It's a possibility that NATO is eyeing as an
increasing likelihood given the invasion of Ukraine. What was once thought impossible, is
now at the forefront for every member of NATO- could Russia really declare war on the alliance,
and could it win? To answer the question we have to imagine an alternate timeline where Russian
forces weren't bogged down in a never-ending fight for Ukraine, and instead opted for
a more direct provocation against NATO. February 24th, 2022. Russian forces have been
involved in a large-scale exercise with their allies in Belarus- but this has been a front
to allow Russian forces to stage closer to the NATO countries of Lithuania, Latvia,
and Estonia. At 06:00 local Moscow time, Russian autocrat Vladimir Putin releases a
pre-recorded message relaying his intention to declare a special military operation meant
to bring NATO aggression to heel. Right on cue, Russian missile strikes begin to rain
down across Lithuania, and Latvia. The first targets are military bases and
airfields. The attack isn't a complete surprise to NATO though, and missile
defense systems begin to knock Russian missiles out of the air. The Russian volley
is overwhelming and with a hit rate of 60%, missile strikes saturate military targets
across both Baltic nations. Dozens of NATO's forward-deployed supply caches are destroyed,
along with several key supply depots. Russia's long-range targeting
capabilities however are deficient due to the 2014 sanctions against it and
the banning of dual-use technology that crippled its space surveillance network. While
many missiles hit their targets, many don't, often hitting civilian targets instead. After
a blistering barrage lasting a half hour, Russia has failed to completely cripple
the command and control or air defense networks of the two countries, and over
half of the air fields remain operational. In the air, Russian planes piggyback on the
missile assault. Thanks to NATO's superior long-range surveillance capabilities, its air
forces are not caught completely off guard, and several combat air patrols have been on
constant rotation ever since the military buildup along Russia's western military
district and Belarus. But the incoming wave of air power is overwhelming for the
few defenders in the sky, and from damaged air fields across the Baltics NATO fighters
are being rushed for combat. Their pilots however have to be recalled to base from their
homes or barracks, adding to the response time. The few fighters NATO manages to get into the
air engage Russian targets with stand-off attack long-range air-to-air missiles. These missiles
allow NATO air forces to operate from well outside the envelope of Russian ground-based
air defenses, which ring the Baltic states. The first combat casualties of the
Russian-NATO war are Russian planes, but there are too few defenders and too many
attackers to significantly stem the incoming air attack. With long-range missiles expended, NATO
fighters are forced to move to positions just outside the threat range of Russian S-400 and
other mobile air defenses, engaging Russian fighters sent to neutralize them until forced
to retreat to air fields in Latvia. With the missile onslaught and Russian air defenses in
Kaliningrad on Lithuania's southern border, any surviving NATO aircraft can only be guaranteed
some measure of safety further north in Latvia. But NATO has plenty of air defenses left
operational even after the opening missile barrage. In our real world, Russia proved
unable to neutralize Ukraine's air defenses in its opening wave of attacks despite having
far superior air and long-range striking power. In this scenario, Russia is committing
far more forces to the attack, but also facing far more sophisticated and
better equipped defenses. As Russian planes are blotted out of the sky by air defenses, the
Russian air offensive is briefly halted. Instead, more limited strikes against air defense
networks are carried out by long-range stand off weapons. However, Russia has a limited
availability of smart weapons and its targeting capabilities are far inferior to NATO. Many air
defense sites are destroyed or heavily damaged, with anti-radiation missiles taking
out all-important air defense radars- but defenses on the more western
parts of the Baltics remain intact. Within minutes of hostilities, NATO's Very High
Readiness Response Force has been activated. Soldiers on leave or at home are being recalled,
and a 5,000 strong response force of special forces, infantry, armor, and artillery is
being assembled for immediate deployment. Within 48 hours they will be on the
ground in the Baltics, ready to help stem the Russian onslaught. A few days later
they can be joined by NATO's Response Force, a rapid response force of 40,000 that includes
combat air power and air-support components. NATO maintains a contingent around 1,000 strong
of forward-deployed forces in the Baltics, and with the military buildup by Russia in
recent weeks, this has been strengthened by an additional few thousand, along
with several dozen aircraft. However, this is far insufficient to stop a Russian
onslaught of 150,000 troops, even with Latvia and Lithuania's approximately 50,000 strong military.
Of that number, not all are actual combat troops, with many being support and logistical personnel,
so NATO's actual combat power in the ground numbers at barely over twelve thousand. Of more
critical concern is the lack of tanks, though Latvia and Lithuania both field nearly a thousand
armored vehicles with some anti-tank capabilities. As Russian troops cross the border, NATO forces
are ordered to retreat rather than engage the invaders. NATO's top general, Supreme Allied
Commander General Tod D. Wolters is aware of the massive mismatch in forces across the Baltics.
