WOMAN: I think we were the poster
country along with New Zealand. We were doing brilliantly well. The Australian public
were highly cooperative. They were doing very well. Thank you. REPORTER: For months,
Australia was the envy of the world in suppressing COVID-19. WOMAN: Until the latest resurgence
in Victoria, Australia's success
was really phenomenal. Now one state is threatening
the health of the entire nation. MALE REPORTER:
How would you characterise Victoria's public health response
to this pandemic? Well, it's been inadequate, clearly. WOMAN: When we heard that
one of the security guards had tested positive, the reaction from both of us was,
"Well, I'm not surprised." In Victoria,
coronavirus infections exploded in a second wave
far worse than the first. WOMAN: Every day,
we're getting notifications saying, "My father's died." "My mother's
died." "My grandmother's died." And this is gonna go on and on. WOMAN: I never thought
I'd not be able to say goodbye or at least hold her hand
through it. Doing it through a video call, is not something
that I ever imagined. Tonight on Four Corners, we examine
what went wrong in Victoria and how coronavirus infections
spiralled out of control. And we investigate
the failings of authorities that are supposed to
keep the community safe, but instead have put
the entire nation at risk. STEPHANIE MARCH: At the end of March,
the COVID-19 pandemic was raging around the world. In Australia, the number of cases
was rapidly rising. The Ruby Princess cruise ship
had arrived in Sydney, delivering hundreds of cases
of deadly coronavirus to the nation's door. It was clear the greatest threat
was people returning from abroad. WOMAN: Australia was on a knife edge
at the end of March. We had a peak in cases. They were mostly about 65% imported
cases through overseas travel. But it was a very, um...
very precarious situation that could have gone either way. To curb the spread, return travellers
had been ordered to go home and self-isolate for 14 days. But the nation's leaders
decided that wasn't enough to stem transmission. SCOTT MORRISON: So, by no later
than midnight tomorrow, that's 11:59pm Saturday, states and territories
will be quarantining all arrivals through our airports in hotels
and other accommodation facilities for the two weeks
of their mandatory self-isolation before they are able
to return to their home. Hotel quarantine was to be the barrier to stop
the virus spreading. PROF MacINTYRE: Yeah, the hotel
quarantine was a smart move because there were instances
before that where people were breaching
the home quarantine. So, you know, we can't rely
on everyone to do the right thing. People will breach those orders. So, the hotel quarantine puts one
extra layer of security in there. In this war against the virus, the Federal Government offered
the help of the Defence Force, but it was up to each state
and territory to decide who would run
their hotel quarantine program. The New South Wales Government
put the police in charge. MAN: We're not getting the sort
of compliance that I feel we need, and that's why
it's important tonight we really switch over to a much more
controlled, police-style operation. And again, I acknowledge some people
won't be happy with that, but I truly believe this will bring
an end to this much, much quicker than just relying on individuals. In Victoria, several government
departments were responsible for the hotel quarantine program, but it's not clear who was in charge. Private security companies
were hired to guard the hotels. MAN: My personal view
of why it was contracted out is because it was cheaper. They engaged
these big national companies to provide private security, and they allowed
these big national companies then to subcontract out. Because you've gotta remember the entire cost of security
is people, workers who actually
have to physically stand there and make certain that
the facility is secure. And so any way
that these big companies can maximise their profit,
they will. Among the hotels used
was Rydges on Swanston. One of the first groups to arrive were passengers from
the Greg Mortimer cruise ship who'd been at sea for two weeks
off the coast of Uruguay. Dozens of them had tested positive
for COVID-19, including Queensland oncology nurse
Christine Cocks, an expert in infection control. WOMAN: Everyone that came off
that vessel into Rydges understood the importance
of two weeks in quarantine and the reason that we were doing it
was to protect Australia, that we were, in reality,
the sterile barrier between potential COVID infection
and the rest of our country. And we were only too happy
to do that. When the passengers
got to their rooms, they were horrified to find conditions that were
far from sterile. When we arrived in our room
and saw the fine layer of dust across the top of the bar
and the shelves there, and the dirty table, the dirty desk, we had a feeling that things
might not have been as clean as we were expecting and that the handling
of the whole situation might not be up to
what it should have been. Some people had stains
