THE BATTLE OF RAMADI - US Navy SEAL Jocko Willink on Retaking Ramadi

so it's 2004-2005 you're starting to hear back that things are really changing in in Iraq and I'm guessing you're already starting to prepare for a second deployment out there and and I just wanted to ask this organization that happened and I want to hear more what it was like that first week in Ramadi that they started doing was that something that they had been planning for years or was it just a natural progression of what happened you know when we first went in and then doing the regrouping no it was because the folks that were regrouping that were organizing the regrouping were not Iraqis they were foreigners they were al Qaeda coming in from from other areas from Syria from from all over they were coming in there they were starting to organize they had the financial backing so it was that was who was organizing it it wasn't the Iraqi people the Iraqi people were happy to be rid of Saddam and looking forward to living in some kind of a peaceful society and then income the insurgents and the extremists and the terrorists who have their own plans is it more about money than it is about religious freedom or jihad is it really of these guys gangsters just running numbers in a money rocket in the end of the day or is there a lot of blurred lines as to why people fight it's both it's both they are definitely power-hungry they're their money hungry and power-hungry and I guess you could say that that roots back to they want money so they can fuel their their viewpoints but it's it's all combined they want power this always strikes me that fight happened in Ramadi it didn't happen you know in the middle of the desert somewhere in the Sahara where there's no resources but like it's happening there for a reason that's happening there for a reason you get back to Ramadi in 2006 when you land on the ground how does it feel different if it already does and what's that first few days like in contrast to your first tour well almost immediately we're going to memorial services for army guys Marines that are killed which you know was a rude awakening so that's that's the welcome to Ramadi the welcome to Ramadi is you know you're going to go and pay your respects to some guys that were just killed and and there's firefights in the city so we're we're just across the river from the city there's firefights in the city all day there's firefights in the city all night we're on the rooftop of our building you sit there and watch tracer fire go back and forth we're shot at from you know across the riverbank there's yeah it was it was legit it was legit combat it was a legit bad scenario with a sustained combat operations how do you lead your men through that when you know they're dealing with not only the funerals which definitely take a psychological toll but then even that just constant fire fighting over there I mean do you have to switch up your gear and think okay I got a lead stronger or maybe a little easier in certain scenarios are changing yes you do have to modulate your your leadership and you have to do that if you're in the business world you have to do that if you're leading any kind of team you've got to modulate and you got to recognize when your guys need to be pushed and when your guys need to be not pushed and given a rest so you're constantly doing that regardless of what kind of team you're leading and in combat like you know I say all the time it's amplified because if you push your guys too hard in combat they're gonna break you know whereas in business so maybe they make errors on something or maybe they do snap I mean it does happen the business world where people like can't take it anymore but in combat will happen very quickly and and so you know you do you're constantly modulating and and taking measure of where your guys are at and you know sometimes I didn't do a great job of that sometimes I went a little far in said oh wow I just saw the look on that guy's face he needs a rest and I should have recognized that earlier and you know you make mistakes no doubt those first few weeks in Ramadi what are you assessing what are you deciding that you have to do differently what do you as a unit I know there's a lot of other you know units there what are you deciding you need to do you know very differently than than the previous tours well one of the biggest things was the strategy the strategy while I was there on my first deployment and the strategy throughout the beginning of the Iraq war all the way up until 2006 was to go out and capture or kill the bad guys you know you find out where these insurgents are you find out where these terrorists are go out capture and kill them so that was the the strategy and the thought was and it's a very common thought and it's one of those sentences that makes so much sense that everyone believes it and that is you cut off the head of the snake the snake dies right that's that's a common common thought and statement because if it's true right if I cut off the head of snake the snake does so the thought was if we can cut off the head of the snake meaning the leadership of the insurgents then the snake will die the insurgents will die and it's just not true it's it's just not true and there was a group of US military people that that knew this and General Petraeus was one of them who wrote the counterinsurgency manual along with a core group of really I I don't know if they take this as an insult I take it as an insult they probably don't but intellectuals guys that were intellectuals guys that were smart HR McMaster General Petraeus a guy that I ended up working for Colonel Shawn McFarlane those guys understood that cutting off the head the snake it just this the snake goes another head and what you have to do is you have to change the environment that the snake is in and so the battle the decisive terrain in this battle was not a building or a mountain or an airfield like it would be in World War two the decisive terrain was the people it was the populace it was the local populace of Iraq that are noble people that wanted to live simple peaceful lives so they recognized that and they brought in a new strategy which was hey look we're going to continue to do those operations because part of counterinsurgency is to go out and still capture and kill bad guys of course but what you have to do is you have to secure the populace you have to make the populace feel that you are the stronger side and that they don't have to live in fear of the insurgents and so that strategy was called seize clear hold and build and when the 1 1 ad which was the large brigade of soldiers and Marines that came in and took over Ramadi from the last unit that was there so when we arrived in Ramadi it was a reservists unit and they were awesome guys the 2 to 8 out of Pennsylvania and if you don't know what a reservist is in England it's the TA it's the it's people that are you know plumbers and physicians and drivers and normal teachers just civilians that have to they do whatever it is one weekend a month and two weeks in the summer but all the Sun they get called up their number gets pulled and there they are they're in Ramadi they were there for 14 months they fought heroically did an amazing job and by the time we got there they were battle-hardened warriors but it was their turn to go home so into take their place was this armored Brigade called the one 180 the ready first armored Gaede the first brigade of the 1st Armored Division they came in to take over and they brought in Sean McFarlane who like I said was a incredibly smart guy who had again experience plays a big role he had been in northern Iraq in a city called Tala far where this other Colonel McMaster had used this strategy up there and won and pacified the city and he turned over with Sean mcFarland and and Colonel MacFarland then came to Ramadi and knew the strategy to use which was completely different than what we'd been doing it was a lot more risky it was a lot more aggressive and it was the right thing to do which is go into these enemy controlled neighborhoods and build these combat outposts these these reinforced buildings where coalition forces meaning both American soldiers and Iraqis would go there and live and stay and drive out the insurgents not just one night go get a bad guy leave but stay there permanently and drive out those in surge from those areas can protect the local populace so the local populace could live in peace turn against the insurgents and finish finish them off to watch the rest of this fascinating interview click on the link below and go to London real academy.com there you can sign in with your social media log in and watch the rest of the episode for free along with all of our episodes on London real my webinars and all of our premium content all located over at London real academy.com so click on the link below you'll be directed there and you can watch the rest of this fascinating interview and I'll 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Channel: London Real

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Keywords: ramadi, iraq, ramadi iraq, the battle of ramadi, battle of ramadi, vice news, retaking ramadi, the battle for iraq, vice, dispatch 11, inside ramadi, special forces, navy seals, seals, seal, navy seal, us navy seals, jocko willink, military, war, iraq war, insurgents, terrorists, terrorism, ramadi iraq 2006, ramadi fighting, ramadi documentary, ramadi combat footage, ramadi liberated, ramadi battle, isis, isil, islamic state, iraqi, militia, jihad, middle east, londonrealtv, london real

Id: vzw71EiIH4o

Length: 9min 28sec (568 seconds)

Published: Sun Apr 10 2016