Guadalcanal Campaign - Santa Cruz (IJN 2 : 2 USN)

[Music] with things at something of a stalemate on the ground and much of henderson field still smoking both sides was poised to feed more ships into the fray and try and break the deadlock around guadalcanal after weeks of back and forth where neither side was willing to fully contest the other's dominance in their part of the operational theatre suddenly both admirals wanted a fight and they were gonna get one the japanese command hierarchy was largely unchanged since the battle of the eastern solomons with admiral yamamoto directing vice admirals kondo and nagumo to take a good chunk of the surviving japanese navy into battle along with subordinate admirals such as karita and abe who either had or would feature heavily in a number of other engagements during the war on the american side things were a little bit different admiral halsey was now an overall command and was directing admiral thomas kincaid into the fight kinkade had been at the eastern solomons serving under admiral fletcher but both fletcher and gormley who halls he had replaced had been reassigned at this point and kinkade was now in the position that fletcher had occupied at the eastern solomons for the upcoming engagement the americans wanted to regain the initiative in the campaign and the japanese wanted a decisive battle or at least a second shot at one given that well midway hadn't gone exactly brilliantly for them if the americans didn't show up they'd support the japanese army with heavy air and sea power much as they might not otherwise want to which they hoped would at least force the us navy to come and play if they hadn't shown up by that point or else of course lose guadalcanal on paper the imperial japanese navy had every reason to be confident they had two of their best carriers the shikaku and zuikaku backed up by the smaller carriers junior and zuiho the latter was a light carrier somewhere in the same order of usefulness as the recently departed regio and primarily loaded with fighters but juno was what's a little bit slow for a carrier able to bring almost 50 aircraft to the party and up until the last minute they'd had a fifth carrier junior's sister ship heo which had a similar compliment between the two of them and zuiho they would have about doubled the japanese navy's carrier-borne complement as compared to just having shikaku and zuikaku but a generator fire sidelined heo on the 21st of october leaving the japanese force with instead roughly the equivalent of three fleet carriers worth of aircraft although the two smaller carriers air groups were somewhat more weighted towards fighters than the roughly one-third one-third one-third split of the fleet carriers when it came to fighters dive bombers and torpedo bombers collectively they had about just under 200 aircraft to available supporting them were the four congo class battle cruisers eight heavy and three light cruisers with many of the heavy cruisers being quite modern units and lastly just over two dozen destroyers by contrast the us navy was coming in with just two fleet carriers the expedited repairs made to enterprise allowing her to be present alongside the newer hornet individually the two carriers had slightly larger air groups than the shikaku's but overall they were still about 60 aircraft short when compared to the total japanese navy air wing although thanks to the large fighter groups they were only about 10 aircraft short of their japanese counterparts when it came to fighters and actually had a few more dauntlesses compared to the japanese navy's val contingent but the japanese 57 kate torpedo bombers were something of an advantage compared to the 24 avengers that the us navy forces carried the americans had just the one battleship although on the other hand it was uss south dakota and thus it was more than capable of taking on any single congo that might come its way at least as long as nothing dramatic like i don't know complete power failure occurred if it came to a surface fight though things were not going to be pretty not only was south dakota outnumbered 4-1 but the u.s navy's cruiser line consisted of three older heavy cruisers and three atlanta class light cruisers and about a dozen destroyers rounding out the force the battleship washington and a heavy escort force was also in the theater but too far away to be of any use in this particular engagement but on the other hand some of henderson fields aircraft had survived and some repairs to the airfield had been made and a major land assault by the japanese army starting on the 20th of october failed to take the vital airfield this allowed the cactus air force to inflict damage on the advancing japanese sinking the light cruiser yura as the japanese had been told by the army that they had in fact captured the airfield this little emission didn't really do that much for japanese navy and japanese army relations although to be perfectly honest there weren't that many bridges to burn at this point the japanese naval forces were split into three junior and about half the surface forces were in one the other three carriers and their escort in a second group and the balance of the heavy surface forces in a third group with admiral kondo in overall command the u.s layout was somewhat simpler two task forces each centered on a carrier sailing in relatively close proximity with south dakota forming part of enterprise's fleet screen battle was almost joined on the 25th of october when a catalina that ever versatile flying boat spotted the main japanese carrier force but they were just out of the u.s strike range the us carriers duly closed and launched a couple of dozen aircraft but the