(airplane engine rumbling) - [Ustinov] At any
moment, the armed forces of East and West
are ready for war. (aircraft engine whining) - Transmission rotary switch? - Cable. - How about slot PLCA
selector switches? - Zero-seven. - [Ustinov] Should our
grudging peace ever falter, today's warriors can
stage a battle far worse than anything our bloodstained
world has ever seen. (aircraft engine roaring) (tanks rumbling) After all, it takes
less than a minute to launch the missiles
that could bring our civilization to
a catastrophic end. - Bravo. - Charlie?
- Charlie. - [Ustinov] The missiles
must never be unleashed; we can all agree on that. So we'd better
search out the roots that might lead to nuclear war. - U-turn commit time. - Three, two, one: mark. (missile roars) (missiles hissing) - The long range missiles of the opposing sides can
dispatch nuclear warheads to 10,000 different targets. Unless mutual terror or good
sense keep them in check, they may rise out of holes
all across our northern lands and come bursting from the sea. (missile rumbling) (missile rumbling)
And where would
these missiles go? And where would
these missiles go? Well...the obvious targets
are where people are. In cities. So the city dwellers
have become the hostages of the threat and counter-
threat of nuclear war. And our nuclear nightmares begin with the destruction of
lively and lovely cities like Paris, an emblem
of civilization itself, and heaven knows where
the nightmares end. A single nuclear
bomb, easily spared from out of the huge
arsenal of these things, could lay the whole of
central Paris to waste in an explosion much
greater than that of Nagasaki or Hiroshima. (slides clicking) (slides clicking) (slides clicking) (slides clicking) (slides clicking) The cosmic lunacy which
produces such horror is not, as you might
expect, the affliction of irredeemably wicked men. No, it's palliative,
carefully worked out and considered
government policy. In the meanwhile, military
accountants are working out how big a bang they
can get for a buck, how much rubble for a ruble. Our dreams might be untroubled
if this mutual terror had really managed to
abolish war altogether, but unfortunately the
mutual nervousness causes the armed
forces of all sides to jostle and probe each other and to shadow box within sight of their potential adversaries. (aircraft humming) Although the crew
of a Soviet bomber acknowledges a point scored
by the western interceptor, the sparring would
scarcely be keener if war had already begun. (aircraft whooshing) A British aircraft
and a Russian warship; Today they shoot
only with cameras. (camera clicking) (camera clicking) While the western
submarine hunters play catch as catch can,
for the Soviet boats it's follow the leader. (helicopter whirring) A helicopter from
the cruiser Leningrad teases the American admiral
who's sizing them up at unusually close quarters. (helicopter whirring) Only the law of the high seas restrains this unfriendly game, and also, I trust, a healthy
fear of the consequences if encounters should
ever become conflict. Will the Americans refrain
from meeting taunt with taunt? Ah no, you see; they stage
their little fly past, too. (helicopter whirring) And it's in the
same forceful spirit that a United States helicopter patrols the border
of East Germany, the frontline ally
of the Soviet Union. The white posts mark the
end of the western world and the army pilot has
been specially coached to fly within a
few feet of them. (helicopter whirring) It doesn't look like the most
dangerous place on Earth, but all the outlandish firepower that's concentrated here -
Russian, American, and British - could touch off a nuclear
volcano at any time. (helicopter whirring) The East German fences,
set back a little from the border, delineate
in suitably ugly fashion the geopolitical rift that
runs right across Europe. (helicopter whirring) If I negligently drop
my keys over here I couldn't just run
down and pick them up because they will have fallen into the other side of the
world into East Germany; I might as well throw
them into the ocean. And this is how close
the American cavalry is to this demarcation line at this observation
post called Alpha. In front of here and behind
great armies lie in wait for the war that
must never happen. The new European war
which could so easily get out of hand
involving not only thousands of tanks and planes, but eventually thousands
of nuclear weapons. And this sinister
arsenal is dedicated to the perpetuation
of the ugly rift... across which young
men in good health watch each other so warily. - What's that you've
seen over there? Our mission here is
basically to overwatch the East German border. It is to observe, record,
and report all actions, whether it's an East
German patrol walking past or walking right
along the border or whether it's a work
force on the border. My personal feelings
are that I like it here. If there's any place in
Europe that I want to be, it's right here on the border. (birds chirping) - [Ustinov] Europe has
a grim reputation for turning its pleasant
hills into battlefields. If that ever happens again, these troops will
take the first shot. (birds chirping) It's been all quiet
on the Central Front for most of the past 30 years. But all along the
rift, the West Germans, the British, and other troops of the North Atlantic
Alliance, NATO, face powerful opponents
from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. (vehicle idling) In this sector where
the East German border juts nearest to the
Rhine, it's the Americans who stand at what soldiers
call the "Sharp End" as the West's most forward
defenders in case of trouble. (vehicle idling) - It's...kinda strange
lookin' out there and have them
lookin' back at you, wonderin' what they're thinking
and... what they're
doing and everything. They've got a job
just like we do. - I don't know,
there's times I'd like to talk to them, but we can't... I don't know... They just sit around and
watch us when they see us. They go hide from us and stuff. - I have talked to a few
of the East German guards. Most of 'em are just
soldiers like we are. (men chattering) - You got that right?
- Got it. - [Ustinov] The Americans are
crack troops, all set to jump into their battle tanks
and oppose any breach of the fateful frontier. (birds chirping) - We're always ready
for a surprise attack. I have a unit that's always
positioned on the border. It's always manned; it
can respond within less than 15 minutes. And all they have to
do is call back here and the rest of us will
respond very quickly. (tank idling) I've got 250 different
combat systems here. They consist of tanks
for my cavalry troops and my tank company. Scout vehicles mounted with
the Dragon weapon systems. Ammunition trucks, jeeps,
command and control vehicles. We pack one heck of a big punch, much larger punch
than any other unit in the United States Army. (tank rumbling) - So, these are 155
millimeter Howitzers. They're capable of indirect
fire support for the squadron. We have different types of
munitions, high explosive. We have the rounds that
will lay minefields and drop bomblets and
they're also dual capable. They have a nuclear capability. (tank roaring) I think that the nuclear
weapon is a great deterrent in the political scene today. I think that you can
see in the newspaper and in the news how much
it plays an important part in everything that is
done with governments. I think that us knowing
that the other side has them and them knowing
that we have them is a deterrent that
is possibly one that will keep us
from another wartime. (loud click) - [Ustinov] Apart from the guns
that can fire nuclear shells, bombs of much greater power can
be delivered out of the sky. Supersonic strike aircraft,
stationed in England for instance, are fully
prepared for that dismal task. (aircraft engine idling) The crew can take
their nuclear weapons to destinations
anywhere in Europe, on the battlefield
or far beyond it. (aircraft engine idling) The leaders of
NATO see themselves increasingly outnumbered
in planes and tanks. They doubt their ability to win a war in Europe
by ordinary means. (ladder clattering) So, as their current statement
of strategy declares, if NATO's conventional forces
were in danger of defeat, selective and limited
use of nuclear weapons could not be deferred. (aircraft engine idling) (aircraft roaring) But to postpone for
as long as possible any need to "go
nuclear" as they say, NATO looks to its conventional
forces in Germany. The snag is, of course,
is that the Russians have nuclear weapons, too. So aircraft specially
built for fighting tanks might seem a more prudent
defense than atomic artillery. (aircraft rumbling) The fighting men who
profit from technology are liable to perish by it, too. Even non-nuclear weapons
are now so powerful that any war in Europe would
be a competition in slaughter, swift and terrible
to contemplate. (helicopter rumbling) Who would want to meet
a helicopter gun ship Who would want to meet
a helicopter gun ship
leaping up before him? leaping up before him? (helicopter whirring) It's chockfull of gadgets
for dealing out death. (helicopter whirring) The predictable
violence of modern war drives the generals and their
headquarters underground. The command bunkers are dotted all around Europe
in unlikely places. For instance, at an
American football stadium just west of the Rhine. Beneath the terraces,
the staff officers secure themselves
against chemical weapons and nuclear fallout. So it would, as
it were, be a fight between one team of
moles and another. (door slams) (indistinct chatter &
control room sounds) They're sending
off strike aircraft to help the ground troops. Thank goodness it's
only an exercise. - In the event there is
a war here in Europe, the primary mission
of ATOC Sembach will be to task and
coordinate offensive support, air support, for the U.S.
