MARTHA MINOW: Good afternoon. I'm Martha Minow, and it is
with utter joy and delight that I will be interviewing two
distinguished public servants, two distinguished academics,
and two longtime friends. So because they
are friends, I am going to call them
by their first names, and I have their
approval to do so. Harold Hongju Koh, as
everyone I think knows, is Sterling Professor of
International Law at Yale Law School where he returned after
his service as Legal Adviser to the US Department of State. And he previously served as US
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor. He is HLS class of 1980. Come on. [APPLAUSE] And it just so happens
that his father is a graduate with an LLM in SJD. He came here on asylum from
Korea, and his sister also. And he told me recently
something I did not know. He was baptized at the church,
the Harvard-Epworth Church right here. HAROLD KOH: Where my brother
was baptized at the same time. MARTHA MINOW: Oh, my gosh. [LAUGHTER] Somewhere along
the way, he slipped in distinguished service as a
dean of the Yale Law School. And I'm not going
to say any more, because he told me not to. [LAUGHTER] Ambassador Samantha Power
has worked as a journalist in Bosnia during the Balkans
conflict as a founding leader of the Carr Center for Human
Rights at the Kennedy School of Government, professor, author
of the Pulitzer Prize-winning book, A Problem
from Hell: America and the Age of
Genocide, which she began as a third-year paper-- [LAUGHTER] SAMANTHA POWER: For a
professor sitting next to me. MARTHA MINOW: Who did
not get the Pulitzer Prize on her own book. [LAUGHTER] So you are two idealists
who went into government. John F. Kennedy once said, I'm
an idealist without illusions. And I'm wondering if you would
describe yourselves that way now. Are you still idealists? How do you think about
the gap, if there is one, between
what you hoped for and what you found
in the government? We will talk first about
some smaller subjects. We're going to move
up to that one. We're going to also
talk about maybe some current issues under the
administration of President Trump, and thoughts
about dealing with the very difficult
issues in the age of Twitter, fake news, polarization,
black and white thinking, small topics. Warm-up questions. Confirmation hearings,
experiences, best moments, worst moments? [LAUGHTER] SAMANTHA POWER: Harold
was confirmed first, so he should go first. [LAUGHTER] And it took him longer,
so he has more stories. HAROLD KOH: So the
worst moment was that I had advocated
that the US ratify the Convention for the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. And in Belarus, they have a
holiday which says that women cannot work outside the home. And so the committee
that evaluates this said it was discriminatory
against women. Now that holiday happened
to be called Mother's Day. [LAUGHTER] And at my confirmation hearing,
my mother is sitting behind me. And I had told my
mother, whatever you do, don't make any
facial expressions. [LAUGHTER] And one of the
senators says to me, I understand you're
opposed to Mother's Day. And you know, I happen
to love my mother. I don't know about you. [LAUGHTER] And meanwhile, my mother
is just infuriated. So she's making faces. [LAUGHTER] And I look back, and her
granddaughter, my daughter, is trying to calm her down. [LAUGHTER] Anyway, that was
the worst moment. [LAUGHTER] The best moment, but
also in a lot of ways, the worst moment was-- [LAUGHTER] --you know, I was opposed,
because as the dean of the Law School at Yale, I went to a
fundraiser and someone said, does your curriculum at Yale
Law School include Sharia law? And I said, well, you know,
if someone makes a contract and they select Sharia
law, you have to know it. And so anyway, this became the
sort of meme on the internet, you know? Koh favors Sharia law. And so when we're
coming up for the-- I had to get enough
votes to get cloture. And I get called by someone-- I'd rather not say the country-- but he says, the former
ambassador to this country is a big fan of yours, because
you served together before. And so I think he's going
to vote for you, even though he's a Republican. And I said, how do you know him? And he said, well,
he's my best friend, and my daughter is actually
his staff person who's writing the talking points. So he'll vote for you. So on the day of the vote,
we're watching on TV. And the senator comes down and
he's hanging around the desk. And then they suddenly
say, one minute left. And then it says, senator
so-and-so votes no. And I thought, he's
supposed to vote yes. [LAUGHTER] And you know, meanwhile, we're
not sure whether I got through or not. And then they
count and they said I went through by one vote. And then my cell phone rings. It's my friend, and he says,
did you see what happened? And I said, yeah,
he voted against me. He said, no. He was for you before
he was against you. [LAUGHTER] And he said he went
down to the desk. And if they were going
to vote against you, he was going to vote
for you, and you wouldn't have gotten through. And I said, well,
tell him thanks. [LAUGHTER] And then my son says, you just
thanked some guy for voting against you. Well, that's Washington. [LAUGHTER] SAMANTHA POWER: I had a version
of that on the back end, which was I thought one of
my biggest supporters was a senator who voted against
me in my confirmation, which ended up being a
little bit smoother than Harold's or my husband,
Cass Sunstein's, which was epic. It was epic proportional to
the amount that he has written. [LAUGHTER] MARTHA MINOW: Which is
really saying something. SAMANTHA POWER: --of how epic. But I had an exchange
similar to Harold's. But I called this guy
after, because I really thought he clicked. And he had worked very
closely with Cass, and I'd met him three times in
the pre-confirmation process. And then I saw him vote no. Just go and do the no. And I was like, oh,
he made a mistake. Like, he's going to correct it. And so I called him,
and he immediately let the call through. I had gotten confirmed, so I
was in an otherwise great mood. And he said, let's just say you
had more supporters than votes. I'm like, profile in courage. [LAUGHTER] But this is how this works. So the hardest thing for me-- and Harold has been
through it twice, right? You've been confirmed twice. So I only went
through it in order to go from being a
White House staff member to being in my
dream job as UN ambassador. And I had written a lot. Again, not compared
to my spouse, but compared to most mortals. [LAUGHTER] And so I knew that they would
pore over what I had written and what I had said. And I think like all of us,
Martha, Harold, Cass, we never write with an eye to-- is
someone going to look at this and make some judgment
about me in some future day? You write what you
think and you make it as precise and
analytically sound as you can. But when the president told me
he was going to put me forward, then I began to have panic
attacks, thinking back to all the things that I had
said that could be either taken out of context, or
frankly just people are going to find
them problematic, because they're
views, and people have different views on the Earth. So it turned out that as
I went over everything, the most problematic
thing that I had written from the standpoint of the
audience that I was confronting was something that actually
was very influenced by my work with Martha when I
was a student here and her work since, which was
on the question of reckoning with misdeeds. And if as a country you've
done things that are bad, you know, I think in
the United States, there's a sort of
fresh innocence that each new
administration brings, as if we're not really
affiliated with what has happened before us. So many of us in the
Obama Administration oppose the word Iraq,
and we think that counts for a lot with other countries. But in fact, we're
still the United States, a country that went
into Iraq in the way that it did and with some of
the consequences that it did. So anyway, I had written this
thing in The New Republic, saying that it was important
that the United States reckon-- when I went back and
read the sentence when I was in this anticipatory
state, I was just thinking, this is not going to go well. But the United States should
reckon with the crimes that we have or it has
committed, abetted, or ignored, or something. So it was like, doing,
complicit, and then bystanding. And so as I went
through this process, you do this thing
called murder boards where some of your friends
and your associates and people you're
going to work with come and they gather around you,
and they start interrogating. It's like the Inquisition. MARTHA MINOW: Moot court. SAMANTHA POWER: Like moot court. Exactly. [LAUGHTER] And so Cass, my husband-- my new husband, I'd just
married him at the time-- knew that one of my
least favorite things was to be called Powers. And so every time
in this murder board he would ask me a question
he would say, Ms. Powers. [LAUGHTER] And then he'd say things like,
aren't you for some big treaty, like, to govern our lives? Aren't you the person
who loves big treaties? But the one that people
kept coming back to is, you know, Ms. Powers, for which
crimes should the United States reckon? And so the right
answer, according to people who very much wanted
me to get confirmed and be in the job as soon
as possible, was to either repudiate
what I had said or basically say something
affirmative and happy about America. But I wanted to
answer the question. And so we went through-- I probably had 20 murder
boards where I just could not do this in a manner that was
going to allow me to take up my position as UN ambassador. And so finally, I
decided that I needed to find a way to say
something that was also true. So if I couldn't talk about
Abu Ghraib or this or that, you know, I could just talk
about things that I do believe. And one of the things I
believe is that America's an amazing country. I'm an immigrant
to this country. Harold's family immigrated
to this country. We get to be in
the jobs we're in. And so I developed
this little routine where when I was asked
