Guadalcanal Campaign - The Battle of Tassafaronga: (IJN 4(?) : 3 USN)

[Music] a couple of weeks after the two big night actions and the loss of two of the congo class battle cruisers the japanese situation on guadalcanal was getting quite serious with the demise of their transports the japanese navy had tried running in supplies via destroyers but these took too long to unload and they were at risk of air attack on their way back north in the morning next they tried submarines this worked somewhat better in terms of the secrecy of the deliveries as the submarines could unload all night quite happily and just slip away underwater during the daylight but the subs were only just about bringing in enough food per night for the following day's consumption around 20 to 30 tons getting that food to the front line was quite difficult and the japanese army was gradually starving neither the destroyers nor the submarines could deliver heavy equipment like artillery or tanks but simply holding ground required more food than the submarines were able to deliver so they came up with a new idea it was quite fun take large drums mostly oil drums clean them up fill them with food and other useful supplies that can fit in a 55 gallon drum unfortunately turns out you can't actually fit a tank in a 55 gallon drum even in parts then you tie the drums together with chains and ropes load them onto several destroyers then charge at the island at full speed chuck the drums overboard make a sharp turn because the destroyer is not supposed to be on land and run home this would allow the destroyers to get away safely during the night because they weren't stopping to unload and the drums at least in theory would either carry themselves ashore or if they didn't at least hopefully when morning came be found drifting close enough to sure that swimmers and men in small boats based on the shore could go and get them the greater carrying capacity of the destroyers compared to the submarines and their ability to arrive in large numbers should in theory boost the level of supplies to the island and stabilize the situation somewhat the task of actually making this idea work in practice fell on admiral tanaka who fortunately for the japanese navy was one of their two top admirals albeit he was a somewhat underappreciated character although to say he wasn't happy about the situation would be something of an understatement he recorded ah we're more a freighter convoy than a fighting squadron these days the damn yankees have dubbed us the tokyo express we transport cargo to that cursed island and our orders are to flee rather than fight what a stupid thing for this he was assigned eight destroyers two his own flagship naganami as well as the takanami were fully armed the other six kuroshio oyashio kaguero suzukaze kawakaze and makinami would be carrying the drums full of supplies and to save weight they would only sail with their two quad launchers carrying torpedoes the reload torpedoes that they would normally have expecting action had to be landed in order to make room and wait for the supplies in the containers further south admiral halsey had managed to scrape together a group of cruisers so he didn't have to take his one operational battleship uss washington in again further out from the operational area he there was the battleship north carolina as well as the older battleships colorado and maryland but north carolina might at best replace south dakota in the carrier escort duty role and nobody in their right mind was going to send slow standard battleships into the maelstrom of close combat at night in what was rapidly becoming known as iron bottom sound the force he'd put together was based at espiritu santo and consisted of the newer heavy cruisers minneapolis and new orleans the older heavy cruisers pensacola and northampton and the brooklyn class light cruiser honolulu along with them were the destroyers fletcher drayton mori and perkins this horse also had a new commander rear admiral carlton wright formerly of the uss augusta another cruiser officially labeled task force 67 which replaced an older formation of the same name that was now somewhat the worst for wear the formation had been under the command of admiral kincaid who had synthesized the plans of admiral scott which he'd been working on before his death with the lessons learned from the japanese actions and then adding into that the use of the new sg radar set he was forming a new knight battle doctrine for the us navy the plan looked good on paper apart from anything else it at least meant that the us ships would know what they were supposed to be doing instead of just guessing amidst a mixture of silence and contradictory orders on the fly kincaid acknowledged that the next fight was almost certain to be at night and so sg radar equipped destroyers would have to lead the formation they would then find the japanese and launch torpedoes then break off and let the cruisers engage with gunfire at a medium range that was set about 10 to 12 000 yards in order to keep the cruisers out of what they estimated to be a 10 000 yard range for the japanese torpedoes unless and until a chance to support the cruisers with gunfire presented itself the destroyers were to stay out of the way and then of course potentially come in to help if possible the scout aircraft that the ships carried would be dropping flares similar to the japanese navy's night fighting doctrine and if those scout aircraft weren't available then star shells could be used but the use of searchlights was forbidden in all but the most dire circumstances since operational experience had shown that basically every ship that had used searchlights at night thus far had become a target for every other ship in the area the new force was something of a scratch force ships had been spared or