WHY did This Boeing 747 MISS the RUNWAY?!

a quantus boeing 747-400 is rapidly rolling down runway 2-1 left in bangkok thailand more than two-thirds of the runway is already behind the aircraft and both pilots are frantically inputting max manual braking but the aircraft just will not decelerate stay tuned a huge thank you to nord vpn for sponsoring this video on the surface this story looks like it's fairly easy to explain right it's easy to understand what and who was to blame for what ultimately happened but it turns out that once again this is much more complicated than it looks and because of that i'm gonna put up a number up here in key moment during the story which i am then going to explain towards the end of the video so make sure that you stay tuned to the end to really fully appreciate what led up to this quantas flight 1 is what we refer to now as the kangaroo route it's the route that qantas uses to connect australia via an intermediate stop in asia to the united kingdom and on the 23rd of september 1999 which is when this story happened the flight started in sydney australia it then proceeded to bangkok in thailand and then onwards towards london in the united kingdom the flight was flown by a 747 400 the queen of the sky one of my absolute favorite aircraft of all time on board the flight there were three pilots 16 cabin crew and 391 passengers for the first leg which is when the accident happened the captain of the flight was a 49 year old male with 15 881 hours of total time of which 724 hours was on the 747 400. and part of his experience was also to do what we call base training which is the touch and goal training that you do with the pilots that have been recently moved over to a new type before they're allowed to fly with passengers and this is actually going to become quite important flying together with him was also a very experienced first officer he was a 36 year old male with 8973 hours of total time of which 5187 was flown on the 747 400 so he was very experienced on the type that he was flying his training record shows that he was a good pilot with even slightly above average skills the second officer who was sitting on the jump seat on the flight uh was a 35 year old male with 6 685 hours of total time 2 961 hours on the 747 400 and he had previously come from the australian air force so he was also considered a very experienced pilot in the cockpit on this flight was also the wife of the second officer but the fact that she was present in the cupboard is not going to have any kind of bearing on what's about to happen the first officer was designated pilot flying for the flight and the initial taxi out take off climb and cruise watch bangkok was completely uneventful nothing out of the ordinary happened as the crew started getting closer towards bangkok they started getting the weather and the weather report for bangkok indicated that there was going to be a one of rumble 2-1 left or right for landing the surface wind was 240 degrees at 10 knots and a visibility of nine kilometers in rain with thunderstorms in the area this type of weather is nothing out of the ordinary in bangkok and thailand this type of year because in september they quite frequently get both heavy rains and thunderstorms so the the pilots didn't think that there was anything out of the ordinary instead the first officer had handed over the controls to the captain and started setting up for a ils approaching for runway 2-1 right in bangkok and they elected to use flaps 25 which is the second highest flap setting for the 747 400 and also idle reverse trust which was the company procedure at that time the aircraft left their cruising altitude flight level 350 at the time 2216 local time which meant that it was now completely dark outside and as they started descending they very quickly were turned over to the bangkok area controller as soon as they switched over the frequency to to that new frequency they were informed that they were number two in sequence behind a thai airways airbus a330 and that they were going to land on runway two one left not number two one right that they had initially prepared for runway two one left is a little bit narrower and also a little bit shorter than runway two one right but it's still a very long runway it's over three thousand meters long which is well within the performance capability of the 747 400. because of the runway change the first officer now had to rebrief for this new wireless approach because even though it's for parallel runway things like minimize things like the frequencies and of course performance is going to differ so he did this new approach briefing and he pointed out that if they were going to land runway 2-1 left they were going to have to roll towards the end of the runway and the taxi off on taxiway sierra and with that he chose auto brake setting 2 which corresponded to a landing distance that would facilitate a nice taxi off at taxiway sierra he also pointed out that drama 21 left had a slightly steeper glide slope than to one right so while the standard eyelash glide stop sits at three degrees this is had a glide slope of 3.15 degrees the reason this is important is because if the glideslope angle is steeper than normal it might be more of a problem for the pilots to reduce the speed and we might have to put the flaps out earlier and this is why we always include that kind of information in the