In the 1960s, a revolution swept through America, reshaping the conduct of warfare. The reins of conflict shifted from the hands of generals to those of politicians. I did not find it easy to send the flower of our youth, our finest young men, into battle. Vietnam served as a brutal crucible for testing this novel approach. The Air Force discovered it was ill-prepared for such a conflict, gaining hard-earned lessons along the way. This narrative delves into the experiences of the United States Air Force. During the tense Cold War era of the 1950s, the Strategic Air Command's formidable bomber and missile fleets enforced Pax Americana. However, when actual combat erupted in Southeast Asia, these powerful weapons proved inadequate. In the early 1950s, France held sway over the Indo-Chinese region, grappling with the communist Vietnamese forces. The communists gained ground steadily, pushing the French forces back from one stronghold to the next. In March of 1954, the French found themselves in a dire situation during the disastrous battle at Dianbiangfu, prompting them to seek direct US involvement. Briefly, the prospect of using US atomic weapons was entertained. Ultimately, no action was taken. Dianbiangfu succumbed to the communist forces under General Guillaume's command. This defeat compelled the French to withdraw from Indochina. According to the terms of the 1954 Geneva Protocols, Vietnam was partitioned along the 17th parallel. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam, backed by China and Russia, occupied the north, while the Republic of Vietnam, supported by the United States, controlled the south. It seemed as though the Indochina theatre had inherited the same complexities as the Korean conflict of the late 1940s. President Eisenhower officially recognized the elected government of the Republic of Vietnam and pledged support. Embracing the domino theory, Eisenhower believed that without intervention, all Southeast Asian nations would succumb to communism, mirroring the North Vietnamese advance. Unassisted, Vietnam cannot, at this time, produce and support the military formations essential to it. To prevent this, the United States committed to bolstering South Vietnam through military aid and training, aiming to halt the spread of communism. On October 11, 1961, President Kennedy authorized the deployment of a segment of the USAF Jungle Gem Combat Training Squadron to South Vietnam, codenamed Farmgate. Their primary objective was to train and equip the Vietnamese Air Force. By 1962, the Vietnamese Air Force consisted of 6 squadrons and 97 poorly maintained aircraft. Under Farmgate, the Vietnamese Air Force expanded into a formidable force, boasting 14 squadrons and 285 planes by 1965. Yet despite this growth, it remained insufficient, a realization that dawned on policy makers. The advisory phase transitioned into direct involvement by the USAF, plunging America into war. In the spring of 1965, Viet Cong activity surged, marked by a mortar assault on Bien Hoa Air Base, resulting in the destruction of five Martin B-57s. Simultaneously, the American embassy in Saigon came under attack. Clad in black pajamas, Viet Cong insurgents engaged in conventional battles with South Vietnamese forces. response, the US opted to deploy USAF tactical airpower directly, targeting infiltration routes in Laos and objectives in North Vietnam. The Air Force recommended that, if America was forced into a contest with North Vietnam, there was a quick solution. A decisive bombing campaign, targeting 94 key industrial sites, could have crippled North Vietnam's ability to wage war. During that period, North Vietnam lacked the intricate defense infrastructure of surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft systems, and MiG interceptors it would later develop. The only conceivable path for the United States to lose in Vietnam was through massive ground troop deployment. Conversely, victory could have been achieved through overwhelming aerial bombardment. And with your permission therefore I'd like to tell you something. In the early 1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara imposed a managerial approach akin to that of a prodigy on the Pentagon. McNamara, a virtuoso of quantitative analysis, held sway as a paramount figure in number crunching. His ability to recall statistics was legendary, and he was ruthless in challenging any erroneous information presented to him. of planes which are operating off our carriers today in the South China Sea. Because it was then that... He advocated for the procurement of military hardware based on statistical analysis, a perspective not universally embraced by military experts. When I graduated from National War College, apparently I was the number one draft choice, so I was drafted up on the staff of Secretary Robert McNamara, who it was said about he knew the cost of everything and the value of nothing and I learned that very well. Transitioning from procurement to employing mathematically elegant techniques for military operations was a natural progression. However, McNamara overlooked a fundamental truth. The corporate notion of a bottom line does not seamlessly translate into the life and death decisions inherent in military matters. This oversight profoundly impacted America's ability to achieve success in the war. How would they have ever won World War II if they'd had direction like that? It was... McNamara set the Air Force back 15 years, maybe 30, I don't know. Additionally, McNamara disregarded the counsel of General Curtis LeMay, the architect of SAC's atomic defense, who now served as the Air Force Chief of Staff, albeit reluctantly. And he admitted he wasn't a very good chief. It just wasn't that environment. It's a committee action, discussion back and forth. He was a marvellous commander. What he would say, not a good chief. He was frustrated during that whole time period. I'm sure you realize that... By 1964, advancements in technology enabled real-time monitoring of global events from Washington, D.C. This capability empowered the commander-in-chief to issue directives directly to field operatives on a daily basis, a tantalizing prospect for many leaders. For Lyndon Johnson, it proved irresistible. That the people of South Vietnam shall have the right of choice, the right to shape their own destiny in free elections. In World War II in Korea, the government had set broad policies for the military to fulfill in the conduct of military operations. In Vietnam, the government exerted daily control over military operations, dictating targets during attacks and even specifying the ordnance to be deployed. You know, President Johnson getting personally and deeply involved in what the airplanes would take. I've been sitting on the ramp and they stopped us and changed our ordnance and the order came down from the White House. I mean, you can't micromanage that way. While communication was swift, orders originating from the White House had to navigate through various headquarters, including the Pentagon, the 13th Air Force in Hawaii, and the 7th Air Force in Saigon. By the time directives reached the battlefield, the situation often had shifted drastically, partly due to leaks to the Viet Cong. This led to wasted missions and deadly ambushes. The Department of Defense and the White House established a complex and fluid set of rules of engagement, subjecting military actions to short-term political considerations. One notable strategy was a policy of graduated response, characterized by measured escalation in response to provocations. Besides, we seek no wider war. Our response will depend upon the action of the aggressors, in this case the North Vietnamese. The key to the situation remains the cessation of infiltration from the North. The rules that the politicians geared up for us in North Vietnam just made no sense at all. They were sending all these, they thought, subtle but profound signals that weren't real, but the North Vietnamese looked on them as a sign of weakness, and they were right. From the comfort of Washington officers, it was decided that air operations should convey a political message, rather than inflict devastating damage. from all branches to compensate for the perceived failures of both civil and military leadership. They would strive to perform admirably under adverse conditions, only to find themselves scorned by the public for fulfilling their duty. For whatever reason, we were there. And we had American young men there, many of which were 55,000 of whom gave their lives. They risked everything they had and they lost it. And I read in Mr. McNamara's book that he said, the President and I got many, many recommendations from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of which had a paragraph about the risks involved. And in every one of them, there was the risk of intervention, the risk of attack, the risk of exbroadening, the risk of that and the other. And so McNamara said the President and I had already agreed that we weren't going to take those risks. You can't persist long in asking your young men, now your young women, to risk everything they have in war if the nation that's putting them in that position isn't willing to share their risks. On August 5th 1964, North Vietnamese torpedo boats purportedly attacked US ships in the Gulf of Tonkin. In response, two days later, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, expanding the President's authority to retaliate against North Vietnam. This led to the deployment of B-52s to Anderson Air Force Base in Guam. KC-135 tankers were dispatched to Okinawa, while the B-52s were initially held in reserve as Rolling Thunder, a bombing campaign commenced in the north. This operation primarily utilized Republic F-105 Thunderchiefs, supersonic fighter bombers, renowned for their heavy payload capacity. Affectionately dubbed the THUD, the F-105's nickname humorously highlighted its sightable dimensions and weight. Under America's self-imposed rules of engagement, there were certain constraints on targets during rolling thunder missions in the North. Military traffic on roads, bridges, rail lines, and radar installations were permissible targets. But striking surface-to-air missile sites or visible MiGs on North Vietnamese airfields was prohibited. Furthermore, North Vietnamese dikes, crucial for water management in rice paddies, were designated as off-limits. Consequently, the rice paddies became a favored site for North Vietnamese anti-aircraft batteries. Washington wanted the war to be contained without killing any Russian and Chinese advisors at the airfields and missile sites. We would find an area that had all been outlined like this. You could see the ring and the minute they drew that ring you knew they were putting up a SAM site there and they would put SAMs all around the ring so that if one was being attacked the other ones would be fire nets. And we could see that they were doing that, what they were doing, they were building the SAM site, putting in the stuff and we would report it and request permission to attack it. Can't attack it, might be Russian. The Russians are helping the Vietnamese and the Russians may be... We'd send a wire back and say, so there's a Russian there, he knows it's a combat zone, what the hell is the problem, let us go after... Nope, that's off limits. And then a month later, that damn SAM site would be up and would be firing and then we would get direction to go in and hit it. Now instead of taking care of it easily and not losing anybody, you'd go in there and probably lose at least one airplane trying to knock that whole sign side out, and maybe not even do it. And next thing we know we got not only MiG-15s and 17s and 19s, we got MiG-21s in the equation, and it got to be a very sporting course. MiGs were off limits for attack unless they displayed hostile intent by manoeuvring to initiate an assault. Over the subsequent two years, the USAF and Navy intensified their efforts under rolling thunder, conducting nearly 170,000 sorties and dropping hundreds of thousands of tonnes of bombs, resulting in the deaths of almost 30,000 civilians. In response, the resilient North Vietnamese dispersed their facilities and bolstered their imports of arms, petroleum, and food from Russia and China. American bombing ceased in 1968, intended as a signal of willingness to engage in negotiations with the communists. By 1968, it was apparent that we were not there to win, we were not allowed to win. Rules of engagement, tremendous restrictions, there were times when we were fired upon, we could not fire back, airspace border requirements. And it was extremely discouraging, particularly when we were losing people every day. We were not allowed to do what we were trained to do, what we were capable to do, what the airplane was capable of doing. However, North Vietnam utilized this pause to enhance their air defense capabilities, importing Soviet equipment and advisors, and fortifying their defenses with 40 surface-to-air missile sites around Hanoi alone. They also introduced MiG-21 fighters armed with atoll missiles, analogous to the American Sidewinders. The North Vietnamese sustained the Viet Cong and their own regular units by supplying them through a network known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This intricate system comprised roads, rivers and paths concealed under a dense triple canopy of jungle. Utilized by guerrillas for centuries, the trail straight-line distance from Saigon to Hanoi was approximately 600 miles, but its actual length was far greater, meandering through Laos and Cambodia and occasionally crossing into South Vietnam. Thousands of Russian-built ZIL trucks transported up to five tons of supplies each, while bicycles carried sacks of rifles and individuals bore sacks of rice. We forlornly tried to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which was absolutely impossible, up in northern Laos and so forth. And then, of course, we did some in-country work when someone thought they knew where some lid cong were and you usually end up strafing trees. When US attacks temporarily disabled bridges or roadways, labourers manually transported the materials to the next point, exhibiting tireless determination akin to a trail of ants with their burdens. We couldn't operate effectively at night, so the night was the time of sanctuary for the adversary. That's the time they reconstituted, repaired, regrouped, got ready for the next day. In his belief in the power of technology, Defence Secretary McNamara authorised $2.5 billion to be invested in a system known as Igloo White. Igloo White consisted in part of airdrop sensors that detected troops or trucks by acoustic or seismic means. Information gathered was relayed to an orbiting aircraft, typically an RC-121 Constellation, which then transmitted it to Task Force Alpha for analysis and the mobilization of an appropriate strike force. However, Igloo White suffered from defects and limitations, notably the astute response of the Vietnamese. Upon spotting an acoustic sensor parachuting down, they would locate it and deploy a single truck to repeatedly pass by, creating the illusion of significant troop movements. Despite billions spent and millions of dollars worth of enemy supplies destroyed, the net quantity reaching the Viet Cong continued to rise. While public interest in the war mirrored that of the Korean conflict, focusing on air-to-air combat with MiG fighters, the victory ratio shifted in Vietnam. Unlike the 10 to 1 ratio in Korea, from 1965 to 1967 it averaged about 3.5 to 1, decreasing to 2 to 1 from late 1967 to 1968. The underlying truth was that pre-war combat training for US forces had not been sufficiently rigorous. There had been excessive focus on flight safety rather than adequately simulating the challenges of combat. As a result of tougher training implemented after 1968, the USAF victory ratio improved to 3 to 1, although it still fell short of the ratio observed during the Korean War. Furthermore, it did not match the remarkable 13 to 1 ratio achieved by the Navy in 1972, attributable to the rigorous training provided in the Top Gun program. Several factors contributed to the Air Force's comparatively low victory to loss ratio. One significant factor was the strict ground control exercised over the North Vietnamese People's Air Force, which avoided combat except under highly favorable conditions. They like to get supersonic, either high or low, fire their ATOL, their ATOL heat-seeking missile and dive away. And they learned that they didn't want to get in close. The McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom, widely regarded as the