diverted from carrier escort duty destroyers poached from various convoy escorts and half the strength of the force had only arrived from pearl harbor a couple of days before on the 27th of november but at least the u.s navy now had a cruiser-based task group in the guadalcanal area again well at least for now and then in a move that must have seemed brilliant to somebody kinkade was reassigned and rear admiral carlton wright who hadn't seen any surface combat so far in the war and who had only just arrived along with the uss minneapolis was given command right as news began to filter in that all the new night combat lessons would soon need to be put into practice task force 67 was then set to 12 hours notice for sailing on the 29th and they waited for the signal to weigh anchor thanks to allied decryption experts the u.s navy now knew when tanaka was supposed to make his supply run although thanks to some confusion probably resulting from the use of destroyers as transports the intel officers passed a message to the effect that the japanese force was to be made up of six destroyers and six transports but in any case the us force set out to intercept passing through the lengo channel between florida and guadalcanal islands aiming to meet the enemy in the same gap between savo island and guadalcanal that had seen so much action over the preceding months on the way in they picked up a couple of extra destroyers uss lamson and uss lardner who were nearby having just escorted a bunch of supply ships these were told to go and join the aft of the line after the incoming u.s task group almost collided with said convoy also on route they received an update that the enemy force would probably be made up entirely of destroyers although this intel also suggested that the destroyers might be trying to land reinforcements as well as resupply ironically enough this meant that the us navy was deploying to intercept tanaka's force before tanaka himself left on the final leg of his run as tanaka's force left one of the allied coast watchers spotted it and reported it in the coast watches being a system of human spotters that effectively worked as talking radar sets who had been set up in various places in the island chain often behind enemy lines to look out for and report japanese shipping movements this was further confirmed by u.s recon aircraft the us cruisers then launched their scout aircraft for some evening reconnaissance with orders to land at nearby u.s bases once they'd completed their sweeps in theory the aircraft would then refuel and take off again to provide the flare drops in the night action which also neatly avoided having fueled aircraft present on the cruiser's decks however as it turned out contrary weather conditions would prevent them from taking off again in time that night and they would take no part in the subsequent action on the flip side a japanese recon aircraft spotted a supply convoy almost certainly the one that lamson and lardner had just been borrowed from and tanaka realized that any convoy must also have an escort and if there was an escort it must be nearby and if it was nearby then it was quite possible that he might run into it and therefore they could expect to meet resistance however unlike other japanese admirals not only was tanaka prepared for this but he'd already briefed his captains that whilst they might be on a supply run if they came across enemy ships they should prioritize destroying them instead of continuing with the supply run the japanese army might have disagreed with these particular set of priorities but tanaka was the one in command he led his ships southeast between savo and guadalcanal whilst the u.s ships were heading northwest with uss fletcher leading the three other destroyers that had actually been assigned to the unit then the flagship minneapolis leading the cruisers this being followed by new orleans pensacola honolulu and northampton bringing up the rear of these all but the two oldest ships had sg radar equipped lamson and lardner of course were tailing on at the back as tanaka passed by savo island moving at between 12 and 15 knots he prepared to deploy the supply drums meanwhile multiple u.s ships coming the other way at about 20 knots began to pick up the japanese ships on radar but this was well beyond any reasonable gun range at night the us formation tightened up and headed in whilst the japanese blissfully unaware of the situation started to loosen the supply drums on their decks however six minutes after us radar had spotted the japanese navy tanaka's flagship spotted the u.s ships and ordered the rest of the japanese destroyers to stop what they were doing immediately and prepare for action a few minutes thereafter the u.s destroyers who are now only 7 000 yards away asked for permission to fire their torpedoes as one of the orders that had been issued at the last moment before sundown had been similar to those you'll have heard from earlier battles no firing without direct permission from the admiral in this case unless you were below 6000 yards and had a confirmed enemy contact at this point the two formations were about to pass each other so a launch at this stage would have had the torpedoes running at the oncoming japanese ships in a perpendicular direction closing quickly and over the most optimal short range but nothing came back minutes ticked by and then admiral wright refused permission to fire stating that the range was too long in fact the range was less than half the maximum range of a mark 15 torpedo something that fletcher's captain william cole wasted no time in letting the admiral know of and which fletcher's xo would later record as the most stupid thing i've ever heard of more minutes passed and eventually the order to fire the torpedoes came unfortunately during the time from the initial