We finished our video dedicated to the events
of the Russo-Ukrainian war in August with reports about the start of the long-awaited
Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kherson oblast. In the first half of September, Ukraine maintained
a slow, but steady progress there. But as it turned out, this would not be the
most important process in this period. Ukraine launched a surprising and highly successful
counter-offensive in the eastern part of Kharkiv oblast. In this video, we will describe both Ukrainian
counter-offensives and provide you with updates on other notable developments from the war
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to skip the wait list right now. Our previous video described the start of
the Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kherson. After several months of targeting Russian
ammunition depots and critical supply lines in and around Kherson oblast, Ukraine launched
its counter-offensive in three main axes. It was reported that Ukrainian forces broke
through the first line of the Russian defense, which was mainly defended by the separatist
DPR units. Even though the Ukrainian command maintained
a strict silence policy in connection with its Kherson offensive, information about the
liberation of several villages and towns was reported by the media. The message of the Ukrainian command and officials
was not to be euphoric, as the Kherson offensive was planned to be the slow and methodical
destruction of the Russian military assets in the area. In the first half of September, Ukraine continued
putting pressure on the Russian forces in Kherson oblast to advance slowly, while further
degrading Russian supplies and attacking Russian pontoon bridges and barges to minimize supplies
coming to the Russian contingent of around 20k-30k troops in this area. Losing Kherson would threaten the Russian
control over Crimea and another key logistical hub of Melitopol in Zaporizhia. Hence, since late August, Russia has ramped
up efforts to bolster its numbers in the area. The British Ministry of Defense reported that
elements of the elite 1st Guards Tank Army were deployed from the Kharkiv-Izium front
to Kherson. Furthermore, RFE/RL provided footage of Russian
convoys moving into Southern Ukraine via the Kerch Strait Bridge. But Ukraine did not intend to allow Russia
to strengthen its positions in the Kherson oblast and continued targeting Russian military
infrastructure. On September 1, a Ukrainian air strike destroyed
a Russian military base in Snihurivka. On September 2, a Russian pontoon crossing
in Nova Kakhovka met the same fate. On September 3, the Russian 45th Guards Spetsnaz
Brigade, which was reportedly either encircled or enveloped in the Vysokopillia area by the
60th Motorized Brigade and the 108th Territorial Defense Brigade, and the 60th Mechanized Brigade,
managed to break through towards the South to link up with the 98th Guards Airborne Division
troops. Nevertheless, this led to the liberation of
Vysokopillia, Olhyne, and Potiomkyne, which have been contested for months. On the same axis, the Ukrainian army reportedly
made an advance towards Khreshchenivka. On September 4, it was reported that the Ukrainian
28th Mechanized Brigade, the 59th Motorized Brigade drove the 20th Guards Motor Rifle
Division and the elements of the 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault Division away from Liubomyrivka
near the M14 highway leading directly to Kherson. The Ukrainian army also liberated Blahodativka
to expand its Andriivka-Lozove bridgehead across the Inhulets. Ukraine managing to protect and expand this
bridgehead poses a threat of taking the T2207 highway under control to advance on Berislav
and Nova Kakhovka, which would mean dissection of the Russian army in Kherson oblast into
two. According to Russian sources, Putin’s just
doesn’t have enough infantry to get rid of this bridgehead. Another interesting development in early September
was the resurfacing of videos of Bayraktar TB2 drone strikes on Russian military equipment
and positions for the first time in a while. After having some success at the initial stage
of the war, the Russian air defenses and radar systems, presumably managed to minimize the
impact of these strike drones. It is argued that the AGM-88 HARM missiles
supplied by the United States to Ukraine, which have been essentially designed to target
radar systems, have drastically decreased the electronic warfare capabilities of Russia
in Kherson and other fronts, allowing Ukraine to send TB2s back to the air and cause some
damage. On September 6, Ukraine destroyed another
Russian ammunition depot in Tomyna Balka, about 20 km west of Kherson. On the following day, the advance of the Ukrainian
army in the Northeastern axis of Kherson continued. It was reported that the village of Novovoznesenske
was liberated. On September 8, an unconfirmed report claimed
by Russian Telegram channels stated that either the elements of the units defending Kyselivka