This exact scenario has been wargamed extensively, and the only chance NATO has of holding off the
Russian military long enough for its response force to arrive, is to force the Russians into
fighting in major cities where the terrain favors the defender and Russia's overwhelming
firepower can be largely neutered. However, it has always been accepted that it was
strategically impossible to guarantee the security of the baltic members of NATO,
given that stationing enough troops to do so would have required massive commitments
of forward-deployed soldiers from across the alliance, a costly proposition.
And a hugely destabilizing move that would have guaranteed a conflict between
Russia and NATO much sooner than this. NATO will fight as best it can to hold
the Baltics open for as long as possible, but its main response force already has
plans to launch a counter-attack from Poland, planning for the fall of Latvia and Lithuania
within the first few days of fighting. Already Polish troops are digging in for an assault from
either Kaliningrad or Belarus, but such an assault won't be forthcoming- Russia's strategy to break
NATO is to target the relatively undefended Baltic states and then simply dig in. NATO will then
have to decide if it wants to invoke Article 5 of the alliance's charter stating that an attack
on one is an attack on all, knowing they'll be fighting an offensive war against an entrenched
enemy in a conflict that could turn nuclear. Russia is betting that NATO's resolve is weak, and
it won't risk escalating the war. The assurance of mutual defense is a bedrock principle of NATO, and
should it fail the alliance could be splintered. The United States, Poland, and the United
Kingdom are staunchly committed to invoking Article 5 in any case of hostilities, but other
member nations may not be as committed to waging war for countries many of them weren't happy about
joining NATO anyways. Some of them, like Germany, have deep financial ties to Russia already,
and an end to Russian energy for Germany will be economically catastrophic. Only the coming days
will determine if NATO invokes Article 5 in full, but for now what's sure is that even if Russia
is just facing Poland, the UK, and the US, it's still facing a significantly powerful
force- the US just has to get its firepower to Europe first, a process that
will take weeks to fully mature. In our fictional scenario though, the US hasn't
been blind to Russian buildup of forces along its western military district and in Belarus. In
this scenario an invasion of Ukraine was possible, but the buildup of forces and supply depots
along the borders with the baltic states tipped Russia's hand weeks ago. Still,
the US has delayed deploying the bulk of its firepower to Europe in hopes of
not destabilizing the situation further, but that doesn't mean it hasn't taken steps to
move a significant force to its bases in Germany. A large contingent of its air power has also been
moved to bases in mainland Europe and the UK, and is now preparing for combat
with the Russian air force. This has been a conflict the US Air Force
has been waiting for for a very long time. Its F-15 Fighting Eagle was designed to
kill Soviet Migs, but today it's more than capable of sweeping the skies clear
of Russian fighters. The US's F-35 fleet isn't fully operational yet, but dozens of the
advanced, stealthy planes are ready for combat, and as the Russians will soon find
out, are absolutely game-changing. NATO strategy is simple- draw the Russians into
NATO territory and away from their logistics hubs inside Russia and Belarus. Logistics has
always been the Russian military's weakest point, and in our real world a lack of logistical
support has severely affected the Russian military's ability to fight in Ukraine. This is
because Russian forces are simply not capable, by design, of fighting major land
offensives far from their own borders. This sounds strange given that Russia's greatest
potential conflict was a major land war in Europe, so it seems like it should be something that
the Russian military would be prepared for. Yet for all the focus on new hypersonic missiles, overwhelming amounts of artillery,
thousands of tanks and APCs, etc. etc., the Russian military has failed to learn the
lesson it has been forcibly taught over and over again throughout history: a military
can't fight without fuel, food, and ammo. Russian logistics focus on rail transportation,
with an incredible capability to move troops and equipment within their own borders quickly
and efficiently. Russian internal logistics are probably some of the best in the
world, and they even have an entire corps dedicated to railway transportation-
its building, repairing, and maintenance. But Russian railways stop at the Soviet Union's
old borders. That's because Russia uses a wider gauge railroad track than the rest of Europe,
meaning that their plan to resupply forces via railroads stop at the Baltics and Ukraine.
