The Byzantine military reforms in the 10th
century changed the face of warfare in the near east strongly and lastingly. The Byzantines
introduced catapults that fired incendiary projectiles containing the infamous “Greek
Fire”, their new heavy cavalry usually bested the enemy cavalry in well-coordinated charges and
added much needed offensive punch to the army, while the infantry was deployed in
a big hollow square formation that provided support and refuge in case of a
counterattack. It was this new war machine that would bring the empire to a new Golden
Age - but it was a long way to get there. The “Byzantine empire” also known as eastern
Roman Empire underwent a period of cultural and military decline in the 7th and 8th centuries,
often referred to as the Byzantine Dark Ages. Only in the 9th century, after decades of
internal struggle and military defeat did the Byzantine Empire begin to stabilize. This was due
in no small part to the defensive capability of the Byzantine army which at this time was
already effectively organized in military or administrative districts called themes and
centered around professional standing regiments, the tagmata, but it lacked offensive
capability. This offensive insufficiency stood in stark contrast to the ambitions of
the emperors. They wanted to take the fight to the Bulgars in the north and Muslim states in
the south. This policy, however, called for a more professional and more offensively capable
army. It called for military reforms. In this video we’re looking at the three central changes
that turned the Byzantine army into a force that would propel the empire into a new Golden Age.
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Byzantine Empire needed more reliable, more professional soldiers, organized in a way
that would allow them to operate effectively and aggressively on offensive campaigns. This
was achieved by three major reforms: First, reviving a corps of disciplined, effective
line-of-battle infantry that could confront enemy infantry and cavalry, support their own
cavalry, march long distances and function as garrison troops away from their home territory on
a permanent basis. Second, introducing a corps of heavily armored lancers that could operate in
conjunction with the infantry. They increased the aggressive power of the Byzantine cavalry
substantially and added power to its attack. This is often referred to as the revival of the
cataphract. Third, using Greek fire in pitched battles by deploying handheld pumping-devices
and grenades filled with the incendiary. However, only very little information has come
down to us about this last change. In general, we can track these changes mainly through a series
of treatises on strategy and tactics written in the tenth century. Although they don’t go into too
much detail, these primary sources show that most of those substantial changes were completed by the
960s and 970s. But they had begun much earlier. Generally speaking, infantry used to play a
secondary role in Byzantine armies from the 6th to the 9th century, both tactically and
numerically. But by the 10th century, this changed drastically due to political and military
alterations. Not only was it now considered more significant tactically, but it also outnumbered
the cavalry almost two to one. The new prominence of infantry was emphasized by placing it
under a senior officer, the hoplitarches, who was second to the commander-in-chief. He
was responsible for the infantry’s training, field discipline and effectiveness in battle.
Looking back to the proficient legions of the Roman Empire, which were still idealized by
many Byzantine commanders, the focus of infantry training switched to discipline and drill.
At the same time the tactical role of infantry changed. The Byzantines recognized
the weaknesses of foot soldiers, especially when facing heavy cavalry and understood an
increase in numbers and improvement in training alone wouldn’t be enough. They adapted to this
problem by deploying their foot soldiers in a hollow square or rectangle formation made
up of 12 brigades, so-called taxiarchies. This was meant to prevent the infantry from being
encircled by enemy cavalry, serve as a homebase for their own cavalry in battle, and to prevent
the infantry themselves from turning to flight. There was enough space between the blocks of
this formation to allow the cavalry to easily leave and enter the square. These gaps were
guarded by additional small infantry units. Hitherto, infantry had been drawn up in a deep
line with very limited offensive capabilities. In these lines, the taxiarchies had been arrayed
like a phalanx, with 16 rows of spearmen, backed up by 4 rows of archers. The new
taxiarchies in contrast were double faced: 10 rows deep with 4 rows of spearmen on either
side and two rows of archers in the center. This way they could quickly change their
front to either side, for example if an enemy cavalry unit managed to penetrate the
hollow square, they could defend their back. Simultaneously, a new kind of infantry was
introduced. They were equipped with a menavlion, a long spear that served a function similar to the
medieval pike. Operating independently from the rest of the taxiarchy, they had the task to stop
heavy cavalry attacks by advancing in front of the rest of the formation and draw up in a line or
wedge to break up the charge. In case of a cavalry charge, the infantry reinforced its lines by
moving the menaulatoi to the very front while the backmost line of regular infantry reinforced the
front as well. By this they increased the depth of the front from 4 to 6 lines very quickly. Once
the infantry had stopped the charge, javeliners moved forward to attack them from the flanks. By
ca. 965, when the praecepta militaria, one of the treatises, was written, a taxiarchy consisted of
1’000 soldiers, with 400 spearmen, 300 archers, 200 light infantry, and 100 menaulatoi.
The new square formations were more mobile and able to cooperate with the cavalry in new
ways. Hitherto the horsemen had operated from behind an infantry line. Now they started
the battle in the front of the infantry but could always retreat into the hollow square,
which served them as refuge and mobile base. Deploying the infantry in this way also
provided solidity and security in defense, a retreat for lighter troops, and flexibility, as
the formation could be transformed into a solid attacking formation quickly. According to the
historian John Haldon, a quadrilateral formation was nothing new, as square formations had been
used by both the ancient Greeks and the Romans when setting up camp, marching through hostile
terrain, or in cases of emergency in general. Making this particular hollow square the
standard formation, however, was an innovation. All these changes increased the infantry's status.