on their sheets, as if the sheets were dirty. There were a couple of rooms
that had bedbugs. Another person said that there was faeces in the toilet
that hadn't been flushed and urine splattered on the floor
around the toilet that she had to clean. Security guards
were posted on each floor to make sure the guests didn't leave. Christine was worried about the guards' potential exposure
to the virus. The guards that didn't
have their gowns on would be wearing gloves and masks, but that doesn't
necessarily protect you. If you rub your face
with a gloved hand and then, after the glove is off,
you scratch again, put it in your mouth,
near your nose, you're away. There goes your infection. And it takes a mindset
and an education to understand the nuances
of non-transfer of pathogens. The Health Department placed
government officials in each hotel to oversee operations. The Department of Jobs contracted
three large security companies - Wilson Security, MSS and Unified - to provide guards
to more than a dozen hotels. TIM KENNEDY: This is a system
that's been adopted by governments,
both Federal and State, for 30 to 40 years. And it's been based on the fact
that the private sector is more efficient and proficient. And what this health crisis has
shown us is that they're neither. They're very good
at extracting profit and moving risk
onto individual workers. What the pandemic has shown us is they've moved risk not only
onto individual workers, they've moved the risk
onto all of us, and now we're all paying the price
of this COVID pandemic. The Andrews Government
had known about problems with underpayment, competency
and subcontracting in the private security industry long before it hired them
for this highly sensitive task. MAN: What's actually
quite disconcerting is that the Department of Justice
of Victoria had launched a review
of the security industry and they started to really look
into it quite thoroughly. What's really terrible is
that the signs were there and that should have been addressed,
not only by the Andrew Government, but all the State Governments
and the Federal Government probably before that. So the red flags were there? Yes, the red flags
were definitely there, and there were ongoing inquiries
about it. The three companies were allowed
to subcontract to smaller operators. TIM KENNEDY: A number of guards
who had been members of the union came forward
to some of our organisers and they indicated that
they'd actually procured work through social platforms. They weren't told
where they were working. They weren't told, essentially, what it was about
until they turned up. They were given perfunctory
documents to tick and flick, and generally directed
to go stand on a floor and don't let anyone move. No PPE, no proper training. And it's a feature of this sector where there is
a lot of subcontracting. Peter was one of the security guards
who worked at a quarantine hotel. He still works
in the security industry, so he doesn't want
to reveal his identity. Well, my mate, he knew someone else. They were looking for the guards. He sent me a text message,
"Oh, you wanna do some work?" I said, "Sure."
He said, "You get $29 an hour." Said, "That's fine." And he gave me one number.
I called the number. And he text me,
or WhatsApp me, later on, "Are you available
to work tomorrow?" I said, "Yes."
He said, "You got a business suit?" I said, "Yes." That's how I got a job. He was told to arrive for his shift
at the Novotel on Collins at 6:00am. I wasn't know what I was doing,
to be honest. And the guys... I asked a guy,
"What do you want me to do?" He said, "Just follow the guards
who worked there before." So, just went to sign in. And they said
go to Level 12 for my role. So, I went to 12. Asked a couple of guards,
who said, "Just sit on the corner." That's it. What sort of training did they
give you before you started? Nothing. Not even a single thing
about COVID. All I know about the COVID
is from television, not from the security. Got no training whatsoever. And did you have any protective
gear, face mask or anything? Yes, they provide
one face mask per shift. One?
One per shift. How long is a shift?
One shift? For 12 hours with one mask. Four Corners has obtained
images of guards employed under Unified Security asleep on the job while working
at a quarantine hotel. The company says
the guards were fired. (MAN SNORES) Peter also worked under Unified
through a subcontractor. From the beginning, he was alarmed
at the conditions at the hotel. The things in the corridor
was not acceptable. Acceptable means
there's only two feet difference between us and the guests who were
walking through the corridors, who arrived from international,
that want to go to their rooms. So, there is not much social
distancing, no proper training. I have a family
waiting for me at home. I don't wanna pass
this disease to them. And so, did you have a break? I do get a break. I go to the
7-Eleven for the coffee, that's all. So, you walked from the hotel
down to the 7-Eleven? Yes. And when you went on your break,
did you take your mask off? Yes, I did. And you put it back on?
Yes. The same mask?