and German Army Corps within the central region. - Four oscar nine zero
two is airborne, 1232. - Roger that, sir. Juliet
charlie here at the ATOC. - One fox six zero two romeo. He was successful on target
number three victor 901. - Five two three will
also file the full profile. - [Ustinov] If the
battle is going badly and if the political
leaders of the West consent, the commanders can replace
their ordinary weapons with nuclear bombs... a contingency that is
familiar to scholars of war. - A nuclear war could
arise in the first place from a Soviet attack
on Western Europe. And indeed...NATO defenses
quite deliberately have this nuclear risk built
in as part of the deterrent. It is made clear
to the Soviet Union that we cannot defend
ourselves...for very long without initiating the
use of nuclear weapons. Initially, hopefully on
a small and local scale, but with every possibility
that this would escalate to ultimately a major
nuclear exchange in which the territory of
the Soviet Union itself should be at risk. Well, this is quite deliberate. It is part of the
deterrent posture. - If NATO fires any nuclear
weapon, however small, then the Russians will
almost certainly respond with nuclear weapons because their nuclear weapons by and
large are rather vulnerable and therefore have to
be used very early on in a nuclear or even
conventional war. And therefore, the risk
of escalation is enormous; I would say inevitable,
and the escalation would be very rapid. And this would certainly lead to the total destruction
of both sides. - The buildup in the
Eastern side of Europe is a serious one...both in
the purely conventional field and in the nuclear field. Perhaps one of the most
serious aspects of it is that it doesn't
seem to stop...in spite of the fact that you've
had in the last decade a very tangible improvement
of political relations. The Soviet military effort
has not been affected by it. - On the surface it does appear that there's an
enormous preponderance of Soviet forces in Europe...
and one of the arguments, of course, advanced
is that these forces are too large for
defensive purposes. That of course is a statement
from the Western side and it doesn't really
take into account Soviet prescriptions. The Soviet argument
is that they have a large and legitimate
defensive task to carry out in
Europe as a whole. They have the defense of
their own alliance system and of course their
own perimeter. Europe is very large,
north, central and south. And they must also face
a complexity of problems. From the Soviet point of view, they have not to deal
only with a NATO alliance, but there's always been the
problem of the local adversary, something with which we
have not had to deal. So therefore, from
the Soviet side they would argue that their
forces are tailored exactly to discharge its defensive task. (tanks rumbling) - [Ustinov] But it's the powerful
attack of those Soviet missiles and of armies much stronger than
their own that perturbs the generals of NATO. (tanks rumbling) They picture the Russian tanks
bursting across the border and charging through
West Germany, unstoppable by
conventional forces. It's not at all obvious
how such an attack could be in the Soviet interest, yet among the Western allies
the troubling vision persists. (tanks rumbling) The NATO general on
the Central Front happens, himself,
to be a German. And in this nightmare, he
might then see his own country turned into a
radioactive battleground in the desperate bid to
make the invaders go home before they reached the Rhine. (tank rumbling &
water splashing) Just let the unwholesome
brew of tanks and bombs work on your imagination and
you may feel it closing in; the first of our
nuclear nightmares. To me, one possible sequence
of events seems all too clear. They had to try and stop
the advance somehow, you understand that I hope. This is the last of
the coffee, I'm afraid. Who would've thought
that the fallout would keep us down
here for so long. Now...there's something
that I want you to believe. Nobody actually intended your
families to die like that, or your school friends
for that matter. The German general in
question, well...he was... Put yourself in his shoes
if you will for a moment. He was always opposed to
the use of nuclear weapons. In fact he said, "Do
you want me to be tried like a war criminal like
others were before me?" But, on the first
day...Soviet armor had advanced 40 miles
into West Germany. On the second day, 80 miles. And it was then that the
American supreme commander told the German general,
"We are going to stop this war with nuclear weapons. Your chancellor and
my president are in full
agreement about this." "So it's come to this,"
said the German general. "Well, at least, thank God,
it won't be my decision." "Oh, but it will my friend. We want you to
select the targets." "There must be some other way... If I could swing the
Netherland corps around onto the flank..."
