The Battle of Milne Bay - The Unknown Turning Point of the Pacific War

on the 14th of january 1942 a formidable naval force of the imperial japanese navy departed guam and headed south its main body was composed of the first air fleet commanded by rear admiral chuichi nagumo a task force to contain the aircraft carriers akagi kaga zoikaku and shokaku two battleships three cruisers and nine destroyers behind this formidable force steamed a transport convoy which was escorted by elements of the fourth fleet on board the numerous transports were the veteran south seas detachment based on the reinforced 144th infantry regiment and numbering around 4500 men this formation was the primary land force for the guam and wake island campaigns the detachment contained the regiment's three infantry battalions plus a mountain gun battalion and cavalry and engineer regiments after a devastating airstrike by the carriers at 11 pm on the 22nd of january the invasion 4 sailed into simpson harbour within sight of the town of reball new britain papua new guinea were the mandated territory of australia in 1942 this vast area of mountains jungle and islands was almost wholly undeveloped although small papuan villages dotted the coastline and mountainous interior there were only two major settlements in the whole of the territory the administration of the area south of the central mountains called papua was centered on port moresby the primary australian base to the north of the territory which is called new guinea was the town of reball on the very northern tip of the island of new britain not only did the town of 4000 have electrified lighting and an operational airfield but the harbour at reball was one of the best in the region report was an excellent air in naval base and its possession allowed the japanese to dominate the entire bismarck archipelago japanese planning in 1941 had viewed the occupation of reballs strategically vital as not only would this formidable air and naval base secure their southern flank but would protect the massive truck naval base from air attack as it was within range of b-17 strikes on the morning of the 23rd of january the 1400 strong australian garrison found themselves in a desperate position although a sharp battle was fought around the landing zone the australian defence was soon outflanked over a thousand men took to the jungle however most were captured or surrendered over the coming weeks the japanese rapidly developed the air enabled facilities a week after the invasion a squadron of nine zero fighters flew in from truck and by the end of the month the whole fourth air group of the 24th air flotilla some 48 medium bombers 48 fighters and 12 flying boats was operating from a ball the january operations had gone so well that navy high command began urging further offensives in both the solomon islands and new guinea these included expanding offensive operations into papua with the aim of capturing the only other major allied base in the area port mosby in a dispatch to navy high command by rear admiral yano this rationale was explained 1. acquisition of air bases in the solomons and papua areas would vitally strengthen japan's strategic defense position giving the navy the advantage of expanded aerial reconnaissance over waters in which the enemy naval forces must maneuver for a counter-offensive from the south east 2. seizure of such bases would deprive the allies of key positions for a counter-attack and could be affected at the cost of committing a relatively small number of troops three japanese control over these areas would intensify pressure on northeastern australia and hinder its use as a base of allied particularly air operations by the 29th of january the army and navy had come to an agreement and the following orders were given to both the south seas detachment and combined fleet operational objectives to invade strategic points in the solomon islands in the eastern part of british new guinea in order to cut communications between these areas and the australian mainland and to neutralize the waters north of eastern australia operational plan the army and navy will jointly invade the lay and salamawa areas as soon as possible while the navy independently or jointly if warranted will invade tulagi and capture air bases if possible the army and navy will invade port moresby after the invasion of ley and salamawa japanese command accurately estimated the defending strength in the salamawa and lay areas to be light and by the 8th of march both of these objectives were taken without major resistance the port moresby offensive which was originally intended to be launched in february was delayed by reports of u.s carrier activity in the area as the commencement of this amphibious operation from reball was deemed to be too risky without the carriers of the combined fleet covering the operation nearly two months after the salome and lay offensive in early may the amphibious assault on port moresby was finally launched covered by the fifth carrier division with the two aircraft carriers zuikaku and shokaku in addition to the light carrier shoho and close escort the invasion fleet sailed from a ball at a very slow 6.5 knots forewarned by intelligence intercepts an allied naval force composed of two fleet carriers eight cruisers and twelve destroyers intercepted the japanese on the 7th of may the resulting battle of the coral sea was indecisive although the japanese were able to sink the fleet carrier lexington for the loss of a light carrier shokaku was badly damaged and the combined air group had been badly mauled only 9 out of 36 dive bombers and 6 out of 24 torpedo bombers were operational although largely undamaged without carrier support the invasion convoy was deemed to be too vulnerable to land-based air attack and the fleet returned to reball after the disastrous defeat at the battle of midway the imperial general headquarters realized the possibility