The long and bloody guerrilla war in Ireland
between the Irish Republican Army and the British Army finally came to an end in January
1922. But the peace treaty’s division of the island
proved more than controversial: the new Irish state is only a few months old when it descends
into civil war. The Anglo-Irish War of 1919-1921 saw the Irish
Republican Army fight the British Army and local police in the cause of Irish independence
from Britain. Backed by the republican Sinn Fein Party,
the IRA used guerilla tactics to ambush police patrols, assassinate officials and degrade
British power. The British responded by first great war veterans
to the Black and Tan paramilitary police, introducing martial law, and cracking down
with brutal reprisals. By 1921, the IRA was near breaking point and
UK public support for the war was weaker than ever. A truce ended the fighting, followed by a
controversial peace treaty signed in early 1922. The Anglo-Irish Treaty included many contentious
articles. Ireland would not become an independent republic,
but would remain in the British Empire as a Free State. Six largely protestant counties in the north-east
of Ireland would be partitioned and stay in the UK, while members of the Irish parliament,
the Dáil, would have to swear an oath of allegiance to the king. The treaty had also been signed in controversial
circumstances. Eamon De Valera, the president of the self-proclaimed
Irish Republic, did not attend the negotiations in London and led opposition to the treaty. Leading the support for the treaty was Michael
Collins, a popular figure in the republican movement. He claimed the treaty was not perfect but
was a stepping-stone for full independence later on. In the end the Irish parliament approved the
peace deal in a very close vote, and De Valera resigned. So Ireland had a peace treaty and partial
independence, but its political and military leadership was now bitterly split into two
factions: the pro- and anti-Treatyists. The pro-treatyists established the Provisional
Government in Dublin, and wanted implement the treaty quickly. They claimed they had overwhelming public
support, and although anti-treaty politicians blocked a plebiscite on the issue, 24 of 26
southern Irish city councils did pass resolutions in favor of the treaty. Sinn Fein founder Arthur Griffith now became
president, and Collins chairman of the Provisional Government. The anti-treatyists led by De Valera refused
to accept the new government, claiming it had no authority to disestablish the republic
that had been announced in the 1916 Easter Rising. The IRA also split into pro- and anti-treaty
factions. Much of the experienced leadership of the
General Headquarters supported the treaty, but the Dublin-based GHQ had limited control
of IRA units in the field. Of the 16 IRA commands in Ireland, only 5
wholly or largely supported the treaty - the southwestern region of Munster soon became
the anti-treaty heartland. Tensions were increasing, and violence between
rival groups was barely avoided in February 1922. The split in the IRA was further exacerbated
when the Provisional Government created an official armed forces, the National Army. The army was based on the British model of
a conventional force, and the pro-treatyists attempted to portray it as the successor of
the IRA. In March, the anti-Treaty forces held a series
of banned IRA Conventions and formed a new Army Executive separate from the National
Army. With about two-thirds of IRA brigades represented,
the Executive claimed it would no longer answer to Dublin. The new group elected First Southern Division
commander Liam Lynch as its leader. That’s not to say all IRA cooperation stopped. Anti and pro-treaty leaders, including Lynch
and Collins, continued to work together in the partitioned north-east as late as April
1922. Both factions did make plans for a unified
offensive against British control were laid, but never acted upon. So as rival Irish governments and armies formed,
the British quickly and quietly left the territory of the future Irish Free State. The departing Brits handed over barracks and
equipment to whichever IRA brigade controlled the region, and often the British left behind
a power vacuum. Law and order in Ireland quickly began to
suffer after the British forces left. Sectarian violence, agrarian agitation, strikes,
robberies and looting all became more common. Republican unity had largely kept the peace
during the Anglo-Irish War, but this was beginning to unravel. Pro-treaty minister Kevin O’Higgins described
the difficult position of the Provisional Government: “Simply eight young men in the City Hall
stand… amidst the ruins of one administration, with the foundations not yet laid, and with
wild men screaming through the keyhole. No police force was functioning throughout
the country, no system of justice was operating, the wheels of administration hung idle, battered
out of recognition by the clash of rival jurisdictions.” (Coogan 30) Talk of civil war was also becoming more frequent,