but the subordinates were getting impatient, although the British
general was stiff lipped. "There's quite a lot
of blood flowing up here. Although we've managed
to nudge his armor into a nuclear fire
zone quite effectively, put in a good word for us. There's a good chap." A nuclear fire zone
including villages, farms, people, civilians. The American
commander was adamant. "We are going to accomplish
eight nuclear strikes on armored spearheads
of your choice and we are going to send
eight missions in the rear in Czechoslovakia
and East Germany." You see, the
Americans calculated that they could smash
the Soviet armor at the same time saving
New York and Chicago, not Cologne and
Munich unfortunately. You remember the
postcard I showed you of Cologne cathedral. A
very beautiful one, it was. A German corps commander,
almost surrounded, added his voice to the rest. (speaking in German) "Why am I being abandoned like
von Paulus in Stalingrad? Where are the nuclear weapons?" So, at length, the
German general consented. "Very well, although may my
tongue rot for saying so." "Oh, you know. You know the
targets in any case." And so...the Germans and the
Americans were in full accord and on the morning
of the third day, the first bombs lit up the
skyline like a false dawn. Although as the German
general had said all along, why on Earth would
the Russians back down when they're winning? And of course, when the
Russians didn't back down... there was no logical
time or place for the nuclear
exchanges to cease. Would there be any European
cities exempt from devastation? Well some nations believed
that the possession of a nuclear force of
their own makes them safer and that the hostage cities
could in some sense hit back. The French, for instance,
hope that the possession of such a nuclear
force exempts Paris, makes it immune from
the nuclear epidemic. But have things changed so much since the Élysée Palace
here was occupied by Louis XV's mistress,
Madame de Pompadour, whose contemporary,
Voltaire, wrote so scathingly about the heroic
butchery of war? Well, I wonder what
Voltaire might have thought of the president of
the French Republic who now lives in the Élysée,
controlling from his basement enough nuclear power
to carry destruction thousands of miles away. In the most elegant
of headquarters, he has enough power
at his beck and call to make the war of the
Austrian Succession seem like an outing,
like a picnic. (button clicks) (button clicks) And because an enemy
might have similar power, France puts her command
posts underground, too. (phone buttons clicking) You don't have to
be a superpower to
build nuclear bombs, but you'd be
well-advised to assemble the computerized
paraphernalia of modern war, as France has done, and
guard your bombs with care. (key clattering into hole
& lock clicking) (lock clicking) (door opens) A nuclear weapon,
author of nightmares, and, so the French
hope, a discouragement and, so the French
hope, a discouragement
to potential enemies. to potential enemies. It's hard to grasp that
the gleaming object has so much death in it to be
scattered indiscriminately by heat, blast, fire,
and atomic radiation. (footsteps) But we'd deceive
ourselves if we didn't see that the French are
really rather proud of the standing attached to
the possession of the bomb. After all, who isn't? (airplane engine accelerating) Their supersonic bombers
represent only one of the methods that
the French employ for fighting or threatening
to fight a nuclear war. They have ballistic missiles,
too, entirely homemade, here going by road
under plain cover to a base in the
south of the country. (trucks rumbling) The missiles a la
maison are capable of hurling H-bombs as far
as Moscow, for instance, or over any lesser distance. The key that could do it
makes an unusual halter. - Bonjour.
- Bonjour. (speaking in French) - The weapons are meant to deter any nuclear attack
and warn all comers that the French won't be
walked over next time. (speaking in French) They could also help to
shield Western Europe... so the French spare
no expense in keeping their missiles up to scratch. But they don't want all
the rest of the world joining the nuclear club. (speaking in French) Their tour de force
you'll find at rest. The submarines that
skulk under the sea, each carrying 16 missiles. They could easily
obliterate the chief cities of any enemy. (speaking in French) But if the French think they
need them, why not everyone? Why not Brazilian
missiles and submarines or Korean nuclear bombers? (water splashing) The United States first made
the bomb for fear of Hitler. Then Russia fearing
the Americans. Next came the British,
their nuclear submarines and bombers now loyally
assigned to NATO. Then France, firmly
asserting her independence. The Chinese, who followed,
think that nuclear war is bound to come. Inevitably perhaps, it
was India's bomb next. By all accounts, Israel
now possesses the bomb and perhaps South Africa, too, while Pakistan is
striving to follow suit. So the bomb is proliferating
through the hotter regions of the world, despite
all the efforts of the diplomats to prevent it. Will the seven or eight
who have it so far soon be 18 and then 80? There's a new form of
racism which suggests that nuclear weapons
are respectable, but only for rich,
predominantly white countries. After all, it's rather
grand to be a superpower. You can continue to
improve your weapons while preaching
piously about peace. If you are a smaller
nation with only a very few nuclear weapons, then I'm
afraid this is irresponsible, nuclear weapons, then I'm
afraid this is irresponsible,
if not criminal. if not criminal. Well, whether there is
or not any wisdom at all in this hypocrisy,
proliferation would seem to point a second way
towards a holocaust, this time through the less
affluent parts of the world. And the greatest
danger of all lies here in the narrow streets
of the Middle East where modern technology
serves ancient bitterness. (indistinct chatter) The global bazaar for
nuclear merchandise is not easy to
police and anyone can equip himself for making bombs. - We and the Soviets... have set a very bad example
to the rest of the world in essentially demonstrating
that nuclear weapons... are the main instrument
of our foreign policy. And essentially are
the main support of our status as a superpower. That being the case,
it's awfully difficult to convince anybody
else not to have them. - All these countries
that are interested in the acquisition
of nuclear weapons have generally hostile neighbors and you have what you call
"odd couples" in country A and country B, and you
have some examples. For example, in South
Asia, that are very hostile and are both interested
in nuclear weapons. It's quite clear that
if country A decides to acquire nuclear weapons, country B will
follow the example. And so very dangerous
nuclear arms threats would be triggered. - I was astounded that the
United States governement has declassified so
much information, it's available at places here
like the Library of Congress, that a single competent
individual could easily design fission bombs
and I think carry them through to construction. There's no doubt in my
mind that a small group of motivated organized
people, even perhaps people not very highly
technically trained such as terrorists, could
conceive and bring to fruition, a nuclear weapons
construction project. - Any country to date that has decided
to develop a bomb, a crude, maybe
crude fission bomb, has been successful
on the first try. So looking in the future, I don't expect to see
countries actually detonate their first weapon. I think that they will
know whether or not they are in a position
to have a weapon. Clearly the collected
wisdom of the world is that Israelis,
Israel has a bomb, but they've never tested it. And I think that's what you're
going to see in the future. - [Ustinov] Spies and nuclear
experts seem to agree it's at Dimona that
Israel makes her bombs. Even though the signs
would have it otherwise. (truck rumbling past) The plant itself has been kept
from prying eyes for years. But won't Israel's
nuclear efforts simply spur her enemies
along the same road? The holy city of Christians,
Jews, and Muslims; the order is strictly
alphabetical. It has been the focal
point for conflict for thousands of years. Jerusalem is at this
time in Israeli hands, but you can look north
towards the Soviet Union, with its Muslim minorities
and affiliations, east towards a patchwork
of Muslim states, patient yet unforgiving, south towards Mecca, the
power of religion and of oil, and west towards America,