of covering an amphibious invasion of port moresby was now gone however the strategic significance of the base was only growing with ever strengthening allied air power operating from northern australia and port moresby the japanese army especially was still committed to the capture of this major allied base a new plan was developed in which the army would land the south sea's detachment on the north coast of papua at buna after developing buna as a major base japanese army units would begin offensive operations towards kokoda with the objective of taking port moresby via a land route in support of this operation the navy would launch a concurrent amphibious landing in the vicinity of port moresby once the south sea's detachment was in a position to attack from the south slopes of the owen stanley range this combined attack was a critical element in the plan however an airbase had to be established in eastern papua to provide air cover for any task force given the carrier losses the ijn had suffered at midway japanese reconnaissance detected the development of an airstrip at milne bay in july at an area referred to by the japanese as rabi the milne bay area was strategically located at the very tip of papua and from the air base there allied air power would be a critical threat to any japanese naval operations in the northern coral sea its capture would be a vital prerequisite for any amphibious landings at port moresby in melbourne at south west pacific area general hq allied command had also seen the value of developing an airbase to the east of port moresby upon his arrival southwest pacific area supreme commander douglas macarthur had been placed in command over all australian forces in the theatre all throughout 1942 and 1943 the majority of the land formations under macarthur's command were australian however as can often be the case in coalition operations the direct chain of command was a little blurry macarthur could only practically exercise his command of australian forces through general thomas blamey who was appointed supreme allied land commander south west pacific area this made the formation of allied operational strategy more of a cooperative venture than many have portrayed it as technically blamely answered to the australian prime minister not macarthur although blamey could not give direct commands to u.s forces without macarthur the american general also relied upon blaming to command australian units which were the majority of his tonal force this gave the australians a little leeway in conducting the campaign in papua as although macarthur could and did disparage australian efforts and capabilities there was actually not much he could do about it without the compliance of blaming in june 1942 well before the japanese advance along the kokoda track australian units had begun developing an air base at ghillie gili a small village at the head of milne bay the terrain at milne bay is typical of many areas of papua equally formidable and beautiful the bay itself is some 40 kilometers long and 10 kilometers wide its northern and southern shores are dominated by towering mountain ranges which rise to an altitude of over a thousand meters leaving only a narrow strip of flat land with mangrove swamps and thick jungle punctuated by plantations the head of the bay around gilly gilly is relatively flat and was selected as the primary area for airbase construction on the 8th of june although work on clearing the first airstrip had begun by papuan workers two weeks earlier the first major allied units arrived by sea on the 25th of june spearheaded by easy company of the 46 regiment u.s army corps of engineers the construction of the milne bay air base preceded a pace in one month the american sappers had constructed a dock one working airstrip camouflaged aircraft parking areas and taxiways and by the 22nd of july raf p40s began to arrive within days two rwaf fighter squadrons number 75 and number 76 squadron were operational and work had commenced on two additional airstrips on the 11th of july the first major combat formation arrived at milne bay the seventh infantry brigade commanded by brigadier john field this formation was a unit of the citizen military forces colloquially referred to as a militia unit at this time australia essentially had two armies the all-volunteer elite australian imperial force unit or aif and citizen military forces or cmf formations which did include conscripts but were generally designed for home defense under australian law only volunteer formations could fight outside of australia but as papua and new guinea were australian mandated territories it was legal to deploy these cmf units although the morale and unit cohesion of militia formations could be a little patchy by this time they were well armed and equipped with a full allocation of small arms machine guns and artillery the seventh infantry brigade was in general terms at a good state of combat readiness better than the 14th brigade which formed the foundation of the port moresby garrison and would see action along the kokoda track the brigade group contained three infantry battalions the 9th 25th and 61st a battery of anti-tank guns two batteries of anti-aircraft guns one heavy and one light and the 24th field company of australian engineers by the end of july the japanese interest in the new allied air base at milan bay became apparent with numerous air raids and reconnaissance flights as the american engineers now reinforced to a full battalion continued to work on the other airstrips the australian sappers focused on roads and accommodation transportation was a critical problem at milne bay as the regular torrential rain would turn the few tracks and dirt roads into mud making movement of heavy weapons or vehicles impossible as the men continued to work to improve the air base blamey at landforce headquarters in brisbane decided to bolster the defense of milne bay by deploying the