Hey guys, the Battle of Cannae has three chapters. If you missed the
previous one, you can find it here.
Some distance north of Cannae, the massive
Roman host lumbered forward through the plains of Apulia, when the forward elements spotted
Hannibal, hastily abandoning his camp just ahead.
The enthusiastic Roman vanguard rushed forward!
The pursuit lacked organisation, but for once they
caught the Carthaginian general off-guard and they were not about to allow him time to consolidate .
But… while Hannibal’s standard did leave the camp, the Carthaginian general was in fact
lurking in the forest nearby...
He lured the Romans into an ambush yet again,
despite their extensive scouting efforts.
Panic gripped the Romans and it seemed
like another disaster was afoot.
But Consul Varro quickly rallied
the troops and reformed the lines, managing to beat back the Carthaginians.
Hannibal committed significant forces in
an effort to destroy the Roman vanguard and shatter the morale of the Republic’s army
in yet another ambush, but the legionaries he met on that rainy morning showed the kind
of determination he hadn’t faced before…
It’s late July, 216 BC. As the Roman column
approached, word reached Paullus and Varro that the supply depo at Cannae
fell into Carthaginian hands. The two consuls were alarmed by the news, knowing
that Hannibal now had the resources to camp throughout the winter with little need to forage
or pillage the surrounding area for supplies. This would keep the Carthaginians sheltered and rested,
and would undoubtedly help Hannibal maintain high morale among the troops over the coming months. Meanwhile, Paullus and Varro were aware that, with their logistics disrupted, maintaining
and supplying their vast army in the field would present numerous problems. From their
perspective, a well-supplied Hannibal could now, in theory, try to play for time and
prolong the war well into next year, which would give him plenty of opportunities to
gain political points and successfully persuade Rome’s allies in Southern Italy to join him.
For the Roman leadership, the thought of a possible cascade of defections on their peninsula
was unacceptable. Hannibal had to be dealt with.
However, while surveying the battlefield, disputes
began over where to fight the planned battle. To the south lay Cannae on a line of hills,
with undulated land beneath the hillsides and a very flat plain north
of the river Aufidius.
In ancient times the river itself is
suspected to have had a different course, which ran further away from the hills, and
the area surrounding it was mostly treeless cultivated open country, much like today.
Paullus wasn’t pleased with the ground, arguing that the flat terrain favoured Hannibal’s
more numerous and better cavalry, expressing his preference to move the camp into the hills to
the west, where the more broken ground would be more suited to infantry and would restrict cavalry
maneuvers. Varro disagreed, correctly pointing out that the
legions performed best on fairly open ground, expressing his willingness to give battle even
in the open country north of the river despite Hannibal’s superiority in cavalry, but
arguing that deploying the army in the undulated terrain south of Aufidius would
also suit the Roman infantry, whilst the river and the hills would restrict any extensive
Carthaginian cavalry maneuvers on the flanks.
Both consuls were clearly concerned about
the mobility of Hannibal’s cavalry.
Varro was certainly more eager to fight,
and contemporary sources put this down to inexperience, whilst describing Paullus
as the more level headed of the two.
But Paullus’ plan was problematic in many ways:
The Roman host was very large and was composed of a mix between newly trained troops and more
experienced legionaries, which made movements, maneuvers and deployments of the army a slow
process, which would’ve been even slower in the broken ground that Paullus suggested, despite
other advantages such terrain would offer.
In addition, it is doubtful that Hannibal would
accept a battle against a numerically superior army in a well defended position, unsuited for his
cavalry. He would’ve likely arrayed his troops in the plain below to taunt and challenge the Romans,
and if they didn’t come down from the hillsides to fight, he would use this as propaganda to show off
the Republic’s weakness to its’ Italian allies.
Worse, Paullus’ plan to move
into the hills to the west meant that the Romans would perhaps be forced
to wait until an opportunity for a battle arose, and that could’ve potentially kept the
army in the field for a long time.
Feeding and supplying so many troops for a
prolonged period would’ve been a major problem, whilst Hannibal now held the most
important supply depo in the area, at Cannae, and could afford to wait.
In addition, it is unlikely that Paullus completely refused the idea of giving battle
on the flat terrain, because just like Varro he understood that the Roman camp
was already too close to Hannibal, therefore repositioning to the western hills
would essentially require them to disengage. But any withdrawal from the field in the face
of the enemy was very difficult and dangerous, especially for an army dominated by infantry
that faced superior cavalry, who could pick them off piecemeal and potentially cause a rout.
Furthermore, despite being in open country, retreating from an outnumbered enemy would be
deeply dispiriting for the troops, especially given that the Senate, the army, and the people
of Rome wanted to fight and destroy Hannibal.
In every sense the Roman army was now
committed and could not easily pull away from the field without a battle. Therefore,
whatever misgivings Paullus had, Varro’s preference to fight as soon as possible was not
at all unreasonable, under the circumstances.
The two Consuls came from
very different backgrounds.
Paullus was the grandfather of Scipio
Aemilianus, who was the principal financier of the famous Greek historian Polybius, the main
contemporary source for the 2nd Punic War.
