Narrator: The Boeing 737 Max was the fastest-selling
airliner in Boeing history, selling more than 5,000 aircraft
over the past few years. But in April and May, Boeing sold zero. The 737 Max was big, fuel-efficient, and more affordable than other planes. It was a popular plane
until a particular sensor became a problem, which eventually led to two fatal crashes in five months, killing everyone on both
flights: 346 people total. Since then, there has
been a worldwide grounding of the 737 Max, lawsuits from pilots and from families affected by the crashes, and congressional hearings, and the US Department of Justice has begun a criminal investigation. Boeing took a long time
to address the issues, which only seems to
have made things worse. With modifications to the
plane's software underway and hopes that it will fly again soon, the question remains: Can Boeing bounce back? This wasn't the first time Boeing had a problem with their designs. In the 1960s, the Boeing 727
had issues with its new wings. In the 1990s, the Boeing 737
had issues with its rudder. And in 2013, the Boeing 787 Dreamliner had issues with its
battery catching on fire. Boeing has a history of
introducing new designs that lack advice from outside
experts to ensure safety. And this sensor problem with
the 737 Max was no different. Christine Negroni: How the
Boeing 737 Maxes crashed, not one but two occasions, is the result of complicated decisions that were made early on in the process when they were trying to decide
what they were going to do with their next narrow-body aircraft in a competitive market with Airbus. And they decided, rather
than build a new plane, they would go back and
tinker with an old plane. Narrator: Boeing took the
737 model from the 1960s and added larger engines
to create the 737 Max. This new design caused the
nose of the plane to point up. Boeing added the
Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, also known as MCAS, to essentially keep the
nose from pointing up. Negroni: And then, of
course, the next problem was that they didn't tell the
pilots or even the airline that this solution
existed on the aircraft. What would happen when the MCAS triggered is that the airplane
would not give control back to the pilots. It would continue to put the airplane in a nose-down position. And even when the pilots recognized that maybe there was a
problem with this system and tried to turn it off,
the forces on the tail were so great that they were unable to physically override the nose-down. Narrator: Pilots also lacked proper training with the MCAS. They were trained on an
iPad instead of a simulator to cut costs and shorten training time. And the two planes that crashed didn't have the optional
angle-of-attack safety feature that could have alerted pilots if the plane was pointing
in the wrong direction, and that Boeing charged extra for. Sinéad Baker: So this increased
public mistrust of Boeing is probably a result of
both the two fatal crashes, but also how Boeing responded to them. The public is definitely
skeptical of Boeing after these two crashes. A recent poll found that 41% of Americans wouldn't fly on the 737 Max
until it was back in service for six months and
there were no incidents. It took Boeing almost a
month to issue an apology, to say, "I'm sorry for the first time." And, in the meantime, the US
was slow to ground the planes compared to other countries,
which maybe made people feel like the US and its safety regulators couldn't be fully trusted. Narrator: Experts say
that this was a mistake, that it made Boeing look insincere, and that it prioritized
profit over people. Irv Schenkler: Had they
opened up, had the CEO or another senior executive spoken to this more
general sense of concern, indicating that the company
is doing everything it can as soon as it can to find out
more and will report back, that could have at
least lessened the sense that the company was being evasive. Narrator: Boeing's slow
response has cost them. The company wasn't able
to sell any 737 Maxes for three months after they
were grounded in March. Baker: Boeing is doing a
lot of things at the moment in an attempt to win back people's trust. They've been apologizing more frequently, they've been offering to fly
their CEO first on the plane in a bid to prove that it's safe, and they've also been organizing
more sales of the plane to prove just how confident the industry still is in the jet. Narrator: During the 2019 Paris Air Show, Boeing announced its first buyer since the 737 Max grounding. International Airlines Group, the parent company of British
Airways and other airlines, placed an order for 200 737 Max planes. While the deal would
normally carry a list price of $24 billion, it was likely discounted because of Boeing's current woes. Though the planes won't start
to be delivered until 2023, the sale gives the company a
much-needed vote of confidence. Schenkler: You can't manage a
crisis, but you can definitely manage how you communicate about it. They need to be able to get affirmation from individuals and
groups who are credible and who were perhaps skeptical
and who could indicate that the company is righting its wrongs, and that would go, I think, a long way towards ultimately
regaining a degree of trust. But, again, it's a slow process. Narrator: Boeing may have gained support from certain airlines. But the company also needs to show pilots, flight attendants, regulators,
and the general public that it cares, through words and actions, that its planes are safe to fly and that the company can be trusted. Negroni: Boeing knows that
the 737 Max cannot survive another event with this MCAS system. So nobody wants the fix
to work more than Boeing. We can rest assured that
its desire is there. Is it capable of understanding
all the potential faults, all the potential pathways, and
all of the required remedies and instituting them is the next question. Narrator: One thing Boeing
should definitely do? Show it is listening to experts and voices from outside the company. Negroni: I think Boeing needs
to be opened to the media. I think Boeing needs to
stop shutting out reporters and stop closing down and obstacating when legitimate questions are raised, because I don't think
it does them any good. Narrator: The crisis has
already been pretty expensive for the company, and it's
likely to cost them even more. Baker: In the first quarter of
the year, it lost $1 billion. And airlines around the world now want compensation from
Boeing, even those who say that they still completely
trust Boeing and the plane. It's also facing lawsuits from
families around the world, some for hundreds of millions of dollars. So, chances are, this whole thing is going to cost Boeing billions. Narrator: There's no
telling when the 737 Max will be cleared to fly again. Recent reports indicate that the software fix may not even work and that the plane might
require a hardware fix, which would be even more expensive and take even more time. But experts do believe that Boeing has a chance to recover from this. The company has to be much more open about what it is doing,
while also making sure that there are no more
issues with its planes. Negroni: I think it's
probably 60/40 that Boeing commercial aircraft
will recover from this. But I definitely think
that they've been shaken up enough to know they have
to change their ways. Narrator: What do you think? Would you fly on a 737 Max when airlines start using them again? Let us know in the comments.
