Before the Punic Wars which made them famous, the
Carthaginians stood as one of the most pre-eminent naval forces of their era. This was a legacy
centuries in the making which was built over many wars often overlooked by history. Today let us get
to know these forgotten sailors of North Africa and the warships with which they forged a
vast Empire that nearly took down the Romans. This is the proud history
of the Carthaginian Navy! Naval history often takes a back seat in
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and get 25 off of premium membership enjoy At its peak, the Carthaginian navy was
considered to be one of the most powerful sea powers of Antiquity. This was the proud
culmination of a long naval tradition dating back to their Phoenecian forbearers in the
Bronze Age. It was this group of cities along the coastal Levant which had first pioneered methods
of navigation and ship construction that allowed them to dominate the seas prior to and even after
the Bronze Age Collapse of the 1200s BC. By the 9th century BC, Phoenicians had founded hundreds
of outposts across the Mediterranean which enabled the formation of lucrative trade networks that
linked far flung markets across the known world. Tradition holds that Carthage would be founded
in 814 BC by the city of Tyre [Tire] as a part of these endeavors. Strategically located
at the nexus of east-west and north-south trade routes it was almost inevitable that
the city would rise to dominate the seas. Little is known about how this process occurred.
Speculatively we can assume that the heart of the early colony was its bustling port and merchant
sector capable of hosting dozens if not hundreds of ships of all sizes. Most would have been
fishing or trade vessels. Yet it seems likely that at some point the young nobility of Carthage
would have seen fit to begin equipping their ships for battle in the same manner as their Phoenician
home cities with which they kept regular contact. While no outright wars are recorded in this
period there would still have been a need to combat piracy, to raid neighbors, and to
establish naval superiority over rivals. By the 6th century BC, the power
of the Phoenician mother cities began to wane as the silver trade collapsed and
they were attacked by neighboring land powers. The western colonies were now on their own. It
is at this point that Carthage would truly begin its rise to power. The upstart first began by
shaking off the yoke of the local Libyans before next establishing regional dominance over Utica,
Hippo Acra, and the other Phoenician settlements of North Africa. From here the New City then
began to look out across the Mediterranean, intent on claiming Tyre’s old throne. Yet,
whereas Tyre had dominated the colonies almost solely through economic pressure, Carthage
began adding military force into the mix. Her navy became formidable and feared, and her
army began seeing deployment in foreign lands. In these ways, Carthage established
a new model of hegemony which more closely resembled that of a traditional empire
compared to the previous system under Tyre. Let us now take a closer look at the
warships with which Carthage ruled the waves. Naval vessels of this period were galleys, meaning that they were narrow, shallow draft ships
powered primarily by oar and backed by sails. Naturally these evolved over time and came in
all manner of shapes and sizes. We will briefly summarize the major classifications of warships
and their role. Please note that while there is some debate in terms of how groups are defined, in
this video we will be referring to the number of rowers per file, that is the number of rowers in
a cross-section regardless of their arrangement. The first class of ships were the Monoremes.
This is actually a hugely diverse group which gets lumped together due to the fact that
they all have a single bank of oars generally with one rower per oar. As such most merchant vessels
dating back to the bronze age were of this type with the Phoenecians and others merely adapting
them for military use. The oldest and simplest Monoreme warship was the Pentekonter. It measured
around 30 meters long and 4 meters wide. As the name implies it was powered by a total of fifty
oarsmen, each of which manned the 48 rowing oars split between either side or the 2 steering
oars along the back. Early models had no top deck and thus crew capacity was limited to
just a few additional officers and marines. Later variants had partial or full decks which
further increased their capacity. Soon new Monoreme models, such as the Lembus, the Hemiola,
and the Liburna, arose to complement or replace the Pentekonter. While Monoremes would eventually
be outclassed by larger warships they were never rendered obsolete. Their simplicity, versatility,
and long range meant that they would continue to be used for centuries to scout, patrol, raid,
transport troops, and even fight in major battles. Eventually, naval innovators found that by
stacking oar banks, often by way of outriggers, you could get more rowing-power per linear
foot of ship. By the 8th century BC, this is what eventually gave rise to the second class
of warship, the Bireme. Again there were many variants but overall these vessels appear to have
been 25 to 30 meters long and 3 meters wide. Thus for the same relative dimensions of a Monoreme,
a Bireme could now boast roughly 120 oars split between two sides. These would be manned by 120
rowers in addition to a few officers, sailors, and marines. While initially deployed as
front line warships over time they would yield this position to larger vessels and take on
support roles similar to those of the Monoremes. The next class of ship was the Trireme which came
to the fore around the 6 to 7th century BC. Such ships were roughly 37 meters long, decked, and had
170 oars split between three banks of rowing-oars on either side and steering-oars in the back.
