In 1686, Chinese cannons bombarded the Russian
fortress of Albazin for several weeks. The Qing Kangxi Emperor had sent an army to the
frigid and inhospitable east of Siberia to capture the fortress and stop the expansion of
the Tsardom of Russia in the region. But despite relentless bombardment, superior numbers, and
ferocious assaults, his troops still struggled to capture the fortress. This was not due to any
fundamental inferiority of the Chinese forces to the Tsardom’s troops. Instead, the trouble
arose from the clash of Eastern siege methods with a Western-style star fortress with bastions.
Chinese siege tactics differed significantly from those practiced in the West, which typically
featured massive fortifications with bastions, systematic trench digging, and the use of heavy
artillery. In this video, we’ll investigate the reasons for these differences and examine how
early modern Chinese siege warfare differed from that in Europe.
East vs West: Different Fortresses, Different Sieges
Albazin is located in subarctic Siberia, in the valley of the Amur or Heilong River—a narrow
fertile zone in an otherwise hostile region. In the 17th century, it was part of the border area
between China and the Russian Tsarist Empire, and it was fiercely contested. In 1672, the Tsarist
Empire laid claim to Albazin, shortly thereafter converting it into a modern star fortress in the
Italian style, that is, an artillery fortress with bastions. European engineers developed this
type of fortress in the 15th and 16th centuries in response to increasingly effective cannons
that could easily penetrate medieval walls. This sparked a continuous back-and-forth between
defensive strategies and methods of attack, ultimately giving rise to a very specific form
of siege warfare. This method relied heavily on the capability of these new fortresses to
withstand artillery bombardment and eliminate any blind spots, ensuring that any attackers
within range could be fired on from at least one position. Taking such a fortress by
storm was almost impossible. This forced siege armies to construct extensive trench
systems, which allowed them to approach the fortress without being shot to pieces. This
development reached its peak in the 17th century when a French engineer named Sébastien
le Prestre de Vauban perfected both the bastion system and the method of conquering a fortress.
A well-organized and determined siege using his standardized method brought down every fortress.
This development did not take place in China. Although black powder weapons had been
in use there since the 13th century, the heavy artillery commonly used in the
West had never caught on. The exact reason for this remains unclear, but Tonio Andrade,
an expert on all things China and gunpowder, suspects that it may stem from variations in
wall-construction techniques in the Middle Ages. In Europe, walls were built thin and high
until the 15th century, making them ill-equipped to resist heavy artillery fire. China, on the
other hand, had built massive earthen ramparts since ancient times that were impervious
to damage from cannons. As a result, there was simply no need for heavy siege artillery in
China because it was useless against these walls. Because of this, in China, siege warfare
developed in a completely different way. Walls played a crucial role from very early on,
which is reflected in the fact that the main characters for “city” and “wall” are the same
(城). In China, even small towns were surrounded by ramparts of such dimensions that European city
walls appeared tiny and brittle in comparison. In the Longshan culture around 3000 BC, some cities
already had walls more than 10 meters thick, and by the time of the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644)
almost every important town had a massive rampart. These walls were not made of bricks and filled
with stones and rubble as in Europe but rather consisted of tamped earth with a brick surface.
They were actually pretty similar to those of later European bastion fortresses.
Because they consisted mainly of earth, they absorbed the energy of heavy projectiles
instead of shattering like medieval European walls. It was therefore almost impossible to
breach them with cannons, which led to the Chinese using artillery—first catapults and later
cannons—primarily against buildings and people. If you’re going to visit these walls yourself,
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European-style heavy artillery became widespread in China. This artillery type was called a “red
barbarian cannon” (紅夷炮) after the hair color of the Dutch and British who brought them. Thanks to
the long development they had undergone in Europe, these cannons were now also effective against
Chinese walls. However, it took some time for them to become widespread and, most importantly,
for the Chinese to learn how to use them against a Western artillery fortress with bastions.
When Chinese officials imported cannons in the 17th century, they also became familiar
with Western-style fortifications. This is well-documented in military manuals and there
is even some evidence suggesting that some people—notably Ma Weicheng, in an effort to
protect his home county, Xiong —experimented with the construction of Western-style star
fortresses. However, in the 17th century, the Chinese still experienced serious difficulties
when they had to attack Western fortresses, as the few existing examples show. One
of these cases is the siege of Albazin, an ideal case study to illustrate the challenges
Chinese armies faced when attacking Western-style fortresses. Let’s take a closer look.
Case Study: The (Staggering) Siege of Albazin 1686 In 1672, the Tsardom of Russia officially
laid claim to Fort Albazin. At that time, it was a sturdy wooden fortress surrounded by a
small settlement with numerous farms, a village, and a monastery. The Chinese Emperor was not
pleased with the Russian advance and decided on military intervention. In 1685, he sent one
of his generals, Langtan, with an army of 3,000 men and a huge artillery train to eliminate the
Russian outpost. After only a short bombardment, the fort was so badly damaged that the commander
of the defenders, Alexei Tolbuzin, was forced to surrender. Langtan then razed the fortress
and the surrounding settlement to the ground. But as soon as Langtan had retreated with his
army, Tolbuzin returned to rebuild the fortress. Instructed by a Prussian soldier, whom sources
call Afanasii Ivanovich Beiton, they built a massive Western-style artillery fortress with
earthen ramparts and bastions. They reinforced the ramparts with roots of bushes and trees that
were tightly woven together, which, according to one contemporary Dutch scholar, made them “as hard
as stone, and unbreakable.” Albazin became a far stronger fortress than it had been before.
