Mongolian success in taking fortified strongpoints
across 13th century Eurasia was one of their most extraordinary feats. At the beginning of the 1200s, few of the
nomads of the Mongolian steppe had ever seen a building beyond their felt yurts, yet by
the end of the century they could take the mightiest metropolises of China. In this third episode of our series on the
Mongol army, we’ll explore what made the Mongols so adept at siege warfare, and where
this siege ability met its limit. Thanks MagellanTV for sponsoring this video! A lot of you already know MagellanTV or even
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support our channel and do that at try.magellantv.com/kingsandgenerals. You will get a free one-month membership trial! Thanks to Magellan for supporting our channel! In the 12th century Mongolian steppe, warfare
was between forces of highly mobile horse archers, though a few forts were scattered
across the region, largely left over from the rule of the Khitan Liao Dynasty. With raids on China uncommon in this period,
there was little opportunity for up and coming warlords like the young Temujin to learn how
to assault fortified sites. With the declaration of the Mongol Empire
in 1206 and consolidation of his rule over the region, Temujin, now taking the title
of Chinggis Khan, could begin new assaults on China. His first target was not the immense Jurchen
ruled Jin Dynasty, but its vassal, the Tangut Xi Xia Kingdom. Here, the newly formed Mongol Empire had its
first test against cities and forts. Lacking siege equipment, the Mongols could
rely on only three tactics. The first was the simplest: a blockade to
attempt to starve the city into submission. The second was the feigned retreat; appearing
to panic before the walls, the Mongols could trick the garrison into running out to pursue
them or collect seemingly abandoned animals, goods and slaves, only for the Mongols to
suddenly fall upon them. The final was the most complicated, used first
against the Tangut capital, modern day Yinchuan. A nearby river would be dammed or redirected,
forcing the waters towards the city. Chinese walls made of rammed earth would be
undermined, and when the water stagnated it spread disease throughout the city. The first attempt against the Tangut was not
a smashing success, for the Mongols accidentally flooded their own camp in the process. Still, by 1210 Chinggis Khan succeeded in
taking the submission of the Tangut, and these three tactics were to be utilized again and
again. The next lesson in the sieging of cities came
in 1211, when Chinggis Khan led his armies against the Jin Dynasty. The Jin’s border defences, the predecessor
to the more famous Great Wall of the Ming Dynasty, ran through modern Inner Mongolia’s
steppeland, consisting of a long ditch and earthen wall; this was bypassed as the tribes
manning them submitted to Chinggis Khan and let him through. Over their first year of battle against the
Jin, the Mongols routinely won in dramatic field battles, like Yehuling, and devastated
the countryside, but cities, towns, and forts could only be taken when the garrisons were
drawn into feigned retreats. As Mongol victories over the Jin armies mounted
and the dynasty increasingly looked like it was losing the Mandate of Heaven, a steady
flood of defections of Khitan, Jurchens, and Chinese provided Chinggis Khan the secrets
to the ancient Chinese arts of taking cities. Some of these were basic tools: woodworkers
constructed simple rams, ladders, and mobile shelters which could be used to approach the
walls. Vast numbers of defected or press-ganged Chinese
infantry could climb ladders and push siege equipment. More valuable were actual siege specialists
and engineers, who provided the specialized tools of taking cities. Large wheeled scaling ladders, including the
folding cloud ladder, provided quick means for large groups of men to mount the walls. A large wooden screen held onto a mobile arm
provided cover for these scaling ladders from enemy arrows. Some of the most effective were the ranged
weapons, catapults and ‘ox-bows’. The Chinese used a traction catapult: teams
of men would pull on ropes attached to one end of the arm of the catapult, thus propelling
its projectile through manpower. The ox-bow (#2) was essentially a large crossbow,
used to pick the defenders off the walls. These tools and the experience to build them
were adopted by the Mongols quickly. Cities would now fall to them with regularity,
and by 1215, after a protracted and bloody siege, they took the Jin capital of Zhongdu,
modern Beijing. When taking a city that had refused to submit
to them, such as Zhongdu, another tool was employed: massacres. The intention was to spread a simple message. Cities which immediately surrendered were
treated relatively leniently, generally needing to only send tribute, perhaps supply soldiers
or tear down their fortifications. Cities which tried to resist were severely
punished, especially if through their resistance they brought on Mongol losses or killed a
Mongol prince. In which case, the destruction was thorough,
the slaughter indiscriminate. Individuals of skill, such as artisans, engineers,
and craftsmen, were spared, sent elsewhere for service to the Great Khan. Some women and children were taken as slaves
and the remainder of the citizenry slaughtered. Slaughter allowed the Mongol troops to exert
their pent-up frustration at a long siege, but generally the Mongols viewed it as a practical
necessity. They lacked the numbers to provide garrisons
for every city, and didn’t want to engage in lengthy sieges for every settlement. The fear of the consequences that would come
from resistance was just as effective a tool as the most powerful catapult. Horrific atrocities, such as building towers