briefing but throughout this briefing there was no discussion about the runway state as in if this rain that was at the airport was going to have an effect on the braking action the aircraft continued to descend and about four minutes after the approach briefing was completed the area air traffic controller informed the aircraft ahead of qantas one that there was now heavy rain at the airport the captain in qantas one responded that by selecting autobreak 3 instead and he said due to the water now this would indicate that he saw a potential problem with a lot of rain on the runway but there was no further discussion about this the tower also reported a visibility of four kilometers at the airport and at this time quantus had a limitation on first officer's landing of 1500 meters but since four kilometers was well above that there was no need to change the plan as they were now getting closer the pilots must have looked down on the weather radar screen and realized that there was quite a lot of thunderstorm activity around the airport because the first officer started discussing that in case of a missed approach they needed to head down to the south to keep clear of the weather but they were still quite far away more than 70 kilometers away from the airport at this point and the thing with thunderstorms is that they move fairly quickly so even if you have a thunderstorm over the runway when you're that far away it might be long gone by the time that you land at time 22 30 there was a new weather observation made information uniform and transmitted out on the 80s frequency which is the automatic broadcast that is sent out the weather was 240 degrees at 9 00 visibility five kilometers in heavy rain and thunderstorms this weather report was copied down by the second officer whose job it was to do this monitor the weather information but also to talk to the company and arrange things like buses and whatever else they might need at time 2233 the aircraft was now getting so close to the approach that they were handed over to the approach controller and after this the crew completed their approach checklist they reconfirmed that they were going to use flaps 25 and idle reverse trust during landing they were now also cleared towards a 10 nautical miles final from a two one left and as they were getting closer they now started to reduce the speed uh to prepare to get the flaps out they selected flaps one flaps five and the aircraft was decelerating normally at this point everything looked normal but what the crew didn't know was that this time as they were getting ready to intercept the glide slope in towards roman two on left there was a special weather observation sent out information tango and in this information the visibility has now gone down to 1500 meters in heavy rain falling to 750 meters this means that the rain was now getting worse over the runway but because the crew was never given this information you have to actively listen out on the 8th frequency in order to get this and there was no prompt from air traffic control about this new information being available this was not noticed by the crew the crew now captured the ils approach from where to one left and as it did so they were told by air traffic control that as they passed the outer marker which is a specific point on the ils approach they were to contact bangkok tower in order to get landing clearance unbeknownst to the crew they had now become number three for landing instead of number two which they thought they were in between them air traffic control had managed to squeeze in a boeing 737 which was also a qantas flight qantas 15. now as the crew was descending down the glide slope and the airbus 330 from thai airways which was originally ahead of them managed to land but the qantas 15 flight actually went around as they got into this really heavy rain and lost all visibility at about 350 feet descending on the islets now the qantas one crew would have heard this if they were actually on the tower frequency but as they were now descending in and were waiting to pass the automarketer they were still on the previous frequency so they did not hear this aircraft going around the aircraft is now descending down the glide slope and the crew can clearly see the runway lights ahead of them they can see also obviously that there is a rain shower over the approach but at this point during the approach they are in relatively nice weather with good visibility so the first officer actually decides to disconnect out the pilot and out the throttle and hand fly the aircraft to get a little bit of hand flying experience since when you're flying long-haul you might not do that very often at time 2245 the crew switches over to the tower frequency and when they speak to the tower the tower tells them that they are cleared land runway 2-1 left but also caution runway is wet and that a previously landed airbus 330 had reported breaking action as good the tower does not mention that the 737 that is just ahead of them on approach has gone around due to the rain so this means that the crew are now descending down they haven't received a special observation they don't know that the aircraft ahead of them has gone around and that's important because that might have kind of switched their mind into potential go around scenario the fact that the weather is much worse than what they were expecting it to be but the crew is