Israel's powerful friend. It is hard to see how an
eventual nuclear anarchy can be avoided in this area. Already in very few
years several states could have bombs of their own, to say nothing of
certain minority groups. Even with a bomb smaller
than that of Hiroshima, maddened men could
be responsible for hundreds and
thousands of deaths, a tragedy which would be
attributable to man's folly, or here, to the wrath of God. I don't suppose we'll
ever really know who blew up Jerusalem. Nowadays it seems as long ago as the fall of
Babylon, doesn't it? At the time it
perplexed and alarmed the Israeli prime minister
and horrified him, as it did everyone else. Oh I wish people wouldn't
cut up newspapers. You know they're relics
for students of history, even for amateurs like
myself who are trying to...imagine how this war began. Oh talking about amateurs,
the Israeli Secret Service was very active at the
time that the amateurs first got hold of the bomb. Just after those first
two...hideous explosions... bungled explosions at
Belfast and at Lisbon, the Israelis...where is it? Oh yes...an Israeli
government spokesman said, "We warned the British
and Portuguese authorities that nuclear weapons
were now circulating among unofficial groups." Well, Israel's own problems
were about to start on that Sunday, or... No, it must've been the Monday when two El Al airliners
were shot down by missiles and Ben Gurion Airport
was subsequently closed. The secretary of
state remonstrated, "The Soviets are supplying
Middle Eastern countries with surface to air missiles of unnecessary sophistication." And the Israelis
immediately plunged into the Lebanon for
the umpteenth time. But now, to report
catastrophic losses to their prime minister
and the fact that they had lost control of the air. "There will be a time
for mourning later," said the Israeli prime
minister to the Knesset. He didn't know
how much mourning. Or on the Wednesday,
a small nuclear device blew up the ancient
walled city of Jerusalem with its predominantly
Arabic population and all its holy places. While the news of
this act of folly was still reverberating
around the world, it could be supposed that
the Israeli prime minister was saying, "How
do we retaliate? Who do I hit?" But, his advisors were
as baffled as he. The next day on television
the Palestinian leader, in tears, said "Why should
we destroy our national home? The place that
we have cherished and suffered for so long. We are not mad!" But of course there
were those that did claim responsibility
for this hideous act... ...various groups. The Lisbon Red
Heroes, Dark December, others too numerous and
too psychotic to mention. The American and the
Soviet fleets converged on the coast while their
governments remained in contact, attempting to, as they said,
"defuse" the Middle East. The Israeli prime
minister protested... "The superpowers
are trying to take even our tragedies
out of our hands... ...and what's this you tell me
about Saudi Arabian bombers on Amman Airfield? I want an Entebbe-like raid! I want you to seize all the
nuclear devices they have." But...the commanders were
blown out of the air. The prime minister
saw the net closing. "What? The Libyans have agreed
to give nuclear bombs to the Lebanese? The Pakistanis have already
done so to the Syrians?" Trembling for his cities,
the Israeli prime minister authorized nuclear strikes
against Amman, Damascus. "Yes, and Beirut!" he cried. And so...on the eve of
sabbath in that subcontinent of prophets, cataclysms
began to rival... the Book of Revelations. And since the
superpowers were unable to disentangle
themselves, the madness eventually engulfed us all. The Americans and the
Russians are at pains to avoid war by
mishap, and for this they employ military
intelligence, high speed communication,
and very complicated systems of what they call
command and control. Any loss of control
would automatically entail a third route
into a nuclear war. These controls are, of course,
very highly guarded secrets. But what is fairly obvious is
that the systems themselves would come under
immediate attack in the event of hostilities. And here, Fylingdales Moor
in the north of England, would probably be hit in
the first few minutes. Why? Because it has become
one of the nostrils of the American high command, endlessly sniffing the
air for signs of danger. And inside those round
objects are radars which warn of the approach
of ballistic missiles. Meanwhile, high above the
Earth, there are satellites looking out for the first
glow of rocket engines. And it's in the frozen
north that the other early warning outposts stand. That's because the
missile flight paths between the superpowers
would mainly pass this way. The giant radars never rest in
Greenland or here in Alaska. (wind howling) The military planners believe,
or pretend to believe, that a missile
attack might burst upon the United
States at any time. In that event, they'd have
less than half an hour's notice before the nuclear warheads
arrived at their targets. (machine humming &
footsteps down ladder) So the news from the big radars goes straight to Colorado
and the chief defenders of a continent who
man their headquarters at Cheyenne Mountain
day and night; the North American
Air Defense Command, usually known as NORAD. (vehicle engine rumbling) Because they're so vital
for command and control, the NORAD staff put 1400 feet
of granite between themselves and the fragile world outside. (phone rings) And NORAD's computers
would announce any massive attack,
where it's coming from... and what's more to the
point, where the missiles can be expected to fall. - The detection would
be almost instantaneous. The reliability is very high. The warning time, of
course, would depend on where the missile
was launched from since it's a matter of
flight time of the missile. And the same way
with a submarine. The warning time
then would depend on where the submarine
was when it launched. Attacks upon the sensors
could make us blind and deaf... but we have overlapping
and redundant systems and to knock them all out
would be a sizable effort, and to do so would be
considered an act of war. - [Ustinov] Even in peacetime
the radar outposts have plenty to do,
reporting to NORAD on all the satellites
that circle the Earth. Most of them have
war-like functions and some could make mischief. The watchers see the
superpowers using spacecraft more and more for military
command and control. They rely on them for
spying, for early warning, for their world-wide
communications. They are tempting
targets indeed. (machine clicking loudly) And from time to
time NORAD spots anti-satellite
devices under test. - 10382, the kernel set is 485.
(machine clicking loudly) - Every medium that
man has entered before he has found ultimately some
way to conduct warfare in it. Now, whether or not
there's going to be warfare in space I think is more a
matter for mankind to decide. - [Ustinov] For those
of us still stranded on this planet, the
chain of command comes to its bitter end with
the missile crews. On the windy plains
of North Dakota they never know that
the president's order won't come today to fire
their missiles in anger. But how can anyone make certain that they'll never
shoot without authority and yet never fail to shoot
if their nation requires it? When the crews
change their shifts, the brother officers are
cool and punctilious. - You ready to brief our status? - Okay. LCB status is normal. - Very good. Communications status? - The radios are
all operational. - Okay. Launch switches? Check the launch
switch first over here. - Launch switch... - [Ustinov] The new
commander won't take charge of the missiles until he's given the control capsule a
thorough inspection. There must be no funny
business down here with our world at stake. - [Officer] It's good. - Okay. Did you check the keys already? - Yeah. - Okay, you want check our locks
and make sure they're on? (locks rattling) Well, there's your lock.
- Okay. - You guys have a good one.
- Okay, have a good one. - Safe trip back. - Take care.
- See you tomorrow. - Well, let's go on
our inspections. - [Ustinov] On these young men
falls direct responsibility for 30 H-bombs, the warheads
of 10 Minuteman missiles of intercontinental range. (machine beeping) Once the missiles have gone,
they can't be called back. - This is the missile
launch checklist. Step one, launch
keys inserted. (seatbelts clattering) - [Ustinov] Even here, presumably
safe from all intruders, the keys that can unlock
death for millions of people are not left lying around. And to launch the missiles,
two are not enough. - Inserted commander.