Same mask. Doesn't sound very safe. Well, there is
not much options, then. We know that healthcare workers
are very meticulous, and even they can make mistakes. These aren't healthcare workers. Taking off
your personal protective equipment is one of
the most dangerous moments. So, are they good at that? But do they understand
how psychopathic this virus is, that all they have to do is
do one small thing that's wrong and they could then acquire it? CHRISTINE COCKS: We're fairly
certain that the guards didn't have
the level of understanding. From our window,
we could watch them arrive at six o'clock in the morning. Two cars, eight guards, would
all get out to start their shift. And, I mean, that would've been the first thing
that you would've stopped, that they would be travelling
in a car together to come to work. Unified insists all guards
were required to do online and face-to-face
infection control training. But Four Corners
has talked to multiple guards who say this wasn't provided. If the government decided
to put the guards on the line, they should have proper plan. OK, you're gonna provide
the training. What sort of training? Not a video training,
not online training. One-to-one training
for a couple of days before the guards go onto the job. That should be paid training
as well. Well, the security industry
doesn't work like that. There is no paid training. By mid-April, the Australian
Medical Association in Victoria was getting reports from members working in hospitals and
the quarantine hotels about problems. MAN: The first problem was
the breakdown in infection control in the hotel quarantine
arrangements. And clearly the department
wasn't really, perhaps, as conscious of the need to have the proper
infection control protocols around the security personnel. And we really needed
to have someone checking the compliance of their behaviours to make sure that they
followed the right processes. They were also concerned
about travel arrangements. Well, I was hearing from
frontline emergency staff that they had concerns
about the arrangements for transport of positive patients
from the quarantine hotels who were getting medical checks
at the emergency rooms. And so, the concern they had
was about the transfer arrangements. Often they could be transferred
in the appropriate ambulance, but would need to find their own way
back to the hotels themselves. And that would obviously either
involve either a taxi, an Uber or even
prevailing upon family members. So, catching Ubers from the hospital
back to the hotel. Correct.
Why is that a problem? Well, because of
the obvious potential for cross-infection to the drivers and to other people
in the community. Four Corners can reveal the AMA wrote to
the state's health department, giving detailed instructions on how it believed the
quarantine program should operate. We had a whole host of concerns around how the hotel quarantine
system was being managed in terms of resourcing and also in terms of
the protocols being used, of which infection control
was one of the issues we raised. And we were obviously disappointed that those suggestions,
given in good faith, were not subsequently followed. On May 26th, the hotel
quarantine barrier was breached. A worker at Rydges
tested positive for COVID-19. Four Corners has established
it was a hotel staff member who'd been working in the lobby. The next day, a security guard
at the same hotel tested positive, followed by four more guards. I wasn't surprised. The way they was running, they're running very awful. It's like live bacteria
inside the rooms, in the labs. And people who are there,
aren't with proper equipment. So what are you going to expect? And most of people
who are working there they've got another jobs. They're working from
one hotel to another hotel. Someone else
was driving Ubers or cabs. So I wasn't surprised
we are at this stage now. When we heard that the guard,
one of the security guards, had tested positive, the reaction from both of us was,
"Well, I'm not surprised." I don't think any one person
or group can be singled out as being responsible
for the spread of COVID that started in Rydges. I think it's a whole maze of issues where everything has just lined up
to allow this to happen. When I saw the first case
in the hotel quarantine, I... That was a real red alert. What would have helped,
in hindsight, is experts in infection prevention
and outbreak looking at how things could evolve even if it... It could have occurred
in the lunchroom, for example. At the time, it should have
triggered the suspicion that there could be a chain
of transmission in the community linked to that breach. And you have to
sort of expand the testing and really look hard for cases within the time frame
of the incubation period, which did happen, eventually,
by June. But perhaps
some earlier contact tracing might have revealed
more...more cases. The virus was quietly spreading. PROF McLAWS: I'd been stalking
the data for a long time and I was watching
the numbers go up. And I saw at the end of May things were, in Victoria
and Melbourne specifically, they couldn't get the numbers
down to single figures over a 14-day period, which meant
that there was no wriggle room for human resourcing to go out and find everybody