completely unaware of this so they continue the approach and soon after this the first officer asks for flaps 25 he gets that from the captain that's the landing flaps and after this he makes remarks and he says the aircraft doesn't want to slow down the landing speed that they have selected is a v ref speed of 149 and a fly speed of 154 but at this point the crew is actually flying about 12 knots faster than that at 166 knots the captain acknowledges that the speed is high but it's still within the stabilized landing criteria which is vref to vref plus 20. so they continue to descend we can see from the flight data recorder that the trust is reduced momentarily but that first officer doesn't want to reduce it too much because once you have landing flops hanging out you you don't want to go back to idle for example because the drag of the aircraft and the kind of time it will take for the engines to spool up is is too high so he reduces it but then kind of sits there and the speed never really decreases below this 166 knots at around 350 feet descending the first officer asks the captain to put the windshield wipers on as they're now entering some light rain and as the rain now just becomes heavier and heavier and heavier the first officer starts to deviate above the glide slope for the first time the captain points this out saying you're getting high now as he looks out and he can still see the poppies that goes from three whites and one red which is the normal that you'll see in a 747 to four whites but he's also aware that they're now so close to the runway that you can't really judge the landing from the poppies anymore you have to look at the touchdown zone so as the aircraft descends through 100 feet the captain asks the first officer you okay and the first officer responds with ah yes they're now passing the threshold of the runway at 76 feet where they should have been at about 50 feet they're also about 15 knots faster than they should be but this even though it is both hot and high is still well within the manageable range of a 747 coming into such a long runway at 50 feet the nose of the aircraft starts coming up and the captain notices this this is quite early and it says get it down get it down you're into the flare the first officer acknowledges this uh but it doesn't really change anything he just continues to descend with the center rate about 300 feet per minute what he does do is he reduces the trust back to idle in preparation for the touchdown now things are starting to happen really quickly because as the aircraft was already both high and fast of the threshold is now doing a really slow flare it means that they're eating up valuable runway below them and at 30 feet the captain reaches over and switches the outer brake setting from three to four indicating that he's well aware that this is now a potential problem but it doesn't mention that he is doing this to the rest of the crew there's just no time for it at 10 feet the captain announces gore out the first officer immediately reacts to this by advancing the trust levels towards go around trust and preparing for the go around it seems like he was probably awaiting that call but one thing the first officer does not do is press the toga buttons that would have initiated the flight directors into go around mode because the aircraft is only at 10 feet and because of the enormous inertia of the 747 there's no way that they're not going to touch down so only a second after this the aircraft main gear touches down on the runway and here something very peculiar happens because it seems like they now get out of the worst part of the rain shower it means that the visibility is going up drastically and the captain takes the decision to revert his own go around decision into a landing decision he reaches over and on puts his hand on top of the first officer's hands and reduces the trust back to idol again but by doing so he actually misses to reduce trust level number one so that trust level is still set towards go around trust the other ones are at idle and there is a momentary confusion as you might understand about who actually has the controls here because the captain doesn't tell the first officer that he's taking this decision there are several issues with doing things like this and i'm going to get into why the captain took this decision and based on what later on the video but the immediate effect this has is that as the thrust levels are now being reduced back to idle um the spoilers on the wings does not come up okay generally speaking on a normal landing when the wheels start spinning up and the weight on wheel switches feels that they're on the ground the spoilers will immediately come up on the wing and this will force all of the weight of the aircraft down onto the brakes making the brakes more effective but since the truss lever on the engine number one is not in idle it means that the aircraft still thinks that maybe these guys want to try to go around so the spoilers does not come up but on the other hand the fact that all of the other three trust levels are reduced back to idle means that the outer brake that was set to four just prior to touchdown now switches to disarm instead so the aircraft is now on the ground more than a thousand meters in on the runway they've already done a very long landing but they don't have the spoilers up they don't have the outer brakes working and