premier fighter of the 1960s, was well suited for the demands of the Vietnam War. With its extended range, aerial refueling capability, high speed, and heavy payload capacity, it proved to be a formidable asset. An airplane like the Phantom, that had equipment in the back seat that was not in the front seat, that was designed to be operated by two people, it was a definite advantage to have two people under those conditions, highly trained, both highly trained, and to be able to fly as a team all the time. Chuck DeBellevue and I flew over a hundred sorties together. Chuck was the best of any of the back-seaters at Udorn. I was very fortunate to be able to select him to fly with me. We got to the point that we didn't have to say a lot to each other in the cockpit. I knew what Chuck needed, he knew exactly what I needed. What the early Phantom could not do was dogfight effectively with the MiGs. And the F-4 was not a dogfight machine, that was a big huge monster with a tremendous amount of power, and it turned like a sewer cover. The F-4 Phantom was not optimized for dogfighting. MiGs typically detected the larger F-4s first, often launching surprise attacks from behind, firing missiles from the 6 o'clock position before quickly disengaging. The MiG-21 was small, hard to see, it left very little smoke trail. It had a lower wing loading, which meant that it turned tighter than we, very important in air battle. The F-4 in comparison, large, bulky, we left two big smoke trails when we were not in afterburner, so a flight of four could be seen 20 miles away. Initially armed solely with missiles intended for anti-bomber operations, some pilots, like Ace Steve Ritchie, achieved success, but for many, the missiles proved ineffective. The MiG was in a high G turn. The first missile went through the center of the fuselage of the MiG and the second missile went through the fireball. And on the second MiG, I only fired one missile because I thought we were out of parameters. We were too close, the angle was too great, and we had another absolutely perfect missile. The Seventh Air Force rule was you had to close on him until you could visually identify him, and then by that time you're inside the range of the Sparrow missile. Most of the time you might even be inside the range of the infrared missile. And so what you're left with now is a gun situation, and there's no gun on the F4. To address this, gun pods were hastily mounted on the center line attachment point as a temporary solution. That 20 millimeter gun, I put around about every six inches, and we come in there with two of those guns and just run the whole length of them, and just the boat, you could just see the boat. It would do like that, it would just fall apart, you know, just cut it right in two. Between 1968 and 1972, air-to-air combat was minimal, with the F-4 primarily tasked with escorting bombers. Frequently paired with the Republic F-105 Thunderchief, the F-4 compensated for its lack of dogfighting prowess by capitalizing on the Thunderchief's capabilities. Despite its early reputation for accidents, the F-105 emerged as the pre-eminent fighter-bomber in Vietnam. Renowned for its speed, it could penetrate North Vietnamese defences, deliver its payload, and if necessary, engage in dogfights, using its internal gun to combat the MiGs. The Republic F-105, affectionately known as the Thud, was a formidable aircraft, weighing over 50,000 pounds. Renowned for its speed and power, it served as a backbone of the Vietnam War effort, accounting for more than 75% of missions over North Vietnam. One such aircraft, Memphis Belle II, distinguished itself by downing two MiGs during its tour of duty. We quickly found that we could, with conventional weapons, and using some of the techniques that those of us who had the opportunity to use in Korea were still familiar with and could teach and get other people to do, Using those techniques with conventional, dirty old 750-pound iron bombs, six of them hung underneath the belly, or 2,000-pounders on the wing, we could do extremely precise bombing work with that airplane. When missions targeting Hanoi were authorized, dubbed going downtown, the thuds led the way, both in bombing runs and in bearing the brunt of casualties. The crews of these aircraft faced daunting odds, with only a 50% chance of surviving a 100 mission tour. I can only describe it as the most eerie sensation I have ever had in my life. Between my wingman and myself, a guy named John Bobel, all of a sudden there is a roar that's beyond description, and incandescent light that just goes in through your eyes and right down to your stomach. It paralyzes everything. Two SAMs came up between John and myself, we were perhaps 50 yards apart. Thuds and F-4s alike shared one of the war's most perilous and critical missions, the Wild Weasel mission, tasked with suppressing surface-to-air missiles. In North Vietnam, Wild Weasel teams adopted a daring tactic of presenting themselves as targets to locate SAM sites. Once the SAM radars locked onto them, the Wild Weasel aircraft would retaliate by launching radar homing missiles to neutralize the radar installations. Okay, deep legs, Bill. Let's get out of here. By the time we were halfway through my operation with Rolling Thunder, if you had to go in without a ECM pod or if you didn't have a weasel flying along, you felt quite persecuted. This mission was exceptionally perilous and demanding, requiring nerves of steel. Weasel crews would linger in the area even after the attackers had departed, living up to their motto, First in, last out. A vastly different aircraft, the Boeing XB-52, originally conceived as a high-altitude nuclear bomber for solo missions deep into the Soviet Union, unexpectedly emerged as a significant asset in Vietnam. Despite its age and intended purpose, the XB-52 found itself repurposed as an aerial artillery platform, flying alongside more modern aircraft formations and delivering conventional iron bombs. The transformation of this aircraft, initially designed for Cold War nuclear deterrence, into a workhorse of conventional warfare in Vietnam was unforeseen by both the Air Force and Boeing. Flying at 30,000 feet, B-52s operated undetected and unheard from the ground, their mere presence compelling the enemy to disperse their ground forces to avoid being decimated by carpet bombings. For B-52 crews, life became a monotonous cycle of briefing, flying, and sleeping, contributing contributing to a sense of detachment from their actions that, combined with tension, fatigue and boredom, gradually wore down morale. Crew members humorously referred to themselves as coconut knockers for the countless hours spent bombing the jungle below. Despite this, B-52s were widely regarded as the most dreaded weapon by the Viet Cong. By 1968, the United States recognized the need to disengage from Vietnam. Secret negotiations between the US and North Vietnam aimed to establish a framework for the Vietnamization of the war, whereby the responsibility for combat operations would gradually shift to South Vietnam. South Vietnamese forces would be so trained and strengthened that they would not require US support. On October 23, 1972, all bombing operations north of the 20th parallel were suspended. However, the North Vietnamese used this respite to repair infrastructure such as railroads and bridges, preparing for a decisive military campaign, aiming to compel the enemy to negotiate rather than persist in prolonged guerrilla warfare. This offensive was dubbed Linebacker 2 and it saw the lifting of artificial rules of engagement. Linebacker 2 commenced with a relentless B-52 assault on Hanoi and Haiphong. Despite encountering heavy enemy defences, the Strategic Air Command executed 729 sorties over 11 days, dropping a staggering 15,000 tons of bombs while sustaining only 15 aircraft losses. By the conclusion of the operation, North Vietnamese resistance had been severely weakened. Following Linebacker 2, the North Vietnamese found themselves devoid of surface-to-air missiles, SAMs, and the means to deploy them. The relentless bombing compelled them back to the negotiating table, thus concluding the operation. Among the often overlooked heroes of the conflict were the crews of the Boeing KC-135 tankers, responsible for refueling attack aircraft mid-flight. Acting as a force multiplier, the KC-135s significantly augmented the effectiveness of fighters and B-52s, allowing them to operate with extended range and heavier payloads. Aerial refueling, however, posed significant risks. Tankers weighing 300,000 pounds and hurtling through the air at 500 miles per hour had to delicately rendezvous and make gentle contact with equally swift aircraft. The hazards were further compounded by factors such as night operations, turbulent thunderstorms, radio silence and minimal lighting conditions. Nevertheless, tankers played a crucial role in enabling fighters to depart with fully laden armaments, refueling them mid-mission and providing assistance to damaged aircraft when necessary, including towing them within gliding distance of their bases. Throughout the conflict, KC-135s performed over 800,000 refuelings, transferring nearly nine billion pounds of fuel. Despite the gruelling and perilous nature of their duties, the rewards for tanker crews were primarily psychological. A fighter pilot might express gratitude, acknowledging a save as they disengaged, recognising that without the tanker's assistance, they would have had to abandon their mission. As a result, tanker crewmen rarely had to buy their own drinks on fighter bases. visual reconnaissance regained the significance it held during World War I. The close-quarters nature of the conflict, with adversaries often fighting in their own villages, elevated the importance of visual reconnaissance photos. That was the responsibility of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam. Despite the challenges of command, the Military Assistance Command Vietnam, MACV, dictated the timing, location and method of reconnaissance missions. Despite the risks, reconnaissance crews ventured unarmed into heavily defended areas to capture vital photographs. Among the most intimate forms of reconnaissance was the Forward Air Controllers, FACs flew low and slow over combat zones, vulnerable to a range of threats from thrown objects to anti-aircraft fire. Throughout much of the conflict, FACs piloted unarmed light aircraft like the Cessna 01, responsible for locating targets, calling in airstrikes, marking targets, and guiding attacks. Okay, real fine. Okay, 6-1, I'd like you to put your bomb just short of two. All tasks requiring exceptional skill and courage. In the later stages of the war, fast-forward air controllers operating jet aircraft such as the F-100 and the F-4 conducted rapid reconnaissance in high-threat environments. Only the most seasoned veterans in peak physical condition could withstand the demands of this mission which included four to five hours of low-level flight and high G turns. Service at the forefront of operations was invaluable not only for hitting targets but safeguarding innocent lives. In Vietnam, strategic airlift played a more pivotal role than in World War II or Korea, as the harbours and roads of Vietnam were unsuitable for the timely unloading of ships. 34 squadrons of the military airlift command were dedicated to airlift operations. Initially, many of the aircraft employed were outdated Douglas C-124s. However, the introduction of the Lockheed C-141 in 1965 marked a significant enhancement in cargo capability. The C-141 could carry twice the cargo of the C-124 at double the speed and range. In 1969, the controversial Lockheed C-5A became operational. In total, 73 of these massive aircraft were deployed in service. Tactical airlift in Vietnam reached new heights with the introduction of the Lockheed C-130 Hercules, a robust four-engine turboprop. These versatile transports operated extensively in the combat zone, with some analysts asserting that tactical airlift was even more crucial than the interdiction provided by tactical fighters. Transport played a vital role in ferrying troops and supplies to the front line, supporting major parachute assaults and sustaining the logistical backbone of the war effort. This demanding and relentless work continued day after day, requiring immense physical exertion and nerves of steel. Between 1967 and 1973, tactical airlift operations transported over 7 million tons of passengers and cargo within South Vietnam alone, a volume nearly 10 times greater than that moved during the entirety of the Korean War. One of the most formidable weapons employed during the Vietnam War was a side-firing gunship, a modification of transport aircraft. Born out of necessity and ingenuity, the aerial gunship was outfitted with cannons and gunports, creating a potent platform for close air support. The concept behind the gunship involved executing pylon turns, with the pilot using a ground reference point to maintain a stable orbit around the target area. This allowed the side-mounted guns to accurately engage relatively stationary targets on the ground. The abundance of C-47 transport aircraft made them prime candidates for conversion into gunships. The resulting AC-47 gunships earned colorful nicknames such as Spooky, Dragonship, or Puff, the latter inspired by the imagery evoked by the song Puff the Magic Dragon, referencing the dramatic display of flame and smoke produced when the guns were fired. As demand for gunships grew, faster and more modern aircraft were chosen for conversion, including the Lockheed AC-130, which further enhanced the gunship's capabilities. Like an ancient ship of the line, the Lockheed Martin AC-130 is truly an angel of death. It bristles with side-firing weapons from the 20mm Gatling guns to the 7.62 miniguns to the 40mm cannon. Collectively, the sheer volume of fire unleashed by gunships rendered them a formidable force on the battlefield, capable of exerting significant influence. These aircraft proved remarkably cost-effective both in terms of the destruction inflicted upon enemy assets, such as trucks, and in the lives saved while defending villages and outposts. Despite the inherent risks and isolation of their mission, the tangible rewards of safeguarding ground forces or disrupting enemy supply lines, provided immediate gratification. Vietnam veterans, once marginalized by a vocal minority, are now rightfully recognized as the heroes they truly were, men and women who bravely fulfilled their duty in the face of immense challenges. Among the various missions carried out in Vietnam, none better embodies the spirit of selflessness and altruism than that of the search and rescue teams. Operating under the motto, so that others may live, these courageous individuals willingly risked their lives day in and day out to retrieve downed aircrew members. By 1968, every aircrew member flying in Southeast Asia understood that if they were to be shot down, every possible effort would be exerted to rescue them, regardless of the obstacles posed by the location, cost or impact on other ongoing missions. And most people would have broken all of the rules, they would have done anything possible to rescue a downed colleague. It was not until November 1964, after more than 20 aircraft had crashed or been shot down, that the first official trained search and rescue capability As part of standard rescue operations, Douglas A-1E Sky Raiders, nicknamed Sandys in Vietnam, served as armed escorts. These aircraft were tasked with providing suppressing fire to deter enemy forces from approaching downed aircrew while rescue helicopters conducted recovery operations. Introduced in 1965, the Sikorsky HH3E helicopter, commonly referred to as the Jolly Green Giant, became a vital asset for rescue missions. These helicopters faced numerous challenges, including attacks by enemy aircraft and navigating through intense anti-aircraft fire. Hold your hover. Hold your hover. Hold your hover. Take it out to slack. Hold your hover. Hold your hover. Hold your hover. Stand foot below the aircraft. Stand foot below the aircraft. Hold your hover, Van. Hold your hover. Hold your hover. Hold your hover. Fire into the door. Fire is coming in the door. Fire is coming in the door. Fire is coming in the door. In the final search and rescue mission of the war, Air Force and Marine helicopters tirelessly conducted mission after mission to evacuate South Vietnamese patriots who were unable to confront the occupying forces. The United States Air Force entered the conflict in Southeast Asia under orders and withdrew in a similar manner. In eight years of the air war, we never really won air superiority. We would have air superiority at conditional times and places, but in terms of a general air superiority in eight years, we never won air superiority. It has nothing to do with whether we were there, whether we should have been there. We were there, and we fought the war in the wrong way. And we shouldn't hazard our people like that. That's primitive. That's the kind of conflict they did in the dark ages, when armies slaughtered each other. 