japanese knew that they didn't know where the u.s carriers were and so they withdrew north opening the range up again and denying any battle that day this would thus result in a slightly diminished enterprise air group as the pilots were forced to return after dark losing eight aircraft and two pilots to ditching or hard landings in the process however confident of catching the americans now that they knew roughly where they were the japanese wheeled about in the small hours of the following morning and headed south again both sides closing in until they were well inside strike range of each other's aircraft dawn saw recon aircraft heading skywards from both sides and within about 10 minutes of each other the respective scouts reported the position of large portions of the enemy fleet now it was a race to get strike aircraft aloft and on their way catalinas had spotted the japanese formations much earlier thanks to radar but their reports were so delayed in reaching kinkade that by the time they arrived he considered them to be of no further use as the japanese forces would surely be in different positions by the time he was able to read the report and actually act on it the japanese won the race of strike aircraft with a balance strike force of 64 aircraft up and away less than an hour after the scouting report had been received helped by the fact that they were sailing south east into the wind whereas the us carriers coming the other way had to double back briefly to launch their own aircraft but it would be the u.s navy who drew first blood using sbd3 dauntlesses as scouts meant that they could also initiate their own small strikes and that meant that when two such aircraft found zuiho just as the japanese navy strike force headed off in shades of midway the japanese combat air patrol was distracted by other us aircraft also scouts and the two newly advised aircraft managed to score at least one significant hit with their 500 pound bombs these aircraft were carrying lighter ordnance reflecting their scout role as opposed to the big thousand pounders that the strike loaded dauntlesses could bring to the party still this explosion was enough to ruin zuiho's day leaving her afloat but with her aircraft having to find a new home upon their return as she couldn't land them anymore as all the arresting gear had been destroyed in the explosion sensing nonetheless that they had the drop on the u.s ships the japanese formation that was composed almost entirely of surface ships was ordered forward to engage the u.s navy forces in a surface action junior and her group came up to support the shikakuz and a second strike from the latter carriers were launched this was slightly smaller than the first but it still meant that collectively well over a hundred aircraft in two organized waves were heading the u.s navy's way as with midway the u.s navy's own air operations were somewhat slower although only by just over a quarter of an hour as compared to the rather more massive gulf that had occurred at the earlier battle still this increase in speed did come at a cost aircraft were forming up into small groups of somewhere around two dozen before heading off on their own with wildly varying numbers of torpedo and dive bombers in each group the only real consistency was in fighters as about eight wildcats made up the escort complement of each of the three small formations the us navy having not quite mastered the multi-deck strike that the japanese navy was capable of putting up as time rolled on and began to approach about quarter to nine in the morning the various strike groups started passing each other the heavily laden strike aircraft quietly hoping that the enemy escort fighters would think more about their own charges than the lumbering juicy targets that the strike aircraft were for the most part this held true but one formation of xeros from zuiho went after the group that had been launched from enterprise swapping four zeroes for three wildcats and two avengers shot down and another wildcat and two avengers forced to abort leaving that particular group with a mere three dauntlesses five avengers and four wildcats to press on it did however remove the remaining five zeros in that formation from the fight as they were all either low on or out of ammunition the japanese got their attack in first about 10 minutes after passing the us aircraft they spotted hornet local weather patterns temporarily concealing enterprise things had improved a little bit compared to the eastern solomons and three dozen f4f wildcats on combat air patrol were vectored onto the oncoming hostiles but once that initial task was accomplished things began to collapse back into the cacophony and chaos that was all too familiar to those aboard the enterprise meaning that the end result was round about the same the japanese aircraft screaming into their attack runs on hornet about the same time as most of the wildcats managed to sort themselves out to begin their own attacks on the incoming for a start only the cruiser northampton's radar had actually seen the attackers and she unaware that neither carrier had spotted the incoming aircraft on their own sensors kept radio silence and was instead using signal flags to relay her findings to hornet which delayed notification somewhat once enterprise realized what was going on her fighter direction officer made a critical mistake in the heat of the moment instead of giving a vector to the incoming japanese aircraft based on the compass he gave a vector relative to the ship itself which of course meant nothing to the wildcat pilots who couldn't see the enterprise as it was a completely the wrong direction if they read though bearing as an