Battle of Savo Island 1942: America's Worst Naval Defeat

many see the battle of midway as the high water mark of the japanese navy as a fighting force but this belief is incorrect although japan had been defeated it was far from a defeated force the japanese still had a numerical advantage over the u.s pacific fleet in almost every major category of warships and the americans would soon come to find out on the night of august 9 1942 that the japanese surface fleet particularly its heavy cruisers was a force to be reckoned with [Music] admiral king was the commander-in-chief of the u.s fleet from the moment hostilities commenced to japan he had been eagerly waiting to go on the offensive the only thing preventing him from doing so was the powerful kido bhutai the imperial japanese navy possessed however with the decisive victory at midway which saw the core of japan's carriers destroyed king realized a golden opportunity had arisen with japan's offensive power now blunted he finally had his chance to take the initiative as things stood he had already seen the south pacific as the perfect place to start so he ordered for an offensive to retake tulagi a seaplane base the japanese had established back in may planning had begun for an invasion to commence in the fall and vice admiral gormley was selected as a theater commander but then on july 2nd everything changed american intelligence revealed that apart from the seaplane base at tulagi the japanese were beginning work on an airfield across savile sound on the island of guadalcanal this was bad news from this position land-based aircraft could threaten the sea lanes and communication lines between the u.s and her ally australia the allies could not let this happen and so it was that operation watchtower was created the objective was taken to laggy and in addition guadalcanal before its airfield could be made operational much to admiral gormley's dismay his original deadline for an invasion in the fall was moved up to august in great haste planning was undertaken in what truly was an improvised operation despite the tight time schedule and logistical challenges operation watchtower was considered ready to commence on the last day of july on july 31st an armada of 82 ships carrying 19 000 marines began its journey towards guadalcanal bad weather shielded the expeditionary force from being spotted allowing them to surprise the japanese when they entered savo sound on august 7th following aerial and naval bombardments the first marine division began landing its troops the first offensive of the united states in the pacific had just begun in the early morning of august 7th the japanese main fleet base cyber ball received an urgent message from tulagi enemy task force cited it was followed by another message an hour later reporting that they were being bombed and that enemy landing preparations were underway and then a final transmission at zero eight zero five enemy force is overwhelming we will defend our post to the death praying for eternal victory and after that nothing was ever heard from the station again although the japanese had been caught by complete surprise by this bold operation their reaction was quick and decisive vice admiral mikawa age 53 was in charge of the recently formed eighth fleet mikawa was an experienced commander and was recognized for his judgment and courage described as gentle and soft-spoken he could also be aggressive and this was confirmed by his reaction to the invasion upon hearing of the allied landings a plan immediately sprung to his mind attack he took several immediate actions first he sent reconnaissance flights to gather more intelligence on the enemy this was followed by ordering all his available forces to assemble before he set out to strike the allies in addition to all this an airstrike was dispatched to bombard the ally naval forces at sabo sound it soon became apparent to mikawa that this might not just be a raiding force but instead something much bigger since aircraft carriers were reportedly involved in providing air cover for the landings given this scenario he settled on a night action to strike the allied invasion force his reasons were as follows quote my choice of a night action was made because i had no air support on which to rely and reliable air support was vital to anything but a night action on the other hand i had complete confidence in my ships and knew that the japanese navy's emphasis on night battle training and practice would ensure our chances of success in such an action even without air support mikawa's plan heavily relied on making a careful approach and maintaining the element of surprise he would avoid added reconnaissance planes during the day and then at midday make a dash down the new georgia sound and enter savo sound at night a quick and devastating attack would be delivered followed by a prompt withdrawal under the cover of darkness before american carrier aircraft could retaliate he sent a dispatch to tokyo suggesting his plan the naval general staff originally opposed it at first believing it to be rash and reckless but then reconsidered what other option did they have let the americans establish themselves on the island unimpeded no way the japanese spirit was that of attack and they weren't about to let the americans take their islands without a fight so at 13 30 they approved mikawa's bold operation at 16 30 mikawa took off to rendezvous with the forces he had been able to gather his force was composed of his flagship the cruiser chokai four heavy cruisers of cruiser division six the oba kako kinugasa and furutaka two light cruisers tendrew and yubari and a single destroyer unagi it was a small force but it would have to do although most of these ships were not top of the line fleet units they were still a formidable force the following day on august 8th mikawa saw an allied plane circling above him at 10 25. moments later chokai intercepted a sighting report this aircraft had sent out then at 1103 another aircraft was spotted surveying him at this point it was clear to mikawa that surprise had been lost his entire plan had been banking on this and now it was possible that the americans would follow up the sighting with an airstrike so to lessen the chance of this he would have to postpone his approach even further into the evening so he could use the cover of darkness as protection and yet despite this mikawa still had reasons to be optimistic reconnaissance flown that day revealed to him that although he was greatly outnumbered by allied ships the allies were operating them in two separate groups this was excellent news mikawa could exploit this mistake and defeat each force in detail bearing this in mind regardless of the odds act against him and having the element of surprise gone mikawa decided to press on with the mission at 1600 he began his approach down the new georgia sound which would soon acquire the nickname the slot tensions onboard mikawa ships were high since there is a possibility an american airstrike would come despite this potential threat mikawa had to move on to other matters his pre-battle plan his force apart from cruiser division 6 had never worked together as a group so he decided to keep it simple no complicated battle formations here just a simple call information would be fine at 1640 the pre-battle plan was issued to his men we will penetrate south of