Since bowing out of the console race over
20 years ago, we’re still yet to see anyone quite like Sega. Hitting lofty heights and shocking lows with
as much breakneck speed as their nippy blue hedgehog, all in the space of a decade, it’s
no wonder the saga of Sega in the 90s still holds an air of reverence. A true veteran of the Console Wars, this plucky
underdog – or under-‘hog, if you will – managed an impossible feat. At the height of Nintendo’s power, they
beat that goliath at their own game, taking the home console market by storm with the
hip, trendy, and oh-so-radical Mega Drive… Or ‘Genesis’, if you wanna get Sega of
America about this. For an all-too-brief moment in the early 90s,
they were on top of the world… until it all came crashing down in a storm of company
division, fierce competition, and baffling decisions in a swiftly changing market. And one console sits at the heart of this
storm: The Sega Saturn. This was to be Sega’s entry into the 32-bit
market, and on paper, the run-up was perfect. Old rivals Nintendo were running late, and
Sony were cocky, but inexperienced newcomers. But somehow, Sega fumbled, and in a cruel
twist of fate, the Saturn’s legacy became famous not for its own accomplishments, but
the actions of their new challenger, who’s legendary “$299” mic-drop moment at E3
1995 left the more expensive Saturn dead upon arrival. The poor thing only lasted a few hours. The Saturn still gained a good cult following,
as its top-quality arcade ports, hidden gems, and unique blend of 2D and 3D hardware, gave
it an unmistakeably distinct personality. However, it was also a masterclass in how
NOT to break into the newly-emerging 3D console space. And because the Saturn was so intrinsically
linked with Sega’s turn of fortunes, it makes this story such a fascinating one, covering
not just a single console failure, but the beginning of the end for Sega’s hardware
empire. Soget comfy, grab your funky Nights into Dreams
hat, and sink into that Daytona bucket chair, because it’s one hell of a ride to Saturn… For full context, let’s head back to the
origin point of Sega – or should we say, Sega’s Genesis? [long pause, to camera]
……. I don’t get it. All the way back in 1940, Sega was founded
under the name ‘Standard Games’, producing coin-operated arcade games in Hawaii, before
moving to Japan in 1952 and becoming ‘Service Games of Japan’… HEY, PAY ATTENTION! This IS relevant, if only to remember Sega’s
long history in the arcade business, decades before video game tech, when mechanical games
and slot machines were the norm. Of course, Sega’s story reallypicks up in
the 90s, thanks to their generation-defining Genesis and/or Mega Drive. Following their humble SG-1000 and Master
System, the third time was the charm. Launching in 1988 to 1989, the Genesis got
ahead of the upcoming Super Nintendo by a couple of years, and while it couldn’t dislodge
Nintendo’s firm grasp inJapan, in western markets, it was a smash hit. In 1990, Sega hired Tom Kalinske – you might’ve
heard of him – as President of Sega of America, to push the advantage in the US, and a year
later, a certain rapid blue boy debuted, kickstarting the golden era for Sega. Armed with Sonic, a sassy, speedy mascot infinitely
cooler than a plump moustachioed plumber, along with a relentless marketing campaign
dissing their rivals with classic slogans like “Sega does what Nintendon’t”, all
while pushing their hardware superiority with gimmicks like “Blast Processing”, Sega
cleaned up the competition. Suddenly, they had the hip, trendy console,
compared to the childish Nintendo withall their baby games! ‘Project Saturn’ began as early as 1992,
as despite success in the west, Japan was no closer to joining Team Blue. More detail on the Saturn’s design is coming
soon, but let’s just say Sega became increasingly worried about the competition, which influenced
their 32-bit machine considerably. With the Panasonic 3DO and Atari Jaguar already
out, and Sony’s upcoming console gaining hype, Sega started bolting on parts to Saturn’s
existing hardware and pushing for an earlier launch, along with a stop-gap solution to
stall their rivals – the 32X addon for the Genesis. This visible panic was a far cry from their
cool confidence of the Genesis era. On 21st November 1994, the 32X launched in
North America, while one day later, their next-generation Saturn arrived in Japan. Crucially, they beat PlayStation to the punch
by a couple of weeks in Japan, and amazingly, this plan worked! At least, to begin with… Despite boasting only 2 exclusives out of
5 launch titles, Saturn sold half a million units, compared to PlayStation’s 300,000. Truly, a Christmas miracle! In the US, Saturn was set for a September