Adjustable carriages do exist, but engines cannot be made adjustable to fit both old Soviet
rails and newer European rails- thus Russia would have to seize European engines to drive their
railroad carriages into Europe proper. But NATO would never allow these engines to fall into the
hands of the Russians for exactly this reason. But whether delivering supplies to a railhead
their trains can actually reach, or deeper into Europe with seized European engines, Russia
still has a serious problem with logistics- mainly that there aren't enough logistics
personnel or equipment for the job of supplying all of its forces. Each Russian combined arms
army is allotted a single material-technical support brigade. Each material-technical
support brigade has two truck battalions with a total of 150 general cargo trucks with 50
trailers and 260 specialized trucks per brigade. The further an army moves from a railhead, the
less trips that its resupply trucks can undertake, increasing the total length of time for resupply.
At the current number of trucks available, there are simply not enough trucks for operations
more than a few dozen miles from a railhead, and that's before taking into account losses
due to enemy activity and equipment breakdown. Take for instance, Russia's heavy use of rocket
artillery. Each Russian army has approximately 56 to 90 multiple launch rocket systems, and
resupplying a single launcher takes up the entire bed of a truck. So if the entire MLRS force fired
just one volley, it would require up to 90 trucks solely for resupplying its ammunition. Those
trucks can then not be used for anything else, like for example ferrying the fuel the MLRS need
to drive to a new location, or food, water, and ammunition for the men manning those systems. Just
a Russian army's MLRS attachment is already taking up a significant amount of Russia's logistical
capabilities, leaving the rest of its forces- tanks, APCs, infantry, tube artillery- with
much less trucks for their own resupply needs. And again, this is before taking
into account the fact that Russian logistics will be under constant
enemy attack, or that resupply is further diminished the further from a safe
railhead that the Russian offensive moves. In our hypothetical scenario, NATO
understands this all too well, and that's why as their forces retreat to
pull the Russians deeper into NATO territory, special operations forces launch raids against
Russian supply convoys before melting back into the countryside. NATO's strategy is to put up
a mobile defense that keeps the Russians firing and burning gas, but places a tactical
victory always just out of their grasp. Russian units are equipped to be
independent of resupply for 3-5 days, but in intense urban combat those figures shrink
dramatically to just three days at best. By the dawn of the fourth day of fighting, Russian forces
are forced to cease their advance towards Riga, starved of ammunition, food, water, and fuel.
In Lithuania though they have managed to capture Vilnius, though partisan fighters are making the
Russians suffer in street-to-street fighting. With superior reconnaissance capabilities, NATO
is able to pinpoint Russian air defenses and send Wild Weasel aircraft on a mission to destroy them.
Taking from the example of Russian performance in Ukraine today, these Suppression of Enemy Air
Defense missions succeed with astounding success. For longer-range S-400 and older S-300 batteries,
F-35s equipped with glide bombs are able to overwhelm their missile defenses and destroy them
without the S-400 ever getting off a single shot. Loitering Migs defending from air attack
are likewise unable to pick up the F-35s until they get to within close range, which
very few manage to do without getting blown out of the sky. However the number of F-35s
is limited, which is where their capability to network with non-stealthy 4th generation planes
comes into play. With their advanced datalinks, F-35s are able to guide to target bombs and
missiles fired by non-stealthy planes, who can carry out attacks far outside the threat envelope
of Russian defenses. The results are devastating, and though a dozen F-35s are lost in combat,
Russian air defenses are savagely mauled. The greatest factor in NATO's success however is
Russia's own incompetence. Our real-world invasion of Ukraine has proven that the modern Russian
military is nowhere near the formidable beast that Europe has feared. In fact, they're barely
capable of carrying out modern combat operations, and it's only their overwhelming numbers that
are seeing them slowly defeat Ukraine's forces. On the tactical level, we have seen time and
again as Russian tank commanders don't make use of dismounted infantry to protect
their tanks from anti-tank kill teams, leading to numerous deadly ambushes by Ukrainian
forces using NATO anti-tank missiles. We have also seen as Russian forces practice no
discernible convoy security procedures, with their convoys often coming to a complete