newly arrived 18th brigade of the seventh division aif the men of the 18th brigade were combat-hardened veterans the famed rats of dubrook and were under the command of brigadier general wooten newly arrived from north africa the three brigades of the seventh division were dispersed between operations along the kokoda track milne bay and one reserve formation held in queensland the strength of milne force was now approaching half a division and to command the multiple brigades a quasi-division headquarters were set up under the command of major general claus who arrived with his staff on the 13th of august claus was a very experienced commander learned cautious and deliberate a man who had seen action in the great war and had served as the core artillery commander in 1940. by the 28th of august the forces under his command totaled 8224 men including 7459 of the australian army and 1 365 americans the japanese had no idea how strongly the air base at milne bay was held in accordance with the orders issued on the 31st of july the milan bay offensive would be solely an imperial japanese navy operation so no army forces would take part the japanese navy contained numerous land forces called special naval landing units effectively the equivalent of the united states marine corps each landing unit was essentially an over-strength infantry battalion although japanese infantry battalions were already larger than their australian equivalents and numbered around a thousand men japanese naval ground forces were elite formations highly trained disciplined and motivated this relatively small force essentially two landing units was deemed to be sufficient to take the airfield japanese intelligence noted the presence of 30 allied fighters and had detected the movement of shipping from australia to the area but concluded that given the very short time the airfield had been operational it was unlikely to be strongly held in a critical oversight the only preliminary reconnaissance of the area was conducted by aircraft but this was severely hampered by weather and the airfields fighters and anti-aircraft guns the commander of the 17th japanese army lieutenant general harukichi hayakutake had reservations that naval forces alone would be enough to secure the airfields but with the american offensive at guadalcanal he had no army units to spare the japanese plan involved a pincer attack on milne bay launched from both reball and the newly established base at buna on the north coast of papua two special naval landing parties would be committed to the initial attack both the cure and sasebo detachments of the fifth special naval landing party with a combined strength of 1162 combat marines these forces would be supported by elements of the 19th establishment unit japanese sappers and the eighth signals unit the total numerical strength of the initial landing force with some 1524 officers and men sasebo detachment would be divided with its main strength operating from buna and the remnant deploying with the main force under commander sukiyoka toroshige 553 men of the sasibo detachment would depart the base at buna on seven motorized barges their orders were to sail 300 kilometers down the coast to the area north of milne bay land at taupota about 10 kilometers north of rabi and begin advancing over the mountains to the north of the allied position at gilligilly once these forces were in position overlooking the airfields the main body would enter milne bay and make a landing on its northern shore with a beachhead established the two forces would make a simultaneous attack on the airfield the plan was a complex one but if it could be effectively coordinated the australian defenders would be hit with a devastating flank attack from the mountains after they moved to meet the seabourn landings from the beginning the japanese plan began to unravel the northern force left buna at 5am on the 24th of august and by midday of the 25th the unit had anchored on the shores of good enough island which sits about 30 kilometers off the coast of papua although the japanese men did not know it their movements were being tracked by australian coast watchers these small groups of australian intelligence officers were stationed on remote islands all throughout the southwest pacific and provided key information on japanese shipping movements advised of the japanese activity major general klaus ordered an airstrike and p-40s of number 75 and 76 squadrons departed in the morning at 11 30 the japanese location was detected by a single scout aircraft and one hour later the fighters arrived nine p-40s found the seven barges drawn up in a neater row on an open beach and began lining up for strafing and bombing runs it was to use an american euphemism a turkey shoot according to a diary of an unknown japanese soldier almost instantly all of their vessels were burning wrecks the infantry 4 suffered 6 dead and 8 badly wounded but the formation's radios were all destroyed without transportation and a means of communication the men were marooned on a remote papuan island and faced an uncertain future the main force left for a ball at 7am on the 24th of august the men of the curay and the remainder of the sasibo detachments embarked on two transport ships which were escorted by a force of two light cruisers five destroyers and two submarine chases the operation was supported by an air raid conducted by the 24th air flotilla however the total strength only numbered some 14 bombers the fighter escort was badly disrupted by a morning air raid on the japanese airbase at buna conducted by american p-39s the bombers were unable to find their targets due to bad weather however a force of 15 fighters did make contact with the allied p-40s the japanese pilots claimed some 10 enemy kills for no loss however australian records indicated that no p-40s were lost in the middle bay area that day and rwaf pilots claimed four kills such is the peril of