1995 launch, heavily marketed as “Saturn-day” the 2nd – but Sega of Japan couldn’t hold
their nerve, and encouraged by the early lead, they told Kalinske the release date would
be secretly brought forward. The new date? May 11th, 1995, at the inaugural E3 trade
show. Where a simple 3-digit number would change
Sega’s fate forever… Poor Saturn, that’s got to be the worst
first day on the job ever… You may already be familiar with Sony’s
infamous mic-drop moment at E3 1995, but the finer details are fascinating, so let’s
dive in. Sega took the stage first, asTom Kalinske
announced to the world that their upcoming 32-bit Saturnwasn’t coming out in September… it was available right now! 30,000 Saturns were shipped out to Toys R
Us, Babbage’s, Electronics Boutique, and Software Etc, ready for sale immediately,
at $399 a pop, as part of a summer rollout. What a delightful surprise, right? The problem was, this wasn’t just a surprise
to the general public, but to pretty much everyone else. Major retailerslike Best Buy and Walmart were
understandably furious about being left out of the loop, and KB Toys even dropped Sega’s
products from store shelves entirely! Developers were angry about this release date,
as many would miss a golden opportunity to be part of a console launch lineup, not to
mention the damage this would do to a future player base, and future sales for their own
products. Even fans were annoyed too, given they only
shipped 30,000 units, making it near impossible to get a Saturn on launch day. This surprise ‘shadow drop’ was misguided
enough, but then Sony delivered the killer blow. On the same stage, on the same day, Steve
Race, the Head of Sony Computer Entertainment, is due on stage for a so-called ‘brief speech’. Race calmly walks up to the podium, shuffles
his big stack of papers around, pauses, and says one thing: Two Ninety-Nine. And the crowd goes wild. With just three digits, Sony single-handedly
destroyed what little credibility Saturn had left, undercutting its price by 100 dollars. What really adds some spice to this story
is that Steve Race previously worked for Sega – in fact, he was Kalinske’s right-hand
man in marketing, a major part of the genius behind the Genesis success story. Kalinske stated himself years later, that
“Steve knew all our secrets”, but despite the supposed insider knowledge, Race had been
debating with Sony about their own price “right up until that morning” of E3. The Saturn had been sunk by the same guy that
helped kickstart Sega’s Golden Age. As if that’s not enough drama, Race resigned
from Sony a couple of months after, before the PlayStation even launched in America,
due to disagreements with their head office in Japan. What a rollercoaster. Back to E3, the 32-bit battle broke out in
full swing after the presentations: Sega turned up their booth speakers near Sony, drowning
out their demos; Sony set up posters saying “if you bought a Saturn, your head was in
Uranus”. Steve Race even popped Kalinske’s inflatable
Sonic, the absolute villain! Must’ve taken ages to pick up all those
rings it dropped… The Saturn’s fate seemed a cruel irony for
Kalinske, a man who helped organise the first E3, but despite that, he never seemed too
bothered*. Almost as if he knew how doomed they were
from the start… The big 2-9-9 looked like a knockout blow,
but the Saturn had already entered the ring dazed and confused. The Genesis did so well partly thanks to its
early lead, releasing two years before the Super Nintendo. This wasn’t a new tactic, however, as Sega’s
company ethos has always been “gotta go fast”. Remember their coin-op arcade roots we mentioned? In that market, embracing new technology and
providing the latest cool gimmicks was key to keeping customers coming and the coin flowing. But playing at the cutting edge means you
sometimes end up injuring yourself. On the back of the Genesis – quite literally
– came the Sega CD, in 1991. The add-on represented an early step towards
the disk-based future of gaming. Sadly, it flopped commercially, what with
a retail price of $300 being more expensive than the host console, and all for a low number
and low quality of titles. It’s a minor footnote in the Saturn’s
story, but one Sega CD developer is noteworthy – Sony Imagesoft, who Sega helped on the
software side. ForeShadow the Hedgehog has a bad feeling
about this… *
*Could stay to-camera here, zoom on face, as it falls from smiling to serious, while
VO says Foreshadow line… By 1992, western markets were still caught
up in Genesis Fever, but Japan’s numbers were rather dismal, so Sega began planning
their next big thing, codenamed ‘Saturn’, set to be the ultimate pixel powerhouse. But don’t take my word for it –pop that