Total crew capacity is estimated at 170 rowers, 25 sailors, 5 officers, and about a dozen marines
including 2 archers. They could reach a high speed of about 8 knots and hold a steady 4 knots
for long periods of time. Properly constructed and equipped, they would serve as fast and nimble
warships. Triremes featured in virtually all major naval actions of antiquity and
were the true workhorse of the period. Yet by the 4th century BC, naval powers of the
Mediterranean would begin fielding a new class of ship, the Quadrireme. Reportedly invented by
the Carthaginians it was about 40 meters long, 5 meters wide, and featured four rowers per file. Whereas previous ships had followed the
pattern of 1 man per oar, the Quadrireme began to share oars between rowers who were
typically distributed across 2 or 3 levels. This is believed to have occurred due to the
fact that four independently-operated oars would be impractical to build and
even more difficult to coordinate. The shared-oar approach allowed more manpower
to be utilized whilst lowering the average skill required by each rower. Based on Rhodian
records, they typically boasted 240 rowers, 25-30 sailors, and 5 officers with
a fighting complement of 19 marines, 6 archers, and 2 artillerymen. Many navies
used them as their main front-line warship. However the arms race between premier powers
of the period also yielded an even larger ship, the Quinquereme. Apparently invented
in 399 BC by Dionysius of Syracuse, it was 45 meters long, 5 meters
wide, and featured 5 rowers per file. Their arrangement also used shared-oars, this time
spread across 3 levels in a 1-2-2 pattern. The Carthaginians apparently built their Quinqueremes
with a separated oar box for rowers which improved ventilation whilst expanding the deck size and
allowing the hull to be better reinforced. There were roughly 30 files on either side of a ship
for a total of 180 oars manned by 300 rowers. The total crew included about 25 sailors, 6 officers,
70-120 marines, and at times artillerymen. Fully decked, sitting 3 meters above the water,
boasting a formidable complement of fighters, and at times sporting towers, Quinqueremes
were widely hailed as the premier warships of their time. Consequently, they formed the
bulk of the Carthaginian Navy at its prime. But how were these ships built? Understandably
construction was a massive endeavor given the scale and complexity of such vessels. Timber
needed to be felled, transported, and cut to size while nails had to be made, rams cast, sails sewn,
and on and on. Once components had been procured, assembly could begin. The hull came first
followed by the rowing benches, the rowing-oars, the interior, the mast, the deck, the
sails, the rigging, the steering oars, and the anchor. Finally, large amounts of
work would also go into decorating the ship including carvings, statues, painted
eyes and detailed bronze rams. Such a process was extremely labor
intensive and costly. Most first-rate powers had dedicated harbors and covered
sheds for both construction and maintenance. In this regard many of the Phoenecian colonies
were capable of significant production while the Carthaginian naval facility known
as the Kothon was a jewel of its time. Punic engineers further improved their means and methods
by developing a proto-assembly-line in which each piece of timber was cut to a universal
size, marked for efficient construction. But once they were sea worthy, how were
these warships staffed? As stated before, the vast majority of a ship’s crew was its
rowers which could number up to 300 in the case of Quinqueremes. During major battles
like Ecnomus, the Punic fleet was said to have fielded over 100,000 rowers. To solve the
colossal issue of manpower, Carthage sourced its crews from a variety of places. A large portion
of the rowers probably came from the city of Carthage itself while the rest were likely
recruited from nearby islands and other Phoenician cities. In the ancient period, rowers
were always free men who were probably recruited from the poorer citizens as in Athens and received
a reasonable wage for their skilled labor. Marines meanwhile appear to have followed
the same model as the Carthaginian army with some elements being drawn from the Punic
citizenry while many came from auxiliary and marcernary sources. Their equipment would
have been similar to their land counterparts though some alterations likely occurred
given the unique nature of combat at sea. In later periods it seems that Carthage had
neither the want nor ability to provide the manpower required for its vast armies and navies
which led to increased outsourcing. For instance, mercenary Gallic helmets with Punic markings
have been found amidst the seafloor wreckage of the battle of the Aegates islands from
the First Punic War. In other locations, private and mercenary sources seem to have
provided entire ships, or even squadrons. Once rendered fully operational,
how were these warships trained? Unfortunately, little is recorded specifically
about these Carthaginian practices. We know that they had a long naval tradition which
meant that sailors likely gained the requisite skills over the course of their daily lives.