salvo island and torpedo the enemy main force off guadalcanal then we will move toward the ford area at tulagi and strike with torpedoes and gunfire after which we will withdraw to the north of sabo island and shortly after this message mikawa ordered his men to jettison all flammable materials off their ships since they could pose a deadly fire hazard in the upcoming fight the sun set at 1816 and tensions on board east as it became clear that no air attack was coming that evening chokai intercepted american carrier signals confirming to mikawa that the carriers were indeed out there somewhere but where exactly but wait this also brought up another question why hadn't they attacked apparently the americans hadn't taken advantage of the early morning report given to them no air attack had materialized heck even additional scout planes hadn't been seen this was strange then later in the evening further great news was delivered to mikawa the air group that had attacked allies shipping this day had returned to reball and they had given an incredible battle report they claimed having sunk 14 ships and heavily damaged three more well apparently the odds were even better now things were looking up at 2313 three floor planes were launched ahead of mikawa's fleet this would be a unique tactic that the allies would never counter let alone match these planes were tasked with dropping flares right before the battle this would illuminate the enemy forces and give mikawa a tactical edge over his opponents as midnight approached spirits were undoubtedly high mikawa's forces were trained for night actions and it would soon be their chance to prove it in a message reminiscent of admiral nelson's speech before his great victory at trafalgar mikawa had signaled his ships earlier that evening in the finest tradition of the imperial navy we shall engage the enemy in night battle every man is expected to do his best his men would not disappoint the japanese had the finest night binoculars in the world and at 43 minutes past midnight lookouts caught sight of an enemy destroyer at an incredible distance of over 5 miles mikawa's ship's reduced speed and altered course so as to slip by 50 guns were trained on this little destroyer ready to blow it out of the water if it sounded an alarm but nothing happened the lone destroyer seemed oblivious to his presence and was moving farther and farther away he couldn't believe it miraculously he was able to pass by it undetected mikawa was truly on a lucky streak first no american airstrikes had reached him despite having been spotted and now he was able to slip by this weak picket screen had he truly achieved surprise or maybe this was a clever trap with the americans waiting to ambush him regardless of what was to come he knew that his men were well trained and equipped to handle whatever came their way he increased speed to 26 knots and at 0-133 gave the order all ships attack mikawa couldn't have known it at the time but he had actually achieved complete surprise how mikao was able to travel 700 miles without being detected is a question we will answer shortly but first we need to take a step back and go over the landings that took place two days prior rear admiral richman turner was in command of the amphibious force conducting the landings on tulagi and guadalcanal age 57 he has been described by author john lundstrom as a tough bright even brilliant officer but according to others who knew him said he could also be arrogant domineering tactless and egotistic either way his bold aggressive leadership is just when an operation like this needed his entrance into the sound caught the enemy by surprise the landings for tulagi and the nearby eyelets a guvutu tanenbogo begin at 0-800 hours they will be taken successfully but only after a brief but fierce fight the entire japanese garrison of 1500 men fought as they promised virtually down to the last man the marine suffered 248 casualties in this engagement guadalcanal on the other hand proved much easier since the garrison on the island were actually just construction crews working on the unfinished airfield once the marines landed the laborers fled into the jungle the americans were able to secure the airfield the following day as mentioned the japanese had reacted immediately to the landings by happenstance they had already planned a bombing raid that day against land targets in new guinea so the force was diverted to bombard the transports instead unfortunately for them because of the prior mission the planes were not armed with torpedoes their deadly preferred weapons but they didn't want to delay the attack by rearming them so they decided they would send them as they were right behind them would be another strike nine vowel dive bombers given the distance they did not have the fuel to strike and return to base regardless of this they were sent and simply towed to ditch near the shortland islands and await rescue the bombers took off at 0-950 the dive bombers at 10 45 any hope of achieving surprise was dashed when coast watchers cited the bombers and warned the expeditionary force this gave the allies precious time to prepare for their arrival the bombers arrived over the area at 13 15 and were greeted by 18 fighters unfortunately for the japanese because they were bombing from such a high altitude and through heavy clouds their accuracy suffered the bombers scored no hits apart from achieving nothing the strike had also lost two zeros and six bombers then an hour later the nine vowel dive bombers appeared they managed to score a single hit that lightly damaged a destroyer five valves were shot down and the remaining four exited the area to ditch their planes at their designated location the americans had successfully defended their beachhead but losses have been heavy for them nine wildcat fighters and one dauntless bomber had been lost this japanese raid on the seventh had proven to be ineffective and their second attempt the following day would be even worse on august 8th rabaa ordered a new strike on the allied ships 26 betty bombers with 15 zeros as escorts this was the airstrike that would eventually report back to mikawa that it had sunk and damaged a total of 17 ships however nothing could have been further from the truth the attack had been a complete disaster the 41 aircraft took off at 0 800 hours this time the bombers were properly armed with torpedoes their original mission was to find the american carriers that were bound to be near guadalcanal however this effort proved unsuccessful so they diverted and went to attack the transports instead they unexpectedly appeared over florida island and swooped down to attack only three american fighters were providing air cover but were out of place to intercept them therefore at 11 55 the situation looked grim 23 torpedo bombers now had an open shot at all the ships in the sound it seemed that nothing stood in their way of achieving absolute destruction except anti-aircraft fire and lots of it the mitsubishi navy type 1 attack bomber also known as the betty was the ijn's principal bomber it was fast and had an extraordinary range but was lightly constructed and weakly protected it would gain a notorious reputation for not being able to withstand even the modest amount of damage before being engulfed in flames it would soon acquire a nickname by the allies the type 1 lighter and we're