of severed heads, to intentionally exaggerate the numbers killed in cities, all served to
buttress an image of the Mongols as an unstoppable and implacable foe. Many cities would simply submit rather than
face such an existential threat. The war against the Khwarezmian Empire provided
the next greatest evolution of Mongol siege techniques. Muhammad II Khwarezm-shah’s defensive strategy
against the Mongols consisted of maintaing garrisons across his empire’s northeastern
frontier, based on the simple, but sadly mistaken, calculation that the Mongols lacked the means
to take cities. Chinggis Khan brought with him teams of Chinese
siege engineers to construct his weapons, and by then his army was well versed in the
art of the siege. With access to large teams of engineers, Chinggis
Khan would array vast groups of catapults to concentrate on a single section of the
enemy wall, firing day and night in an incessant barrage, demoralizing the defenders and grounding
the fortifications to dust, or bringing pots of naphtha into the city to spread fire and
chaos. Mongol troops protected by mobile shelters
would advance on the walls, using their excellent archery to pick off any defender foolish enough
to stick his head over the crenellations. Feigned retreats repeatedly drew overconfident
garrisons out to be slaughtered. The Khwarezm-shah’s decisions to leave each
city to its own defence allowed them all to be picked off one by one. Fear and demoralization were refined as tools
of conquest - a psychological assault as well as physical. Massacres and absolute destruction rewarded
cities which held out like Urgench, or rose up after previously submitting like Merv and
Nishapur. Attacking the rural and lesser settlements
around a major city and driving the refugees into the city brought panic and exaggerated
stories of Mongol prowess, and also stressed the city’s resources. The flight of Khwarezm-shah Muhammad, hounded
to his death by Jebe and Subutai, prevented the Khwarezmian leadership from becomign a
rallying point to organize a defense. Fake letters were allowed to be intercepted
by the Khwarezmians, claiming the Khwarezm-shah’s mother was in cooperation with Chinggis Khan,
which wrought further disunity. Another gruesome method was called the hashar
in the Persian sources. This was the forced levy: captive townsfolk
were forced at spearpoint before the Mongol army, making it appear larger than it was. During a siege, they were forced against the
walls, taking the most vulnerable positions as veritable meat-shields: soaking up enemy
arrows while pushing siege equipment or filling in moats, often with their own bodies. The defenders were forced into the mental
torment of having to fire on people from neighbouring cities, or allow them to advance the Mongol
siege. The more valuable Mongol and Turkic horsemen
were thus protected from the menial labour, and could keep their strength for the actual
fighting. When Chinggis Khan returned to the Tangut
Kingdom in 1226 for his final campaign, his army was well hardened at siege warfare. The Tangut cities now fell in quick succession,
and when Chinggis died in August 1227, the Tangut capital was razed to join him. Mongol siege abilities continued to advance
under Chinggis’ son and successor, Ogedai. In north China, the Jurchen Jin were finally
reduced. The Jin capital of Kaifeng was taken through
a difficult year long siege, in which it seems early gunpowder bombs were used by both sides. The Jin dropped them onto mobile shelters
protecting sappers attempting to undermine the walls, while the Mongols used catapults
to lob them into the city. Some historians, most notably Dr. Stephen
Haw, point to the possible use of early cannons during this fighting, but the evidence is
controversial and will be examined in the following video. The Mongols do not seem to have used gunpowder
weapons outside of fighting in China and Japan. Mongol sieges in Korea met with surprising
difficulty. At Kuju in late 1231, multiple assaults on
the city were repulsed: one commander with a few picked men drove off repeated attacks
by the Mongol vanguard. Attacks were launched on the walls day and
night: carts of dry grass and wood were pushed to the gates to burn them, only to be destroyed
by Korean catapults; a shelter built before the walls to protect sappers was destroyed
when the Koreans dug holes through their own walls to pour molten iron onto it. Scaling ladders were toppled by Korean polearms. Bundles of sticks soaked allegedly in human
fat, set aflame and hurled into the city, could not be put out with water, but were
smothered with mud and earth. One set of catapults was repulsed by Korean
counter artillery; another through constant barrage breached the wall 50 times, and 50
times the defenders filled the gaps. After a month without headway, the siege was
called off, the city deemed to be protected by heaven. A spirited resistance, as the Mongols faced
throughout Korea, could hamper even their efforts. In Rus' principalities, the armies of Batu
and Subtuai were met with much greater success. The wooden walls of the low-lying Rus’ cities
were easy prey for the warriors of the Great Khan. Palisades were erected around the cities to
trap the townsfolk, protect the besiegers, and cover their actions. Catapult teams acting in unison made multiple
breaches in the walls and spread fire in the cities. Few held out more than a few weeks. In the eastern half of the Hungarian kingdom,
where fortified sites were made of wood in the easily accessible terrain of the Great
Hungarian Plain, the Mongols were unstoppable. Depopulation in these areas reached as high
as 70% by some estimates. To ensure the population of a given site was
reduced, the Mongols would leave for a few days after taking the city. Those who had survived would come out from
