In many ways, the Russian invasion of Ukraine
felt all too familiar to the people of Taiwan. Here is a larger, more powerful,
authoritarian, and revisionist bully attacking its democratic neighbor for
nothing more than historical proximity. And beneath a mountain of explanations,
theories, and models is really just one man’s deranged pursuit of empire. Or,
something else entirely — we truly don’t know. It even began like we expect an attack on Taiwan
would — with a long, drawn-out buildup of forces, followed by a sudden and
chaotic barrage of missiles. With very large present populations
but below-replacement fertility, both China and Russia are what you might call
“demographies in decline” — and there isn’t much time left. A man born today can expect to
live 74 years in China and a mere 67 in Russia.
“Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow”
isn’t just hypothetical, either. Quote “reunifying” with the island has been the
goal of every Chinese leader for the last 70 years and chairman Xi Jinping has gone well
out of his way to eliminate ambiguity. Needless to say, China’s refusal to call
Russia’s actions in Ukraine what they are — an invasion — wasn’t too comforting
to the 23 million residents of Taiwan. …Yet, China is not Russia. And Taiwan is
not Ukraine. For all their similarities, there remain huge differences the
world would be unwise to ignore. Sponsored by CuriosityStream and Nebula, where
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still, 900 days later, trying to maintain zero cases of COVID, despite the enormous cost and
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CuriosityStream and Nebula bundle, which is just $12/year right now
in the U.S. for Memorial Day. Just 100 miles, or 160 kilometers,
east across the narrow Taiwan Strait, you could be forgiven for thinking China could one
day just swallow up its little disconnected tail. Russia has three times the population of
Ukraine. China, 60 times more than Taiwan. The Russian economy is — or, more accurately,
was — 9 and a half times larger than Ukraine’s. China’s is 22 times the size of Taiwan’s. The Russian landmass is 28
times larger than Ukraine’s. And China’s, 265 times larger than Taiwan’s. In 2020, China spent $244 billion on defense. Taiwan, just 11, about as much
as the Netherlands or Colombia. Of course, as the American Navy demonstrates, not
every dollar spent on defense is created equally. Still, the disparities are quite dramatic. China
has upwards of 2 million active duty troops, thirty-three hundred fighters, and 59
subs to Taiwan’s 160,000, 560, and four. In other words: China is probably every bit
as big, strong, and powerful as it looks. And yet, ask just about anyone in the
defense community and they’ll tell you: a Chinese invasion of Taiwan
would be just downright hard. Now, there are many different ways China could go
about this — by launching a Cuba-style blockade, by first seizing smaller islands on its
periphery, or even infiltrating from within. But the most likely sequence
of events would be as follows… First, China would start bombing critical
Taiwanese infrastructure — ports, airports, and bases — in hopes of causing chaos, confusion,
and a breakdown in the chain of command. Second, China would attempt to establish air superiority — control of the skies and
therefore cover for what comes next. As we’ve seen in Ukraine, this
is much harder than it sounds, even for an ostensibly larger
and more powerful attacker. Still, up to this point,
there’s no doubt China could, at the very least, quickly inflict
serious and irreparable harm. This next phase is when the People’s
Liberation Army likely runs into trouble. As anyone who's seen “Saving
Private Ryan” can attest, amphibious assaults are no walk in
the park, even on the best of days. Generally speaking, to be successful, they
require three conditions: air superiority, overwhelming fire and manpower or surprise,
and the ability to quickly reinforce. Every battle is different, of
course, but historical successes have, with few exceptions,
possessed all three criteria. In the vast majority of cases, the absence
of even one of these has led to failure. If everything goes as planned for China, it
will have accomplished the first. But that still leaves two very difficult hurdles,
which brings us to the real challenge… Russia’s struggles so far in Ukraine make it
easy to lose sight of the basics. This is not, with one major exception, a geographically
challenging environment. When you come across pictures of the war, make a note of what you
see: roads — and what you don’t: mountains. We’re used to seeing Russia’s invasion on a map. But this is what it looks like on the
ground — what geographers would call flat, Eurasian Steppe. The biggest natural
impediments are trees, grass, and… tractors. The coast of Taiwan, on the other hand, is much
trickier. Sure, there are flat mud plains and coastal rice paddies, but any invader would
soon be met with 2 and 3-thousand foot peaks within artillery distance of the shoreline.