stop at crossroads and other danger crossings, and without deploying security elements
on their flanks to delay an enemy attack and allow the convoy to push through. Even their
ability to prevent friendly fire incidents through discipline and communications is under question,
as more than once Russian units have engaged in full-blown battles between each other, much to
the observing Ukrainians’ delight. Perhaps most baffling of all is the destruction of Russian air
defense inside a convoy by Ukrainian aircraft- even when at a complete stop for several
hours, their Russian crews never bothered to turn on their radar and scan for threats. This
scenario has also repeated itself numerous times. Lastly, we’ve seen time and again how Russian
forces fail to properly respond to Ukrainian ambushes. When caught in an ambush, the proper
procedure is to either fight out of the ambush, or assault through it. Instead, Russian forces
are often seen scattering in a panic, while their comrades who stayed behind to actually assault the
ambush are obliterated one by one. Forces outside of the ambush zone are commonly observed to either
drive away in a panic, or come to a complete stop and begin to back up. Instead, forces outside an
ambush should be deploying for a flanking assault on the ambushing enemy force, neutralizing the
threat to their comrades stuck in the kill zone. All we have seen so far in Ukraine is indicative
of one thing: the Russian military is largely poorly trained. But they’re also operating
equipment in various stages of disrepair. Some units enjoy more modern, well-maintained
equipment, and are appropriately deadly, but many others seem to be suffering from
serious maintenance and modernity problems. Russian tanks for instance are being
savaged by Ukrainian infantry armed with anti-tank missiles not just because
of poor tactics in their deployment, but also because they lack active
protection systems such as TROPHY, which an increasing number of US combat vehicles
are equipped with. They seem to also lack environmental sensors to help them pinpoint
the source of an attack, leading to confusion and panic after an attack only made worse by poor
discipline, training, and ever-shrinking morale. Often vaunted for its electronic warfare
capabilities, the Russian military has proven itself incapable of securing its own
communications in its invasion of Ukraine. As it turns out, an astonishing number of Russian
units operate on completely unsecured radios. This has allowed the Ukrainian military and even
amateur radio operators to interfere with and jam Russian radios. Ukrainians have hopped onto
Russian frequencies to insult their invaders, play the Ukrainian national anthem on
repeat for days at a time, and even jammed the frequency with white noise revealing
messages or images when analyzed digitally. Against NATO, unsecured communications
spell disaster for the Russian military as NATO electronic warfare operatives
don't just jam Russian communications, but actively use them for sabotage. False orders
are relayed over unsecured radios, causing entire Russian units to move out of formation or even
launch attacks against phantom targets. Fluent Russian speakers wreak havoc on Russian forces
simply by hijacking their unsecured comms, but because they must be very close to the front
line to do so their effectiveness is limited. As NATO's response force finally prepares for
a proper engagement against Russian forces, their air forces launch a devastating assault from
the air. American B-2 stealth bombers penetrate into Russian air defenses to destroy important
communication hubs and surveillance radars, throwing air defenses into disarray.
Much like in the first Gulf War, when Iraq used air defense networks
modeled after Russia’s own, these precision strikes by stealthy aircraft
prove to be crippling for the air defense capabilities of Russian units. Add in serious
resupply problems after constant missile and air attacks against Russian railways
and strategically important bridges and the Russian army's capability to defend itself
in the air falls largely to its aerospace forces. But here too NATO has the advantage. Russian
pilots struggle to keep a 120 hour flight time minimum per year, while NATO pilots regularly
fly nearly twice as many hours to maintain their proficiency. Maintenance problems
also affect the Russian aerospace forces, in our real world we saw two Russian
aircraft simply fall out of the sky on the first day of the Ukrainian
invasion due to maintenance issues, and across the broader Russian air force we
can expect similar levels of unreadiness. But it's better avianics, sensors, and
longer-range anti-air missiles coupled with a sprinkling of F-35s that proves decisive in the
sky. In the largest air battle since World War II, NATO forces wrest control of the skies
over the front away from the Russians, resulting in dozens of casualties on both sides.