In July 1686, Langtan returned with 3,000 well-armed soldiers, dozens of ships with
supplies, and a ton of artillery to complete his work. Once again, the Qing army was vastly
superior to the defenders, who only had around 800 men and 11 large guns. However, soon after their
arrival, the Qing found that the walls of the fortress compensated for much of this imbalance,
as they did not have enough men to completely surround the fortress, even with some locally
recruited auxiliaries. Nevertheless, Langtan gave the defenders an ultimatum: surrender Albazin
without resistance or be mercilessly wiped out. The siege proper began on July 18, 1686. Right
from the start, it was evident that the Qing had no experience attacking such fortresses, as they
did not build trenches to cover their approach as a European army would have done. Instead, they
built field fortifications from gabions, which were baskets filled with earth and rubble and
tried to take the fortress by storm several times. Because these assaults were all quite similar, we
will only look at one example, which took place on the night of July 23, 1686. On this night, Langtan
directed that the fortress be attacked from two sides. His cannoneers opened a dense barrage
from the north, while the infantry approached the fortress from the south and attempted to
storm it. The defenders greeted them with a barrage that was reportedly so dense that both
the town and the fighting men disappeared in the gunpowder smoke. Experiencing massive confusion
and heavy losses, the Qing were forced to abandon the attack. The defenders seized the opportunity
and immediately launched a counteroffensive. Their musketeers rushed toward the enemy fortifications
and pursued the fleeing Chinese, taking numerous prisoners and inflicting further casualties. This
scheme of attacking was repeated several times, as the artillery fortress made it easy for the
defenders to repel direct assaults despite being outnumbered. In the end, Langtan’s assaults were
far more costly for the Chinese than the Russians. Unlike the Chinese, Western attackers
would have dug three parallel trenches and connected them with what is referred to
as saps, or zigzagging trenches. This would provide constant cover as they slowly advanced
toward the fortress. Once they reached the moat, they would try to break through with heavy
artillery or mines. The Qing, who were apparently unfamiliar with this method, now realized
that their traditional approach of bombarding and assaulting was getting them nowhere.
Langtan therefore tested various alternatives. First, he tried to weaken the walls from a
distance by bombarding them for an entire night. As expected, this did little damage
because the fortress walls were built to withstand exactly this type of assault. When this
approach fell short, the Qing commander tried to storm the southern defenses but failed once again
before finally resolving to build more advanced artillery positions along the river. Although his
men succeeded in building several such positions, they didn’t last long. The defenders shot one of
them to pieces and blew up another with a mine. Whenever the Qing completed a new position, it
was destroyed by the Russians. This shows that Langtan had trouble finding good positions for
his siege works, which was exactly the point of a star fortress. The bastions were designed to
eliminate blind spots, so the defenders could fire at any position around the fortress at any
time. When Langtan realized this, he came up with a new weapon to conquer the defenders: starvation.
Putting this plan into action, the Qing built a network of moats and ramparts to surround the
defenders, cutting them off from the river and thus their access to clean water. Tolbuzin’s men
tried to prevent this, but they did not have the necessary capacity, so the Qing siege works grew
relentlessly. Soon, several bulwarks made of huge gabions, each with room for three large cannons,
stood some 11 meters high and a Qing fortress towered on an island in the river. As seen on
this map from the early 18th century, which is based on the sketch of an eyewitness and was also
the model for our siege map, the Chinese now had more massive fortifications than Albazin itself.
The blockade was hard on the defenders. They had no way to bring supplies or reinforcements into
the city and the winter came early and was harsh. This was a problem, because the fortress
had not been completely finished when the Qing attacked it, and many soldiers had to live in
makeshift huts or even covered pits in the ground. They had enough grain, but they quickly ran out of
fresh food, and sanitary conditions deteriorated because they could not bury their excrement
in the frozen ground. By the end of November, disease had decimated the defenders to such an
extent that only around 150 of the original 800 men were left. Just a few weeks later, there were
barely enough soldiers left in good health to man the guns. Nevertheless, Albazin did not surrender.
The Qing fared only slightly better. Their camps were ill-suited for the harsh winter conditions,
and they also ran out of supplies. This resulted in a staggering mortality rate, probably
around 50%. Western sources even report that the defenders mocked them by sending them
meat as a gift. Given the dire circumstances, Langtan decided to force a decision in December.
Just when they were all set to launch a general assault, however, a messenger arrived from
Beijing. He informed both sides that the Kangxi Emperor and Tsar Peter the Great were
engaged in peace negotiations. As a result, the siege was paused and finally ended. Albazin
was ceded to China in 1689 in the Treaty of Nerchinsk, which is considered the first agreement
between the Qing and a European state. In return, the Qing granted Russia trading privileges
and the city of Nerchinsk. So, in the end, it was diplomacy that concluded the siege—despite
his best efforts, Langtan had not conquered the artillery fortress of Albazin.
Conclusion: If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.
The difficulties encountered by the Chinese forces during the siege of Albazin show that
although fortresses in the bastion system were known in China, they lacked the necessary means
and methods to fight them effectively. This also became evident in the few other cases in which
Chinese troops attacked Western fortresses. There, too, they relied on direct bombardment, blockade,
and assault—all methods that were of limited use for attacking Western-style artillery fortresses.
Interestingly, Western armies also experienced difficulties with Chinese fortresses. When the
Dutch besieged a small town in Fujian province in 1662, for example, they found that their cannons
were no match for the massive earthen walls and instead, in true Chinese style, shot down the
gates. Overall, we must note that very little is known about siege warfare in China in the last
millennium and one should not jump to conclusions. This is a wonderful example of how historiography
is always in a state of flux. To date, only a fraction of the extensive sources on Chinese
sieges has been explored. Historians who study this area will certainly have to expand, adapt, or
potentially even completely revise their findings.