55,000 young men that didn't have to die. Despite the senselessness of the entire intervention, valuable lessons were gleaned from the experience. If I can say, we came out of the Vietnam War with an enormously deeply embedded, almost burned in our souls, set of lessons about our inadequacies, that is, about the deficiencies in our ability to do what we thought air power would be able to do and what we certainly knew air power should be able to do. The inherently flawed and politicized command structure that had led to disastrous outcomes would undergo significant reforms. A new generation of leaders, equipped with a thorough understanding of advanced technologies and tactics would emerge, paving the way for more effective and strategic military operations in the future. The challenging and frequently harrowing ordeal of Vietnam left them better prepared to confront future conflicts. The F4 Phantom II is a versatile tactical fighter. It can be used as a fighter bomber, interceptor, or as an air superiority fighter. To gain and maintain air superiority is, in part, the mission of a tactical airman. F-4 pilots assigned the specific mission of seeking out and destroying enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground, must understand and be proficient in aerial combat maneuvering. Air-to-air combat is a swift and deadly game. Victory or defeat may be decided in only a few seconds. Mission success and usually your life depend upon a thorough knowledge of your weapons and weapon system, as well as those of the enemy. Pilots assigned combat duty will be exposed constantly to situations where only the most skillful maneuvering, teamwork, and timely application of basic air combat tactics will enable them to emerge victorious. Applying the F-4 in air combat tactics training, as well as in combat itself, demands an ability to maneuver the aircraft at maximum performance. To do this, the pilot must have an understanding of adverse yaw and dihedral effect. Adverse yaw is defined as yaw that is opposite to the desired direction of turn. At subsonic speeds and high angles of attack, rudder must be used in the F-4 to offset this yaw. This yawing moment is caused in part by the aileron on the top wing, left wing in a right turn, being deflected down and causing more drag than the spoilers on the low wing, because because these spoilers are operating in a lower pressure area. One example of dihedral effect, and perhaps the easiest to understand, is the characteristic of any swept wing aircraft to obtain more lift from a wing that is straightened out into the relative wind. The opposite wing is, in effect, swept further back. For this reason, the F-4 can be rolled with rudder. When performing a hard turn, as angle of attack begins to increase, the pilot may be tempted to tighten the turn by using more aileron. This adds to the undesirable condition. And if these improper controls are held, a snap roll away from the desired turn may result. This could be disastrous in combat. from the desired turn may result. This could be disastrous in combat. To prevent a snap roll or post stall gyration, the pilot must, when subsonic at high angles of attack, use rudder to control roll rate and bank, hold the ailerons neutral, and control turn rate with back stick pressure. Caution! Develop a feel for the rudders. Do not arbitrarily jam full rudder in the direction of turn, or dihedral effect will cause a roll in the direction of applied rudder. With proper training, the F-4 pilot will have no trouble in developing a feel for his aircraft and flying it to maximum performance. Remember, you are flying the airplane, not riding it. The basic fighting unit is the two-ship element. It is much more maneuverable than a flight of four. The leader must, however, spend a great deal of his time clearing the wingman rather than looking for potential targets. When the element is used as a part of a flight of four, the wingman flies a position 1,000 to 3,000 feet out from the lead, depending on altitude, and from line abreast to 20 degrees back. Flying this position, the wingman can cover the leader's 9 o'clock to 3 o'clock area through the rear hemisphere, his primary area of responsibility. During turns, the wingman maneuvers in the horizontal and vertical planes. By playing the outside as well as the inside of the turn, the wingman can easily maintain position, conserve energy, and provide visual coverage in the rear hemisphere. When on patrol, the wingman stays well forward in easy view of the leader. He maintains coverage in the rear hemisphere while the leader searches for the enemy. The distance between aircraft may be increased at higher altitudes due to increased enemy missile performance. This increased separation extends visual coverage in the rear hemisphere, moving the blind spot farther out. Upon initial contact with the enemy, the wingman must move to the maximum performance maneuvering envelope. The size and shape of this envelope varies, but generally it Generally, it is a cone 60 degrees to 90 degrees from the leader, and 1,000 to 1,500 feet back. These distances and angles may vary as long as the wingman is able to provide mutual support and visual coverage during violent maneuvers. The primary duty of the wingman while flying in the maximum performance maneuvering envelope is to provide coverage in the rear. To maintain position and to perform his duties, the wingman will need a degree of skill and proficiency which is gained only through practice. When flying in the maximum performance maneuvering envelope, the wingman provides the leader with a spare weapon system, should his own malfunction. My gun's jammed, take him too. Should this occur, the wingman moves forward, assumes the lead, and maintains whatever advantage the leader may have had. If at any time the wingman cannot perform his duties, he should notify his leader immediately. The offensive potential of the two-ship flight is greatly enhanced when it is used as part of a basic combat patrol formation. This is a four ship flight comprised of two mutually supporting elements. In this formation the leader plans the attack and engages the enemy. The number three man or element leader supports the flight leader and assists in the attack. The number two and four men support their respective leaders and cover the vulnerable six o'clock areas. Since the element leader functions as alternate flight leader as well as leader of his own element, he is selected for his demonstrated leadership, ability, and aggressiveness. The supporting element is flown three to nine thousand feet out from the leader and 0 to 5,000 feet up. These distances will depend upon altitude, configuration, and mission requirements. This is because of decreased enemy missile performance in denser air and the difficulty in seeing camouflaged aircraft at low altitudes. Visual contact must be maintained. While on patrol, the element leader may maneuver his element from a position of line abreast to a maximum of 10 degrees back. During turns, the element maintains this position by energy altitude trade-offs. Generally, this type of maneuvering will require one crossover for every 90 degrees of turn. The leader will usually turn 90 degrees or in 90 degree increments. If not, he'll inform the element leader so that he may plan his crossover so as to be in correct formation position when the leader rolls out. There are two points that deserve special emphasis. First, wherever possible Wherever possible, the supporting element is flown down sun. Second, great care must be taken when crossing over in the fluid four formation to prevent midair collision during the brief periods of reduced visual contact. Correct employment of visual search techniques by each member of the flight will provide good detection rates at ranges of three miles or more in the rear hemisphere. The flight leader searches the forward hemisphere from 15 degrees above the horizon downward. The lead also makes casual checks of his element and its rear area. The element leader, in addition to maintaining his position, searches the forward hemisphere from 10 degrees below the horizon upward. The right wingman searches the area from the flight leaders nine o'clock position to the rear as far as he can see. The left wingman searches the area from the support leaders three o'clock position to his rear as far as he can see. The use of small check turns will improve the 6 o'clock coverage by displacing the blind spot from side to side. Laxity in performing scan responsibilities cannot be tolerated. This is equally true in regard to radar search. Radar coverage in a flight of four is improved when each flight member searches a definite area with a minimum overlap. The lead aircraft selects one bar scan, radar mode, 50-mile scope, and adjusts the antenna elevation so that approximately half-inch ground return appears at the top of the scope. This radar search pattern supplements the leader's visual search area. The rear seat pilot maintains constant radar surveillance of his area. The number three man or supporting element lead selects three bar scan, radar mode, 50-mile scope, and adjusts the antenna to the desired elevation. This radar search pattern supplements the element lead's visual search area. The number three rear seat pilot, like the lead rear seat pilot, concentrates exclusively on radar scan. The number two man selects one bar scan, radar mode, 25 mile scope, and adjusts the antenna so that half inch of ground return appears at the top of the scope and maintains that search position. While the number two aircraft commander is scanning his visual search area, the rear seat pilot divides his time evenly between the radar and a visual scan of the same area scanned by his aircraft commander. The number four man selects one bar scan, radar mode, 50 mile scope, and adjusts the elevation strobe to eight degrees up. He then selects three bar scan for search. The rear seat pilot in the number four aircraft, like the number two rear seat pilot, divides his time evenly between visual scan and radar scan. The number four aircraft radar scan area combined with the number two radar scan area provides a thorough long-range detection capability in the forward hemisphere when combined with the visual and radar scan of the lead and supporting element. It can be said that the air battle consists of three phases acquisition, maneuvering, and terminal. Acquisition, you must find the enemy to engage him. Maneuvering. You must outmaneuver the enemy to destroy it. Terminal. You must know your weapons and weapon system to hit it. The F-4 has an excellent long-range air intercept radar. If properly used, this radar can be a decisive factor in the air battle. With this long-range detection capability, it is probable that contact will occur in the forward quadrant prior to visual contact. The problem of visual identification of bogeys must receive special attention. Proper interpretation of radar returns can provide valuable information at sufficient range and time to allow the attackers to maneuver to gain tactical advantage prior to visual contact. When equipped with all aspect missiles and in a front hemisphere attack, separate the elements to achieve a first pass ID and missile launch. A good rule of thumb to determine minimum contact range necessary to gain the separation for attack is approximately three times optimum missile range. For example, if optimum missile range is five miles, then minimum contact range is 15 miles. If contact is made at sufficient range, the ID element should make a descending acceleration, using afterburner to 1.2 mach. The launch element executes a barrel roll or S maneuver to obtain desired separation in minimum time. While gaining separation, the ID element wingman should make a thorough radar search of the area for other aircraft that could be a threat. The ID element lead maintains radar contact and maneuvers for a collision course. After allowing the ID element to gain the desired separation, the launch element also accelerates to 1.2 Mach and maintains a target lock-on while keeping visual contact with the ID element. As soon as visual ID can be made, the ID element lead relays to the launch element lead the identification of the target aircraft and, if it is enemy, clears him to fire. Migs, Migs, 21s, no missiles on board, clear to fire, clear to fire. If the ID element is undetected passing below the enemy, or if the enemy fails to maneuver, the ID element should employ basic fighter maneuvers to re-attack or support the launch element. If, however, the ID element is detected and the enemy maneuvers against it, they may employ counter maneuvers against the enemy or continue a straight-ahead run-out, while the friendly launch element sandwiches the enemy. When the ID is made and clearance to fire received, the launch element executes either a front or a rear hemisphere attack, depending on the enemy's actions. Both elements then engage the enemy, supporting each other until the enemy is destroyed. When attacking from a beam, the separation required is less, and it is easier to attain. On the initial visual identification pass, the ID element may fire if identification can be made soon enough. If not, he turns 180 degrees from the target's heading and maneuvers for a follow-up attack. The turn will put him out of the target area and allow the launch element a shot as they follow and maneuver for a missile or a gun attack. The two elements then fight as a team until the enemy is destroyed. In a stern attack, you must consider the range to target, fuel required to close, and your heading. A stern chase is useless if bingo will occur before identification or firing range. A stern approach, however, is the best position for surprise in a stern attack maneuver so as to keep pressure on the enemy at all times and support each other until the enemy is destroyed. When operating as a lone element and attacking a flight of four, make either a beam attack or a stern attack, since identification and re-attack are the most difficult from head-on. Be very careful to maintain element integrity when attacking as a lone element, since look-back from the F-4 is poor. After radar acquisition and initial attack, competence in basic fighter maneuvers is essential in destroying the enemy with either a missile or gun. A high-speed yoyo is a good maneuver to maintain the advantage when on the attack. Its purpose is to maintain nose-tail separation. As you recognize an overshoot coming up, keep your G's on while reducing some of your bank. Slide high and inside the defender's turn. This will reduce your forward velocity while maintaining nose-tail separation. Watch your opponent and slide back down on the attack. Don't get the nose too low or you may be forced out the bottom. The low speed yo-yo is another good attack maneuver in the F-4. Lower the nose and establish your cutoff while nose low. Light the afterburner and accelerate to Mach 1.1 or more. Terminate afterburner and begin pull-up. When the nose is above the horizon, relight afterburner and slide up toward the defenders six o'clock. As you slide into your opponent's lethal cone, be prepared to perform a follow-up high-speed yo-yo. The barrel roll attack is an excellent offensive maneuver for a missile or gun attack. When the defender is turning into you while you are still at long range, 8,000 feet or more, and generating angle off, 40 degrees or more, begin the maneuver from low and inside the defender's turn. Play the rate of roll for the desired effect, depending on the range and rate of the defender's turn. If the defender is turning right, you roll to the left and vice versa. Back stick and rudder is used throughout the entire maneuver to hold the nose in the desired position. Upon completion of the roll, you will find your angle off diminished and the range reduced. If G-load permits, fire Fire a missile when in range. Press the attack and if need be execute another barrel roll attack or perform a high-speed yo-yo. While the fighter pilot and his aircraft comprise an offensive weapon, the possibility is strong that the first contact with the enemy will be in the rear hemisphere. This is due in part to the enemy's GCI