there's still a little bit of confusion what's going on and engine number one is still producing trust the first officer says at this point okay we're on and the captain asks you got it and the first officer says uh yeah yeah and at this point as well this is about two seconds after the initial touchdown the first officer reaches over and reduces the trust back to idle on the remaining number one engine which means that the spoilers are now coming up even though the spoilers are up the engines that were accelerating towards go around thrust when you cut the thrust on the engines it's not like an engine on a car for example they will still be accelerating for a while due to the inertia of the fans so they're still producing forward trust here and because there's been this confusion no one thinks about reaching over and selecting reverse thrusts so the engines even though they will start to decelerate quickly they're still producing a forward trust vector rather than the reverse trust vector that they would normally have which would help even if it's on idle it's still better than a forward trust vector when the aircraft pass about the midpoint on the runway is where there is a sign on the flight data recorder that the deceleration actually starts up in this point there was actually a small acceleration due to the engines uh producing forward trust the first officer must have noticed that the the aircraft is not decelerating at all so he's putting in max manual braking but as we were discussing before up until this point it's been raining fiercely on the runway and this runway is not grooved there are two different types of runway it's either the runway which is grooved which has little grooves in it as the name suggests that lets the water kind of drain out quickly from the runway and leaves a lot of surface for the aircraft tires to kind of grip onto or it's the ungrooved surface which in this case is concrete in bangkok and on this type of runway the runway is a little bit elevated at the center of the runway to allow the water to kind of rinse off but it takes a longer time so as the crew is now trying to get max manual braking in they're actually deviating a little bit to the left or center line and the flight data recorder shows that as they're now braking the anti-skid system jumps in almost immediately and that's most likely because of dynamic aqua planning dynamic aqua planning is something that's extremely dangerous the amount of aqua planning you get has to do with the speed of the aircraft the tire pressure and also the grooves in the tires but if you find yourself in aqua planning it's basically like the aircraft goes up water skis okay it's kind of going on top of the water removing almost all friction okay it's going to make the braking action for the aircraft essentially poor to nil and this is what this aircraft is now experiencing both pilots are now giving max manual braking but because the anti-skid system jumps in and makes sure that the tires doesn't come to a full stop the brakes are doing almost nothing and it's at this point that the use of reversers is the most important thing that you have but they're not selected neither will they be selected at any time during this landing rule when there is a thousand meters left of the runway the speed of the aircraft is still 134 knots and the aircraft is now slightly left of center line and it's likely that because they are not on the centerline and they're moving out towards the edges that's where there's more water which actually makes the situation worse the aircraft passes the opposite threshold at 96 knots they get beyond the stop way at 88 knots so that's when they leave the paved part of the runway and 117 meters later they run into the localizer antenna which is sitting on about a meter high concrete foundation as it does so the nose wheel collapses and so does the outer main landing gear on the right hand side this causes the nose of the aircraft to dig down into the soft ground as well as both the engines on the right hand wing 103 meters later the aircraft finally comes to a complete stop with the nose resting on a slightly elevated airport perimeter road now what's about to happen after this it's an almost equally interesting story and i'll tell you all about this after this short message this video is brought to you together with nordvpn now you know just as well as i do how important it is to protect you and your data in this day and age i use the nordvpn app whenever i'm out traveling so if i go into a cafe or an airport i want to use the public wi-fi well then i switch 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as well so as the aircraft touched down at time 22 46 30 the person started welcome to bangkok pa but he very quickly realized that this was not the normal landing so he stopped that pa at the same time some of the other cabin crew down in the uh the back of the aircraft also understood the same and started calling out brace brace and heads down grab ankles the way that they had been trained to do however not all cabin crew did this for reasons unknown as the aircraft came to a complete stop in the cockpit the first officer quickly started his memory items which included shutting down the engines using the the fire switches at the same time the captain tried to make a couple of pas to the passengers he tried it twice but it didn't work and the reason for that was