In between are fairly populous, urban areas. Take the usual defender’s advantage — 2
or 3 attackers per defending troop and, thanks to Taiwan’s tall and irregular
coastline, multiply it several times over. If that sounds hard, well, the
world’s most powerful military agreed. The United States considered
attacking then-Japanese-occupied Taiwan in 1944 — going so far as to
draft plans for “Operation Causeway”. Overtaking a patchwork of 30,000 starving
Japanese defenders, it estimated, would require an invasion force over twice the
size of D-Day — 400,000 marines and 4,000 ships. Despite commanding this
incredible concentration of force, Pacific War planners considered the idea too
risky and opted for the Philippines instead, referring to Taiwan as an
“unsinkable aircraft carrier”.
Suffice to say, China would need a figurative
boatload of troops. Somewhere between 1 and 2 million, to be precise — making it the
largest amphibious operation in history. If war is primarily an exercise in logistics, this would be the ultimate challenge. Moving
that many bodies simultaneously is no easy feat. Take a simple, back-of-the-envelope calculation,
for instance. Assuming China was using that same 2020 equipment from earlier, this is all it
could transport across the Strait at a time. Even if all it transported were troops — it
could only move about 30,000 — or 3% of the total number of active PLA Ground
forces — at a time. And remember, that’s if they just carried
people — with no tanks or armor. For obvious reasons, this hypothetical operation
has been nicknamed the “million-man swim”. Oh! And by the way, nothing
about this would be a secret. Experts estimate the world
will have no fewer than 30 and up to 60 days of warning — giving Taiwan a
full 1-2 months to make itself as impenetrable as possible — laying mines, staging weapons,
and repositioning critical infrastructure. Not only that but we also already know during
which parts of the year China could attack. Waves are too strong in the Winter
and typhoons too unpredictable in the Summer — leaving just two good
candidates — April or October. So too do we know where it would happen. There are only about 13
beaches across all of Taiwan suitable for landing — and
“suitable” is being generous. Take one of these — Linkou beach, for instance.
Although invaders would be welcomed by about a mile of flatland, they would soon be
confronted by two huge mountain ranges. This would also be these PLA soldiers’
and generals’ first real experience with combat. China hasn’t fought a
single major war for over 40 years, when it invaded Vietnam and
was quickly forced to withdraw. Now, even if it was ‘successful’,
China would now face a new challenge: occupying an island of 23 million people
— most of whom hate it — with much of what it considers ‘valuable’
about Taiwan utterly destroyed. Military doctrine suggests a 1:10
ratio of soldiers to population for successful counterinsurgency operations, which, on paper, would require the entire
PLA — leaving no one for anything else. As we see in Ukraine, local resistance can
be incredibly powerful, especially given that Taiwan has been preparing for its entire
modern existence for precisely this scenario. In one 2020 poll, 77% of the Taiwanese public said
they were “willing to fight” for their country. Still, it should be noted that,
at least today, conscription only lasts 4 months in Taiwan. How much
can one really do or learn in 120 days? And, in general, conscription armies
are less competent and more apathetic. But don’t get too lost in the weeds asking
whether China can attack before asking if it will. Balance of strength is important,
but it’s far from the whole picture. Any theory about what China wants or how it thinks has to contend with two
seemingly contradictory facts… On one hand, China has been beating the drum of
war for seven decades, making countless explicit threats and seemingly preparing its population
for conflict. Like North Korea and missiles, the issue seems to percolate to the surface several
times a year. Each time feels like a crisis. Yet, on the other hand, China has…been beating the
drum of war for seven decades and has never once actually followed through. No
matter your political affiliations, you can’t say China hasn’t had the full range
of American administrations to choose from. The funny thing is that, look at a graph
of Google searches for headlines related to war between Taiwan and China, and a clear
pattern emerges: Panic, at least by this metric, is a relatively recent, and uniquely
English phenomenon. Searches in traditional Chinese — used in Taiwan — have been pretty
much steady for as long as the graph goes back. Likewise, when Chinese jets make mock attack
runs toward Taiwan, it’s very often the American, not Taiwanese public who panics. So, what do
calmer minds know that the rest of us don’t? In democracies like the U.S., it’s often said that