- Inserted deputy. - The four key system
is a system used to ensure the correct
launch and authorized launch of the Minuteman missile force. Four keys is the
minimum amount required to launch any Minuteman missile. Two keys are in each
capsule, one for the deputy and one for myself,
the commander. When we turn our keys together, we constitute one launch vote. Our one launch vote combined
with the one launch vote of another launch control center to which we are
electrically connected allows the four key
system to come into effect and constitutes an
authorized launch command. In the event an unauthorized
command is sent, we have what we call an
inhibit launch command which is used to cancel
out the unauthorized order. - Enable. (indistinct conversation) - Depress illuminated. - [Radio] Charlie,
Bravo, Echo. - Launcher, this is
Alpha and we need a key turn in five seconds. - [Radio] Bravo. Charlie, Delta, Echo. - Okay launch
switch, hands on keys. - Hands on. - Three, two, one, mark. (key clicks) - Key turn. (machine buzzing) I have one gone,
two is missile away. Four is gone. - In order to
become a missileer, you have to be very
carefully screened. Any person who exhibits
unstable behavior such as a heavy drinking problem or develops a serious
marital problem or something more personal,
he would be removed from duty. Only the most mentally
fit and prepared people are permitted to pull
missile alert duty and SAC bomber duty. - [Ustinov] The missiles
and bombers of SAC, Strategic Air Command,
are controlled from an underground command
post here at Omaha, Nebraska. Launching the missiles
usually requires proper orders relayed from the
highest in the land, but the SAC command
post may not be buried deep enough to
escape destruction. Indeed, attacks on
key headquarters might leave the superpower
like a beheaded dragon unable to strike back. An unusual aircraft tries
to avoid that outcome. (plane roaring) Anticipating the
chaos of nuclear war, the generals of SAC take turns
in providing another channel of command in the comparative
safety of the air. It has a codename,
Looking Glass. - This airborne command
post, which has been flying, or an airplane similar to
this, for the past 17 years, offers our commander in
chief and the national command authorities a method
to maintain connectivity or communications with
all the organizations that we are responsible for within the Strategic
Air Command. We will never be
caught unawares. We'll always be able to
maintain communications between the national
command authorities and the Strategic
Air Command forces. Aboard several of our airplanes, including this
particular airplane, we have the ability to
launch the Minuteman missiles if in fact circumstances
on the ground would prevent them
from being launched under execution orders from the national
command authorities. (buttons clicking
& computers humming) (paper rustling) (buttons clicking
& computers humming) - The reasoning is
straightforward. In this Looking Glass,
stranger far than Alice's, we see a disturbing sight;
the pilots looking down on ruination, on
incinerated cities, military targets crushed. An airborne general
awaiting orders from the senior surviving
member of the government. Orders to wreak similar
havoc on the enemy. It is very images of
horror such as these that the superpowers seek
to deter each other, but the very fact of the
existence of headquarters in the sky like these
acknowledges the frailty of other elements in
command and control. And the frailest of all these
elements are human beings. (indistinct conversation) - [Ustinov] Looking Glass
itself might lack authority if no word came
from the president, so he too has an
emergency command post, a jumbo jet with the
improbable name of "Kneecap." It can whisk the president
and his military chiefs out of harm's way IF they make
it to the airfield in time. - The command system, because it depends upon
fragile communication assets and a very few people,
is extremely vulnerable itself to attack. So, a first strike
on a command system gives the probability
of seriously degrading the military capability of
the force that is attacked. Modern command systems
understand that fact. Given all this, in
the midst of a crisis in which military commanders
believe that a war can no longer be avoided
because the preparations have gone too far, there
would be extreme pressures to go the full
way and to get in, if not the first attack, certainly to establish
basic military plans and bring their forces right
up to the actual brink of war. (bootsteps marching
in snow) - [Ustinov] The same knotty
issues of command and control beset the Soviet Union's
strategic rocket force. (footsteps down stairs) Anyone who might find
himself at the receiving end of a Russian missile
would naturally hope their precautions against
any unauthorized launch are at least as strict
as the Americans. But Soviet missile officers, like their American
counterparts, know that in a nuclear
war their systems of command and control
would be targets of the highest priority. (machines humming) They're quite aware that
communications can fail, headquarters can be
atomized, political leaders and generals can perish. (switch popping) (platform rumbling) Soviet anxieties mirror
those of the United States. The need to avoid
being caught unawares in a surprise attack,
to be sure of getting the big missiles away before
the chain of command snaps. But how do they
arrange these matters on the other side of
the balance of terror? - I don't know if there is a
difference in vulnerability between the United States
and the Soviet Union, but there certainly
is a difference in their style of operation with respect to
command and control. The difference has to
do with the basic nature of these two societies. The United States is a
highly decentralized society and so are its military forces. A great deal of dependence
upon the initiative of low level commanders
under actual operations of military forces. Soviet Union is a highly
centralized society and so are its military forces. They have gone to
extraordinary effort as far as we can tell to
maintain that central authority, even to the point of trading
off against the vulnerability of their actual force elements. (water churning &
seagulls squawking) - [Ustinov] The
trickiest of all forces to control are the
submarines, whose missiles are the superpower's
last resort. But in time of war, will the
commands ever reach them? The American sailors casting off from Holy Loch in
Scotland won't see daylight again for two months. And communicating with
submarines under water is difficult enough
in peacetime. - [John] I really do not know
what kind of orders the United States missile
submarines operate under. However, we can realize
that the vulnerability of their communication
links require that a great deal of
authority be vested in the submarine
commander and the officers and men serving underneath him. In circumstances in
which it became apparent that the United States had
been attacked massively and their communication
links had been broken and could not be reestablished,
the submarine commander would have to decide whether
to execute the missions for which he had been prepared despite the lack of
formal authority to do so, or whether he
should fail to do so and possibly degrade the
retaliatory capability of the United States. I don't think it's
predictable in advance how a submarine commander
would resolve this problem, but everybody recognizes
that there are circumstances in which he would
virtually have to do so and some of them
undoubtedly would. (water churning) I think the same logic does
apply to the Soviet submarines, but I personally believe
that they do not operate under quite the
extension of authority that is characteristic of
the United States force. Indeed I believe
that's why there are observable operational
restrictions on
Soviet submarines. At any given time they have
many fewer of them at sea and they do not
operate quite as far from the Soviet Union as
the United States submarines do from the United States. I simply believe they've solved the problem in a different way. They are willing to accept
some greater vulnerability of their submarines
in order to achieve tighter operational control. - I know very little
about submarines, but I imagine that their crews are as cramped and as isolated
as we are here...cut off. I'm thinking in
particular of the captain of a Soviet submarine selected
for a long range mission in the Pacific because
of his proven loyalty to the party, and also because
of his quality as a seaman. Now, he had lost touch
with his base for days. His second in command told him nothing from the
shore transmitter, nothing from the
emergency aircraft. The captain addressed the crew: "Comrades...perhaps
our Mother Russia has been burnt to
a cinder already and we're the only
ones left to avenge her. But my orders are specific. I must have proof that
nuclear war has broken out before I take any initiative. We should surface,
sample the atmosphere, listen for news broadcasts." But... there were three
unidentified ships bearing down on him already. "Three destroyers,
Comrade Captain, and a possible submarine." "If they sink us we shall
have the proof we need," grunted the captain. "And if I launch my
missiles the chances are "they'll sink us anyway." "But why should they
provoke us like this if they have not attacked
the Soviet Union?" "Oh...we provoke each
other all the time in this war of nerves;
that's nothing." "But Comrade Captain,
(speaking in foreign language)? The emergency aircraft?" The captain took his decision. "I will launch two missiles. In this way if it's
a terrible mistake the party chairman
can always say to the American president:
"That stupid captain, we've punished him. We apologize about
Denver and San Diego." "If it isn't a mistake we
shall have done our duty in part at least." "But... we would never
start a war ourselves!" cried the second in command. "Remember what
the admiral said!" The crew cheered quietly. "There are certain circles
in Washington eager to destroy us. Are two missiles sufficient?" "Two missiles..."