that needed to be found. And also with the geo... ..exponential rate of spread, it would mean that it could spread
quite rapidly, which it did. Despite the risk, in June, Victoria
lifted some lockdown restrictions. Up to 20 people
were allowed to attend restaurants or family gatherings. PROF MacINTYRE: Anywhere in
the world, wherever you are, when you start lifting restrictions, you'll get more transmission
of infection. We're in the middle of a pandemic. It's the worst pandemic
in living memory. And there's a huge number
of cases overseas. Our borders are not completely shut. So as soon as you lift restrictions, you'll start to see transmission
increasing and cases increasing. On June 17th, a guard working
under MSS Security in another quarantine hotel,
The Stamford Plaza, tested positive for COVID-19. Two days later, five more guards from that same hotel
tested positive. WOMAN: There's been some
closer mingling of these guards than we would like in the workplace. There's a large cohort of
security guards and other workers, and unfortunately it does appear that quite a few of them have worked
for single or multiple days whilst infectious. So we do expect that there are quite
possibly going to be further cases linked to that outbreak. PAT: What did you think when there
was the outbreak at the second hotel? What were your thoughts
at that point? Well, I was very concerned
that we were going to find escalating levels
of community transmission, because I was aware, of course, that many of these people
who were employed in security, of course, are on a minimum wage. They also had a number of different
types of jobs in the community. And as a result of that, they would be moving freely through
different types of workplaces. By June 20, the daily number
of new cases hit a two-month high. Premier Daniel Andrews
said family gatherings in breach of COVID-19 restrictions
were largely responsible. It is pretty clear
that behind closed doors, when one family
comes together in large numbers and potentially goes and visits
another family, they...they are not
practising social distancing. They are not
in a controlled environment. Now, this is not about blame. It's not about
those sorts of issues. They are the facts of the matter and Victorians are entitled to know
that that's what's driving about half the new cases - transmission within families, transmission from
one family to another, as a kind of extended family,
if you like. Tonight - are we lurching towards
another lockdown? Victoria records
75 new cases of coronavirus. By the end of June, the virus
was spreading out of control. Clusters were popping up
across Melbourne and growing. There were nearly 300 cases where authorities didn't know
the source of transmission. Daniel Andrews revealed that hotel
quarantine breaches were to blame for many new infections. This morning, I received the most
comprehensive genomics briefing that I have received
throughout the pandemic. And what that briefing provided
and put to me very clearly is that at least a significant
number, and potentially more, of the outbreaks
in the north of the city are attributable,
via genomic sequencing, to staff members in hotel quarantine breaching well known
and well understood infection-control protocols. That is unacceptable to me. PAT: Do you think guards,
individual guards like you, have been unfairly blamed
for what's happened? Of course. It's always get blame
who are the bottom. Do you reckon the government
should not done the first thing? They know they should do
a proper assessment. This is a deadly virus. They had a live example
in Europe, Asia. They know what was happening. And they still hire private guards? STEPHANIE: Premier Andrews
called an inquiry into the hotel quarantine debacle. Look, there's an inquiry
that's upcoming. That is not... I have not been involved in it. I think it's entirely appropriate that the judicial inquiry
goes to all of the issues that might be at play here. PAT: So, how would you characterise
Victoria's public health response to this pandemic? Well, it's been inadequate, clearly. And the reason
that that's been the case is because it's been
woefully under-resourced. And compared to other states, it's just a fraction of
the resources that they've deployed. STEPHANIE: The AMA says the Victorian
Health Department has been weakened by years of budget cuts
and restructuring. I think we've known for many years that the,
particularly public health, tends to be underfunded
and under-resourced in Victoria. And also the Department of Health
and Human Services, which was formed in 2015, really has
what I would call a dysfunctional and Byzantine
organisational architecture. So that this has
kind of given rise to, I think, the situation we've seen here. As the clusters grew and spread, the Premier locked down
the worst-affected suburbs. DAN ANDREWS: This is what
we must do now. If we do not do this now, then I won't be locking down
10 postcodes, I will be locking down
all postcodes. And I can't do this, the government
cannot do this on our own. We need every Victorian
to play their part. One of the biggest clusters,
which grew to nearly 200 cases, began at the Al-Taqwa school