capability. Thus it is imperative that you have a thorough knowledge of both offensive and defensive maneuvers. The basic defensive maneuver is the defensive turn. This is a hard turn performed to prevent an opponent from achieving a launch or firing position. With this maneuver the defender can diminish the lethal envelope and improve his position by rotating his cone of vulnerability away from the attacker. If the attack is discovered closer in, a break may be necessary. This is a maximum performance turn into the attack to destroy the enemy's tracking solution and force him to overshoot. The effect is gained in the first 45 to 60 degrees of turn. If the attacker does not yo-yo and overshoots, reverse and if you're lined up, take a quick shot at him. If you are not lined up, get him out of phase and die for separation. If an attacker has been forced to overshoot, another maneuver is the scissors. As the MiG overshoots, make a nose-high reversal and continue with a series of turn reversals. This will rotate your lethal cone away from the attacker and force him again to cross your flight path and eventually to your 12 o'clock position. The scissors is an effort to gain an offensive position. The advantage, however, lies with the aircraft having the shorter turn radius and the lower airspeed. For this reason, the scissors is not considered a good maneuver against the lighter, more maneuverable MiG series aircraft. After the first couple of reversals, if you cannot get a shot, watch the MiG. Get him out of phase with you, and when he cannot see you, roll rapidly. Engage the afterburner, pull the nose down to vertical, and accelerate out. Bear in mind, you need altitude for this. Should the MIG follow close in, you may set the hook. As he commits himself nose low, reduce power, extend speed brakes, and pull up at maximum performance. This should throw the MIG out the bottom. If the MiG does not follow close in, do not set the hook. Accelerate out to at least Mach 1.1, descend to low altitude, and gain separation. A moderate 2G roll while descending should be enough to spoil the MiG's tracking solution on the way down. When on the deck, make random reversals to keep him from getting a tracking solution, while you use the F-4's advantage of speed at low altitude to out-distance the enemy. When out of gun range, stay low if you're still within missile range. When you are definitely clear of the MiG, then pull up and re-engage head-on. When a flight of four F-4s is attacked by two MiGs, the element under attack should separate either by a straight ahead diving acceleration or by a turn away from the free element. The free element then quickly sandwiches the attackers. Again, be doubly watchful for additional MiGs in the area. If both friendly elements are under attack, it may be necessary to fight as lone elements until one element destroys his opponent and is thus free to assist the other element. When defending as a lone element, the defensive split is a valuable maneuver to use instead of the last-ditch ditch maneuver. With the MiGs approaching gun range, for example 4,000 feet out, and remember that is 4,000 feet out from the wingman, and you are unable to force him out of your lethal cone, call for a split. The low man continues his hard turn into the attack, while the high man slides high, gaining separation on the low man. The attackers are then forced to make a choice. Take the low man, take the high man, split, fake at the low man, and then take the high man, or perform the fluid separation. An analysis of past engagements reveals that the MiGs are unlikely to fake or perform a fluid separation. The defenders must be on the alert. If the attackers take the low man, he continues the hard turn and goes into a diving spiral to gain separation, while the high man zooms up, then drops down to sandwich the attackers once they're lying abreast. Should the attackers take the high man, he performs a moderate G roll under, ending in a turn away from the low man. The low man then pulls up and sandwiches the attacker as quickly as possible. It becomes readily apparent that teamwork and radio discipline are mandatory for the defensive split. Proficiency in fluid-pore and air combat tactics comes exclusively from training and practice. This proficiency is the only key to success. Air combat is a deadly game, a fight for the highest stakes in the world, your life and the life of your buddy. With so much to lose, there is no room for error. The knowledge gained in that aggressive air combat tactics program, combined with the skills developed in air-to-air gunnery training, will provide the tactical fighter pilot the tools necessary to engage and destroy the enemy in the fight for the sky. Good luck, and good hunting. and good hunting. You I just spared this flight here that's getting ready to bake the angle, or take off. We've got over 50 airplanes involved in this strike force. And it was going to be a big raid up near the Hanoi area, but the weather's bad, now they're going to various other areas. A spare's job for every four airplanes we launch, we launch one spare off the end of the runway. In case one of the airplanes we're having trouble with, they can fill in in any four position, any one of the four position. He can be usually a leader, so in case the leader aborts, he can fill in that spot. You see this bike taking off now, and the airplane standing by is the spare. He'll be coming back up like me probably pretty soon. We like to fly and fight the war. That's why we have a spare out there because if we didn't, we'd never get another airplane up in time. Okay, my name is David B. Waldrop, W-A-L-D-R-O-P. I was a first lieutenant when I did my combat tour in Vietnam. I actually flew out of Thailand at both Karat and Takali. I started at Takali. I was TDY from Yokota. But I was a first lieutenant my entire tour. I was fortunate enough to be born and raised in Nashville, Tennessee, which I think is one of the greatest places in the world, especially in the 50s when I was actually growing up. You know, Nashville was a city. It had everything to offer that cities have, but yet just a little outside of town, it was rural. And my dad used to raise hunting dogs, bird dogs specifically, and we used to hunt and fish. Back then, even as a young kid, when I started driving, I could knock on a farmer's door and say, Sir, do you mind if I go hunting on your place? He'd take a good look at you and he'd say, You know how to hunt? You know how to handle a gun? I said, Yes, sir. My dad taught me well. He said, You know I can shoot any of my animals already. I said, No, sir. That's not what I'm here to hunt. I want to hunt some quail. And they would let you do it. Think about doing that today. Forget it. But I grew up there and it was an awesome place to grow up. We could go outside, even when we were little kids before we started driving. You'd go out on the weekends and stuff like that. Your mom and dad wouldn't see you all day long, but they weren't worried about you. We were safe. We'd wander all over the place. We'd spend more time outside because we didn't have video games, TVs even hardly back then. So we were outside all the time, usually barefoot. So it was an awesome time. Looking back, especially now, it was an innocent period of time. the preponderance of crime and all the social issues that otherwise the social aspect of things was was great and it was a safe place and you felt secure and you felt comfortable so it was a great place to grow up. I went to Hillsborough High School which was just that was another great place because it was a good school, the teachers were good, and we didn't have a lot of kids that were mean or anything like that. It was a big school too. That was a great part. I tried to play on one of those Local teams and I've got a picture somewhere. I wish I could find I look for it Showing this this cast of characters and I mean these are guys that You wouldn't wouldn't want to come up against on a football field And I mean they had the old leather helmets and they took a team picture after a game, and I mean, they were nasty, covered with mud, and they looked the part. And, you know, I always... Dad wanted me to play football, of course. That's just what dads, you know, do with their sons. And I wanted to play. But I weighed all about 120 pounds when I started high school. I was a skinny mini, and I'm still not very big. And I'd go out there, and, you know, they'd say, oh, you've got to hit the big guys low, you know. And I'd run as hard as I could. I tried to hit the – we had a fullback that weighed 220 pounds. And I'd try to hit that guy when he's doing an end sweep, and I'd bounce off him like a little dog. Rrr, rrr, rrr, you know, just – it was just – I said, good Lord, give me some weight, something to work with. But anyway, that – so I didn't become a big football star, as you can well imagine. But I did try. So you know, we did all the swimming and the fishing and skiing and we had a lot of lakes around Nashville. And a buddy of mine and myself, we used to go duck hunting by ourselves. At 16 years old, we'd get up at 3 o'clock in the morning school and you know tow a boat down to Kentucky Lake which is about 70 miles away from Nashville. I'm 16 years old. Do parents let their kids do that kind of stuff today? I don't think so. And then we'd go out there and hunt ducks and we'd find ducks and the ducks would come to us we'd actually call them in and everything. I remember one time we went down there, I know this is probably going to be long winded, but we went down there and it was so cold, one of those floods came through. We had a boat and the water, because it rained first, and then when these flash freezes came in and dropped down about 20 degrees, the boat froze to the trailer. So we get down there and back up trying to get this boat off the trailer. It won't come off, it's frozen to the trailer. And I pulled my pants off and my boots off and I walked out in this ice water and literally rocked the boat and finally broke it loose. It's just what we did. So it was great. And you know, I had my first shotgun, I think, when I was 13 years old. And it was just a different time. But it was great. It was fantastic. The TV came about probably, I guess, when I was somewhere in grammar school. We had one of the stations in Nashville. There was only three at that time. It used to close out their evening broadcast at 11 o'clock at night with the poem, High Half-Life. Oh, I have slept the surly bonds of earth, and danced the skies on laughter-silvered wings. Sunward I've climbed and joined the tumbling mirth of sun-split clouds and done a hundred things you have not dreamed of. Wheeled and soared and swung high in the sunlit silence. Hovering there I've chased the the shouting wind along and flung my eager craft through footless halls of air. Up, up the long delirious burning blue, I've topped the windswept heights with easy grace but never lark or even eagle flew. And while with silent, lifting mind, I trod the high, untrespassed sanctity of space, but at my hand, I touched the face of God. With a 104 in the background doing rolls and just clouds, and I mean that just, it just grabbed me. Plus we had a guard unit that was flying F-84s, and although we weren't really near the airport, their pattern would take them pretty near our house and they'd be in fingertip formation, you know, you'd see those guys. And I'd look up and, God, that's so cool. And nobody in my family had ever even set foot in an airplane. But that was it. When I was 16, I decided I was going to be a single-seat fighter pilot, flying in the Air Force. Not the Navy, not the Marines. I didn't know the Marines had airplanes, actually. But not in the Navy, but the Air Force. That's just what I decided I was going to do. And so I pretty well oriented everything I did from that point forward to go that direction. And I got accepted to Vanderbilt is a pretty tough school, but I did get accepted, barely. But they had naval ROTC. Well that wasn't what I wanted. I wanted to fly in the Air Force. So I knew, I did enough research and I found out that what I had to do was come out of college with a degree and the best way to do it would be to go through ROTC so you come out as an officer. Because I did talk to some, I guess, counselors that knew. And so I said, I'm going to the University of Tennessee. Well, I saved Mom and Dad a lot of money because Vanderbilt was a private university. Although, of course, I was living away from home, but that was also good. And so I went to the University of Tennessee. And once again, I could not have picked a better school for David Walter. Actually, I went by the name Barry because my dad was called David. His dad was David and so they called me B for Barry. That's what the B stands for in my name. And so I grew up being that and so I went to University of Tennessee and that was the best thing that ever happened to me. I met some of the greatest guys who I still keep up with to this day and we get together every once in a while for reunions. I was in a fraternity up there and that also was really, really, that was a maturing actual experience because there were certain roles of leadership that you could actually assume by being in a fraternity, which I did. I was never president or anything like that, but I did several different things that allowed me to grow up and mature in that respect. And so I had a lot of fun up there. In fact, I had so much fun I spent two extra quarters before I could graduate. But then finally, you know, I was ready to get on. I was just ready to go start flying airplanes. And of course, I was very lucky. This is something also that's very important. To be medically fit to get a pilot slot in the military was really a critical and non-negotiable aspect of getting into a pilot slot. Fortunately, I was medically completely fit. My eyes, my hearing, and everything, all that was satisfactory, so I was able to get a slot in pilot training. I passed all the appropriate tests and so forth. When I extended and stayed in ROTC, at that time, every male had to go through two years of ROTC at the University of Tennessee. No choices. That's just the rules. But then if you want to stay on and get your officer's slot, then you had to, you know, the third and fourth year, you also had to be in ROTC. And so that's what I did. And one of the guys in my fraternity was in ROTC, and so he started flying with me when I was a freshman. And I was able to start getting a little bit of stick time and getting the feel of it. I knew that you made the right choice because that's the first time I flew in an airplane. Even though I'd never been in an airplane, I knew this was it. I'd get up there and boy, the exhilaration and excitement and just the feeling of making that airplane do something while you're up in the sky was fantastic. So anyway, then your junior year, well actually your senior year, you go to a six week military camp your junior year, but then if you're a pilot candidate, then your senior year they would send you to a local airport where you'd actually learn to fly and get your wings. Not your wings, military wings, but you'd get a pilot's license. And I got about 35 hours there and got my pilot's license. I remember one time, we had a little airplane that was called a Shen 2150, which was a tandem seat. You sit one behind the other. It looked like a miniature T-34. I thought that airplane was just so cool. I went up and I'd fly it. I went up one day by myself. I did something I shouldn't have done, but I did it anyway. Our commandant of cadets for the ROTC unit, they'd bring a T-33 jet trainer up periodically. It was tandem seat also. I got to ride in it a few times. Of course, he always would do a roll and do some maneuvering and stuff like that. I thought that was cool. So I get in this little shin one day and I said, you know, I'm gonna do one of those rolls. I didn't have a clue how to do a roll. And I started pulling the nose up a little bit and I start putting the stick over and of course in an airplane, when you once you get something like this, the nose is gonna want to drop. And it did. And I so I kept on, here I am going straight down at the ground. I'm doing, I'm seeing the red line. I said, Oh my God. And I started pulling and then geez, I felt the Gs, that was cool, I liked that. But I said, that probably, I ought to find out how to do this first, so I do it again. So I went in and I talked to Colonel Wyatt, and I said, by the way, you remember when you did that, how'd you do that? And so he started telling me, he said, no, no, you, I said, well, I wound up, he said, oh my God, don't do that anymore. That