about to see why a photograph was taken as they swoop down to attack you can see the skills of the pilots by how low to the water they are but at this low altitude every anti-aircraft weapon on board the ships could be effective and it was the american ships put up an impressive barrage of fire and bomber after bomber splashed into the water one of them so heavily damaged intentionally crashed into the transport george f eliot it started a fire so fierce that it eventually led to the scuttling of the ship only one bomber struck home and it was on the hapless destroyer jarvis the destroyer was badly damaged but remained afloat a photograph captured the two victims of this air raid jarvis is seen here down by the bow and dead in the water the george f eliot is in the background burning she would eventually be scuttled later that evening in 10 minutes the attack was over the few betty's that survived exited the area and that's when the horrific losses came to light apart from the two zeroes that were destroyed 18 of the 23 bombers were also lost the majority of them due to anti-aircraft fire this would end up being the largest single loss of land-based aircrews in the entire guadalcanal campaign 125 experienced airmen were lost and all they had to show for it was a transport and a destroyer by all measures it had been a successful beginning to operation watchtower the allies had much to be proud of they had withstood three separate air attacks with very little loss and had reached their main objectives successfully the only real trouble for them had been the unloading of supplies it had taken longer than planned nonetheless to admiral turner the operation was off to a good start but after two days of constant operations most of the sailors under his command were no doubt exhausted it was hoped by many that this night would be a quiet one so they could finally get some rest two of the most important elements in any combat operation are intelligence and communications and we are going to see that both fall short here the air search and communications network the allies had in place was feeble and allowed for the failure of detecting mikawa's approach and we will see that like a chain of dominoes is going to be one failure after another until it all accumulates into putting the allies in the worst possible state before mikawa arrived so we will begin by looking at the intelligence admiral turner had on the eve of battle on the evening of august 8th this is what the admiral knew he knew that three principal sightings had been made on the enemy the first was the day prior on august 7th submarine s-38 has spotted mikawa's force heading southeast but this report proved unhelpful since it had occurred a day ago and it gave no concrete indication that it was heading towards guadalcanal it might have just been heading towards covane or maybe even buca the second report would be the most crucial one and would be the one that would influence turner the most this was the signing of mikawa's force at 10 25 on august 8th unfortunately there were two issues with this report to begin with the air crew's ship identification skills were very poor it erroneously reported two seaplane tenders with the group but more significantly is the fact that when the report had arrived to turner that evening it was over 8 hours old so what's the explanation for this terrible delay i think it's worth exploring this segment in detail since i believe it to be the primary reason for the debacle the allies would face at salvo that being the failure to detect mikawa heading down the slot in turner's defense he had very good reasons to believe that his forces would receive adequate warning if a japanese force tried to attack his position he had dozens of reconnaissance aircraft conducting searches however the devil was in the details the problem was that there were two different commands in charge of the air searches turner was operating under the south pacific command area under vice admiral gormley however the aircraft carrying out searches in the sector of verbal and the northern solomons belong to the southwest pacific command under the responsibility of general douglas macarthur an arrangement had been made between the two commanders if a plane made a sighting it would deliver its message to base and if it was deemed urgent and pertinent to operation watchtower it would be delivered directly to admiral turner notice then turner has no direct communication with these aircraft in essence turner's security in his northern sector was entirely dependent on macarthur and his aviators and for their ability to deliver messages in a timely manner what could possibly go wrong well something called murphy's law things didn't go as planned because a slight oversight had been made because of the secrecy operation watchtower was undertaken with very few were told about this arrangement and incredibly this included the airbase and the airmen who were supposed to do the searches in other words senior command forgot to tell the airbase hey guys if you find something suspicious let's say a force heading southeast that could threaten the allied landings let admiral turner know right away as a consequence for the pilots this was going to be another routine air search for them they wouldn't have been looking for any potential threats that could endanger the landings because they weren't even aware the landings were taking place as can be expected repercussions were sure to follow so now with the groundwork set up i will take a minute to explain in detail the passage of the 1025 message so you can fully grasp the failure of this mistake at 10 25 the force was spotted by the australian search plane the reported sighting was transmitted but not acknowledged at base to the pilot's credit he immediately returned to base to report it in person at 12 42 his plane landed and the report was delivered but the debriefing officer being unaware of operation watchtower deemed it not urgent so he sent to following standard procedures up the long chain of command it was serenely sent to port moresby and then to townsville where it arrived at 1437. it then lingered there for over three hours then the message was transmitted to brisbane at 1820 it was then dispatched to the naval radio station in canberra who then transmitted it all the way to pearl harbor who then finally retransmitted it to the american ships at guadalcanal wow what a journey what should have taken minutes to deliver had taken over eight hours now there was a third reported sighting shortly after the 1025 one and this could have corrected these mistakes except that it had a similar story the reported signing was deemed not urgent when delivered by the pilot and it was sent the long way to turner the sighting arrived to turner at 21 30 10 and a half hours old what we just witnessed was a breakdown of communications crucial information has been delayed at a moment when time mattered the most i will not understate this if turner had received a timely report it's only logical to assume he would have sent additional scouts who probably would have located mikawa and then turner could have ordered a pre-emptive airstrike as the japanese had expected not to mention all the ships at sabo sound would have been prepared for mikawa how unfortunate for the allies so the communication factor was a mess we can see that this leaves