The emphasis on training and new field tactics initiated an improvement in morale, tactical
cohesion, and battlefield discipline. At the same time, the use of mercenaries and the recruitment
of high-quality infantry from among certain ethnic groups within the empire, who had a reputation
for being warlike became more important, notably the Armenians, who were considered
the best infantry well into the 11th century. All this drastically improved the
effectiveness and prestige of infantry. Still, it remained lower in status than cavalry
and its equipment was relatively poor, but it was professionalized very much
and probably closer resembled the disciplined Roman footmen than any Byzantine
infantry in the previous three centuries. While this major change in the role of infantry
was taking place, the cavalry of the empire was reformed as well. The regular mounted units,
which made up the bulk of the cavalry force, were grouped in tactical units of fifty men, so
called banda. In battle, several of these banda were arrayed eight to ten rows deep with
varying width, depending on the army size. During the reforms in the late 9th and 10th
century, Byzantine tacticians modified this formation several times until it was usually 100
men wide and only five men deep, with the first two and the last row made up of heavy cavalry,
while the third and fourth consisted of mounted archers. So, like the infantry, the cavalry
formation was now double-faced, which made it more flexible too. Inevitably, the proportion of
heavy cavalry and mounted archers changed as well. In addition, the cavalry units were complemented
with a type of unit well-known from earlier times. The cataphract made its reappearance. These
heavily armed cavalry troopers were clad in lamellar armor, mail and quilting from head to
toe. The cataphracts were the elite of the army, and were, of course, extremely expensive. In
battle they formed up in a broad-nosed wedge, the so-called trigonos parataxis, and their
primary function was, supported by the regular lancers and other cavalry, to smash through
the enemy’s heavy cavalry or infantry line, break up their formation, and create an opening
for the lighter cavalry which would then try to turn the flanks of the severed lines. According
to the Praecepta Militaria a full wedge was twelve rows deep with the first row being twenty ranks
wide. The width increased by four men every row so that the twelfth had sixty-four men and the
formation a total of 504. A smaller alternative consisted of 384 men with rows from ten to
fifty-four. But these formations were not exclusively made up of cataphracts. The middle
of the formation consisted of mounted archers. This was perfectly suited for shock attacks. As
often discussed in our videos, cavalry could have a hard time when charging into an undisrupted
infantry formation. It seems, however, that the Byzantine tacticians had well accounted for this.
The trigonos parataxis was ideally suited for a charge in three steps. (1) While the formation
was approaching the enemy, the mounted archers would send a hail of arrows into the enemy ranks
to open up gaps; (2) then the wedge charged into the enemy lines, for which the heavy cataphracts
in the front were ideally suited. After first impact they pressed forward in melee to cut
their way through the enemy ranks. (3) Finally, if the attack succeeded, the archers in the
back took over to pursue the retreating enemy. In addition, the military manuals of the tenth
century record a change in the tactical deployment of the Byzantine cavalry. For centuries, the
traditional model of deploying cavalry was to set up the entire mounted force into two lines,
along with the necessary units of flank guards, outflankers and rear-guard units. Apparently,
the tacticians of the 10th century considered this unwieldy, instable and vulnerable to attacks
from the side and suggested adding a third line of cavalry, at least in some cases. This saka
or rearguard was to be equal to the first line in numbers and thus reflects the efforts
to make units double-faced on army level. Finally, there was a third crucial tactical
change. This is best illustrated by a passage of the Praecepta regarding support weapons.
It reads: “The commander of the army should have with him small cheiromaggana, three elakatia
[these are both launching devices, i.e. some sort of catapults], a swivel tube with liquid fire and
a hand-pump, so that, if the enemy is using the same deployment in equal strength, our men can
gain the upper hand over the foe and break them up by using […] the artificial liquid fire.” This
is obviously a reference to the famous incendiary known as Greek fire. Greek fire was primarily used
in naval and siege warfare by the Byzantines and according to historian Gergios Theotokis this
passage in the praecepta militaria is actually the first mention of its use in pitched battles
by a land army. This was probably inspired by Muslim armies who had relied on devices to project
incendiaries already in the 9th century, mostly in grenade-like containers that were thrown by hand
or siege machines, depending on their size. These were used in the opening stages of battles along
with archers. Now the Byzantines expanded the use of Greek fire to land battles, at least to a small
degree. Unfortunately, we don't know how exactly Byzantine armies used the incendiary, which
makes it hard to assess whether it caused much damage in the enemy ranks. It seems more probable
that it was deployed for psychological effect. The late 10th and 11th century proved how
successful the Byzantine military reforms were. Thanks to the tactical changes, the Byzantine
army had enough punch to reconquer a lot of the empire's former territory. Throughout the
next decades the emperors of the Macedonian dynasty were very successful on the offensive,
defeated most of their enemies and led the Byzantine empire to new prosperity in what
has been dubbed the Byzantine Golden Age.