abandoned their positions under intense pressure, allowing Ukraine to take it. On September 10, Ukraine struck the Alkoresurs
enterprise in Kherson, which hosted a Russian military base. On the same day, it was also reported that
the Ukrainian 28th Mechanized Brigade drove the elements of the 20th Guards Motor Rifle
Division from Oleksandrivka on the T1501 highway leading to Kherson. On September 12, the Ukrainian command stated
without too many details that Ukraine has been able to liberate 500 square kilometers
in Kherson since the start of the offensive. Spokesperson of the Ukrainian Southern Operational
Command, Natalya Humenyuk noted a couple of newly liberated settlements - Bilohirka near
the Andriivka-Lozove bridgehead and Myrolyubivka in the Northeastern axis. The liberation of Bilohirka means the further
expansion of the strategically important bridgehead. Humenyuk also claimed that Russian forces
deployed in Kherson oblast have offered to surrender. We cannot be sure whether that is true or
not, and whether Humenyuk was talking about specific units or the Russian force in the
western bank of Dnipro in general. At the time of writing of the script for this
video, there were no further updates on this claim. On September 13, several social media accounts
claimed that Ukraine further expanded its bridgehead in Kherson by liberating Novohrednjeve
and Mala Seidemynukha. There have been additional claims of Ukrainian
advances in Kherson oblast, namely a considerable progress south of Vysokopillia reaching Novohryhorivka,
which would mean a 40-kilometer progress on this axis since the start of the offensive,
but we cannot confirm this at this point. The last major event with a direct impact
on the battle of Kherson was the Russian strike on Karachunivske dam in Krivyi Rih, which
had substantially increased the water levels of the river Inhulets. Right now, it is difficult to fully understand
how it will affect the resupply of the Ukrainian forces fighting in the Andriivka-Lozove bridgehead. We will see very soon, if Ukraine manages
to solve this issue and how it is going to impact the situation in Kherson. The slow and methodic Ukrainian advance continues
in the region and it is clear that the Russian supply situation is worsening. Most of Russian artillery moved back across
the river in order to improve its ammunition situation. Regardless, the danger for the Russian troops
is very real in the area, as they don’t have any bridges left across the Dnipro making
a fighting retreat impossible. Now, let’s take a look at the events on
the Kharkiv front. In our previous videos and above we talked
about a small Ukrainian advance west of Izium in August and deprioritization of this front
by the Russians, as they redeployed some of its units from this direction to Kherson expecting
the Ukrainian offensive to start there and probably hoping to counter-attack against
the forming Ukrainian bridgeheads. For weeks, Russian Telegram channels warned
about Ukrainians deploying more troops to the area, but somehow the Russian command
ignored these signs of impending activity on this axis. Their main focus was on the ongoing Ukrainian
counter-offensive in Kherson and their continued attempts to progress in Donbas. This paved the way to another Ukrainian counter-offensive,
which shocked the world and might have turned the tide of the war in favor of Ukraine. On September 6, the 92nd, the 93rd Mechanized
Brigades, the 25th, the 90th, and 95th Airborne Brigades, and the 3rd Tank Brigade launched
an offensive in and around Balakliya defended by the elite 1st Guards Tank Army, SOBR quick
response units of the Russian National Guard, and several other units deployed in this area. Balakliya was an important transport hub for
the Russian war effort in this area, which also hosted a major ammunition depot called
the 65th Arsenal - one of the largest during the Soviet period. It is reported that the Ukrainian pace of
the offensive was very quick. Instead of massing around and sieging settlements,
Ukrainians moved very quickly to bypass them and wreak havoc in the Russian rear. Footages from battles in the area and comments
of Russian military bloggers indicate that Ukrainian reconnaissance units moved very
fast ahead of the main group of Ukrainian forces and created a sense of an all out attack
by basically firing at will at everything on the horizon and breaking the resolve of
the Russian troops suffering from low morale and poor supplies to resist. Within hours, Verbivka, a village north of
Balakliya was liberated. Very soon other villages like Volokhiv Yar,
Kunie and Vesele on the roads leading to Balakliya were taken under control, putting Russian
SOBR under threat of encirclement. SOBR managed to flee the town, but had to
leave the vast majority of its equipment to the advancing Ukrainians. At this point, the Russian front in the area