Specific training such as rowing practice on land is mentioned by the Romans so perhaps something
similar took place. Otherwise the crews would likely have drilled along the shores of North
Africa by exercising over long distances, learning to follow commands from their
officers, and executing all kinds of maneuvers. Life in the Navy could be tough. Ancient warships
were cramped spaces slicked with cold seawater where hundreds of men rowed for hours with
little awareness of their surroundings. Reprieve may be had when under sail but ships
had to make regular landfall to rest, cook, sleep and resupply. This might occur
at a port but more often than not required the men to literally drag their
ships ashore. It was a miserable experience, made only marginally better by wine
and a simple, high protein diet at sea. In terms of organization, each ship had an overall
captain with officers in charge of administration, navigation, observation, morale, and the timing of
the rowers. Ship groups are less well documented but it seems that squads of typically around
20-50 warships were commanded by a rab sheni, or sub-general, while overall command of a fleet
numbering sometimes in the hundreds would fall under a rab mahanet, or general. Multiple combat
and support fleets could be operational at a time across various theaters of the Mediterranean.
This all would have varied based on what the situation demanded and thus we should not
expect much uniformity across the centuries. Details are sparse but it's believed that in the
height of its power, Carthage regularly kept a fleet of perhaps 120 or 130 warships while this
number often jumped to 200 or 300 in times of war. Administering such chaos fell to
the large Carthaginian bureaucracy which included bodies like the
Adirim that functioned as a Senate, the Court of One Hundred and Four which provided
oversight, as well as various poorly understood Commissions with more narrow focuses on
things like taxes and perhaps logistics. When it came time for battle the Carthaginian
Navy would have used a range of tactics. These were a reflection of the tools at their
disposal which included: a ram, ranged weaponry, and marines. Let us review the ship level
tactics which accompanied each of these. Ramming tactics involved charging into enemy
vessels using bronze rostrata located at sea level. This was a delicate matter.
Charging head on with another ship would be to attack its strongest point
and would be suicidal for both sides. Thus charging the weaker flanks was preferred.
However the angle of attack was critical. A perpendicular strike delivered the most force but
risked impalement or serious damage to one’s ram. The ideal tactic was therefore to attack
at a shallow angle which would rupture a wide section of the hull. The impact was still
traumatic for both sides but far less deadly for the attacker. A highly skilled captain and his
crew might even aim to strike a glancing blow that would shear off an enemy’s oars. This would
leave the opponent’s vessel dead in the water, allowing for a deadlier follow up strike or better
yet the capture of a ship with minimal damage. During these operations it might be the case that
a charging warship would retract its oars prior to impact to avoid crippling itself. Replacement
oars would also have been present on board. Ranged tactics involved using archers and
artillery to fire upon an enemy vessel from a distance. Projectiles were most effective against
ships with exposed rowers who might be picked off. Decks and various forms of cataphracting
helped mitigate such threats and were relatively impervious to all but
the most powerful of ship-mounted artillery. Overall ranged weapons rarely destroyed a ship
outright but could certainly batter an enemy crew into submission or at the very least disrupt their
operations. Small, fast vessels would focus on using superior maneuvering to win ranged battles
while large ships would rely on volume of fire. Compared to the previous two forms of
naval warfare, boarding tactics were the simplest. They involved closing the distance and
overpowering a foe in close quarters combat. To do so ships would use grapples to hook their prey
and then drop boarding bridges to charge across. Once linked together, the advantage often went to
the ship with the largest contingent of marines and so it's no surprise that Quinqueremes, capable
of holding over 100 fighters, were so formidable. But these were all ship-level tactics, what
about the maneuvers of squads and fleets? It seems that the Carthaginians tended to favor
ramming over boarding and thus victory was a matter of attacking an opponent’s flanks.