turner with what limited intelligence he had and as will be seen the poor skills of the pilots gave him a false view of the situation one that lowered his guard admiral turner had to make an assessment that evening and he made it based on the 1025 report unfortunately here we will see how the misidentification of the japanese force played a fatal role if we recall the report had stated that there were two seaplane tenders with the group well if that was true turner reasoned then perhaps the japanese were planning on building a seaplane base nearby i mean sure there is an escort of three cruisers and three destroyers with them but this small force would never dare to make a knight attack would they and this is what turner was guilty of he was assuming what the japanese would do and not taking into account their capabilities in other words turner's battle plan was based on what the enemy would do not could do given this evaluation the conclusion reached that night was that the enemy's most likely course of action would be to establish a sea plane base and not to attack but to be fair to turner he didn't make this decision simply based on a hunch that the enemy wouldn't come any further south he had been rightly concerned about his north western approaches specifically the slot so much so that he had ordered an afternoon search to cover this area if mikawa had continued southeast he surely would have been spotted however there was yet again another failure of communications turner sent the order but his seaplane tender never received it thus no afternoon search was flown that day although turner had assumed it had and since there had been no reports he took it as evidence that this force had not gone down the slot it wasn't until about midnight that turner was informed that the slot had never been searched that afternoon so the question in turner's mind was had this force continue south turner didn't know the verdict although it was logical to assume that the enemy would build a seaplane base it should not have been discounted that the report could have been inaccurate given this possibility he should have provided his commanders with a situation report and a threat assessment letting them know that although unlikely a night attack should not be discounted completely this way the commanders could have taken precautions but unfortunately for the allies this wasn't what happened turner confident in his belief that the japanese were building a seaplane base and not coming to attack did nothing to raise the alert status of his ships and i have to mention here that there is a bit of american overconfidence at play the allies did have a sense of superiority over their opponents and given a worst case scenario where they were attacked they were comforted in their belief that they could handle themselves even turner would later admit when reviewing his forces i was satisfied with arrangements and hoped the enemy would attack i believed they would get a warm reception two things to this one turner obviously didn't know about the japanese navy's expertise in night fighting if so he would have been more modest in his wording and two a look at their poor dispositions would have shown their overconfidence to be unwarranted turner's two transport groups were protected by his cruiser screening force which was under the command of british rear admiral victor crutchley guarding the western approaches he had a powerful force of six american and australian cruisers with four destroyers as escorts so on paper the allied fleet will be more than capable of handling the japanese however since they wanted to guard each of the entrances into the sound they had divided their forces into two this unfortunately left them in a position to be defeated in detail the groups were as follows the southern group was commanded by admiral crutchley himself it included two australian ships his flagship the australia and her sister ship canberra in addition it had the american cruiser chicago and two destroyers as escorts patterson and bagley the northern group was commanded by captain rifko with him were three cruisers vincennes which was his flagship quincy and astoria they had two destroyers with them as well wilson and helm there was also another force i haven't mentioned it was the eastern group under rear admiral scott it contained a light cruiser and two destroyers but as events would turn out they would play no role in the upcoming fight regarding the picket screen it was inadequate the reason for this was that there were insufficient destroyers available since many were needed to guard the transports against possible submarine attacks as a result only two destroyers were stationed to patrol the northwestern approaches blue and ralph talbot crutchley chose those two ships for picket duty after the commander of destroyer squadron 4 told him that of the nine ships in his squadron blue and ralph talbot had consistently obtained the best results with their search radar and this quote highlights another grave mistake the allies committed they were being overly reliant on radar the allies were betting on their radar to be able to spot the enemy from afar if it came to attack however at this point in the war the americans were still inexperienced with this relatively new technology so despite this high praise of their performance they failed to live up to it neither blue nor ralph talbot discovered mikawa as he approached to make matters worse there was a huge gap of 8 miles between their patrol lines and at their furthest point they could be as far as 20 miles apart and it was by pure luck that mikao was able to squeeze through this gap undetected moreover another point to be discussed is the condition of the sailors the cruisers had been at general quarters for the past 15 hours so this night the exhausted crews would finally be given rest and be placed in condition to readiness meaning that battle stations and guns will be partially manned fatigue and wariness could be another factor explaining why blue never spotted mikawa's force even when it was just two miles away from her and to top all of this off admiral crutchley was summoned for a conference that night by admiral turner at 2055 the australia pulled out a formation but before she left admiral crutchley signaled captain bold of the chicago take charge of the patrol may or may not rejoin you later unfortunately he did not signal this to captain reefco who technically now was a senior officer captain bo then attempted to get ahead of camera so as to lead from the front but then reconsidered it it was always tricky maneuvering in the night better to just wait a few hours and wait for the admiral to return but as events would turn out admiral crutchley never returned that night and would consequently miss out on the battle thus a broken and confused chain of command had been achieved the overall commander was absent captain bold was in command but leading from the rear of his group captain rifko was now the senior officer but didn't know it and he also didn't know that the commanding admiral was absent the setup for disaster is now complete the allies had failed to detect nikawa's force heading down the slot turner made the wrong assessment based on the intelligence he had leaving his forces unprepared the forces had a weak picket screen the cruiser force was split into two groups stations