said the captain. "Proceed." And so he remained poised
on a balance of error, not knowing whether he
had started a nuclear war or merely stoked fires
that were raging already. (alarm blaring)
(men chattering) (alarm blaring)
(engines racing) When bomber crews scramble
it certainly sounds like the end of the world. (alarms blaring) Memories of the Japanese
surprise attack on Pearl Harbor nearly 40 years ago still
haunt American strategies, so they always keep a
hundred aircraft on alert, laden with nuclear weapons. Otherwise a sudden
strike by missiles might annihilate the entire
bomber force on the ground. So, if the warning comes, the
crews scurry into the air. An attack of that sort
would be yet another way for a nuclear war to start. One superpower or the
other coming to believe it can or must strike first, the aim being to cripple
the other's nuclear forces embodied in bombers,
missiles and submarines. Any of them sooner or later could well be
vulnerable to attack. (aircraft roaring) (aircraft screeching) Even if the somewhat elderly
B-52s get airborne in time, won't they just be shot down before they reach their targets? - Not all manned bombers
are necessarily vulnerable. They have become
increasingly vulnerable as time goes on
because, for example, the Soviet Union has developed
an anti-aircraft system that essentially layers
the air above the ground and addresses each layer
with a different weapon. Therefore, they sort of have
covered the entire range in which a bomber could fly
with a different kind of weapon and that seems to be
reasonably lethal. On the other hand, a
bomber has ways to confuse the radars, for example,
of the anti-aircraft system and thereby be able to
penetrate with less danger and threat than one
would normally expect. The best way, of course,
to do that is avoid the defenses and that's where
the cruise missile comes in. (vehicles humming) The cruise missile can be
launched from the bomber and travel very near the ground where it would probably
hide in the clutter, in the noise that the
ground generates on a radar. Therefore, be able to
penetrate much more easily than a large bomber like a B-52. Then the bomber does
not have to approach the dangerous areas
that are defended and therefore its
survivability is increased. (missile rumbling) The equation of survivability
versus penetrability goes back and forth. You devise a new
weapon and for awhile you have the ability to
penetrate and hit a target. The other fellow
who is interested in
defending the target eventually defines a
counter measure to that. Then of course you come
around and you define a new weapon that takes
care of that countermeasure. And it's this
measure-countermeasure situation that you are really encountering
in military operations, in bombing or in
anything like that. So, it is perhaps
misleading to say that the bomber is
inexorably vulnerable and will be eliminated
from the face of the Earth. - [Ustinov] The superpowers
wouldn't trust their destinies to just one method of
hitting each other. That's why scattered
across the countryside the intercontinental
missiles stand in their buried launchers. The Americans have a thousand. But would they survive
in a nuclear battle? Would the airborne commander
in his Looking Glass aircraft have anything left to launch? Once through the
looking glass we find the garden of intercontinental
ballistic missiles. And if the order should come
from Strategic Air Command or from the Looking
Glass aircraft, then the massive lid
on which I'm standing would be thrown aside
and the Minuteman missile would come roaring out. This is a silo in the military rather than in the
agricultural sense and there are over
a hundred of them in the farmland in this
part of North Dakota. (mechanism rumbling) But each Minuteman
has three separate nuclear warheads
concealed in its nose, each aimed at a
different target. And now that the big
Russian missiles, too, have several re-entry
vehicles apiece, swarms of powerful
and accurate warheads might in theory rain
down on the silos and destroy most of
the Minuteman force. (rocket roars) If the duel of missile
against missile becomes plausible, the
side that shoots first might gravely weaken the other, unless of course the
victim hurriedly launches his own missiles
before they're hit. - [Kosta] Missiles are being
tested now from test sites into the Pacific Ocean
or the Atlantic Ocean and the same thing is the
case in the Soviet Union. Neither country, I believe,
have tested missiles from operational silos
with operational crews over the trajectory they're
going to follow in time of war. Therefore we don't really
know what's going to happen if you try to launch a thousand missiles
over half an hour and send them all cross-targeted against a thousand silos. This kind of extremely
complex process that obviously
like all technical and technological processes
will have bugs in it, has never been tested, has
never been rehearsed even. Therefore, it seems to me to say with any degree of
certainty that indeed the missile is going to
perform as we expected, is simply not true. - I certainly believe the
Soviet Union has taken advantage of Minuteman
vulnerability in the past through the development of their large,
heavy, SS-18 missiles. I certainly think they
will take advantage of it in the future. of it in the future.
As a matter of fact, I think
it's their number one goal As a matter of fact, I think
it's their number one goal to be able to launch
first strikes, wiping out 90% of our
Minuteman III-IVs. I don't think they'll
do it dramatically or cause any great
public concern, but over a period of time
through the mid-1980s they will take advantage of our
Minuteman III vulnerability. - The Soviet Union may
within two or three years have enough accurate
re-entry vehicles technically to destroy 90%
of the Minuteman silos. That doesn't mean that they
can destroy the missiles. They could launched before
they were destroyed. It doesn't mean that
the Soviet Union would do what they are
technically capable of doing. They would use more missiles,
more re-entry vehicles than they would destroy. They would still have to
face the submarine launched ballistic missiles and the
air-launched cruise missiles. It makes no sense for the
Soviet Union to destroy only a small component of
the U.S. strategic force. - One of the first
things the president has to decide when he's elected and takes that oath of office, what will he do if he is
told with no question, no lack of confirmation
that there is a 500,000 missile attack
on our Minuteman field? He shouldn't have to say,
"Gee, I never thought of that. Let's form a committee."