relying upon fighter pilot kill claims allied efforts to strike the convoy were just as ineffective as japanese efforts to strike the airbase on the 24th a force of 9 b-17s would turn back due to bad weather and numerous other attempts to attack the convoy failed on the afternoon of the 25th however it was located in clear skies just north of normandy island a force of rwaf hudson bombers and p40 kittyhawks struck the convoy scoring a direct hit on a submarine chaser which fell out of formation and won near miss on a transport despite the best efforts of the raf cruise the japanese force entered milne bay on the evening of the 25th of august largely intact under the cover of darkness the japanese ship steamed up the bay and began landing operations about 10 kilometers along the northern shore from the main australian concentrations around giligili with the overwhelming japanese naval superiority and the inability of the rwaf to operate at night there was little the australians could do to oppose the landings klaus had disposed his forces in depth although there were almost 10 000 personnel at milton bay a large number of these were sappers and other non-combat units his primary combat formations with the australian 7th and 18th brigades the militiamen of the seventh were deployed in the main defensive positions around the number three airstrip and maintaining the beach defenses at killer gilly then in reserve he kept the veteran 18th brigade as a counterattacking force the men of the aif were much more able to maneuver an attack as the whole formation had been much better trained in large unit maneuver not to mention the years of combat experience in the western desert along the northern shore of the bay towards rabbi and kb mission he had several companies of militiamen deployed to cover the coast one of the most exposed was d company of the 61st battalion who were cut off by the japanese landing around lilihoa it would be this narrow strip of land a flat corridor sandwiched between the blue waters of milne bay to the south and the towering forested peaks of the sterling range to the north on which the battle of milne bay would be fought for klaus the night of the 25th of august was shrouded in confusion he knew the japanese were landing forces somewhere but without searchlights naval guns or aircraft he could not know where in fact they could be landing in multiple places as the sound of battle to the east began to grow stronger reports came that the lead elements of the 61st battalion deployed at kb mission were engaging the japanese this position was about five kilometers forward of the main defensive line around the number three airstrip by midnight the japanese had completed landing operations and the whole force was effectively put ashore without major incident the escort vessels moved up the bay and began shelling what they suspected to be the main australian positions but were forced to withdraw before daybreak throughout the night the lead elements of the japanese and australian formations clashed along the coastal road a section under lieutenant robertson kept contact with the advancing japanese as he fell back from one position to the next he was startled to see a japanese tank driving down the road machine gunning the bushes as drove along as the tank stopped to negotiate a wooden bridge robinson shot the tank commander who was observing the situation and the vehicle careened off the road this would not be the last time in the battle that the australians would have to deal with japanese armor as dawn broke the raf got into action at 9 00 am a flight of p-40s found the primary japanese landing zone along the beaches were stockpiles of fuel and ammunition which had been neatly stacked after the orderly unloading during the night within minutes columns of smoke rose up from the japanese positions as these supply depots burned the activity of the australian fighters was relentless as the landing areas were only some 15 kilometers from the airbase the aircraft could rapidly return to re-arm and depart again although much of the japanese infantry effectively remained under thick jungle cover any movement in the open immediately drew the p40s attention resulting in bombing and strafing runs the allied command of the air was completely uncontested during the day of the 26th and any daylight attack was deemed to be impossible this dictated the pace of the battle one that would primarily be fought at night by day allied air superiority would force the japanese to take to the jungle but at night japanese naval superiority constantly threatened the australians with both naval bombardment and the possibility of a new landing the second night of the battle began with a moonlight attack by japanese elements against the men of the 61st battalion around the kb mission not only were the untried militiamen about to face their first real battle but they lacked any anti-tank weapons there were several anti-tank gun batteries in the main australian positions but these could not be brought forward due to the condition of the roads knowing he had no chance of stopping the japanese armor the commander of bee company captain bix decided to retreat behind the mottu creek hoping this would act as a tank obstacle the night opened with japanese naval gunfire as the cruisers and destroyers had re-entered the bay and began shelling the australian positions the men of the 61st around three companies strong had not slept in nearly 48 hours from around 10 pm the japanese began probing forward and for six straight hours battle raged although supported by artillery and mortifier bix was forced to give ground he was engaged by flamethrowers to his front and had japanese units moving around his flanks even wading through neck deep water casualties had been heavy and at 4am he decided to pull back to the gamma river almost a mile to the rear by the morning of the 27th it was clear to clouds that he had to