To this end, tactics such as the Periplous could be used to fix the enemy’s front line
while sending fast ships around the side to hit them from the exposed rear. This tactic might be
countered by using terrain to deny an envelopment. The Diekplous by contrast was a maneuver meant
to pierce a battle line. The tactic was executed by sending a single ship into the gap between
enemy warships. At the last moment the captain would vere to the side and shear the oars off
one of the opponent’s ships, incapacitating it. A second warship would follow close behind and
deliver a full speed ram to the crippled boat. At this point a tear would form in the
enemy line through which the rest of the attacking fleet would pour in and rip
the opposition to pieces. This was often countered by the use of tactical reserves
meant to plug any gaps that might develop. In addition to these standard tactics, the
Carthaginians proved that novel stratagems were also possible. At the battle of
Ecnomus for instance they attempted an envelopment of the Roman fleet by giving way in
the center and forcing their way around the sides. This tactic occurred forty years
before the battle of Cannae and may have even inspired
Hannibal’s battle plans. Now let us finally turn our attention to the
service history of the Carthaginian navy. This would have begun in the
coastal waters of North Africa as the fledgling colony sought
to establish local dominance. We have only a dim understanding of this period
though it's likely that naval battles were quite small, involving only a handful of ships.
Soon however the Carthaginian fleet and its sphere of influence would expand across the
Mediterranean. In doing so they would start to compete with the other naval powers of the
era such as the Etruscans and the Greeks. Around 600 BC it seems that the Punic Navy was
used to deploy forces overseas to occupy Ebusus in the Balearic Islands and soon to secure control
of Sardinia. No naval battles are recorded and it seems this was instead a relatively unopposed move
which helped Carthage secure its dominance over the seas of eastern Iberia and southern Gaul.
Likely, this would have caused some friction with the Etruscan fleets which operated in the
neighboring Ligurian and Tyrrhenian seas. Though both had raided and traded with one another for
decades, they would find common cause when it came to combatting the growing Greek influence in the
western Mediterranean. Thus the two would forge an alliance in 540 BC to oust the Phocaeans who
had recently established a new home in Corsica. At the Battle of Alalia, 120 Etruscan and
Carthaginian warships faced off against 60 Greek vessels, all of which
were likely Monoremes or Biremes. We are left with no tactical records of the battle
and must imagine the carnage of the incident. Missiles flew, swords flashed, and hulls ruptured
all while men drowned in the churning seas. Herodotus notes that the Greeks
lost 2/3rds of their ships, winning a Pyrrhic victory but ultimately being
forced to abandon Sardinia. In the aftermath, Carthaginians and Greeks would continue
to clash in the surrounding seas. The island of Sicily became the nexus of
these conflicts for over two centuries. It is in this theater of war that the Punic
fleet would see the bulk of its action. The first major campaign seems to have
occurred sometime in the 6th century BC when the semi-mythical King Malchus
reportedly raised a force to invade. Few records exist but it seems that this
mostly amounted to a glorified raid which involved capturing booty and slaves, and sacking
a number of coastal areas in the western regions but without establishing direct rule. In 483 BC,
the first true Punic-Sicilian War would break out when Carthage raised a host of allies aboard
several hundred ships to oppose the Greek Tyrants Theron and Gelon. The fleet faced little
opposition at sea and was instead used to transport land forces for a series of pitched
battles which culminated in the siege of Himera. Here the Punic fleet was drawn
ashore in a fortified coastal camp. The Greeks correctly identified this
as the greatest threat and infiltrated the position for a surprise attack whilst a
pitched battle was underway. In the ensuing chaos many ships would be destroyed making the
eventual defeat and retreat of the Punic army all the more deadly. As had occurred during their
initial advances, the survivors would be battered on the way home by another storm. Such were
the vicissitudes of the Sicilian campaigns. There would be 8 more of these Punic wars
in Sicily with increasing levels of military investment and resulting ferocity. We will
not have time to cover them all in detail but can give you a taste. Generally speaking we see
the Carthaginians deploying fleets in the hundreds with each wave boasting greater proportions
of new ships such as Triremes, Quadriremes, and eventually the hulking Quinqueremes. These
were often used for large scale operations like invasions, blockades, and pitched battles.