the question by anybody, I would talk about how
much I loved America, and that was my answer. And so if you go to YouTube-- and then I'll end the story,
painful story to recollect-- you will see the
craziest exchange between two members of the
human race that I can imagine-- [LAUGHTER] --where Marco Rubio,
predictably, asked me, for what crimes should
America apologize? And I think you can
see him, because he expects me to just say, oh, I
misspoke or that was excessive. But instead, I said, this is
the most incredible country. [LAUGHTER] I love this country. America's the greatest
country on Earth. I would never
apologize for America. And you can just see his face. He's like, but I-- no, no. But I mean for what--
like, you said this thing, for which crimes-- you know, as I said,
Senator, this country, I can't tell you what it was
like to come to this country when I was an immigrant. To this country, just
what the flag meant to me. You know, this is
the greatest country. I would never, ever apologize. And meanwhile, I'm
watching the clock, and I just know that I've got
to get through-- what is it? They have the five minutes
or the three minutes. And it just goes back and forth. And so finally he's like, OK. So let me get this straight. I'm asking you for
which crimes we should-- and you're telling me America's
the greatest country on Earth? I'm like, yes, Senator. [LAUGHTER] And I was confirmed 87 to 10. [LAUGHTER] MARTHA MINOW: You're here! SAMANTHA POWER: Somehow. MARTHA MINOW: So you each
worked in these crucial jobs with large teams of people. How did law school
prepare you or not prepare you to do that, to
work with large teams of people with politics as well as law? What lessons did you learn
about working with your staffs and across your staff
with other staffs? HAROLD KOH: When you say
large teams of people, there are different groups. You know, I was the head of a
law firm, the Legal Adviser's Office, which has about
220 lawyers and 25 different offices. Many of them are the great
experts on the subject that they're doing-- climate change or aerospace
or the use of force. With that group of people,
I just said to them, if you win, I win. And if we win, America wins. And I just tried to
become as close to them personally as possible. Whenever anybody
new got hired, I asked them to come and
see me on the first day, because I thought it was
so important that people felt like they had a
relationship with me. Because you know, they were
supposed to speak for me. We also had many
interagency meetings, and some of my colleagues for
those interagency meetings are here. And in those meetings, you
try to find common ground with people who, frankly, have
different portfolios from you. And you know, but you
can always find something on which you can connect. MARTHA MINOW: Red Sox. [LAUGHTER] HAROLD KOH: That was with her. [LAUGHTER] There are a lot of Yankees fans. When I came up, I tried to
stay away from the topic. [LAUGHTER] I couldn't negotiate
my way out of that one. SAMANTHA POWER: You know,
when I was at law school-- and I haven't had an
administrative role like either of you-- my wing woman and wing man
are these two iconic deans of the two great law
schools in this country. I know there are others. [LAUGHTER] Good law schools and other
good deans, I'm sure, but these guys are
the cream of the crop. So I was a loner as
a student, and had come from having been
a war correspondent, and was a bit alienated,
I think it's fair to say. When I got here, didn't-- they now have a class,
actually, that Cass is teaching on legislation
and policy and administration. I wish in my day
they'd had something like that that would have
brought home in the first year how law can really
matter for real people. So congrats to you, Martha,
for introducing that. Or had I been at
Yale Law School, I would have been in
Harold's clinic, trying to get refugees
into this country, or deal with Guantanamo
inmates, or the amazing work he's done over the years. But I was sort of a
little bit removed. I think what I took from law
school was what so many take, which is just the importance
of analytic precision. And I think what bothered
me about law school at one point was a sense of
kind of moral equivalence or that it was all
just-- felt very removed in the experience I had at
least in the first year or two from the world. But then I had the
turning point that-- and the best law
school experiences people get the
chance to have, which is when you realize that
your convictions haven't gone anywhere. The things you care about
haven't gone anywhere. Now you just are
going to be better at pursuing those convictions,
and more rigorous and more precise and more likely
to anticipate what others are going to throw at you. And so I think I really
brought a lot from law school, actually, to my team of
people who worked for me when I was UN ambassador. And that was the
biggest team that I've had the chance to
work with in getting them to think in those ways. Like, that's just not enough
to want to promote LGBT rights or to want to let X
number of Syrian refugees into this country. You know, we have to
find a way to meet people where they are, anticipate
their objections, and then transcend them somehow. And that meant both them
with other countries as we're trying to build
coalitions or get resolutions through, but most critically,
because most of the big-- the way these things you do
in government, funny way, are internal. It's when you try to
get your own government to be the best version
of itself as you see it. And so for them to go into every
meeting not simply thinking, what do I believe, and what do I
think are the strong arguments, but having anticipated
what's going to come at them around the table. To me, the rigor
and the training you get out of law
school puts you in a position to do that,
I think, in an optimal way. MARTHA MINOW: Both of you
are eloquent beyond belief. Harold, you've actually
coined the term "the legal adviser's
duty to explain," and described it as "a
loyalty that the government legal advisers owe not just
to their clients and ministers but also to their publics
and national citizenry." And your commitment
to transparency and explaining is
quite distinctive. So I wonder, can you tell us
about controversial occasions or occasions where
controversy made that a challenge to performing
that duty to explain and dealing with
issues, like, there are classified information
that you can't explain? And how do you manage
that duty to explain in the age of Twitter? HAROLD KOH: So I don't
know how to use Twitter. [LAUGHTER] So that's how I manage that. [LAUGHTER] In international law, there is-- customary international law
is state practice followed out of a sense of legal obligation. Or as it's called, opinio juris. So if your country is a leading
country in this process, as the United States is,
and it's doing something that it thinks is
lawful, it needs to explain that for it
to be international law and for it to start a trend
toward international law. So early in my time,
drones started being used, and they were controversial. And I said I thought we
should make a public statement of our position on drones. One, we thought they
were lawful, and one, we thought they weren't lawful. Because otherwise, people
would question whether we were following the law or not. Now, everybody in the
meetings, internal meetings, thought they were
lawful, but we had not articulated the rationale as
clearly as we should have. And so the process of
giving that speech actually generated more
clarity and consensus. But one of the
most amazing things I remember about
that was I decided that I would give this
speech at the American Society of International
Law Meeting in April 2010. There were a couple
thousand people there. To make sure that I
had a speech to give, our office wrote about
a 40-minute speech, and then the last 15
minutes were on drones. But when I stood
to give the speech, the last 15 minutes had
not yet been fully cleared. It had to be cleared
by 100 people. And so I'm giving the
first part of the speech-- [LAUGHTER] --and I'm wondering which
ending I'm going to give. And then suddenly, from
the back of the room, in comes the assistant legal
advisor working on the issue. And he runs up to
the podium, and he sticks on the last eight pages. [LAUGHTER] And it's all marked up and
read and all this stuff. MARTHA MINOW: Redacted? HAROLD KOH: Well, some
things were dropped. But you know, so it
gets to this point, and your colleague Jack
Goldsmith describes it by saying, at that
point in the speech, Koh became riveted to his text. [LAUGHTER] Because if I didn't read word
for word what had been cleared, it wasn't the position
of the United States. I did a similar
thing with regard to our rules of cyber conflict. I tried to do it
again with regard to whether we thought that
certain human rights treaties forbidding torture apply
extraterritoriality. And I also tried
to do it, again, in a speech I gave in Georgetown
about our policies of what constitutes agreements that
bind the United States. For example, the Paris climate
deal and the Iran nuclear deal. And I think it's just a good
thing for the legal advisor to do, because other
countries are looking to us and trying to figure out
whether we have a rationale. So say nothing or Twittering
something is not the same as writing a legal opinion. SAMANTHA POWER: Tweeting. Tweeting. [LAUGHTER] MARTHA MINOW: Ambassador
Power, you certainly are someone who has tried
to explain and explain the United States. But sometimes to an internal
audience in the United States, sometimes to a global
audience, how did you? How should an ambassador
navigate those issues? And speaking for those
multiple audiences, along with the
issues of secrecy, diplomacy, loyalty
to the US, et cetera? SAMANTHA POWER: These
questions are all so great. They're making me think
thoughts I haven't had before, which is always a good sign. I'd say a few things. The thought I had when
Harold was speaking is, number one, the number of times
I sat in my security council chair with the United States