reinforce the 61st battalion the militiamen had fought well but was steadily being pushed back by the aggressive japanese offensives reports had come in from observations of the landing that the japanese force was some 5 000 strong and with japanese naval superiority at night there was a good chance of a second landing to the south of the airstrip thus klaus was determined to keep the majority of his forces uncommitted until the japanese showed their hand if he lost the airfield around gila gili his position would immediately collapse this uncertainty explains cloud's reluctance to commit his superior forces to battle he wanted to remain in a balanced posture with a healthy reserve for as long as possible however the 61st battalion now facing its third straight night of combat had to be relieved at 10 am bix was informed that the men of the 10th battalion 2 aif would be relieving him and the 61st would be withdrawn from the line the men of the 10th battalion were battle-hardened veterans the famed rats of to brooke these men had been in action for two years and were highly confident their battalion commander dobbs gave orders for his men to pack light discarding most of the heavy weapons including their anti-tank rifles and borrowed a large number of machine guns from other units they had around 20 anti-tank grenades called sticky bombs in australian servers and there was no possibility of moving up anti-tank guns about 500 strong the men of the aif advanced from the main defensive perimeter at the number three airstrip their objective was kb mission where the previous knights fighting had begun their advance was uncontested as the japanese had withdrawn from the positions they had won the night before and by 6 pm the australians were digging in around the mission itself the battalion position was in a crescent shape anchored on one side by the sea at 7 45 the battle began the first sign of the japanese advance was the sound of the approaching tanks though these halted short of the australian positions then eerily a single voice began to chant in japanese singing in a beautifully soft tone the song went on for around a minute when it was then repeated by hundreds of japanese soldiers it was a strangely beautiful beginning to a night that would be filled with the sounds of death and battle at 8 pm the advance began spearheaded by a pair of type 95 hargo light tanks the japanese fell on the lead australian companies the two vehicles were impervious to small arms fire and drove straight over the australian fighting positions the tanks covered each other with spotlights preventing the australians from getting close enough to board them and cleared paths through the defenses for japanese infantry for four hours the vehicles drove up and down the line machine gunning and even ramming foxholes as they went but the australians held their ground lieutenant scott got close enough to one of the vehicles to engage it with an anti-tank grenade but the weapon failed to detonate a similar story occurred on another company's front where sergeant spencer charged the tank however his sticky bombs would not stick as the tanks cleared lanes for the japanese infantry to infiltrate the fighting positions the combat grew viciously close with japanese and australian infantrymen stumbling into each other in the darkness killing one another at point-blank range with submachine gun and bayonet the battalion's historian records the deeds of a private mclennan who after finding his fighting position surrounded left out of his foxhole and killed six japanese men with a bayonet as determined as the defense of the mission was the battle was not going the australian's way they simply could not effectively engage the japanese armor which hampered their ability to suppress the infantry after beating off four attacks it was clear by midnight that the australian position was beginning to disintegrate the left and center companies had large numbers of japanese infantry between their fighting positions and several officers had been killed including the artillery observation section with communication breaking down and ammunition as low as 5 rounds per man the leading companies began a staggered and disorderly withdrawal back to the gamma river but the japanese were right on their heels just after the australians had taken up their new positions a japanese tank came rumbling down the road and battle was rejoined although engaged by an anti-tank rifle the vehicle simply drove over the australian position and the defenders began falling back to the main defensive line at the number three airstrip the japanese were hard behind them but they ran into the freshmen of the 25th battalion who were holding defensive positions forward of the airstrip itself fighting from roadblocks and cleared fields of fire the men of the 25th finally brought the japanese advance to a halt as morning broke the dejected men of the 10th battalion trickled back to the lions in platoons and companies casualties had been heavy in four hours the battalion had lost 43 men killed and 26 wounded and one of the lead companies was now at half strength it had been a hard night for the men of a proud and experienced volunteer battalion thrust back in their first encounter with the japanese and with many of their mates lying dead on the field the japanese armor had been used well and their attack had been pressed with vigor and commitment confident of victory when they departed the main defensive perimeter the defeated men of the aif struggled back throughout the day to a new reserve position behind the airstrip what the australians did not know however is that the knights fighting had left a searing impression on their enemy the japanese were shocked by the savage level of resistance they had encountered the previous engagements with western formations in the south pacific had all ended quickly guam wake island and reball had been taken with relative ease