik
Russia to secure the eastern frontiers and new weapons, and continued to reform the army.g
Turkish commanders like Refet Pasha improved logistics, and added assault battalions of
troops partially trained based on German stormtrooper tactics which Ottoman officers had learned
in the First World War. At the same time, Turkish resources were stretched
and they feared they could not sustain a lengthy war. Meanwhile the Greek situation continued to
get worse. The economy was in crisis, allied support
for Greece was limited to a few British cabinet ministers, and Greek leadership no longer
had the political will or military means to hold the territory it had won with its hard-pressed
army. Army logistics were catastrophic as supply
lines stretched 300km from Smyrna into the interior. In May 1922, General Papoulas resigned and
was replaced by Lt Gen Georgios Chatzanestes, who did little to change the dangerous position
of Greek formations in the exposed Afyonkarahisar salient. Athens was so desperate to force a solution
that in June it transferred Greek units from Anatolia to Eastern Thrace to march on Constantinople,
a move the Allies simply blocked. The Turks felt they had to strike before further
Greek reinforcements arrived, and launched the Great Offensive or Büyük Taarruz, on
August 26. Their army now had 200,000 men, 2900 machine
guns and 323 artillery pieces, as opposed to 218,000 Greeks with 4400 machine guns and
418 artillery. The major Turkish advantage was cavalry: 5300
horse to just 1300 Greek sabres. The Turkish plan designed by Kemal and Ismet
was for 1st Army to move behind the Afyon salient from the south, while 2nd Army supported
the effort from the north. The cavalry would surround and destroy the
Greeks, just as they had tried to do to the Turks in the previous battles. Turkish artillery smashed the Greek lines,
followed by an infantry assault hoping to imitate stormtroop tactical success – but
the Greeks managed to prevent a Turkish breakthrough at first. The next day though, Turkish troops captured
the high ground at Erikmen, which made the whole Greek defense vulnerable to encirclement. General Chatzanestes’ headquarters was 300km
away in Smyrna, so he was not able to react to the threat in time to prevent disaster. Over the next several days, Greek units simply
disintegrated in the confusion as the Turks tried to close the ring around them. On September 1, Kemal ordered a full-on pursuit
of the routed Greeks: “The oppressive and arrogant army of the enemy has been defeated. Armies! The Mediterranean is your immediate objective. Forward!” (McMeekin 459)
As the remnants of the Army of Asia Minor fled west in disarray, Turkish units harassed
and surrounded them piece by piece, taking thousands of prisoners. Surviving Greek units applied a scorched earth
tactic, and tens of thousands of stragglers pillaged villages along the way, leaving a
trail of death and destruction. Athens dismissed Chtatznestes but it made
little difference. The Greek navy evacuated its remaining forces,
and on September 9, 1922, Turkish nationalist troops entered Smyrna. Greek and Armenian civilians were terrified
that the Turks might commit atrocities, but Greek authorities urged them to stay. Regional governor Aristidis Stergiadis told
civilians to stay put while telling govt officials to leave, since he feared refugees might spark
a revolution: “Better for them to stay here and be slaughtered by Kemal, than for them
to go to Athens and turn everything upside down.” (Gerwarth 241)
The Archbishop of Smyrna pleaded in vain with Venizelos to save the Christian community:
“Hellenism in Asia Minor, the Greek state and the entire Greek nation are descending
now to a hell from which no power will be able to raise them up and save them. […] it is a real question whether when your
excellency reads this letter of mine we shall still be alive.” Fromkin 545
Turkish soldiers and civilians now took what they saw as revenge on Christians of Smyrna,
despite the presence of Allied warships in the harbour. The day they arrived, Turkish officers under
the orders of Nureddin Saklai Pasha delivered the Archbishop to a group of Turks who mutilated
and killed him. Four days later, Smyrna’s Armenian quarter
began to burn, and the flames quickly engulfed the Greek and European quarters until 50-75%
of the city had been destroyed. Most western and Greek historians argue the
fires were either deliberately started or spread by Turkish troops, which many Turkish
historians debate. In the orgy of violence and fire, an estimated
12 to 30,000 Christians were killed. (Gerwarth) Some of the refugees were eventually