basically collapsed, allowing further progress of the Ukrainian army. It moved towards another important road junction
at the town of Shevchenkove, opening the road for liberation of Kupiansk, an extremely important
railroad hub, which played a key role for supply of the Russian campaign in North Donbas. Liberating Kupiansk and other settlements
on the western bank of the river Oskil would mean encirclement of the remaining Russian
units in the area, including Izium, another strategically important city in this area. Nevertheless, it seems like the Russian units
understood the threat posed to them very quickly and most of them managed to flee to the East
of the river Oskil, while leaving most of their equipment to the Ukrainian army. By September 8, the Ukrainian units liberated
Senkove on the eastern bank of the Oskil river, south of Kupiansk. On September 9 advanced on Kupiansk and liberated
at least part of the city East to the river Oskil. At this point, even late Russian reinforcements
sent to the area could not turn the tide, as the panic engulfed the Russian lines. On September 10, Russians fled from Izium,
in order to avoid being encircled, but they had to leave a massive stash of weapons and
equipment to the advancing Ukrainian forces. The Russian units west of Oskil and pro-Russian
collaborators in this region fled to Russia and the Russian occupied areas of Ukraine. The collapse of the Russian army in this area,
forced Russia to withdraw from the occupied areas of Kharkiv oblast, as Ukrainians within
days retook control of towns like Vovchansk, which had been occupied in the beginning of
the invasion. For days, the Russian command remained silent
about the Ukrainian progress, while the Russian Telegram channels and social media followed
and informed on it with astonishment and anger. Only on September 10, the Russian Ministry
of Defense officially stated about regrouping actions the Russian units in the Izium-Kupiansk
area conducted in order to focus on their mission in Donbas. The Russian public did not really buy this
explanation, even though some of the most ardent loyalist admins of Russian Telegram
channels continuously claimed that the Russian forces withdrew intentionally in order to
draw Ukrainian forces into a trap. But you do not regroup or conduct strategic
withdrawals while losing most of your equipment to the enemy. Ukraine liberated almost 6k square kilometers
of its land in a matter of days, a massive area, which required Russians almost 4 months
of highly costly operations to occupy. Very poor Russian command and coordination
between its forces, low morale, problems with supplies, lack of manpower in this direction,
and astonishing indifference to indications of an impending Ukrainian counter-attack led
to this collapse. Russian occupation administration claimed
that Ukraine had an 8:1 numerical advantage against Russians on this axis. One of the key factors for the success of
this brilliant counter-attack was the inability of the Russian airforce to impose its will. German-supplied Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft
guns moved alongside the Ukrainian infantry defending it against the aerial threat. Liberation of this area allowed Ukraine to
take control of several important supply lines and logistical hubs, relieve Sloviansk and
Kramatorsk from a threat coming from the North and seize a huge number of Russian military
supplies. Most importantly, any danger for the second
biggest city in Ukraine - Kharkiv completely dissipated. According to Oryx, during the counter-offensive,
Ukraine captured 388 pieces of Russian equipment, 200 of them in good condition. This included 49 tanks, 24 armored personnel
carriers, 32 artillery vehicles and MLRS, and 2 planes. More importantly many Russian ammunition depots
were captured intact and that would allow Ukraine to supply its largely Soviet-made
artillery. It is difficult to say how many Russian soldiers
were killed or captured, but the number is in the 1000s, with some units stopping to
exist as a fighting force. But perhaps the biggest benefit of this highly
successful counter-offensive operation by Ukraine is an incredible boost of morale for
the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian people. This victory, which is perhaps the biggest
success of the Ukrainian army in the war on par with its victory in the battle of Kyiv,
is yet another indicator that the Ukrainian army is not only capable of defending valiantly,
but of conducting daring offensives as well. On the contrary, the already poor morale of
the Russian army deteriorated even further. Unfortunately, after the Russian retreat,
it became clear their troops have commited atrocities in the Izium area. Hundreds of corpses were found buried, many
of them belonging to the civilians who were executed. Ukraine once again asked the international
community to recognize Russia as a terrorist stated and invited the UN to conduct an investigation
in the area. This defeat increased the discontent in Russia