each party needs the other. That, if one party were ever given too much power for too long, it
would be forced to deliver on its promises — many of which it never intended to. It would have no
excuse, no scapegoat to blame when it failed. A similar dynamic plays out in autocracies
like China. The enemy, in this case, is not the opposing party — there are none —
but some manufactured national humiliation. Remember! Taiwan, the island, was
never ruled by the Communist Party. The framing of Taiwan as a
source of shame for China, that it can only ever be “complete” after
quote “reunification” — is entirely artificial. China, in other words, wilfully
chose this version of history. And its predictable effects give us a hint as to
why. Chinese citizens are regularly told their country could easily “take Taiwan in a day”,
constantly reminded that they, personally, are being transgressed upon when American carrier
groups sail through the Taiwan Strait. Chinese artists render video game-like scenes of valiant
Chinese soldiers roaming the streets of Taipei. This mix of shame, patriotism,
and thirst for conquest makes a large number of Chinese citizens
love the party just that much more. One can’t help but wonder: Given what
an invasion would entail, is Taiwan more useful to the Chinese leadership as a
perpetually imminent national rejuvenation? A button, in simplistic terms, Chinese authorities
can press, whenever things aren’t going particularly well at home, not only to distract,
but more importantly, to stoke Nationalism? This does not, however, rule out an invasion. The danger, for China, is that it can
easily become dependent on this button. Each time China gains short-term
domestic approval for threatening Taiwan or making outlandish claims
about how easy an invasion would be, it is, in effect, writing a check that
would be extraordinarily costly to cash. Yet, it has created conditions under which
it may feel forced to — if, for example, Taiwan were to formally declare independence
or if it faced a legitimacy crisis at home. And, ultimately, predictions can only get
us so far. One of the principal lessons so far from the war in Ukraine is not
that the “experts” were wrong, exactly, but that rational models of how humans
should behave don’t always match reality. We can only see the world as it is,
not as Putin or Xi Jinping see it. Russia will pay an enormous
economic cost for its actions. It has already been reduced on the world
stage to the status of North Korea. But, although these sanctions may slow
its efforts, they have not dissuaded them. While the odds of a Chinese invasion
of Taiwan may appear slim on paper, we cannot proceed under that assumption. …In no small part because the world’s vigilance is
itself one of the things that may dissuade China. By taking the possibility seriously,
we may make it less likely. The status quo is ideal for no one. China will
forever see Taiwan as a “renegade province”, a piece of unfinished business from its
past. Many in the United States are likewise, angry that we have to tip-toe around
the “issue” so as not to upset a bully. And, of course, the people of
Taiwan face the biggest burden of all — being denied the privileges, safety, and
opportunities of widely-recognized statehood. But, at least for now, all three parties have
seemingly and for vastly different reasons, decided the status quo is still
better than the alternative. Still, predicting China’s
actions is hard — in fact, currently harder than it has been for
decades, as it remains effectively cut off from the rest of the world thanks to its
extremely heavy-handed COVID restrictions. China is so cut off from the outside world that
it’s now banning all, quote, “unnecessary travel”, preventing many of its own citizens, even
students studying abroad, from leaving. Almost no one expects China
to open up again anytime soon. Why? That’s a question that’s
been on my mind for a long time, and one I try to tackle in the second episode
of my new Nebula Original series. Some argue it’s about the economy. Others say it’s more about
presenting an image of China abroad. But none of these theories quite capture the craziness we’ve
seen in Shanghai — live fish tested for COVID, investment bankers left starving in their
homes, and all manner of things in between. You can watch this, along with the first episode
of the series, plus all my normal videos ad-free, and other great Nebula Originals,
and get access to CuriosityStream right now for just $12/year
in the U.S. for Memorial Day. On CuriosityStream you’ll find
great feature-length documentaries, like this investigation into a dangerous, secretive Ukrainian city completely
cut off from the rest of the world. Click the link on screen right now to
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watch my Original series over on Nebula.