taken onboard Allied ships, many others threw themselves into the sea to escape the flames
and the Turks, and drowned. The Asia Minor Catastrophe, as the Greeks
called it, caused political chaos in Greece. On September 24, Colonels Gonatas and Plastiras
led a coup that deposed the government, and King Constantine abdicated. The Venizelists returned to power and several
Royalists, including former Prime Minister Gounares and General Chatzanestes, were executed. On October 11, 1922 Greece and Nationalist
Turkey signed an armistice, which ended the fighting in the Greco-Turkish War. One of the conditions was that Greek soldiers
and civilians had two weeks to leave Eastern Thrace, causing a massive exodus witnessed
by Toronto Daily Star reporter Ernest Hemingway: “Twenty miles of carts drawn by cows, bullocks
and muddy-flanked water buffalo, with exhausted, staggering men, women, and children, blankets
over their heads, walking blindingly along in the rain besides their worldly goods. […] They are the last of the glory that
was Greece.” (Gerwarth 242)
By the end of 1922, about 1.5 million Greeks had fled or been driven from Turkey. As Greece imploded, Turkish victory also provoked
the Chanak Crisis in Britain. As Turkish forces advanced towards Gallipoli
and Constantinople, there was a risk of war between British occupying forces and the Turkish
nationalists. Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Colonial
Secretary Winston Churchill wanted to fight for the Empire’s gains in the First World
War, and to prevent Britain losing prestige in its Muslim colonies by losing to a Muslim
power. But France, the United States, Italy, the
British press and trade unions, and the rest of the government were not. As British and Turkish troops faced each other
across the barbed wire in the neutral zone, Canada and Australia refused to send troops. The Conservative Party withdrew from the coalition
government, Lloyd George resigned. The Conservatives then formed the 1922 Committee
to make sure it never made the same mistake as Lloyd George when he became out of touch
with the Parliamentary rank and file.eg Soon after the crisis the British and Turks
signed an armistice, and Kemal’s new government deposed the Sultan to make way for a new Turkish
Republic. Lasting peace was finally established with
the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which replaced the Treaty of Sèvres and confirmed the modern
borders between Greece and Turkey. It also confirmed the population exchange
that had largely taken place during the upheavals of the previous years: 1.2 million Thracian
and Anatolian Orthodox Christians ended up in Greece, and 400,000 Balkan Muslims ended
up in Turkey. Tens of thousands of civilians had also been
killed as the cycle of revenge killings and ethnic cleansing continued from the Balkan
and First World Wars. The Greco-Turkish War or Turkish War of Liberation
was a deadly conflict on the battlefield as well. Turkish military losses were 13,000 killed
and 35,000 wounded (Erickson), while Greece suffered 23,000 dead, 50,000 wounded, 35,000
prisoners (Gerwarth). It was also, perhaps, the final phase of the
long and bloody series of wars that followed the First World War. The long, bloody, and ugly war between Greece
and Turkey is just one of the conflicts that we think it’s important to cover in our
documentaries. We also made an epic documentary about the
Battle of Berlin in 1945 called 16 Days in Berlin – it's 4.5 hours long over 18 episodes,
taking you through the battle day-by-day. It features original film footage from Soviet
cameramen, never before seen photos of the battle, detailed maps and animations and expert
interviews with David Willey from the Tank Museum, Ian from Forgotten Weapons and more. Unfortunately, we can’t upload this series
to YouTube because it shows the grim reality of the 2nd World War – and that would get
as demonetized or worse. So where can you watch 16 Days in Berlin in
4k resolution? On Nebula, a streaming service we built together
with other creators and where we can upload and ad-free. We’d like to thank Konstantinos Travlos
for his help with this episode. He is the editor of the book Salvation and
Catastrophe, The Greek-Turkish War 1919-1922, and we used several articles in the book for
this episode. If you want to order it you can check out
the link below. This is the Great War 2022, a dctn f eal Time
History and the only Youtube history channel with a clear advantage in sabres.
Amazing episode! Great Job like always
Nice video and thanks. One question though,why is the comment section of Ataturk's video is closed?
Looks great can’t wait to watch