airplane is not even aerobatic. You're not even supposed to do aerobatics in that airplane. I said, oh really? So I said, okay. So anyway, I had a lot of luck when I was in the military, and I really did, in a lot of places, a lot of different times. I was supposed to have a March class in the Air Force, go to pilot training. So I was going to, I graduated in December, I was going to go home and I wouldn't report to the lawful Air Force base until March. And I about drove Colonel White crazy, I said, Sir, I'm ready to go now. I've been waiting for this all my life. And he said, Well, you know, they come up with these assignments and everything. You've got to just take what they give you. And I said, Can you just talk to somebody, please? And so he said, Okay, okay, I'll do my best. Well, damn if he didn't go talk to somebody. And I got a January class. So I wound up going in and here's the irony of the thing. I wound up going in in January starting pilot training. The March class, and I can go into more detail, but I got an F-105 assignment. I had to work my ass off, but I got an F-105, which I ordered a single seat fighter, and that was one of the two airplanes that I wanted to fly when I was 16 years old. The March class, they didn't have any 105s. You'll never know how it changed my life. It completely oriented my entire life. That was sort of interesting also when I was at pilot training. I'll skip the first part because it's T-37s. Everybody goes through the T-37s. But then a good friend of mine was a fellow named Pete Foley. He was six months ahead of me. So in other words, we were going like this. So I go where he leaves. Was he your T-guy too? No, he was not. But he got an F-105 assignment also. And his instructor was a fellow named Chris Paterakis. And Chris Paterakis was a guard guy that had come back on active duty that used to fly fighters in the Guard. So, I mean, he was the real deal. And so Chris, I mean, Pete told me, we got to be really good friends, he said, Dave, you want fighters, you want an F-105 or an F-100, you've got to get Chris as your instructor, and you're going to be taking our place. Let me introduce you to Chris, and maybe he can get you as his student. So he did, and so Chris did get me as one of his students. Well, the first thing an instructor does when they start out in flight training is they will sit down individually, student instructor, by themselves, and say, what do you want out of this? What's your goal? Of course, Chris already knew what mine was because I had met him, repeated introductions. He had told him, this guy wants fighters as bad as I did. Well, but when we sat down, what he said to me was, he said, I already know what you want. That's easy to say you want something. Now is when the test starts because you're gonna have to back it up because I, the other two guys, they really don't care what they get. They just want to get their wings. But you want something and I'm gonna be on your back 100% of the time. Nothing is ever going to be good enough, and you're going to have to work harder than anybody in this whole squadron. Are you willing to do that?" I said, yes sir. And I did. If I was 10 feet off, Dave, what's wrong with your altitude? Well, I'm working back to it. I mean, that's what it was the whole time. And finally, one time, the coup de grace sort of came after we did our formation and so forth. I remember one time I was leading and, you know, you'd fly solo, and I was leading back into the formation. They had turned the airport around because the wind changes while we were out. I didn't know it and I didn't get the information correctly. So I'm leading back the same way we started out and all of a sudden over there, I've got to fight. Get on my wing. So I hopped on his wing. We go back out and re-enter. I said, oh my God. We got on the ground and I mean Chris walked over my airplane and it was all everybody on the flight line could hear Chris just absolutely wearing me out all the way back in. Of course I got a big old pink on that ride too. But my formation was good and I had I was doing night formation ride. So Chris set it up so that I did my solo ride with them. Now, when I was flying with Chris, we sort of were doing some pretty good – we were doing 90-degree wing overs. More than – 45 was all you're supposed to be doing. We were doing 90-degree wing overs, and I'm hanging right in there. And Chris was just, he was absolute atom, but smooth, smooth, smooth. If you've got somebody on your wing, this is what I'm learning to fly formation. He said, don't ever let them know they're even in a turn. Make it so smooth, they don't even know they've started a turn. You just, he said, that's the whole key. And so I get ready for this night formation ride and Chris says, Dave, I want you to do exactly what we were doing the other day. And I said, sir, it's night. And I said, besides, we were supposed to be doing fortified. He said, if they don't come back with their flight suits soaking wet, I'm going to pink you. And, of course, it was a full moon. And he said, it's a full moon. Nobody will have any trouble seeing each other. So I went up and, I mean, here we are at night, 93 Wheelers, and we get back on the ground. I got in the room and I saw Chris and he said, well did you? I said, I did what you told me, sir. So I'm standing about as far as me to Scott from Chris. Those two characters walked in, full Colonel and a Lieutenant Colonel. They walk in and they stop right in the doorway. And they looked at Chris. They looked over at me. One guy didn't even turn his head, he just looked back at Chris. Did you put him up to that? Chris said, oh God, Dave, what did you do? And I said, I just, I flew like you told me to do, sir. Red Wine, who was the squadron commander, started laughing. He said, I think I have seen it all now. That's the first time I have done 90 degree wing overs at night on some brand new pilot's wings. And I passed. Anyway, the formation night flight was toward the end, and at that point in time, I had my F-105 assignment. And that was one thing that Colonel Redwine said, what kind of assignments do you get? And I said, I got an F-105, sir. And he said, well, you ought to do well. And we graduated. We started in January of 1965. I graduated in February of 1966. And then we had, back then they used to group all the students from all the different training bases into one big list. Everybody was ranked according to their ranking and also what their instructor, their recommendations and so forth. Anyway, they had six F-105s and five F-100s. Those were the only single-seat fighters that we had. We had 11 single-seat fighters and 225 students. So Chris got me my single-seat fighter. And I went to Nellis and my class didn't start until May. So I had really February to May, I wound up going to survival school up at Reno, at Stead Air Force Base, which was great since most all of us were going to Vietnam, so we had a February Stead survival school and had to wear snowshoes. Somehow or another, going to Vietnam with snowshoes didn't seem like the right program, but that's what we did anyway. Most of us were hopping backseat rides with instructors, which you could do. It started getting you familiar with the airplane, that giant airplane. And our class started in May, I think it was, of 1966. And, you know, my aunt... Now here's another interesting... So I had Chris Paterakis. By the way, what I didn't say about Chris Paterakis is this. He applied to the Thunderbirds. He got selected to fly left wing on the Thunderbirds. So you can get a little bit of an idea of the mentality, the demand for perfection, the absolute acceptance of nothing outside the box. It had to be constantly the best of the best. Well, I go to Nellis and I get an instructor who doesn't have the same uniform as the rest of the Air Force guys. He's a Navy exchange pilot by the name of Harley H. Hall. And I'll just tell you, then I'll give you the rest of the story. When I'm out there just starting formation flying with Harley, over the air for everyone in the world that's on the frequency to hear Dave. Smooth, smooth, smooth as the skin on a maiden's breast. Every fighter pilot that was on that frequency of course had to chime in and jump in on top of Harley. But you know what Harley later became? Blue Angel lead. Oh yeah, we lived off base. I lived in an apartment right off the strip. I tell you what, for a bachelor in Los, the only problem was I didn't have any money. I had a red Corvette and a third of my paycheck, and I mean one third of my paycheck was going to my car payment, but I had my little red Corvette. I was a fighter pilot, you know, you got to do what you got to do. You can't drive an old junk heap around. And of course at that point, it was everything Nellis had ever, ever, ever been because Vietnam was full board. And so everything we did, and we flew, when I was learning to fly, I mean, they were pushing. We were getting really aggressive. We were getting low, we were getting fast, we were getting demand. They were pushing us as far as we could go as students. Because they had to get us ready, because most of the guys were going straight to Vietnam. And the 105 used to be so complex and so fast. In fact, the final approach speed on the 105, on the single seat model, was 185 knots. Now that's basic, plus fuel, 5 knots per thousand, 1,500 pounds of fuel over a thousand. So you were coming down final at about 190 knots. That's over 200 miles an hour. As fast as landing an airplane we had in inventory. And at one time you had to have 500 hours of tactical fighter time to get in the 105 because it was so complex, because it had terrain following radar, it had a fire control control system that was extremely capable but is also very complicated. And so, a guy like me, back in the early days, I wouldn't have even been able to get a 105 assignment. But Vietnam changed everything because then they needed to bring in fresh blood, they needed to bring up guys. So those of us that the instructors felt could handle the airplane got to have the opportunity to fly it. The best thing that ever happened to me. Actually, my whole class got orders to go to Yokota Air Base. And we all thought, gosh, I thought we were going to war. And we had six guys in my class, and all of us went to Yokota. And that was because they needed to fill in Yokota, which had a nuke alert commitment, and they had to keep that fully manned. It was the best thing, once again, that ever happened to me. Because when I got over to Yokota, I wound up in the 35th Squadron, and there was a captain there by the name of Robert Spielman. I call him Spiels. And he was sort of a country guy also, in terms of he liked to hunt and fish. And so we just hit it off and they had a couple of motorcycles there and so we started riding motorcycles together and we got to be really good friends and he was a weapons officer. So we would fly a lot together simply because he could fly with me. And once again, I mean, he just pushed, he pushed, he pushed. He let me lead. And when I lead, lieutenants were not even supposed to be leading, but when I was with him he would always make me lead part of the flight, get on the wing, and he would always maneuver, always maneuvering the airplane, always working me out. And he let me do stuff that none of the other lieutenants over there even got to do. And I know one time we were, lieutenants were never supposed to ferry an airplane solo from Osan, which is where we did our Osan career, which is where we did our new commitment. And so we were going to come back together. There was two airplanes that needed to come back to Yokota. So I was in one airplane, he was in another one, and we'd get up, fire up and get ready to go. And his airplane goes down. Now, he's supposed to have cut me off at the same time. He didn't. He said, Dave, we need to get that airplane on back. I'll take the heat. So I took it on back. Well, halfway back to Yokota, I had a complete electrical failure. Here I am, by myself, at night, and I have a complete electrical failure. And we had, it wasn't an overcast. I didn't have a visibility problem. So I went out and brought the airplane back to Yokota by myself. I had struck a little pencil flashlight up in my helmet to shine on my instruments. We had standby instruments over on the right side of the—our main instruments, they were gone. But we had little standbys. I got back to Yokota with the airplane. Spiels, never anything ever came of it, because the head guys never knew about what took place, other than one came back with an electrical failure. That's all they knew. But Spiels said, I knew you could do it. I said, I wasn't planning to do it this way, though, sir. And we went out one day on a dark mission, in fact, right before I went to Vietnam. And this was sort of interesting too. House line number two on Spills' wing. Now, a dart, do you know what a dart is? It's a long, silver-winged device that is towed behind another airplane. In our case, we towed it with a 105. And they would let the dart out, and then when he starts to turn, he'd clear you in, because he wants to be out of the line of fire. You'd be off to the, for instance, like on the right side, he'd start a right-hand turn, so he's clearing, well then you shoot, you come in, roll in on the start, and you shoot at it. To, you know, learn how to air-to-air shoot. And it's hard, it's not easy, it's not a real big target. So Spills went in and he didn't hit it. And so I came in and blew it away. I come off and get on his wing. We had two other guys, and one of them was the 5th Air Force, one of the colonels. Colonel Vatzel, actually, was his name. And he was flying number 4. Well, number 3 comes in, he fires, didn't hit it. Well, they had a Dart spare. I'm sorry. I hit one, then they had to dispatch that one. They had a Dart spare airplane, because this was real critical. We all got our air-to-air renewals. And so they brought in the spare. So number three goes in, he didn't hit it. Number four went in, and his gun jammed, so he didn't hit it. And so Spill says, well, we still got a dart. I'm fired out. Anybody got anything? And so I waited, because I'd already got a dart. And he said, Dave, how about you? I said, well, I might have something left. He said, go for it. I went in and I did press. And I hit that thing, and I mean it literally just exploded. And I had a high G over the top over the thing. We got back on the ground, and Colonel Batsell said, you are really pressing on that target. Before I even had a chance to open up spills, I said, sir, this is one of the things we've been trying to ingrain and teach into our drivers is sometimes they're going to have a close in shot. And they need to have the flexibility and be prepared to handle these situations. So I got two darts on one mission, which is pretty cool. And that was right before I went to Vietnam. OK, when I first got to Yokota, I wanted to... The guys were walking around at Nellis with this 100-mission patch, and I really wanted that 100-mission patch. It was one of those goals that I had, is to get that 100-mission patch. I'm going to go to the bathroom. So when I got to Yokota, I went down to personnel and I volunteered for Southeast Asia. I didn't have a clue at this time. I was the only one that had volunteered to go to Southeast Asia. So in May, I think it was April or May of 1967, and this was right after, right following those dark missions that I had, they got an order to send five guys, TDY, from Yokota to Takali Air Base to fly a combat mission. I was just a lieutenant and I was the first one called up because I was the only one with a volunteer statement. And so then, of course, there's a lot of guys who wanted to go, they just hadn't thought about putting in a volunteer statement. And so, anyway, they filled up real quick. went down and we went to Tocqueville and I wound up going to the 357th squadron. It was a 355th wing at Tocqueville and the 357th squadron and got to fly with some really really great guys and then this this is where this is where the rubber meets the road as the saying goes. And once again, this is where my six months of experience with the 105 really, really, really paid off. Because I knew the airplane extremely well. Because like I said, spills would push me. So I was able to assimilate into that role pretty quickly and effectively. Nobody had to worry about where I was. I was always going to be where I was supposed to. I was going to do what I was supposed to do. And because I knew the rules, I knew why the rules were there. And that's part of the training that I had gotten. And so I started flying. The first ten missions