request the two formations had closed and were now actually passing one another so the deflection needed meant that the us torpedoes almost two dozen of which were now in the water were having to chase the japanese destroyers meaning both a longer run and easier evasion if the weapons were spotted since the closing speed would be considerably less perkins fletcher and drayton had launched all of their weapons but mori was the sole destroyer in the leading formation without any radar and so she didn't launch as she had no enemy contacts a minute later wright also ordered the us cruisers to open fire which rather ruined the point of a surprise torpedo strike since the u.s torpedoes were still on route and you know cruiser gunfire does make it rather obvious that enemies are present the destroyers in accordance with the battle plans fired off starshell for illumination as the aircraft hadn't shown up and then made off at speed to clear the firing lines for the bigger ships coming up behind them the closest japanese destroyer was one of the two fully armed ships takanami us cruiser gunfire wrecked her in short order although she launched all her ready use torpedoes before she was taken out of action she would never get a chance to reload the us ships meanwhile recorded her as an atago class cruiser but never mind the other seven destroyers were accelerating which also now moved them out of the predicted line of advance for the american torpedoes and then began to swing about 180 degrees on a parallel course with the american ships whilst laying smoke and salvo wing off their own torpedoes within 10 minutes of the engagement opening the first of almost four dozen long-range japanese torpedoes were on their way despite having ordered a torpedo attack by his destroyers wright and a number of his captains do not appear to have considered that they were in reciprocal range of japanese torpedoes perhaps they believed bjord's claims that the japanese could never build a torpedo as good as an american one and after all the american ships according to right at least had been firing at the edge of their range this proved to be a critical mistake as the us cruiser line proceeded nice and steadily without varying their course and speed and thus the japanese torpedoes duly began to arrive and two promptly blew holes in minneapolis crippling much of propulsion and seeing the entire bow ahead of the main armament fold over like cheap cardboard into the sea whilst the next ship in line new orleans was contemplating this another torpedo arrived and up went the forward magazine everything forward of the super firing turret fell off as systems began to fail one imagines an officer on the bridge looking down and thinking i'm pretty sure the front's not supposed to fall off the ship was about 15 lighter now as that missing displacement merely floated past but what were now the forward bulkheads were not designed to be exposed to a racing sea and the ship soon had to slew out of line now it gets even more bizarre having seen the two ships ahead take hits pensacola decided to do nothing simply maintain course and speed with a minimal adjustment to account for avoiding the reeling forms of the minneapolis and new orleans somewhat unsurprisingly shortly thereafter she was also hit by a torpedo which set her on fire tore off her portside propeller shaft and left her without power and with a worrying list next up was honolulu apparently with captain halier being the only sane captain on the room he accelerated to full speed and took evasive action whilst sending enough six-inch downrange to make helena proud shockingly this ship was not hit by torpedoes the last cruiser in line was therefore uss northampton and for some utterly inexplicable reason having seen the respective fate of the other four cruisers ahead of it decided that clearly the best course of action was to imitate the first three and plodded along at the same course and speed as before with a minor detour around what was now three slowing and burning ships two of which were missing their faces and thus in a move predicted by almost everyone northampton was now also hit by a pair of torpedoes they were spotted at the very last minute and the ship tried to swing to port but to no avail the hits wiping out most of the ship's propulsion and setting the ship on fire as well according to the damage report the detonations occurred almost simultaneously and the survivors generally just reported a single massive shock and saw one combined geezer the aft engine room and several other compartments were open to the sea and a 10 degree lister port quickly developed both port shafts and the starboard inboard shaft stopped immediately leaving them with just the one set of propulsion all communications after the area that had been damaged were disrupted and as fuel oil tanks had been in the path of both destinations large amounts of oil were quickly redistributed into several deck areas they weren't supposed to be as well as over the main mass structure within a few seconds fire broke out and unsurprisingly spread very quickly this being fed by oil from the ruptured tanks bubbling up to the surface in the damaged area the oil that had been thrown over the top side was also quickly ignited and the entire main mass structure served as a huge torch this fire would never be fully controlled to add injury to insult new orleans now opened fire on the two newly recruited destroyers that had been bringing up the rear who decided that it was therefore best if they just left up ahead the speeding vanguard u.s destroyers found themselves in the strait between guadalcanal and savo islands and found themselves needing to motor on around savo island to come back in again to help out something that would end up taking far too long and leave the same passage open