were partially manned and the overall commander was absent and what does mikawa have against this he has the undisputable number one advantage in a night battle the element of surprise set against these circumstances we can see that tragic consequences for the allies we're bound to follow mikawa slipped past the blue and at 0-133 he made his final approach into the sound undetected as he passed sabo island a lone ship suddenly appeared on his port side this was the wounded destroyer jarvis if we recall she had been heavily damaged in the air raid the day before well now she was exiting the area and by chance found herself on a near collision course with mikawa but once again mikawa's nerve held and he did not open fire on the destroyer and to everyone's surprise the jarvis simply steamed on the only explanation for this could be wariness or fatigue because although she came incredibly close to the japanese column she did not open fire or possibly even spot them jarvis was essentially the last hope the allies had to sound the alarm the destroyer yunagi separated from the group to deal with the ship at 0-136 lookouts spotted camera and chicago heading right towards them there was now nothing standing between mikawa and the southern group the moment they had been waiting for had finally come at this time high above the allies were hearing planes hovering over them many had thought they were friendly aircraft with only a few correctly deducing them as enemies but even then the alarm was not raised at 0-143 patterson spotted the japanese and sent its now infamous report warning warning strange ships and train harbor but it was too late four torpedoes from chokai were already on their way a moment later flares from those mysterious planes were dropped illuminating the allied ships battle had commenced chokai opened fire followed moments later by the rest of the battle line all gunfire was directed on the first ship they saw the cambra from only 4 500 yards a rain of shells started to fall on the unfortunate cruiser cambra heroically turned to starboard to put herself between the enemy and the transports she tried her best to fight back but she never had a chance she was hit by as many as 27 shells all damaged exclusively on her port side her engine room was struck propulsion and power were lost and her captain was mortally wounded there were also some hits below her water line and she soon developed the list cambra was left dead in the water and engulfed in flames the chicago veered off and saw torpedoes coming her way she tried to avoid them but one fired by the kako hit her on the starboard side however the damage was minor as they had only clipped her bow moments later she was struck on her foremast by a six inch shell there was confusion in the bridge over what was happening and her response was slow her main guns never got a chance to fire but her secondary guns did score a hit on the tendril causing casualties chicago retired to the west and would cease to participate in the battle captain bold would later say that he had been drawn away by some gunfire he saw what he probably saw was the unagi who at the moment was having a duel with the jarvis the wounded destroyer had put up quite a fight with unagi more than she could handle and after five minutes the japanese destroyer withdrew however this was just a skirmish the main fight was about to begin and it was to the east of chicago captain boat committed three mistakes that night his cruiser with his fighting capability still intact steamed away from the main enemy and in effect left the transports he was supposed to protect unguarded but that wasn't even the worst part he astonishingly did not send a report or a warning of any kind to the northern force the southern force had been defeated in six minutes for the most part the destroyers were ignored bagley launched an ineffective torpedo attack and then broke off to the west the patterson bravely engaged tendril and yubari all on her own she hit nothing but in return received a hit in the aft gun mount and withdrew from the area by this point mikawa had spotted the northern group and already had his formation heading towards it captain rifko in the northern group had heard the gunfire and knew some type of action was occurring with the southern group but he didn't want to be drawn towards it since it would leave his transports unguarded therefore he decided to maintain station and await orders from admiral crutchley which of course never came so the northern group continued on their north west course but wait what about patterson's warning well when the ships received patterson's warning it couldn't have been at a worse time the ships were busy communicating amongst themselves as they were conducting their north west turn as a result vincennes got patterson's warning but it wasn't delivered to captain rifko quincy received it and the astoria never got it at all in short 10 minutes into the battle the northern group was in the same state as the southern group oblivious and unprepared for an enemy that was heading its way due to confusion that is inevitable in any battle mikawa's column had become disorganized and had split into two however this actually gave the japanese an advantage the iron juggernaut had now transformed into a two-headed monster and in between the two heads laid the unprepared and unsuspecting northern group the japanese readied their torpedoes and closed in they lit up the northern fleet whose guns were still trained forward they could see men running on their decks as general quarters was finally being sounded and yet confusion still reigned among the americans with many men believing they were being lit by friendly ships vincennes represents this case the best she began to signal repeatedly turn those searchlights off of us we are friendly near misses began to fall upon astoria her gunners were quick to respond and immediately returned fire but then the captain ordered a ceasefire he had just woken up and stepped into the bridge and like many others he feared they were shooting on friendly ships he was soon convinced otherwise and ordered the guns to resume firing but his indecision proved fatal it allowed chokai to land the first effective savo successive hits followed and struck astoria's bow gun deck and bridge two of her turrets were disabled foiling any attempt to fight back her hanger was then hit where an immense fire started the americans would soon discover that their cruisers had a fatal weakness their floatplanes located on the well deck and in the hangar were the achilles heels of their ships the gasoline lubricant oil ordnances and all other flammable contents that were concentrated and exposed in this area greatly contributed to feeding the fires astoria suffered as fires raged uncontrollably and could not be contained she narrowly avoided colliding with the quincy who was also suffering a similar fate astoria had become a burning wreck the coup de grace came as aoba kako and kinugasa finished her off her forward injury room was abandoned and she soon came to a halt in total she received anywhere from 34 to 63 hits the quincy came under heavy and accurate fire by the oba suddenly she saw new enemy targets on her port beam this was the western group she turned to starboard when she saw torpedoes heading her way but she was struck by two from the tendril she soon began to