of America in front of me when things were being
broadcast live on TV. Which doesn't happen that
often, but at the height of the Ukraine crisis, different
moments in the Syria crisis, we'd just be live on CNN
or on Fox or on MSNBC, and I'll be sitting there saying
to my staff who I was normally, I hope, relatively nice to, but
in these moments, not my finest moments of generous
leadership, (WHISPERING) where the fuck is my speech? [LAUGHTER] But I'd be there, United
States of America, like, all happy, happy. Like, (ROUGH VOICE)
where is my-- I need my speech! [LAUGHTER] You know, and because
I can wing it-- and that's maybe another thing
that comes out of law school. You know the core
of your argument, and you can be hopefully-- you know, find a way to express
what you need to express. But there's this issue
of the clearance process. Samantha and Harold
don't just get to decide what US policy
is on a given day, much though we might have tried. [LAUGHTER] So I just identify
so much with that. I hadn't heard that story
before about the drones, and I identify with it. Then the second thought I had--
and there are only three-- but the second is that to some
degree what Harold was saying reminds me of something that
I used to do with a very, very different audience,
and in many ways, a more impressionable audience
than the legal community. And that is my son who
was between five and-- basically, eight years. I guess four and seven years
old when I was UN ambassador. And you know, I would come home. Cass was teaching here
while I was in New York. And so during the week,
it was me and my young son and my daughter when I was
able to be home with them. And some days, I'd come
home, and the Ukraine crisis was the first really
high-profile conflict that I was involved
in where I'd come into the UN Security Council. Russia's just gone into Crimea. I'm sitting at the
Security Council. Lights are flashing,
cameras everywhere. I'm thinking, this
is just like what it must have been like when
they went into Hungary in 1956 or they cracked down
Czechoslovakia in '68. And you know, it just
felt so anachronistic and crazy that this was happening. And then I had that
moment of like-- you know, those great standoffs
that we've all read about and that I was so steeped in
between the US and the Soviet Union. And I'm kind of drifting
off and thinking about-- and then I'm like,
oh, now I'm America. Like, I'm America. I've got to be America
in that confrontation. And so we had-- I had very memorable exchanges
calling the Russians out on what they were
doing and so forth. And I think important ones,
for what they were worth, in terms of moving
public opinion of the UN, because a lot of countries would
want to duck issues like this. And then sometimes,
particularly if I've been out of the office, or
excuse me, away from home for a long time because of
the intensity of these crises and having meetings
in the Situation Room till all hours of the night. And I'd get a window,
and I'd take my son, and I'd take him just out for
a burger before I'd go back to the office or something. And so one of these
early sessions, I was describing my clash
with the Russian ambassador. And you know, he said
this, and then I said this, and I was likening it
to if Putin came in and he took your toys and-- [LAUGHTER] --but I was kind of
feeling as if I'd made a powerful
statement, and it was getting favorable coverage. And people felt like
I had adequately represented the United
States in standing up against Russian aggression. And then my boy
just looks at me. And he's listening, and
he's totally into it. And he gets taking somebody's
land and how wrong it is. And then he's like, but,
Mommy, did they leave? [LAUGHTER] Did they leave Crimea? [LAUGHTER] Oh, man. That is exactly
the right question. [LAUGHTER] If I ever forget that
and get enamored with, oh, I really nailed the argument
and miss the larger point, you know, that's when I've
lost my soul in this job. And then the last
example I just give is I think that we have
to, in these jobs-- one, we need to do-- and
this is a long conversation-- but we need to do a better
job of selling what we're doing internationally
clearly given what's happened in this country and
the degree of polarization domestically. But my little neck of
the woods was the UN where we also weren't really
in the practice of humanizing the things that we were trying
to get done in a manner that would convince anybody. And so there are sort of
these habits of interaction that had grown up over many
years, habits of diplomacy. They exist at NATO, at the OSCE. They exist in bilateral meetings
between foreign ministers. And it's like, you
know, you almost had to be a bit of a newcomer
to just walk in, say, this is, A, boring, B,
repetitive, C, no one's listening to each other. They're all on
their phones doing God knows what, sort
of like some law school classrooms these days. [LAUGHTER] When I'm back teaching
here, we were not having laptops in my classroom. Just future warning. But I wish I could have banned
phones from the Security Council, because the
kind of back and forth that you imagine-- anyway. So I decided that if I
couldn't bring the sort of man to the mountain of
bringing the Security Council to every place where
the consequences of our actions or inactions were being
felt, then we needed to bring mountain to man, I guess. And so for instance,
during the Ebola crisis, it was such-- you know,
you have the UN briefing with the number of
statistics, and these were eye-popping
statistics of how many people were going to die. But there was some
way that the UN managed to make the imminent
death of 1.4 million people not that newsworthy. And it was just, da,
da, da, you know. And so I thought,
what can we do? Let's get someone
from the region. They can't get out because
of all the travel issues at the height of the epidemic. But let's get them
to the UN base and beam them into
this discussion. And we had this health worker
I'm still in touch with, Jackson Naimah, who
was working for MSF. He was just a-- he wasn't a doctor or a
trained nurse or anything. He was just somebody who'd
stepped up to the call. And he told the story of
people coming in and trying to get into the MSF clinic, the
Doctors Without Borders clinic, and there being no
beds and no facilities, because that was the point
we were at at the epidemic. It was just before-- just as President
Obama was deciding to send 3,000 troops
and health workers into the eye of the storm,
thus enabling me to build and Kerry to build a
big global coalition that managed to
end the epidemic. Unbelievable. But we didn't know
that that's where this was going at that time. And Jackson just
described, like, a man carrying his
daughter and begging him to be able to leave
his daughter there so his daughter could get care. And you know, Jackson
having to say no, because the treatment
needed to be just so, and there were all kinds
of infection control issues that were causing health workers
and others to get infected. And he described the man leaving
his daughter at the entrance to the clinic on the
road just knowing he was leaving her to die. And there's that, and what
that felt like for him, which he described. But then there's also the
fact that the man went back to his family having
carried his daughter and was going to infect
everyone around him, because that's
how the epidemic-- and so this is your reaction. This is-- I'm about
to cry right now. This is all these years later. You can imagine in the
Security Council at this time, it's the only time I
ever saw people just-- and he ended his thing by
saying, if you do not act, we will all be wiped out. We will all be wiped out. And you know, policies
are made elsewhere. They're not made in New York. These guys, the
ambassadors there largely are following instructions. But all I knew was that because
the human was introduced and someone had communicated
the stakes of this in a way that I never could
have on my own, that each of those individuals
in the room at least became allies and
advocates to try to get their governments to do more. MARTHA MINOW: And put
their phones down, too. SAMANTHA POWER: Yeah. And that. MARTHA MINOW: You know,
it's kind of poignant. We're in this room that was
named for Dean Vorenberg, which is the only room
in the law school that has on the walls pictures
of clients, pictures of people. And that was one
of the reasons is, let's think about
the people whose lives are affected by the law. So there's Tinker. We can go through
them at some point. So that's quite an image
to hold in our minds. I wanted to ask you each to
say something about a highlight of your times in government. You've just giving us one. I can supply them, but
do you want to offer one? SAMANTHA POWER: Do
you want to go next? HAROLD KOH: Well, one incident
that got a lot of attention was I went to China
for a meeting. And while I'm
there, I get a call. I was in the town of Chengshan. And it was the chief of
staff, or Secretary Clinton. And she says, I'm in the
office, and I realize it's 3:00 in the afternoon. So it must be 3:00
in the morning. And I said, you're
in the office. And she said, can
you get to Chengdu and call me on a secure phone? And I say to my handler,
how far away is that? They said, four hours away. And I said, can I talk
to you about it now? And she said, no,
because of what happened. So she said, get
there and call me. And then I said, is anybody
in my office working on this? And she said, yes,
your deputy who is also in the office
at 3:00 in the morning. So I call her and I
said, what's going on? [LAUGHTER] And she said, you need
to get to a secure phone. [LAUGHTER] And then I said, is this like
the thing with the scientist? Which was Fang Lizhi had
gone into our embassy. And she said, yeah,
but he has different physical characteristics. And then I realized
that she must be talking about Chen Guangcheng
who is this famous blind human rights activist. So I concluded that I must be-- he must have tried to come
into our embassy in Beijing. So they say, go to
the train station where you are, and we have