hood and take a look! This bad boy was packing not one, but TWO
CPUs – Hitachi’s new SH-2 chip – along with not one, but TWO Video Graphics Processors–
one for sprites and polygons, the other for 3D and backgrounds. The high-end Yamaha sound processor – just
one this time, sorry – was capable of high-quality output, like this banger:
‘Daytoooonaaaa’ clip from Launch Games bit
And naturally, the CD-ROM drive itself meant games had loads more storage space, for a
fraction of the production cost of cartridges. Yes, that’s a lot of hardware. No, it’s not normal to have a billion processors,
not for this era at least. Originally, Sega wanted it to be a 2D sprite-machine
on steroids – a Mega Drive on Overdrive – because even though their Virtua Fighter
took arcades by storm in ’93, with its revolutionary 3D graphics, they still thought home consoles
were years away from replicating this. The first iteration of Saturn’s design was
considered almost done in late 1993, but then the next-gen competition arrived, with the
Panasonic 3DO and the Atari Jaguar, and Sega started panicking about being left behind-
an unthinkable proposition! Then rumours started circling about the PlayStation’s
3D polygonal power, sending Sega into full panic mode. 3D graphics were not only possible, but coming
sooner than they thought, so in a real Tower of Power tribute, Sega started awkwardly bolting
new bits to their existing hardware to beef it up. Sega’s Director and veteran engineering
mastermind, Hideki Sato, added another SH-2 processor to help calculate 3D spaces, though
this could’ve been the plan all along, since this processor was designed to work efficiently
in pairs. A second Video Processor was also added to
produce more polygons, although the Saturn used four-sided shapes, so technically they’d
be called… quadrilatergons? I don’t know, I’m not a doctor. Naturally, this wacky hardware setup made
development far more difficult. The potential for gorgeous 2D sprites and
slick 3D models was high, but it needed a genius to even navigate it. Meanwhile, Sony’s new machine included a
BIOS and an API that made development far more user-friendly, which of course Saturn
DIDN’T have – they didn’t even provide studios with development tools or documentationat
first! These complex Saturn components weren’t
even cost effective, either – they were basically ‘off-the-shelf’ parts from companies
like Hitachi and Yamaha, compared to Sony, who were able to make custom parts all on
their own! Saturn’s hardware was a mess, and Sega were
right to be worried about the competition… but could this competition have been avoided
altogether? Looking at video game history in the 90s often
feels like one big What If moment. In an alternate universe, the fabled Nintendo
PlayStation could’ve been a reality, uniting two great houses that surely would’ve dominated
the industry. Instead, Nintendo burned Sony, which gave
them renewed determination to break into the video game market. That particular tale has been told many times,
but less infamous is Sony’s almost deal with Sega. We believe this happened at some point in
1992: Kalinske and his teamat Sega of America were underwhelmed by early hardware specs
for the Saturn, so they met with Sony to discuss the idea of a joint console. The logic was, since Sega always took a loss
on hardware sales, they’d split the cost of hardware, but not software – Sega keeps
all the profits from their own games, likewise for Sony. Kalinske had to convince the higher-ups in
Japan, however, which included Sega President Hayao Nakayama*, the notoriously strict, straight-talkingboss. *Hi-Yow Na-ka-yah-ma
During this meeting, it became apparent that Nakayama was not a fan of Sony President Norio
Ohga, who revealed that Sega’s old owners Paramount almost sold Sega to Sony in 1983,
and Ohgathen went on to annoy Nakayama further by dodging the topic of partnership with several
long, winding anecdotes. In the end, both parties agreed it wouldn’t
work out. Much like Nintendo, Sega feared the partnership
would be uneven because of Sony’s larger size, so Nakayama said:
“Why should we help Sony in that way? We’ll do our own system, and they can do
whatever they want.” The outspoken Kalinske called it “the stupidest
decision in the history of business”. And I'm sure ForeShadow the Hedgehog might
have some choice words about it too... “be careful what you wish for…” Huh… But wait, this ‘What If’ gets better. On his personal quest to outdo Sega of Japan’s
pitched Saturn, Kalinske met with Jim Clark, chairman of Silicon Graphics, who were experts
in 3D graphics and movie VFX. Their new chipsetwas ideal for next generation
