Medieval Mercenaries: The Age of Mercenary Companies (1300—1400)

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Renaissance Italy was marked by both continuous  warfare and economic growth. Against this backdrop   arose the Condotta, the contract system of hiring  mercenaries, which was arguably the most distinct   characteristic of the period. Initially, soldiers  hired themselves out to the highest bidder as   “free lances,” the lance being the smallest unit  of army organization at the time. This is the   origin of the modern term “freelancer.” However,  these soldiers soon formed entire mercenary   companies led by elected leaders, such as John  Hawkwood, who were seen as first among equals.   The powerful and wealthy Italian cities, enriched  by their monopoly on maritime trade with the East,   could easily hire these companies, but they  soon learned that doing so often brought   more problems than they had bargained for.  Known as Free Companies or Great Companies,   these mercenary groups saw themselves as  independent, self-governing adventurers   always on the lookout for the most lucrative  offer. A rich Italian city, they soon realized,   was a worthwhile target to plunder. It was not  long until they would become the bane of Italy. In   this video, we investigate the phenomenon of Free  Companies and how they were eventually replaced   by the arguably more famous mercenary captains,  the condottieri. Let’s start at the beginning.  Chapter 1: The Business of Terror By the mid-12th century, medieval   Europe had become increasingly urbanized. The  climate was warming, allowing for better harvests,   and forests were largely cleared, making room  for fields of barley, emmer, and wheat to help   feed the growing population, especially in  the many new urban centers. It was against   this background that the paid military service  of infantrymen gradually became an increasingly   important factor in warfare. Urbanization led to  better fortifications of cities and more castles   and thus to the proliferation of siege warfare.  These new siege specialists often offered their   service for pay rather than fulfilling other  military obligations. Infantry was also needed   to serve as long-term garrison troops of border  castles. As the historian Michael Mallet put it:   “all pointed toward a growing role for infantry in  the warfare of the day.” Not everybody liked this   change. Many denounced these new infantrymen as  brigands and outlaws because they tended to harass   travelers and merchants in the absence of other  lucrative economic opportunities. Over the course   of the 12th century, these infantrymen  formed distinct bands called Routiers,   from the word rutta or route meaning band or small  group. While this term is most closely associated   with the Hundred Years War, the phenomenon of  Routiers is actually quite a bit older. One   famous example is the Brabançons, who were most  active from 1166 to 1214. According to the German   historian Julia Knödler, the Brabançons were  in the business of spreading fear and terror.   They were deployed to wage an economic war on  enemy territory, brutally ravaging the countryside   and destroying resources to force the enemy to  surrender. Their destructive raids and plundering   in Europe led the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick  Barbarossa and King of France Louis VII to sign a   pact in 1167 forbidding the use of mercenaries,  and even the Church prohibited mercenaries in   the Third Lateran Council in 1179. Despite these  bans, the Brabançons always found new employers,   even in Frederick Barbarossa himself, who  in 1175 hired them for his Italy campaign.  Unlike most peasant infantry, who were  mobilized based on feudal obligations,   their pay enabled them to equip themselves  handsomely with mail armor and helmets. They   were experienced fighters who usually relied  on pole weapons, long pikes, and knives.  Over time, the crossbow gained popularity  among Routiers, especially after the   Crusades. However, the adoption of the weapon  was initially delayed due to a papal ban on the   use of crossbows against Christians. More  importantly, large-scale production of the   new weapon in Europe was hindered due to various  economic and societal factors. It wasn’t until the   middle of the 12th century that both the crossbow  and the long bow were fully established as popular   infantry weapons. The increased firepower led  many armies to deploy large numbers of archers   and crossbowmen. This demand led to new supply,  with many Pisans, Venetians, and Genoese offering   their services abroad as crossbowmen. The new  missile firepower was directed against both enemy   knights and infantry, which led to new defensive  methods. In Italy, for instance, infantry units   were divided into pike men and shield bearers,  with the shield bearers resting their long   shields on the ground to provide protection  for both the pikemen and the crossbowmen.  