largely because of the high fighting spirit of the japanese forces but the men of the fifth special naval landing unit had never experienced anything like their encounter with the men of the 10th battalion 2aif with hundreds of dead and dying the japanese commanders knew they stood no chance of taking the airfield at a dawn they ordered a withdrawal to the jungle tool weight reinforcement it was at this juncture of the battle that pressure began to be applied from melbourne at general headquarters macarthur was clearly becoming nervous on the 28th ghq said the following two million millenforce hq the commander-in-chief requests that you instruct major general clause to at once clear the north shore of milne bay without delay and that you direct him to submit a report to reach general headquarters by 0-800 of the 29th of the action taken together with his estimate of the enemy strength in the area macarthur had many strengths as a theater commander as is evidenced by the formulation of operation cartwheel his planning ability was second to none however he lacked combat experience at the lower levels of command as did his staff which led to a practical disengagement with the tactical level of warfare prone to anxiety and inflexibility whenever a battle was not immediately going to plan macarthur would often lash out at subordinates and allies questioning their commitment and capability his ignorance of the practical aspect of battle was compounded by his unwillingness to actually investigate the conditions under which the forces he commanded fought this led to micromanagement of battlefield commanders by a theatre commander who had no idea what the tactical situation was indeed under his command australian officers and men had to endure habitual insult and disparagement with the situation at milne bay still unclear macarthur cabled washington this is first test of australian troops under my command the australians claim the commander is excellent and raped half his troops as good the other half from the seventh australian division they rate excellent the strength of japanese forces that have been landed not known but am convinced it is very much less than that of australian combat troops at milne bay with good troops under first class leadership would view the situation confidently unless enemy reinforcements are landed but as i have previously reported i am not yet convinced of the efficiency of the australian units and do not attempt to forecast results japanese high command was also becoming anxious the commander of the 8th fleet vice admiral mikawa had expected the japanese forces to break through to the airfield on the night they had landed however after realizing that they had been repulsed in two consecutive battles over two consecutive nights mikawa began to grasp the seriousness of the situation clearly if reinforcements were not immediately dispatched the situation at rabi would only deteriorate at 8 47 pm on the 27th of august makawa ordered the qra 3rd special naval landing party and elements of the yokohama fifth special naval landing party a force of some 767 men to immediately depart from milne bay the marines boarded the japanese destroyers arashi yayoi and murakumo in addition to a couple of patrol boats and the convoy began steaming rapidly south throughout the 28th and 29th of august both sides remained inactive taking stock of their positions and licking their wounds the australian position was now anchored on the number three airstrip this long straight piece of open ground formed a formidable defensive barrier the airstrip which had never been in use ran in an almost east-west line and terminated near the ocean it was some 100 meters plus wide and over a kilometer in length compared to the dark thick jungle it was an area much more like the western desert a perfect killing field in the making this area was strongly held by the 7th brigade near the ocean on the australian right the strip was held by the 25th battalion to their rear a competent company of maintenance personnel and american sappers gave this position substantial depth the central section of the strip was held by the 61st battalion and at the far left was the majority of the 10th battalion both of whom had enjoyed a couple of days in reserve to recuperate all along the airstrip the australians entrenched their vickers guns in pre-sighted firing positions forged in the heat of battle of the western front one of the many lessons the australian army had learned during the great war was how to emplace its medium machine guns in order to maximise their lethality supported by emplaced mortars that were also pre-sighted the brigade's vickers guns covered the airstrip in interlocking fields of fire forming a great tangled web of crossfire steaming quickly from reball the japanese convoy entered milne bay on the evening of the 29th of august landing of their embarked units again went smoothly although these were dispersed over two beachheads they found the initial force in good spirits but badly depleted with combat strength at around 50 percent including walking wounded as some of the force had been landed quite far up the bay there was no chance of a large-scale assault on the airstrip on the 29th so the whole japanese force spent the day of the 30th under the cover of the jungle around rabi despite their frightful losses spirits were still high amongst the japanese men the last entry of an unnamed diary found at milne bay reads 29 august waited in the jungle at milne bay the concerted attack has been ordered all of us are in good spirits nothing but serving the emperor we make our sortie all hopeful of success during the day of the 30th the 61st battalion dispatched several patrols to make contact with the japanese captain bix led a detachment of five men down the road towards kb mission which had seen several nights fighting not far down the road they found the two tanks that had caused the australians