US diplomats in every line. And whichever one is closest
to the front, you go there. So I go, and there
are seven lines, and I see this blonde
hair right near the front. And I run up, and the guy
goes, get on the train. We're going to go to Chengdu. We jump on the train,
and we're sitting there. I don't even know his name. Then he said, I saw you
at Harvard Law School. [LAUGHTER] He said, you know, I
worked at a law firm, and I was in the East Asian
Legal Studies program, and now I'm a member of
the diplomatic corps. And I said, didn't you guys
have an incident in Chengdu where someone came
into the embassy? And he said, yeah. And I said, well, look,
I've got nothing but time. So he tells me all about it. And we get to Chengdu, and I
call back, and they said, yes. This blind Chinese activist
escaped from house arrest. He's broken his foot,
and he's outside asking to come into our embassy. Secretary Clinton would
like him to come in, but she won't do it unless
you give your legal opinion. And what we're
concerned about is that we don't want
everybody in the whole world to claim a right to
come into our embassies. So I said, well, what if the
United States claims a right to admission for purpose of
getting medical care, which he can't receive elsewhere? I said, we could narrow that. And on that basis,
they admitted him. At which point, I went and flew
to Beijing, and there he was. And we sat together for 14 days. Meanwhile, during
the whole thing, this largest meeting
of 250 US officials with the Chinese
government is going on, and Secretary Clinton was
dealing with that all publicly. Meanwhile, in the
backdoor, we're trying to persuade him
to leave the embassy. And so we end up
calling and making an arrangement that he go to
NYU, because we thought that he could go to NYU Shanghai
or switch to NYU New York if it all went south. And the negotiations
went on for a long time. The main message that
I learned, though, is you have to take cultural
context into account. Because what finally happened
is that the Chinese finally decided that they didn't
want this to mess up the negotiations or
the broader discussion, and that they would let
him leave the country, but they had to do it their way. So we're watching
TV and getting ready for the final announcement. And we had written two speeches,
one which slammed them, and one which was sort
of moderate and said, we'll see what happens next. And so they said,
the foreign minister announces that he
is allowed to apply for a visa to go to America. And we had a meeting,
and suddenly everybody says, well, that's a disaster. He's allowed to apply. He could be rejected. And so I think we should give
the speech slamming them. And I said, wait, this is Asia. [LAUGHTER] I said, the enforcement device
here is not consideration. It's face. I said, have you ever
heard an Asian father say, my kid is applying to Harvard? [LAUGHTER] If they're applying that
means they're going to get in. And we have to
respect their right to make the final decision. But he's going to get
the visa, so I think we should give the other speech. So that's the speech they gave,
and a week later, he came out. So I was there for 15 days. I had two shirts, and
I took turns wearing one and then wearing the other. And meanwhile, my whole
family didn't even know what I was doing. And then they're watching on TV. This was in the
middle of a campaign where Mitt Romney
suddenly appears and says that we've destroyed
the life of this guy, and we should all be fired. And then they go on
TV, and they show the list of people who are
working on it who should all be fired, including
my face is there as someone who should be fired. And then I got a series of calls
from a series of congressmen, and they just berated me. And partly, I think, because
I was at the end of my rope, I said, when we encountered
this man, he had a broken foot, and he was lying in a ditch. Now he's been admitted
to the embassy. He has superb medical care. We obtained a
scholarship-free admittance to seven different universities,
and now he's going to NYU. Can you explain to me how he's
worse off for our intervention? And they couldn't
answer the question, and they sort of dropped it. So anyway, I could
tell you more. It was an interesting
experience. But it's one that
will stick with me. SAMANTHA POWER: And you know,
I have a lot of highlights, as does Harold, that
I could choose from. And I love sharing
them, because I think there is a
bit of darkness, you might have noticed,
in the air these days. And when people, also even in
our time, something like Syria and the Syrianization of the
world, as some have called it, can really crowd out
even the memory of what we did that was good and
important and constructive, and even that which is
lasting, which a lot of I think will prove to be. But the example I
will give just-- and you'll see why in a second,
because I'll bring it back today-- involves LGBT rights, which
is one of the hardest issues to make progress
on internationally. Because such a large
subset of the countries that comprise the UN are
themselves homophobic, certainly by culture
and by practice, but also in the case of
more than 70 countries by law where it's
actually prohibited, as it used to be in this country. And so to try to push water
uphill on that set of issues was never going to be easy. But over the life of
our time, initially I've worked with Ambassador Rice when
she was in my job in New York. And in that phase-- I was the president's
human rights advisor-- we got LGBT rights recognized
as human rights in Geneva. Harold was, I think, involved
in that as well at that time. But then we started
to think, OK, well, what more can we do
beyond establishing this norm, which is important,
and the effect of it? An altered norm may not
be felt for generations, but it's still about
changing the DNA. And one of the
things I realized was that ISIS was, for
all of the groups that they were targeting
in different ways-- you know, Christians
and Sunni who just didn't get with the
ISIS program, Shia, Yazidis, you name it-- they also would very
specifically target gay people and make them jump off
buildings, kill them. And it struck me
as just so shameful that the UN Security Council,
the council, the premier maker and shaper of international
law, could get its act together over things that
are very important. Heritage, cultural heritage,
you know, the sale of artifacts, the horrible things
they were doing. That we could pass
a resolution on. But the idea of even discussing
ISIS's targeting of LGBT people was completely unthinkable. So I wish I could tell you
that we got a resolution passed that criminalized or rendered
illegal under international law what ISIS was doing
to LGBT people. We did not. But we did manage to hold the
first ever UN Security Council session on this issue. And true to form, we
brought in two people who had been victimized
by ISIS who were trying to get asylum in this country. One of them was granted asylum
and the other was about to be and thought he was
coming to this country. But some of what has happened
with this administration appears to have derailed him. So he's likely to
end up in Canada. But to have these
two voices describing for an array of
governments, many of whom criminalized homosexuality-- but for them to describe
what ISIS was doing, it was sort of-- it's almost like people said,
when will there be world peace? You know, when the
Martians invade and it forces us all
to agree in a way that we wouldn't otherwise. ISIS was like the
Martian, you know? It was the one thing
that surely everybody would be able to agree on. But this made those governments
very, very uncomfortable. So we did that. And then not that long after
that, the Orlando massacre happened. And in that moment-- and again, you have these
opportunities in diplomacy that grow out of the worst
forms of human tragedy, and in this case, human horror. But it's a moment that one
needs to move very quickly to try to take advantage
of for the good, to find some good in it. And sure enough, the revulsion
over what had happened and the sadness and the
genuine empathy for the lives that had been lost
and the survivors allowed us, in the
UN Security Council, to secure an action condemning
the targeting of people on the basis of their
sexual orientation for the first time in the,
at that time, 71-year history of the UN. And so we did that,
and then there is a core group of countries
that come from North and South, mainly Latins, who come
together to brainstorm about these kind of
normative, incremental things that we can do with an eye
to countries then being held accountable
to these evolved and hopefully more
progressive standards. And so I decided to
convene the core group, because we only had a year left
in the Obama administration, at the Stonewall
Inn in New York. And so we had this
amazing experience at the Stonewall Inn. And there we discussed
a couple things, one very concrete and important,
and the other symbolic and a little mischievous. The sneaky and
mischievous, but I think, also, in its way
an important thing was we decided-- or someone proposed-- I think
it was the Dutch ambassador proposed that we try to
paint the crosswalk that goes on First Avenue from, in
effect, the rest of Manhattan into the UN in rainbow colors
when the heads of state came to town. [LAUGHTER] And so you know, if we'd
been really mischievous, we would have posted some kind
of whatever, hidden camera where these-- like, Robert Mugabe
crossing the-- [LAUGHTER] --you know, LGBT crosswalk,
and you know, encapsulate that and broadcast it all over. We didn't do the second
thing, but we did manage, thanks to Bill de Blasio-- but you can imagine
the bureaucratics of getting this done. But we did manage to
have the gathering of the heads of
state, the entrances be rainbow-colored
entrances last year at the UN General Assembly. The more lasting
thing that we did was that we worked with
the Latin countries. They were actually in the
lead very deliberately, because when the
United States is in the lead, that can create
a backlash of its own kind. And the Latins