you fly, they get you easy missions. The lower route packs or I even had some Laos missions, which we weren't in, but I had some Laos missions anyway. Those Blue Jays are really raising canes back there. But then you start flying Rupak 6. because they had more guns, missiles, than anything from what I've been told by the old heads that we ever faced. The flak sometimes would really be horrendous. One mission, it was sort of interesting, actually, because when I first started flying the PAC-6 missions, the guns were quiet. I couldn't believe it. You know, we'd roll on the target, I was expecting all this stuff to come, but nothing. And then July, I think, 4th or 5th came along, and we were going against Kepp Airfield, and I'm flying, I think, in the second flight, Bob White was leading. He flew with our squadron, actually. He was leading the force in against Kep Airfield, which is on the Northeast Railroad, which is northeast of Hanoi. That's why they call it the Northeast Railroad. We roll in, and all of a sudden I see something I hadn't seen before. These red streaks were going by my cockpit. And I was, it took a little bit for me to realize that's flak. It hadn't gone off yet. That's the flak going up. And then this horrendous explosion took place right underneath me. And I mean it literally, it was like somebody took you and hit you in the back as hard as you could. And it's just, I mean, the whole airplane just completely just moved. And it rolled me upside down. Here I am going straight 45 degrees down to the ground, upside down now, and I thought I'd been hit. I mean, there was no doubt in my mind that I'd been hit. And I checked my gauges real quick and this is where knowing the airplane everything felt solid. And so I kept the roll going and I rolled it out I checked the gauges real quick everything was still in the green and so I continued I dropped came off the target and I looked up and I saw a sight that I'll never forget. One of the guys on the first flight had been hit in the belly. We had a belly tank. And fuel was just pouring out and he was a ball of fire all the way back. And... Give me a second. Anyway, I pulled up beside him and he had a real high angle attack, was climbing and this fire was just pouring out of the back of his airplane. I pulled up alongside of him and I didn't know for sure who it was, but I said, I'm out here to the left of you, I'm out to the left of you, you've been hit, lower your nose, you've got too high an angle attack, you're going to lose it, lower your nose. And the nose came down a little bit. And he said, it's getting sloppy. I heard him say it over the air. And I said, try to head a little bit, bring it over to the left more. And he said, I can't hardly see, there's too much smoke. I said, roll a little bit left, roll left. Trying to get him out to the sea. Try to get him out where he could have a chance maybe to get out of the airplane. And he sort of rolled, but then he said, I'm starting to lose it, I'm starting to lose it. And I said, well, don't let the, get out of it before you lose it, because what would happen if you got an angle attack in the 105, if you got a high angle attack, the nose would just slam down like this. And then when you punch, you're off the seat and that seat comes up, hits you, but it can really hurt you bad. So I was trying to, it was obvious he was gonna bail out. So I said, get out of it before you lose it. So anyway, he leaves the airplane. So I went back, I joined up with the tanker, get home, and the crew chief, of course, they come up on the airplane and said, how did it go? And I said, well, check the belly. I might have taken a hit. And he checked it, and he said, yeah, there's a hole in the bottom of the airplane. After that guy had gotten hit, two other guys got hit. So we lost three guys on that mission. And the guy that I tried to help was Ward Dodge, and he was basically my mentor when I showed up in the 357th Squadron. He's the one that taught me how to fly combat. And from that point forward, FLAC was the name of the game. And we had a lot of it, lost a lot of guys. In fact, the 105 community on the D model was a single seat version. We lost half the fleet of D models over there. And that just came to be part of the game and you dealt with it. That's what you do. When we started flying, you've got to remember it was a graduated process. And so the higher ups, I don't know whether this part of it was the military side or the civilian side, but they divided North Vietnam into what they called root packs. Starting from the DMZ, which was the dividing point for South Vietnam and North Vietnam, they started working their way north. Root pack one was right there north of the DMZ, then two, then three, four, five, and six. Six was the entire Hanoi-Haiphong area. They further divided Route Pack 6, which was absolutely the worst place to fly, into A and B. The Air Force had A and the Navy had B. So ours were 6A missions, for instance. When we get a frag, the frag would be the orders for the next day. It would always have three targets, primary, secondary, and alternate. It was sort of funny because we were starting to get frags that would come down 6A, 6A, 6A. So no matter what you did, you weren't going to get an easy one out of it. You were going somewhere up in Hanoi. So it was sort of a standing joke, really. Well, at least our alternate is 6A today. Because a lot of times you'd go up there and the weather would be bad and you wouldn't necessarily get a mission in if the weather was bad when you got up there. We had to have VFR conditions. We didn't do IFR bombing. So everything was visual. But Hanoi, Pac-6A, obviously, like I said earlier, that's where the guns, the missiles, the MiGs were operating. No, no, you want to get me mad, huh? I'm just saying that this is one of the things that we had to deal with that was difficult to accept. Everybody and their damn brother knew when the North Vietnamese had a bombing halt, all they were going to do is renew, rearm, and up the ante. They'd bring in more missiles. They would better disguise their gun sights. They would have opportunity for the MiG drivers to train more, because we basically had air superiority up there. They didn't have a chance to fly a whole lot when we were around, and they chose not to until basically August 23rd, 1967. That was the first time that they really came up and fight that much because they were just so outnumbered. But, we had to live with these bombing halts. And fortunately, I will admit, I personally was not involved in a bombing halt. The bombing halts took place before and after my time there. So I personally wasn't one of those that could really throw up the anger from allowing them to build up while I was sitting on the ground, waiting for them to finish building up, then be told to go back up there. But that's what would take place. And they took full advantage of increasing their defenses every single time. It was stupid. Absolute stupid. You know, anybody that has a brain of sense is, if you're going to go into combat, if you decide to go to war, then there's only one decision. Kick ass and take names and get the hell out of there. Now, you've got to give Bush credit for that. When we went over to Iraq, whatever the reasons were, we went in there and in six days it was done. It was a done deal. In our case, we couldn't even touch Haiphong Harbor. The ships would be sailing in and out of Haiphong Harbor. This was when I was there in 1967. They'd be sailing in and out of that damn harbor bringing in guns, missiles, fuel, you name it. We couldn't touch it. And all of our quote allies, the French and everybody else were also sailing in and out of Haiphong Harbor. I say the French, I've been told that. I didn't see any French ships, but I have been told that they were coming in and out of there as well. And so I better back up on that statement. They had total immunity. And our government would not even allow us to hit any of these ships but you're not coming in there. You're not bringing the stuff in. They wouldn't even stop it. And that's where I have a hatred for Johnson and McNamara that will, the only day it will die is the day that I die. There I was, 40,000 feet, pulling 9Gs, going to Mach 2, 105. No, not quite. First of all, there is something I will add before I got to the MiGs. Because the MiG situation actually occurred because of this thing I'm going to tell you about. I was down TDY, Tackle East. and orders came in sending the five of us back to Yokota, and then there was another five going to come down to take our place at Takali. That all made perfect sense to everybody, except for David B. Colonel Treys, who was my squadron commander at Nellis when I checked out in the F-105, had taken over a squadron at Karat, which is our sister F-105 wing. And he was the boss of the 44th Tactical Fighter Squadron. Well, I went down there to get my 100-mission patch. I think I mentioned that earlier. Well, I pick up the telephone and I call Colonel Trays, this is Dave Waterford. We'd seen each other a lot because we had single runways at both Takali and Karat. Sometimes somebody would blow a tire or foul the runway and we'd have to divert them coming to Takali, us going to Karat. I ran into Colonel Trays a couple of times. Anyway, I said, This is David B. over here, or David B. Walter. I just said Dave Walter. And I said, I'm down here TDY from Yokota, which you knew about that. I said, well, they're sending me home. I want to stay down here and get my 100. Do you need any experienced driver? I got 45 missions, 30 of them in pack six. And he said, get your fucking skinny ass over here. I'll take care of the paperwork. Now you're going to have to edit that, but that's just what he said and I'm not going to change it. And so I said, yes sir. I packed my bags. Nobody had a clue what I had done. I didn't tell anybody because I didn't even think about it. He was going to take care of the paperwork. So, because we were all, they were giving us leeway a little bit of time, you know, between leaving Thailand and getting back to Yokota anyway. miles to the east of me in outland and I started flying the next day and the only thing is as I found out later Colonel Tres hadn't taken care of paperwork. So I'm over there without orders just lying my ass off and I mean I started flying immediately because he was he had he had lost some guys and then some guys had finished up and got their hundred so he was short-handed, especially experienced drivers. And when, when you, like I was mentioning earlier, our frags were starting to come down six, six, six. So that's where we were going. And they, you don't want to take a brand new guy into Hanoi because my gosh, anything in the world can happen. And the, the rest cap, if somebody gets shot down, knowing who to call, how to call, how to rest cap the guy, who to stay over, who to go hit the tanker, and cycling. So you, there's a lot goes on on a rescue. And first of all, in the Hanoi area, generally you're not even going to do a rescue. That's the really, that's the hard-hitting line on this whole thing. If you're in the Hanoi area, nobody's going to be able to come in and pick you up. If you can get out to sea, if you can get out to the west, to the mountains, to Laos, or someplace like that, and yeah, then we try to get you out of there. And I've been involved in a few of the arrest captures myself. But that's why you didn't want a brand new guy just in the theater going downtown Hanoi, because there was a lot going on up there. I mean, you've got to Karat. The first thing Colonel Drees did with my background, he made me a section leader. I could fly three and four, lead for three and four. As soon as I walked in the door, in fact my very, very first mission was the first strike on the Demer Bridge, he put me as number three. And then we got on the tanker and lead, which was Major Bill Wraith, I think it was, he couldn't take gas, and Major Wraith said, Dave, you've got more experience than anybody else in the flight, you've got to lead. My very first flight at Karat, I led a flight downtown Hanoi. So, that's a lot that goes on when you're a lead. Anyway, what I'm saying is, I was a section full-time. Perhaps, and this will take a little bit of time to describe this because it really was the most involved and complicated mission that I flew in the Hanoi area. We were going against a big railroad yard which is right across the Red River from Hanoi was a railroad yard called Yen Vinh Railroad Yard. It's a big target, so we had our typical four flights of 105, a flight being four airplanes for those of you that are not familiar with that. So a flight is four airplanes, so we had four flights of strike aircraft. They're all single-seaters, and that's 16 airplanes. Then we had a flight of Weasel airplanes. They'd come in and snoop out the missiles, the radars. That was a flight of four. So we had five flights of 105s up there. It was such a big target that the Air Force also attached two F-4 strike flights from Ubon of F-4s. And they got behind our flight. So we had six strike flights coming in on this target. Now we all come in pretty much together because we had what they called these little whizzies, these devices that would help blank out the SAM missile radars. So we all came in together in what they call a pod formation back then. Then Robin Olds, a flight of four, was flying MIG cap to keep the MIGs off of us. And up to this point, like I think I mentioned earlier, there hadn't been any MIG activity to speak of. and drop off the tanker, which you always, you refueled when you're on a PAXIS mission, you always refuel going in and coming off. So you got pretty proficient at refueling airplanes. You could do it almost in your sleep. And so as we're coming up there, we had some Snoopy airplanes out off the coast that had what we call a big eye. And they had radar coverage of North Vietnam, and especially Hanoi when we were going in. They started calling them bandits, bandits, bullseye. That means MiGs taking off Hanoi, bullseye being Hanoi. MiGs are taking off in the Hanoi area. So I said, whoa, something different. And so they start tracking them, and we're coming in that afternoon from the west. Sometimes we'd come in from the ocean, the Gulf, and most of the time we came in from land over on the Laos side. We were coming over from Laos that day. So we came up, there's a big ridge called Thud Ridge, which basically ran northeast, I mean, yeah, southeast, northwest, and it ran toward Hanoi. It almost pointed right at Hanoi. So we were going around the north side of that, and as we're starting to get our track, the call-outs for the MiGs and their position and their headings were, it was obvious, and by the way, this was an afternoon sortie. Where is the sun in the afternoon? It's in the west. It's in the lower part of the west. And what the MiGs were doing is they were going out to the west and they were going to turn and come in out of the sun where we could not see them. And that goes all the way back to the earliest combat airplanes. You always try to come out of the sun if you're going to attack somebody. And that's what they were doing. They were MiG-21s. And so they came from the West and so the force commander, I can't remember his name right now, who was leading the whole force in, he said, Robin, make sure you keep those guys off of us. And Robin says, we're working and we're trying to find them right now. Well, this is one of those cases where the MiGs won out and they came out of the sun. They were doing 1.2 Mach. Now that 1.2 Mach is 1.2 times the speed of sound. Speed of sound being 760 miles an hour at sea level. Now at altitude it's less. So they were probably doing close to, oh, maybe 6, 7, 800 miles an hour. So they're moving on. And if you look at a MiG-21 head-on, there's not much to see. It's a very, very small profile. The wings, the intake, it's not a lot of airplane if you're looking at it head-on. So they're very, very difficult to see. And they did it right. I mean, these guys, they did it right. I've got to give them credit. They came in and they launched off two of their ATOLs. An ATOL is a heat-seeking missile just like our Sidewinder. Same deal. And they knocked two F-4s down right behind my flight. Remember I said something about luck? And they were right behind my flight, and had they not been there, who knows? But they caught They caught the brunt of the MiGs. And they knocked two of them down. And so now we got Mayday calls, beepers. When you bail out of an airplane, or, I bail out, you don't bail out, you eject. When you eject out of an airplane, you've got this beeper that goes off. It