in Truganina in Melbourne's outer west. MAN: On Monday,
I think it must have been 29 June that we got a text message
from Al-Taqwa saying that a staff member
had tested positive. At that stage,
there was no clear instruction as to, you know,
which students or grades actually has been affected. A couple of days later, we got a text message
from Department of Health saying that one of my child
who goes to Al-Taqwa, 12-year-old, she's Year 7, was a close contact,
she needs to self isolate at home. The Al-Taqwa cluster was linked to Victoria's biggest outbreak
at public housing towers in Melbourne's inner north. DAN ANDREWS: The public health
advice is to close those nine towers. There will be no reason for any of those residents
to leave their home for a period of at least five days, effective immediately. SHAZELI OSMAN: I know for sure
that I've got friends also who live
in that housing estate, and I really, truly felt for them. Theatre nurse Shazeli Osman,
whose daughters caught COVID-19, worried that many in his community
were reluctant to get tested. There's a huge stigma out there
within the community, the fear. The fear within the community that,
you know, if we get tested, you know, how we're gonna be
even more marginalised, we're gonna be
even more discriminated. Then there are the issues
where a lot of self-employed people actually, you know,
if we get locked down, how are we
going to pay our mortgage? How are we gonna actually
sustain our families? You know, the handout from the
government is not gonna be enough. These kinds of fear. Thanks very much for joining us. We have 5,165 cases of coronavirus
in Victoria. That is 428 new cases
since we last updated you. As the number of
new cases climbed, the state's contact
tracing system was failing to keep up. PROF MacINTYRE:
The two most important things to stopping the spread is one, finding all the cases so
that they can't infect other people, isolating them and treating them. And secondly,
tracking all of their contacts and putting them in quarantine
for two weeks, which is the incubation period. You need skilled contact tracers, public health people
who can identify all the contacts, follow them up, call them,
get all the information they need. Keep following them up
in the two-week period and then activate a plan
if those people develop symptoms, if they need to be tested,
et cetera. There are multiple accounts of the
contact tracing system's dysfunction. In July,
healthcare worker Kerry Sheperd was told by the Health Department her COVID test was negative
and she went back to work. The next day
she got an alarming message. Then I saw
that there were three missed calls and a text message saying,
"This is from Department of Health. "You've tested positive "and you've missed our attempts
at contacting you, "but you are required
to quarantine." There was a moment of,
"Oh, no, I've gone to work. "I've interacted with everybody." Fridays are our busiest day by far
in the clinic. So, all our staff were there. I'd passed, you know,
patients in the waiting room. And I just thought, "If I've brought this
down on their heads "and everybody in the clinic
has to quarantine for two weeks now "and all our patients' surgeries
have to be cancelled, "it's going to be a nightmare." The next morning, she was told
she was actually negative, but her close contacts
were still told to isolate. So at this point, my colleagues
and my partner had kind of an official SMS
from the Department of Health saying you are required to quarantine. And then they had a forwarded SMS
from me that said, "No, everything's fine.
You don't have to." And I think some of them
were OK with that, some of them were
really uncomfortable with the lack of official direction. Many of the health officers that
have been seconded from other states to assist Victoria have noticed how much or how much
further behind Victoria is compared to other states in terms
of their IT preparedness for a pandemic. It seems to me that, you know, Victoria and the Department
of Health and Human Services has almost like a fax machine-style
IT capability compared to a more contemporary one
that we've seen other states. In early July, cases began to appear
in large numbers in the worst places imaginable -
aged care homes. REPORTER: As the number of new cases
in Victoria again edges towards 300, the big worry is nursing homes. Nearly 80 residents and staff
across 29 aged care facilities have now tested positive. MAN: I thought we could have been
far better prepared. We should have learned
from Dorothy Henderson Lodge and the Newmarch House outbreaks, which had occurred
in New South Wales I think almost two months earlier. And so we were poorly prepared, and we were running around
essentially like headless chooks, to use the vernacular. A major outbreak developed
at Epping Gardens aged care facility. WOMAN: We really started
to get quite worried. I sent the email and said, "Is
there a COVID case in your centre?" No response. WOMAN: I just feel
at a point of disbelief. I just can't believe that... ..they just dropped the ball
and just let these events happen. WOMAN: I want to see my mum! At Epping Gardens,
residents' families were locked out. I want to see my mum! I don't care what anyone says!