led, and we created the first ever sort
of UN human rights position dedicated to measuring
the progress or lack thereof on LGBT rights. And that's the so-called
independent expert on LGBT rights
based out of Geneva. And today, this very day,
this independent expert, who's a Thai gentleman who's
actually stepping down, unfortunately, for health
reasons, but he'll be replaced, presented for the very first
time to the General Assembly the results of his months
of work documenting. And so all the
countries are upset, or they're working really hard
to find a way to undermine him. They tried to
defund the position. So having lost in the
Human Rights Council when we created this
position the Islamic states and the African
countries in the lead, and with Russia and
the Chinese support tried, through a bunch
of different procedural mechanisms, to take
the position away. And so having lost on the
substance in a body that even for all of its flaws
allows you to get things like that done in Geneva,
because it's a smaller subset of the UN membership. They then tried
to take advantage of the more mob-like
atmosphere that there is at times in New York. And you know, I think it
was on three occasions, basically tried different
ways to defund the position, most of which we held
off by one or two votes at different times. So for today, this
individual to just go just even in
briefing and giving a venue, a receptacle for
advocates around the world to bring their stories and
to bring the documentation of what's happening to
them in their communities is what passes at least
for a victory these days. And I should say, it's an
example of something very, very important, and a takeaway,
I think, for all of us after the last eight years,
and coming into this four years that we will have-- maybe-- which is
institutionalization, right? Like, it's one thing to be good
for five minutes on LGBT rights and push it and have a
meeting, but it's another thing to embed a position within an
organization, which means that no matter what the position
of the current administration of the US is on these issues,
and it's not quite what ours was, that still lives. And this is the same
thing that allowed us-- and this doesn't get enough
attention-- on climate. You know, the natural
course of things, international law would have
been for the Paris agreement to have been negotiated on
climate back in December 2015, finished. And then in the normal course
of things, I think Kyoto, it took nine years
for that treaty to come into force for the
requisite number of countries to actually have
gotten it through their domestic ratification. Even though we thought
that Secretary Clinton was more likely than not to win,
we did a full court press for the entire year
between December 2015 and December 2016 to get
the Paris agreement to come into force so that we were
less vulnerable to the results of the November election. And got it done, actually
I think, just a couple days before the election itself. What that means
is even though we have to live with the
horror of pulling out of Paris as a
country potentially, if that's what happens,
and we certainly have to live with the
horror of pollutant policies and the undoing of really
important regulations. What we don't have
to live with is what we would have
had to live with if things were allowed to
just take their course, which is the complete unraveling of
the Paris agreement as a whole. There'd be no Paris agreement,
because the agreement comes into force when at
least 55 countries who account for more than 55% of
the emissions in the world are party to it. So we were party. We may now not be
about to be party, but the agreement's
already in the bank. HAROLD KOH: Let me just-- Trump has declared his intent
to withdraw from the Paris agreement on November
4, 2020, which is the day after the next
presidential election. That's like my saying,
I intend to move from my house in four years. Nothing has happened. It's legally meaningless. I went to a group of
Europeans who said, the United States is in a
state of virtual withdrawal. And I said, the
United States is in. And you know, Trump
does not own Paris. We do. And I think we should just
say, we'll always have Paris. [LAUGHTER] By the way, I mean,
tweets are not law. [LAUGHTER] MARTHA MINOW:
Whatever they may be. So here's the question
that I alerted you to that I want to ask. Idealism, realism,
idealism without illusions, speaking from your own voice
versus speaking as the United States government. Samantha, you recently said
that during college, you realized that you didn't want
to go through your life-- and I quote you-- "giving myself
alibis for not trying to change my little slice of the world." And your magnificent
book, A Problem from Hell, sharply criticized
government officials for standing by
during the atrocities. And so then there you
are, and you can't do everything you want to do. So are you still an idealist? How do you put that together? I know you're writing
a book about this. SAMANTHA POWER:
Funny you should ask. [LAUGHTER] To me, the hardest policies to
be associated with or certainly the hardest events on the ground
to witness were those in Syria. You know, it was the
largest mass atrocity of the last decade, one of
the largest of my lifetime. And as I indicated earlier with
this phrase, the Syrianization of the world, the strategic
effects of just the rise of ISIS and the displacement,
now 67 million people displaced around the world. Half the Syrian
population displaced. Then the migration that
followed from that. Would there have been Brexit
if the Syrian war hadn't degenerated to that extent? Would there be Trump if the
fear and the sort of specter of difference and threat weren't
available to people because of all the images out of this? There's just a lot. It's one that was very
hard to live with. And the hardest part
day to day was just having people like
Caesar, who is the pseudonym for
the gentleman who was a photographer
in Syrian jails and took the photographs of
tens of thousands of Syrians who'd been tortured and
executed in Syrian jails. And who believed when he got
out that if the world only knew, if they only saw these
images where people literally had serial numbers
carved into them and acid poured all
over them, and just-- I'm sure some of you at least
have seen the photographs. And he came out and
he told the story, and people were horrified. And we as an international
community, we as the United States, all the
countries that comprise the UN didn't manage to move the
ball in the manner that helped anybody else in a material
way who was in a Syrian prison vulnerable to just
those kinds of crimes. So I think the way
for me when I-- I mean, A, Syria was
a really hard one, because it wasn't one-- and this is probably how complex
policy decisions in real time just always feel. But it wasn't one where,
while I had ideas for things that we might be doing
that we weren't doing, it wasn't like I could come home
and just say, you know, Cass, they won't listen to me. I have the idea for what's
going to solve this sectarian conflict and going to
mitigate, if not solve, you know, mitigate the
suffering of millions of people. Like, just the complexity--
it felt kind of almost overdetermined by so many
of these demons that have been unleashed on the ground. And you do-- and
I knew this from-- I'd interviewed
hundreds of people to write A Problem
from Hell-- but when you're in the room in real time,
as I tried to document even in the book, but the
limits of what you know are very salient to you. And the sense of kind of
epistemological humility about what you don't know
and all that lies out there. So that could sound like
an alibi of the kind that you describe,
but it was just the context in which
I would keep still trying to climb up
the hill with ideas for things we might
do that might make things a little bit better. And John Kerry was the same way,
and I found a lot of solidarity in him. I mean, even till
the very last day he was in office as
Secretary of State, just the effort he
made to try to gin up a peace process, a political
process, which is ultimately how this thing has to end. My way of living
with Syria, apart from all the other
examples I could give you about things we
did on other areas, was just if I'd come
out of a meeting, and it was clear that
the thing I was proposing was going nowhere,
and I couldn't get support from my
colleagues or the UN Security Council for that matter. If I got the US government
or we, the US government, were in what I thought
was a good place, but then we were
thwarted by Russia, I would come back to my team-- and this is sort of
a motto of mine-- and say, OK, so what now? And the motto was, there's
always something we can do. Even in Syria, there was
always something we could do. So we didn't solve the war,
the Syrianization, and the pain of all those people persisted. But I would focus on a
single political prisoner who I could-- I couldn't get the
Russian ambassador to go along with me on
sanctioning the Assad regime for the crimes that they
had committed in their prisons. But I could get him to
engage his counterpart, his Russian
counterpart in Damascus and get that individual
through, again, my Russian
counterpart at the UN, to go to the Syrian
government and try to get this guy out of jail. It's sort of like the
story of one individual. These stories get lost. But my team could never-- it would be a terrible state
to have the privileges of being in these positions of public
service and not every day be thinking, OK. We can't do X. We're not going
to solve the whole thing, but what is the
little piece of this? So we got a resolution
through the Russians. This is going to sound so
modest and tame, but it was so important to allow,
for the Russians to allow-- to roll the Syrian
government, basically, and allow humanitarian
assistance to come across the
international borders to people who were living
in opposition territory. The Syrian government's position
was, we're the sovereign. You've got to bring your food
to Damascus before you go to any of these breakaway rebel areas. And this was absurd, because