Being paid by Paullus’ immensely
influential and wealthy family, it is easy to see why Polybius portrayed the
Consul in such a positive light, claiming that it was he who solely raised the morale of
the army and made major efforts to organize the newly formed legions, whilst mentioning
Varro only in passing as his “colleague”, not including him in his writings at all
during the campaign until Hannibal was sighted, and even then Varro is portrayed as somewhat
of an inexperienced hothead, in contrast to the supposedly more sensible Paullus. This can make it
difficult to separate propaganda from the truth.
However, it is true that Paullus had more
military experience, having previously served as consul in 219 BC and was campaigning in
Illyria. But, after being involved in a scandal with the distribution of war plunder, he was
keen to avoid further stains on his reputation during his second consulship in 216 BC,
which may have been part of the reason for his cautiousness prior to the battle.
In military terms, the Illyrian war was a combined operation between the navy and the army,
but there were no pitched battles. So despite the demands this campaign must’ve had on Paullus as a
general, the conflict in Illyria did not require the skills needed for controlling a massive field
army. And since his reputation was embellished in contemporary sources, we have no reliable
way of knowing how good of a commander he was.
In contrast, Varro was a novus homo, a “New Man",
one of the very few in any generation of Roman political circles, to be the first in
their family to reach high office. Contemporary sources further smear him by describing
his ancestry as humble and poor, claiming that his father was a butcher and that Varro
himself worked in the shop during his youth.
Despite being described as a brutish simpleton,
in reality a “new man” needed substantial political ability to win elections against
opponents from old prominent Roman families and their many clients who voted for them. Varro
could not parade the achievements and high status of his ancestors, and had to find other
ways of making his name known to the public, in a voting system that heavily favoured the
rich, which in a way made him an underdog.
This shows that Varro must’ve been a shrewd
politician, who managed to gain the support of influential aristocrats and Senators, all of
whom looked to invest in a candidate that would aggressively confront Hannibal – a desire that
was widespread in all political circles in Rome.
In addition, changes to Roman laws
in 217 BC made it nearly impossible for a consular candidate without military
experience to be elected, regardless of the influence and prestige of his financiers.
So while Varro never held senior command, considering the serious crisis that Rome was
in at this stage of the war, it is reasonable to assume that he could not have been made
consul without certain military qualifications.
On the second day came Varro’s turn to command. He led the army towards a position closer to the
enemy, despite objections from his colleague.
Hannibal responded by sending out groups of
cavalry and light infantry to harass and slow down the advancing enemy column.
Seeing the incoming Carthaginians, Varro closed ranks and the column only
barely continued to move forward.
A series of skirmishes caused significant
confusion in the Roman ranks, but Varro’s formed close-order infantry drove back each attack.
The sporadic fighting went on until dark, without either side gaining an edge
or inflicting losses on the enemy, but the Roman progress to a new camp site
slowed down to a crawl, because they were forced to maintain a constant fighting
line, eventually encamping when night fell.
Paullus, still supposedly reluctant to give battle
in this terrain, took charge of the army next morning and continued the advance towards the site
chosen for the main camp, marshalling the troops to close the distance with the Carthaginians. Meanwhile, Hannibal was still positioned
on high ground near Cannae, south of the river, observing
enemy movements without taking any action.
The Romans proceeded to aggressively
take control over the battlefield. Two thirds of the army remained in the main
camp, while the remaining one third of the troops was sent across the river Aufidius.
Setting up a second camp showed the determination of the Roman leadership to put pressure on the
movement of enemy troops, whilst taking up a position from where they could protect their own
foraging parties that ventured closer to Cannae.
More importantly, this aggressive stance served
to build up the confidence of the troops.
Hannibal countered by advancing down from
the high ground towards a new camp location, most likely the flat plateau atop a
ridge west of the main Roman camp, leaving a garrison to guard
the fortified depo at Cannae.
The size of the Roman host was clearly on his
mind, as he continuously spoke to the men, encouraging them that "this" is why they came to
Italy! Challenging the Romans for control over the battlefield showed Hannibal’s belief in
victory, which raised the spirits of the men.
The new camp was in a fairly
good defensive position, overlooking the plain below, with the river
nearby offering the crucial water supply.
On the last day of July, The Carthaginian
general ordered the troops to prepare for battle. The camp was abuzz for much of the late
afternoon, as the men sharpened their blades, cleaned their weapons, armor, and clothing,
wanting to look their best and most intimidating once the battle commenced.
Early on August 1st, the Carthaginian army marched out of their camp. On the Roman side, Paullus was
once again in command. He posted covering forces in
front of the palisades of each camp, but the legions stayed close to the ramparts
and little was done to provoke a battle.
Hannibal, meanwhile, took the initiative and
dispatched his Numidians across the river to attack the secondary Roman camp.
He kept the rest of the troops arrayed for battle, facing the enemy camp for several hours. He
exploited Paullus’ reluctance to give battle to raise the confidence of his troops
by impressing upon them that the Romans lacked the will to fight.
Across the river, the Numidians were ordered not to press the camp
directly but to harass the foraging parties, mostly consisting of servants gathering water
supplies, and chase them from the field.
For Hannibal, this was another way to
humiliate the Romans and show to his troops the inability of the enemy to counter
the Numidian raid and protect their foragers.
Some of the Roman officers felt
ashamed with how the day went, resolutely wanting to turn things around, and the
troops were especially displeased with the delay.
Undoubtedly the two consuls
read the mood of the camp.
And… on August 2nd, Varro decided to fight…