Yet they could also be used more flexibly for smaller operations like
raids and lightning strikes. The third Sicilian War against Dionysius of
Syracuse provides an excellent case study. In the initial phases, the Carthaginians had but a
fleet of 100 to delay the advances of the Tyrant’s force of 200 warships and 80,000 infantry.
Soon however Punic reinforcements arrived bringing their total to 300 warships and
50,000 infantry. Under the commander Himilco, this force was deftly used to outplay Dionysius.
For instance a landing at Cape Pelorum drew out the Greek Army from Messene at which point a
detachment of the Carthaginian fleet filled with picked rowers and marines quickly sailed
around their rear to seize and sack the city. Soon after the two sides would clash at sea in 397
BC at the Battle of Catana. Here Himilco fielded some 200 triremes and 300 transports retrofitted
with rams while Dionysius deployed a mix of 180 triremes and the new Quinqueremes. According
to Diodorus Siculus, the naval battle began in the Greeks’ favor when their admiral
led a sudden sally of an elite force. However he was ultimately driven to flight,
leaving the rest of his fleet leaderless and disorganized in the face of the ensuing
Carthaginian counter-attack. Though the Greek Quinqueremes were larger and far better
manned than the Punic Triremes, the smaller ships were able to lock them down with grapples
and shoot, swarm, or ram them into oblivion. When the battle was finished and the Syracusan
fleet crushed, the Carthaginians showed no mercy, sweeping along the coasts to kill any Greeks
attempting to swim back to shore. Accordingly, the coasts of Sicily became choked with the
corpses and broken timbers of the defeated navy. After the Third Sicilian War, the Carthaginians
fought two more wars against Dionysius, and in these the Carthaginian
fleet proved invaluable. For instance the capture of the Syracusan
fleet at Eryx and the death of the Greek Tyrant led directly to the end of the fifth Sicilian
War. In the next two Sicilian Wars, the Punic navy continued to show its strength and versatility
with the fleet breaking into small squadrons of 20 to 50 ships which brutally raided coastal cities
and wreaked havoc on enemy shipping. By the third century BC the Carthaginian Navy had justifiably
attained a formidable reputation. When Pyrrhus of Epirus launched his invasion in 280 BC, Carthage
would actually pledge 120 of its ships to support the Romans. When Pyrrhus turned on Sicily next,
it was the Punic fleet which would help resist his advances and eventually dealt him a punishing
defeat upon his retreat back to Italy. But the ultimate withdrawal of this external force would
leave Carthage and Rome on a collision course. The First Punic War, which kicked off in 264 BC,
would primarily take place in Sicily between two asymmetric powers; the Romans excelling on land
and the Carthaginians excelling at sea. Initially this made for a rather inconclusive affair as
Legionary advances across Sicily were stalled by a Punic blockade of the island which choked
their supply lines and allowed them to raid coastal Italy with near impunity. Eventually
the Senate would seek to break the impasse by raising their own navy, largely using allied Greek
expertise and reportedly by copying the design of a wrecked punic Quinquereme. In the
ensuing battles along the coasts of Sicily, the Carthaginians were initially
able to maintain the upper hand. However the invention of the corvus
changed the nature of combat. It was a spiked boarding bridge capable of being
lifted, swiveled, and dropped on enemy vessels. The device made it far more difficult
for Punic ships to use their superior maneuverability to evade the
clutches of the Roman vessels and essentially allowed the legions to
transform naval combat into a land battle. With the playing field leveled, the Romans
began to turn the tides and even planned a naval invasion of Africa in 256 BC. This would
be contested by the Carthaginians at the enormous battle of Ecnomus which featured almost 700
ships and a quarter million participants. It was here that the Carthaginians split their fleet
in three to attempt to draw apart and envelop the compact Roman formation. The assaults on the
wings were successful until a victorious Roman center was able to rally and relieve their
beleaguered comrades, winning the battle. Over the course of the war, the Carthaginians
fought back and were greatly assisted by a series of storms which the inferior Roman sailors,