for tanaka they could in theory turn around where they were but that would leave them incredibly vulnerable the opportunity was not something that an admiral like tanaka would miss and so with a salvo of extra special goodbye torpedoes the japanese vessels motored away north west toward home leaving a couple of their number behind to try and help takanami but with honolulu in the area they decided that the abandoned takanami wasn't worth risking themselves over and soon thereafter they also withdrew for the u.s ships it was now simply a struggle for survival northampton's fight was not that long the after action report noted that efforts to control the list were futile progressive flooding continued and the list increased slowly transfer of ballast and remaining fuel as well as counter flooding had little to no effect and about an hour and 40 minutes after the torpedo struck the ship was abandoned except for the commanding officer and a salvage party the list continued to increase and when it reached 55 degrees the salvage party and commanding officer also left the ship shortly thereafter some 3 hours and 15 minutes after being hit northampton rolled over completely and with the keel showing plunged by the stern fortunately the departure of tanaka's force meant many of the survivors could then be rescued by pt boats and other craft that were based on guadalcanal the other three cruisers that had been hit did manage to make their way slowly to tilagi often not even making walking pace fortunately talagi was not that far away and the ships arrived with fires and flooding still aboard assisted by four of the destroyers whilst the other two went to help northampton survivors aboard the two new orleans class ships both were afloat pretty much only due to the heroic efforts by elements of their crew a number of whom would unfortunately later be found dead at their posts having foregone opportunities to escape in favor of completing vital damage control work even as it cost them their last breath minneapolis still technically had her bow attached it was just folded down almost 90 degrees and acting as a giant water break once safely alongside pensacola would be the first to be patched up and sent south for repairs this took about a week she'd been incredibly lucky one of the torpedoes had hit a fuel tank which had covered the aft of the ship in a wave of liquid flame which then dripped down into the hull and set off a number of shells in the aft magazine once the heat had grown too great fortunately they had been relatively low order individual detonations occurring in sequence instead of a mass detonation of propellant charges which had doomed other ships the other two required temporary bowels to be made from locally sourced coconut logs in order to keep the pressure off the internal bulkheads now exposed to the sea these were relatively crude slab-sided affairs and not particularly pretty but they worked this took most of the next week during which time the ships would also be covered in camo nets to try and keep the attentions of japanese aircraft away from them but they would also eventually make it to safety although all the ships involved would need almost a year before their repairs and replacement bowels were complete needless to say the whole thing was something of a disaster leaving the u.s navy with only just over a dozen cruisers in the entire pacific theater initially wright claimed he'd sunk two japanese light cruisers and seven destroyers in exchange which probably accounts for why he wasn't reprimanded but of course it would eventually turn out that only one japanese destroyer had been lost of course this was at a time when american ships torpedoes didn't work very well and the us including wright refused to believe that the japanese torpedoes worked incredibly well albeit that after so many engagements with the japanese ships firing torpedoes and sinking allied vessels at somewhat considerable range you'd think the tired old submarines must have snuck in close line might have sounded a little bit tired but this is what wright claimed in his report even though it was fairly obvious from rangefinder measurements from the engagement that the range had been close enough that even some world war one torpedoes could have made it two officers had previously separately called attention to the fact that the japanese had superior torpedoes admiral scott and captain rooks of uss houston but both of them were sometime dead at this point and their warnings had gone completely unheeded tanaka on the other hand had maintained that his victory was thanks to the training and skill of his men although as with so many other capable japanese officers he would shortly be reassigned to non-frontline duties for the crime of not winning hard enough the one bright spot was the supply run itself had not been completed and between pt boat attacks air attacks and the like most further attempts to land supplies were mostly or entirely disrupted within a fortnight of the engagement the japanese navy was advocating that guadalcanal be abandoned and by the end of the month approval had been given only one last struggle would remain between the japanese evacuation efforts and the u.s forces trying to close the net but that's a story for another time that's it for this video thanks for watching if you have a comment or suggestion for a ship to review let us know in the comments below don't forget to comment on the pinned post for dry dock questions

Channel: Drachinifel

Views: 594,064

Rating: 4.9204335 out of 5

Keywords: wows, world of warships, Admiral Wright, Admiral Tanaka, Tassafaronga, Lunga Point, IJN, USN, WW2, Pacific Campaign, USS Minneapolis, USS Houston, USS New Orleans, USS Honoloulu, USS Northampton

Id: Aa-29Uzo6c4

Length: 26min 7sec (1567 seconds)

Published: Wed May 19 2021