absolute reference five dive bombers had either been shot down or forced to break off nonetheless which left sixteen and all twenty torpedo bombers were intact hornet blazed away as best she could but having to split her attention between high and low attackers as well as having the aft 5-inch battery temporarily disabled by a young officer who'd accidentally run the guns into their stops freezing them in position until the issue could be sorted meant that two 550 pound semi-armor-piercing bombs and one fractionally lighter high-explosive bomb soon crashed down the first two stabbing deep into the ship and the other one blowing a hole in the flight deck accompanied by a dive bomber that had been shot down but elected to go out by slamming into the hornet as opposed to the sea even some small comfort that aircraft's bomb didn't go off as well flying low and slow despite their numbers the torpedo bombers suffered heavily but hornet was caught in a pincer much as hms repulse had been less than a year earlier and despite a large number of their comrades falling ablaze into the sea the japanese pilots compounded the carrier's problems with a pair of torpedo hits followed up by another damaged dive bomber slamming into the ship at the cost of 25 of the 36 attackers they'd left hornet dead in the water and ablaze as well as short half a dozen fighters with commendable skill and aplomb the ship's escorts and her own crew worked to get the fires under control and attempts were made to rig a tow line but the second japanese wave was inbound and enterprise now had to deal with both carriers combat air patrol and scout aircraft which were all coming in with a little fuel left in their tanks this landing procedure would however have to be cooled off as enterprise had to shift into clearing her flight deck ready for action anyone still airborne and running low on fuel would have to ditch which in turn led to the first us vessel to be lost that day as an avenger touched down near the destroyer uss porter which shortly thereafter took a torpedo hit and quite possibly from the avengers weapon deciding that well water immersion must surely mean that it should activate uss shaw the revenant survivor of pearl harbor was then forced to rescue the surviving crew of both the porter and the aircraft before finishing off the stricken porter with its guns it wasn't all sunshine and rainbows for the japanese though although the first u.s navy strike force had decidedly mixed results the avengers in that group got lost and went after the cruiser tourne on their way back missing and the wild cats got neatly peeled away by a single flight of zeroes leaving the dauntlesses wide open to another dozen japanese fighters but these aircraft somewhat botched their attack and of course the dauntless pilots started doing everything possible to make the japanese pilots lives as difficult as humanly imaginable the dauntless was not a fighter by any stretch of the imagination but a good pilot could perform a decent set of evasive actions that would make him a difficult target and so although the zeros knocked out four dive bombers two of them permanently and two forced to abort the other eleven made it to a position above shikaku which pulled a neat evasive turn that sent the first clutch of thousand-pound bombs into the sea but here the slightly disorganized nature of the american assault actually worked in their favor as the next few dive bombers initiated their own dives just long enough after the first aircraft to see and correct for this evasive action which allowed them to score numerous bomb hits causing heavy damage and leaving shikaku ablaze and lag zuiho unable to operate aircraft unfortunately this golden opportunity went unremarked as what was left of the second u.s formation as well as the whole of the third formation missed the carriers completely instead going after the cruiser's suzuya and chikuma managing a total of three bomb and one torpedo hit on the chikuma and forcing her to withdraw with heavy damage back at the us fleet an outgoing japanese aircraft from the first wave spotted enterprise emerging from the rain school that had concealed it and told the second wave where to go find it hornet at this point was still on fire and listing and appeared to be finished and so these new aircraft went after the enterprise once again combat air patrol was vectored in but once again they only managed to get into the action just as the attack runs began by now familiar with this particular scenario enterprise and her escorts put up a furious resistance but still several semi-armor-piercing bombs smashed into the carrier at the overall cost of 12 out of 19 attackers 10 of them shot down there and then and two more being forced to ditch later on due to the damage then the torpedo bombers arrived but unlike those that had dealt hornets such a heavy blow these split their attention between enterprise south dakota portland and the rather bewildered destroyer uss smith which got a damaged kate and its torpedo to the face for its trouble the wild cats were also able to make their intercepts in somewhat better time and overall only five of the 16 torpedo aircraft survived and unlike their earlier compatriots this horrible casualty rate came with nothing much to show for it other than the wildly burning smith which nonetheless avoided becoming the second ship to sink by chasing down the speeding south dakota and immersing itself in the great sheets of water that the battleship was throwing up dousing most of the fires aboard enterprise's crew spared any torpedo hits managed to get the fires aboard under control and resumed landing aircraft only to be forced to call it off yet again