I want to see my mum! I want to know she's alright! One night, resident Maureen O'Brien
buzzed for a nurse, but when no-one responded,
she went for help. She struggled to get up on her frame and she went out to the nurse's
station and asked for a Panadol, and she was told...told off
quite severely, ushered back to her room. But my mum wanted to know,
"Why are all these people here? "What's going on?" She thought it was
some get-together. Six staff were attending
an unauthorised baby shower. Two were not on shift, and bypassed COVID protocols
when they entered the building. It was arranged by
one of the senior... ..more senior registered nurses
at the time. It was unauthorised. Breached protocols. I can speak not only as a CEO,
but as a registered nurse. I think the regard, or the lack
of regard, that they have shown, those particular individuals, is
something that is beyond the pale. How many people
who went to that baby shower have tested positive for COVID now? The whole six. Is that how COVID
got into Epping Gardens? We don't know. We don't know. WOMAN: What were you thinking? Having a party, a baby shower... ..in a place that was supposedly
COVID free? They were safe up until that point. We couldn't get in,
so why could they? A staff member and a resident were diagnosed with COVID―19
four days later. Health officials arranged
for all residents to be tested, but it took six days for the swabs to be taken
and the results returned. The tests revealed the virus
had spread like wildfire. 60 residents were positive
and 22 staff. GREG REEVE: From the first case,
everything was introduced in terms of
an outbreak management plan. That includes
isolation of residents... ..personal protective equipment,
masks, etc. So we did everything we could
to mitigate the risk. But the impact is that you've got a whole group of people
that are in there together, and we don't know who's positive
and who's negative for what I think one could
understand is seemingly an unreasonable
length of time. Fewer and fewer staff
were now coming to work. Some were infected,
some were close contacts, others simply fearful
for their own families. All of a sudden, we found ourselves
running on empty in terms of staff. We tried every agency. We accessed the government, we informed
the Department of Human Services. We informed the public health unit. We informed the Quality
and Safety Commission. WOMAN: We're not getting answers
on email. We're not getting answers
on the phone. I don't know where we stand,
but something's not right. We're feeling quite uncomfortable that our 92-year-old mother
is in there and they don't answer a phone
and they don't answer an email. Many of the residents in
Epping Gardens suffered terribly. Meals missed, medications forgotten,
unshowered for days. MAN: I've received calls
off at least 20 different people who have had loved ones
in the centre. They've all said that
"There's no-one attending to my mum. "No-one attending to my dad." "They haven't received medication.
They haven't been cleaned." There was a lot of cases where people were soiled
and wet and dirty. There was a case of people
that weren't fed, which is absolutely extraordinary,
when you think about it. No, I don't abrogate
my responsibilities. And I'm never going to say that. What I am saying is, first of all, that I don't think
that they were neglected. There were... Clearly there was anxiety.
Clearly there was a lot of stress. And clearly... But in terms of meeting
their primary care needs, I will stay...say to this day that
we will manage to deliver on that. The federal Health Department
told Epping Gardens it had a plan to source extra staff
through agencies when a Coronavirus outbreak
occurred. But the plan didn't work. I was of the belief
that Plan B was available. But clearly when... ..we did seek it,
clearly it wasn't available, and... ..there were no...not... ..there were inadequate beds,
there were inadequate staff and a range of other matters
that I think is well publicised now. As the number of cases rose above 60, Epping Gardens wanted to send its
COVID-positive patients to hospital. But Four Corners has established the federal Health Department pressed
management to keep them at the home. When some were taken to hospital,
they were turned away. I gave a directive for them
to be decanted - excuse the word - but transferred, as I always thought was available
to us, to hospitals. What I came to understand... ..is that that was not, in fact,
allowable. Yeah, so the hospital
refused to take those patients and sent them back? So what impact did that have
on those patients? Well, it's fear. It's...it's...it's...it's... ..anxiety, as you can imagine. We didn't have the staff. And it's on record
we could not provide the care. And that's what it...
You know, it was just that simple. And I was seeking help from day dot. And the only thing was, the response that we got
as an organisation was, "It's your obligation
as the approved provider." At the height of the chaos,
Sam Agnello's mother, Carmela, was taken to hospital
after having a fall. Once there, she tested positive
for Coronavirus. We actually had a... A Skype...
..a Skype meeting with my mum. And I just remember
seeing her eyes... Terrified. It's like they were rolling around
in her...in her eyes, the eye...pupils,
and I'll never forget that. I go to sleep and I still think... ..and I can still see that call
as though it happened just today. You know what I mean? She looked like she was scared
and didn't know what was going on. She didn't.