because the nose gear had been pushed into the body of the aircraft and had actually damaged the electronics bay which is situated just behind the north gear and in that electronics bay the the kind of circuit for the pa system and the intercom system was situated so this meant that not only could the captain not make a pa to the passengers or to the cabin crew he couldn't even access the intercom system and neither could the cabin crew so they couldn't communicate with each other and this turned out to be a major hurdle when the captain realized this he told the second officer to run down and to liaise with the purser which is the head cabin crew it's important to understand that the boeing 747 is a really big aircraft okay it is divided into six different zones which are named a to f where a to e is on the main deck and f is the upper deck there are 10 emergency exits on the main deck and there are two emergency exits on the upper deck there are 16 cabin crew and to each of these 12 doors there's one cabin crew assigned and their responsibility if something like this happens is to stand by their doors and be ready to evacuate on a very short notice when the second officer came out and spoke to the purser you could tell that from the forest they know there was no fire going on the cabin and there was no major injuries so the purser actually left his door unattended and went up with the second officer back into the uh the cockpit it told the captain that his assessment was that all of the cabin crew was ready to evacuate in case they needed to and that there was no sign of a fire or major injuries in the cabin the captain took this into consideration when he decided whether or not he was going to evacuate and based on that decided not to at the moment as this discussion was going on the first officer tried to talk to her traffic control and traffic control was constantly calling um qantas one to see what their status was because they couldn't see the aircraft from the tower but anytime that the first officer tried to transmit he couldn't reach a traffic control so atc just kept calling about one minute after the aircraft had gone off the runway air traffic control got a report from some airport workers that was working in close proximity of where the aircraft went off and these workers told them what had happened so agency press the accident button and sent out the emergency equipment towards the runway end but because it was still raining and the ground was so soggy the emergency vehicles couldn't actually access the aircraft immediately they had to turn back and use a perimeter road instead to access the aircraft and that actually took quite a long time now during this time the uh the captain told the person to go back out into the cabin and check throughout the cabin talk to all the cabin crew and verify the situation the person did that and when it came to about midship over the wings the cabin crew and the passengers sitting there complained that there was a very foul smell in that area it smelled like rubber or electrical um he brought that information back to the captain and the captain then told him to open the overwing exits to ventilate the aircraft the problem with that though is if you want to open the doors to ventilate but not below the slides you're gonna have to disarm the slides prior to opening which is what the cabin crew did effectively rendering those emergency exits non-usable at the same time though in zone a which is closer with the damage nose wheel wars there was more passengers and cabin crew complaining about a really foul order and in their case they they actually felt fumes they had problems breathing and their eyes were watering up and there was actually an engineer working for qantas that was sitting in that section that recognized the the smell of hydraulic fluid unfortunately that information didn't reach the captain at time 2253 this is a full six minutes after the aircraft had come to complete stop the captain finally managed to reach air traffic control via the radio and ask them whether or not the emergency service is coming air traffic control tells them that they have already been dispatched and that they should be there momentarily now at the same time in the back of the aircraft the passengers are getting really really worried because remember during these six minutes when they've been sitting there the aircraft has turned off the engines which means that the only lighting they have is the emergency lighting on top of that they haven't heard anything from the captain because the pa system is not working and also they're getting really annoyed with the cabin crew because they feel that the cabin crew is not doing anything they're just standing by their doors what they don't understand is that in a situation like this the cabin cruise duties goes from being service to safety minded their job is to be standing by their doors to you know assess the situation look for fires look for the situation outside of the aircraft to be able to start an evacuation immediately so here although it's understandable that the passengers felt like this this is what you can expect if you find yourself in a situation like this at time 2257 the first fire fighters arrive at the scene they they pull out their firefighting equipment in case there would be a fire they also put some flood light up on the right hand side of the aircraft and they