And as soon as he takes office, he'd better make up his
mind what he's going to do. If he's done that,
either he's going to launch or he's not going to launch. If he's not going to
launch then clearly the missiles are at risk. If he decides that
he will launch before the adversaries'
missiles arrive, then they're no longer at risk and I would think that if
he's made such a decision and it's understood,
that is part of the overall deterrence. - If the worst
came to the worst, what would actually happen? Well, this question exercises
well-informed experts and well-informed computers
both here in Washington and elsewhere, and they
fight imaginary wars and try to assess how many
people would be killed and what damage would
be done on both sides. And these activities
are called "war games." Any number can play. (buttons clicking) The outcome is always disastrous with tens or hundreds
of millions of dead. Yet nowadays the war
games of the superpowers often commence with one
team making a hopeful strike at the other's nuclear forces. The simple idea of
avoiding a nuclear war by deterrence is being
eroded by notions on fighting and winning quickly without suffering
unduly in the process; a question of a judicial
selection of targets. - If our enemy is
really the Soviet state and its leaders, murdering... murdering Soviet
children is not, to my mind, where our
strategy ought to be. Also, I think it's militarily
and politically foolish, but it's not the kind
of promise of damage that the Soviets should
find most deterring. The kind of damage they
would find most deterring is loss of their military power, loss of their ability to control
their country politically. But we can not even
begin to think hard about what kind of target
sets we should strike for that unless we at the
same time recognize that we have to be able
to limit the damage they can do to us, because
no matter how intelligent a set of targeting
suggestions I can give you for our forces, if
the Soviets can kill a hundred or 120 million
Americans within a few days of the beginning
of World War Three, any reasonable American
president who isn't drunk, drugged, or just insane,
would not be able to exercise offensive strategic options because of what
they could do to us we would be self-deterred. We have to have a
strategy from which we are not self-deterred. - The Soviet argument
about deterrence is this: very simply, that
if deterrence fails then you go over to
limiting the damage upon your own country. And indeed in military
preparation terms you take all measures
to minimize that, even if it should
include striking first at a potential enemy. (water splashing loudly) - [Ustinov] But are Russia's own
forces any safer from attack? The missile submarines
after the bombers and land based missiles
are the third main branch of the superpower's
nuclear forces. They're intended
always to survive for the final revenge,
but every Soviet submarine leaving its base at
Murmansk, attracts attention from the submarine
hunters of the West. (aircraft rumbling) If it's bound for the Atlantic, it passes under the eyes of
the Norwegian air force. (aircraft humming) And they're just the first
of its uninvited escorts, these watchful men of Norway. In keeping track of
Soviet submarines, the allies in NATO
use all the skills and resources they can command. Could their superior technology put the missile submarine
fatally at risk? (speaking in Norwegian) The submarine is not well
hidden even if it dives. When the Norwegians alert
their British colleagues, a Nimrod aircraft will
pick up the trail. In the Bible, Nimrod
was the mighty hunter. (aircraft rumbling) It's mainly concerned that
the large Soviet fleet of ordinary submarines
might one day run riot through the shipping
in the Atlantic, which prompts this diligence. (cannister clattering) The submarine can't avoid
making a noise as it travels. If they're searching for it
in the right patch of sea, it'll give away its
position when the RAF men sow their sound
detectors in the water. (big splash) As the readings come in by
radio, they have contact. So the Russian
submarine finds itself in a chase that's
disconcertingly realistic. (buttons clicking) - Buoys are in the water then and submarines are
somewhere to the north of the line of buoys. And we're expecting them to do-- - [Ustinov] The submarine will
try to shake off its pursuers, but a string of secret and
ultrasensitive sound detectors lies in ambush across its path, all the way from
Britain to Greenland. (aircraft roaring) This pursuit
engages the interest of the United States Navy, with their clever
airborne instruments. (aircraft humming) They track it relentlessly. This is what passes
for peace in our time. (aircraft rumbling) - Sir, here's the tape
you've been waiting for. The three o'clock...
let's see what's on it. - All right. - [Ustinov] And when
the fliers return to their carrier, a computer
devours their recording. - Okay, Lieutenant Sandberg. - [Ustinov] The machine
refreshes its knowledge of the submarines at sea. It can always recall
their last positions, so the Russian
submariners can never feel safely out of sight
of the western Navy. At the start of a war many
could be promptly sunk and they might include some
of the missile carrying boats, which form an essential part of the Soviet nuclear deterrent. The executioner could
be another submarine; an attack submarine
or hunter-killer. The American Navy has
fearsome craft of this sort and they can hound their
prey wherever it goes. (water churning) For the coup de grâce
they can strike with anti-submarine missiles
and homing torpedoes. (apparatus humming) American arms control
officials have argued that these thorough
going systems of anti-submarine
warfare could well sap the Russians' confidence
in the submarine branch of their deterrent. So, just as the West
abhors the growing power and accuracy of Soviet
intercontinental missiles, Soviet leaders may be alarmed by increasing Western ingenuity. An ominous interplay
because sooner than any hope of victory,
it is fear of defeat that might impel that
fatal first blow. (water splashing) - I've no doubt at all that the political
administration of
the United States and the political administration
in the Soviet Union have, in academic terms, no wish at all to have
a nuclear world war. I'm convinced of that. But the technology will
make it almost inevitable that the politicians
decide to do it in order to stop the other side, which they trust very
little, in doing it to them. And it's this reason
which is so dangerous for world security. - Anybody who can count
up to five will tell you that that building over
there is the Pentagon. Well, tabloid newspapers
like nothing better on fallow days than
to publish pictures of cats and dogs
in perfect harmony playing innocently together. It seems to prove that
instinctive antagonisms can be countered with
a little patience. Superpowers also have
instinctive antagonisms by virtue of their size,
their influence, their power, and they adopt
aggressive postures before any calmer
counsel can prevail. Well, how can harmony be
brought to superpowers? First of all, it's
essential for them to understand each
other's point of view. You are seeing the world there from the point of
view of the West. I over here from my
surrounded position see it from the point of view
of the Soviet Union and I seem to sense from
here, from being surrounded, I seem to sense your agressions. I seem to sense your
paranoia even and your fear. Why? Because of your troops and
listening stations in Alaska. Throughout the Arctic
Circle, down Europe, cross Turkey, Iran,
where a hole was driven into the hedge
only the other day with characteristic
outcry, Afghanistan, where the hole was punctured
in the other direction, China with its offer
to the United States to compensate for the lost
listening posts in Iran, and back to Alaska again. And there is nothing in history
to reassure me from here. After all, they
remember only too well that in 1917 feeble
expeditionary forces from the United States,
Britain, and France landed in order to attempt to
thwart the 1917 revolution. They did nothing
in point of fact but give the Red Army
its first battle honors and its first experience
against foreign troops. You may remember how exercised
the United States was when there were Soviet
missiles on Cuba. Well, what would be the
position of the United States and of the entire
West, I wonder, if there were Soviet troops
and listening devices all along the Canadian border,
all along the Mexican border, and throughout the Caribbean? We must remember and
remember solemnly that a cornered animal
and a cornered man are the least open to appeal. There comes a moment when
the terrible lucidity of desperation takes over and
then...there is no way back. Of course the historians,
or whatever historians there are left,
will always find it extremely difficult to
decide whether it was on the pecan pie or
the blueberry tart that the American president
so nearly choked himself when he first got the news
of the missile attack. And what is perhaps