before lunchtime as a third wave of japanese aircraft now appeared these had come from juno which had come up into range and launched its dive bombers although again these split up resulting in only a somewhat damaging near-miss to the enterprise one hit on south dakota plus another to the uss san juan the 17 dive bombers losing eight of their number in exchange in the fight with three more too badly damaged to recover at the other end whilst the japanese had paid an exceptionally high price in aircraft the us navy was now without any meaningful carrier capability hornet was still dead in the water and enterprise was damaged to the point it could just about get aircraft back on board but offensive fly-tops were not anywhere in the immediate future conversely the japanese still had zuikaku and juno intact assuming they could put together another offensive thus admiral kincaid decided it was best to withdraw as he didn't know exactly how many aircraft the japanese had lost which at this point with the japanese surface forces having made up around half the ground between the two sides was also probably the wisest course of action once what was left of enterprise's flight deck and hangars were full further aircraft were directed to ditch near other u.s ships who would then pick them up as it turned out zuikaku and junior were preparing a follow-up strike but the scattered bedraggled and badly shot up survivors of the morning's operations shook many of the observing officers badly compared to the last time they tangled with the u.s navy's carriers the anti-aircraft fire had been much much more effective even if the wildcats hadn't done particularly well in their intercepts they couldn't know it of course but the officer aboard enterprise who'd recommended re-carpeting the ship with 20 millimeter orlicans had at least partially been listened to and the effect on the japanese navy's elite air crews had been devastating still they were on the front foot and so zuiho and shikaku were sent back with a much smaller japanese fourth wave heading out from the intact carriers to accompany and guide the surface forces in for the kill this was made up of 14 torpedo bombers 19 zeros and six dive bombers although a number of the torpedo bombers were sent out with the much heavier 1 600 pound mark 80 armor-piercing bombs the same kind that had done in the arizona at pearl harbor at about 20 past three in the afternoon these aircraft julie began to arrive the cruiser northampton was towing hornet at a stately 5 knots when out of the sky came seven torpedo armed aircraft they managed to miss the barely moving hornet with all but one drop but one hit was really all that it took the location causing additional damage to the stricken carrier and demolishing most of the repairs that had been made to the earlier damage now without any power and taking on water fast hornet's crew were ordered to abandon ship even as one of the sixteen hundred pound ap bombs came crashing down a somewhat random 550 pound semi semi-armor-piercing bomb would follow sometime later mainly on general principle whilst sinking there was still a small chance that hornet might be towed out of the danger zone and then re-boarded but by now the japanese navy surface forces were getting closer and the order was given to scuttle hornet instead but she proved remarkably hard to actually encourage to sink at any pace but her own a number of torpedoes and several hundred five inch shells later the two destroyers assigned to the job seemed none the closer to actually finishing it and they were forced to hightail it out of the area shortly after 10 o'clock that night the japanese forces came across the still afloat and still ablaze hornet but concluding at this point that taking her as a prize wasn't particularly likely they put four long lances into her and hornet finally sank just after 1 30 in the morning however with the rest of the us forces having proceeded at speed away and considering that their own fuel was running somewhat low the japanese surface ships decided to head back to refuel and then return to base initially both sides thought they'd won the u.s thought that both shakakus had been sunk and a congo plus at least four cruisers had been damaged the japanese thought that they'd sunk south dakota hornet enterprise two further unnamed large capital ships they said carriers that hadn't even been there plus a cruiser and a destroyer which led admiral nimitz to quip well i wish i had as many carriers as they claimed to have sunk in actuality of course the losses were actually far less the japanese had in the course of the actual battle lost nothing in the way of ships although shikaku and zuiho would need extensive repairs as would chikuma more pressing was the loss of almost 100 aircraft and many of their precious aircrew the us by contrast had lost hornet and porter with damage in varying degrees to enterprise south dakota san juan smith and mahan the last being through being sideswiped by south dakota during the retreat as well as 81 aircraft but a much lower ratio of aircrew lost around one-sixth of japanese aircrew losses but they had of course also seeded the field to the enemy this left the damaged enterprise as the sole us carrier still afloat in the pacific as saratoga was still in dock whilst the japanese still had zuikaku and juno could in theory get here back online soon if needed and they had a couple more light carriers floating around somewhere assuming of course that they could find some squadrons to fly from them and despite the damage cv6's crew quite happily declared that oh well it's enterprise versus japan now thus should be an approximately even fight and the ship would stay in