consoles, but after meeting them, Sega of Japan once again said no. Hideki Sato, the hardware maestro, said the
chip was too big, and would produce too much run-off waste in production. This didn’t mean the chip was literally
too big for the console itself. This was about the manufacturing process,
as multiple chips are made on a large ‘wafer’ and carved out, which creates varying degrees
of excess material, so size and yield rates are quite important here. To camera, explaining with actual wafer/cracker? Break off pieces, then eat the ‘excess’
bits…. Pause, “What?” Kalinske was beyond exasperated. This wonderchip seemed more advanced in every
way, and still Japan said no. So when he broke the bad news to Silicon Graphics,
he suggested another game company to Jim Clark, saying “I think their name starts with an
N”. Yes, this tasty forbidden chip ended up powering
the Nintendo 64. Sega had the opportunity to work with Sony
on a CD-based console, AND use the powerful chipset that the Nintendo 64 would end up
using, but they blew it on both counts. Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but even at
the time, these decisions from Sega were mind-boggling. At least Sega also dodged a possible partnership
with the ill-fated 3DO, so that’s a silver lining. The frustrated Kalinske had one more trick
up his sleeve, however… Shall we get back to something Sega actually
did make? What? The Saturn? No, we’re talking about the 32X, silly! Codenamed “Project Mars”, the ill-fated
add-on for the Genesis was designed to be a cheaper entry point to the 32-bit era, aiming
to capitalise on the large user base of the Genesis. It was also intended to fill the gap before
the Saturn released in certain territories, and to act as a speed bump against the competition. In reality, all it did was provide competition
for itself, splitting the market and confusing fans and studios alike. ‘Project Mars’ was originally conceived
as a standalone unit, essentially an upgraded ‘Genesis Pro’, but the US team pushed
for it to become an add-on instead, to avoid alienating their existing fanbase. They believed the Genesis still had another
year of life at least, and Kalinske was also keen to stop the undercooked Saturn from being
rushed out. They borrowed elements from the Saturn’s
production, like the SH-2 processors, and Sega of America headed up the 32X project,
going head-to-head with Sega of Japan over hardware. The result was, predictably, a disaster. It had only 6 games at launch, totalling just
40 in its lifetime; it retailed for $160, far too much for the lack of games available;
it looked like a mushroom-shaped tumour, requiring even more cords and adapters to work. But most damning was how the 32X launched
in the US in November 1994, just ONE DAY before the Saturn released in Japan. Many fans were left wondering why they should
drop a significant chunk of cash on a system that would be obsolete in less than a year,
and wouldn’t even play the newer Saturn games anyway? Plus, Donkey Kong Country had just launched
for the SNES, boasting some incredible graphical wizardry, all WITHOUT needing an expensive
add-on… so why couldn’t Sega do this? Finally, any brave souls who DID drop money
on Sega’s so-called ‘Band-Aid’, would be less likely to upgrade again in a few months. Sega split the bits, and paid the price. There’s nothing wrong with a lower-cost
entry to next-gen gaming of course – look at the early popularity of the Xbox Series
S. But thanks to timing, price, practicality
and alack of games, this 32-bit split not only harmed the 32X, but actively undermined
the chances of the Saturn, which had enough problems to deal with anyway. Kalinske later admitted the 32X was mostly
just a ‘marketing ploy’. Nakayama’s eventual replacement as President
of Sega, ShoichiroIrimajiri*, called it “a huge strategic blunder.”. *show-ee-chee-row Ee-ree-ma-jee-ree
Any comment from the hedgehog this time?[pause, hands another paper]
…Well, this is just nothing but expletives. And by March 1995, Kalinske had received the
order to surprise launch the Saturn at E3 that year, giving the 32X market just half
a year before being totally cannibalised. Why was Sega so determined to sabotage itself
at every opportunity? Well, we have a couple of theories… Keep your voice down, because it’s time
to talk office politics. We’ve already been introduced to the key
figures on either side of this rift: in Japan, no-nonsense ‘tough guy’ President Nakayama;
and in America, Tom Kalinske, the marketing maverick who conquered Nintendo. But they weren’t necessarily personal rivals
– Nakayama was actually a big fan of Kalinske! He convinced Tom to join in 1990, and despite
hating Kalinske’s hyper-aggressive plan to topple Nintendo, Nakayama kept faith in