their hiding places in search of food or to begin to repair the damage. With their guard let down, Mongols riders
would suddenly return and fall upon them, repeating this process until no more came
out from hiding. In the more densely populated and rugged western
half of Hungary past the Danube, where the major sites were protected by hard to access
stone fortifications, the Mongols found their progress slowed. At Esztergom in early 1242, Hungary’s main
political centre, Hungarian prisoners were forced to build a screen of bundles of twigs
before the city’s moat to cover 30 siege engines. Once the catapults had brought down the city’s
towers and part of the walls, they began to hurl bags of dirt into the moat, the garrison
unable to clear it due to the precision of Mongol archers. With it apparent the city was to be breached,
the townsfolk set fire to the suburbs, destroyed or hid anything of value then retreated to
the citadel. A furious Batu, denied his prize, was unable
to take the stone citadel. An able defence led by Simon the Spaniard
commanding teams of balistarius, referring either to crossbowmen or counter siege engines,
kept the Mongols from breaching the citadel. Batu pulled back from Esztergom, leaving nothing
standing of the city but the citadel. Further difficulties were had at Szekesfehervar. The outer part of the city and its suburbs
were razed by the Mongols, but again the stone citadel, defended by Hospitallar knights and
their own counter artillery, resisted the Mongol assaults. After a few days the siege was lifted, and
soon the Mongols began a slow withdrawal from Europe. For more on the reasons for Mongol withdrawal
from Europe, you can check out episode 19 of our podcast on the Mongols, but it seems
that stone castles, built on hard to access sites, proved difficult for the Chinese style
catapults the Mongols used, with their crews reduced by enemy counter artillery. The withdrawal in 1242 may have begun as a
temporary retreat to prepare reinforcements and more catapults, only for political matters
relating to the death of Ogedai Khan to keep them from immediately returning. When Hulegu set on his campaign against the
Nizari Assassins and the Caliph in the 1250s, he was met with a variety of well defended
sites. The Nizari strongholds were cunningly designed,
nearly impregnable mountain fortresses. Most fell through negotiated surrender thanks
to the capture of the Nizari Imam. Some resisted, and were so strong they only
fell after lengthy blockades. Lammasar, near Alamut, fell after a year,
and Girdkuh, on the eastern edge of the Elburz mountains, withstood a Mongol siege for 15
years! Unable to bring their large teams of catapults
to bear upon them, such sites could hold out as long as their food stores did. For more accessible locales like Baghdad,
built in the great Mesopotamian floodplain, there was little chance for the isolated and
outnumbered defenders. There, huge teams of catapults could work
in unison unceasingly against designated sections of the walls. After only a few days of this, the walls of
Baghdad were breached and the Mongols were in the city. At the start of 1260 Hulegu, assisted by troops
from Georgia, Armenian Cilicia, the Principality of Antioch and County of Tripoli took Aleppo,
despite its well maintained and sturdy fortifications, sending shockwaves across the Ayyubid princes
of Syria. It’s quite possible that this close cooperation
with the Crusader kingdoms brought the next evolution to Mongol siege technology, in the
form of the counterweight trebuchet. Able to launch projectiles further and harder
than a traction catapult, the trebuchet used weight and gravity to replace teams of men
pulling on ropes. Having spread across Europe and carried to
the region by the Crusader kingdoms, the Mongols carried it even further. For the siege of Xiangyang, Kublai Khan requested
Hulegu’s son and successor, Abaqa, to provide him with Arab engineers capable of building
these fearsome weapons. Thus did engineers make the long trek across
Mongol dominated Eurasia to bring the trebuchet to the Great Khan in China. Xiangyang and its sister city of Fancheng
were defended by huge walls and moats so wide the traction catapults were powerless against
them. Possibly, as identified by Stephen Haw, the
defending Song Dynasty forces used some sort of cannon mounted on small boats to break
the Mongol blockade and allow the cities to be continually resupplied by river. The siege dragged on for five years until
the arrival of these trebuchets. Greatly outranging the defensive weapons within
the cities, they broke both the walls and the spirit of the defenders. Having once picked up their first siege weapons
in China, the Mongols returned with the most advanced weapons of the age. Yet the fall of Xiangyang and the Song Dynasty
by the end of the decade also became the highwater mark of successful Mongol conquests. Successful sieges in their ensuing campaigns
did not translate into strategic successes, and in wars against the Mamluks and Delhi
Sultanate, hot weather, strong fortresses, and able defense stood defiant against Mongol
efforts. As catapults and other complicated siege machines
became a smaller part of the armies after the end of the unified Mongol empire, and
they had less access to the vast reserves of manpower to send as fodder and to man large
numbers of catapults, the successor Khanates could not repeat the many victories in siege
warfare their grandfathers had enjoyed. Lacking in both political will and unity,
they could not develop means to overcome their gradual deficiencies in siege warfare, though
the heirs of Chinggis Khan remained yet deadly in open battle. Our videos on the Mongol armies will continue,
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