including from former president De Valera in March: “The Treaty… barred the way to independence
with the blood of fellow Irishmen. It was only by Civil War after this that they
would get their independence… if you don’t fight today, you will fight
tomorrow; and I say, when you are in a good fighting position, then fight on.” (Irish Independent 17/3/22) Some members of the IRA Executive, led by
Rory O’Connor, decided to act while the Provisional Government was weak. On April 14th, around 180 men of the Dublin
No. 1 Brigade occupied the Four Courts in Dublin - the nation’s most important judiciary
building. Clearly reminiscent of the Easter Rising in
1916, the move was designed to undermine the authority of pro-treatyists in their capital,
and perhaps provoke British reaction - which could potentially reunite the IRA against
their mutual enemy. At the same time, though, De Valera and Collins
were attempting to reconcile. Both suggested putting forward a unified Sinn
Fein in the coming election in June, but the plan soon broke down amidst suspicion from
both sides. The British claimed it was tantamount to refuting
the treaty. When the election results came in on June
16th, pro-treaty Sinn Fein won a convincing victory, with 58 seats to the anti-treatyists’
32. Britain now put pressure on the Provisional
Government to end the Four Courts occupation, which had been going on since April. Then, on June 22, two IRA gunmen, both former
soldiers in the British army, assassinated British Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson in
London. The British government stated that if the
Irish Provisional Government could not impose order, British forces would return to Ireland
and do it themselves. Winston Churchill made his position clear
in the House of Commons: “The presence in Dublin of a band of men
styling themselves the Headquarters of the Republican Executive is a gross breach and
defiance of the Treaty. The time has come when it is not unfair, premature
or impatient of us to make to the strengthened Irish Government and new Irish Parliament
a request in express terms that this sort of thing must come to an end… If it does not [then] we shall regard the
Treaty as having been formally violated.” (Coogan 36/37) With the British gone but threatening to return,
and the Four Courts still occupied by anti-treatyists, the Irish Provisional Government’s new National
Army issued an ultimatum on June 28, 1922: if the occupiers wouldn’t leave, the Army
would open fire. During their two-month occupation, the IRA
had done little to fortify the Four Courts building or develop defences, partly out of
a desire not to provoke the National Army. There were also no plans to assist the garrison
if it was attacked, and they didn’t occupy the surrounding buildings. IRA leader Ernie O’Malley estimated he needed
70 more men to fully defend the large building. Still, the IRA were armed with rifles, automatic
weapons, mines and ‘The Mutineer’ - a Rolls-Royce armoured car. In the early hours of June 28th, Major General
Emmet Dalton of the National Army issued an ultimatum to the Four Courts occupiers: Surrender
or face bombardment from his British-supplied 18-pounder field gun. The IRA refused, and so at 4.30am, after a
misfire reportedly rectified by a kick, the National Army fired the first shells were
at the Four Courts – the Irish Civil War had begun. As the bombardment started, National Army
troops cordoned off the area and probed closer, but their inexperience began to show. They were reluctant to assault the building
and British General Nevil Macready suggested the artillery was more useful as a morale
booster than an actual weapon: “I agreed to send [Dalton] fifty rounds
of shrapnel, which was all we had left, simply to make a noise through the night, as he was
afraid that if the guns stopped firing his men would get disheartened and clear off… About every quarter of an hour during the
night a shrapnel broke up against the walls of the Four Courts, making much noise but
doing no harm.” (Hopkinson 120) British civil servant Alfred Cope was equally
unimpressed with the fighting: “[This is] not a battle. Rory is in the Four Courts. Free Staters are in the houses opposite, each
firing at the other hundreds of rounds with probably remarkably few hits. A few hundred yards away the people carry
on their ordinary business.” (Cottrell 165) The next day, the IRA tried to relieve the
Four Courts garrison from outside Dublin, but efforts were poorly organised and blocked
by the National Army. But, a smaller group of IRA fighters were
able to occupy several hotels along O’Connell Street - later called ‘The Block’. They were soon joined by anti-Treaty leaders
including De Valera, former Defence Minister Cathal Brugha and Lynch. However, these new positions could do little
to support the Four Courts. On June 30th, National Army troops stormed
the Four Courts with fixed bayonets. During the short fight that ensued, a huge
explosion damaged the public archives, destroying hundreds of years of Irish records. There is debate whether this was caused deliberately