this strategy, which paid off big-time, giving Kalinske free rein to run Sega’s US operations,
for a time. That is, until around ’93,‘94, where Sega
of America started swiftly losing their autonomy, almost out of nowhere, leading to the bizarre
decisions you’ve seen so far. It turns out, Nakayama’s admiration for
Kalinske during the Genesis era translated to disappointment in his own team, as Sega
continued to struggle in Japan. Apparently, he’dberate staff every Monday
for their perceived failures, asking why revenue wasn’t up like “Tom has in the United
States” – he even got physical, sometimes slapping subordinates around. As Kalinske put it, if you’re a middle manager
getting yelled at every week, “you start to hate this Tom guy”. Eventually, those same people rise the ranks
in Sega of Japan, still holding that grudge, and start persuading Nakayama to tighten the
leash. Sega of America were literally a victim of
their own success – at least, this is the most popular narrative, a theory held by Kalinske
himself – but it’s important to remember most of what we know comes from Sega of America. What about Japan’s side to the story? Sources aren’t as readily available, but
there’s a good chance this change simply boiled down to the most obvious aspect of
business: money. 1993 felt like Sega at its peak, but if that
were true, why would Nakayama state in a yearly review that they’d “suffered hardship
this past year”? He cited three reasons for this: the worsening
economic climate globally; the appreciation of the Yen, which sounds like great news for
a Japanese company, except when their biggest sales are earned overseas; and finally, an
‘off-season’ for arcade and home markets. AKA, a mid-generation slump. While overall revenue looked ok by 1994, export
revenue had dipped massively, and to make matters worse, Sega of America was haemorrhaging
money by this stage. It cost a lot to overtake a market leader
like Nintendo, and their advertising budget alone went up from $10 million in 1989, to
$95 million for 1993. Factor in the failed Sega CD, the design costs
of the Saturn and 32X, other wacky experiments like the Sega Pods and the Activator, Mega
Drive’s failure in Japan, consoles being discounted at a heavy loss… Profits were falling even in 1993, so these
so-called ‘glory years’ looked much more grim from high up in Sega HQ. Whatever the reason for Japan’s increasing
interference, be it old grudges, or simple budget constraints, rushing out their next
console wasn’t the solution, and that impacted the most important part of a console itself:
the games… It speaks volumes about how badly the Saturn
was handled before it even released, that we’re only NOW covering the actual games. It’d be easy to trot out the classic“it
didn’t have enough games!” line, and swiftly move on, but that isn’t
entirely true. Across its lifetime, the Saturn hosted 1,046
games, give or take – still miles behind the PlayStation’s ludicrous total of almost
8,000, but compared to the Nintendo 64’s miniscule 388 games, Saturn’s library was
respectable! The only problem was, 75% of that library
were Japan exclusives, around 785 of them. That leaves only 261 western releases, even
less than the N64’s western library of 303. This skewed distributioncould have evolved
from Sega’s early, encouraging lead over Sony in Japan – in 1996, Kalinske even claimed
“we are killing Sony” in that market, which sounds ridiculous now, but wasn’t
completely delusional at the time! However, between the development difficulties
from awkward hardware, the audience split between 32X and Saturn, and the surprise early
launch, developers were playing catch-up since day one – particularly noticeable in the
sparse launch lineups. Japan had five titles, and only two first-party
exclusives: the excellent, albeit downgraded arcade port of Virtua Fighter, and mediocre
FMV detective game, Wan Chai Connection. Virtua Fighter single-handedly carried the
Japanese launch, but Sega wouldn’t be so lucky elsewhere. The US got six titles, with Daytona USA and
Panzer Dragoon being the other standouts, and the European launch 2 months later somehow
got LESS than this, having to wait for Panzer Dragoon and Pebble Beach Golf Links. We could forgive ONE delay, but how DARE you
keep us from our Pebble Beach Golf Links, Sega? Had the US stuck to their original September
release date, they could’ve added another 8 names to that lineup, including 2.5D platformer
‘Bug!’, hack and slash-er Shinobi Legions, and the iconicMyst. It’s not like the Saturn was devoid of high-quality
titles during its lifespan, either. Sega’s arcade credentials produced classics
like Sega Rally Championship, Virtua Cop, House of the Dead, and Die Hard Arcade. The Saturn also became an RPG powerhouse,