sort of makes a sound like a, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa. And you can hear it over guard frequency, which everybody monitors. So we got all these beepers going off. We got Mayday calls. You're on fire. Get out of it, all this stuff, all this crap's going on, we're still heading for the target, we ain't got there yet. And so Robin gets tied up trying to help these guys, and of course you're not, like I mentioned earlier, there is no rest cap in the area we were now in. You just don't even, you're on your own, because the helicopters, they can't get in there, it's just too heavily heavily defended. So we press on, this is what you do. You just, that's what you do. You don't sit there and just everybody, say, oh, I'm going home. You keep on truckin', doing what your mission is, that's what we're paid to do, that's what we signed up for. And by the way, speaking of signing up for, every one of us flying fighters, we volunteered to fly fighters. And this was a big distinction between myself, ourselves, and the poor kids down in South Vietnam. They were drafted. They had no choice. They were sent over there to fight a political war and they didn't have a choice about what they did. We all put our name on the line voluntarily. And I don't know why, that just was something I didn't want to bring up. Two separate wars, two totally different wars. Our war was an air-to-air, air-to-ground war. It was a sterile war. We never saw faces. We never saw any blood and guts. We saw airplanes. We saw targets. Never saw a face. Those four kids down there, different ballgame. And I don't think anybody that's here, unless they've been through it, including myself, can never appreciate what they were faced with. But getting back to my story. So we press on in, we're going into the target. And I was in, I think ours was the third, ours was, yes, ours was the third flight. Because like I said, we were staggered at the back, and the flights are staggered like this. Lee would be here, second flight, third flight, fourth flight, like that. I don't know whether you get that on camera, but otherwise, anyways. And that's why I said, if the F-4s hadn't been behind me, then I would have been in line for the MiGs that came in. Or my flight would have been. I might have been lucky, I don't know. But, we get in the target area, we're the third flight in. And I now have, you know, about 600 hours or so in fighters. And I'm going in, everything is set, you check your radar, your fire control system going in, you always line up on another airplane just to check, get everything, make sure everything's working properly. I had a, the 105 had the most sophisticated fire control system of any fighter flying in North Vietnam. Period. It was, it had the latest and greatest, and it worked terrifically. As I described on the dart. That was a good example of it. It works. Especially if you know how to use it and you're smooth. And as I'm turning in, and we're now where it's, what's called a push-up point. That's when you leave the cruise mode and now you throttle up and you're picking up to about 550 for your roll-in. That's 550 knots, about 650 miles an hour or something like, whatever it is. And all of a sudden I'm looking, you have what's called a reticle. It's projected up in front. In our case, it's red rings with a dot in the middle. That's the piper. The dot is the piper. And you put that on your target. And so I'm just trucking along. Everything's looking great. And all of a sudden, my reticle goes, and it's gone. And so I didn't think anything about it at the time because we're about 15, 20 seconds from rolling. And the last thing in the world you're going to do is try to start screwing around with stuff and see if you can figure out how to get it back. But I didn't really know for sure what was wrong. And so I said, well, I've done this bombing mission plenty of times, so I can figure it out. I'll use the TLR missile. That looks about right. And so I rolled in, and sure enough, I used my TLR and I released my bomb. So I'm coming off and we had pre-briefed to turn hard to the north for our join up. Because you always operate as a flight for mutual protection, especially when there's MiGs in the area. And there were MiG-17s all around the target. And but none of them posed a threat to us, so we didn't fool them. Our job was to bomb the railroad yard. But now I'm coming off and I'm pulling about 6 G's, coming off the target and doing about 600 and so knots. And I'm back out of the burner because you want to save your gas. But I'm still doing 600 knots. 105 is fast. That thing was just so beautifully fast. And I look up, though, as I'm making my turn to join up with the flight, and I see an F-105 heading west. He's got two MiG-17s right on his butt. The lead MiG is directly in trail with the 105. The second MiG was off to lead MiG's right side and staggered aft. And I saw that, and then I saw the fire coming out of the MiG's nose. He was actually shooting at the 105. So I hollered out over the radio, because I didn't have a clue who the 105 was. I just said, 105 heading west, you got two MiGs on your ass, do something. And he just kept on going. He probably didn't hear it, or he'd already switched over to a different frequency, which we normally did. We'd go to squadron comm, because there's so much chatter. If you're trying to join a flight up, it's really difficult with all that, because you can't talk over somebody else. So you'd switch immediately over to Squadron Common. So that's probably why he didn't hear me and I didn't hear him or whatever. And so then I made my decision. I had to go in and get these MiGs off his tail or he was going to be dead, or at least shot down. And so I hit what's called a panic button. There's a button over on the right side of the cockpit. And when you push this button, it cleans everything off the airplane except the outboard stations. And since I was flying number three, I had a sidewinder on my left station. Sidewinder, once again, is a heat-seeking missile that you can use in an air-to-air environment. I just pushed the nose over and lit the afterburner to accelerate as quick as I could. I went down, I lowered my nose so I could pick up speed as quick as I could, and also to go more, because it was almost like this, and I wanted to get more in trail. So I went low and down so I could come up below them so they couldn't see me coming. And that all worked. I mean, I got that down pretty good. And the last thing I saw, when I started my pull, I looked at my airspeed indicator and I was doing about 1.3 Mach. That's 1.3 times the speed of sound. I mean, I'm smoking. But, for a good reason, because that nigger's still shooting at the 105. How he had missed him up to this point, I will never to this day know. Because he was dead trail, the 105 did not know he was there. He was just going straight and level. He was only doing about 400 knots because the MiG didn't even have his afterburner on. And the MiGs had afterburners if they needed the extra speed. He didn't even have it on, so the guy was just doing, breaking all the rules. Number one, coming off the target, you got to throttle up, you're hauling ass, and you've got the stick in your lap, and you're moving the airplane. We call it jinking. You constantly do this. What you're doing is two things. If somebody is back there, you're killing their tracking solution and number two, you're looking. You're looking for other MIGs because also you are in charge of helping defend your own flight. You want to see if there's a threat somewhere in your back that's not in front of you. And so you're really looking hard. And so I came off at target, I was doing, pulling six, six and a half Gs. And I, you know, doing this when I saw what was going on. So this guy's just going straight and level, the 105. So I, then I come up and my sidewinder is on and it's growling. Now growling's audio means it's got a lock on to a heat signature. The heat is coming from the back of the airplane. That's where the engine exhaust comes out. So it's looking at a heat source. The lead MIG was so close to the 105 though, I didn't know whether the sidewinder was looking at the 105 or whether it was looking at the MIG, which would have been great if I could discriminate, but I couldn't. And I didn't have my sight, damn it. And so I couldn't really, you know, I didn't have all that working for me. And so I decided I could never live with myself if I had turned that sidewinder loose and it had gone to the 105. I don't know what I would have done. I could never have accepted that, ever. And so I turned the volume down on the missile, and I said, well, I've got to go in with a gun. Well, remember earlier I was talking about that thing, that round thing with a pimple in the middle of it? Well, that's what you use if you're going in air-to-air-wise to shoot at another airplane. So I didn't have that, but I said, well, you know, I shot the gun. It's somewhere out there somewhere in the middle. And so I came up and I went after the second MIG first, because I didn't want to go past him for the lead MIG, because then the second MIG would have a good shot at me. So I had to be smart and just try to bust these guys up. And so I went after the second MIG, and actually that's when I realized how fast I really was going. I'd seen my airspeed indicator, but I realized how slow they were going. That's a better way to put it. It's because all of a sudden I started seeing this closure, and I realized I am really closing fast. And so I opened up on the second trailing MIG, and I did a rake, and I thought I saw flashes on his left wing. And now I'm pulling, I did about a 6 or 7 G pull, vertical, to 7g pull vertical stay behind these guys because the 105 is not a turning airplane So I had a really crank to stay behind him which I did and I go up Through a broken layer of clouds and I'm sitting up upside down just just floating there like this ups Literally upside down and all of a sudden underneath this broken layer of clouds Out comes this mig-17 now this one had his afterburner going. That's the difference. The other two did not have their burner going. So I don't know whether it was one of those guys, another guy, or if after I came through and got them off this 105's tail, then they lit their afterburner to get some speed. That might be what happened. I'll never know. Nobody will know. But I saw that, and he did not know I was there. So he's just driving straight, and he's trying to get his speed up. He's dealing with a speed demon when you're talking about a 105, because we were the fastest thing below 10,000 feet and flying. And so I came right down on top of him, and I opened up, and the first bullets went right through the cockpit. Then started working down the side of the airplane. And, I did not realize this at the time, but while I'm actually hitting the MiG, a 105, actually came between myself and the MiG. He was slightly low, but apparently I had, I'm hitting the MiG, right as he passes directly between us. and a drop around must have hit one of his tanks because a big ball of fire comes out from this 105. But all the 105s got home that day. That was the best part of this whole deal because you don't really, in our world up there, our environment, you really don't have a chance to ever save somebody else's life. Because of the opportunities, I mean, when you're dealing with Flack and Sams, there's nothing you can do. You can't go over there and help a guy with his airplane. It's his ride. And there's nothing you can do to help him. So if you get hit by Flack or Sams, then you're on your own. But in this particular case, I was able to get there, clean these migs off this guy's tail, and every 105 got home that day. The only thing is, and this may be hard for some people to comprehend, considering the hostilities and the environment that we were operating in, we still had a code of ethics, there's probably a better choice of words, I don't have it at my grasp right now. But if I had had the sight that was working, and since he didn't know I was there, I would have probably gone for his engine or one of his wings. I would not have gone for him personally. And in fact, when I got back to Krot, the first thing everybody... Everybody's seen the movie Top Gun. And you know when the guys land on the carrier deck, everybody's around them. Actually, I have a picture of that, and that same thing happened to me. But the first thing everybody asked, did he get out? And I had to say, no, he didn't get out. Because everybody respected the fact that he was another kid or guy who was doing what he loved to do, and he was in his own way protecting his country. to me. So I would have not gone for the cockpit. But I didn't have the sight, so I had no choice. I just did what I had to do. I wouldn't change anything, but I regret that the guy didn't get out. for any fighter pilot is to take an opportunity to engage an enemy airplane, in our case a MiG, and to actually accomplish the task of shooting it down. I mean, that's, it sort puts you into another group. And no, there weren't that many. Now, I do want to say this. There were two MiGs. When I got back to Karat, I claimed a kill. I knew I had this guy. I didn't know whether I got the first guy or not. And to this day, and I'm just, for the record, I've said this before, I don't know for sure what took place. But what did take place is, and the reason the Wing gave me credit for two, and the official Air Force record is only one, but all they had to go on was film documentation, I guess. But that night, I'm going to have to really doctor this up, because the actual language that took place, I don't think I can quite, maybe I can bleep it. That night, we're getting ready to do our mass debrief. The mass debrief, when you go to Hanoi, when you come back, all the flights get together. In one room, force commander stands up in front of all of us. We're all in the room, the intelligence officers in there, the wing commander, the vice wing commander, everybody, a lot of squadron commanders would come in because they wanted to know what took place if they weren't on the mission. Not everybody is on every mission. This was a big one though. The room was pretty full. The force commander is up there getting ready to start and he starts talking about some of the stuff that took place. place? Well, the sergeant comes in and we're down where all the intelligence people were also located and I think they were in the same building. But anyway, the sergeant comes in and I think our intelligence officer was a major and he said, Major, empty up, we got a call from Ubon. And so this guy says, could you hold a brief until I get back? So we're all just sort of milling around, standing around, talking. So pretty soon he comes in, he had this funny look on his face. He said, Lieutenant Walrop, now, what, you claim you got one MiG? I said, yes sir, that's what I claimed, I got one MiG. I know it because I saw him hit the ground. Well that was Colonel Owls and he just called and he wanted to speak to me and when I got on the phone he said, who is this? And I identified myself as Major Umphion and he said, well this is Colonel Owls over to Ubon and I want to confirm a kill for one of your guys over there flying thuds. It was, it's in that letter. He said it was it absolutely was the most spectacular thing he had seen in that whole tour he had over there. A little while later I got a letter from Robin and because that they were going to have the review board and one of the guys that was on it uh... back it was uh... bob white told me about the review board come up he said if you got any kind of documentation you might want to try to get down there because all they got it to go on is just strictly right now film so i i i contacted carlow and so he wrote me this letter this is very little water here's my observation. Based on vivid recollection, pass it on the 7th Air Force, and they were the ones that were going to do the review and so forth, and let me know and he said if that doesn't work let me know and I'll redo this. So anyway he said as far as I'm concerned you got the first MiG without any shadow of a doubt. As for the second the film showed hits, what happened What happened after that will require confirmation by you and anyone else in 388 that saw it or saw a chute. Which of course, like I said, nobody else saw the engagement except Robin, and the man didn't get out of the airplane. And remember, I saw no chute connected with that first MIG. None of our troops went down in the vicinity that day, shoot north or northwest of Phuket, it had to be your second MiG. And may I say in