so much trouble bogged on the side of the road and abandoned as bix advanced he found signs of a disorderly japanese retreat at the gamma river they came across the remnants of a japanese hospital as bix approached he found a row of dead men all with dressed wounds who had been laid beside each other and shot in the heart clearly they were executing their own wounded by midday he had reached as far as the caping mission where the 10th battalion had been overrun the battlefield was strewn with australian and japanese bodies amongst them were some australian prisoners who had clearly been massacred found with their hands tired faces unrecognizable arms broken by gunshots and bayonet wounds to the chest after engaging one or two japanese stragglers bicks returned to the australian positions around the airstrip at dusk the japanese attack resumed under the newly arrived commander yano the combined japanese forces advanced on the airstrip by 3 am on the 31st of august they had reached their attack positions finally for the first time in the battle they had reached the main australian defensive position as they began forming up on the far side of the airstrip they ran into an australian observation post alerting the defenses the first attack was made on the australian right wing near the sea an area which was held by the 25th battalion as artillery fell amongst the japanese formations they began to cheer chant and yell loudly but did not advance finally after several minutes of this strange pantomime they attacked charging in large groups across the open ground as was so often the case in the second world war the bravery of the japanese soldier which was on display at milne bay was if not unequaled then certainly unsurpassed hundreds of screaming japanese men ran headlong into the teeth of the australian defenses however machine guns do not feel fear as was also often the case during this conflict if not used wisely japanese bravery would simply produce nothing more than a slaughter like a great wave breaking against a rocky shore the japanese assault melted in the face of withering machine gun fire with the vicar's guns arranged in pairs every inch of the airstrip was covered in a crossfire as they charged mortars fell amongst the advancing infantry who moved in tight groups only increasing their vulnerability three times that morning the australian defenses could hear the great cheers and battle cry of the japanese infantry like the sound of some ancient battlefield lost to history and three times the australians mowed them down as they charged into the pre-sighted killing field the results were not difficult to predict hundreds of dead and dying japanese men lay strewn along the open ground to the front of the australian machine gun positions after the third assault yano finally realising that bravery alone was not going to overcome this position alone decided to try and move around the far left flank of the australian defenses to the west of the airfield however the 61st battalion had already covered this area from the high ground called stevens ridge the japanese were caught in the open ground and again were met with a withering weight of fire from the company's bren and vickers guns along with hundreds of his men commander hiyashi was killed in the attack on the airstrip and as dawn approached the prospect of roaming rwaf p40s joining the battle compelled the japanese forces to retreat commander yano reported the situation at 8 am we attacked as planned but came under heavy crossfire from well dug in positions when we drew near the enemy sustaining heavy casualties though the reserve units were summoned they did not arrive before dawn making the assault problematic force withdrew about 1 000 metres to the rear to await reinforcements with the bloody defeat of the japanese assault on the number three airstrip klaus began to deploy his reserve forces apart from the 2nd slash 10th battalion wooten's veteran 14th brigade had so far not been committed to battle wooten was ordered to attack along the north shore with the objective of retaking the kb mission at 9 30 am on the 31st his lead elements the 12th battalion 2 aif began moving through the australian positions at the airstrip as soon as the lead company crossed the open ground they made contact with small rearguard forces such as snipers and minor ambush parties of three to four men the japanese frequently impersonated the dead only to open fire on the australians once they had passed by this quickly led to an australian habit of shooting dead bodies no matter their apparent wounds after a slow and careful advance the 12th battalion was back at kb mission the scene of two nights of vicious fighting farther back at the gamma river elements of the ninth cmf battalion were moving up in support when 300 japanese charged out of the hills for two hours the two sides fought in close combat however the fresh australians soon gained the upper hand and the japanese retreated leaving around 90 dead and wounded as this japanese force withdrew to the west it was engaged by the elements of the 12th battalion aif and was largely destroyed over the next two days lead elements of the 12th and 9th battalions advanced along the north shore by the morning of the 3rd of september the australians had made contact with the main japanese defensive position about a kilometer west of the mission in a vicious battle two platoons assaulted the japanese defensive line which were anchored on a pair of machine guns dominating either side of the coastal track within five minutes of the 60 men who made the assault 34 were casualties the remnant fought a hand-to-hand fight with the japanese defenders who were eventually outflanked by a reserve company as night fell japanese destroyers entered the bay again and began shelling the area japanese intelligence had reports that an allied cruiser had entered the bay however this was incorrect all throughout the battle