start to knock on the side of the aircraft to try to get the attention of the flight crew now that doesn't work obviously given the amount of noise that will be going on inside but the arrival is communicated through traffic control they also tell them that bosses are on the way to take the passengers on so the captain now decides to start what's called a precautionary disembarkation proportionate disembarkation is different than a full evacuation as in you can use just certain doors but it's still considered to be an emergency procedure they decide to use two of the doors on the right-hand side because the aircraft is tilted to the right it means that the slides will have a lesser angle on the left-hand side it will be much steeper and also they have the flood lights on that side so it'll be easy for the passengers to see initially as the evacuation starts since they're only using two doors there are a lot of bottlenecks that are opening up some of the passengers are taking their bags with them some of the cabin crew actually allows the passengers to take the bikes with them but here's a really important point whenever you have to use a slide on aircraft you cannot take your bags with you your hand luggage with you because you might be hurting other people you might also be damaging the slides so under no circumstances should you ever take your bags or hand luggage with you if you're evacuating an aircraft to a slide before the disembarkation is complete there's also a group of cabin crew from qantas that was supposed to do the outbound flight from bangkok that arrives at the scene and they try to gain access to the aircraft to see if they can help with something this was not seen like a great idea given the fact that they had no idea what was going on inside or what dangers there might be at time 2330 almost 43 minutes after the aircraft had come to a complete stop all passengers cabin crew and flight crew had vacated the aircraft safely with only some minor bruises so now it was time for the air accident investigation to take place and this actually turns out to be a very good example of why air accident investigations are so critical for the ongoing safety of the airline business because when you look at this accident it looks very clear from the onset who made the mistakes where the mistakes was made that led up to the eventual accident but that's not what the air accident investigation is about instead the accident investigation team wanted to know what the root causes were so that they could go to the bottom of that making sure that nothing like this happened again and that's why i have been indicating six different points six different critical points during this accident which the investigation team also kind of drilled into so let's start with the first one the base training experience of the captain so it turns out that this captain was a management pilot he had been a senior czech captain on the boeing 767 and he was a senior check captain on the boeing 747-400 and that job came with quite a lot of desk work right meant that he was flying way less than other pilots were doing in his job as a base trainer he would go out and fly with new pilots that were converted onto the type so he was doing touch and go landings and in that job he was very used to having to assess available runway distance whether or not a touch and go landing was safe to continue or if he had to reject it so that lay as a foundation to his decision to revert his previous decision to go around into a landing when the visibility suddenly cleared up and he could see that he had almost two kilometers of runway left that turned out to be a bad decision on this occasion and the investigation team drilled into how much flying experience he actually had during the previous 12 months and it turned out that it was quite a bit less than other line pilots and that led up to a recommendation that management pilots should be given more training on an ongoing basis to kind of make up for that lack the second and probably the most important point was the policy that qantas had at the time back in 1999 of using flaps 25 as a standard flap setting and idle reverse trust this was a decision that was taken in qantas back in 1997 when the investigation team started looking into it they saw that there had not been any real risk assessment done in accordance with this policy change it seems to have only been based on uh wanting to reduce noise and drag which means fuel costs and also maintenance on the trust reversal sleeves quantas had not been talking to boeing about this policy change if they had asked boeing boeing would have said that they did not recommend to use for example idle reverse trust as a standard because it could lead the pilots into a feeling of not really ever using reversers and when they actually needed to use them they wouldn't think of it as a possibility and this led to a recommendation that qantas needed to improve their risk assessment before making big policy changes like this and when the investigation team started looking into why the pilots hadn't decided to use flaps 30 instead if they knew they were coming into potentially flooded runway they realized that the pilots weren't really worried about runway flooding as an issue at all they associated poor braking action with wind drops procedures but not with wet or flooded runways they didn't even have access to the advisory