This opens up the greater use of air support to attack Russian army formations though, and
here again another of NATO's strengths over Russia comes into play. Very few Russian pilots
have multirole experience, while NATO pilots regularly fly both air superiority and air
strike missions. For a NATO plane switching from shooting down Migs to blowing up tanks is
as simple as switching the plane's munitions, but Russian air forces must use dedicated
aircraft and crews for each mission. The lack of flexibility hurt Russian forces badly in Ukraine,
specially in the opening days of the war, and this is why historically Russia relies heavily on
artillery for fire support and not aircraft. Logistic problems have starved Russian artillery
of ammunition though, and even when fully supplied Russian artillery is not very flexible. Needing
to always stay under an umbrella of ground-based fire support has also significantly slowed
Russia's advance, while NATO forces can better exploit tactical opportunities thanks to
their reliance on air power for fire support. Now NATO is on the offensive on
the ground, not just in the air, and the final critical weakness of
the Russian military is revealed. NATO attacks Russian formations across multiple
fronts with smaller, much more maneuverable forces. This exploits an inherent weakness
of the Russian Battalion Tactical Group, which is its inability to coordinate
fire support against attacks coming from multiple directions. A lack of maneuver
forces held in reserve also limits the Russian BTG's ability to respond to
various new fronts at the same time. NATO's aggressive attacks across multiple fronts
throws Russian commanders into disarray due to inherent limitations in their command and
control systems. Their electronic warfare and direct-fire assets are formidable, but
incapable of focusing across a wide front. By comparison, the decentralized command
structure of NATO forces allows them to maneuver three times as many units
simultaneously, with each formation acting semi-autonomously and pursuing
objectives and opportunities as they arise. The result is like a giant trying
to swat away hundreds of bees attacking simultaneously. Where Russian blows
land, they are devastating, and numerous NATO units are annihilated in fierce close quarters
combat. But while one front is being reinforced, a completely different front is being attacked,
causing confusion and chaos at the command level. NATO's own electronic warfare assets and fire
support only add to the quickly gathering fog of war that the Russian chain of command
is suddenly finding itself fighting in. As night time rolls around though, things
go from bad to worse for Russian forces. As observed in Ukraine, Russian night
attack capabilities are uneven and sporadic. Many soldiers lack basic night vision, and NATO
tanks and armored vehicles have on the whole more capable sensors and imagers. This allows NATO
vehicles to open up first, and from further away. American Abrams’ 'silver bullets' prove
particularly deadly versus Russian armor, just like they did against Russian tanks in the
first Gulf War. T-72s make up the bulk of Russian armor, and while domestic models are better
protected than export models provided to Iraq, the results are largely the same. T-90s fare
better against NATO's more modern tanks, but there's simply too few of
them and the front is too wide. The vaunted T-14 which was supposed to
revolutionize tank warfare never made it into full-scale production thanks to sanctions
against Russia and its sputtering economy. The fight is not bloodless for NATO forces,
and casualties quickly climb into the thousands after days of fierce fighting, with hundreds of
armored vehicles lost on both sides. However, NATO operational superiority, higher morale,
better training, and largely more capable equipment proves to be decisive. Perhaps more than
anything else though, it's Russia's logistics that doom its military offensive into the Baltics.
NATO forces have been savagely attacking Russian supply convoys, even at the cost of foregoing
attacks against tank and artillery positions. NATO knows that it's far more important to disrupt
Russia's ability to resupply its forces than to actually destroy said forces, and now with
Russian troops deep in the Baltics and far from their rail network, their supply difficulties
increase exponentially with each truck lost. The Russian military has been pressing civilian
trucks into service, but ongoing attacks against supply convoys and even the destruction of public
roads makes resupply increasingly impossible. By a week of proper ground fighting between the
two sides, Russian troops are surrendering en masse or abandoning their vehicles. We
saw this in our real world in Ukraine, and continue to see it as Russia struggles
to fix its logistics problems. Ukrainian forces have discovered entire convoys
of Russian tanks and APCs abandoned due to a lack of fuel or food, their crews
trying to hike back to friendly lines. Against a far more capable force such as NATO,
these logistical problems become critical vulnerabilities that spell disaster for the
Russian military. It's the same story across every facet of the Russian military that has proven
to be, in the words of retired American Major General Paul Eaton, “unexpectedly incompetent”,
and “incapable of combined arms warfare”. Stalin had a famous adage when asked about
the West's technological superiority, “quantity is a quality all its own”.
That may have been true back in his day, but today no amount of quantity can make up
for the Russian military's complete lack of basic fundamentals. While a NATO-Russian
war would be devastating for both sides, in a non-nuclear scenario Russia has proven
in its bungled invasion of Ukraine that it has no hope of victory against the obviously
superior North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Now go watch What Would Happen If Russia Invades
Ukraine? Or watch this other video instead!
So this was written before we knew the Russians were incopetent.
In an agreement with Russia as part of the Russia-NATO founding act, we agreed not to station large numbers of troops in the Baltics or anywhere else in Osteuropa, opting for a "tripwire" system.
After what happened in Bucha with all the rape and murder, NATO has decided a tripwire is insufficient, and there will be a large, permanent NATO presence in eastern Europe, with significant tactical capability, including land-launch tomahawk stations.
Those 50.000 Troops are NATO troops by the way, they are "insufficient" to stop 150.000 Russian troops.
Oh no! Actually having logistics and support personnel, what a recipe for disaster!
The fact the narrator is ex military as well lmao
infographics is HIGH KEY a Russo-Sinoboo
I was ready to be all triggered snowflake at first lols, but then the video was like, yeah after initial successes, they get all their planes shot down and SAMs and logistics blown to hell, which even if they didn't, said logistics wouldn't be able to support the war. We see in Ukraine they failed here, here, here, and there, so after a couple bloody weeks the entire Russian war machine that hasn't been shot to shit surrenders or retreats...
SO way to Credible an analysis haha