regarding the situation in Ukraine. For instance, the head of the Chechen Republic
Kadyrov criticized the Russian command for its “mistakes” and threatened “to contact
the leadership of the Defense Ministry and the leadership of the country to explain the
real situation on the ground”, if the situation did not change. This was followed by a surprising petition
of 65 municipal deputies in Russia to strip Putin of the presidency for “treason”. Along with that, several Russian MPs, including
the chairman of the Communist Party, Gennady Zyuganov called for full mobilization. Military setbacks on the ground might push
the Kremlin to announce mobilization in the foreseeable future, but the effectiveness
of its conduct and whether it is going to change the situation remains highly debatable. The Russian government continued its efforts
to restore the Russian manpower in Ukraine by creating new Wagner units. The owner of the Wagner group Yevgeny Prigozhin,
who is known for his close ties to Putin, was seen making a recruitment speech in a
Russian prison on September 14. In his speech, he offered amnesty to inmates,
who would fight in Ukraine for 6 months and stated that refusing to fight and withdrawing
after agreeing to fight in Ukraine would not be an option for them. Along with that, RFE/RL reported that Russia
was redeploying its troops in Central Asia to Ukraine. Also, Kadyrov called upon federal subjects
of the Russian Federation to launch self-mobilization campaigns, which is extremely problematic
in terms of the unity of Russia. Amidst Kremlin’s unwillingness to declare
a politically risky mobilization, the Russian elite is clearly worried about the situation
in Ukraine and understands that the lack of manpower is one of the factors behind it. Russia has also been attempting to bolster
its military resources by purchasing arms from other countries. On September 5, New York Times reported that
Russia was purchasing artillery shells and rockets from North Korea. On September 13, after months of speculation,
the first physical evidence of the Russian use of Iranian drones emerged. Debris of Iranian kamikaze Shahed-136 drone
was found in Kupiansk and later in Nikopol. But the quality of weapons purchased by Russia
continues to be overshadowed by foreign military aid given to Ukraine. In early September, the White House asked
Congress to approve the provision of a further 13.7 billion dollars of military and economic
aid to Ukraine, while on September 8, Biden approved a new 675-million-dollar package,
which included more ammunition, more artillery, more grenade launchers and so on. Russia also suffered setbacks on the diplomatic
front. Against the background of weakening of the
Russian international standing, hostilities renewed between Azerbaijan and Armenia despite
the presence of Russian peacekeepers. Armenia requested military support from the
Russian-led military alliance - CSTO, but only received diplomatic support, which damaged
the Russian reputation even more. As a result, two other CSTO members - Tajikistan
and Kirgizstan began clashing along their borders. The occurrence of these ongoing conflicts
show that Russia is quickly losing its leading position among the former Soviet states. The Ukrainian command stated on September
13 that the Russian command has suspended the deployment of new units to Ukraine, but
this has not been confirmed yet. It seems like Ukraine was content with consolidating
its gains west of Oskil, since it did not want to endanger its success by going deep
into Luhansk oblast and risking its overstretched lines. Still, Ukraine gained ground towards Lyman
and liberated Sviatohirsk. Ironically, Ukrainian forces were able to
cross the Siverski Donets river near Bilohirovka, the location where Russia infamously lost
a few BTGs in May, and advanced towards Kreminna. Success in this area will negate costly gains
made by Russia around Sieverodonetsk and Lysychansk in a grinding battle that lasted for months,
as Ukrainian officials are already reporting engagements in the vicinity of Lysychansk. There are reports that Ukrainians have already
crossed the Oskil river near Borova and east Kupiansk, which means that Russia still hasn’t
managed to form a good defensive line, creating a threat to Putin’s control over the Luhansk
region. Another important factor is the disarray in
the Russian supply lines. Kupiansk was essential for the supply of the
Russian troops in Luhansk and Donetsk and without it, the nearest usable railway is
in Valuyki in Belgorod and Ukraine can interdict that supply line with ease with its artillery
and MLRS. Either to avenge its clear defeat or to calm
down the military press, Russia shelled a number of Ukrainian power plants in the northeast
of Ukraine leaving that area without electricity for some time. Striking civilian installations, that have
no military utility, is a war crime. In response, Ukraine shelled the army base