withShining Force 3, Grandia, Panzer Dragoon Saga, Magic Knight Rayearth, and countless
others amongst a whopping 135 role-playing games. But again, many of these were Japan-only releases,
over 100 according to some sources. And this hints at another issue, which wasn’t
about quantity OR quality… it was the TYPE of games being offered. The Saturn’s strengths were pick-up-and-play
arcade ports, Role-Playing Games, classic Shoot-Em-Ups, and 2D sprite-based platformers. But the market was changing, and new genres
were emerging as games explored proper 3D. Even with Saturn’s best titles, most of
them felt too familiar; mere improvements of existing formats. By comparison, Sony seemed to offer fresh
new experiences on every disk. A long list of PS1 classics left their mark
on the industry: Crash Bandicoot, Wipeout, Twisted Metal, Tomb Raider, Resident Evil,
Tekken, Ridge Racer, Parappa the Rapper, Final Fantasy VII…
…all influential in various ways, and all those titles released in the first two years
of the PlayStation, while the Saturn was still very much alive. And yes, we know some of these did come to
the Saturn too – Tomb Raider actually debuted on Saturn a month before PlayStation! But really, do any of us associate the original
Tomb Raider, Resident Evil, or Wipeout with the Saturn? …didn’t think so. The absence of hit sequels only hurt the Saturn
further. Third parties flocked to the PlayStation,
leaving Saturn lacking in key areas that Sega once excelled in, such as their licensed sports
titles. EA was a notable loss, leaving to back the
Panasonic 3DO, before backing the winning horse in Sony. Leaked marketing documents from 1996 say it
best: “Sports drove Sega Genesis’ success. Sports is now a liability on Saturn.” Most of Saturn’s sports lineup was either
poor quality, delayed past peak release time, or just non-existent.** Sony also negotiated hard to entice heavy
hitters like Square, Konami, and Williams Entertainment, later known as Midway. One of the biggest moves was securing a deal
with Namco for Tekken and Ridge Racer, both effective answers to Daytona USA and Virtua
Fighter, hitting Sega where it really hurt, right in their arcade credentials. Sega was outdone in every metric, but one
notable absence might just have changed their fortunes… With overwhelming odds stacked against the
poor Saturn, only one star had enough pulling power to stand a chance at saving the doomed
console – and with all due respect, it wasn’t Nights or Akira Yuki. Yes, we had to Google those names, which proves
our point. The Saturn needed Sonic, a name so synonymous
with Sega, that his absence in this video so far is weird enough – to miss a Sega
console would be unthinkable! Fans were certain it was coming at some point,
and many hoped it’d be a revolutionary step into three dimensions, unleashing the true
power of the Saturn. Something extraordinary. Something explosive. Something… Extreme. Unfortunately, the tale of Sonic X-Treme became
a metaphor for everything wrong with the Saturn itself. It was a hodgepodge of different ideas pulled
in different directions, hampered by internal squabbles, needlessly complex development,
and a rushed timeline. In late 1994, the project was given to Sega
Technical Institute, the American team behind Sonic the Hedgehog 2 – and funnily enough,
a team founded by Mark Cerny, Sony’s future hardware guru, and another ex-Sega employee
that would contribute to their downfall… Early concepts bounced from isometric views,
to 2.5D, to fully 3D formats, and went from a 32X game, to numerous ever-changing versions
of Saturn hardware. When Sonic creator Yuji Naka saw their progress,
he simply shook his head and said: “good luck”. …But hey, he made Balan Wonderworld and
then got caught for insider trading, so what does he know?! Development was split into two groups, working
independently on two separate engines. One focused on the main levels, adopting a
hybrid 2.5D platformer approach, with a funky fish-eye lens effect, all developed on PC,
to be ported to Saturn later. The other group made the boss stages, set
in open 3D arenas, coded natively on the Saturn itself. By March 1996, Nakayama inspected both parts,
but the ‘Main Level’ demo was an old version, poorly ported from PC, generally not representative
of their current progress. The ‘Boss Stage’ demo looked moreimpressive,
so Nakayama ordered the whole game to be made like that, despite those sections only being
a smaller part of the experience. So the majority of the game needed remaking
from scratch, and they only had a few months to do it, to meet an October 1996 deadline. Meanwhile, Yuji Naka’s Sonic Team were finalising