She couldn't speak. On Monday the 27th of July, a week after the outbreak started, just six staff turned up
to care for 115 people. The federal government
finally decided to send in Defence Force medics. The next day,
Carmela Agnello died in hospital. I never thought
I'd not be able to say goodbye. I knew she was going to die one day,
but I never thought I'd... ..I'd not be able to say goodbye, or at least hold her hand
through it. Doing it through a video call is not something
that I ever imagined. Is this a woman 92 years of age? She deserves respect. And she didn't get it. She didn't get the care we thought
she was gonna get at Epping Gardens. Would they treat their own mothers
like that? Would they treat
their own grandmothers like that? Because ours didn't get it. Horrible what's happened here. I mean, heartbreaking to everybody. And they need...they need
to have a good look at what they're doing in there. And the government needs
to have a damn good look too, because this cannot happen
to more families, and it's still happening. Every day, people are dying
from Epping Gardens. Every day, we're getting
notification saying, "My father's died." "My mother's
died." "My grandmother's died." And this is going to go on and on. Donna's mum, Maureen,
also caught COVID-19. DONNA O'BRIEN: I've... She's really struggling. And, you know, I've had to
have calls with doctors about.. ..not about her future
of getting better, about what they'll do
if she goes into cardiac arrest, which is nothing. So... ..I just...I just can't believe it. I just...I just can't believe it. I just think this is
the most disgusting, unfair thing I've ever been involved with. 28 Epping Gardens residents
have died of coronavirus. Are you sorry for what happened
on your watch? I'm exceedingly sorry,
exceedingly sorry. 'Sorry' is a word
I'm not afraid to use. I feel for all
and every one of them and the staff, families, staff, the residents. If I could have done it
any different, I would have. If we, as an organisation,
could have done it any different, we would have. However, we followed
all the guidance - Federal, State - every piece of guidance
that was available to us. Close to 1,400 residents
in Victorian aged care have been infected with coronavirus
in the last seven weeks. More than 180 of those have died. PROF IBRAHIM: My biggest fear now
is not how many more will die... My biggest fear is we concentrate so much
on what's in front of us that we don't stop to think about
preparing all the other homes. So if Victoria has
100 homes affected now... There's another 2,600 homes
in Australia. My question is, how prepared
are they for an outbreak? And are they prepared well enough
to catch it incredibly early so it doesn't do what it's done
in Victoria? And, are we paying attention
to the... Who's dealing with that problem? Who's preparing that? The causes of Victoria's second wave
are being investigated by two inquiries in Melbourne. Today marks the first sitting
of the public hearings of the COVID-19
hotel quarantine program inquiry. This inquiry relates specifically to the hotel quarantine program established by
the Victorian Government. While the entire nation
waits to see if this second wave can be stopped, it's clear nowhere is immune. (TRAM DINGS) PROF MacINTYRE:
It could happen anywhere. That's what we all need
to wrap our heads around in order to change our behaviour and all do our bit
to stop things getting out of hand. You know, the fact is
everyone in Australia, or almost everyone in Australia, is non-immune to the virus. And, you know, the virus is there. It's going to keep coming
into the country through international travel and this kind of scenario
could happen anywhere. We all have to be prepared for it. We all have to change
the way we live so that we minimise
the risk of it happening. Captions by Red Bee Media Copyright Australian Broadcasting
Corporation
Reader's digest version:
Everything went wrong.
A baby shower?
Are you fucking kidding me.
What a dogs breakfast of a mess!
With that level of incompetence, it is amazing that there are still people in Victoria that haven't caught the virus....
Was disappointed that they did not pursue the security providers (Wilson et al).
What was the value of the contracts and how much profit was taken?
It would be easy to gestimate the order of magnitude if basic stats were available.
Value of contract/Number of Guards @ $29/hr and hours worked/Management Overhead to find how much was creamed off. (Probably in the order of 60% of contract value)
Also any "ghosting" where the number of claimed guards was a lot less than the actual guards working, a well worn rort in these "services"!
Focussing on the guards so much was a crock.
Anyone else find it odd that this isn’t on r/Australia?
I would have thought that this met their criteria for important Australia related topics, rather than something like
https://www.reddit.com/r/australia/comments/ibbkln/is_bark_from_a_gum_tree_edible/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=ios_app&utm_name=iossmf
Worth watching? Anything we didn't already know?