by IRA mines, or munitions being hit by artillery. In any case, the explosion marked the surrender
of the Four Courts. The National Army now turned to The Block,
where the morale of IRA fighters like Emmet Humphreys was weakening: “We were becoming more and more frustrated
at the fact that we were achieving nothing whatsoever.” (Hopkinson 124) Some IRA men talked about going down as martyrs,
but few were enthusiastic. Instead, De Valera and others were smuggled
out of the city before ‘The Block’ surrendered on July 5th. Brugha, however, charged out into the street
where National Army troops shot him. The storming of the Four Courts was a disaster
for the IRA. 12 of the Executive’s 16 members were there,
and Rory O’Connor, Liam Mellows, Tom Barry, and others were arrested. Liam Lynch was captured, but was later released
on the promise he would not continue the fight – a promise he soon broke. The occupation had not resulted in a surge
in public support or sympathy for the republican movement. 65 combatants and civilians were killed, and
281 wounded. Perhaps most importantly however, the Dublin
battle clarified the civil conflict: it was now the Irish Free State versus Irish Republicans. The Free State had defeated the Republicans
at the Four Courts, but the Irish Civil War was far from over. Despite the Four Courts debacle, the IRA still
seemed to hold the military advantage. In July, the Free State announced an expansion
of the National Army to 35,000 men, but many of these were young, raw recruits attracted
by regular pay. The Dublin Guard, made up of IRA veterans
and former Dublin Fusiliers, would become the shock troops of the National Army. But what the National Army lacked in experience,
it made up for in firepower. Britain provided the Free State army with
rifles, Lewis guns, revolvers, grenades, machine guns, artillery, trucks, armoured cars, and
aircraft. The Free State government also instructed
the media to reinforce it as the legitimate government: “The Army must always be referred to as
the ‘Irish Army’, the ‘National Army’, ‘National Troops’, or simply ‘Troops’. The [IRA] Irregular Forces must not be referred
to as the Executive Forces nor described as ‘forces’ or ‘troops’. They are to be called ‘bands’ or ‘bodies’.” (Kissane 81/82) The Free State estimated around 12,900 IRA
fighters were still active, especially in the south-west. Many of these were veterans of the Anglo-Irish
War, although their quality had been diluted by new arrivals following the truce, and they
only had one rifle for every two men. Nonetheless, three-quarters of the country
could be considered anti-Treaty territory, and the largest and most experienced IRA divisions,
the First and Second Southern, were strongly anti-Treaty. Given IRA weakness, Lynch ordered his units
back to their home turf to take over pro-treaty barracks and towns. But some IRA leaders like Séumas Robinson
told Lynch he was being to cautious: “Liam… it’s absurd to stay in your own
areas, for they’ll take you piecemeal.” (Hopkinson 129) In reality, there was little central control
over IRA forces. In July, the National Army began to advance
to prevent a rival government from forming in Munster. The IRA abandoned County Wexford, and Lynch
tried to form a defensive line running from Limerick to Waterford. But the line was an illusion: there were few
defensive positions, and the IRA rarely contested it. On July 20th, the National Army captured Limerick
after a short battle - breaking communications between the IRA in Munster and the north. Waterford fell soon afterwards, followed by
Westport, Carrick, Redmondstown and Clonmel by early August. IRA successes were limited to clearing the
towns of Skibbereen and Listowel of their pro-treaty garrisons. In most cases, the IRA withdrew in the face
of overwhelming firepower, and only fought pitched battles around the villages of Bruree
and Killmallock. In early August, General Dalton shifted his
strategy to focus on weak IRA coastal defenses. On August 8th, National Army troops landed
at Union House and Yougal in amphibious assaults, which were diversions for the main landing
at Passage West near Cork. Exhausted IRA fighters like Frank O’Connor
struggled to mount a coherent defence: “Technically, a landing from the sea is
supposed to be one of the most difficult military operations, but as we handled the defence
it was a walkover.” (Cottrell 181) On August 10th, the National Army took the
IRA stronghold of Cork, followed by the last IRA military base at Fermoy. After a string of National Army victories,
the so-called Munster Republic was over and some IRA men began to talk of surrender. Instead, Lynch ordered his forces to form
flying columns and conduct guerrilla operations. This was a return to their old methods and
led to new successes. On August 22nd, 1922 Michael Collins toured
the southwestern regions recently captured by the National Army despite warnings from
colleagues. Officially he went to inspect the troops,
but oral evidence suggests he wanted to start peace talks with the IRA. In the early hours, Collins and General Dalton