the western pacific for the next few weeks in varying stages of patchwork repairs until it was eventually relieved the devastating losses to the air crew however meant that the japanese could not fully exploit their victory with over half the pre-war air cardrack now dead over the course of several battles the surviving carriers were largely withdrawn and the decision was made to finish off the guadalcanal efforts the old-fashioned way with surface capital ships on the u.s side they simply had no truly operational carriers left regardless of aircraft availability and so battleships were the only offensive tool left in the box and so the stage was set for the next major battle of the campaign as the congo class led the japanese efforts to complete their victory and the uss south dakota and washington were assigned to stop them as with the battle of the eastern solomons enterprises action report as well as covering the battle itself contains a lot of useful information noting that the expenditure was just over 50 000 rounds of anti-aircraft ammunition from the ship's defenses 46 000 of which were 20 millimeter ammunition as well as a more than four-fold increase in five-inch ammunition expenditure there are also a number of surprising observations about the state of some of her most advanced systems and so some highlights follow and believe me these are highlights because the action report itself is even longer defense by anti-aircraft batteries this is section c item one again fire control radar did not pick up any target at no time since its installation has it been useful and previously submitted recommendations relative to its modification are again stressed the precision requirements necessary to put this equipment on an aerial target apparently cannot be met in action two neither five inch director picked up targets although the rangefinder in sky forward was able to do so three complete power failures occurred in groups one and two of the five inch guns partial power failure occurred in group three and there were frequent rammer failures and electrical misfires on all guns 4. the apparently unwieldy director firing system augmented by numerous casualties which greatly slow the rate of fire has made the 5-inch battery the least useful of the anti-aircraft guns for all except high altitude horizontal bombing attacks in local control difficulty is experienced in getting both trainer and pointer onto the same target a new type of fuse which it is understood will soon be available may greatly increase the effectiveness of the 5-inch against dive bombing and torpedo attacks 5 the performance of the 40 millimeter in their first action was gratifying eventually these guns may prove to be our best defense against dive bombers several faults now exist namely empties jam in the chutes local control is too sensitive firing mechanisms are not satisfactory and our splinter shields are too high separate reports on these deficiencies will be forwarded six the twenty millimeter in spite of its short range was extremely effective and accounted for most of the enemy plane shot down by this ship it cannot always get the dive bombers before they release but it can keep them high and reap a fearful toll of those who press home their attacks one gets the feeling that it's the same officer writing the action report and he is very happy about this last point some other highlights include the following under the category of air department it is very evident in this action as apparently was the case in the action of the 24th of august the fighter direction was a disappointment some errors in judgment on the part of the fighter director officer were undoubtedly made the most apparent of which were the stationing of fighters at altitudes generally too low and the frequent use of relative bearings which under the circumstances were meaningless to pilots in the air however fighter direction having fallen short of expectations in two successive actions a careful re-examination and analysis of the problem is required it is not sufficient simply to charge the failure to lack of training inexperience or similar causes it is a fact that when the problem is simple that is when one group is to be intercepted little difficulty is experienced in effecting an interception this was done repeatedly whilst on route to the south pacific area in drills wherein our dive bombers or torpedo planes represented the enemy and came in from an unannounced direction and altitude as soon however as the problem becomes complicated as it did on the 26th of october with some 38 of our fighters in the air and with enemy planes in large numbers coming in from various directions and altitudes and with friendly planes complicating the situation then the system breaks down two conditions of attack must be considered in the first condition the attack group is located well out here precise interception pursuant to detailed instructions from the fighter director is practicable and should be affected in the second condition the attack group has arrived in the immediate vicinity of our formation and has probably separated into groups at various positions and altitudes in the second case the multiplicity of planes the amount of radio traffic which has to go through the air and the numerous radar reports received reports on friendly planes complicating the picture present such a complicated picture that it maybe the problem is not solvable if we attempt to give detailed instructions to all fighters possible in the latter case a plan whereby the combat patrol is stationed in definite localities and at select altitudes wherein the fighter director gives out general information and undertakes detailed interception