receive a barrage of shells and her aft turret was taken out the catapult was struck and the five planes she had on board went up in flames the quincy quickly became an inferno the most iconic photograph taken of the battle was of the quincy in her plight from this view you can get an idea of how close range this engagement had become here we can see that the quincy is on fire and down by the stern and yet despite the damage she was able to fight back she got off three sabbas during the battle the last of which hit chokai's bridge nearly taking out mikawa and his staff however she herself was struck in the bridge and her captain was killed soon after her propulsion was lost when she was struck by another torpedo on her starboard side as many as 54 hits were ultimately scored on the blazing cruiser and just so you can get an idea of how intense the fires were on the ships halfway through the battle the japanese actually turned off their searchlights because the flaming ships were illuminating the combat area so well the head of the northern fleet the vincennes took a beating at the onset of the battle she was initially hit by two torpedoes on her port side courtesy of chokai she fired back and managed to strike the kinogasa slightly damaging her but this was all the damage she would inflict on the enemy a barrage of shells fell upon her as she was caught in the crossfire from both the eastern and western column all over turrets were hit and taken out testifying to japanese accuracy and gunnery skills then another torpedo struck her port side afterwards more hits followed shell struck the main steam lines the fire mains and the main battery control the conning tower was hit severing communications on the ship and like the others her hangar lit up as well the steering power failed the electrical system failed and the flagship of the northern group began to fight for her life it was later calculated that up to 74 shells had struck the ship the destroyers of the northern group played no significant part in the battle the helm had fired one sabo at the enemy and then ceased to participate the wilson fired at various enemy ships throughout the battle but didn't register any hits as planned the japanese cruisers began to exit the area behind them lay a scene of destruction as three cruisers were fighting for their lives the only obstacle left for the japanese force was the pika destroyer ralph tavit yubari tendrew and furutaka engaged the destroyer she fought back but wasn't able to score any hits in the exchange however she was hit six times fortunately a rain squad saved the destroyer from assured destruction at 0-220 mikawa ordered the ships to break off their engagement the battle of salvo island was over it had been a stunning victory the enemy forces were destroyed and from it emerged an opportunity to turn this tactical victory into a strategic one the transports were now exposed and vulnerable to attack mikawa had a decision to make and it was over the following choices should he head back and destroy the transports or should he withdraw we will call this mikawa's predicament and it occurred from 0-15 to 0-223 mikawa took stock of his situation and pondered over his options there were some factors in favor for attacking first mikawa's force was reasonably stalked they still had over 60 of their gun ammunition and 50 of their torpedoes left and second there's still little in the way of him achieving this goal since the main screening force had been destroyed in short if he attempted to go for the transports he would likely be successful however there were also many reasons not to attack to begin with the single hit on chokai by the quincy was truly a lucky shot for it had destroyed the charts and maps mikawa needed to navigate safely in the sound but the biggest concern was time dawn was not far off it was calculated that it would take an hour and a half to reassemble and reverse course to enter the sound again then another hour to reach the transports this meant that at best he could commence an attack around 0-500 leaving him only an hour of darkness before sunrise if he attacked at that time he wouldn't be withdrawing back home under the cover of darkness he would be exposed in daylight hours and it was certain that he would have to face the wrath of american carrier airplanes during his retreat mikawa was well aware of what could happen to a surface force without air cover when attacked by carrier-based bombers he was bound to suffer heavy losses if not outright destruction now at this point it's even two in favor two against but if we really want to get into mikawa's mindset then there were probably some other factors weighing heavily on his mind in favor of withdrawing that we have to consider before he had left for a ball he had spoken with the chief of the naval general staff admiral osami nagano he had been told by him that since japan's industrial power was meager he was to avoid losing his ships as they could not easily be replaced was at the moment in possession of a third of all the heavy cruisers the japanese navy had moreover was that the japanese imperial army had already boasted to him how they would defeat the americans soon enough his mission was to take care of the navy which he had done and they would take care of the marines so going for the transports wouldn't have been necessary given that promise and finally it's important not to forget that mikao was an old-school commander who adhered to the imperial navy's concept of sea control it stated that what was most important was to destroy the enemy's warships which would give you dominance of the seas which in turn meant control of the island so in his mind he must have thought i have already made it now without a screening force the transports will have to withdraw regardless so mikhail must have wondered why risk his fleet this was mikawa's predicament between 0-215 and 0-223 and i would ask the viewer if you were mikawa shoes which option would you have taken go back and enlarge your victory by destroying these transports but then risk losing your precious cruisers to inevitable air attacks during the retreat or be content with what you already have achieved and not press your luck go home now and lessen the chance of an airstrike reaching your cruisers mikawa deliberated with his staff and at 0-23 he made his decision he would play a safe he ordered a withdrawal the irony however was that the american carrier force the one he was so scared of was already on its way out of the operational area vice admiral fletcher in one of his most controversial decisions of his career had ordered his carriers to be withdrawn the previous evening therefore if mikawa had decided to go with the gamble of attacking the transports he could have done it and his force would have escaped unmolested during the day this is one of the greatest what-ifs of the guadalcanal campaign but who could blame him we today have the benefit of hindsight while mikawa had to act on the information at hand in 1957 umikawa would state that had he known the americans would have never been dislodged by the japanese army and that the american carriers had withdrawn then of course he would have attacked but based on the information he had he didn't and he therefore felt he had made the right decision it could be said that mikawa failed to recognize the scale of the landings and to