left Cork in a convoy consisting of a motorcycle scout, a Crossley tender, a touring car and
an armoured car in the rear. When passing through the valley of Béal na
mBláth, the convoy asked a local for directions. Unbeknownst to Collins, the local was also
an IRA sentry, who recognised Collins and informed his unit. Assuming the convoy might use the same route
to return, the IRA blocked the road with a cart and mined it to prepare the ambush. But by 8pm, the convoy had not returned, and
most of the ambushing party left. Five men remained to dismantle the blockade,
but just as they got started, the convoy arrived. The IRA men launched an impromptu ambush. Dalton told Collins to drive straight through,
but instead Collins ordered his men out to fight. The resulting firefight lasted 30 minutes,
during which the armoured car’s machinegun jammed. Towards the end of the skirmish, Collins rose
from cover with his rifle in hand and was fatally shot through the neck. He was the only casualty on either side. Michael Collins’ death is perhaps the single
most controversial moment of the Irish Civil War, and who fired the fateful bullet is still
hotly debated. The most common suspect is IRA man and former
British Army marksman Sonny O’Neill, but there are other theories. Some republican historians suggest he was
killed by his own entourage, even by Dalton himself, because Collins wanted to make peace. Some have said that De Valera set up the hit,
and others point to the Scottish gunner on the National Army armored car, since he later
joined the IRA. Many of these theories first arose long after
the event, based on statements from people who were not there at the time. In any case Collins, the most influential
of the pro-treatyists, was dead. So the Free State had lost of its leaders,
but the National Army still held the upper hand – and now it cracked down on the IRA
harder than ever before. W.T Cosgrave replaced Collins as Chairman
of the Provisional Government. Originally, the British were doubtful about
the civilian Cosgrave, but he soon proved a willing commander. Collins had largely been reluctant to instigate
harsher policies against the IRA, many of which were his former colleagues. Cosgrave would have few such reservations. From August, the war began to resemble the
Anglo-Irish conflict that had come before it, a reality General Dalton recognized: “The [IRA] have now adopted a type of warfare,
of which they have years of experience. They now operate over territory which they
know. They are now better armed and better trained
than they were against the British. In short, they have placed me and my Troops
in the same position as the British were a little over a year ago.” (Hopkinson 174) In August alone, the National Army lost 58
men in IRA ambushes, and it now became harder to strike back at IRA groups. As the war began to resemble an insurgency,
National Army troops became frustrated. Often the IRA would fire the first volleys
in an attack, kill or wound soldiers and then immediately surrender before the National
Army could fire back. In such circumstances, commanders reported
it was hard to prevent their troops executing prisoners. Pressure mounted on Cosgrave to allow the
official execution of captured fighters as a deterrent to such tactics. The result, in October, was the Army (Special
Powers) Resolution. It allowed the military to establish special
courts, to try suspected IRA fighters and execute them if necessary. Commander-in-Chief Richard Mulcahy had a blunt
message for the Irish parliament: “Life must be taken, if necessary, and it
is the responsibility of the government to say that it must be taken.” (Enright 26) The Catholic church also lent their support. Captured IRA fighters were to be denied communion,
and an official pastoral made the Church position clear: “The guerrilla warfare now being carried
on by the Irregulars is without moral sanction; and therefore the killing of National Soldiers
in the course of it is murder before God. ” (Kissane 89) In response, Lynch ordered the assassination
of all parliamentarians who voted for the resolution. But attacks were immediately answered by the
firing squad. In November, the first executions based on
the resolution were carried out. Eventually, high ranking republican figures
like Rory O’Connor, Liam Mellows and Erskine Childers were executed, supposedly in response
to IRA attacks. The brutal government policy seemed to work,
since Lynch abandoned his assassination attempts in December. The government resolution also allowed for
official reprisals, which also became increasingly common. The Dublin Guard gained a grisly reputation
in Kerry for brutality, including executing IRA prisoners with mines. However, unlike British reprisals in the Anglo-Irish
War, the National Army usually directed their attacks against specific individuals, not
entire communities. The IRA’s guerrilla campaign in late 1922
began to flounder in the face of government executions, and the republican cause was in
trouble. By early 1923, IRA morale had plummeted and