it was too dangerous to get to Damascus in some cases. And if it got to Damascus, all
the food was going to be taken, and it would never get-- So again, just through
wearing down the Russians and using some public
shaming around, how can you block
humanitarian assistance to these vulnerable people? We were able-- and so now, even
though everything else is still terrible in Syria, at
least these areas that would otherwise have
no UN assistance, none of the big factory-like
flow, convoys of food, none of that would be
existing but for, again, to try to continue to
find that one thing you can do against a
backdrop of ultimately not being able to do
what you wish you could. MARTHA MINOW: Harold, you've
described the legal advisor to the State Department
as conscience for the United States
government with regard to international law. And I have a suspicion
that there were times that you were arguing
for particular positions, maybe not on law but on
the policy, that didn't become the ultimate positions. And I just wonder,
did that ever happen? And how do you deal
with not winning? HAROLD KOH: Well, let
me ask you, Martha. Did you ever have to defend
a tenure decision with which you didn't fully agree? [LAUGHTER] MARTHA MINOW: I actually
didn't have that experience. [LAUGHTER] But I absolutely have
had to do things. That's what I'm asking. It's the role-- having a role. HAROLD KOH: You're
part of a team. MARTHA MINOW: Yeah. HAROLD KOH: I should have
said, when I was in college, I was a physics major
until my junior year, and then I took a
class on government. And I'm sitting in
the class, and the guy starts talking about
the in and outers. And I didn't know what that was. And so I said, what's that? And he said, oh, oh,
scholar ambassadors. And I said, like who? And he said, Henry
Kissinger, John Kenneth Galbraith, Patrick Moynihan. They have the best life
because they have tenure, but then they can go
into the government and go back and forth. So I actually wrote
a paper about this, and that sort of started
my thinking about it. Now, there are
risks of doing that. In the faculty lounge,
you can be right. And then if people disagree,
you go get another cookie. [LAUGHTER] No. I mean, you could say
inconsistent things from week to week, and people
don't hold you to it. But in government, you
are part of a large group trying to make decisions. And you know, judges
say things like, I just see myself as an umpire
calling balls and strikes. Of course, everybody has
their own strike zone. But anyway. [LAUGHTER] I didn't want to be a judge. I didn't want to be an umpire. I want to play the game. And if you play the
game, even if you're a Ted Williams, six times out
of 10, you don't get a hit. So the question is, how do
you move the ball forward on the things you care about? I had three rules. Rule number one,
the airplane rule. If you're in at the takeoff,
you can be in at the landing. So I would not
defend the decision that I didn't participate
in the making of. But if I participated
in the making of it and I lost in a fair fight,
you know, you defend it, just as you do
when you're a dean. Rule number two is you're only
as good as your principles. P-L-E-S and P-A-L-S. You're only
as good as the people you work for, the principals. So work for people you
think have great capacity. Otherwise, you'll find yourself
limited by their limitations. And you're only as good as
your principles, P-L-E-S, the things that
you stand up for. As William Sloane Coffin used to
say, "If you stand for nothing, you'll fall for anything." [LAUGHTER] And then the third rule
I got from Derek Bok. I was sitting with
him at a dinner here. And I said to him, what's
your advice about leadership? And he was great. He said, you ever play pinball? [LAUGH] And I said, yeah, I've
played a lot of pinball. And he goes, you know, if
you don't shake the machine, you're not really playing. [LAUGHTER] And he goes, but if
you tilt it, you're not a very good player either. So shake it, but don't tilt it. [LAUGHTER] And so wherever
I was, I thought, am I shaking the machine? [LAUGHTER] And how close are we to tilt? You want to be right
there, right at that edge. SAMANTHA POWER: Can I share
one little, short anecdote? Just what it's like-- so Harold and I were allies
pretty much on everything, and it was amazing just
to know I'd be in this-- like on landmines. We were trying to get
us to ban landmines. And we'd just look, and there'd
just be this one smiling, cherubic face. Because I'm chairing these
meetings from the White House, and he's my great owl. But early on-- and
I can't remember why it was-- but I think it was
a meeting on the International Criminal Court that
I was chairing. Again, my capacity
as the president's Multilateral Affairs and
Human Rights Adviser. Harold was representing
the State Department at this meeting. There would have been
a lot of ICC skeptics. It would have been early,
relatively early in 2009, probably not long after
you were confirmed. But anyway, apparently
I chaired this meeting in a way that was very-- kind of, I just work here. [LAUGHTER] I'm just calling
balls and strikes. Like, go ahead, Harold. Oh, that's a great point. Now, what about you, sir? What are the arguments
you think for us, having nothing to do
with this body, you know, which wants to pursue
Americans and do all these terrible things? And so anyway, Harold
got very mad at me. Do you remember this at all? So you called me. You didn't come to my office. So you just called. Someone was like, Harold's on. I was like, oh, Harold,
like a warm bath. You know, one of my
few true soul mates, allies in government. And he just starts
laying into me. And he's like, you need to
go home and read your book. [LAUGHTER] Read your book! [LAUGHTER] You seem to have
forgotten what you wrote! You know? This is a really,
really important thing, because it's a
little bit like what can happen at law school,
what I was describing earlier is that you can-- there are roles that you occupy. And in those roles, it's
appropriate to hear all views. But you know, you don't lose
sight of what you believe or how you want the orchestra
to play the song, basically, and where you want it to land. And so I was like, oh. I don't know what happened
to me there for a minute. Sorry. And so then we went back
to business together. And he had said,
even when he was-- when I was first going into
government, he said, you know, occasionally-- and he was just entering
for the second time. But in his previous
human rights job he said, you know, occasionally
in government, I would go home and I would read what
I had written so I could remember what I thought. [LAUGHTER] And so there he was-- I thought it was fair
that he was chastising me to do the same thing. HAROLD KOH: One important
thing is when I first got to the State
Department in 1998, I was the head of the
Human Rights Bureau. A guy pulled me aside. He said, you know, at
the State Department, we hate four things. And I said, what's that? He said, political appointees,
human rights people, lawyers, and professors. [LAUGHTER] So I have a message for
the younger students here. You know, they're not waiting
with baited breath for you to come in and make the
theory of your last article the government policy, you know? And so you have to basically
work with the people who are there and what
they're trying to accomplish. And you know, I keep getting
asked about articles I wrote. The fact of the matter is that
nobody in the US government cared what my
position as a scholar is on the War Powers Resolution. It's, what are the opinions
of the Legal Adviser's Office? And where do my
views fit into that? Finally, you know, when you
work in a field for a long time, you learn things. And at one point
somebody said to me, I think what you're saying is
inconsistent with something you said in some
article you wrote. And I said, well, what do
you think matters more? [LAUGHTER] What I put in a footnote when
I was coming up for tenure when I was 27, or what I say
after a lifetime of thinking about these issues,
going to the government twice, dealing with it
now, and addressing it in this life-and-death setting? I don't defer to myself as a
27-year-old trying to impress somebody with my footnote. And you know, listen to me now. [LAUGHTER] MARTHA MINOW: That's very good. Well, we're living, as you've
already alluded to, at a time after the term of the president
under whom you both served. And there's been
a lot of changes. The United States has
disengaged from UNESCO. They've talked a little bit
about the Paris climate deal. Some people say Pax Americana is
over, the post-World War II way of dealing with global issues. Certainly, one major
change is at least the rhetoric, the rhetoric
about what the United States has a role to play in the world. And talk about roles. As dean, I would be
leaning over backwards, whatever anyone thinks. This might be great for America,
might be bad for America. I'm not dean, so I'm
not going to do that. But what do you
think about this? What do you predict? What's the consequence of
this new moment for us? SAMANTHA POWER: Well, I think
for starters, this moment and this protracted period
is hastening and will really accelerate the rise
and the prominence and the leadership of China
in the international system. And as two human rights people
here, and you just heard one-- actually, by the standard
of the crackdown underway, that's been underway
in China now for some time, a relatively
good news story of someone who was able to get out. But for China to
be asserting itself on the global stage where
there is now a vacuum, it will inevitably
mean projecting their domestic pathologies
into global statecraft. They actually, up to this
point, punch a little bit below their weight,
in the sense that they are very active in
blocking action, like on Rohingya on Burma. Very active in trying to
prevent discussion if North Korea is a human rights issue. But we haven't seen
the beginnings of this. And Graham Allison, our
colleague at the Kennedy School, has a book
out that I recommend to people, which looks at