This new need for protection also led to changes  in the cavalry division. The historian Michael   Mallet explains: “the new threat from crossbow  bolts led to the gradual replacement of leather   and mail armor by plate armor for cavalry. It also  provoked concern for the protection of horses and   the introduction of horse armor.” With this change  came an increased need for spare horses to replace   those slain in battle or exhausted from bearing  the weight of the new armor and equipment. Cavalry   now required assistance from a small group of  pages and archers to lead the horses and provide   covering fire. Mallet notes, “Out of these needs  grew the cavalry ‘lance,’ the small group of men   attached to the armored man-at-arms, which was  to become the characteristic formation of late   medieval cavalry.” The effectiveness  of this new combination of pikemen,   crossbowmen, and knightly cavalry was vividly  demonstrated in the 1289 Battle of Campaldino,   a clash between pro-papal and pro-imperial forces,  known respectively as Guelphs and Ghibellines and   represented here in blue and red. Both armies  consisted of mostly feudal and communal forces,   with small groups of Routiers coming from various  countries. The Ghibellines launched the first   charge, committing the first two lines of cavalry  and the infantry to the fight. They succeeded in   pushing back the Guelf advance guard, forcing  the main Guelph cavalry force to slowly give   ground. The battle hung in the balance, with the  Ghibellines maintaining momentum until the Guelph   forces were pushed back to their line of carts,  which served as a reserve and rallying point. At   this stage, the bulk of the Ghibelline army found  itself overextended. Quickly, the Guelph infantry,   many of them crossbowmen, pushed up on both  flanks. Caught in the crossfire from both sides,   the Ghibelline reserve panicked and fled while  the Guelf reserve swept around the flanks and came   in on the center rear of the trapped enemy. The  coordinated efforts of knights, crossbowmen, and   pikemen secured a decisive victory for the Guelfs. Routiers were employed in a manner similar to the   Battle of Campaldino throughout Europe during this  period, but their prevalence gradually declined   between 1250 and 1330. This is usually attributed  to a general resistance against them. For example,   much like the pact of Frederick Barbarossa or  the papal ban, the Magna Carta of 1215 included   clauses prohibiting the use of mercenaries. Other  historians ascribe the decline of the Routiers to   the long domestic peace in France or changes  in warfare, such as the ever-heavier cavalry,   which—at least on certain occasions—slaughtered  entire Routier formations. Whatever the reason,   the phenomenon did not reappear prominently until  the beginning of the Hundred Years War in 1337,   when the Routiers came to  be known as Free Companies.  Chapter 2: Free Companies In January 1340, Edward III   of England proclaimed himself King of France  and later invaded French territory to assert   his claim to the throne. This kicked off the  first major campaign of the Hundred Years War.   The initial phase of the war was characterized  by mounted cavalry raids called chevaucheés.   Like the aforementioned Brabançon strategy of  raiding and pillaging, the English raids on   French territories were meant to weaken the enemy  economy and the French confidence in their king.   Edward III even allowed some of these plunderers  to form somewhat autonomous bands, which became a   real nuisance for the French. To make matters  worse, France lost two major battles—first   at Crécy in 1346 and then at Poitiers in  1356. According to the historian Nicolas Savy,   these losses prompted mercenary bands to exploit  the king’s vulnerability and “Edward III’s resolve   to further weaken France in order to intensify  their marauding by ruining crops, extorting   money from the rural populations, and forcing  entire villages to pay them protection money.”  In 1360, the first phase of the war ended  with the Peace of Brétigny. This treaty   mandated the transfer of numerous castles and  other territories between the English and the   French. This led to a significant number of people  being uprooted and Routier armies terrorizing the   French countryside. As many of them were mounted,  they could travel great distances, strike quickly,   and leave before the local royal forces could  react. Unlike the Brabançons, the Routiers of the   Hundred Years War were experts in mounted raids,  but also adopted English tactics from the battles   of Crécy and Poitiers. More heavily equipped men  often dismounted and formed the infantry line   while archers forced the enemy to attack. Their  combined expertise in mobile raids and open-field   battles made them a force to be reckoned with. In the writings of many historians,   the bands of Routiers begin to be referred to  as “Free Companies” starting from the 1360s.   