the japanese naval bombardment had been completely ineffective as it had not inflicted a single allied casualty to this time however the japanese warships were able to make contact with the landing force at 10 pm on the 4th of september the following message was received we have reached the worst possible situation we will together calmly defend our position till the last death we pray for absolute victory for the empire and for long lasting fortune in battle for you all that day an australian patrol had advanced two miles beyond the last known japanese defensive position finding nothing but supply dumps it was clear to both sides that the japanese situation had become critical as the australians kept attacking the number of effective fighting men available to yanno was dwindling he estimated that only 200 ncos and men were battle-worthy at this time still clinging on to hope of victory admiral mikawa was considering deploying two army battalions to the battle however these could not be available until the 12th of september when news of the situation as described on the fourth was relayed to eighth fleet command these hopes were immediately shattered as it was abundantly clear to everyone that the battle was lost even if the two additional battalions could be committed on the fourth the situation may not be reversible and by the 12th of september it was very likely that yano's force would have been utterly destroyed on the morning of the 5th of september the order was given that all japanese forces committed to the millen bay operation would be withdrawn that evening and the light cruiser tenryu and three patrol boats departed reball throughout the day of the fifth australian lead elements continued to push the japanese back finally reaching wagawaga three miles beyond kb mission the australians engaged yet another defensive regard unit in another close-range vicious battle the lead australian platoon engaged a force estimated to be around 80 men losing four killed and 14 men wounded the tenacity of japanese defence in these episodes was a sign of what lay ahead for the australian army during the offences of 1942 and early 1943 every inch gained in places like buna and gona would be paid for in blood that evening clouds received intelligence from land forces headquarters that the japanese may land reinforcements in the area however the japanese ships bound for the millen bay area were empty tenryu and the patrol boats arrived off the major japanese positions after nightfall unmolested by allied aircraft 1318 men were evacuated and by the morning of the six the japanese forces in milton bay were gone in the fields and jungle around rabi and gilly gilly lay 625 dead japanese men according to japanese sources of the 1300 men that were evacuated none were capable of further combat due to wounds sickness or battle fatigue evidence of the bitter hardships these men had been through on the six the lead elements of the 12th battalion advanced into what had been the primary japanese base area with supplies and paraphernalia scattered all over the shoreline it was clear to everyone that the japanese had gone the battle of milne bay had been won milne bay was a catastrophic defeat for the japanese they were lucky to evacuate anyone at all the lack of reconnaissance and intelligence was breathtakingly negligent as the forces deployed were wholly inadequate even when reinforced with a third landing party klaus defeated the japanese forces with only half of the units available to him klaus generalship during the campaign had been cautious but sound and in the end the japanese forces were defeated without ever compromising the australian's ability to respond to new threats despite the urgings from macarthur to commit all of his forces to the attack immediately klaus never allowed himself to become unbalanced the fact that such a decisive victory was achieved with his reserve forces fully intact is evidence of cloud's quality as a battlefield commander in fact the primary reason the japanese forces achieved as much as they did on the 27th was a combination of the surprise employment of japanese armor and the lack of an effective man-portable anti-tank weapon in the australian infantry battalions certainly this was a substantial australian weakness however had the roads allowed the movement of anti-tank guns the japanese may have been stopped at the kb mission japan's early victories over allied units had made them dangerously overconfident as japanese command clearly believed that the superiority of the japanese fighting spirit impressive though it was would be enough to overcome larger allied formations this led to a dangerous underestimation of the fighting quality of both australian and american forces and a concurrent overestimation of the japanese military's ability to deal with the australians at milne bay and the americans at guadalcanal japanese hubris was indeed a critical factor in the battle at no point in the pacific war to this time had the japanese been defeated so clearly and decisively with the operational objective not even close to being met as the japanese withdrew from milan bay it was clear that the rest of 1942 would be a story of two grueling land campaigns guadalcanal and kokoda it was in these two operations where the japanese offensive in the south pacific would be brought to an end and the tide of the war would irrevocably shift towards the allies

Channel: hypohystericalhistory

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Id: pToxEa30KdU

Length: 45min 19sec (2719 seconds)

Published: Mon May 31 2021

Reddit Comments

[u/parpooa45]

Grew up in PNG in the 1950s. Most interested in WW2 in the SWPA. Enjoyed your historical footage but a bit concerned that the narrator had difficulty with pronunciation of place names. Rabaul is Rabal, not Rabawl, Salamaua is Salamowa not Salamooa. Please take this as constructive criticism in the interests of historical accuracy.