assess that this was a vital opportunity that had been presented to him although i personally think it's a bit unfair he didn't possess a crystal ball that told him how important and how tough the struggle for the island would become most of us only know that through hindsight either way to see the grand opportunity that had been presented i believe author mark stilley summed it up perfectly mikawa did not know it at the time but he had just squandered the ijn's best chance of delivering a knockout blow to the first american offensive in the pacific it is hard to imagine the americans holding on to their lodgment following the destruction of their transport fleet and the supplies still on board the destruction of the american transports would have been worth the sacrifice of mikawa's entire force that being said even to this day some may still question mikawa's decision what do you think did mikawa make the right call [Music] at 0-23 mikawa's force departed leaving behind a scene of devastation the damage had been catastrophic and fatal to the allies ships the quincy was the first to sink 15 minutes after mikawa's departure at 0-35 370 men were lost the vincennes sank at 0-250 taking 332 of her crew come the following morning canberra was still afloat and it looked like she might be saved however a major withdrawal of all the naval forces was underway and it was ordered that if she couldn't make the departure she should be scuttled so she was she sank at 0-800 73 men died the last to go was the astoria she sank in the afternoon at 12 15. 216 sailors went down with the ship this was the worst defeat of the united states navy in the pacific war the final score four cruisers were sunk and a fifth damaged in addition two destroyers were also damaged 1077 men were killed 709 wounded what is striking about the losses is that almost as many sailors died on this one day as marines during the entire six-month guadalcanal campaign that's how vicious this battle was for the japanese the losses were minimal three ships were damaged 35 men were killed and 51 wounded although not a strategic victory because mikawa hadn't destroyed the transports there can be no denying that it had been a smashing tactical victory for the japanese the battle of sabo island was the greatest japanese surface combat victory of the war it demonstrated to the americans that the ijn surface fleet packed a meme punch and that they were superb night fighters this engagement would be the first of many intense battles for control of the waters off guadalcanal in fact so many ships would end up sinking in savo sound that it would soon acquire a new name iron bottom sound and remember the guadalcanal campaign had only just begun on august 9th turner and his transport ships withdrew from the sound but i want to be clear about something the allies were not pulling out because of mikawa's victory they were withdrawing because they didn't have any more air cover thanks to admiral fletcher's decision to withdraw his carriers the evening before as a matter of fact the conference they had right before the battle the conference that led to admiral crutchley being absent from the battle was to discuss that very issue of fletcher withdrawing you see turner had been in a dilemma they still hadn't finished unloading all of the supplies for the ground forces but now without air cover the transports would be vulnerable to an air attack if the japanese followed on as they had done so for the previous two days therefore the decision was made that night before mikawa had even entered the sound that they would withdraw the following day so by the evening of august 9th sabo sang was empty of any ally ships left behind were 17 000 marines who were short on food ammunition and supplies the marines would be on their own for now lessons learned regarding admiral turner's performance i hope i didn't come off too harsh on him because admittedly he was in a tough spot he had very limited intelligence due to the breakdown of communications clearly he cannot be faulted for this but what he was guilty of was making the wrong assessment he tried to guess what the enemy would do instead of preparing for the enemy's most dangerous course mikawa on the other hand did many things right but let's admit he was aided a lot by luck he showed initiative kept the plan simple and was opportunistic to take advantage of all the failures the allies committed but what really helped them was the following and i hope i made the case clear by now that the primary reason for the ally defeat was because of the element of surprise the japanese had coming into the battle in these night battles surprise would play a crucial role in favor of the victor just two months later we will see how the americans had surprise on their side and how they decisively turned the tables against the former victors that said i'm convinced that if only mikawa had been spotted earlier and if he hadn't had a factor of surprise the allies would have fared better mikawa and his men for their part were ecstatic with the victory they had achieved they would soon get a hero's welcome when they returned to base however their euphoria was cut short when the americans unsuspectedly obtained revenge on august 10th submarine s44 had been on patrol near new ireland when it spotted cruiser division six returning to covane she fired four torpedoes and three of them hit the cocko decaco sank that morning 68 men were lost however remember that wounded destroyer the jarvis she had a grim and final role to play in this story she was on her way back to australia for repairs when a japanese search plane misidentified her as a cruiser a japanese airstrike was already airborne heading to attack the shipping in iron bottom sound much to the relief of turner and his unprotected ships the strike never arrived but this was only because it had been redirected to this new target the jarvis limping along at seven knots had no working radio and worst of all to help lighting the weight had gotten rid of her lifeboats at noon 16 betty bombers approached the ill-star destroyer she would give a good account of herself shooting down two bombers and causing another to crash land later on [Music] nonetheless the odds against her were simply too great she was sunk with all hands it was going to be the start of a vicious campaign indeed a topic that cannot be dismissed was canberra hit by friendly fire it has come to light in the last decades that the camera had been a victim of friendly fire the culprit being bagley who launched torpedoes at the japanese when one looks at the track charts if bagley had been at its appropriate station it would have been close but not really in a position to do so however all one must do is imagine bagley have been further aft of her proper station which many claim she was well given that course we can see that at 0-147 it was possible her torpedo spread could have hit the camera all i will say is this if true then unquestionably august 9th had to be one of the unluckiest days for the allies because it meant that on one of the rarest occasions the deficient infamously unreliable mark 15 torpedo worked it had been on a friendly ship alright if you made it this far thank you for watching i hope you enjoyed the video and i'll see you next time as i continue on with the naval battles of the guadalcanal campaign montemere over and out