The historian Kenneth Fowler explains that a  company consisted of groups of Routiers who banded   together. The individual groups from different  regions and countries retained their identity   but chose to combine their strength because  plundering and pillaging was much more   lucrative and safer when carried out by large  bands. As the historian Michael Mallet notes:   “For foreigners in a strange land, the larger the  band the better.” Primary sources describe these   companies in Latin as gens sine capite, literally  people without a head, meaning they had no leader.   Obviously, they had a leader in name, but he  was elected and seen as the first among equals.   It is commonly assumed that the name “Free  Company” was meant as a deliberate rejection   of Feudalism, or at least the hierarchical  structure of medieval society. However,   there seems to be controversy among historians  on this point. At least part of this perspective   emerged later and may be somewhat anachronistic. What is clear is that those who did not plunder   France on their own soon found  employment in various conflicts,   including the War of Breton Succession,  the Franco–Navarrese War, the feud between   the Counts of Foix and Armagnac in the  southwest of France, and, after 1364,   the war in Castille. Historian Nicolas Savy  notes that in the early 1360s, plundering by   the Free Companies was at its height and they had  formed veritable armies consisting of thousands   of men. As these increasingly vast and powerful  companies rose to prominence, they, and others,   soon adopted the term Great Companies. Chapter 3: The Great Companies  In 1360, the German Albert Sterz,  who had fought in the English army,   formed a company of mercenaries with other  demobilized soldiers of fortune, such as   the Englishman John Hawkwood. It was known as  Great Company, but it wasn’t the only group that   bore that name. Most people associate the Great  Companies with either the Sterz–Hawkwood group,   which would come to be known as the White Company,  or the Hundred Years War in general. However,   it was not the English who first formed such  companies. Already in 1302, the German-Italian   Roger de Flor commanded the Catalan Great Company,  a few thousand strong, on a spectacular campaign   from Italy to Byzantium. There, they first  defeated many Turkish beylics, then the Byzantine   emperor himself, and finally established their own  small state in Greece. In Italy, Great Companies   were already in existence in the 1340s under the  Swabian knight Werner of Urslingen and later in   the 1350s under an Italian known as Fra Moriale.  Only in 1361 would a Great Company mainly composed   of Englishmen move to Italy. Initially,  it was just known as the English Company,   but later it was called the White Company. The  White Company was made famous by an adventure   story of the same name by Arthur Conan Doyle. The  historical company was later led by John Hawkwood,   who was dubbed “the most sought-after mercenary  captain in Renaissance Italy.” All these companies   have fascinating stories, each meriting their very  own video, so that’s what we’re going to do. Here,   we’ll just refer to them as examples in  the general history of the Great Companies.  Most of the famous Great Companies had at  least one thing in common: at some point,   they tried their luck in Italy. There were  various reasons for this. One major motivating   factor for the Germans, French, and English was  the bad economic situation in their homelands.   In the 1340s and ’50s, trade and harvests were  severely impacted by the fallout from the Black   Death, which had just ravaged large stretches  of Europe. Famine was at an all-time high and   war was more common than peace. Italy was just as  affected by the Black Death as any other region,   but it had a few economic advantages. As Michael  Mallet puts it: “Italy lay at the heart of the   commercial revolution of the thirteenth century  and at the heart of the expanding money economy.”   The wealth of cities like Genoa, Florence, and  Venice provided the necessary capital to finance   entire mercenary armies. These cities were also  interested in freeing up their working population   from the duty of war and, at least initially, were  more than happy to outsource military affairs to   mercenaries. At the same time, this economic  expansion slowly led to more conflicts with   neighboring city-states and an increased need for  armed forces. Space and resources were limited in   Italy, and the lucrative trade routes from  the East increasingly became the target of   ever-more-competitive cities and merchants.  Before long, numerous cities began claiming   more land around their territories. This was  largely driven by the expanding populations’   need for wider and more secure hinterlands to  sustain themselves and a growing self-perception   as important cities exacerbated political  rivalries. Proto-Renaissance Italy also   saw the rise of banking, which provided funds  and credits for the growing merchant economies   and was also a profitable target for the  Great Companies. Many mercenary companies   simply traveled through Italy, wandering into the  territory of city states and forcing the Italians   to pay them to wander back out again. Historian P.  