information in their manuals regarding landing on very wet and flooded runways and this led to a recommendation of further training being given to the pilots in case they were going to go in and land on these type of runways point number three why the aircraft didn't want to slow down on front approach and this is quite interesting one because qantas actually had a monitoring system where they looked for risk parameters that were happening all of the network to see if something was happening that they needed to attend to and the fact was that the number of approaches which had been carried out slightly high on speed or even too high on speed had increased quite a lot around 35 percent when the change was made to the flap policy to use flaps 25 rather than flaps 30. the pilots said that the 747 was easier to handle speed wise with flaps 30 but since the policy was now to use flaps 25 as a standard flap this had started to happen so those figures were available to qantas but they hadn't been highlighted and all of this brought together this led to qantas actually abandoning the standard flaps 25 and idle reverse policy point number four the captain's decision to revert his go around decision to a landing decision we've already touched on a little bit that had to do with the captain's previous experience as a base training captain but it also highlighted the importance of communication into cockpit to make sure that the whatever decision has been taken is very clearly communicated between all three pilots in this case so that no ambiguity exists or whether or not they're in a go around or in a landing this confusion probably led to the first officer completely missing that he hadn't selected reverse trust at all it's even possible that his movement of the trust level number one back to um to idol might have translated into him thinking that he had taken reverse trust even though he hadn't done it because of the stress of the situation so that also led to some recommendations regarding crew resource management crm point number five communication of the aircraft came to a stop the air accident investigation team very quickly realized that the fact that the nose gear had collapsed inwards and damaged the circuitry that had to do with the pa system and the cabin intercom system had a really severe impact on the communication between the crew and this big aircraft so a recommendation was made to boeing to make a redundant system which was not reliant on two components sitting in the same position behind the nose wheel which was sure to be damaged in any type of overrun accident like this they also recommended to the australian authorities and to quantas to install loud hailers in the aircraft because this was actually a requirement in america and in europe but it wasn't a requirement in australia at the time and it would have helped in case this would have developed into a full-blown evacuation and last but not least number six the decision not to evacuate so the captain was asked why he decided not to evacuate the aircraft immediately even though he knew that the aircraft had gone off and then it was probably damaged the captain said that he based that decision on the fact that there was no reports of any fired he knew that in case he started an evacuation there would be people who would hurt themselves as part of the evacuation he also knew that it was rainy and dark outside and if he started evacuating before they had any emergency equipment outside it was a possibility that the passengers might start moving towards the only light they could see which would be the terminal building and that would mean that they would go into a potentially active runway which was run by 2-1 right in bangkok so he had a full thought process involved here now if he had been made aware of the fumes in the forward part of the aircraft he might have started evacuation anyway but given the information that he had because of the problems of communicating in the aircraft he based his decision on the overall safety for as many people as possible and it turned out that that was a correct decision to make after disembarkation so what looks as something that doesn't make any kind of sense when you look at it as a glance might make much more sense when you actually dig into it which is what an air accident investigation is supposed to do if you want to check out another video where the aircraft started accelerating uncontrollably after landing well then check out this video up here or if you just want to binge watch air accident investigation videos i've got just the playlist for you up here before you go remember the acronym class i want you to report class complete in the comments section below have an absolutely fantastic day and i'll see you next time bye

Channel: Mentour Pilot

Views: 241,693

Rating: 4.9435353 out of 5

Keywords: qantas flight 1, air crash investigation 2021, air crash investigation full episodes, seconds from disaster plane crash, aviation accidents, aviation accidents documentary, aviation accident clips crash animation, aviation accidents explained, aviation accidents and incidents, aviation accident that changed, aviation accident investigation reports, Mentour Pilot, Mentour Pilot crash investigation, Fear of flying, fear of flying help, Nervous flyer, Boeing 747, Jumbo Jet, Boeing

Id: gR24_39ymkU

Length: 39min 2sec (2342 seconds)

Published: Sat Sep 18 2021