even more difficult to attribute is the blame
for the end of the world as we knew it. As the president himself said
when he recovered his breath, "Maybe we shouldn't
have gone on alert." Well, on day one
Washington asked Moscow to stop fighting the Chinese
and also asked Peking to stop fighting the Russians. But on day two, the
Chinese suddenly announced that the Americans
were now their allies. "The path to peace lies
through the tunnel of nuclear confrontation,"
they proclaimed. The Americans denied this. The American president said,
"As far as we're concerned both sides are Communists." On day three the
Russians set in motion a huge civil defense exercise. "That is scary..." said the
Americans and put their bombers on generated alert. "The Americans are war
mongering" said the Russians and sent their
submarines out to sea. In an effort to bring
down the temperature, the American president
left his command center and ostentatiously
undertook all sorts of civilian duties
and ended the day with a civilian supper
which was interrupted. "I want an immediate
decision to execute," said the secretary of defense. "To execute?" "He has to shoot, to
launch, to get the missiles off the ground where
they can't be dug out." "Those aren't cans of caviar
they're sending over, sir. NORAD predicts 2,000
warheads aimed specifically at our nuclear bases,
at our missile bases and our bomber bases. The general stakes
his life on that data." "Well I...it wasn't
the general's life I was thinking
about specifically," said the president, "Although
I gotta believe him." "Can we just hit
their missiles?" "You'd just be wasting
your force on empty silos." "That's what we can do
to him if we hurry." The secretary of state spoke up. "If you should choose
to do nothing, sir, "you'd certainly
have my support. I realize that millions
of us are going to be killed, but if we retaliate, why,
that's the end of everything." "No!" said the
secretary of defense. "He's gambling on
our holding back." Well, if the president was
listening to these arguments, he showed no sign of it. "We hit their silos
and they hit our... ah, no, they hit our
silos, we hit their cities, and they hit our cities... I guess the bullet's
left the rifle, huh?" "Now, all you have to
say is Tripoli, sir," said the defense secretary. "Yeah... Tripoli." "Execute, you have the word
of the commander in chief." "Do the people know
what's happening?" said the president as he
was hurried to safety. "Oh yes, sir, they're getting
it all on television." - [Narrator] One, go to
a public fallout shelter. Know where the nearest one is to your office, your home,
your children's school. (ominous tone) If you decided to
take shelter at home, know how to improvise and
improve your protection there. (water jet gushing) - Everybody wants to
avoid the big war, of course they do, but how? For as long as
anyone can remember, Switzerland here has been
the main talking shop for peace and disarmament. And here in Geneva at the
Palace of the Nations, the negotiators now talk
of nuclear submarines and napalm where
they once talked of battleships and bayonets. And in their embassies,
in their villas, in their hotels, the
negotiators struggle through glaciers of talk and
mountain ranges of paper with exemplary patience. What drives them on? It is the hope
that among all this there may be the magic
words, the magic few pages which will save
millions of lives. I wish I could report
that our Swiss hosts have the greatest confidence
in these negotiations, but they are by nature
a cautious people and they have hedged their
bets in quite an expensive way. Like the Chinese who
have covered their land with a rabbit warren
of protective tunnels, the Swiss are resolved
that they will survive any nuclear holocaust which
happens to drift this way. (water gushing) Switzerland, owing to
her special status, is hardly likely to be the
object of direct attack from any quarter, but
whereas bombs may recognize neutrality, fallout
has no such scruples. (wind blowing &
indistinct noises) Every man not
assigned to the army is forced to serve in
Switzerland's civil defense and the men in the very
sinister suits behind me, well they could be
engineers, factory workers, or clerks practicing here in
Geneva's civil defense school. By law every new house
built in Switzerland has to have, purpose built
in the very foundations, a shelter as a protection
against nuclear war, but...be warned. This nation of fine
hotels and boarding houses makes no special provision
for foreign tourists, nor indeed for the foreign
negotiators in Geneva, should their missions fail. (shovels scraping) The local government has a
larger and stronger shelter from which it would continue
to administer the canton in the event of...
fallout drifting across from France, Germany, or Italy, or a few misguided missiles
actually falling on Swiss soil. Oh yes, I always suspected
that the last survivor would be a bureaucrat. But actually, the
Swiss are more active and more determined
in civil defense than any of the
countries engaged in the nuclear confrontation
whose populations are asked to trust
the nuclear strategy of their governments,
enshrined, of course, in the principle of deterrence. - Deterrence has worked
so far because of the fact that no aggressor
could contemplate starting a nuclear war
and gaining any advantage. Any aggressor would
be faced with the fact that for him to start
a nuclear exchange would mean national suicide. It's also worked because
both sides recognize that they have the
retaliatory forces that provide that
deterrent and, therefore, they don't have to start
an exchange out of fear... out of fear that their
deterrent would be destroyed. Now as long as those
factors continue to exist, deterrence will
continue to exist, and that, of course,
is one of the purposes of arms control, to
preserve that situation of strategic stability. - We have, most of
the time since the end of World War II, have
had nuclear superiority, so the Soviet Union
did not dare attack us. I think today we have
what we would call rough equivalence or parity. The Soviet Union
would not attack, but if we allow them
through treaties or through our own
decisions of cutting back our forces unilaterally, to
achieve nuclear superiority then deterrence will break down and there is the
possibility of an attack by the Soviet Union. - In the next five years I think it's possible to
state almost statistically that a risk of nuclear
war is quite considerable, precisely because of
the imbalance in forces and the different
perceptions of both sides. If we can get
through to the 1990s then I think the
danger would recede. - I believe that the incentive for all nuclear weapon states, in particular...the
two major powers... to find a way of regulating
their competition in the nuclear
field, that incentive remains very powerful.
I would expect that in the messy world
of the future, with possibly other nuclear
weapons states around, that incentive will
grow even further. And so, the two major
countries responsible for the maintenance of
deterrence...will, I think... find it almost inevitable
that they should sit down, they should try in
dialogue and in agreements to regulate this relationship. - Perhaps every 5 or 10
years it should be required that all world leaders
attend a multi-megaton blast in the atmosphere. I think if they
were to, let's say, strip down to their
skivvies to feel the heat at a distance of
some 20 or 30 miles... they would appreciate
a little better the enormity of the
power which they have at their disposal
and I think that once they realize this and
continue to realize it the way I think our
present world leaders do, then I think we can
count on the deterrence for a very long time. - People talk about disarming,
destroying nuclear weapons. I think that is not
the way to do it. I think there will
be too much suspicion that the other guy will hide some missiles, hide some
bombs, and thereby acquire... supremacy of some
kind when you disarm. So my belief is let's stop
the technological arms race. Let's not make any new weapons. Let's leave what we have alone and gradually even
stoop proof testing it, so those missiles
will rot or corrode or whatever will you
have it in the silos and the submarines will
become less and less safe to dive under the sea. And that kind of a
obsolescence... will make it less
and less tempting... to use or even to
threaten to use these arsenals in time
of political crisis. - [Ustinov] May the missiles
then pass uneventfully from decrepit silos
in distant fields to decent exposure
in famous museums. And here in future times
the visitor will, perhaps, pause to wonder at
our unromantic age when great nations spoke
plainly to one another only in the language of
mutual extermination. But it's for the sake
of those new generations that I trust we'll
allow no other fears ever to surpass our
fear of nuclear war, and think no effort of mind
and heart too troublesome or too risky if
the alternative is that our nuclear
nightmares come to pass. (indistinct chatter)