the question of whether China and the United States
are destined for war. Doesn't think that
we are, but thinks there are a set of
factors that might mean that every
policymaker needs to take this prospect very seriously. But just the stat
that leaps out at me, indicative of China's rise-- I'm going to just
share it with you, because it's so eye-popping
to me, at least was-- is that China produced and
used more cement between 2011 and 2013 than the United States
did in the entire 20th century. [LAUGH] And that's a bricks
and mortar example, but imagine that
getting translated into policy leadership when
there isn't another vocal kind of pull on the other side. And I saw this even as
I was leaving New York. It was the first time in
the budget negotiations, because China is
now the number two donor to UN peacekeeping, which
is like an $8 billion budget. And they'd been a very small
donor for so many years, but now it's measured on
the basis of basically, your share of the global
economy and per capita income and stuff. So now they're number
two, right behind us. And so for the very
first time, they moved away from the developing
countries in the budget negotiations with whom
they'd always been affiliated as the G77 plus China. But they didn't want to be with
us in the Western countries, so they just put their chair
between these two negotiating blocks. And we still thought
this could be helpful, because they have a lot of
leverage with these countries, because they're a much
bigger development donor now than we are, than all
of the Western countries are really combined. So we thought, this could
be helpful in a clinch. We could maybe get
a sensible budget with cutting some of the
bloat that needs to be cut. And sure enough they were
much more budget-conscious, because they were
on the hook in a way that they hadn't been before. But the things that
they wanted to cut were the human rights positions
from all the peacekeeping missions. So that's one example. And then the second
thing I'd say is just other than China's
rise in terms of us, I mentioned earlier, I think,
that often new presidents take over and we're
kind of like goldfish. You know, we think
that, I'm a goldfish, and I just get to
start over and have new thoughts in a given day
and lead in a different way. And I think this has been
true of American history, that we don't see that other
countries see this continuity in our policies. I think the cost of breaking
our word on the Iran deal or on Paris, the cost
of daily falsehoods coming from the highest
office in the land, the cost of embracing police
brutality vocally and even arguably sexual assault,
I mean, those are not costs from which we just
get to elect somebody else and then say, hey,
guys, we're back. You know, we believe
in things again, and we believe that in order
to keep our people safe, we have to engage the world. And that, you know, in effect,
our security and our humanity is linked. Like, we believe
that, and we're back. And now we'll go
back to, hopefully we won't have a nuclear
war in the meantime, and we'll go back to all of the
things we've walked away-- it's not going to work that way. Not only because
of China's rise, but because as a very
senior European official, the national security advisor to
a very prominent European head of state said to me
recently, you know, the problem with us is we're
going to have post-trauma-- us meaning Europe-- we're going to have
post-traumatic stress about this period. Because it isn't that
Trump is your president. It is that you elected Trump. So now we have these
two data points. You elected Barack Obama. And from the standpoint
of foreign policy, people have their
critiques of Barack Obama that I'm sure are fair. But now you're capable of
electing and supporting this. And so what does that mean? How can we rely again on
you being able to stick to who you say you are? So that's the word,
but maybe Harold will say something happy
about the Trump legacy. [LAUGH] The checks and balances. Maybe you should talk about
the checks and balances, because you've been
Mr. Check and Balance. HAROLD KOH: So for
the last nine months, you know, you turn on
the TV in the morning. It's Trump this, Trump that. And it reminds of the
famous joke by Mel Brooks, the 2,000-year-old man,
where they say to him-- he's playing a
2,000-year-old man-- before God, was
there anybody else? And the 2,000-year-old
man says, yeah, there was a guy named Phil. [LAUGHTER] And they said, what happened? He said, we'd say, oh, Phil. Don't hurt us and
don't beat us and don't make our lives miserable. And then one day, lightning
came out of the sky and struck Phil dead,
and we said, there's something bigger than Phil. [LAUGHTER] Well, you know, there's
something bigger than Trump, which is this
whole process that we all own. And he may be a major player,
but as I said in the panel this morning, you
know, he may want to put in a Muslim ban
called the travel ban. He announced it on
January 27, and the groups that have risen up to
litigate against it, it's been in effect
for less than 24 hours. You know, he may want
a transgender ban. The bureaucracy is resisting. You know, he may want
to pull out of Paris. All he's done is say
that he will pull out of Paris in the
future at a time when he may no longer be president. He might say he wants
to decertify the Iran nuclear deal, but he's going
to kick it to Congress, and it's not clear that they're
going to do anything different. Because actually, they
don't have anything better than the Iran deal. And in fact, what
could be a worse time to renege on
the Iran deal when what you're trying to develop is
some sort of nuclear diplomacy with North Korea? So Martin Luther King said,
"The arc of history is long, and it bends toward justice." It doesn't bend by itself. We were lucky. We could afford to withdraw from
this process and let, you know, Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton
and John Kerry and Samantha Power do the right
thing in our names. But that time no longer exists. In this room are five people
who signed a brief on behalf of national security officials,
former national security officials of both
parties, who say, look, this travel ban is
not based on a process that deserves judicial deference. There was no process. They've actually explained
no national security rationale for it. To this day, they have yet
to produce a single person from any of these countries who
committed a terrorist killing in the United States. And in fact, Trump
himself says he would bomb for Syrian
children who he will not admit to the country. So I think we have
a right to say, what is going on here is not
deference to the president and a process we respect. What's going on
instead is the question of whether the
process we respect is being followed by the
person who happens to hold the position of president. And if not, that does
not warrant deference from the courts. We don't have a wild split in
the circuits about the travel ban. Every single court
that's ruled basically has ruled against it over
and over and over again. Or take the transgender ban. The Defense Department
under Ash Carter, who teaches at the
Kennedy School, had made the process to
remove the transgender ban for the good of
the military to be effectuated on January 2018. And then suddenly we
got a tweet saying, transgender individuals will
be removed from service. Why? Because it disrupts
unit cohesion. Guess what? 18 of our NATO allies
have transgender people in their forces. American soldiers serve
alongside those transgender individuals and have
done so for years. And nobody said that those
units are not cohesive. So it's demonstrably false. So today, I think as we speak,
we have a clinic at Yale Law School called the
Rule of Law Clinic where we're filing
a brief on behalf of 50 generals and
military officials, including Chuck Hagel,
Leon Panetta, Admiral Stavridis, General McChrystal
saying, if there's no process, it's an attempt to disguise
rank discrimination as based on national
security imperative, and the court should
not defer to that, because there's no professional
judgment being exhibited. So when we sent
the brief out, we didn't expect 50 generals
to suddenly rush to sign it. But it turns out that people
who have worked in this process and respect it don't respect
the way that their own work is being undermined and manipulated
in the name of discrimination. MARTHA MINOW: I want
to ask a question about surprising friendships. Have you made any
surprising friendships in the course of
your public service? SAMANTHA POWER: I
think the friendship that surprises most
people that was probably my most important
diplomatic friendship was that with the
Russian ambassador. So the same individual who was
representing a country that was lopping off
part of a neighbor, killing children in Syria, and
interfering with our election, and committing an assault on
our democracy was my friend. [LAUGHTER] Go figure. So why was he my friend? He was my friend because
he worked every day to try to wring out
of his government whatever positive action
there was to be rung out. And a little bit like what
Harold-- well, actually, different from what
Harold was saying. He would not have met
Harold's standard of, if you're in at
the takeoff, you're in on the landing, because
Putin doesn't operate that way. No one's in on the
takeoff except Putin, who then lands the plane. So I think there's a
very real question, and I suspect it was
one he grappled with, about whether the
cost-benefit for him in terms of his own integrity
and future made sense for him in all of this. But he stayed loyal to the end. He passed away very
suddenly earlier this year. And I was struck. Martha, you and I talked
about it at the time. I wrote a piece basically
describing my friendship with him, which no one knew
about, for obvious reasons. [LAUGHS] It would not have been
good for either of us. And I describe the work
that he did helping me on Syrian political prisoners. And the peacekeeping missions
that exist today that wouldn't have existed
if his system would have just been
allowed to just reject whatever we were proposing. And I got so much