in Valuyki and a few other military installations within Russia. It is important to mention that both sides
shelled each other’s territory along the northeast border for months. The situation in the rest of Donbas remained
stable. Russia continued its attempts to break through
around Avdiivka, Pisky, Mariinka, Bakhmut, and Soledar without much to show for it. Putin’s deadline of capturing Donbas by
September 15 obviously failed, and the Ukrainian advance will likely further hinder the Russian
attempts there. A stalemate in the Zaporizhian front which
has been continuing for several months persisted, but there have been reports of deployment
of additional units to this area by both sides. Russian military reports cautioned the Russian
command that this may be the next axis of the Ukrainian counter-offensive, which would
put the Russian control over strategically important Tokmak, Melitopol, and Mariupol
under threat. The Zaporizhian Nuclear Power Plant crisis
continued. On September 1, the Russian Ministry of Defense
made an unfounded claim that Ukrainian saboteurs landed near the power plant to seize it, but
most probably this was just another propaganda effort of Russia. Also in early September, the International
Atomic Energy Agency delegation inspected the power plant. On September 6, the IAEA released its report,
which did not explicitly blame Russia, but noted the placement of military equipment
near essential facilities of the power plant and called for demilitarization of the power
plant. But later the board of the IAEA adopted a
more directly worded resolution, which called on Russia to “immediately cease all actions
against, and at, the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant and any other nuclear facility in Ukraine”. But the risk of a nuclear disaster still exists,
as Russia does not intend to withdraw from the power plant. Intensification of fighting in Zaporizhia
may exacerbate these risks. It is important to understand why the Ukrainian
approach to the counter-offensives in Kharkiv and Kherson are so different. On one hand, there is the matter of different
terrain - the Kharkiv area is more forested and has elevations, both of which allow the
infantry to have concealment, while the Kherson oblast is the open steppe with little chance
to hide, making mass advances costly. On another hand, Kherson was taken by Russia
with relative ease and is not nearly as damaged as Izium or Mariupol, or Volnovakha, which
means that Ukraine would prefer to liberate it with the least amount of destruction. Still, the fact that Ukraine has a decisive
numerical advantage, while Russia can’t generate manpower, means that the Ukrainian
troops can create mismatches on any portion of the front and break through once again. With neither side willing to negotiate, the
Russian government intends to continue its occupation of Ukrainian territories hoping
that winter is going to weaken the resolve of European governments and create cracks
in the Western alliance. On September 3, Gazprom maintained its shutdown
of the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline in an attempt to prevent European countries from filling
up their gas depots. But according to experts, Europe is well positioned
to brace for this winter in terms of its energy security situation, but it is unclear what
would happen in the following winter, if the war in Ukraine continues. Still, the Russian government seems to gamble
on destabilizing the EU member states through increased gas prices and inflation. For Ukraine, September has arguably been the
most successful month of the war. They have almost fully liberated Kharkiv oblast
in an unexpected and rapid counter-offensive, while also gaining ground in Kherson. The Ukrainian government will be hoping for
more Western military aid to continue its de-occupation efforts. There have been some discussions regarding
supplying Ukraine with ATACMS precision missiles with a range of 300 kilometers, which may
be absolutely devastating for the Russian Army. But the losses of the Russian army continue
mounting even without ATACMS. There have been no recent updates from foreign
or reputable local sources regarding manpower losses, but Oryx blog continued reporting
about visually confirmed losses of military equipment on both sides. By September 16, Russia had lost 1128 tanks,
2374 vehicles, 142 command posts and communication stations, 18 heavy mortars, 351 artillery
pieces and vehicles, 109 multiple rocket launchers, 56 aircraft, 48 helicopters, and 127 drones. On the Ukrainian side, the visually confirmed
equipment losses are the following: 263 tanks, 639 vehicles, 7 command posts and communication
stations, 117 artillery pieces and vehicles, 22 multiple rocket launchers, 46 aircraft,
14 helicopters, and 34 drones. We will continue covering Putin’s unprovoked
invasion of Ukraine in the coming weeks, so make sure you are subscribed and have pressed
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