weighed down by their Corvi, were poorly equipped to deal with. Hundreds of ships would be lost
along with many tens of thousands of lives. Yet the stubbornness of the Senate meant
that absurd amounts of money and bodies would be thrown into the conflict to rebuild after
every loss and keep the war machine churning. The Carthaginians by contrast
were unwilling or unable to devote the same levels of effort and by the end of
the war struggled to fully staff their navy. Yet they nonetheless put up a valiant effort,
winning victories at the battle of Drepana and Phintias while proving their superiority in
smaller scale action like blockade running and raiding. It seems that by this time they
had learned to better counter the Corvus which was simultaneously seeing less use
owing to its associated risk during storms. In 241 BC a final, climactic battle would be
fought between both fleets at the Aegates Islands. Here the Carthaginians deployed 200 quinqueremes
against the 250 of the Romans. The battle did not feature much in the way of noteworthy tactics
and appears to have been a straightforward brawl. While the Corvus was not used it seems that
the Romans were more capable in traditional naval tactics than when they had started
the war and, because they had stripped their ships for speed prior to battle, were
said to now be able to get the upper hand against the understaffed and
overburdened Carthaginian warships. Nonetheless it was a bloody fight
with heavy losses on both sides. Ultimately the Romans emerged victorious. By this point, a thoroughly exhausted
Carthage was ready to come to the peace table. The ensuing treaty would see them abandon Sicily
and agree to massive payments over 10 years. This would prove to be the end of Carthaginian
naval supremacy. Yet their fight with Rome was far from over. While they never again took to the
seas in the same numbers, the Carthaginians were quick to get their naval capabilities back online.
For instance it is believed that the Great Kothon harbor was built around this time. The exterior
harbor was likely its ancient port which would be reserved for commercial use while the new interior
harbor would be dedicated to military use. It was surrounded by a double wall, inside
of which lay dozens of ship sheds, capable of housing between 150 and 220 ships. Each ship
shed was propped up by ionic columns, giving the impression that the harbor was a grand portico,
concealing the weapons of war that lurked within. In the middle of the Kothon the
Carthaginians built an island on which the admiral’s tower was located,
which oversaw both the facilities and the sea itself. From here, the admiral could
direct all kinds of naval matters at Carthage, sending out fleets for offense or drawing a
great chain across the entrance for defense. Over the course of the Second Punic War, the
harbor would be the origin from which Carthage’s military might was once again projected.
While few pitched battles at sea occurred, fleets nonetheless helped supply and
reinforce armies across many theaters of war. However, Roman victory at the Battle of Zama
ultimately forced the surrender of Carthage with the punishing terms of peace putting an
end to Carthage’s maritime empire. Nonetheless Punic sailors once more returned
to the seas to enrich themselves through trade. This prompted Rome to finally
put an end to any dreams of an eventual return. With Cato ending every speech before the Senate
with the admonition “Carthage must be destroyed,” the Third Punic War was finally waged
to put the great city under siege. This was another brutal affair which saw the
remnants of the Punic fleet bravely partaking in sallies, raids, and blockade running.
Ultimately however it was their home, the Kothon Harbor which would become the
focus of Roman assaults and the breach through which the city was stormed. Yet while
this would be the end of the Carthaginian navy, its legacy and even its sailors would fight
on under the new management of the Romans. I hope you’ve appreciated this deep dive
into the woefully understudied affairs of ancient Naval warfare and in particular
the long history of the Carthaginian fleet. What units of history should we cover next? A big thanks to the Patrons for suggesting
this topic and making this video possible through their continued support. A big
thanks is also owed to the researchers, writers, and artists for
bringing this episode to live. Be sure to like and subscribe for more content
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