only in case of large groups or in special cases certainly the positioning of fighters both as to location and altitudes must receive the most careful thought it is imperative that operating carriers continue to exert every effort to improve their fighter direction and reach a satisfactory solution of the problem permanency of personnel is important and in the past has been lacking this can be corrected further there is good reason to believe that the material condition of the radar on enterprise has been improved however what is urgently needed is a sound doctrine this can only be arrived at by extensive trials and experiments therefore it is a problem the solution of which may well be undertaken concurrently by the carrier replacement groups both as training for themselves and the fighter director officers and in order to formulate doctrine these trials even though they start on a modest scale must work up to full scale exercises wherein a very large number of fighters is employed and wherein a number of attack planes on the order of two or more carrier groups are brought in from various directions at various altitudes and in several groups the duration of the attacks should be varied thus there will be simulated a condition such as may be expected to be encountered in a large-scale engagement such as that of the santa cruz islands the remarks of the commanding officer vf10 concerning the deficiencies of the electric propellers and the auxiliary wing tanks are strongly concurred with in view of the fact that almost all fight emissions require the auxiliary tank it is rather discouraging to have tanks which can only be used once as apparently the specifications of this particular tank contemplate under such circumstances it is almost impossible for the ship to be sure of having enough air groups should be thoroughly indoctrinated in night landing procedure if possible the pilot should be qualified on board and in any event they should be carefully checked out ashore in night carrier landings by a qualified carrier signal officer this checking should include the full procedure required when a group returns to a carrier after nightfall when night landings became necessary on the evening of the 25th of october results were disappointing especially during the short period between dusk and moonrise as soon as the moon rose sufficiently to clear some low clouds on the horizon landings improved materially however had it not been for landing crashes which tied up the deck for considerable periods there is no doubt that several planes which landed in the water due to fuel exhaustion would have gotten on board further such night training should include in addition to landings and takeoffs thorough exercise with weapons on the various carrier-based squadrons when whilst night bombing may not generally be feasible at the present time surely night operations for fighting and torpedo planes employing radar planes for locating the enemy would be most useful a fighter strafing attack on a plane laden carrier at night would probably [ __ ] the air group and the resulting fires could easily put the carrier out of action the limitations in the use of torpedo planes which have been repeatedly set forth in reports of previous actions were again amply demonstrated although the attack of the enemy torpedo squadron estimate around 18 planes against the enterprise was executed with obvious skill and great determination only about nine pilots reached a proper release point and no hits were made the harassing effect of the japanese on the japanese pilots of the extremely heavy and accurate fire of the combined task force and the maneuvers of the ship in combing the wakes of the torpedoes launched were the prime factors in nullifying the attack the results of the attacks of our own torpedo planes whilst not nil were disappointing it has been proven time and again that the probability of success of a torpedo plane attack in good visibility against formation properly defended by fighters and anti-aircraft fire is small and out of all proportion to the losses in planes and men the conclusion is obvious that in the present state of the art torpedo plane operations should if practicable be limited to attacks delivered under conditions of low visibility or in mopping up operations after the defensive power of the enemy formation has been reduced thus limited the torpedo plane is not as valuable plane for plane in day operations as is the dive bomber accordingly it is recommended that for the present the air groups of our large carriers include not more than 12 torpedo planes only when torpedo squadron personnel are fully trained and planes are equipped for all aspects of night operations will torpedo planes reach their full effectiveness we should not abandon them for carrier use after all they were the decisive factor in the hornet attack many of our fighters expended their ammunition long before the attacks by enemy planes were over and were forced to remain helplessly looking on whilst the carriers were being attacked the f4 f4 ammunition supply of 240 rounds per gun is wholly inadequate as seen from the fighter squadron 10 report the preference of vf pilots for a four gun installation with at least 400 rounds per gun is practically unanimous and strong it is recommended that action be taken at the earliest possible date to introduce the four gun installation into new f4 f4 production and lastly from this section when preparing for an attack mission against enemy carriers it has been the practice to use a .01 second delay fuse in the nose and tails of thousand pound and 500 pound demolition bombs the striking velocity of a heavy bomb released in a dive bombing attack can