men were already disbanding and returning home. Politically too, the anti-Treaty side was
in tatters. De Valera was increasingly side-lined by military
leaders and failed to form a viable political alternative to the Free State. Meanwhile, as the National Army shifted to
cordon and search operations, more IRA fighters and leaders were arrested or killed. On April 10th, National Army troops fatally
wounded Liam Lynch in County Waterford. By the time of his death, 12,000 IRA fighters
were in custody. Lynch’s replacement, Frank Aiken, understood
the struggle was now over. On May 24th, 1923, he ordered all remaining
republican units to ditch their weapons and go home. De Valera’s joint statement suggested future
operations might be possible, but in reality the Irish Civil War was over: “Further struggle on your part would now
be in vain and the continuance of the struggle in arms [is] unwise in the national interest. Military victory must be allowed to rest for
the moment with those who have destroyed the Republic.” (Cottrell 187) By the end of the fighting, about 750 pro-treaty
troops had been killed, along with a similar number of anti-treatyists, at least 78 of
whom were executed by the Free State. So why did the IRA, who seemed so effective
against the British, fail against the National Army barely a year later? Historians have suggested several reasons. Firstly, the IRA - a mostly irregular formation
- was unsuited to position warfare or defensive battles. Liam Lynch’s decision not to push on Dublin
has been criticised, as it gave the Provisional Government time to breath, receive British
support and take out isolated IRA brigades. Many National Army officers were former IRA
men themselves, so they understood IRA tactics and even knew the locations of safehouses
and caches. The Four Courts occupation has also been highlighted
as naive, wasteful and poorly executed. Even at the time, IRA commanders were criticised
for acting like common soldiers - with many being captured as a result. But perhaps the most critical issue for the
IRA was a lack of public support. The Four Courts occupation did not get the
sympathy of the Easter Rising of 1916, and throughout the civil war, IRA commanders complained
of local hostility in some regions. Anti-treaty leader Harry Boland admitted the
population was against them: “There is no doubt that the people in the
main is [sic] against us at present, believing that we are to blame for the present state
of affairs.” (Hopkinson 127/128) Some of the public opposition to the IRA was
based on the dire economic situation. Many of the anti-treaty regions were those
most economically damaged by the Anglo-Irish War, and IRA activities, and the need to raise
finances limited economic recovery. IRA attacks on railways in particular earned
public scorn. For a sizable portion of the public, the Free
State seemed to be the only institution capable of providing security, peace and economic
recovery after years of conflict. The IRA was no longer the face of popular
rebellion, and although attritional guerilla tactics worked against a perceived ‘foreign
occupier’ they were much less effective against a government largely seen as legitimate. But, the end of the civil war was not the
end of violence, especially in the partitioned north. Sectarian violence and assassinations would
continue, even after Ireland gained full independence from Britain in 1937. In the 1960s, rival paramilitary organisations,
some of whom claimed continuation from the IRA, would engage in a 30-year conflict in
Northern Ireland simply dubbed ‘the Troubles’. Only in 1998, after nearly a century of violence
the Good Friday and Belfast agreements brought peace to Ireland that has lasted more than
twenty years. The bitter and tragic Irish Civil War is just
one of the conflicts that we think it’s important to cover in our documentaries. We also made an epic documentary about the
Battle of Berlin in 1945 called 16 Days in Berlin – it's 4.5 hours long over 18 episodes,
taking you through the battle day-by-day. It features original film footage from Soviet
cameramen, never before seen photos of the battle, detailed maps and animations and expert
interviews with David Willey from the Tank Museum, Ian from Forgotten Weapons and more. Unfortunately, we can’t upload this series
to YouTube because it shows the grim reality of the 2nd World War – and that would get
as demonetized or worse. So where can you watch 16 Days in Berlin in
4k resolution? On Nebula, a streaming service we built together
with other creators and where we can upload We’d like to thank Mark Newton for his help
with this episode. As usual, you can find all our sources for
this episode in the video description. I’m Jesse Alexander and this is The Great
War, a production of Real Time History and the only Youtube history channel that believes
there is no doubt that the people in the main is with us.
The Great War channel has done some solid videos dealing with the Irish Revolutionary period. Looking forward the watching this.
I thought the Troubles started in 1916?