Channel: Montemayor

Views: 1,612,100

Rating: 4.917028 out of 5

Keywords:

Id: lICRQPIduFc

Length: 63min 57sec (3837 seconds)

Published: Mon Jun 14 2021

Reddit Comments

[u/dearmrfrodo]

06:41- IJN striking force consisted of tier 4-tier 8 cruisers with Chokai(Atago varient) as the flagship.

11:49-DD didn't spot well, giving the IJN element of surprise.

15:43-IJN sky cancer got denied. Enemy laughing git gud.

17:31-The decorative fighter consumable. Misplaced and didn't attack the enemy aircraft.

17:45-What Anti-aircraft guns used to be in the game...

19:07- Everyone in the chat screamed "just dodge!" Jarvis took a torpedo hit.

20:19- The allied took the cap.

21:08-The allied players won't listen to the game chat.

38:38-Unicum Japanese players called target and focused fire.

39:27-DD knife fight duel

44:08-It explained why the US cruisers got citadeled at funny angles.

46:44-Unicum IJN players positioned well to create crossfire.

46:09-To cap or not to cap. That is the question.

50:33-possibility of facing the wrath of cv. Constant spotting and bombing.

60:02- DD: why you bully me?

62:35-CL: you don't torp when friendly is in line of sight. DD: you should just dodge. Noob.

Conclusion: tactical IJN victory. The Allied won on points. All wows-related humor aside. RIP to the souls lost in the battle.

[u/ugiresunlu]

"The Pacific" had a nice scene showing this battle as seen from the eyes of the US marines on Guadalcanal and they had no idea who was killing who.

[u/Dont_try_it7]

This battle is so dumb when you look back at it. Just really, really bad leadership

[u/mccao]

Make sure to check out Montemayor's series on Midway. It is the most insightful battle analysis on Midway available, with fog of war and detailed strategy & reasoning on both sides. Probably one of the best battle documentaries ever.

[u/flooki_]

Oh finally a new Montemayor vid. Yay. Together with the new Hardcore History podcast I'm getting spoiled this month