be expected to be in the order of 600 feet per second with the .01 second fuse delay the explosion takes place about six feet below the point of initial impact the normal expectancy is that a bomb so fused striking the flight deck of japanese carrier will detonate about six feet below the hangar overhead an area which is particularly well vented a fairly large hole in the flight deck will probably result but this can be readily bridged a close miss of a bomb so fused will detonate about five feet below the surface of the water deep enough to smother the fragments but not deep enough for a good mining effect thus with our present policy of fusing bombs there is little likelihood of one of our bombs reaching a really vital area in an enemy carrier such as the fire rooms engine rooms magazines or gasoline stowage areas our bombs will be temporarily crippling and may start fires which may get out of control but there is not the proper expectancy that a small number of bomb hits will put down or stop an enemy carrier considerable thought has been given to this subject and it is recommended that the bombs of approximately the leading 20 to 30 of attacking dive bombers be equipped with instantaneous fuses for maximum effect against anti-aircraft guns crews and planes on deck and that the bombs of the remaining planes be equipped with fuses having a delay of 0.08 or 0.1 seconds in order to reach the vital areas of the ship in case of a direct hit or to obtain a better mining effect in the case of a close miss under the section on gunnery the following is recorded the information obtained from the search radars was not sufficient to coach the fd radar on it is strongly recommended that at every opportunity a group be tracked in without iff and with fighter interception in other words as realistically as possible for training of fire director radar operations the fire director radar is almost useless for search and cannot pick up the target unless coached on by accurate and prompt information from the search radar the fire director radar cannot pick up the present iff and that adds greatly to the problem with friendly fighters and enemy attackers in the same ranges the fire director radar cannot distinguish between the two it is believed that with proper coordination between the search radars and the fire director with practice the 5-inch guns can open fire on planes before they can be seen and long before they reach their dive points or bomb release points it is believed that the 5-inch guns of screening vessels might best be employed in shooting at enemy planes that have not yet pushed over into their dives their problem in this respect is identical to our own the fire of 5-inch at diving planes other than a barrage fired by a ship being attacked is ineffective but it should be possible to hit them before they start their dives all supporting ships should direct their five-inch fire accordingly the five-inch guns should be equipped with a single man control either a mark 51 director or a joystick similar to that of the 40 millimeter for use against dive bombers the five inch gun can hit but it is most difficult to get the pointer and trainer on the same plane this is important and must be done if we are to stop dive bombers before they release their bombs each 5-inch gun group should be equipped with its own auxiliary power supply if only sufficient to provide rammer power it is understood that small diesel driven generators which would be suitable are available in every action we have lost power on some of the 5-inch guns the loss of power on the rammer slows the rate of fire to about half and will make the gun useless against horizontal bombers as the dead time becomes unpredictable the gun cannot be rammed by hand at high elevation and must be depressed for each shot this takes time and requires cutting out the firing circuit between shots making the director almost useless the 40 millimeter shields must be cut down and the firing cam's remade so that the guns can be depressed to fire horizontally during a turn this job cannot wait and will be started by the ship's force in addition to being too high it's believed that the shields are too large they should be brought in until the gun barrel protrudes over the shield if the shield is cut down the top row of ammunition will only be a few inches below the muzzle blast there is ample room around the mount at present and it's believed that decreasing the diameter of the shield will not interfere with the service of the guns and it would save considerable weight after a thorough investigation should be made of the ejection troughs the shooting of our 40 millimeter guns was interrupted several times at critical moments because of empties jammed in the tube we are experimenting to find a remedy but the work that can be done by the ship's force in this respect is limited the joystick control the 40 millimeter mount is too sensitive a leverage system on the present stick should be designed at present every time the pointer shifts his weight a little or the ship heals over the gun swings violently in some unwanted direction the mechanical firing system of the 40 millimeter is not satisfactory because it is too complicated to maintain and cutouts cannot be accurately set it is considered that this can be greatly simplified and improved the mark 51 director and mark 14 sites are excellent but the mounting must be as rigid as possible and the location as clear of smoke as possible for maximum effectiveness the initial velocity of the 20 millimeter gun should be increased and the weight and shape of the projectile should be changed to give it better ballistic qualities an increase in the effective range of about 