passing, and this is the neat part, may I say in passing that the sight of your thud hot on the tail of a MiG-17 shooting like hell and scoring hits was one of the most thrilling sights in my whole tour. You look like a shark after a minute. By the way, after that I wound up with a call sign, it was shark. And I still get called shark today. Shark after a minute. I couldn't help shouting, go get them, thud, breach of radio discipline, I know. But it was a beautiful moment. All the best to you and good luck with your claims board. And it says, hell, we fighter jocks know you did it, never fear, and have fun in the F-4. Because I was telling him that since I was, we lost our thuds at Yokota, that we were going to pick up the F-4. So that's where he was coming from on that. It's not a bad bird at that. Robin Owens. I know he did not want to leave. He, in fact, I remember talking to him after I got to know him, and he said, you know, I didn't really want to get my fifth kill because they would have pulled me, and I still had work to do. That's exactly the words he used. He said I still had work to do. He was the real deal. I mean, he was probably... And I will take nothing away from our leadership because we were lucky. God, I flew with some of the greatest leadership and commanders and I think about the leadership we got in this country today up in Washington and I think about the difference between those guys and the real deal, the guys that were leading us, that were actually feet on the ground with us and that's not really true, feet in the air. Those guys were the real deal as far as leadership. The guy at Bozo's in Washington, they don't have a clue. But he was probably, in really getting to know Robin, after the fact, knowing about him through his peers, the people that actually flew with him, that were with him at Ubon, he was probably the finest combat commander that the Air Force has ever had. on a limb and say that because not only was he the epitome of a jock, a fighter jock, he was a leader. When he walked in the room there was no doubt who was in charge. You knew immediately who was in charge and for those guys that got to fly with him when he was in charge they had that warm, fuzzy feeling, this guy knows what he's doing and he's going to take care of us. Like, if he hadn't just been where he was, nobody else in my flight even saw me tangle up with him. I was solo as far as everybody in the 105 community even saw what took place. He just happened to see it. So it's not something that, and it happened so fast. These engagements don't last. I mean, in the movies you see these guys, oh, they just go, oh, this and that. It doesn't work like that. Not in our environment with the fighters and the speeds that we were dealing with. Because, first of all, normally anybody that would have had any sense would have boogied out of there. But in my case, for some stupid reason, I was hanging upside down. I was looking around, don't get me wrong, I was still clearing my six, but I was just having to be upside down when I saw this other MIG. Normally, the environment we were operating in, you're not gonna hang around. That's just, that's not very good for your health. And so that just happened. I don't know of a single other confirmation by some other pilot, really. I'm sure it may have taken place. I'm just saying I don't know of any. But it was special because I did get to know Robin through an organization called Red River Valley Fighter Pilot's Association. The very first one I attended when it was back in the States. It was in Wichita, Kansas at McConnell. And one of the guys asked, you know, knew of that deal, and he said, have you ever met Robin? I said, no, is he here? And he said, yeah, let me go introduce you to him. So I met him, and it was great. It was just awesome. He was a bigger than life guy. And, I mean, he just lit up like a Christmas tree. So you're the guy. He stuck out his big paw. That's cool. But anyway, I got to talk to him several times, and then I got to know him through some friends of mine as well. But he was really a super guy. I think he's probably the only guy that ever took on the President of the United States. Well, on October 28th, just to make sure that there wasn't anything that flying in a combat environment might have to offer, we took off on an early mission. We were going downtown Hanoi, I mean, as in two miles southeast of Hanoi on a target. And we took off before sunrise. The sun started coming up right as we were flying. We were heading to the east, so that means in a fighter, you got lead, three, four, two. It's like that, and you're flying, and you're flying sort of a loose formation. You're not flying tight, so you just relax. But the sun's in your eyes. Well, when the sun's in your eyes, you really can't see any lights in your cockpit. And as a wingman, which I was flying off a lead because I was flying number three, you know, I'm looking over there. I'm not looking at anything in my cockpit anyway. Finally, we get ready to turn south to join up with a tanker. Well, when we turn south, all of a sudden I see this master caution light on in the cockpit. I said, where'd that come from? In the 105, you had the master caution light and you had a warning light. Well, this was a master caution. But then it takes you over to a panel that has a series of system lights. One was lit up and it said, Oil Quantity. Well, when you take off, you're always above a half, more like three quarters to full on the oil quantity. Mine was at a half, because the light was on and it said, Oil Quantity. Well, we have a gauge as well. So there's a lot of redundancy there. And so I looked down at my gauge and sure enough, it's at half. And so I called that out to lead and I said, I've got a master caution, it's saying oil quantity and I'm sitting on a half right now. And he said, well, keep an eye on it. If it drops, get it, get out of here and try to get to Udorn, which was the closest base at the time. And sure enough, I saw it and it was just creeping down. So I told him, I said, hey, this thing is, I'm losing this oil. He said, head for Udorn and take four with you as a chase. So we peel out and head off to Udorn, which is about 30 miles away. Well, I was loaded down. Of course, I still had fuel in my tanks, still had a load of bombs. And it was still dark down below us. And so I could see a bunch of little lights from the villages and everything. I didn't want to get rid of that stuff. I needed to get rid of it because it's dragged. I wanted to be able to stretch the range as much as I could on that airplane in case I lost my oil. There was a range of mountains that I told number four, I said, I'm going to head over here so I can get rid of this ordinance over these mountains, try to stretch my range a little bit. So I started turning and it's like all of a sudden I started feeling this, you probably can't see it on the film but I'm shaking my hand and this vibration just started setting in on the airplane. Oh by this time the oil quantity had completely dropped out to zero. So I had no more oil left. And normally the procedure is set to throttle at about 87% and you don't leave it. And that's where they say you're going to get the best range out of the engine when you lose your oil. So I'm going over this this mountain race trying to get where I punch all this this ordinance and crap off the airplane. And about halfway around there the vibration is it's just like you took a volume knob and just slowly turn it up. And the vibration kept getting stronger and stronger and stronger and stronger. And so I called out to number four that was chasing me. I said, the vibration is really picking up in this thing. And he said, yeah, you're smoking pretty good too. And I said, I don't know for sure I'm going to make it. I'm going to try to get over these mountains, though, with this airplane. And it finally got – I got around to where I was over the mountains and I was going to punch the stuff off, the vibration had gotten so violent that I was literally as strong as the 105 was and it was really, really well built strong. It probably took more battle damage, flak and stuff than any airplane flying. And I knew it was a strong airplane, but I literally, I couldn't read a single instrument in the cockpit. I mean, it was just a blur. Everything was a blur. And I said, this thing, I'm losing it. I'm probably going to have to get out of it. And he said, well, I don't doubt that. You ought to see the back of your airplane. It's like Fourth of July is coming early. And I said, what do you mean? He said, you ought to see the shit flying out of the back of your airplane. And so I said, yeah, that's it. And I said, I'll pop the RAT. A RAT is a ram air turbine. It's a little propeller that falls out. Once you turn it loose, it falls out of the side of the airplane. It's got a propeller that starts spinning up, and that will provide you with a generator so you continue to communicate, as well as it'll provide hydraulic pressure to run your flight controls if you lose your engine, because your engine is run from a hydraulic pump, or the hydraulic pump is run from the engine and that's what provides the pressure for the flight controls. So anyway that allowed me to talk and to fly the airplane. So I said I'm shutting this damn thing down before it comes apart and I did. I stopped cocked and now I'm in the world's biggest heaviest glider and a glider in a 105 is like a rock falling so you're not going to go very far. And so he said well make sure you get out plenty of time. I said, I'm going to get out about 8,000, 10,000. Sure enough, I went down, pulled that handle up, pulled that trigger, and wow. It squeezed the thing, and that rocket, well, the rocket doesn't fire first. It was a shell that initially sends you up the track. It's got a cable that's actually attached to the rocket, because if the rocket fires, it could burn your feet and your legs and stuff. So anyway, that thing went off. What a ride that was. And I still got neck and back issues to this day from that, as a matter of fact. But everything worked. I floated in my parachute. I landed in a big old tree, I think one of the biggest trees in Thailand, or at least the tallest. And I'm up here and I'm looking around and we got one of these rappelling devices and I started to use that thing and I said Damn, I'm not sure that'll reach the ground And of course as a kid I used to climb trees like every other kid did so I said up there naturally the tree Wasn't that big? So I pulled myself I could pull myself over this branch to the street I climb out and turn loose my parachute and I start climbing down this damn tree and I get down the last part of it, probably about the last six or eight feet of the tree. It's so damn big, I got my arms spread as wide as I could. And I don't have any grip anymore. I'm sliding down. The only scratch I got were my forearms where I slid down this damn tree. And anyway, number four, he got the helicopter. They came in, picked me up, and took me back to Udorn. And then I hopped on another flight back to Karat. They check you over, and the doctor, you know, goes over everything, and asks you how you're doing and all this kind of stuff. So anyway, they take me back to Karat. Oh, I forgot to mention something earlier. Remember me talking about, because this came into play, about not having orders sending me to Karat? Well, Yakota found out where I was on August 23rd. I had been missing since about the 12th of August when I went from Takli to Karat. And then, of course, all the news media splattered that all over everything. That's when they found out that I had gone to Karat. Well, what else didn't follow me to Crotte was my medical records. And so I never even have, even to this day, there's nothing documented in any of my paperwork that I ejected from an airplane. The official Air Force records at least. And funny thing was, I never thought a thing about it until about, oh, five or six years ago I was at a river rat reunion and got talking to one of the guys I was down there with, Dick Gow, and somehow that thing came up and he said, by the way, Lieutenant, I got a question to ask you. That's what he always calls me, because he was a captain and I was a lieutenant. And he said, I want to know something. Since when do lieutenants write their own orders? And I looked at him and I didn't have a clue what he was talking about. I just didn't register. I said, what are you talking about, Dick? He said, remember when you went to Crock? I said, yeah. He said, how did you write your own orders? I said, I didn't. I picked up the telephone and called Colonel Trays. And he said, come on over. And I had never thought a thing about that up to that point in time and space. And I did. I guess I did something that I wrote my own orders over there. Because Colonel Trey never got any orders made up for me. Oh well. But, you know, it was a hell of an experience. Working with the people I worked with is something I will never, ever fail to remember and cherish. These people, these guys, just like the guys in South Vietnam, all of us knew it could be our day that something wasn't gonna go our way. But yet everybody put their boots on, everybody put their helmet on, they strapped that big beast on, started up and away we went. And we did our job. And it was frustrating as hell dealing with the leadership that we had that wouldn't support us, that wouldn't allow us to win the war, which we could have done in a damn heartbeat. That leadership would not allow us to do it. Now, I'm going to want to go one step further here. I also fault the JCS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because every single one of those guys should have gone on and written their careers off and they should have resigned en masse and say, President, we can no longer work for you and the way that you're running this war and squandering our resources and our kids. And I mean, I hold them responsible for not having the guts to stand up and say, that's it, we can't support you. If that had happened, that whole thing would have changed immediately. I mean, the whole picture would have changed because the President could no longer conduct what he was doing, the way he was doing it, had they done that en masse, said, sir, with all due respect, we can no longer perform our jobs. Aviation, the art of aeronautics, began with the dreamers, inventors and daredevils who dared to defy gravity. The journey of aviation was nurtured by pioneers like the Wright brothers, whose first flight marked a historic milestone. The role of aircrafts in world wars was groundbreaking, dramatically changing warfare strategies. This initiated a technological evolution in aviation, transforming the simplistic wings of a biplane into the thunderous roar of jet engines. Let's journey through the ages of aviation. Behind every great aircraft there were great minds. These visionaries, like Sir Frank Whittle, the innovator of the turbojet engine, redefined air travel. Then there's skunkworks Kelly Johnson, the genius behind the SR-71 Blackbird. His designs combined speed, stealth and power, crafting machines that dominated the heavens. The contributions of these pioneers have left an indelible mark on the canvas of aviation, shaping the course of history and inspiring generations of engineers and aviators. Each epoch in aviation history gave birth to extraordinary aircrafts, each with their own unique features and roles. The Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird was a marvel of speed and stealth. The F-105 Thunderchief, a supersonic fighter bomber, was vital in the Vietnam War. The P-51 Mustang, a long-range fighter, was critical in World War II. The P-47 Thunderbolt, a heavyweight fighter, was used extensively in the same war. The A-10 Thunderbolt II, the Warthog, is a close air support icon. The Messerschmitt ME-262 marked a leap forward in aviation technology. Each of these game changers were instrumental in their eras and their legacies still resonate today. Beyond the game changers, there are those that have transcended their practical roles to become icons. The Concorde was not just an aircraft, it was a supersonic symbol of luxury and speed. The B-52 Stratofortress, a strategic bomber, is an icon of power and resilience. These magnificent machines and others like them have become much more than just aircrafts. They are enduring icons that encapsulate the audacious spirit, the relentless innovation, and the boundless ambition that define the world of aviation. For more amazing aerial footage, and to join us in this incredible journey, check out the Dronescapes YouTube channel. So, So, you