hate mail, you know? Just so much, like,
how could you? You're an apologist for this. And this gets to this
question of ideals as lived in the real world. I respect the
judgment of people who think that it was inappropriate
to have a friendship with him. And I could have just had
a working relationship. And you know, I
could have avoided getting to know his wife, and
him my family, and so forth. But he was a compelling person
with whom I did compelling work and had dramatic clashes. But what struck me
about the response I got to writing about
this complex relationship, including describing the
loathsome things I thought he was doing, was that
in our current moment, protracted moment,
there feels like there's no space for this kind
of gray zone, you know? Of completely seeing
the terribleness of what he's doing
and defending surely the complete horrors of his
government, and the idea that he would be out there defending. Like, judging that,
calling it out, operating with my own government
to try to get us to take measures to hold his
government accountable. That on the one
hand, and yet being able to build something with
him that would allow us both, I think, for lack
of a better word, to sort of optimize in
this moment of almost Cold War-like tension. And just that
reaction reminded me of our own domestic
political moment. There's no space. I mean, occasionally, Trump
does something that's OK, and I make a point,
like he helped get these hostages, Caitlan
Boyle and her husband, out of Pakistan. And I wrote kudos to the Trump-- just a Twitter. Kudos to the Trump
administration for getting this done. And I got this screed
of, they did nothing. This was only Pakistan. They couldn't do it. You know, almost like, they
are the Taliban, you know? Don't you know. It's like, if you read
everything else I've said in response to the
things they've done lately, I'm aware of-- [LAUGHTER] --the horror show that is being
perpetrated by our government. I get it. But they can still
do good things. And recognizing
that, and we're going to be in this world
for a while, affirming and showing that we're
capable of differentiating is a part of what
we need more of, it feels like in this moment. But I recognize
that's not popular. We're in the binary. Everything feels very binary
at present, unfortunately. HAROLD KOH: My most
unexpected friend was John Brennan, who
was head of the CIA. He was a professional CIA agent. And I didn't even know him. But we agreed most of the
time, because he's a gentleman, and he believes in just war. And he's Irish. Now little noticed was
that the Irish mafia ran the foreign policy. Brennan, Samantha Power, Tom
Donilon, Denis McDonough-- SAMANTHA POWER: Barack Obama. [LAUGHTER] HAROLD KOH: --Jake Sullivan. And I have a kinship
with those people, because I'm married to an Irish
American, but I'm also Korean. And Korean, as you know,
are the Irish of the East. [LAUGHTER] Because both of
us having grown up in the shadow of a more
boring, larger colonial power-- [LAUGHTER] --developed a sort of puckish
irreverence, which is, I think, what made me
connect to Samantha. But by the way, if you
believe in just war theory, it explains a lot. I was often asked,
aren't you a hypocrite? You oppose torture, but
you think that drones can be used lawfully? To which my answer is, no. Torture is always
illegal everywhere, no matter when it's done. Unless you're a
pacifist, and I am not, sometimes you go to war. And in war, there
are laws of war. And drones are not
per se illegal. If they're used
in a certain way, it can be a lawful,
lethal act in war. And if it's not used
that way, it's illegal. And if you're going to be
a lawyer in the government during that period,
your job is to define the line between lawful
and unlawful killing. And you know, that's not
what I signed up for in life. You know, I memorized the
names of all my students for four years. I never memorized the name of
all senior al-Qaeda leaders. But here's the thing. You want the lawyers there. So when you hear
a politician say, let's get the lawyers off
the backs of the generals, you say, absolutely not. Don't you dare. That's the difference
between whether you're engaging in lawful
acts of war or murder. And the idea that lawyers,
or lawfare, or these things are over-lawyered,
that's ridiculous. That's exactly what
we need, especially if we are going to
engage in warfare as a necessary part of surviving
in a hostile and difficult world. MARTHA MINOW: Well,
I'm going to ask as a last question what advice
you have for any students who may be in this room. SAMANTHA POWER: I have
been doing some speaking to mainly college audiences,
not law school audiences lately. And I've been struck
on the one hand by a new level of engagement. But on the other hand, already
a self-expressed fatigue. You know, we're tired. We've been to all
these protests. And kind of not seeing-- I think Harold did a great
job ticking off the non-return on the attempts to make a
set of changes that people-- many people-- sadly, enough
people-- but object to. So there's that as a kind
of morale boost for people to be reminded of that. That kind of positive feedback
loop is very important. But I think sort of stamina-- you used the word
earlier, I think-- patience, asking one's
self in these times, OK. I came to law school, and
I was going to do this. I was in law school
to do this thing. I may still want to do this
thing on the other side of law school or in law school. But what's the new
thing I'm going to do? And my favorite sign in the
many protests that have gone on is that from-- it was
a middle-aged guy, kind of heavyset guy at one
of the women's protests, one of the women's marches. And he's holding up a sign
and it said, "I'm not usually a sign guy, but jeez." [LAUGHTER] So I guess my last
words are just, like, what are you not
usually, but that when you're saying every day,
like, oh, no or jeez, you know, what are you
not usually that it's now time to become? And if you don't have a ready
answer to that, come back to what I was saying earlier
about even if you're living with the equivalent
of Syria every day, there's always
something you can do. If you can't be of
Harold's stature, like, actually leading the
preparation of these briefs to block the implementation
of this horrific racist and discriminatory ban,
if you can't do that-- some of us aren't
capable of doing that-- refugees are still
trickling into this country, and they're all
over this country, coming without speaking
English in many cases, and they're resettling
in our communities, including right here
in Massachusetts. And they're resettling in
the least hospitable climate for welcoming refugees
since the Second World War. You know, just
helping them move in, or making them a home-cooked
meal or something. There's just always something. And I think part of
the Trump problem for many is that it just
feels so big that anything any one person does
feels so incommensurate to these structural changes and
this unleashing of statements and actions that
we never thought-- we thought we were past,
like generations past. It can just feel daunting
and make people tired. But once one starts
doing that small thing, I think that's empowering
and invigorating, and sets us up then
for what amounts to a long haul of getting
things back on track. HAROLD KOH: Well, let me
ask the students a question, and then leave
them with an image. When I was a
second-year student, I agonized I think around
now about whether I'd work for a big firm in one city
or a big firm in another city. I agonized for months. And then finally I picked,
and I told my mother. And she said, oh, that's nice. You know, I was thinking
about working for firm A, and I decided to
work for firm B. And my mother goes,
oh, that's nice. Did they need you the most? [LAUGHTER] I said, what do you mean? She said, you have
so much privilege. You have the best
education money can buy. That's all we could give you. Shouldn't you be
serving the people with the least privilege? The image, though, is one-- yesterday, when we were
at the Sanders Theater, you know, all the
justices are asked, if you were told you
couldn't be a justice, what would you rather be? And they all said, I'd like
to be a history professor. I have to tell you, I thought
that was pretty disappointing, you know? [LAUGHTER] You know, like, if you
couldn't be a law professor, you'd be a history professor. [LAUGHTER] And then one person
said, well, maybe I'd be an art history professor. [LAUGHTER] Well, you know what I would be? And Samantha will like it. I want to be the third base
coach of the Boston Red Sox. [LAUGHTER] You know, we love the
Red Sox, because that's how you become an American. [LAUGHTER] It is. It is. My son said to me,
I love Fenway Park, because it's the only place
in America with 6 foot 3" blonde guys wearing shirts
that say Ortiz and Matsuzaka. [LAUGHTER] So when I was little, I thought
I wanted to be Ted Williams. And then I got older, and I
thought, well, [INAUDIBLE],, and I thought I should
be Theo Epstein. And then I thought, as
I get older and older, maybe I should be a relief
pitcher like Tim Wakefield. But the other day, I was
watching and I thought, the best job is the
third base coach. He's on the field. He has the best view. He's part of the team. He goes into the dugout between
innings, and he imparts wisdom and he spits and-- [LAUGHTER] And he only does two
things during the game. One is sometimes
he says, not now. Not yet. Not yet. But sometimes, and most
of the time, he says, run! [LAUGHTER] Run like the wind! Run like the wind! You're young. Run like the wind! Go for it! Give it everything you've got! And I don't care
what the outcome is. You did it. You took that chance. That's why I love being
a third base coach. [LAUGHTER] [APPLAUSE] MARTHA MINOW: Harold
Koh, Samantha Power, you live lives of run like the
wind, engagement, reflection. You get close. Your brilliance,
your conscience. You deal with media criticism,
cost away from your families, and I think we all thank you. [APPLAUSE] SAMANTHA POWER:
Thanks, everybody. [APPLAUSE]