1000 yards is essential but it is going to be even more essential when the enemy realized that they can probably survive by pulling out at three or four thousand feet whereas at present it's almost suicide to come down to 1500 feet increased depression of 20 millimeter guns is urgently required in order that guns on the high side when the ship is healed over in an invasive action can fire horizontally at attacking torpedo planes it is considered that the installation of additional 20 millimeter guns would be highly desirable however the weight and stability situation in this ship appears to have reached the point at which no further top side weights should be added without adequate compensation by the removal of corresponding weights the remover of the armor belts is again recommended for consideration in this connection it is strongly felt that additional automatic anti-aircraft guns would be of more value to the ship than the present armor belts the removal of the upper portion of the conning tower down to the level of the main deck and the substitution of a small lightly armored electrical conduit trunk is also recommended for consideration as a weight removal item so yes this is quite clearly exactly the same officer because having equipped enough 20 millimeter oil cans aboard the enterprise that the ship was at the risk of significant stability issues if he added more he is now recommending that every additional spare weight up to and including the belt arm of the carrier be removed so that he can have even more 20 millimeter guns i really like this guy and finally i've picked out two observations from the general observation section one the advantages of operating two carriers in close proximity if the operations are in areas where air attack is to be expected are numerous one carrier alone under such conditions forced to conduct morning and evening searches combat patrols inner and possible intermediate air patrols has nothing much left with which to strike and if long continued is likely to suffer a considerable weakening of its air strength due to exhaustion of personnel and deterioration of material if of course an air umbrella is furnished from other sources and if it is reliable then the picture changes however at present it is doubtful if such an umbrella exists in this area and certainly a task force commander will be under considerable apprehension as to its reliability other advantages include availability of an additional carrier deck to receive planes from a damaged carrier retention of one carrier's planes is a striking force ready for immediate launching in the institution of a duty system where by in a normal cruising each carrier has days for upkeep and training of its group and other essential work these and others have been discussed before and it is not necessary to go into detail here two when two carriers are operating together it should have its own screen and supporting vessels and should be organized as an independent task force or group this applies to large carriers the separation used in the operations now being discussed about five miles appears to be very satisfactory the distance permitted each group to maneuver independently whilst at the same time maintaining good visual contact for signaling and facilitated patrols the precise separation when air attack is imminent is a question the problem is how much separation will prevent sighting of both carriers if one is picked up in the areas where we are now operating five miles will not do neither will 10. it must be a really wide separation in all or the order of some 30 to 50 miles and even this will not guarantee it therefore unless conditions permit a separation in advance whereby the above can be achieved it cannot be affected on short notice when attack is imminent we must make our choice based on conditions present and likely to be encountered weighing the advantages of close operation such as ease of control and of communications economy of effort in air patrols and surface protection against submarines and against insurance against discovery resulting from relatively wide separation again the air coverage of the area to be expected from sources other than carriers is a large factor so you can see there some lessons from the previous engagement at the eastern solomons were still around others had been improved on somewhat but there was still work to do new ones were being identified and some issues had indeed been fixed uh the officer who desperately wanted every 20 millimeter oliken on the planet aboard the enterprise is of course to be highly recommended and commended but it does show just what a learning curve the us navy was still on they had coral sea midway eastern solomons and now santa cruz under their belts and four carrier battles in and almost all of their carriers gone all out of action there was still a long way to go before the u.s navy carrier formations that we're more familiar with from the latter part of the pacific war would really be as effective as we think of but it wasn't for lack of these reports coming in next month we'll have a look at what happens when you're out of carriers and you have to go in with just the heavy hitters that's it for this video thanks for watching if you have a comment or suggestion for a ship to review let us know in the comments below don't forget to comment on the pinned post for dry dock questions

Channel: Drachinifel

Views: 623,784

Keywords: wows, world of warships, Guadalcanal Campaign, WW2, Pacific Campaign, Henderson Field, Shokaku, Zuikaku, Hiyo, Zuiho, USS Enterprise, USS Hornet, USS South Dakota, Battle of Santa Cruz

Id: xY2LC6Rz7JE

Length: 46min 35sec (2795 seconds)

Published: Wed Feb 03 2021