Nights into Dreams, and after seeing an early build, programmer Chris Coffin asked Sega
for the dev tools and code for Nights, knowing it would help their efforts massively. Amazingly, he got them! And everyone lived happily ever after… For about two weeks. Turns out, Naka was very protective of his
work, and he wasn’t consulted about Sega sharing his precious code, so he redacted
it all from Sonic X-Treme, setting the team back even further. Oh, so THAT sort of insider trading is off
limits, is it Naka? The ‘Boss Stage’ team went full crunch
mode, working sickening 20-hour days, and despite orders, the other team were determined
to finish their vision, crunching equally hard. Of course, this crunch took its toll on both
teams. Chris Senn, animator-turned-lead designer
for Team Main Level, fell ill and was told he had just six months to live, and Coffin
on the Boss engine team caught severe pneumonia that almost killed him. The game was cancelled not long after, and
so Sonic X-Treme was confined to the big ‘What If’ bin, along with Sega’s future console
ambitions, and most of their mid-90s endeavours. Sonic did grace the Saturn a few times, but
Sonic 3D Blast was a Genesis port that was anything but a blast in 3D; Sonic R was a
mediocre racer; and Sonic Jam was just a compilation of old Mega Drive titles. The latter did include a bonus 3D stage, however,
presumably as an ‘F- You’ from Naka’s team, showing what they could’ve done if
they really wanted. A whole segment of this video dedicated to
a game that never released might seem like overkill, but Sonic really could have changed
everything. One undeniably good game, at the dawn of the
32-bit era, could’ve undone the curse of 3D Sonic before it began, and maybe even save
a dying console. Unfortunately, fate had other plans for Sega,
and not even the swift spiky one could stop the Saturn from speeding off into the sunset,
far before its time… Sega’s journey to Saturn sure was a rough
ride. The console’s failure had a devastating
impact on Sega as a whole, marking the beginning of the end for the plucky challengers. Alarm bells rang when Kalinske resigned in
July 1996, replaced by Bernie Stolar, who would announce at E3 1997 that “The Saturn
is not our future” – only two years after that fateful surprise launch. With only 12% of console market share at this
point, and Sega’s continuing financial woes, nobody was surprised. In March 1998, the Saturn was officially discontinued
in the US, lasting less than 3 years, with only 7 games released in 1998. It lasted longer in Japan, even marginally
outselling the Nintendo 64! But with total worldwide sales of just 9.26
million units, the Saturn was deemed a commercial flop. Sega’s follow-up, the Dreamcast, wouldn’t
arrive in North America until September 1999, leaving over a year without new Sega titles,
and despite being a technically impressive machine with some real cult classics, the
Dreamcast couldn’t undo the damage done by the Saturn. Let’s recap this planetary palaver shall
we: While the Golden Age of the Genesis looked
rosy from the outside, the financial costs were heavy, and this created an internal rift
between East and West, that led Sega into some very bizarre decisions. Panicked by growing competition by Sony and
others, the Saturn’s hardware design became increasingly complicated and difficult to
develop for, while Sega of America’s push for the 32X only split their core audience,
confusing them further. At this point, a rushed surprise launch left
the Saturn dead on arrival, thanks to Sony’s bombshell “Two-Ninety-Nine” knockout blow,
and PlayStation pushed that advantage, through more mature marketing, better business strategy,
and simpler hardware that third parties flocked towards. The Saturn’s smaller, less varied library,
along with a VERY noticeable absence from Sonic, was the final nail in the coffin, as
Sega struggled to pull themselves out of freefall. It’s unusual for company politics to be
just as responsible for a console’s failure as the hardware itself, but that’s what
makes Sega’s story so fascinating. Their gung-ho, rockstar attitude captivated
the gaming world and stunned the competition, but this same attitude became their downfall,
through overconfidence and ‘creative differences’, so to speak. Sega were still treating the console wars
like a race, but in reality, it was more like a game of Poker: they showed their hand too
early, panicked as more cards were revealed, and in the end, Sony called their bluff and
won. It’s a sad ending, becausewe’ll probably
never see another console challenger quite like them. Sega shot for the stars, but in the end, their
ambitions for Saturn only brought them crashing back down to earth.