W. Singer aptly notes that in the 1340s and ’50s,   the Great Company of Werner of Urslingen  basically “ran an Italy-wide protection racket.”  It didn’t help that Italian cities were  rarely unified in their responses to the   mercenary companies. In fact, they tended to  be factionalized, with nobles fighting their   own local rivalries, furiously disagreeing on  communal politics and economics. This fragmented   and disunified response partially explains  why the Italian city-states could not do much   against the Great Companies. William Carferro, an  expert on Renaissance Italy and mercenaries, also   points to the simple fact that the Great Companies  outnumbered the forces of the city-states. Werner   of Urslingen, for example, had 10,000 men, while  the English army at Agincourt only numbered around   6,000–9,000. A small Italian city-state that  had just been decimated by the Black Death could   muster far fewer men than that. This became even  more extreme when the companies joined forces,   as they often did. If an Italian city decided to  fight the Great Companies, it usually had to rely   on paid mercenaries to bolster its numbers. This  became a problem when they lost on the battlefield   because they had to make not just one payment,  but two—first paying their own mercenaries for   their service and then providing a payoff to  the enemy Great Company. Even if the Italian   cities managed to defeat the Great Companies, they  usually just split into small bands that remained   in the region and redirected their efforts  toward plundering the countryside. So, while   paying them off was the sensible solution, that  approach only served to attract more mercenaries.  The same fact that brought so many mercenary  companies to Italy also ultimately led to their   demise. The growing Italian economy produced  powerful states like 14th-century Venice,   Genoa, Milan, and Florence. They developed a more  coherent and centralized political organization,   which inevitably led to a greater emphasis on  permanent defense. Eventually, the companies   could not survive against the growing military  strength of the states. The wealth that had drawn   them to Italy in the first place and had fed  and nurtured them throughout the 1360s, ’70s,   and ’80s was ultimately their downfall.  The mercenaries themselves, however,   would continue to be active in Italy, albeit  in a different way. For example, John Hawkwood,   the leader of the White Company, became  increasingly attached to the state of Florence   in his later years. Michael Mallet explains: “Not  only was the position of the mercenary captain,   the condottiere, now recognized but the process  of attaching him to the state had begun.”  The Italian Alberigo da Barbiano is  usually considered the first condottiero,   while his company is seen as the last of the Great   Companies. After his victory over another company  at the Battle of Marino in 1379, the Pope hailed   Alberigo as the liberator of Italy. However,  Hawkwood was also around for another 15 years,   and the companies would operate in Italy for  the remainder of the 14th century. Nonetheless,   Hawkwood and da Barbiano do represent a change  in mercenaryism: the gradual evolution from   the companies to the mercenary captain, the  condottiero. The term comes from the Italian   word “condotta,” meaning contract. Contracts  had also been utilized by the Free Companies,   but the primary sources show a clear change:  In the 14th century, many members of the Free   Companies would sign the condotta, but in the  15th century only the name of the captain—the   condottiero—appeared, and he alone received the  money. The condottieri also relied on mercenaries,   but they used state funds to recruit, commission,  train, and then lead them into battle. Under   these mercenary captains, the Routier groups  that had made up the Free Companies became   gradually less important. The gens sine capite,  the people without a leader, became followers   of a leader. The condottiero was no longer  the first among equals but a general. Soon,   the condottieri would be exalted by artists  and writers, admired by their employers,   and feared by their enemies. In the 15th  century, they acquired entire duchies   and asserted a claim to greatness. The 15th  century would be the age of the condottieri.
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Channel: SandRhoman History
Views: 212,575
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Keywords: mercenaries, documentary, history, education, free company, free companies, mercenary company, john hawkwood, routiers, brabacons, great company, great companies
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Length: 18min 17sec (1097 seconds)
Published: Sun Apr 14 2024
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